



REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF THE
WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE
WAR WITH SPAIN.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

Gen. GRENVILLE M. DODGE, Iowa, *President*.
Col. JAMES A. SEXTON, Illinois.
Col. CHARLES DENBY, Indiana.
Capt. EVAN P. HOWELL, Georgia.
EX-Governor URBAN A. WOODBURY, Vermont.
Brig. Gen. JOHN M. WILSON, Chief of Engineers,
U. S. A.

Gen. JAMES A. BEAVER, Pennsylvania.
Maj. Gen. ALEXANDER MCD. MCCOOK, U. S. A.
Dr. PHINEAS S. CONNER, Ohio.
RICHARD WEIGHTMAN, *Secretary*.
Lieut. Col. F. B. JONES, Chief Quartermaster of
Volunteers, *Disbursing Officer*.
Maj. STEPHEN C. MILLS, *Recorder*.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

VOL. 6.
TESTIMONY.

WASHINGTON:

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1899.

E 725
3661

G. L. F.
John C. Sheffield
Feb. 18, 1937

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TESTIMONY.

NEW YORK, *November 25, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. CYRUS EDSON.

Dr. CYRUS EDSON, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give your name, profession, and present residence?

A. Cyrus Edson; physician; 56 West Fiftieth street, New York City.

Q. And length of time you have been in practice?

A. About eighteen years.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us, in your own way, whether or not, in the first place, you had occasion to visit any of the camps during the past summer; and if so, in what condition you found them, what particular conditions there attracted your attention, and what reports you have had occasion to make upon them?

A. I visited Camp Thomas at Chickamauga just in an incidental sort of way shortly after the camp was established. I was down in the South on business. I own an interest in some property in Alabama, and was visiting it, and ran over to see the camp, but I want to answer your question as to what camps I visited. I visited that, but I didn't examine it closely and merely looked at it from an interested standpoint for a few hours. On August 12 I visited Camp Wikoff at the request of the New York World, and I examined the site of the camp at the time the troops from Tampa had arrived, or some of them, and none of the troops, I was informed, from Santiago had yet arrived there. I met Maj. Ira Brown, who was very busily engaged in erecting the general hospital. He had already constructed six hospital tents and had a few sick soldiers in them at the time. My attention was particularly directed to the water supply. To me the camp seemed to be very excellent—the site of Montauk Point to me seemed to be an excellent site, at that time, except in regard to the water supply. It seemed poor and inadequate. At the time the water was being brought there in large watering carts from a distance, and a well was being dug not a great ways from the sheet of water known as Fort Pond, and about—well, about three or four hundred feet from the sheet of water. On the east bank of the pond a stratum of water had been reached at about 32 or 33 feet depth, and water was entering the hole of the well from depths less than that, trickling down the sides. The men in charge of the work told me they had struck a splendid find of water at about 33 or 34 feet. I have had very wide experience in examining wells. I have been commissioner of health for the State and the city, and I have held every position that a physician can hold in the health department, commencing at the lowest, and also the highest, and I do not think, from the experience I have had, that the well was either a safe well or that it would furnish an adequate supply. The reason I did not consider it safe was that the water at the time of my visit, while it was good and sweet, yet the condition of the strata through which the water passed in reaching the water-bearing strata—the character of that strata—was such that it could not furnish anything but a poor supply of water.

My second visit was August 12, when I again met Dr. Brown, who impressed me very favorably, and he seemed to be very busily engaged in doing all a man could do with the almost superhuman work he had to accomplish. At that time the well was in active operation. The pump, however, was not going. I noticed that apparently the people who had dug the well had but little faith in its being a permanent supply, for a line of pipe had been run to Fort Pond, and a force pump (steam pump) connected with it, and the water from the pond, at the time of my visit, was being pumped into the large tank which supplied the camp with water—the Fort Pond water. I had taken a small vial of it home for the purpose of estimating the amount of salt in it, and I found that it contained over 10 grains of sodium chloride. In regard to the hospital tents, there were 50 of them erected. I counted them, and they were filled by sick soldiers, as far as I could judge by the circumstances and conditions. The people who were in charge, the surgeons and nurses, seemed to be doing everything in their power to make their conditions as comfortable as possible; but the tents were very overcrowded. I counted the men—that is, the men in different tents. The tents were intended to hold, so I was informed—that under the Army Regulations they should hold 30 men to each tent. In several tents there were 70, and in quite a number of others there were 40 to 50. I think in only one or two instances did I see 30 and in no case under 30. Dr. Brown was discharging at that time 75 men. I won't be certain of that, however, but my impression is that, and I heard him myself give very positive instructions to the surgeons who had charge of the men. They were to go over the Long Island Railroad on a train that left close to noon. I heard him give very particular instructions to not send any man who was too ill to be transported. He repeated that at least four or five times in my presence, and when the men went out I looked them over casually, and I didn't see that any were not fit to go. I visited the detention camp with Colonel Forwood, and incidentally looked at his supplies, and it seemed to me that there was more than enough at that time for every purpose the supplies could be needed. The only thing that I would criticise was that I did not think it was possible to get a safe supply of water every day after the camp had been occupied for any length of time. Of course, when the well was first dug the water was very fair there.

Q. Was that the only time you had occasion to visit Montauk?

A. Yes, sir; those two visits. The 30th of August was the last time I was there.

Q. Do you remember, Doctor, whether the dip of the strata was such as to naturally carry the seepage into the well or away from it?

A. I don't think it would naturally carry it into the well, but I do not think it would prevent some of it from reaching the well.

Q. Think you that the water from the pond you mention, Fort Pond—

A. (Interrupting.) I can give my reasons for that last answer. The general hospital was situated above the bottom of the well, at a distance from it, scarcely a safe distance, and at no point between the general hospital and the well was there any impervious matter. There was a layer of clay which was intermixed with sand and gravel between the well and the surface of the ground, and that layer evidently underlaid the whole camp. It was not an impervious layer to prevent the seepage from entering; but at another point between the drainage from the hospital would seep into the ground naturally through the latrines, and there was nothing that would protect the well, that would prevent it from entering the well.

Q. Did its strata dip toward the well or from the well?

A. They dipped slightly from the well.

Q. Any very decided dip?

A. Not in my judgment.

Q. Have you had occasion to know as to the opinion that has been entertained

as to the character of that water of the people who had occasion to visit Montauk and stay there summer after summer?

A. I have no doubt that the water is a most excellent supply—that is, I may explain that in this way. We had here on Manhattan Island, before it became a great city, lots of good springs, but after it became a city we were apt to have them contaminated.

Q. I understood you to say you didn't notice anything particularly out of the way in the hospital?

A. Only there seemed to be a good deal of confusion, which apparently was unavoidable. I noticed a great many visitors there—quite a number of people who were allowed to go around, but who, I think, were only in the way.

Q. At the time of your visit on the 12th, was the officer in charge putting up tents or not, or did he have tents to put up or not?

A. I don't know. I think that he expected to get rid of a number of cases, and then there would be more room.

Q. You spoke of the tents containing 40 to 70 patients. You mean the aggregation, the tents which constituted a ward, I suppose—tents put in end to end.

A. Three or five.

Q. Three or five?

A. That I don't remember. I remember that the Army Regulations—Dr. Brown told me they should hold not over 30.

Q. That would be six beds to a tent and five tents?

A. Yes, sir; five tents.

Q. And at this time they were very much overcrowded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not that overcrowding continued?

A. I don't know anything of the condition of my own knowledge after August 30.

Q. What was the general impression you and others had?

A. That the congestion would be relieved.

Q. That it would be relieved?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By removal and changes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Aside, then, as we understand it, aside from your views on the water question, you were rather favorably inclined to the camp site?

A. On August 12 I would have said and did say that with the exception of the water question it was an ideal site; but afterwards it appeared to me that the high winds there and the dust were not very good. The road was cut to pieces by these heavy trucks and mule teams, and on August 13 the air was full of dust, and it was extremely unpleasant, I should think extremely irritating, to one with bronchial troubles, and I noticed that they prevailed.

Q. Did you yourself, or any of your assistants, or anyone whose qualifications you can vouch for, examine this water afterwards and find it in any way contaminated?

A. No, sir; I didn't judge it was contaminated, but rather that it would be.

Q. The question I asked was whether at any subsequent time of the camp, of your own knowledge, you ascertained that the water was contaminated?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was any other supply than this used during the time that the troops were kept at Montauk?

A. Other than the Fort Pond and the well referred to?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Some other was brought from a distance. I couldn't ascertain where it came from. I looked at it in the watering carts and it seemed to me to be a very excellent quality.

Q. Judging from what you say, could an occupation of, say, sixty days probably result in a contamination of the water?

A. I believe it would; yes, sir. It would be very dangerous. One can not answer a question like that exactly.

Q. Of course. Would the occupation for a period of thirty days, think you, be likely to make trouble?

A. I scarcely think that thirty days would do it.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that typhoid fever did not prevail in the camp except as it was brought in?

A. I believe that was the fact.

Q. So that up to the time of the abandonment of the camp there was very little of it left, if any?

A. Yes, sir. However, that point I take against the water supply is borne out by this: At the time I was there the supply from Fort Pond, which contained a large amount of sodium chloride, was used for drinking, and of course water from that pond would be extremely irritating to people suffering from diarrheal disease.

Q. Do you know whether or not orders were given that that supply should not be used?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you at either of the times you visited there observe anything else to which you would like to call our attention with reference to the camp or its medical condition?

A. I saw nothing to criticise except the removal of the dead bodies, which I think, perhaps, in the hurry is a thing that occurred without people knowing what the conditions were. I noticed the odor from three or four boxes, which evidently contained bodies, was very intense around the depot.

Q. You don't know how long it had been since these individuals died?

A. No, sir; I noticed some leakage from one of the coffins.

Q. Isn't it a fact that decomposition sets in very early in those cases?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Particularly of those who were weakened by the conditions preceding?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You spoke of one detachment going away under orders that men should not be sent who were not able to travel; do you know of men being sent away who were evidently not in a condition to travel?

A. Not of my own knowledge.

Q. We have had considerable testimony, which is without doubt correct, that many were sent away who were not in condition to travel.

A. I can understand that in the rush and hurry and confusion a great many things happened that were almost unavoidable.

Q. Do you know whether or not there has been any typhoid developed along the line of the Long Island Railroad since the camp was instituted?

A. I do not.

Q. Suggesting that the typhoid excreta was dropped by the men along the line, would it not tend to result in typhoid in the villages and towns?

A. Possibly.

Q. Up to this time you have not heard of any particular increase of typhoid?

A. No, sir; I have not.

NEW YORK, November 25, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. ALBERT E. GALLANT.

Dr. ALBERT E. GALLANT, upon request, appeared before the commission.

General WILSON. Are you willing to be sworn?

Dr. GALLANT. I will affirm.

General WILSON. Do you hereby on your honor affirm that the testimony you shall give before this commission shall be the truth the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Dr. GALLANT. I do.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us your name, your profession, the length of time you have been practicing, and your residence?

A. Albert E. Gallant: I was graduated in 1890, at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in this city, and my address is 60 West Fifty-sixth street.

Q. Did you have occasion, Doctor, at any time during the summer to visit any of the camps occupied by troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you tell us, please, what you have observed during the time that you have been connected with this hospital or relief home with reference to the condition of the troops that were put under your care. What we want to determine more particularly is how large a proportion of those you saw were unfit for travel, how long, in your judgment, they had been unfit for travel, and what were the special conditions, if you were able to ascertain them, why they were sent from the hospital or hospitals?

A. Our work in Fifteenth street has been that of taking care of the convalescents. We have taken the men from the Long Island Railroad depot, from the hospitals in the city here, and sent them to country places, country hospitals or places we have had fitted up for that purpose. As I recall it, we have sent about 500 men out of between 2,200 and 2,300 men that have come to the house on Fifteenth street. That gives you some idea of the proportion of men unfit to travel.

Q. Do you know how large a proportion of these men were probably unfit to travel when they started from Montauk or Tampa, or wherever they came from: I don't know where they came from?

A. That would make about 20 per cent, and there were more that were put on the trains and sent home that were not fit to travel.

Q. Do you know in every instance that they were sent away from the hospital whether it was at the request of friends, of officials, of kindly disposed persons, or whether it was at the will and pleasure of the officers of the hospital?

A. No, sir; I don't know. I only know that the first lot we had, the first lot we had that came from Montauk, were brought in by Mrs. Walworth, who is the director-general of the War Relief Association.

Q. She had found them on the road or brought them in from Montauk?

A. Some of them, I understand, she went into the tent and took them out without license.

Q. Is it strange, under the circumstances, that some of them should have been unfit for travel?

A. She said she was going to put them in the country, where they could get the care they needed.

Q. But, as a medical man, however kindly disposed such a person may be, who is the best judge as to whether a man is able to leave or not?

A. I think there were three out of fifteen that had the doctor's permission to go.

Q. You don't know whether that permission was by entreaty or how it was given?

A. I don't know anything about it.

By General WILSON:

Q. Before you leave, there is one final question we try to ask experts. You have seen by the papers the duty that has been assigned this commission by the President of the United States. Is there anything you can say to us that will help us to

frame the report to be sent to the President: is there anything you can tell us that would help us, or anything that you would like to say?

A. From my standpoint, and from the information I received, I understand the Government is going to look after all its men as they come in.

Q. What we are after is whether there have been grave mistakes made, what maladministration, if any, has been found, and what grave errors there have been, which we can seek the source of and inform the President of the United States, so that proper action can be taken, not only in these cases, but hereafter?

A. That is the point I was going to bring out. Some two or three weeks ago, in the company with Major Appel, I went to Colonel Brown's, on Governors Island, and suggested that the Government take care of these men that we have been taking care of as they come in from Porto Rico, and as I understand it the order has been issued from Washington to do so, and that is one reason we have given up the work we have been engaged in.

NEW YORK, November 25, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JOHN W. SUMMERHAYES.

Maj. JOHN W. SUMMERHAYES, upon request, appeared before the commission, and having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Major, will you kindly give your name, rank, length of time in service, and the duties in which you were engaged in the war with Spain?

A. John W. Summerhayes, major and quartermaster, United States of America, been in service since 1861, with two years out.

Q. What is the duty on which you have been engaged since the war with Spain?

A. I have been fitting out transports; inspecting and fitting out transports for Colonel Kimball.

Q. When did you commence that duty?

A. In the first part of May.

Q. And since then you have inspected and fitted out how many transports?

A. I could not tell you exactly without referring to my papers [referring to papers]: this is the list of vessels, the cost of chartering, the length of time in service, and the number of men carried, and horses on each ship.

(Paper filed and marked "J. W. S., Exhibit A, November 25, 1898.")

Q. Major, will you be good enough to state exactly what you did from the time one of these transports—we will take, for instance, the *Concho*—from the time that vessel was turned over to you as ready for inspection until you started her on her trip—will you state what you actually did in connection with her: that is, this commission would like to know as if it followed you directly to see what you did in the way of inspecting and supplying that vessel.

A. The first thing I did was to examine the vessel and see whether she was seaworthy, after which—

Captain HOWELL (interrupting). How did you do that, Colonel?

A. I went through the vessel and examined her and I had the engineers give me a statement as to the condition of her boilers and engines and also the amount of water she could carry, the amount of coal she could carry in her bunkers, and if she had stowing capacity, if she could put on extra coal. I knew there was no coal below and I put on 800 or 1,000 tons extra, using that as a ballast. Then I measured the vessel, and the first vessel that went out, we had so short a time to fit them out, we could not put in the standee bunks, such as the *Empress* had; we had not the canvas, in the first place, and in the second place we had not the

skilled workmen. They were built out of wood. They were put in clusters of 12, three berths high and a long space between them of about 2 feet between each cluster on the sides and ends.

Q. Where were those bunks placed on the vessels?

A. Between decks and in the lower decks.

Q. That is, in the hold?

A. Yes, sir. We allowed an average space of cubic air, space between decks 125 cubic feet, and 125 cubic feet for the lower berth.

Q. Having put the bunks in, what was the next step?

A. I had four or five days to fix up the ship, working night and day; after that, toilets were put in. Wherever we could find the space for cooking—the only chance the men had to cook on these ships was during night—they all went with travel ration, and the only cooking absolutely necessary was cooking coffee, and they did that at night. Those were the first transports.

Q. Major, you stated that you asked the steam engineer about the engines and boilers. Were those men that you had selected for those positions yourself, or turned over to you for employment by the United States when the transport was chartered?

A. When the transports were chartered they only furnished their crews and engineers, and they were responsible for the cleaning or keeping the ships clean. They were occupied by the troops. On these ships there are not many seamen. The supposition is that the troops would keep them clean.

Q. I understand, then, that your inspection of the machinery consisted in asking the steam engineers whether it was all right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And your inspection to determine whether the vessel was seaworthy as to her hull—to what extent was that done or how?

A. These ships belonged to the regular lines, and I would have to inquire when they were docked last and the condition of their bottoms, and also whether they had all of their deck paraphernalia: they had to procure it before the ship left port, such as the towlines, anchors, chains, bunks, hose, and also all her boats were properly supplied with the necessary paraphernalia, which consists of a boat's water breakers, etc.; they were not all of them entirely supplied with the number of life belts perhaps—perhaps they were 100 short of them, but they could not be procured at that time.

Q. In the preparation of the bunks for the men, was there anything put there other than the ordinary wood bunks—was there any bed sacks or anything of that kind?

A. No, sir; none at all.

Q. We now understand—the boat having been turned over to you and chartered, you having accepted it, you erected the bunks and made your arrangements for supplying the men with coffee?

A. No, sir.

Q. That is, you intimated how it could be done?

A. I don't furnish any rations.

Q. I mean you stated how it could be done; that is to say, the men had no opportunity to do anything except at night?

A. They had their travel rations.

Q. How did you determine to your own satisfaction the number of troops that would be transported on these transports?

A. I got the cubic air space of the holds and measured the bunks, how many I could put in, also what other conveniences could be put in to make the men comfortable.

Q. After the men were on the transport, did you have anything to do with inspecting them?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether there was ever sent on any of these transports more men than you said could be carried?

A. Well, that I could not say.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the hospital ship *Relief*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long was she in possession of your department before the arrangements for fitting her up commenced?

A. Well, I forget; it was a very short time.

Q. It has been stated, and stated to me to-day by one of the commission—who would have examined you himself if he had been here, and he asked me to take his place—that the vessel was in the hands of the Quartermaster three weeks before commencing to fit her out?

A. I think that is a mistake.

Q. Do you know what delay, if any, there was?

A. Delay—there had to be to estimate the probable cost of fitting out the ship and there was considerable correspondence between Washington and the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. I don't see her name here? [Referring to paper.]

A. She was fitted out by the Navy Department. That is the reason she isn't there.

Q. When you received her you turned her over to the Navy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What arrangement did you make, if any, for the water supply of those vessels?

A. I bought a lot of casks, a lot of new casks and a lot of secondhand casks, and filled them with water and put them on the ships.

Q. Was fresh water put in your vessel before you allowed her to go to sea?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how much, in comparison with the probable number of troops, how many days' supply, we will say, for the probable number of troops which you thought could be carried on those vessels?

A. I put on those ships 10 gallons to a man for ten days, extra water, besides what she carried herself in the tank.

Q. That is a gallon a day?

A. A gallon a day for each man. If there was room for extra casks I would put them in, because it was reported to us that the water was not there.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. When you state you put that in extra, was that above the usual allowance?

A. Yes, sir; it was put in with the idea that when she got down on that coast she would not have to get water from shore.

Q. For ten days, that was?

A. Yes, sir; outside of the capacity of the ship.

By General WILSON:

Q. Major, having now gone as far as you have, the boat has been inspected, the bunks repaired, arrangements made for the men to cook the coffee at night, having their travel ration already with them, putting the water supply in: what was the next step in reference to the transport?

A. I don't quite understand you.

Q. I will explain myself more clearly—

A. The ship was entirely fitted, that was all I had to do with the ship.

Q. I stated that you had the ship in your possession, and had inspected her as to whether she was sea worthy; you had asked the opinion of the engineers

whether her boilers were ready, you had put up the bunks in between decks and in the hold, and you had made arrangements for the men to cook coffee at night; you put in the water supply, one gallon a day for ten days for every man on board. Was your work done then?

A. I think it was; yes, sir. There probably was some other fitting made I forgot to mention. This is for the first transport. These transports were refitted again afterwards.

Q. The reason I continued the question was, I was under the impression, from what I heard, that probably there were some other supplies; but you had nothing to do with her supplies; that is not in your department?

A. Yes, sir. When these transports first went down we did not furnish anything. The owners of the transports furnished the provisions and they boarded the officers for \$1.50 a day, and if men wanted anything they had to pay 50 cents per day.

By General DODGE:

Q. The crew?

A. For the soldiers; they were supposed to be furnished with rations, and the ship was to furnish them nothing to eat.

By General WILSON:

Q. Did that pertain to the first ones when you sent these vessels—to all these vessels on this list?

A. I don't think all of them—but these were the first transports we sent out I had reference to.

Q. When these first transports were sent out, your opinion, from your long experience in the service, what was your opinion as to their condition for the transportation of troops?

A. I don't think they were good transports.

Q. Did you put them in as good condition as it would have been possible for your department to have done it, considering the character of the transports?

A. Yes, sir; they were too small.

Q. Now, will you be good enough to state what you did on the second lot?

A. We found that in using these wooden bunks the men were not comfortable and they did not take their blankets, etc., so we changed that. We took these down and put up studs, and on these we hung hammocks. The first hammocks we put in according to the Navy measurements, 18 inches to the man, and they were afterward changed to 21 inches. That is the space allowed for the hammocks and the space between the studs in length was 12 feet. These studs were put up 21 inches from center to center.

Q. How wide were the hammocks proper?

A. I think they were about 22 inches.

Q. If they were 22 inches wide and you allowed 21 inches—

A. They nearly touched each other. When a man got in the hammock, the hammock sagged and gave them space. Having them too far apart, they would roll out.

Q. Were these hammocks made of the ordinary sailcloth?

A. Just a plain piece of cloth—canvas. In the daytime they were supposed to be taken down and rolled up, giving a clear hold for the whole of the ship.

Q. You investigated and made arrangements for the lavatories for the men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, will you please go on with the second. You got as far as placing the hammocks in place of bunks.

A. And then we put in some extensive lavatories and put in tubs for the men to wash their clothes in. We put in some tubs there. At the last, there were

several transports that we put fans in for forced draft. I put in some distilling machines for fresh water. I put in also kettles to cook soup and coffee in. There was not room in the ship to put them on.

Q. In cleansing these vessels after they were returned, what steps were taken in that way after they returned from their first trip; of course they must have been more or less out of order?

A. When they came back, they were fumigated and these hammocks thrown overboard, and mattresses and blankets—the Health Department destroyed them, which occasioned me to go to work and refit them; but the ships, all of them, came back in a dirty condition, owing to the men not having kept them clean. Understand, the crews of the ships could not clean them, they were so few.

Q. What were the accommodations for the officers?

A. They had first-cabin accommodations.

Q. After the second time, after having cleaned up these vessels and refitted them, as you state, made all these arrangements, what was your opinion then about the condition of these vessels?

A. You are still speaking of the charter transports?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. There were only one or two of these transports I considered fit for troop ships. They were all too small. It was impossible in hot weather to make the holds comfortable for the men with forced draft.

Q. Do you know by whom they were selected for this purpose?

A. I don't, really; they were the only vessels in this market at that time that could be gotten, and we had a very hard time getting them, particularly the Clyde Line; they could not take them off their trade.

Q. What steps did your department take in its initiation in procuring them; that is, have you anything to do with that?

A. I had nothing to do with that. I simply got my orders to inspect the ships.

Q. You stated you had such a hard time getting them?

A. I went around first to see if I could find ships and report to Washington. Some firms had their trade broken with Cuba and their trade broken up, but other lines could not spare their ships.

Q. And the trouble arose, as I understand you, not that the United States was not ready to get them, but the owners would not let them go?

A. That's right.

Q. And do I understand—I don't want to put a leading question in this way. Do I understand that you accepted the best offer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How were the prices fixed? You don't know that?

A. I had nothing to do with that.

By General DODGE:

Q. When you fitted these ships up, did the owners of these ships report to you their capacity for carrying passengers?

A. No, sir; I never asked them, sir, except as to the cabin passengers.

Q. But not as a troopship?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you reported this number of passengers that these ships were competent to carry where did you report that to, the Quartermaster?

A. Colonel Kimball, his assistant.

Q. (Referring to paper.) We have a statement here. Most of these ships, I see, were first used at Tampa to go to Cuba in the Shafter expedition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The number of passengers that was reported to them as these ships being

able to carry, when they arrived at Tampa they found it was impossible to put that number aboard then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And for that reason they were unable to take as many men as expected?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know why they could not carry the number of men they reported to them?

A. When these vessels got there they were down in a very hot climate, and you could not get a man to stay below two hours, and the whole of these troops were on deck night and day, and of course that crowded the ship's decks. They slept on deck and in the boats, in fact, they slept on the awnings, but below it was too hot to sleep. Later on, with the other transports, we put in forced draft and and they had no trouble.

Q. What is the reason you did not put in forced draft on the first transports; didn't have the time?

A. General, I was getting an order. Understand, these ships had to go at once. I would have anywhere from three to five days to take a ship and fit her up to go to sea. We put 100 men on, working night and day. It was a rush order.

Q. Now, who selected the captains and crews?

A. The owners. They had them and selected them.

Q. There has been a great deal of complaint about the most of these captains and crews on all these ships—do you know anything in relation to that—that they were insubordinate and it was almost impossible to do anything with them? A great deal of testimony is when they lay off Cuba it was almost impossible to get them to land and to unload them, and they would lay 5 to 15 miles off.

A. I never heard about that. If you would look at the proceedings of the board—we had to inspect these ships on account of damages caused by their lying so close together—you would make up your mind they did not lay off 10 miles. It was a marine risk, and the Government did not have to pay for it. If they would they would have had a very large bill to pay.

Q. Then they were taking their own marine risk?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The United States was not responsible?

A. No, sir. They took them into Siboney; where three vessels could get in they took in ten or fifteen, and when they swung they swung together, and the result was that with all these lines you could see how badly they have been used.

Q. Can you give me the names of some of the captains of these ships?

A. No, sir; I can not.

By General WILSON:

Q. Who would be responsible for all this damage, the engineer?

A. It is a peculiar fix. I got the United States district attorney's decision from him; we had some very nice points. For instance, a ship is brought in by a navy officer and the captain complains about the bringing of her in, and he runs her in and he throws out a chain away across the windlass and he stoves in the plates and does \$8,000 or \$10,000 damages. There is a marine risk, and the owners had to pay it. Now they have gone to the insurance companies to see if they can not make them pay. If so, this vessel is in the navy service, and I don't think they ought to pay this insurance. That is in court now.

Q. Are any of these ships that you chartered in the service now?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have anything to do with these transports that were purchased?

A. Only to put the United States flag on them.

Q. Who outfitted them?

A. I outfitted them.

Q. You also outfitted the transports that you purchased for the United States?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that on the list?

A. I have given you two lists, one of the chartered vessels and I think I have given you the other. There are the vessels that were purchased [paper handed to General Wilson].

(Paper filed and marked "J. W. S., Exhibit B. November 25, 1898.")

Q. What class of vessels were those?

A. Most of them were English troopships: cattle ships. They are required by law to have them fitted up so they can turn them into the English service as troopships, but I was not satisfied with them and I went to work and fitted them over again.

Q. What kind were they?

A. Large ships: splendid ships. We are now fitting them up to carry 2,400 men. I never put more than 1,200 in them. Now we are fitting them up for 2,400 men and they are magnificent ships.

Q. How are you fitting them different?

A. In the first place, the *Mobile*, which is now in Philadelphia, each soldier has a spring mattress to sleep on. It has an ice plant, a distilling plant, carbonating plant, a steam laundry, and in the aft of the ship a large hospital fitted up with all conveniences. They have electric lights all through the transports. There have been no ships in the world for troopships better fitted than they. We have three; the *Mobile* will be out first, the *Massachusetts* next, and the *Mohawk* next.

Q. You did not explain how you increased the capacity of that ship from 1,200 to 2,400.

A. That I can not tell you very well; I have not the plan of the ships here. We utilize room now that we did not before. I think that one ship we have, the *Missouri*—I think we were eighteen days in fitting her out.

Q. Then how about the water for these new ships?

A. These new ships each have a large distilling plant. Then they have immense ballast tanks. Every one of these ships—the *St. Paul*—I have had the ballast tanks cleaned out and had them cemented and filled with fresh water. So they all have a large supply of water.

Q. These cattle ships, don't they have a keel that keeps them from rolling?

A. They have what is called a bilge keel. These things are just as steady as possible.

Q. They have been used to transport cattle from here to England?

A. Yes, sir. I rode on the *Obolam* with a number of ladies and we went out on a rough night and not one of them was sick on the trip. You can imagine how steady she was.

Q. Where did she go to?

A. Santiago and afterwards Ponce.

Q. Did each of these transports have a Government officer in charge of it?

A. No, sir; it was too early.

Q. And the present transports, is there a quartermaster aboard them?

A. Yes, sir; a quartermaster and commissary.

Q. Did many of these ships that came back here from Santiago have aboard supplies that went over there with them?

A. I stayed up one night loading animals. I put on two pontoons with all the paraphernalia and baggage, and when we received her back after the war was over—she made several trips—I unloaded the same stuff I put on her—that was only one ship. I had several the same way, and some of the baggage I am trying to find out to whom it belongs now.

Q. That is, he makes the statement, the ships went to Santiago and were not unloaded?

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. The *Grande Duchesse* was in the same fix?

A. I think you are mistaken about that; I think she was unloaded once, but somebody loaded her with onions and covered her up with coffee and sugar and it stayed in her hold, and when she came back I could not get my stevedores on her; it was awful. I had the board of health after us. You did not have to see this; you could smell it.

By General WILSON:

Q. Do you know who had charge of that?

A. No, sir; it was not in our department.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you ever hear any explanation why they were not unloaded there?

A. No, sir.

Q. You spoke of the size of those ships. Were there not larger ships here in this harbor that could have been obtained?

A. Well, I could not say. I do not think there was an American ship that we could have taken. Of course the *Paris* and those ships were \$10,000 a day. We could not buy ships. The large ships here were English ships and we could not take them. It takes a special act of Congress. We took what we had. There was no time to "swap horses." We had to take them while they were here.

Q. Therefore the taking of those ships of that size was a necessity?

A. Yes, sir, it was an emergency.

Q. They were bought and the flags changed?

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. How many of those vessels did you find in the condition you say you found the *Grande Duchesse* and other boats in?

A. I don't know. There was mighty few came back that I did not have to unload them.

Q. They went backward and forward?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. Did you do this fitting out by contract?

A. No, sir.

Q. It was done under your own supervision?

A. Yes, sir; it was like going out and getting an expert to do something and money was not in it. We had to do the thing at once and I had to have the best men in New York City to do it.

By General WILSON:

Q. In addition to the information you have so kindly given us, will you give us any information in your power which can aid us in any possible way in complying with the orders of the President? If, in the discharge of your official duties, you have observed any neglect or any lack of prompt assistance on the part of any branch of the United States Government in carrying out the work committed to your charge, we would like to know it.

A. No, sir. I think everybody responded freely and quickly where it was possible, and, in fact, people put themselves out to do it. One gentleman gave us a

ship which we now have. He pays the crew, the engineers, and feeds them, and the Government has the use of the ship, not paying a cent for it. That is the *Missouri*.

Q. I would like to have on record the name of the gentleman.

A. Mr. Baker, of the Atlantic Transport Line; and not only that, but he said, "Fix up that cabin and I will stand the expense. Go ahead." He did not spare any money at all as far as his department went. That was free. He is doing that now.

Q. Was that so with the *Devine*?

A. That was a hospital ship.

Q. Charter vessel?

A. No, sir; loaned to the Government by Mr. Baker.

By General DODGE:

Q. There have been a great many complaints before us from soldiers and others that they had to pay the stewards and crew for meals, and cooking, and everything of that kind.

A. Yes, sir. I do not doubt it. I had to discharge one or two that were reported to me. General Ludlow reported one to me and he was discharged. That was all I could do.

Q. What was the captain of the ship doing?

A. The fact is, aboard these ships there is a large crew of men. They go to the galley and the captain does not see it. They sold liquor and all that kind of thing. And the captain of the ship knew nothing about it. The present ships are under the charge of a quartermaster and he does not often see it. When he does, he corrects it. There are a great many of these stories I do not believe.

Q. Have you investigated any of them?

A. Yes, sir. One I referred to Colonel Woodruff, and this came out in the Times—"An indignant father," and "This young man was starved; he had to go and buy things; there was not enough aboard the ship," and Colonel Woodruff came out in the Times and stated what was put aboard—all kinds of canned stuff and things in cases. It was almost impossible to control these stewards. The men have broken into my storeroom and stolen a great deal.

Q. On these transports that the Government owns, have you had any complaints of that kind?

A. Well, I have not had any, but the transports now, instead of having complaints, we are getting letters from quartermasters, both officers and passengers, of the way they have been treated and served and attention paid to them.

Q. You mean favorable?

A. Yes, sir. I have been getting it down now to a system, and there will be no more trouble. We ought to have these men enlisted—the crew and officers—and when they don't behave themselves you can tie them up and punish them.

Q. Don't you think when these transports which carry troops when they leave port should be under a naval officer?

A. No, sir; they ought to be turned over to the Navy. There is always friction between the Army and Navy. They have an idea we should not have anything of the kind, but I think it should be under a quartermaster-general, the same as the revenue is under the Secretary of the Treasury. The only way is to have them enlisted and they would do all right. We have as good service in the marine as in the Navy. They are certainly as fine a class of men as you will find in the world. Of course there are some black sheep, but I have weeded out many.

Q. Don't you think in the loading of these ships, for instance, if there was a naval officer a naval officer is far more competent to tell how a ship should be loaded than an army officer?

A. An army officer does not load the ship; the regular stevedores load it.

Q. Your troops have to help and any help you can get?

A. But you can take the first officer of the ship; he understands about that. At Tampa, it could have been done better if you had the officers loading the ship that belonged to it; but it was not done that way. It was done by anybody—niggers. The first officer of the ship is the man to direct that. It is to his advantage, and he would see to it.

Q. Didn't the officer of the ship have control of the loading at Tampa?

A. I don't know, sir; I was not there. I do not think so. I think the army officers should have nothing to do with it.

Q. The crew of the *Alamo* was employed by the company?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. She belonged to the Cromwell Line?

A. No, sir; the Mallory Line. At the time we fitted out these ships—the *Alamo*—it was waiting to get men to go in them; the crew, they backed out; they were pretty hard cases, and they had an idea that they would be shot, and all that.

By General WILSON:

Q. Major, you knew the rate of pay for all these various vessels?

A. I have given it to you; some of them I don't know; all I did was to report on the vessel.

Q. I meant to ask whether the price was excessive or not, so far as you know. What is your opinion?

A. I think they were well paid.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who made these contracts for these ships?

A. They were made, I think, in Washington; I had nothing to do with that; that was out of my department.

Q. Who had charge of the fitting up of these new ships?

A. That was under Mr. Kirby; he is an expert shipbuilder.

By General WILSON:

Q. Is he here in New York?

A. He was here this morning; but I don't think he stays but a very short while anywhere. He will be in Bath, Me., to-night, and the next day he will be on his way to Philadelphia; I don't know whether he is here or not; I saw him this morning.

By General McCook:

Q. Has he been detailed to any of these ships in the shipyards?

A. No, sir; I think he is interested in the shipbuilding yards on the lakes there somewhere.

Q. You don't know where Mr. Kirby's home is?

A. I think it is in Detroit; I think his headquarters are at the Waldorf when he is in town.

By General DODGE:

Q. And you think these new ships being fitted up are finely fitted, do you?

A. I think they are as near to perfection as can be. They never had any ships like them in the world; that is, with the conveniences. The one thing I dislike about it is I don't want to spoil the soldiers.

Q. How many of these are you fitting now?

A. Three; the *Manitoba*. As they go out, they will put the others in.

J. W. S. Exhibit A. November 25, 1898.

Cost of fitting and dates of receipt and sailing of vessels chartered by the Quartermaster's Department for use as transports.

Name of vessel.	Cost of charter per day.	Cost of fitting.	Date of receipt.	Date of sailing from New York.	Fitted for—	
					Men.	Horses.
Alamo.....	\$575.00	\$2,440.88	Apr. 29, 1898	May 1, 1898	835	450
Concho.....	550.00	2,440.88	May 10, 1898	May 14, 1898	835	300
Rio Grande.....	500.00	2,440.88	do.....	do.....	1,050	200
Leona.....	500.00	2,440.88	do.....	May 13, 1898	695	400
Nueces.....	650.00	4,477.50	June 13, 1898	June 29, 1898	825	300
Lampasas.....	650.00	5,406.80	do.....	do.....	235	400
Vigilancia.....	600.00	2,975.65	May 10, 1898	May 15, 1898	845	500
Seguranca.....	600.00	1,380.00	do.....	May 16, 1898	635	250
Yucatan.....	500.00	2,214.65	do.....	May 20, 1898	1,045	250
Seneca.....	450.00	1,946.19	do.....	May 15, 1898	627	250
Saratoga.....	450.00	2,117.65	do.....	do.....	840	250
Santiago.....	450.00	1,220.00	do.....	May 16, 1898	640	250
City of Washington.....	450.00	1,700.10	do.....	May 14, 1898	770	250
Cherokee.....	500.00	2,507.84	May 11, 1898	do.....	900	50
Iroquois.....	600.00	1,878.50	do.....	May 13, 1898	740	300
Comanche.....	640.00	2,440.88	June 3, 1898	June 4, 1898	550	300
Louisiana.....	500.00	2,083.36	do.....	do.....	355	300
Arkadia.....	250.00	9,233.07	June 15, 1898	July 6, 1898	365	300
Catania.....	600.00	10,202.87	June 13, 1898	June 22, 1898	840	250

Ventilating and distilling apparatus on the *Nueces*, *Lampasas*, and *Arkadia* and distilling apparatus on the *Catania*.

J. W. S. Exhibit B. November 25, 1898.

Dates of receipt and sailing, and cost of fitting vessels purchased for use as transports.

Name of vessel.	Date of receipt.	Date of sailing from New York.	Cost of fitting.	Fitted for—	
				Men.	Horses.
Mohawk.....	June 30, 1898	July 5, 1898	\$7,676.03	1,080	1,000
Mississippi.....	do.....	do.....	7,302.52	840	800
Obdam.....	do.....	July 8, 1898	5,932.70	1,350	100
Mobile.....	July 7, 1898	July 13, 1898	9,672.73	1,080	1,000
Roumanian.....	July 9, 1898	July 21, 1898	13,128.73	1,145	50
Berlin.....	do.....	July 15, 1898	12,279.36	2,075	1,000
Massachusetts.....	July 14, 1898	July 22, 1898	12,314.29	1,080	800
Michigan.....	do.....	July 21, 1898	12,841.29	840	1,000
Manitoba.....	July 20, 1898	Aug. 1, 1898	22,245.11	1,080	1,000
Minnewaska.....	July 26, 1898	Aug. 6, 1898	27,436.68	1,300	1,000
Chester.....	do.....	Aug. 8, 1898	20,421.28	1,270	250

Ventilating plants for the *Roumanian*, *Berlin*, *Minnewaska*, *Chester*, *Manitoba*.
Distilling plants for the *Obdam*, *Chester*.

NEW YORK, November 25, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES M. SWIFT.

Mr. CHARLES M. SWIFT, upon request, appeared before the commission, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Will you kindly give us your name and official duty?

A. Charles M. Swift; officially I am purveyor of the fleet.

Q. On duty under whom?

A. Under Major Summerhayes.

Q. The duty you performed as purveyor of the fleet consisted of what?

A. Putting stores aboard; ship's stores for the stowage department.

Q. That is, for the officers and crew of the ship proper; not for anybody else?

A. No, sir.

Q. What do those stores consist of mostly?

A. About everything you can think of that you can get in this hotel; everything that is furnished on a first-class trans-Atlantic liner.

Q. Is that furnished to the crew also?

A. No, sir.

Q. Will you kindly state what you put on that ship for the officers and what you put on for the crew?

A. That is rather a tedious list. I have a list copied from some of the ships that have been furnished [papers are handed to General Wilson]: fresh beef, fresh fish, vegetables, jellies, jams.

Q. I see there are no quantities on them?

A. No, sir; they fill them in.

Q. (Examining papers.) Here is what was furnished the steamship *Obalam*, July 26, 1898. It contains a large list of articles, just as the Colonel has said, that can be found anywhere. How many days were these for?

A. Sixty days, I think; they averaged from forty-five to sixty days for so many men; from 75 to 100, according to the size of the ship.

Q. Were those articles furnished by contract or in the open market?

A. In the open market.

Q. No competition invited at all?

A. We could not very well do that when I got an order to-night to furnish a ship to-morrow.

Q. You had it that way often?

A. I have had it several times, probably twelve.

Q. These were generally from large establishments here at the current market prices?

A. Yes, sir: R. C. Williams and houses of that standing; I got the vegetables and the best of everything, because the best is the cheapest; I got the poultry of Robbins, and the vegetables from Oehrichs, at the Fulton Market, all packed in the best manner.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is there not a good deal in the packing of these articles as to their keeping?

A. Yes, sir; a great deal.

By General WILSON:

Q. In this case, the *Obalam* with the material on board for thirty days, have you in mind the officers and crew for which this was supplied?

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Have you any idea, in your mind, of the total cost of these articles placed on this ship?

A. I think about \$3,000; \$2,500 to \$3,000.

Q. Does this include ice?

A. Yes, sir; that includes ice.

Q. And the same character of goods and the same method was adopted in each case for each vessel that you fitted out?

A. Yes, sir; in the matter of ice sometimes we could not get enough ice, because they were not fitted up for carrying such a number; therefore, we had to put ice houses on deck; the orders were to carry as much as possible.

Q. It is absolutely necessary to carry a great deal of ice?

A. The character of these things was such that they needed ice.

Q. Were there large refrigerators, or cold-storage rooms?

A. Yes, sir; some had cold-storage rooms and some had large refrigerators.

Q. After these articles are turned over to the steward, does he make any return?

A. Yes, sir; when he comes in port, he reports the stores on hand and how the others were used. That you will find on the requisition; there is a list you must fill in [paper handed to General Wilson].

By General DODGE:

Q. This is a typewritten statement of the cost of the supplies you furnished up to September 9, \$75,707.49; will you leave this with us?

A. Yes, sir, if you wish.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Colonel, your duty was to ship stores on the transports?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the quality and quantities?

A. The quality was the very best; the quantities were a good margin over what a ship would require going from here to Europe, on account of the deterioration of the stores in the hot climate.

Q. Did any ship return to this port short of supplies?

A. No, sir; they always had something over.

Q. Who attended the sick on board the transports, do you know?

A. I suppose the regiments that had surgeons, they did. I have known stewards to attend the sick.

Q. What stewards—the hospital stewards?

A. No, sir; the stewards of the ship; they attended them gratuitously. There was nothing in the service requiring them to do so. If a man came to them and said he wanted a cup of gruel, or soup, or tea, the steward would make it for him. The steward of the *Berlin* paid money out of his own pocket and paid the cooks and waiters extra money for waiting on the sick; that is his report to me.

Q. Complaints have been made that the steward's department on some of these ships was made scandalous by the sale of supplies to the soldiers; do you know anything about this?

A. It would be hearsay; I know that the soldiers have broken into the storeroom and stolen the ship's supplies. They have had fights with the stewards because they could not get the delicacies they thought they were entitled to.

Q. Were you in the civil war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you visited Camp Wikoff?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did the hospitals in the civil war compare with those?

A. No comparison at all; Camp Wikoff was a palace compared to the civil war.

Q. What was the character of the food supplied on the transports?

A. The very best.

Q. Were they the travel rations?

A. Travel rations were given to the troops.

Q. What was done for the sick?

A. The Commissary Department supplied for the sick; they had an abundance of delicacies, jellies, soups, canned articles, lemons, and fruit.

Q. What length of time was the ship provided for?

A. From thirty to sixty days.

Q. Were provisions made in your supplies for the care of the sick?

A. No, sir.

Q. No special provision for that?

A. If an officer should ask the steward for a delicacy he could have gotten it.

Q. Did you visit any camps during the late war?

A. I visited Camp Black.

Q. How did it impress you?

A. As far as the cooking was concerned, not very favorably: the men did not know how to cook: I saw one cook house within the length of this room from the sinks; they had the greatest mess of potatoes and pork in a caldron; they were stewing it, and I said to the cook, "You ought to have boiled those potatoes." He said, "That is the way we have always cooked them." I was surprised there were not more sick in that camp.

Q. Do you know whether he was supplied with the cookbook furnished by the Commissary Department?

A. I think he was; yes, sir; I think they all were.

Q. From whom did you get your supplies?

A. From Francis and Asquith and Williams, and those people whom I was confident would furnish first-class articles.

Q. Were they supplied on bids, or were they direct purchases?

A. Lately they have been supplied by bids, where it has been in the last six weeks.

Q. Were they purchased at the market prices?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The lowest price?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Can you give us any other information that we have not asked you about?

A. No, sir; except that I think, as Major Summerhayes said, all the officers and employees of the ship should be enlisted men.

Q. That is, where the Government owns the ships?

A. Yes, sir; the most of these transports were in a very fetid condition that came back. Men would not go to the lavatories at all; they would stay in their bunks in the most filthy condition everywhere. When spoken to about it, some of the officers would tell the captain of the ship, or the quartermaster, "The war was over now, and the boys wanted to have a good time and he was going to give it to them." There was no discipline at all; they ran all over the ship; they even broke into the saloon and would pay no attention to the officers of the vessel; it was wholly the fault of the volunteer officers.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Colonel, you say the chartered ships didn't have officers aboard. Don't you think there should be an officer aboard a transport ship?

A. Yes, sir; I do.

Q. I know during our war, on the Mississippi the man who had the highest rank had charge of it by general orders from General Grant.

The WITNESS. I think some of you gentlemen might remember the treatment we had at Fort Fisher. If you will recall the condition of those transports and compare them with the condition of these men: the men were huddled together thicker than they were in this war; they were subjected to a great storm off Cape Hatteras. I agree with Major Summerhayes that we are making the soldiers to-day "featherbed soldiers," not giving them enough hard knocks. I would like to suggest that as the Navy has instructors in rifle practice. I think they ought to have instructors in the cooking department; they would have saved thousands of dollars and hundreds of men if they had had a good chef to teach the men. Colonel Welch, of the Fifty-sixth Regiment of this State—when I was at Camp Black, I wanted to go to his mess. He said, "We have no mess; all my company officers must eat the same food the company does. We have to go there and we

inspect the food, and if it is bad we will know it." He hired a cook in Buffalo, who taught his company how to cook, and he had the best organized camp at Camp Black. I believe in having instructors for the cook.

(Seven papers are filed by witness as a part of his testimony and marked "C. M. S., Exhibits A to G, respectively, November 25, 1898".)

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT A.

Date.	Name.	Amount.	Date.	Name.	Amount.
	STEMMERMAN & SANDERS, WHOLESALE GROCERS, BROOKLYN.			MEYER & LANG.	
Oct. 22	Montera	\$199.36	Oct. 25	Minnewaska	\$1,522.44
			Nov. 22	Tug McKinley	103.98
	R. C. WILLIAMS & CO.			Total	1,626.42
Oct. 6	Mississippi	1,968.35		ASPELL & CO.	
Oct. 6	Manitoba	3,147.26	July 11	Mobile	2,743.42
	Total	5,115.61	July 12	Panama	1,348.89
	KEEFE & DAVIS.		July 12	Port Victor	1,539.80
Sept. 22	Mississippi	951.97	July 12	Obdam	3,351.50
	ACKER, MERRILL & CONDIT.		July 14	Panama, Acid	5.60
July 2	Mississippi	549.81	July 14	Berlin	3,930.77
July 2	Mohawk	1,006.57	July 16	Massachusetts	4,566.79
July 8	Port Victor	1,124.59	July 18	Michigan	4,672.66
July 9	Mobile	104.40	July 19	Roumanian	3,629.22
July 16	Britannia	539.98	July 19	do	30.00
Oct. 22	Montera	289.33	July 19	do	20.00
	Total	3,594.68	July 26	Gypsum King	782.23
	RAFFERTY & CO.		July 29	Manitoba	6,585.04
Nov. 5	Mississippi	291.58	Aug. 3	Gypsum King	51.00
Nov. 9	Port Victor	1,165.09	Aug. 9	Minnewaska	9,842.32
Nov. 11	Tug Ed. Ward	63.30	Aug. 9	Chester	8,752.80
Nov. 12	Roumanian	775.53	Aug. 24	Mobile	394.98
Nov. 15	Berlin	1,078.27	Sept. 6	Minnewaska	8,509.31
	Total	3,373.77	Sept. 6	Mexico	1,928.97
	F. H. LEGGETT & CO.		Sept. 14	Manitoba	1,007.99
Sept. 16	Mobile	50.15	Sept. 15	Obdam	1,794.34
Sept. 21	Berlin	1,009.83	Sept. 15	Chester	962.90
Sept. 24	do	12.00	Sept. 15	Mississippi	231.84
Sept. 29	Chester	967.68	Sept. 17	Port Victor	743.61
Nov. 7	Manitoba	1,556.77	Sept. 15	Roumanian	1,674.75
Oct. 17	Berlin	811.29	Sept. 16	Berlin	59.54
Oct. 25	Obdam	2,166.44	Sept. 22	Roumanian	90.15
	Total	6,574.16	Sept. 22	Michigan	1,642.24
			Sept. 22	Chester	131.85
			Oct. 17	Massachusetts	12.75
			Oct. 19	Mexico	606.11
			Oct. 27	Michigan	1,016.66
			Oct. 29	do	632.67
			Sept. 29	Massachusetts	232.47
			Sept. 29	Port Victor	2,239.32
				Total	75,707.49

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT B.

Steamship Obdam, steward's department, July 26, 1898.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Fresh beef	4,000 pounds	Fulton Market pork	barrels.. 2
Fresh mutton	1,000 do	Hams	12-pound 16
Fresh pork	300 do	Smoked bacon	pounds. 50
Fresh veal	300 do	Ox tongue	do 10
Sausages	100 do	Lamb tongue	kits. 2
Livers	100 do	Tongues and sounds	do 2
Corn beef	500 do	Bologna	pounds. 20
Corn pork	200 do	Turkey	12-pound. 20
Calf's head and feet	3 sets	Chicken and duck	pounds. 350
Mess beef	10 barrels	Blue-fish	do 50
Mess pork	4 do	Codfish	do 50
Fulton Market corn beef	31 do	Eels	do 20

Steamship Obdam, steward's department, July 26, 1898—Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Pan-fish	pounds. 20	Capers	bottles. 24
Cod, salt	do. 400	Catsup	do. 36
Mackerel, No. 1	half barrels. 2	Worcestershire	do. 36
Mackerel, No. 2	do. barrels. 2	Piccaililli	gallons. 2
Lard	pounds. 150	Curry	bottles. 24
Stearine	do. 100	Olive oil	cases. 2
Butter, cabin	do. 300	Raisins	boxes. 3
Butter, crew	do. 300	Raisins, cooking	do. 3
Cheese, American	do. 100	Currants	pounds. 30
Cheese, Swiss	do. 25	Citron	do. 15
Cheese, "Young America"	do. 3	Prunes	do. 50
Eggs	cases. 10	Baking powder, "Royal"	do. 36
Condensed milk	pints. 150	Allspice, whole	do. 3
Condensed milk	cases. 5	Allspice, ground	do. 3
Flour	barrels. 35	Mace	do. 3
Oatmeal	pounds. 300	Nutmegs	do. 2
Hominy	do. 100	Cinnamon, whole	do. 3
Corn meal	do. 100	Cinnamon, ground	do. 3
Rice	do. 300	Ginger, ground	do. 3
Tapioca	do. 20	Cloves, ground	do. 3
Sago	do. 20	Cloves, whole	do. 3
Macaroni	boxes. 3	Celery seed	do. 1
Vermicelli	do. 3	Carbonate soda	do. 2
Cornstarch	pounds. 24	Saleratus	do. 2
Spaghetti	box. 1	Cocoanut, shredded	do. 12
Gelatine	pounds. 2	Soap, salt water	boxes. 2
Isinglass	do. 5	Cream tartar	pounds. 1
White beans	do. 150	Hops	do. 6
Pilot bread, No. 1	barrels. 4	Malt	do. 4
Pilot bread, No. 2	do. 10	Vanilla, extract	bottles. 24
Soda crackers	boxes. 6	Lemon, extract	do. 24
Ginger snaps	do. 2	Yeast, compressed	pounds. 12
Water crackers	do. 2	Salt, cooking	do. 200
Split peas	pounds. 200	Salt, table	5-pound boxes. 6
Potatoes	barrels. 50	Mustard, crew	pounds. 12
Carrots	do. 3	Mustard, cabin	do. 6
Turnips	do. 4	Stove tins	do. 12
Beets	do. 1	Black pepper	pounds. 6
Cabbage	heads. 300	White pepper	do. 2
Onions	barrels. 5	Cayenne pepper	do. 100
Leeks	bunches. 40	Soap, soft	do. 200
Parsley	do. 30	Soap, brown	do. 100
Garlic	strings. 4	Sal soda	bottles. 12
Herbs, assorted	tins. 12	Ammonia	pounds. 36
Mint	bunches. 12	Gold Dust powder	box. 1
Sage	do. 24	Whiting	pounds. 6
Pumpkins	heads. 60	Plate powder	boxes. 6
Lettuce	do. 6	Sapoli	do. 1
Tomatoes, 2-pound cans	do. 2	Alcohol	gallons. 20
Tomatoes, 1-gallon can	do. 4	Lard oil	do. 5
Green peas	dozen tins. 4	Min. sperm oil	do. 300
Lima beans	do. 4	Cut loaf sugar	do. 400
String beans	do. 4	Granulated sugar	do. 600
Corn	do. 1	Brown sugar	gallons. 2
Okra	do. 3	Sirup	do. 2
Asparagus	do. 2	Sirup, maple	do. 300
Squash	do. 10	Fancet for vinegar, etc.	pounds. 10
Sardines	do. 6	Young Hyson tea	do. 10
Salmon	do. 2	Oolong tea	do. 10
Lobster	do. 3	English breakfast tea	do. 10
Clams	do. 2	Tea, crew	do. 250
Oysters	do. 8	Coffee, cabin	do. 200
Cranberries	do. 5	Coffee, crew	do. 10
Mushrooms	do. 5	Chicory	do. 24
Table peaches	do. 5	Cocoa	do. 100
Table pears	do. 5	Cotton waste	do. 30
Table apricots	do. 5	Chloride lime	do. 1
Currant jelly, 6-pound jars	do. 100	Small pan scourers	gross. 3
Preserved peaches, 6-pound jars	pounds. 100	Matches, safety	pounds. 12
Dried apples	do. 10	Liquid for polishing	boxes. 3
Dried peaches	dozen cans. 15	Toothpicks	do. 6
Pie fruit	gallons. 10	Parlor brooms	do. 6
Cider vinegar	do. 3	Common brooms	do. 6
White vinegar	kegs. 12	Whisk brooms	do. 24
Pickles	bottles. 24	Brushes, scrub	do. 2
Chowchow	do. 18	Dusters, feather	do. 6
India chutney	do. 18	Ice picks	do. 3
Gherkins	do. 18	Tongs, ice	balls. 6
Small onions	do. 18	Twine, cotton	do. 6
Mixed pickles	do. 12	Sewing needles, assorted	set. 1
Horse-radish	do. 24	Trussing needles	do. 1
Olives	reg. 1		
Olives, common	do. 1		

2426 INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN.

Steamship Obdam, steward's department, July 26, 1898—Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Tack hammers	3	Lime juice	case 1
Tacks	6	Oranges	boxes 3
Tacks, double pointed	6	Lemons	do 3
Carpet binding	1	Bananas	bunch 1
Toilet paper	6		

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT C.

Steamship Roumanian, July 16, crew 67, for sixty days, steward's department.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Fresh beef	pounds 5,000	Brown sugar	barrels 2
Fresh pork	do 572	Maple sirup	gallons 1
Fresh mutton	do 1,054	Molasses	do 5
Fresh veal	do 1,000	Cabin tea	pounds 60
Sausage	do 169	Crew tea	do 120
Liver	do 12	Cabin coffee	do 75
Kidneys	do 60	Crew coffee	do 150
Calf heads	do 12	Cocoa	do 3
Calf feet	do 24	Salt meats:	
Corned rump beef	pounds 200	Bacon	sides 30
Crew beef	barrels 6	Hams	48
Crew pork	do 4	Dried fruits:	
Beef tongues	do 4	Cooking raisins	pounds 30
Head cheese	do 50	Table raisins	do 10
Corned beef, canned	pounds 100	Currants	do 20
Mutton, canned	do 100	Prunes, cooking	do 20
Fish	do 400	Apples	do 20
Pig's feet	kegs 2	Peaches	do 20
Salt codfish	pounds 400	Citron	do 2
Oysters	kits 2	Nuts, assorted	do 10
Clams	do 2	Dry provisions:	
Lobsters	do 36	Flour	barrels 36
Salmon	do 36	Graham flour	do 4
No. 1 salt mackerel	barrels 1	Corn meal	do 20
No. 2 salt mackerel	do 2	Oatmeal	do 100
Smoked haddock	pounds 10	Buckwheat	do 20
Tongues and sounds	kits 2	Hominy	packages 50
Butter, cheese, and lard:		Split pease	pounds 100
Butter, cabin	pounds 160	Rice	do 200
Butter, crew	do 300	Rice, ground	do 6
Lard	do 80	Tapioca	do 4
Lard, stearin	do 20	Sago	do 4
American cheese	do 40	Corn starch	packages 24
Pineapple cheese	do 2	Crew and engineers:	
Young America cheese	do 1	Mattresses	40
Eggs	boxes 5	Blankets, gray	40
Milk	cans 144	Pillows	40
Milk	quarts 20	Colored spreads	40
Poultry:		Steward's department:	
Chicken	pounds 60	Soap, toilet	boxes 2
Fowls	do 80	Soap, brown	pounds 120
Turkey	do 249	Soda, sal	do 125
Oranges	boxes 1	Soap water	do 20
Lemons	do 1	Sapolo	case 1
Peaches	do 2	Safety matches	dozen 12
Plums	do 3	Scourere	case 1
Bananas	bunch 1	Sponge cloths	do 20
Watermelons	barrels 1	Waste	pounds 20
Potatoes	do 60	Rotten stone	do 2
Sweet potatoes	do 2	Lamp glasses	do 12
Carrots	do 2	Whisk brooms	do 6
Turnips	do 2	Large brooms	do 3
Onions	do 3	Slop pails	do 2
Cabbage	heads 200	Soap powder	pounds 50
Lettuce	do 24	Tumblers	do 24
Parsley	bunches 12	Receivers for bedrooms	do 2
Leeks	do 12	Cushion for engineer's chair	do 1
Damsons	boxes 4	Dried provisions:	
Bay leaves	pounds 4	Barley	pounds 100
Dried herbs	do 4	Macaroni	do 25
Green herbs	do 4	Vermicelli	do 14
Crushed sugar	barrels 1	Gelatine	do 10
Powdered sugar	pounds 30	Istinglass	do 1
Granulated sugar	barrels 3	White beans	do 200

Steamship Roumanian, July 16, crew 67, for sixty days, steward's department—
Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Bread and crackers:		Malt	sacks. 4
Brown bread	pounds 120	Cochineal	bottles. 1
Pilot bread	barrels 4	Gold paint	do. 1
Navy bread	do. 12	Shellac	gallons. 5
Preserved vegetables:		Ice	tons. 22
Tomatoes	gallon tins 108	Yeast	pounds 60
Peas	do. 108	Chutney	dozen 4
Beans	do. 108	Soap, soft	barrels. 1
String beans	do. 108	Repairs:	
Asparagus	do. 24	Dining-room chair	1
Preserved fruits and nuts:		Glass lamp, staterooms	2
Pickles, crew	pails 2	Saloon lamp	1
Pickles, cabin	do. 18	Radishes	bunches. 50
Olives	bottles 14	Celery	do. 24
Worcestershire sauce	do. 12	Water cress	do. 24
Pepper sauce	do. 2	Mint	do. 12
Tomato catsup	do. 12	Gooseberries	quarts. 50
Walnut catsup	do. 6	Blackberries	do. 50
Mushroom catsup	do. 6	Red currants	do. 25
Curry powder	do. 2	Spinach	barrels. 2
Olive oil	do. 12	Squash	do. 2
Cider vinegar	gallons 15	Beets	do. 1
English mustard	do. 12	Green peas	do. 1
American mustard	do. 4	String beans	do. 1
Tabasco sauce	bottles 2	Sprouts	do. 1
Capers	do. 4	Parsnips	do. 1
Assorted pie fruit	tins 36	Cauliflowers	do. 20
Currant jelly	do. 12	Cucumbers	dozen 6
Peaches	do. 24	Jams	do. 48
Bartlett pears	do. 24	Marmalade	do. 48
Plums	do. 12	Candied lemon peel	10
Spices and extracts:		Anchovy sauce	6
Allspice, ground	pounds 1	Cayenne pepper	1
Allspice, whole	do. 12	Apples	gallons. 12
Pepper, black	do. 1	Horse-radish	quarts. 12
Pepper, white	do. 1	Figs	boxes. 2
Cream tartar	do. 1	Anchovies	keg. 1
Bicarb. soda	do. 1	Kidneys	tins. 24
Nutmegs	do. 1	Ox tails	do. 50
Mace, ground	do. 1	Turtle	100
Mace, whole	do. 1	Sheep plucks	do. 25
Celery seed	do. 1	Lime juice	cases. 2
Ginger, ground	do. 1	Apricots	do. 2
Cloves	do. 1	Pineapples	do. 2
Cinnamon	do. 36	Assorted fruit	cans. 48
Baking powder	tins 36	Bouillon soup	do. 18
Salt	sacks 36	Sardines	do. 18
Salt	boxes 4	Mushrooms	case 1
Vanilla	bottles 2	Bath brick	do. 6
Lemon	do. 4	Chicory	do. 10
Dried herbs	cans 6	Kipperd herring	jars. 24
Alcohol	gallons 5	Liebig's extract beef	dozen 1
Hops	sacks 1	Extra ice on deck	tons. 4

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT D.

Ship stores, steamship Mobile, July 12, 1898.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Corned beef	2-pound tins. 24	Potatoes	barrels. 50
Soup bouilli	6-pound tins. 36	Onions	do. 3
Soup assorted	2-pound tins. 48	Beets	do. 1
Salmon	1-pound tins. 24	Cabbages	do. 10
Lobsters	do. 24	Carrots	do. 3
Oysters	2-pound tins. 24	Turnips	do. 12
Sardines	1/2-bottle tins. 24	Cauliflowers	do. 4
Beans, string	cans. 144	Leeks	dozen. 12
Peas	cases. 6	String beans	crates. 4
Tomatoes, 3 pounds	do. 4	Salt beef	barrels. 10
Macedonia	do. 2	Ham	pounds. 200
Asparagus	do. 6	Bacon	do. 200
Mushrooms	do. 1	Butter, cabin	tubs. 2
Anchovies	kegs. 2	Cheese	pounds. 80
Yeast, German	pounds. 20	Lard	do. 80

Ship stores, steamship Mobile, July 12, 1898—Continued.

Articles.	Quan- tity.	Articles.	Quan- tity.
Butter, crew	pounds 630	Lemolina	pounds 50
Salt cod	do 200	Corn flour	do 10
Beef, fresh	do 4,265	Quaker Oats	packages 36
Mutton	do 1,056	Cereline	pounds 24
Pork	do 964	Macaroni	do 25
Veal	do 239	Vermicelli	do 25
Lamb	do 203	Tapioca	do 30
Sausage	do 150	Sago	do 20
Ox kidneys	do 60	Pearl barley	do 100
Ox tails	do 60	Cabin biscuit	barrel 1
Calves' heads	do 10	Jam	2-pound tins 48
Tripe	pounds 50	Marmalade	do 48
Sausage, bologna	do 20	Red currant jelly	do 6
Corned beef	do 400	Peel, candied	pounds 10
Sheep plucks	do 30	Olives	gallons 4
Corned ox tongues	barrel 1	Pickles	do 6
Fresh fish	pounds 400	Sauce, Worcestershire	bottles 18
Cucumbers	dozen 6	Anchovy sauce	do 6
Lettuce	do 10	Tomato sauce	do 12
Tomatoes	baskets 24	Mustard	pounds 18
Celery	bunches 24	Black pepper	do 12
Parsley	do 24	White pepper	do 6
Mint	do 24	Chutney	do 4
Soft soap	pounds 100	Curry powder	do 6
Hard soap	do 80	Capers	bottles 12
Babbitt's soap powder	do 100	Essence	do 12
Sponge cloths	dozen 4	Oil salad	do 12
Plate powder	do 4	Condensed milk	cans 96
Matches	gross 2	Gelatine	pounds 4
Brass polish	tins 10	Baking powder	do 30
Hand scrubbers	do 6	Mixed spices	do 2
Cherries	boxes 10	Canned apples	cases 4
Plums	do 10	Peaches	do 4
Apples	crates 10	Peas	do 5
Crew sugar	pounds 719	Apricots	do 4
Loaf sugar	do 300	Pineapples	do 1
Granulated sugar	do 343	Plums	do 4
Raisins	do 150	Vinegar	gallons 12
Currants	do 125	Vinegar, table	bottles 12
Prunes	do 56	Seed, caraway	pounds 2
Crew tea	do 100	Salt, table	tins 12
Cabin tea	do 60	Salt	pounds 224
Crew coffee	do 126	Dried apples	do 50
Cabin coffee	do 30	Flour (in bags)	barrels 30
Maple sirup	gallons 2	Navy biscuits	do 6
Cabin oatmeal	pounds 100	Corned beef	6-pound tins 48
Crew oatmeal	do 209	Lime juice	case 1
Rice	do 320	Strawberries	quarts 60
Honiny	do 50	Gooseberries	do 60
Split beans	do 112	Bananas	bunches 3
White beans	do 200	Ice	tons 4
Soda crackers	boxes 4		

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT E.

Ship stores of Manitoba, July 12, and ship stores Michigan, July 14, both victualled the same.

Articles.	Quan- tity.	Articles.	Quan- tity.
Fresh beef	pounds 10,512	Fresh fish	pounds 400
Fresh mutton	do 2,553	Fowl	do 102
Pork loin	do 233	Duck	do 106
Veal	do 200	Turkey	do 279
Lamb	do 150	Rabbits	do 12
Calves' head	do 12	Potatoes (old)	pounds 6,000
Sheep's head	do 24	Potatoes (new)	do 6,000
Ox kidneys	do 60	Carrots	do 400
Ox tail	do 60	Turnips (Swedish)	do 600
Sheep livers	do 40	Turnips (white)	do 200
Ox tongues	do 36	Parsnips	do 300
Corned beef (family)	pounds 100	Beets	do 100
Suet	do 100	Onions	do 400
Sausage	do 100	Cabbage	heads 500
Tripe	do 100	Cauliflower	do 36
Salt codfish	do 200	Yellow squash	do 36

Ship stores of Manitoba, July 12, and ship stores Michigan, July 14, both victualled the same—Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Beeks	bunches 50	Biscuit, water, thin	tins 10
Spinach	pounds 120	Biscuit, soda	pounds 28
Green peas	do 100	Arrowroot	do 6
String beans	do 100	Sago	do 10
Brussels sprouts	do 200	Pearl tapioca	do 20
Parsley	bunches 48	Corn flour, white	do 12
Mint	do 6	Pearl barley	do 28
Meischmann's Yeast (waterproof		Macaroni	do 28
tins), pounds	60	Vermicelli	do 28
Ice	tons 30	Assorted jams	2-pound tins 36
Lime juice	cases 2	Assorted jams	7-pound tins 6
Brooks soap (1 case)	packages 12	Red currant jelly	jars 12
Dry soap (1 case)	pounds 28	Marmalade	do 24
Toilet soap (10 dozen)	do 28	Marmalade	7-pound jars 6
Hard soap	do 56	Jordan almonds	pounds 6
Soft soap	do 100	Candied peel	do 10
Bath brick	do 6	Canton singes	jars 4
Emery powder	tins 4	Assorted fruit (preserved)	do 36
Plate powder	packages 4	Olives	do 6
Brown sugar	pounds 1,120	C. & B. pickles, assorted	do 36
White crushed sugar	do 250	Pickles, jars	gallons 2
Loaf sugar	do 560	Sauces, assorted	bottles 24
Powdered sugar	do 10	L. & P. Worcestershire sauce	do 12
Golden sirup	2-pound tins 36	Chili sauce	do 12
Molasses	do 50	Catsup	do 6
Valencia raisins	pounds 112	Anchovy sauce	do 6
Muscateil raisins	do 24	French mustard	do 20
Sultana raisins	do 20	Crew mustard	pounds 24
Currants	do 112	Ground black pepper	do 20
French plums	do 25	White pepper	do 12
Cooking prunes	do 25	Cayenne pepper	do 2
Crew tea	do 112	Chutney	bottles 12
Cabin tea	do 112	Curry	do 24
Crew coffee	do 200	Capers	do 12
Cabin coffee	do 150	Jelly	packages 24
Chicory	do 20	Flavoring extracts	bottles 12
Baker's cocoa	do 10	Cochineal	do 3
Van Houten cocoa	do 15	Salad oil (B. & G.)	do 3
Corned beef	6-pound tins 24	Condensed milk (Borden's)	tins 336
Mutton	do 24	Cocoa and milk	do 24
Calves' feet in jelly	2-pound tins 12	Leaf gelatine	pounds 12
Corned beef	do 50	Baking powder	tins 6
Stewed kidney	do 24	Spiced pudding	pounds 12
Brawn	do 24	Apples	1-gallon tins 12
Hare soup	do 24	Pears	do 12
Mock turtle	do 24	Peaches	do 12
Kipperd herring	do 24	Apricots	do 12
Finnan haddie	do 24	Cider vinegar	gallons 36
Salmon	1-pound tins 48	Caraway seeds	pounds 2
Lobster	do 48	Nutmeg	do 6
Oysters	do 36	Ginger	do 6
Sardines	1-pound tins 36	Bi-carb soda	do 6
Rat-tail string beans	2-pound tins 12	Cream tartar	do 6
French peas	1-pound tins 24	Tartaric acid	do 6
Tomatoes	3-pound tins 36	Marjarene, dried	packages 12
Asparagus	do 24	Sago, dried	do 12
Lunch tongues	do 24	Mint, dried	do 12
Liebig's extract beef	2-ounce jars 12	Thyme, dried	do 12
Mess beef	barrels 6	Savory, dried	do 12
Ham	pounds 600	Parsley, dried	do 12
Bacon	do 300	Assorted herbs	do 12
First cabin butter	do 180	Celery	bunches 60
Second cabin butter	do 130	Lettuce	dozen 5
Crew butter	do 450	Radishes	do 5
Gargonzala cheese	do 56	Cucumbers	do 6
Wiltshire cheese	do 56	Water cress	do 6
American cheese	do 200	Horse-radish	quarts 12
Eggs	dozen 300	Spring onions	bunches 6
Navy bread No. 1, crew	pounds 300	Tomatoes	pounds 50
Navy bread No. 1, cabin	do 100	Apples	do 300
Flour (Pillsbury)	barrels 40	Cooking apples	do 300
Cabin oatmeal	pounds 300	Oranges (440)	crates 2
Crew oatmeal	do 300	Lemons (100)	do 1
Rice	do 300	Pears (100)	do 1
Rice, ground	do 20	Grapes	pounds 30
Hominy	do 56	Watermelons	do 20
Buckwheat	do 40	Rhubarb	bunches 75
Split peas	do 300	Gooseberries	boxes 20
Green peas, dried	do 28	Cherries	pounds 30
White beans	do 62	Blackberries	do 50
Assorted biscuit	2-pound tins 24	Black currants	do 50

Ship stores of Manitoba, July 12, and ship stores Michigan, July 14, both victualled the same—Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Red currants pounds.	50	Pecan nuts pounds.	10
Greengages do.	50	Hazelnuts do.	10
Blue plums do.	50	Figs do.	50
Almonds do.	10	Dates do.	63
Walnuts do.	10	Salt (cooking) 14-pound sacks.	20
Butter nuts do.	10	Fine table salt boxes.	36

C. M. S.—EXHIBIT F.

Ship stores—Berlin, July 11.

Article.	Quantity.	Article.	Quantity.
Fresh beef pounds.	6,174	Mint bunches.	6
Fresh mutton do.	1,500	Sage do.	12
Fresh pork do.	355	Pumpkins do.	18
Corned beef, family do.	700	Heads lettuce do.	36
Pork bellies do.	106	Tomatoes 3-pound tins.	48
Veal do.	612	Tomatoes 1-gallon tins.	24
Sausages do.	130	Lima beans tins.	48
Liver do.	170	Green peas do.	48
Beef kidneys do.	24	String beans do.	48
Calves' heads do.	6	Sugar corn do.	48
Calves' feet do.	24	Succotash do.	24
Beef, mess barrels.	12	Okra do.	24
Pork, mess do.	6	Asparagus do.	48
Ham pounds.	755	Squash do.	24
Bacon do.	250	Sardines do.	48
Ox tongues do.	12	Salmon do.	24
Bologna pounds.	30	Lobster do.	24
Turkey do.	300	Oysters do.	24
Fresh fish do.	400	Cranberry sauce do.	12
LoBSTERS do.	12	Mushrooms do.	24
Boneless cod pounds.	200	Apples 1-gallon tins.	24
Lard do.	50	Peaches do.	48
No. 1 mackerel $\frac{1}{2}$ barrels.	2	Pears do.	48
No. 2 mackerel do.	2	Apricots do.	48
Butter, crew pounds.	650	Dried apricots cases.	1
Butter, cabin do.	300	Prunes (cooking) do.	2
American cheese, cabin do.	50	Dried apples do.	2
American cheese, crew do.	150	Currant jelly 6-pound jars.	3
Swiss cheese do.	30	Jam tins.	24
Eggs dozen.	300	Vinegar, crew gallons.	50
Condensed milk gallons.	60	Vinegar, cabin bottles.	36
Condensed milk (1-lb. tins) dozen.	40	Pickles, crew kegs.	3
Flour barrels.	50	Chowchow bottles.	16
Oatmeal pounds.	600	Gherkins do.	16
Hominy do.	100	White onions do.	16
Rice do.	483	Mixed pickles do.	72
Farina do.	50	Horse radish do.	6
Tapioca do.	25	Olives 10-gallon kegs.	2
Sago do.	25	Capers bottles.	6
Cornstarch do.	20	Tomato catsup do.	12
Macaroni boxes.	3	Worcestershire, L. & P. do.	12
Vermicelli do.	3	Curry do.	12
Spaghetti do.	1	Olive oil gallons.	4
Gelatine dozen.	3	Table raisins $\frac{1}{2}$ -box.	3
White beans bushels.	6	Cooking raisins pounds.	150
Split peas do.	1	Currants do.	100
Green peas crates.	3	Lemon peel do.	6
Pilot bread, No. 1, cabin barrels.	2	Orange peel do.	8
Pilot bread, No. 2, crew do.	6	Royal baking powder tins.	24
Ginger snaps do.	3	Allspice, whole pounds.	1
Soda crackers boxes.	1	Allspice, ground do.	1
Barley barrels.	2	Mace do.	1
Arrowroot pounds.	10	Cinnamon, ground do.	1
Potatoes barrels.	75	Cinnamon, whole do.	1
Carrots do.	5	Ginger do.	1
Turnips do.	4	Cloves, whole do.	1
Beets do.	1	Cloves, ground do.	1
Cabbage heads.	200	Celery seed do.	1
Onions barrels.	3	Bicarb. of soda do.	1
Leeks bunches.	50	Cream tartar do.	1
Garlic strings.	2	Hops do.	2
Shallots peck.	1	Malt do.	2
Parsley bunches.	30	Vanilla, extract bottles.	12

Ship stores—Berlin, July 11—Continued.

Articles.	Quantity.	Articles.	Quantity.
Lemon, extract.....bottles..	12	Lime juice.....cases.....	2
Fleischmann's yeast.....pounds..	30	Ice.....tons.....	60
Salt (cooking).....24-pound bag.....	2	Oranges.....crates.....	2
Salt (table).....boxes.....	6	Lemons.....do.....	2
Mustard, crew.....pounds.....	24	Bananas.....bunches.....	2
Mustard, cabin.....do.....	10	Watermelons.....do.....	12
Pepper, black.....do.....	24	Muskmelons.....do.....	12
Pepper, white.....do.....	12	Blackberries.....quarts.....	36
Pepper, cayenne.....do.....	1	Green corn.....ears.....	36
Powdered sugar.....pounds.....	25	Tomatoes.....cases.....	2
Loaf sugar.....do.....	300	Radishes.....bunches.....	36
Granulated sugar.....do.....	1,043	Watercress.....baskets.....	6
Brown sugar.....do.....	361	Brown soap.....pounds.....	160
Molasses.....gallons.....	2	Sal soda.....do.....	125
Maple sirup.....do.....	2	Toilet soap, 3 to box.....boxes.....	36
Tea, cabin.....chests.....	1	Sapolio.....do.....	1
Tea, crew.....do.....	2	Toilet paper.....do.....	1
Coffee, cabin.....pounds.....	300	Safety matches.....gross.....	3
Coffee, crew.....do.....	200	Sperm oil.....barrel.....	1
Chicory.....do.....	50		

NEW YORK, November 25, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY P. KIRKHAM.

MR. HENRY P. KIRKHAM, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Please give us your name, address, and business.

A. Henry P. Kirkham, New York City, shipwright.

Q. You came here at the suggestion of Major Summerhayes. I am happy to see you. What particular duty did you have in connection with this work, under him or with him?

A. Under him entirely.

Q. What was your duty?

A. The fitting of the transports, and I was appointed by the Assistant Secretary of War as one of the members of the board of survey.

Q. Will you state exactly what you had to do in connection with fitting out these transports?

A. My orders were to go on board and make all repairs and work out the number of troops a ship could carry, according to the space, etc.

Q. And you superintended the bunks?

A. When we came to take charge of this, by Major Summerhayes's orders, I commenced to put up the hammocks. Previous to that, the ships were furnished with standee berths.

Q. What was the character of the work you had to perform?

A. These hammock stanchions were erected from deck to deck and consisted of three by four spruce, smooth lumber, to which were attached two hammock hooks, or four for each set of hammocks, one above the other, spaced according to the height of the deck in which they were placed; putting into the hatchways suitable stairways, with handrails, etc.; making proper sanitary arrangements for lavatories, washtubs, closets, etc.; also the fitting up for the horses and animals, spacing and directing proper accommodations for them.

Q. You said that the hammock hooks were one above the other. How many deep were those hammocks placed between decks?

A. Two.

Q. One under the other?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Never more?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. In the early part you put in wooden bunks?

A. No, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. How far was the upper hammock from the floor?

A. On account of the space between the fore and aft of the ship, in the place of stanchions the hook was placed in some cases, say, 18 inches from the deck; the bottom hook would be about the same, 2 feet.

Q. Any difficulty in getting in?

A. No, sir.

Q. The one above, how would he get in?

A. It sags sufficiently down; he can strike it away any distance he wants to.

By General DODGE:

Q. How many, comparatively, between the bunks and hammocks—how many more can you put in the bunks than the hammocks?

A. I could get more in the hammocks than bunks. These hammocks are removed during the day, allowing a large space for the men to move around, a 12-foot space.

Q. Then you would have a better circulation of air?

A. Yes, sir. Then I also put in a large system of Sturtevant blowers, and by means of steam connection, which worked the fans, it sent the air down into the compartment where the men were stowed, and along there were ducts of galvanized iron—registers—the same as we put in our homes, that can be shut off or opened.

Q. Did it blow the wind in or out?

A. The fresh air in; and we erected what you call a jet for salt air, and as the air went over the salt water it carried it down.

Q. Did you keep that going all night?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That would give them colds?

A. The ducts were so arranged that it would not strike the men.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. We have had testimony that the air was fetid.

A. In every compartment, as usual, in every ship there are two sets of ventilators. These are turned to the wind and the air is passed down one and the bad air is taken up the other. These transports that the Government bought—we did business many years before for that line. The Government demanded that those ships should be ventilated in a certain way for carrying live stock, and the space is regulated by rules of the Agricultural Department, in which they insist that these ventilators shall be placed in a certain way, affording air for the live stock. If you can ventilate live stock, with the steam and heat from the bodies of these animals, surely there must be plenty of ventilation for men.

Q. We have testimony from intelligent citizens to the contrary.

A. These chartered transports do not require the amount of ventilation that the larger ships do on account of having larger decks; the American ship is built higher between decks and she doesn't need it, and as the men were carried there between decks and the next deck below that, in all cases ventilation was supplied and we had a great many exhaust fans to send the air out.

Q. I understand your duties under Major Summerhayes, who was responsible for everything, was putting in the hammocks, fitting ventilators, and arranging for anything in connection with the ship excepting supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before you reported to the Major, did you always satisfy yourself that everything was in the best of condition, as far as a human being could do it?

A. I had to report to Major Summerhayes, and he was to direct what was to be done.

Q. And then carry out his orders strictly?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever send one of these ships to sea, so far as your portion was concerned, when you were not satisfied with her condition?

A. Where I was not satisfied with the condition? Well, yes, sir; I think I would say they could be better. They were not perfect.

Q. Why were they not better?

A. There was not time. The Major would order me to be on duty. Sometimes I would be all night long at the yard, and he would be there and took the plans as we got them; and then the men had to be on hand all times, nights and Sundays.

Q. Then time only was the reason?

A. Yes, sir. It could not be conducted in the mercantile service of New York better; and that is saying a good deal. We did the business of all the lines in New York—the White Star, the Transatlantic, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, Wilson, Cunard—all the lines. We fitted them out.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you anything to suggest, then, where we have not questioned you? We want to know all about them. We are not experts.

A. I don't think it could be done better again than it was this time—with such fine men as Colonel Kimball and Major Summerhayes.

Q. There is a good deal of complaint about the transports and their crowded condition. Still, after what you say, in going over they did not suffer?

A. The trip was too short. They may have suffered in Tampa with the men on the ship and without a particle of air stirring, without any circulation whatever, the same as we would suffer if shut up in a room in New York.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. The great trouble was the troops were kept on the boats at Tampa?

A. Yes, sir. The United States Government prohibits us from loading live stock alongside piers in summer time in New York, and the ship is supposed to come to anchor in the river, and we are allowed to load there early in the morning before the heat of the sun; that is the regulation of the Government with live stock.

By General McCook:

Q. When did that law come into force?

A. About six or eight years ago.

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 25, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF STEWARD PRESTON C. KING.

Steward PRESTON C. KING having no objection to being sworn, was thereupon duly sworn, and testified as follows:

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Please give your name and address.

A. Preston C. King, Takoma Park, D. C.

Q. Were you in the Army during the recent war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what capacity?

A. Hospital steward.

Q. What regiment were you attached to?

A. First District of Columbia Volunteers.

Q. Did you know Henry A. Dobson?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was sergeant of Company D?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at the time the regiment reached Montauk?

A. The regiment came in separate detachments. Two battalions came ahead, the Second and Third battalions, the First Battalion arriving about two days later. I was with the First Battalion. When we arrived, the Second and Third battalions were in detention camp, and we went into detention camp, and three days later joined them in the permanent camp.

Q. Was Dobson with you in the camp?

A. No, sir; Dr. Pyles treated the First Battalion, and he was treated by other surgeons, being in one of the other battalions.

Q. You were in the First Battalion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Dobson was not in that battalion?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see him during your stay at Montauk?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did you see him?

A. In the camp.

Q. Did you at any time see Mrs. Dobson, his mother?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you state what, if anything, she said to you about having the boy moved?

A. As was the custom, I used to go to the hospital and see the boys who were sick there. I knew most of them. On this day I was there seeing the boys and I saw Dobson. His mother was with him. She seemed to be in a peck of trouble. She said she was going to take her boy with her.

Q. Was Dobson on a cot?

A. He was on a cot, as I suppose it would be called. It was one of the cots ordinarily used in the hospital. I could not tell the ward or number of the cot on which he was located.

Q. That was at the general hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was there like any other patient?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did he seem to be cared for?

A. As far as I could see, the same as a majority of them. I did not see any difference.

Q. State what he said to you.

A. The talk was with Mrs. Dobson. She said she was going to take her boy away from the hospital and wanted me to help her to get him away. She also said she wanted to go on the transport with him. She wished me to use what influence I could to see that she accompanied him on the transport. I went to see the surgeon in charge—

Q. Who was he?

A. I can not tell you his name. He said it was not customary to allow the parents to accompany the boys, as that would overrun the transports with the parents. He said he would do what he could. I told Mrs. Dobson. I told her also where she could get the clothing.

Q. Was that all that took place?

A. That was all that took place.

Q. You were not there when the boy was moved?

A. No, sir.

Q. You wish to make any further statement. Mr. King, about the fact of your having been summoned here?

A. Yes; I would like to have that rectified. The statement in the Star read that I had been summoned here on Tuesday and failed to appear. That is the sum and substance of it. But I wish to say I have never been summoned. I had been requested to come here by Dr. Cox, and when I came I saw Secretary Weightman—

Q. You simply wish to state that you were not summoned? We do not care about hearsay evidence.

A. I came voluntarily when I was asked. Mr. Weightman said yesterday that you would like to see me between 10 and 11 o'clock to-day.

Q. Is there anything further that you wish to state?

A. No, sir; that is all.

Q. Is that all you know about the case?

A. That is all I know about the case.

NEW YORK, November 26, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. M. O. TERRY.

Dr. M. O. TERRY, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Please give your full name, your official title, if any, and your present address.

A. M. O. Terry, Utica, N. Y., surgeon-general of the State of New York.

Q. I would like to ask you, if agreeable to his excellency the governor of the State, if we may have your report which you presented to him, to be considered as part of your testimony?

A. Yes, sir; certainly.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Please tell us where, in your official or other capacity, you were during the war with Spain, so far as relates to camps and hospitals.

A. At Porto Rico and Camp Black, Camp Townsend, Camp Alger, Chickamauga, Fernandina, Jacksonville.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us what you may have to say with reference to Camp Alger, Camp Thomas, Tampa, Fernandina, and Jacksonville? You were at Tampa, were you?

A. No, sir; I was not.

Q. Well, at Fernandina and Jacksonville? Take up the Florida camps together and then take up the Porto Rico matter a little later and give in your own way what the conditions were, what your conclusions were, what had been, why it had been, etc.

A. Good, bad, and indifferent?

Q. Good, bad, and indifferent.

A. I first ascertained the location of the New York troops. I might say, as a preliminary, that I was sent South on the original request of the adjutant-general.

Q. Adjutant-general of the State of New York?

A. Yes, sir; owing to the great number of telegrams being sent him relative to the reported neglect and bad condition of the New York troops. I received these

instruction at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel within a few hours of my return from Porto Rico. I started that evening for Washington and visited, the following day, Camp Alger and Camp Loring.

Q. Give the dates, as far as you can—approximate dates.

A. The 20th of August. Knowing Major Briggs, of the Sixty-fifth Regiment, I went to him in the first instance and I made a tour of the sinks. He seemed highly gratified I should come upon him without any notification, and he had good reason to feel so, because the sinks were thoroughly policed in a way above criticism. The system is something like this: They were under guard, and each man was obliged to use the spade after using the sink, and as a consequence you could see nothing about the sinks objectionable, and flies had no opportunity of putting in their deadly work, which was the case in every camp I visited but this one. So much for the sinks. The next question which was brought to my notice was the lack of medical supplies, or, I might say, remedies, which should be provided to the surgeons at the regimental hospitals, which is not allowed at the camp. The reason given for the need of this branch of the hospital by the surgeon in charge was that there was a preliminary stage which they thought it was necessary to diagnose the cases coming down, as to whether or not they were malaria, which was prevailing at that time, and which is normal to the climate, or typhoid, or the initiatory state of those diseases, a chill usually followed by fever, a temperature ranging from 104 to 105 or 106. Major Briggs, who was, by the way, the sanitary inspector of the camp, informed me that within three days, under the use of strong remedies used for the purpose of breaking this difficulty up, quinine, etc., the men would often regain their feet and resume their duties.

Q. Major Briggs, whom you speak of—is he Dr. Briggs?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The surgeon of the regiment?

A. Yes, sir; Surgeon-Major Briggs. Dr. Briggs said he was unable to get certain remedies, very necessary to give these men during this interval, by which he was able to diagnose the cases; that he had made application, I think, for fully three weeks without being able to obtain them. The doctor, I believe, is now out of the service, so the Government can't do anything with him.

By General WILSON:

Q. They wouldn't do anything to him, anyway.

A. He is a very nice man, very conscientious, and wouldn't do anything to criticise the service whatever. I was at the first meeting of the board appointed by the Surgeon-General of the Army, at which time Major Briggs was on the stand, the point being to ascertain the cause of typhoid fever.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Yes, I know about that.

A. There was no definite conclusion arrived at at that time. After proving the source of the milk supply, vegetables, etc., the meeting adjourned. After this I asked the Major if he could locate the typhoid fever, and he said he thought he could. We took a carriage and went over to Fairfax Manor. He there showed me a small box reservoir, possibly 2 feet square, and in juxtaposition to it had been built one of twice the length and of about the same depth. The odor from this clear water was villainous, as that of a dead animal on a hot day. The doctor said the men were obliged to drink this when they were located in this camp; that his regiment and the Vermont regiment were located near this spring. I asked him if he had had the water analyzed, and he said he had been unable to obtain an analysis. I am speaking of that water. I took a direct line to the house. It was an old place, over 300 years old, I am told, 50 feet long, possibly, with an elevation of 6 feet, and that same terrible odor prevailed about the house. An old gentle-

man met us on the steps, and I asked him if he had ever had any sickness there, and he said "Never." That was a great surprise to me. There was a well near the house, and I asked the Major why they couldn't have this water, if it was all right. He said he thought it was all right, but they wouldn't allow them to use it. He stated that on Tuesday, in fact—Tuesday of the week I was there—he had sent a specimen of the water to Washington to the Army Museum, I believe, of which Major Smart was the head.

In fact, he had carried it there, requesting that he be telephoned to the next day as to the condition of this water. This was Saturday, and he hadn't heard from them yet. On my return that evening from Dunn-Loring I visited the Surgeon-General at his home. By the way, I had taken a list of the things that the Sixty-fifth needed, given me by Dr. Briggs, and I asked the General why it was that the Major couldn't obtain an analysis of the water, stating what I have just mentioned. He appeared to be very much astounded over it and made a note of it, also in regard to the remedies needed at the regimental hospital. Of course I said to him, "I understand you don't require any regimental hospital, which I think is a mistake; a mistake because I think the surgeon connected with the regiment has that personal feeling for the men by which he would naturally give more immediate attention to the regiment than those detailed to a division hospital." They needed also two tents besides the remedies. I presented this requisition to the Surgeon-General, and I will say this to his credit, that on my return, about ten days later, I found on my desk in Utica the report of a most thorough investigation in regard to my charges, if charges they might be called. In that report I found two things. One was that the surgeon—or the medical officer, if you wish—had more fear in reference to what the Government might do for his saying anything outside the line of the law than he had of bullets, for when this Major Briggs, I believe, or the officers connected with his regiment were asked about this requisition which I have presented, they equivocated and evidently showed fear that something would be done to them. I speak in reference to this report. The Surgeon-General mentioned in this report to me that of course I probably knew that regimental hospitals were not allowed by the Government. The position of sanitary inspector of Camp Alger seemed to be one which was very useful so far as the camp was concerned.

By General WILSON:

Q. May I interrupt you with a question as to that report, and ask what the result of the analysis of the water was? You stated Dr. Smart was to make an analysis of the water and that the surgeon had sent a copy of the report within ten days. Was there anything in regard to the analysis of the water?

A. Oh, he made no mention of that that I recollect. If there are any questions in regard to Camp Alger or Dunn-Loring, I would be glad to answer them.

Q. In what condition did you find the division hospital at Camp Alger, especially the one at Dunn-Loring?

A. I should consider the camp overcrowded.

Q. How many men were in a tent?

A. I am unable to say about that. My trip, as I told you, was more to investigate in regard to the New York troops than anything else, but of course I don't suppose you can attend to typhoid fever in camps as you can in a hospital in New York or other large cities. Of course the treatment now is largely to keep their temperature down, and there is no question but that there was not sufficient sponging and washing to keep down the temperatures of those men. I should say, I walked through, and I saw men there in raging fevers, with yellow skin, parched tongue, but we don't expect the men could be sponged off every two hours or every three hours or even every six hours through the day and night.

Q. They ought to have it; they used to get it.

A. Very good; then you can consider it criticism.

Q. As respects the typhoid fever, the medication is a matter of very small importance; I think you will agree with me in regard to that?

A. Well, I must decline to agree with that, because I think it is an important factor together with keeping the temperature down.

Q. As you observed the hospital, especially the Dunn-Loring one, you say it was overcrowded, but yet you are not able to say to what extent and whether it was really overcrowded under Army regulations. Do you know what is allowed, what number of sick in a hospital tent?

A. The number of sick in a hospital tent?

Q. Yes; what is the allowed number of sick to be put in a hospital tent?

A. I don't know, but I know what the arrangement would be down in Jacksonville. They were making tents for specially sick typhoid cases, and there were only four in a tent.

Q. The regulation allowance is six?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The medicines you speak of as being short, were they those which were more essential, or particularly drugs that were wanted for special purposes, or do you know?

A. They were remedies that were needed mostly for these fevers, don't you see, the chill and fever stage. I did know at the time just what they were, but I don't know now.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state what you observed at Jacksonville? Suppose you go to Jacksonville next.

A. Very well.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Before the Doctor leaves Camp Alger, I would like to ask a question in regard to that place.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You answered Dr. Conner concerning Camp Alger?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is your opinion as to the suitability of that ground for either a temporary or permanent camp?

A. I must differ from most of the reports I have read. I think the location was an excellent one for a camp. Of course this malarial feature is not desirable, but the soil is excellent for sinks, and this may have given me a very favorable impression of it.

By General WILSON:

Q. Before leaving Camp Alger, I would ask you a question about it. You said the major or surgeon exhibited rather some hesitancy in giving information before that board, for fear something might be done to him if he gave information?

A. I think that is the idea.

Q. Did he give you, as surgeon-general of the State, any reason for that?

A. That was simply an impression; I won't go any further.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Take the next camp—Chickamauga, if you will.

A. I went to Chickamauga on Sunday, and Monday morning I visited the Eighth Regiment. I think they were camped at Huntsville, that section of the camp. Colonel Chauncey was sick and Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers and Major Neff gave me information in regard to the regiment. I considered the sinks neglected when I visited them, inasmuch as the contents were all exposed. I asked him why they didn't make use of the dirt there and keep the flies away and the disagreeable odors, and he said that the spades were taken away by details from

higher places to do work in other parts of the camp, and that was about an everyday occurrence. He also stated he was unable to get 194 of his men into the division hospital, owing to the fact that the hospital was full. The day previous he had taken over 22 men and brought back 13, unable to get them in. He said there was to be an outmarch on Wednesday (this being Monday) of 60 miles, and he said it would be a terrible thing to allow these sick men to be left in camp. They couldn't go out on the march and there would be no one to attend to them.

Q. Did I understand you to say 60 miles or 75?

A. I think it was 60 miles; I am not sure.

Q. Was that march ever made?

A. Well, if you will excuse me, I will tell you about that in a moment. It might have been 30 miles; I don't know. It was either 30 or 60 miles they were to march. I thought it was 60, but it might have been 30; my memory is treacherous. He said to me, "Now, in order to prove the condition of these nearly 200 men, I will have a special sick call made." He did so. It was a very hot morning indeed, and as soon as I saw the men come up the various streets, in some instances two men bringing a third, and as soon as they formed in line—probably a line of 75 or 100 feet long, double—I was very sorry I allowed it. When I saw these men I walked rapidly along and told them to disperse immediately and go to their tents as soon as possible. They seemed to be in various stages of typhoid and malaria, with skin yellow and of various degrees of fever. Of course, it was a pitiable sight. I visited the Ninth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth that day, and in the evening I saw General Breckinridge at the hotel. I located him from a photograph I had seen. I had never met him before, and I introduced myself and asked him if the Eighth Regiment couldn't be excused from this march, as I felt it would be barbarous if those men were allowed to go out and these 194 left in camp with nobody to care for them. He said that if they didn't go out—it seemed to lay with another officer—he said I should have to see General Frank, or Colonel Frank, I don't know which it is.

Q. General Frank.

A. I told him I thought it was quite sufficient; I had wired the Secretary of War and wired the governor, and I thought that was sufficient and I would not see Colonel Frank. The next day the order was countermanded, and the troops didn't go out for some reason or other. I visited the Fourteenth Regiment, and found they had a very small sick list indeed, 77 only. As I called there were 16 cases of typhoid. Those were the result of three days' neglect. Before those three days they had been especially careful to have the water distilled and boiled. I had no criticism to make other than what I saw at the sinks. I stopped there, as usual, and there was an immense piece of meat there—it would weigh, I should think, 50 pounds—in the process of decomposition, in the drains of the sinks, covered with flies. Dr. Lindheim, I think, who subsequently died in New York, was there at the time I visited this camp, and I was also accompanied by Colonel Weyler. I remarked to the doctor that I thought that might be a source of infection. These flies would be carried to the kitchen, where I have seen them. The doctor didn't seem to think so. I said, "It is stated on pretty good authority that these flies can carry the bacilli of typhoid to the food, and if it is not baked or boiled afterwards, typhoid will result often. Typhoid is largely an infectious disease." The doctor didn't agree with me, and of course that ended the discussion. I have little to say in regard to the Ninth and Twelfth regiments, as I thought they were in very good condition. The officers of the Twelfth, by means of the profits of the canteen and allowing themselves to be assisted, had purchased a plant and purchased a large amount of lumber to floor their tents, and the Ninth was in very good condition. I thought the boys were homesick.

I was especially impressed at that place, and after talking with Colonel Weyler, who thought they were perfectly satisfied to remain in service and go wherever

the Government wished them to. I excused myself from him and visited seven of the tents offhand, so I couldn't be recognized as a military officer, and addressed them personally: "How are you, boys? Are you happy and contented—enjoying it?" I received this report from every one of those tents: "We didn't enlist for garrison duty; we want to go home." Of course I was surprised to think the Colonel didn't understand their feelings. I mention this little incident merely to show that I believe a medical officer, aside from issuing a circular and informing the surgeons under him what is best to do, and how they should do it, that he should follow it up and see that the contents of that circular or the instructions contained therein are carried out. I think there is where some irregularity is produced. It might be that nine out of ten officers in a given command might be competent and one man incompetent or negligent, without proper feeling, and he would break the link in carrying out those instructions, and the one link might be the means of condemnation. The water at Chickamauga—really it isn't necessary for me to say much about that question. I did visit the place where the polluted stream which contained the surface water of the camp entered Chickamauga Creek, and I was very much surprised, of course, to find the water was being dammed so near by where this stream entered into it.

Q. Did you find it entered above or below the intake?

A. I should think it was below the intake.

Q. Was there much current in the main stream?

A. I think there was considerable.

Q. How was that current—was it setting in favor of the stream or against it?

A. As I understand it, the stream moved in this [indicating] direction. The polluting stream came down this [indicating] way; right in there [indicating], and you had your temporary dam there. Perhaps you have seen it?

Q. Yes, I know it.

A. I should say it was 15 feet back, and possibly it was 50 feet at the left; I am giving it offhand; that was the way it was; and they were pumping their water for the Chickamauga camp from there. I don't know whether there were any eddies to permeate, to go through, this sand dam or not; I don't know; I don't say it was contaminated; I merely mention the fact that the filters were not considered good.

Q. Did you have occasion, by yourself or through anyone else, to examine the water used for the troops there?

A. No, sir.

Q. You took the reports that were there?

A. I simply saw this water.

Q. You saw the stream?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to taste the water?

A. No, sir; I didn't take any chances of that sort.

Q. Is there anything more about Camp Thomas?

A. I should like to say something complimentary about Camp Thomas.

Q. Please do so, sir. It is such an unusual thing that we would like very much to hear it.

A. I am told that Major Howard had charge merely of the construction of the hospital, and I really think it was as fine as the Sternberg Hospital, which I thought was really magnificent. The only things they had in addition were the electric fans, which I thought were elegant.

Q. Do you remember what time the Sternberg Hospital was opened?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it long before your visit, or just about the time of your visit?

A. I presume it hadn't been in existence for a great length of time, for they

were then constructing their tents and making their pavilions. This was on the 23d of August.

Q. Is there anything else that occurs to you on the subject of Camp Thomas—its sanitary conditions, etc.? Did you have any occasion to visit the other hospitals—division hospitals?

A. I think it was the First Division hospital, near the Eighth Regiment.

Q. Do you remember who was in charge of it at the time of your visit?

A. I don't remember. I was introduced to him.

Q. What condition did you find it in?

A. Of course I never had any observation before, previous to this war, in regard to how those things were. It was similarly conducted to the one in Camp Alger: not quite so well. I noticed dishes being washed in this yellow water, and I thought if the flies hadn't contaminated the food the dishes would.

Q. Then from Camp Thomas you passed where?

A. From Camp Thomas I visited Fernandina, Fla.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us what your observation was as to the fitness of that for a camp site; next, as to the provisions for the care of the sick that had been made, what the conditions were, and what was done for their development—in short, everything that concerns the Medical Department at the camp at Fernandina.

A. First, I noticed in regard to this place the source of the water. It was obtained, as I was informed, 600 feet—between 600 and 700 feet—below the surface of the earth. It was charged with hydrogen gas, which gave it a flavor. Perhaps you have noticed it. This soon evaporated, so that the water was quite agreeable, I am told. For the first time I drank water in this place, and my fever came on next day; but I can't say it was the water, because everyone around there, the health officer and everybody, stated that the water was absolutely pure aside from that peculiar taste, which was unobjectionable. The soil was sandy, and it was very easy to have proper sinks constructed; but there was the same neglect that I noticed in the other camps. I noticed the same thing there. I told Colonel Duffy how I thought the sinks should be taken care of, and he said he would introduce that method of policing the sinks and see that everybody performed his duty to the sink as well as to himself. The location is good, considering it as a location in the South. It was warm, and the beach being about a mile and a half distant made it very pleasant for the soldiers to go there and get their baths. I think Colonel Duffy was very considerate to the men. They would march along this beach, and in the marches he would often stop there and let the men get the benefit of the breeze. So, on the whole, I think it was a very fair location.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the general hospital?

A. I visited the general hospital.

Q. What condition did you find it in?

A. I didn't find it so crowded there as I did in other places. There were only a few sick at that place.

Q. Were any complaints made to you by the medical officers of your New York regiments as respects the medical supplies?

A. No, sir; I heard no complaints there.

Q. They would naturally have been made to you had there been any such complaints to be made?

A. I think so. I heard no complaints whatever.

Q. You then went to Jacksonville?

A. Yes, sir; I went to Jacksonville. I took the train there and Colonel Maus asked me to visit his hospital. I had known him for some time, so I visited his hospital. His hospital was conducted on rather a novel plan. I presume you are acquainted with it?

Q. Yes.

A. It was arranged in the form of a wheel, with the court in the hub, his headquarters in one of the spokes, etc. The doctor showed a very large amount of pride in the hospital, and I didn't know why the other officers hadn't the same arrangement. I understand, however, that he had entire charge of it, and so any officer he found who was inefficient was discharged and another put in his place. This man was put in the place according to his mental qualifications. I think Colonel Maus went further than others I have seen. He not only had his reports prepared in the most painstaking sort of a way, but he was a very active man, and visited these various places and noted the sanitary condition there in reference to the sinks, etc. The sanitary condition of the sinks was then bad, like those of other places. They had this tub system, which I think is abominable, and they had a large quantity of chloride of lime, but the flies were there just the same in the kitchens. They made their tours. If such a system has to be carried out in camp, it seems to me they should screen places of that sort in some way or other. I might take a journey back to Camp Black, and tell you that under, I think, Colonel Spencer the sanitary conditions there in regard to the sinks were carried out in a very painstaking way.

Q. What troops were stationed there, please?

A. The Two hundred and third, I believe. I was there the day before they left.

Q. It was a State camp?

A. No, sir; they are in the service. They are now in the South.

Q. This Camp Black was one of the State camps?

A. It was one of the State camps.

Q. I should be glad to hear whatever you have to say about such camps, but I hardly think any State camp comes under our consideration.

A. Very good. I believe that is all.

Q. Now will you tell us about Porto Rico, please?

A. I visited the military hospital in Porto Rico in connection with Colonel Senn, who was chief of the staff in the field. This hospital occupies a whole square. Perhaps you can get a better idea of that by using this little illustration.

Q. This is the one at Ponce?

A. Yes, sir. This shows the court. There [indicating] is the hospital. It is a beautiful place up on an elevation.

Q. Is this the old hospital or the convent?

A. This is the old hospital. It is an immense square hospital. In this court you see those soldiers.

Q. It has very thick walls?

A. Yes, sir. What I was going to say was that it was said there were 300 soldiers there. I rather doubted it. I should think, as I recall it, there were about four large wards; there might have been 250 to 275. This was in charge, as I understand, of Dr. Ten Eyck. He was asked if he had everything he wished, and he said he had. The first ward visited, I think, contained between sixty and seventy patients. They had one orderly. There wasn't another at the head of any cot. There wasn't a temperature taken. There wasn't a bath given, and there wasn't a change of garments. There wasn't anyone at all, as I could see, unless it was this orderly, to take charge of the intestinal difficulties, and they arose and took care of themselves. Of course this was a horrid place.

Q. What is this place you are talking about now?

A. That beautiful hospital at Ponce. I would like to direct your attention to the fact that I was informed a Major Bailey, of General Miles's staff, had charge of this hospital and Dr. Ten Eyck was carrying out his instructions. I was so informed.

Q. Is there a Dr. Bailey in service now?

A. Major Bailey; he must have been with General Greenleaf. I wish to say

right here in regard to General Greenleaf that I think he was just as painstaking in regard to the issuing of circulars in regard to what to do to prevent the continuance of those things as the Surgeon-General of the Army, but there seemed to be a lack of sending those directions down through and seeing that they were carried out. I think General Greenleaf was a very painstaking and careful man.

Q. Don't you mean William H. Daly, of Pittsburg, instead of Bailey?

A. Perhaps it was; I am not sure.

Q. I know he was down there.

A. Very well; it probably was him. I was astonished in view of the fact that we had asked if anything was wanted, and the Doctor said they had everything they needed. Mind you, this is the question I put to Ten Eyck. When I saw this, I don't know that I have any word to express the amount of neglect there. It was absolute neglect. To show you an instance, a soldier came up to me and said, "I don't know what I am going to do here. My brother is dead. I just happened to stop in here and found him dead. What shall I do to take him away? I don't know where they will put him; there are no records kept;" and I said, "You stay by him and take your chances." I was two days in this hospital with Colonel Senn, he diagnosing, taking the history of those cases. I wrote up for him 106 cases. We were there from 9 o'clock in the morning until 9 o'clock at night. It was pretty well noted that the typhoid fever was carried down there from Chickamauga. That was about the conclusion of it.

Q. Did you see anything of the other hospitals at Ponce or elsewhere?

A. I visited another hospital.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. This hospital you are talking about, was it at Ponce?

A. Yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What other hospital did you see?

A. I visited this hospital that has been converted from a clubhouse. Miss Chandler was the head of it. Some of the people were taken aboard the *Relief*. I visited the charity hospital, which had no soldiers at all, but it was a beautiful place, where some might have been placed—a beautiful place and beautifully conducted.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the hospitals elsewhere than at Ponce?

A. Yes, sir; I visited another place, where we took some soldiers. I had no particular criticisms to make of that. I think it was pretty well conducted. I visited one in the opera house, and I had no criticism in regard to that. I think the Red Cross people were there. They had quite good facilities.

Q. With the exception, then, of this hospital at Ponce the hospitals in Porto Rico were in fairly good condition?

A. Yes, sir; as soon as this was brought to the notice of Colonel Greenleaf—and it was within twenty-four hours—as soon as it was brought to the notice of Colonel Greenleaf, his son was placed there during our stay, and the process of locating by name on a card was instituted, but of course one man could hardly take charge of 250, to say the least.

Q. Do you know whether or not any considerable portion of the medical officers there at that time were sick?

A. I didn't hear that they were.

Q. So there ought not to have been any difficulty with detailing a sufficient number of medical officers to take care of the men?

A. I should say not.

Q. Was any reason given you why this hospital was left with a single medical officer, as I understand you to say it was?

A. No reason at all; simply a lack of consideration—of humanity. I can't understand such a condition of things.

Q. As near as you can remember or can recall, you think it was Dr. William H. Daly?

A. Well, he was on General Miles's staff, and Daly and Bailey are very much alike.

Q. He was there, and is a prominent man in connection with medical officers?

A. He is a very large man—a magnificent-looking man.

Q. Have you anything else, Doctor, to offer with reference to the observed faults or observed neglects or observed deficiencies? We want to get at the bad things; we don't care so much about the good.

A. I don't like to speak of this beautiful hospital ship, the *Relief*; I don't make any criticism particularly.

Q. Please tell us what you observed on the *Relief*.

A. Oh, there were things that I noticed. One was that I couldn't very well help listening to the conversation of these assistant surgeons who had charge of the wards. There seemed to be no definite plan of treatment coming from a common head. What the trouble was I don't know, but it was very evident each surgeon carried out his own ideas, which didn't seem to be the proper thing. I simply bring this to your notice casually. The second thing that struck me as being exceedingly irregular, in view of the fact that on the ship was Col. Nicholas Senn, who we probably all know is one of the greatest living surgeons, was this: A man had a common fracture of the right femur; Colonel Senn was invited to the operation, but he didn't go.

Q. Why not, if you know?

A. I asked him why he didn't go to the operation, and he said it was because he hadn't been consulted as to whether that operation should be done. The operation was done by a young surgeon, don't you see, and in view of the fact it was done only two days before we landed in New York, there being no urgent symptoms, Colonel Senn thought it was a very improper thing to do.

Q. And so expressed himself to you?

A. Yes, sir; he expressed himself so to me. I don't think Colonel Senn would care to speak of it.

Q. Who was the surgeon in charge?

A. Major Torney was in charge of the hospital ship. I wish Colonel Senn had been invited and had consented to come before this board.

Q. He has been before this board. We examined him and we got a full statement from him—not in reference to this matter, it being rather personal and ethical than anything else. He was a visitor on the ship; he was there by the grace of the commanding officer of the ship and traveling under orders.

A. I supposed he was there by authority of the Surgeon-General. I was there by the grace of the Surgeon-General; also that means the Government, does it not? I didn't understand that an officer can go aboard ship without the grace of the Government, and of course that means the Surgeon-General. I am giving you this and I don't think it is a personal matter at all, for I was there as a guest.

Q. Don't misunderstand me. I am simply speaking of the fact that Dr. Senn was probably there under orders, as you yourself were, and therefore under a permit granted, and as such he was a passenger on that ship. He had no authority nor right to be there, and while it might have been a breach of ethics, as I think it was, not to ask him to examine the case and consult upon the matter, at the same time he had no right.

A. Perhaps it would be just as well if I hadn't said that, then.

Q. Is there anything else, Doctor?

A. No, sir. I have said much more than I expected to say when I came before you.

By General WILSON:

Q. Would the custom of the service be that with a physician of Dr. Senn's standing, being a passenger on that ship, his suggestions would have been heeded, if he had made any?

Dr. CONNER. If I had been in charge of the case I would certainly have asked Dr. Senn's opinion and Dr. Terry's opinion without any question. Whether I should have accepted their opinions is another matter: that is an individual thing.

The WITNESS. In view of the eminence of Dr. Senn, I think it should have been done.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Doctor, you are an expert and were sent to these camps to discover what was the cause of the complaints that had been made, and we are a commission that is trying to find out all about these irregularities and who is to blame for them. From your investigation and from your knowledge of what you saw, were those irregularities that have been testified to by various witnesses in regard to various camps—were they chargeable to the Surgeon-General for not providing medicine, not giving suitable instruction, or are they chargeable to the men who didn't carry out his orders in regard to the sinks and in regard to proper food, etc.? Who is to blame, in your opinion?

A. I can find no instructions in regard to proper policing of sinks. When I say proper policing, I mean as I have spoken in reference to Camp Alger. That is the answer to one question. In reference to the Surgeon-General, as I remarked before, I think his instructions, on general principles, were all right and we have had a very good medical department; but had there been a sanitary inspector for each camp, and possibly one under the Surgeon-General, and had he been held responsible for everything pertaining to the health of the soldiers, it is quite probable that these suggestions and these circulars would have been of more use.

Q. In other words, they didn't pay enough attention to the orders given them, and you think they ought to have been checked up?

A. A general can't sit in his tent and write circulars; neither can a secretary know by sending out the circulars that the work will be done. I think someone should have been sent out to see that those orders were carried out, and in that way if you forced the medical officer to carry out his instructions, the probability is these instructions would be brought to the notice of the commanding officers, and in that way you would have a harmonious work in which both would do their duty.

Q. Still, you think there were a good many physicians, as on the *Relief* there, that didn't observe proper regulations?

A. I think, in regard to the *Relief*, they were young men and they probably did do the best they could; I am not saying they didn't do the very best they could; but I think there should have been a uniform treatment and some treatment under a given head.

Q. I want to ask you about typhoid fever. Do you think there was any difference in regard to the spread of typhoid fever in State camps and in the United States camps? Didn't you have a great deal of typhoid fever in Camp Black?

A. I don't think the record shows there was a great deal of typhoid fever there.

Q. There was some, though?

A. I think there was; but I think very few deaths; and this great breaking out of typhoid has been pretty well located at Chickamauga.

Q. You think that the typhoid fever originated at Chickamauga?

A. That is my judgment; I may be mistaken, but that is my judgment.

NEW YORK, November 26, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. L. W. QUINTARD.

Mrs. L. W. QUINTARD, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Kindly give us your full name and address, madam.

A. My name is Mrs. L. W. Quintard.

Q. You were at Camp Wikoff a portion of the time when that camp was in existence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For how long?

A. I was there from August 17 until September 15.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I went down in charge of the nurses.

Q. At what hospital were your personal services rendered, or had you general charge of the nurses at all the hospitals?

A. At the general hospital and the division hospitals. I was not supposed to have anything to do with the detention hospital.

Q. How many trained female nurses did you have at Camp Wikoff?

A. During the whole time I think I had about 150; I can't be sure of the number.

Q. Did you have enough for the needs of the hospitals that were under your direction?

A. Not at first.

Q. Was that occasioned by any difficulty in securing them, or was it indifference on the part of the commanding officer, or what was the cause of the insufficiency?

A. At first they didn't seem to think we were going to require more than 50 nurses; that was to be the outside number, and there was so much difficulty about us going down there, and the nurses had waited so long, that it was a little hard at first to get even that number together.

Q. What was the expectation as to the number of sick who would require attention?

A. I never heard that spoken of. They came down in such numbers that I think there were a great many more than they anticipated at first.

Q. The calculations were at fault as to the number?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many sick men were under the charge of each nurse on the average, say?

A. Well, at first I only had enough nurses to put two in every ward, and I think that there must have been from 40 to 50 patients at the same time in a ward.

Q. To what extent were the efforts of the nurses reenforced by the Hospital Corps, the soldiers who were detailed in the Hospital Corps; were they efficient or otherwise?

A. They were, as a rule, very inefficient.

Q. They had no previous training for the work?

A. Absolutely none, with the exception of a few.

Q. How did they serve as orderlies for the nurses? Were they ready and willing to do the drudgery of the wards under the nurses?

A. In a great many cases they were.

Q. So they were not only inefficient but unwilling?

A. In a great many instances.

Q. How were these men secured, do you know? Were they secured by detail?

A. By detail.

Q. After the men arrived in camp, or did they belong to a hospital corps detailed prior to their arrival in camp; do you know that?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Did you notice any difference between the men who were detailed from the regiments of the Regular Army and those made up from the volunteer regiments?

A. I didn't know the difference, whether they were volunteers or Regular Army men.

Q. What was the character, as to quantity, quality, and sufficiency, of the hospital supplies? And when I say that I mean furniture and bed linen, and the conveniences for caring for the sick, and all that.

A. We had very little at first. That, I think, was the fault of transportation. It was not any unwillingness we should have it, but we simply couldn't get it there. Latterly we had everything we required.

Q. There was no lack on the part of the ability of the Medical Department to furnish these things, was there?

A. They couldn't furnish them if they were not on the ground.

Q. You mean to furnish them for transportation at this end?

A. No, sir; they told us we could have everything we wanted. The willingness was there, but we didn't get the things.

Q. The difficulty was either in transporting them from here to Montauk or in opening the cars and having them delivered after the cars arrived there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If there was delay in securing these things, then in your judgment it was the fault of the Quartermaster's Department in the matter of transportation rather than in the Medical Department in furnishing what was needed?

A. That I don't know. I know I didn't get the things.

Q. Did you visit all the wards of the general and division hospitals every day?

A. Not the division hospitals; some of those hospitals were three-quarters of a mile away, and I had no conveyance. We had a nurse in charge of each one. The other hospitals, I tried to get into every ward at least once a day, but I had 43 wards at one time.

Q. What was the character of the services rendered by the nurses in these wards; good or otherwise?

A. Excellent; I can't say enough about the service they rendered.

Q. What was the character of the medical attendance rendered by the surgeons in charge?

A. As a rule I should think it was good, very good, judging of what I know of the hospital work.

Q. Was there any inefficiency or inattention or incapacity on the part of the medical men, so far as you observed their conduct and attention?

A. That is rather a leading question for me to answer.

Q. I know, but that is the kind of information we want.

A. I don't feel competent to judge of the doctors' work, and in such an immense work as that I couldn't keep up with the details.

Q. And yet with your experience you have a pretty good idea of whether a doctor is a doctor or not?

A. Well, I think some of them were very poor. I shouldn't care to say who.

Q. Well, in general, were they officers who had been in the service and were accustomed to the service, or were they those who had been hired in the emergency?

A. I am speaking of the contract doctors, the young contract doctors.

Q. Do you know to what extent the contract doctors were examined prior to their appointment? Do you know anything about that?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. What was the general character of the sickness, the diseases from which the men were suffering?

A. Typhoid fever, malaria, sometimes a complication of both, and a few cases we had of pneumonia, and a few cases of diphtheria; measles, very few; but it was nearly all malaria and typhoid fever.

Q. Did you have the facilities for caring for typhoid-fever patients in the way that is recognized as proper?

A. I think as well as it possibly could have been under the circumstances in a camp hospital.

Q. What is your experience as to the treatment of typhoid: is a hospital tent as good as an inclosed ward?

A. Better, if the weather is favorable.

Q. Well, under the conditions as they existed at Montauk, what would be your opinion as to that: that they were better off under canvas than they would have been in a ward in an inclosed hospital?

A. Decidedly. I think the great lack there was in not taking the typhoid cases and placing them in wards by themselves. The patients were too mixed up; there was no selection made at all.

Q. That would have simplified the nursing and increased the efficiency?

A. Yes, and the safety of other patients.

Q. Have you knowledge of any individual cases of patients who were neglected either as to nursing or as to medical attendance?

A. No, I have not; I can't say we did. I don't think they had as much nursing as we could have given them, as good care as we might have given if we had had more nurses in the beginning; but after the 1st of September, when we had plenty of nurses, I think our sick patients had every attention.

Q. Well, was the lack of nurses at the beginning one of those unavoidable things which it is difficult to obviate, or could it have been obviated by energy and persistency on the part of the Medical Department?

A. It certainly could. It was very difficult for us to get in there at all. I received my appointment from Washington about the 1st of August and I didn't get down there until the 13th of August. We had nurses waiting, paying their board here in the city, waiting to go down. On the 13th I went down to see why we were not sent for, and they told us we would be down in about two weeks. Of course we all realize what those two weeks were from the 14th of August to the 13th of September.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us who it was who told you that you wouldn't be wanted or gave you to understand you wouldn't be wanted for two weeks?

A. Colonel Forwood.

Q. Who kept you away as long as you were kept away?

A. I was told to report in one week; they finally sent for us.

Q. You received no communication from him that you were not needed?

A. No, sir.

Q. You went on the 17th and reported for duty?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you reported for duty, at that time, was there a very considerable number of patients in the wards, or were the wards practically empty?

A. I think there were between 600 and 700 patients.

Q. They had been accumulating there during a period of how long?

A. The first patient, I think, went down about the 1st of August.

Q. Hardly as soon as that, I think.

A. Well, I don't know exactly.

Q. I want you, Mrs. Quintard, if you please, to tell us when these wards were,

as you have stated, turned over practically to the care of a single nurse, with how many attendants—two, four, or how many?

A. You mean the hospital attendants?

Q. Yes.

A. Sometimes two in the day and two at night. That was only for a few days.

Q. A few days after the 17th only?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during that time do you think it possible for any one nurse with that amount of assistance to properly care for forty or fifty seriously ill men?

A. No, sir. We hadn't forty or fifty seriously ill in the wards. There were forty or fifty in the wards, but I couldn't tell you the proportion that was seriously ill, but they were not all.

Q. Was it such a proportion that they could not be properly cared for by the nursing force available?

A. It certainly was.

Q. When you arrived there did you find that hospital properly provided with those appliances in the way of commodes, bedpans, hot-water bottles, and everything that was required for the proper care of the sick?

A. Well, for the number of tents they had at that time the commodes were enough. There was about one basin for each ward, and they had to use that for bathing and all purposes. There wasn't a hot-water bottle there that I could find. We all took hot-water bottles with us. There wasn't a hypodermic syringe in the place. There wasn't a clinical thermometer to be found.

Q. In the hospital?

A. In the hospital.

Q. How soon were these deficiencies made up?

A. They got some clinical thermometers quite soon, but we took down those things with us, so we had them at once.

Q. The nurses are expected always—each nurse—to have her own thermometer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see evidences of overcrowding in any of those tents?

A. Yes; the tents were built for—they were supposed to hold five in a section, and I think they are intended to hold thirty patients in a whole section.

Q. Those tents were end to end, were they?

A. Yes, sir. We often had fifty or sixty patients in there, not for any considerable length of time, but they were put in there.

Q. Did you at any time see ten patients in any one hospital tent?

A. There were nearly always eight.

Q. But did it exceed eight at any time, think you?

A. Yes, sir; I think sometimes for a night, while they were getting patients away the next day; I shan't be positive about that, though.

Q. Were they at the time of this overcrowding, for such it was, without any question, were they putting up extra tents as rapidly as possible?

A. Yes, sir; the tent building was going on all the time.

Q. Was there any reason assigned why it shouldn't have gone on twice as fast as it did?

A. No, sir; I didn't ask.

Q. You didn't hear from anyone in authority?

A. No, sir.

Q. A complaint has been made that the patients were very much incommoded in the latter part of the time by the noises of the carpenters erecting pavilions. You were there at the time the work was going on, were you not?

A. Yes, sir; I think that was so to a great extent, but I don't know that it would be so any more than in any hospital where building is going on next to it.

Q. Were the grounds so constructed that it was necessary to put the pavilions up in close relation with the tent hospital already existing?

A. No, sir; there was plenty of ground, but the floors were already there; they took down the tent hospitals and put up frame buildings.

Q. They simply changed, in other words, the covering?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From canvas to boards?

A. Yes, sir; and it certainly was much the quickest plan, and it kept the hospitals together.

Q. In the latter weeks of your stay did you find any lack of hospital supplies?

A. In the latter weeks, no; I think not. I think we had plenty for that kind of a hospital.

Q. By the 1st of September the difficulties had been corrected, are we to understand?

A. Yes, sir; to a great extent. If it had been a permanent hospital, the supplies would not be sufficient.

Q. In what respect?

A. The utensils such as hospitals furnish—dishes, knives, and forks, and everything of that kind. The laundry was not running, and that made us very short of bed linen.

Q. Were the sheets in the early weeks of your stay there laundered or burned?

A. They were burned.

Q. Do you know whether an accumulation of them was permitted for a considerable length of time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was the soiled bedclothing put?

A. It was put under the wards.

Q. Just pushed under the floor?

A. No; the soiled clothes, the foul clothes, were always burned.

Q. At once?

A. At once, yes. They were taken away and the other clothes were put on the rafters underneath the tent or tents. In some instances the tents were quite a good deal above the level of the ground. There were boards put across and these clothes put there.

Q. Are we to understand this clothing that was put under the tent was soiled in the ordinary acceptance of the term, but not soiled in a hospital way?

A. No, sir; it was not fouled.

Q. It was not burned. Was there or was there not any material harm in leaving that soiled clothing under the tents for a week or three or four days, or even for so many weeks?

A. I don't think it is a good plan.

Q. I think without any question that you are right. Did it actually harm the patients?

A. I don't think it did.

Q. Had the soiled bed linen been that which was soiled by the excreta of typhoid or other patients would it have been burned at once or would it have been put under the tents?

A. Burned at once.

Q. So that which was dangerous was got rid of immediately and that which could be kept was kept until it was washed?

A. I think finally they burned a great deal of that. It became water-soaked under the tents, and it would have been impossible to use it, and it was burned.

Q. Did you hear any reason why that laundry plant hadn't been put up long before?

A. No. We were promised it every three days from the time I went down there until it started. I never heard anything about it.

Q. Was it in working order when you left?

A. It was in working order after a fashion.

Q. But not in good working order?

A. I never saw the laundry, and I don't know what their materials were.

Q. You know it was not in complete and thorough working order at the time you left the hospital?

A. It was not.

Q. Do you know how early an attempt was made to have that laundry put up?

A. I don't know; they had started it before I went there.

Q. How far away was it, in the first place, and in the next place what sort of a building was it?

A. I didn't see the building; it was somewhere near the station; it must have been a mile away, at least, if not more.

Q. It has been stated that your wards at Montauk were, so to speak, a place of common resort; that everybody was walking in and out at all hours of the day, on business and without any business?

A. That was so at first.

Q. How long did that condition continue?

A. I can't say exactly, but I should say about a week or ten days. I made a great many remonstrances about that thing. The public seemed to take the place by storm, coming down and walking in and out of the wards and the platform between the wards. The long corridor running down was a thoroughfare for everyone.

Q. It was a place of resort for everybody?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It was the latest show of the season, apparently?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the order was issued restricting the visitors, do you know what its provisions were?

A. That none should enter the wards unless they had personal friends or relatives, and then it was to be by order of Dr. Brown.

Q. He was the surgeon in charge of the hospital?

A. Yes, sir; he was the surgeon in charge.

Q. Did that very materially lessen the number of visitors?

A. It did.

Q. Did you yourself observe that the men were seriously incommoded or disturbed at any time by the throng of visitors in the early weeks?

A. They certainly were.

Q. Do you of your own knowledge know whether or not strong influences were brought to bear upon the authorities of the hospital to furlough men who were unfit to travel?

A. They were.

Q. By whom?

A. I can't go into the different cases, but there were a great many people there besieging the office constantly to have the men furloughed so they could go home. Others came and wanted to take away men by twenties and twenty-fives to different places, and that was a constant thing. Dr. Brown, I know, was simply besieged with those requests.

Q. Did he or did he not grant those requests?

A. In a great many instances they were granted.

Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not he granted in any instances a furlough contrary to his own good judgment?

A. I never discussed that matter with Dr. Brown.

Q. You never heard him express an opinion?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did the removals, those effected, enable the work of the hospital to be carried on more effectually?

A. I don't think so. I think if they had taken away some of the patients who were up and around, provided for them, giving us plenty of scope to attend to the sick patients, it would have been a benefit.

Q. As it was, they took away sick patients and left those who were able to walk about?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that in a large measure?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please state whether you ever observed any instance of neglect or inattention on the part of any medical officer there?

A. I never did. I think the doctors were exceedingly kind to the patients. I have known some of the young doctors to sleep in the wards where they had very severe cases, and do orderlies' work.

Q. You have had a wide experience in hospitals and have observed the manner of caring for the sick?

A. I have had experience in two large hospitals as nurse.

Q. Do you or do you not think that in proportion to the number of nurses and the aid that the nurses had that those men were as well cared for, as well nursed, as they could have been elsewhere?

A. Well, we hadn't as large a proportion of nurses, to begin with, as we should have had in a city hospital.

Q. Taking into consideration the number of nurses and number of attendants to each nurse, the aid she had—taking that into consideration—were the men as well cared for as they would be in an ordinary general hospital?

A. They were. The one thing, the nurses were exceedingly enthusiastic about it; I never knew one to go off duty and leave a patient needing care.

Q. Did you or did you not observe any instance of wrongdoing in any way as respects the policing—that is, the keeping clean of the place, the looking after the necessary details of the tents or doing what was called for by the men themselves—did you notice anything which was out of the way?

A. You mean by the patients themselves?

Q. No, by the attendants.

A. There was no policing done at first when I went there, but after the first week there was and the place was kept clean.

Q. Do I understand you that no policing was done between the 17th and 24th?

A. Very little; the place was in a very bad condition.

Q. What was done with the excreta and refuse and slops and whatnot?

A. That the orderlies were required to take away to the sinks; all that was carried away by the orderlies.

Q. Was that carried away promptly, or was it allowed to accumulate?

A. It was carried away fairly promptly when we had orderlies, but there was a good deal of the time that we were very short of orderlies. I have had reason to complain very often by reason of the commodes standing around.

Q. Needing attention and yet not having received it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And as respects the cleaning up of the wards themselves—were the floors cleaned; were they washed or scrubbed?

A. They were mopped up.

Q. Was it done frequently?

A. Not often.

Q. How often were the bedclothes changed?

A. We changed the sheets whenever we could get them to put on.

Q. That means how often?

A. There was no regular time. A great many patients had no sheets; we kept the sheets for the very sick patients.

Q. A goodly number had no sheets at all?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it altogether because you couldn't supply them or because the men preferred to sleep on blankets?

A. Because we couldn't supply them.

Q. You kept your sheets for the cases that most needed them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you able to change those sheets as often as was necessary?

A. No, sir.

Q. In what proportion of cases were you not able to change them as often as you should have done?

A. I couldn't give the details.

Q. Well, approximately?

A. I shouldn't like to say.

Q. You simply know the fact they were not changed as often as necessary?

A. They were not.

Q. Was it a fact, to your knowledge, that an individual, in a case of typhoid fever, we will say, remained for a period of two days without his sheets being changed?

A. Not in the general hospital.

Q. How was it in the division hospitals?

A. You mean down there?

Q. Yes.

A. Oh, well, we only changed the sheets when we were really obliged to, when they were very soiled and we had to change them.

Q. How was it respecting the men? Were they left in their own underclothing, or was fresh clothing furnished them?

A. They had fresh clothing.

Q. Was that in abundance?

A. We got it in abundance. We didn't get it always from the Army.

Q. You had it from the beginning of your stay in abundance?

A. Yes, sir; I think we had plenty always.

Q. How often, as a rule, was the clothing of the men changed—the men in the hospital?

A. That I couldn't tell you. They wore pajamas, and we didn't change them, of course, unnecessarily.

Q. Do you know any reason why sheets were not there in sufficient quantities?

A. It would have taken a thousand sheets a day if we kept all our patients in sheets. We were burning them up, and it was rather hard to supply enough.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in sending away that soiled clothing and having it laundered elsewhere?

A. Yes, sir; I think there would have been.

Q. How; why?

A. I think, in the first place, very few laundries would care to have taken them. I think the city would have been up in arms if clothing of that kind had been sent away.

Q. Was there any difficulty in obtaining all the sheets and pillowcases that were needed here in New York, for example, or in Boston?

A. Not at all; it was a question of transportation and the enormous number we were using. I think the Army could hardly have estimated what we were going to require every day.

Q. You had, as a maximum, how many patients?

A. I couldn't tell you.

Q. Two thousand at any one time?

A. No, sir; 1,600 is the most I know of, or 1,800 I know of, at one time.

Q. That means 3,200 sheets a day, does it, if every man had his bed linen changed every day?

A. We should never change the bed linen of every patient in the hospital every day.

Q. Supposing you had 1,600 patients in the hospital, how many sheets a day would be required?

A. I should say 1,000 a day.

Q. That means 30,000 sheets in thirty days?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would it have been difficult to have bought 30,000 or even 300,000 sheets in New York and Boston at any time?

A. I should think not.

Q. Then aside from the transportation question, as I understand you, there was no particular reason why they shouldn't have been there?

A. That I don't know. They couldn't understand why we were using so many sheets. It is very difficult to make people understand these things. We were getting an enormous number of sheets all the time.

Q. Isn't it probable that, for example, the Surgeon-General or some one having authority in the medical supply department in Washington would know what was needed for the hospital?

A. No, sir; I don't think they ever had had such an emergency before to contemplate.

Q. Those gentlemen, several of the gentlemen at the head of the Medical Department of the Army, were familiar with the demands of military hospitals of larger size than that at Montauk, knew what was done and knew what had been done; why couldn't they have provided you with the sheets that were needed; do you know?

A. I couldn't tell you.

Q. You only know they didn't?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would it have made any material difference, think you, whether those men had had sheets or not?

A. No, sir; I don't think it would have made any material difference, but it caused a great many ruined blankets.

Q. Was it a question of waste rather than damage to the sick?

A. It was a question of waste and the appearance of our wards. I don't think the patients have suffered for want of sheets.

Q. The men would recover as quickly under the conditions which existed as if they had had all the sheets and blankets they wanted?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to observe at all the men who went away, while they were in transit—did you come to New York at all?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you came to New York—left Montauk—were you on a train carrying sick?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to see the sick on the train?

A. Yes, sir; one or two; one or two were brought into the parlor car; they didn't seem to be right up to the mark, and they were taken to the Red Cross Hospital.

Q. You are familiar with the conditions which prevail along Long Island Sound, are you not, as respects the weather?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that place at Montauk as likely to be as good a place for a hospital as any place on either shore of Long Island?

A. In my opinion it was a perfect place for a hospital.

By General McCook:

Q. Mrs. Quintard, did Dr. Forwood ever give you an explanation why it was that you were delayed so long in reaching the hospital in Montauk?

A. He said he was not ready for me; he hadn't our quarters built, and he wanted to have the nurses there when they could have everything comfortable; he would rather provide that.

Q. Do you think that was the proper thing to do, or don't you think it was a necessary thing to do; do you or do you not?

A. The Red Cross would have had tents up for the nurses long before, but he didn't wish them to do it.

Q. Dr. Forwood didn't?

A. I think he wanted the Army to take care of the nurses.

Q. I think Dr. Forwood swore that the reason he didn't have the nurses there was because he didn't have any proper place to take care of them?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. When you went there on the 14th, how many patients were in the hospital?

A. I am not sure; I think about 400.

Q. Were you there under the auspices of the Red Cross Society?

A. I got my appointment from General Sternberg.

Q. You didn't go as a Red Cross representative, then?

A. No, sir. At that time the Auxiliary Relief and the Red Cross were working together, providing nurses; I went in that way.

Q. Was any requirement made of you by any person connected with the Army, or was there any such requirement made of any of the nurses, so far as you know, that you should not divulge anything as to the abuses you observed?

A. Not at all; I never heard of it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Mrs. Quintard, is there any matter which you can give us information about upon which we have not questioned you; is there any statement you want to make, or any suggestion?

A. I want to say this, that while Colonel Forwood didn't want us to come down at the time we came, of course it was very necessary we should come down there. After we went there he did everything in the world that he could for the nurses to make them comfortable, and there was no restriction in regard to the number of nurses. He told me to get all the nurses I wanted, and he seemed very anxious the nurses should come there, and provided tentage for us, and did all he could.

Q. Were the nurses in every respect properly cared for there, so that they could take proper care of themselves?

A. I think as far as they could in a camp hospital. We didn't go down there expecting to find things as we have them in a hospital. We knew the sick were the first consideration. Our meals were served in the general kitchen for two weeks; the kitchen where every meal was cooked for all the patients, officers and nurses and convalescent patients; they all received their rations there. Of course that was not a very comfortable place for our meals. I never heard a nurse

grumble about it. I never heard them say they thought they were abused in being asked to take their meals there. As soon as possible Colonel Forwood had a dining-room tent put up and we had our own kitchen, and that was running by the 1st of September, I think.

Q. Were all the proprieties duly observed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there an opportunity for the care and needs of the person to be attended to in any way?

A. In the first place, when we went down there there were no toilet accommodations. That was attended to as soon as possible. We have no complaint to make about that. We went down there knowing these sick men were there and we expected to find for ourselves very little comfort.

Q. Were you disappointed in that expectation?

A. No, sir; but there isn't a nurse who wouldn't do it again.

NEW YORK, November 26, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MISS ALICE B. BABCOCK.

Miss ALICE B. BABCOCK, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Please give us your full name and address.

A. Alice B. Babcock; 58 West Fifty-seventh street, New York City.

Q. Did you have any experience at Camp Wikoff?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was your experience there?

A. At Camp Wikoff?

Q. Yes.

A. I went with the Red Cross and my principal experience was the lack of having transportation for the men.

Q. When did you reach there, and how?

A. I went by train from Long Island City; about the 10th of September, I think it was.

Q. What has been your previous experience with the Army?

A. On the transport *Concho*, from Siboney to New York.

Q. When did you leave Siboney and when did you reach New York?

A. On the 23d of July we left Siboney, and we got to New York on the 31st of July.

Q. Where did you board the *Concho*, at Santiago or Siboney?

A. Siboney.

Q. Who was in charge of the vessel; do you know?

A. The captain, do you mean?

Q. No; the medical officer.

A. Dr. Lesser.

Q. Any officers of the Army aboard who had any military supervision of the men?

A. No; not that I know of.

Q. How many passengers had you aboard, and how many of them were soldiers and how many civilians?

A. There were about 176 soldiers altogether, including about 18 officers, and I think there were four or five newspaper reporters, besides Dr. and Mrs. Lesser.

Q. Do you know who the senior military officer aboard was; that is, the ranking officer?

A. No; I don't know.

Q. Any other Red Cross representatives except yourself and Dr. Lesser?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many?

A. Mrs. Lesser and three of her sisters, who had been ill, and two assistants and myself.

Q. You don't include the Sisters of Charity in your enumeration of the nurses?

A. No, sir; I didn't include them.

Q. What provision had been made for those aboard the transport at Santiago before you sailed from there; do you know?

A. None that I know of.

Q. Had any representative of the Red Cross or any military officer, medical or otherwise, looked after the water supply?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did you make any inquiry about the water supply before you left?

A. Did I?

Q. Yes; or any representative of the Red Cross that you know of?

A. I don't know.

Q. What was the water supply, as a matter of fact?

A. Very bad: about the worst that could be; it was even repulsive; the odor was bad; it had been on there for three months.

Q. What food supplies were taken aboard at Santiago?

A. I don't know at Santiago; I know only about Siboney; the army rations at Siboney.

Q. Were there any put aboard at Santiago?

A. I don't know.

Q. Well, did the representatives of the Red Cross look after any provisions for themselves at Santiago?

A. I don't know about that part of it. The transport, as I understood—it was their provision; they should provide the people who go as passengers.

Q. You expected the captain or the quartermaster of the transport himself to do that?

A. Yes, sir; the captain of the transport, as I understand, attends to the supplies.

Q. How did that pan out in practice?

A. Very bad. I lived on stewed tomatoes for three days; it was all bad.

Q. What food supplies were put aboard the vessel at Siboney, did you notice?

A. Army rations; barely enough to carry us through.

Q. Do you know whether there were any delicacies for the sick of any kind?

A. Only such as Mrs. Lesser brought with her, which were very few.

Q. Had you any knowledge of any supplies, previously prepared at Siboney, put aboard for the sick?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you knowledge that there were no such supplies?

A. I didn't see any.

Q. Did you give personal supervision to the sick during the journey?

A. Yes.

Q. What had you aboard to be given them—given the sick?

A. Only some cereals that Mrs. Lesser brought—about two packages oatmeal or Quaker oats, or something like that.

Q. How many sick were taken aboard at Siboney, including those who were supposed to be sick?

A. Who couldn't walk themselves?

Q. Yes; and those who were supposed to be under a surgeon's care.

A. I should think there were 25 which were brought aboard. They were all sick, more or less.

Q. How many turned out to be sick?

A. I think the second day out most every man on the ship was sick—needed some attention of some kind.

Q. What was the character of the sickness, malaria or otherwise?

A. Typhoid and malaria.

Q. Were any of the so-called convalescent typhoid patients aboard?

A. Yes, sir; many of them.

Q. Do you know what proportion were convalescents—typhoid?

A. I think about 7 convalescent typhoid patients came on board.

Q. Was there any proper diet aboard the vessel for men in their condition?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. When did you reach New York on the *Concho*?

A. On Sunday morning, the 31st of July.

Q. Was the voyage longer than usual?

A. Yes; because we stopped at Hampton Roads.

Q. For how long?

A. Two and a half days, I think. We got there Wednesday night and left Friday afternoon.

Q. Did the quantity of food put aboard at Siboney last until you reached New York?

A. I think not entirely.

Q. So that, in your judgment, then, there was not only no provision made for the sick, no adequate provision, but there was not adequate provision of any kind for the number aboard?

A. That is what I think; yes, sir.

Q. Were you ashore at Siboney?

A. No, sir.

Q. You don't know, then, how the provisions for the voyage were apportioned or sent aboard, or by whose direction?

A. No, sir; I do not.

Q. How were the men lodged on the *Concho*?

A. They were put in miserable little bunks that were put as close together as that [indicating], so it was difficult to give the men a drink of water without striking their heads, almost entirely without mattresses or even clothing; right close together, so you couldn't walk between them—between the bunks.

Q. Had they the liberty of the upper deck during the day?

A. Oh, yes; any time; those who were able.

Q. Did any of the men take advantage of that during the night and sleep up there?

A. Yes, sir; plenty of them slept up there.

Q. How many died during the voyage?

A. Six.

Q. Of what?

A. Typhoid. I think two of them died because they had food given them when they shouldn't have had it; not proper food. One of the boys died from blood poisoning, because we had absolutely nothing to take care of him, with no medical supplies of any kind.

Q. What was done with the bodies—buried at sea?

A. Buried at sea. The first one who died was buried after we got to Hampton Roads; the other two died as we were approaching Hampton Roads, so we couldn't bury them. We had to keep them there a day and a half before we could go out and bury them, and as we were returning the fourth died, and we returned and buried him.

Q. They were buried on the land, you mean?

A. No, sir; we went out to sea and buried them. They wouldn't allow us to go ashore at Hampton Roads.

Q. Do you know how many of the men who were aboard the transport died subsequently? Have you any knowledge on that subject?

A. No, sir; I think not; no positive knowledge.

Q. Was the recovery of these men retarded and their health seriously injured by the conditions which existed on board the *Concho*, in your judgment?

A. I should say so, decidedly.

Q. Anything else you would like to say on the subject?

A. I should like to say that we had no medical supplies, at least very inadequate medical supplies. After the fourth day everything gave out—quinine and sulphur and everything. There was nothing to work with. We couldn't really do any nursing, because we had absolutely nothing to nurse with. We could just cheer them up, do what we could, give them this bad water to drink, which was not very good for them, of course.

Q. Is there any other statement as to the *Concho* or Camp Wikoff which you would like to make?

A. No; I think I have said it all. There were no mattresses, no blankets, no medical supplies; that was the condition of things—supplies inadequate in every way on the *Concho*. Transportation was lacking after we had come to Wikoff.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you say you had charge of the transportation at Camp Wikoff?

A. No. It fell to my lot to look after it. I was by the station, in the Red Cross tent. They put up a sort of hospital tent there, the Red Cross, and my work was there, and right practically across the Red Cross tent was the transportation tent, so it really fell to my lot to look out for transportation for the men who came down, many of them ill and too weak, really, to be sent away. Still they came down, and often their transportation papers were not properly made out. It happened more often than otherwise, and they were there from early in the morning until late in the afternoon before they got away, with no provision having been made for feeding them. The Red Cross tent had been opened there.

Q. The Red Cross tent was there for the purpose of supplying them with food and things of that kind?

A. Yes. I don't know whether that was known to the authorities or not.

Q. In relation to this transportation, you say a great many mistakes were made in their furloughs?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were those furloughs made out, at the hospital or in their regiments?

A. They were made out—the furloughs, I believe, were made out in the hospital if they came from the hospital: then they had to go and get their rations at the transportation tent.

Q. They received the commutation of rations, \$1.50 a day?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And their transportation?

A. Yes, sir. There was a great delay in getting those men off, so the men were kept all day waiting sometimes; often kept over night.

Q. Were you able to make those men that were kept there, kept there over night, comfortable?

A. Yes, sir; we tried to.

Q. Did you see any suffering there at the station on account of the men not having proper attention?

A. Yes, sir; it seemed to me so.

Q. That is, the delay?

A. Yes, sir. Why, a great many men, as I say, were weak, very feeble, some going from one hospital to the other.

Q. Going without anybody in charge of them?

A. No, sir; sometimes they had somebody in charge and sometimes they were simply sent from one hospital to the other.

Q. Without anybody in charge of them?

A. Oh, no; they had some one in charge of them; some one who came to get them; sometimes it was a doctor and sometimes I don't know who had them.

Q. Did that class of men—did you take them into your Red Cross tent and take care of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When their furloughs were made out properly, how long did it take to obtain their transportation and commutation?

A. That depends upon the number. They would have a great many sometimes; sometimes forty or fifty. If they only sent them fifteen or twenty minutes before the train went, they naturally couldn't go on that train.

Q. Were not the trains held there for the purpose of taking them?

A. They couldn't hold them very long; not more than five or ten minutes. They were very good about doing that.

Q. Is there anything that you have to say, Miss Babcock, anything that you can give us any information on where we have not questioned you?

A. I will speak about the graveyard, about the names on the headstones. They were not attended to until I happened to notice it by chance. That was then about the 15th of September, I think, and they were only marked in lead pencil.

Q. Do you know how they are marked now?

A. I don't know.

By General McCook:

Q. Do you know a lead-pencil mark will last longer than anything? Did you know that? I didn't know it until recently. It will last longer, a record on a book.

A. And on wood?

Q. Yes; I think so.

A. Than marking ink? I didn't know it.

NEW YORK, November 26, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH F. CHMELICEK.

Dr. JOSEPH F. CHMELICEK, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Please give your full name and present address.

A. Joseph F. Chmelicek, 204 East Seventy-second street.

Q. What is your profession, Doctor?

A. I am a physician and surgeon.

Q. What experience, if any, did you have with our Army during the late war?

A. Well, I spent a whole month down at the Second Division hospital of the Fourth Army Corps at West Tampa; also six weeks at the Third Division hospital of the Fourth Army Corps at Fernandina.

Q. How many sick had you in the hospital at West Tampa?

A. In all 476.

Q. What facilities had you for caring for them?

A. We had hired a convent for hospital purposes, with ample ground around it, and when the convent was filled we built tents, in all about twenty tents. hospital tents.

Q. What had you in the way of medical supplies for attending upon the sick?

A. Well, the medical supplies were amply sufficient.

Q. What did you have in the way of hospital facilities—beds, bedding, bed clothing, personal clothing for the men, bedpans, commodes, cuspidors, thermometers, hot-water bottles, everything for the hospital, for careful nursing?

A. We had everything in abundance, but the most part of it came from the Red Cross people.

Q. What was the general character of the sick? What was the nature of the diseases from which they were suffering in general?

A. Typhoid fever.

Q. Did you have the facilities for caring for those cases according to modern ideas?

A. We did.

Q. What was the character of the medical attendants, Doctor, of the faculty and the profession?

A. I believe it was the best I would like to have for myself.

Q. Have you any knowledge of any individual cases in which men were neglected, either by the physician or by the nurses or by the hospital attendants, in any way?

A. Well, in the beginning we didn't have enough orderlies, and it caused a great deal of hardship upon the orderlies, and they soon succumbed to the strain.

Q. They were overworked, were they?

A. Yes, sir; and they took sick themselves.

Q. How was that remedied?

A. Well, by volunteers from the different regiments.

Q. Did you have any female nurses in your hospital?

A. We had nine.

Q. Were they efficient or otherwise?

A. Well, most of them were efficient.

Q. What was there at the hospital at Tampa, Doctor, that in your judgment calls for adverse criticism?

A. Well, I wouldn't say there is anything that could be criticised, but I would suggest that in building camps down South the first thing that should be provided is a mosquito guard, so that the patient could sleep.

Q. That is, around the entire place, you mean?

A. That is, over the face of the patients; they had to suffer some from that cause.

Q. Did you have those individual mosquito nets which we saw at Jacksonville, Fla.?

A. Yes, sir; we had them, but they are not sufficient. The patient often rolls around and throws it off.

Q. They are rather impatient of having the machinery of it around their necks and heads, are they not.

A. Yes, sir; and it takes the air away.

Q. Now as to Fernandina, Doctor; you were there for six weeks?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the character of the ground for camping purposes and for hospital purposes?

A. Well, the ground was not well selected, because it was back of the troops.

Q. That is, the camp for the hospital was not well selected?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In general, what was the character of the ground around that camp; good or otherwise?

A. It was good, sandy soil, and had good water.

Q. And the facilities for bathing; how were they?

A. Well, the facilities for bathing were very good for sectional work, only a company at a time.

Q. Now, as to the hospital; you say the selection of the ground for the hospital was not good, because it was back of the troops?

A. Yes, sir; in a direct line with the prevailing wind there.

Q. How many patients had you there?

A. About 160.

Q. Had you tent capacity for them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had you medical supplies in abundance?

A. Plenty of them; but the hospital ground was used for six weeks before we came there, and there wasn't any floors for the tents, and it was rather unhygienic.

Q. Well, had the ground been used by the troops before you came?

A. No, sir; it had been used only by the hospital for six weeks in succession, and it was out of the way of the whole route.

Q. So that you had difficulty in the transportation of your supplies?

A. Yes, sir; and of the patients, too.

Q. What was the character of the hospital supplies, beds, bedding, clothing for the men, hospital facilities, and all that?

A. There was hardly any, especially the cots. We used those cheap cots with a spring where the patients sink way down. It doubles them up.

Q. Had you brought any with you from Tampa?

A. We didn't bring any from Tampa, but we had some on the way from somewhere; I don't know where.

Q. What was the character of the medical attendants there; good or otherwise?

A. From my experience I don't know. I couldn't speak from what the men said. I wouldn't testify, because I couldn't swear to it.

Q. How many medical officers did you have there at that hospital?

A. Four, I think; surgeons.

Q. Four, including yourself?

A. Yes, sir; besides a major and a captain, who was the medical officer; six in all.

Q. The surgeon in charge, the medical officer, and four ward officers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the prevailing character of the diseases there?

A. Typhoid.

Q. Had you facilities for nursing them?

A. Well, we moved them at once, as soon as we could; moved them to the beach.

Q. Did you have any female nurses there?

A. Yes, sir; we had fourteen.

Q. For how many patients?

A. One hundred and sixty patients.

Q. So that the nursing was adequate?

A. Yes, sir; they received every attention they could possibly get.

Q. How were the orderlies there; did you have orderlies to wait upon these nurses?

A. Well, the majority of the orderlies at Fernandina were the worst lot of men I came across. I heard from the officers that they were selected by the regimental officer because they couldn't do anything with them and so they were put there for this work.

Q. What they called in the Army "unloading"?

A. Yes; unloaded them on the division hospital. But we had plenty of nurses, and that compensated for the orderlies.

Q. For the inefficiency of the orderlies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the character of your camps at both places in reference to what they style "policing;" were they kept in good condition?

A. Yes, sir; under the surgeon we kept a strict policing of the camp.

Q. You made no change at Fernandina of the hospital ground for six weeks, as I understand?

A. Oh, no; we changed at once. The camp had been kept there for six weeks prior to our coming.

Q. And you made the change?

A. At once; yes, sir.

Q. You changed from the rear of the troops to the front of them to give the men the benefit of the beach?

A. Yes, sir; right down on the beach, and the result was we didn't lose a single patient.

Q. What was the number of deaths at West Tampa? Do you remember?

A. At West Tampa, 11 out of 476.

Q. And at Fernandina not one?

A. Not one between September 5 and September 30.

Q. Have you any other statement, Doctor, as to affairs at either place that you would like to make?

A. I have.

Q. Just make your statement, if you please.

A. I made a special study of those forms of typhoid fever. I wanted to go down to the ground and find out what was the cause, and I found the soldiers, the troops and officers alike, went down town very often and ate all the ice cream, pies, etc., stale beer, and disregarded the requirements of the camp.

Q. And the hygienic conditions as well?

A. Yes, sir. I would sum it up as inexperience of officers and ignorance of men, and too much money from their relatives—spending money—and flies. That is the cause of the whole business. Now, in Fernandina two carloads of watermelons arrived for some merchant, who wanted to sell them. The health officer of that town, Dr. Halsey, condemned the melons, and they had them dumped somewhere in the rear of the yards of the railroad. Somebody gave the tip to the soldiers. All the officers knew it and they permitted all the watermelons to be carried into the camp and, of course, even to the hospital grounds, and on visiting them, making a visit among the patients, we found that relatives smuggled in everything possible to eat or to chew or to smoke. We found under one man's pillow 6 packages of chocolate and about 20 packages of cigarettes and things to chew, chewing gum and everything else, and one man confessed to me, after having had a relapse—he was all right and was slated to go home, and he begged to be allowed to go down town for a little shopping, and I allowed him to go, and he came back with fever—he confessed he had had 15 cents' worth of molasses candy. Of course, if a patient is kept five or six weeks on milk alone he is naturally hungry, and they always implored the visitors to bring them something to eat and not allow them to starve. We had to keep a guard at the hospital entrance to prevent all the people from bringing in eatables.

Q. Contraband articles?

A. Yes, sir; mostly, and these hard crackers. They claim they couldn't eat hard-tack, but these hard crackers, they were crazy for them; that is my experience.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to state, Doctor; anything that would help us in reaching a conclusion?

A. I believe in moving troops they should be allowed to march at least 5 or 10 miles a day, in the early morning or late in the afternoon, and kept near the railroad, so if they are needed in a hurry they can move them quicker, but not dump them in a city like Tampa all at once, all ready for dissipation and other excesses; and, second, I think it would be well if men under 21 should not be allowed to enlist.

By General WILSON:

Q. How long did I understand you to say the camp at Fernandina was maintained?

A. Six weeks prior to our coming; six weeks after that.

Q. Our testimony before has not indicated that it was that long. I only mention it incidentally. Do I understand you to say your facilities were limited for bathing?

A. Limited to companies, because they had to travel three and a half miles to reach the beach.

Q. We saw that magnificent beach: went over it, and were informed by prominent people there that they had seen 2,000 people in bathing at the same time there. The general manager of the railroad told us he had seen that. I only mention these things incidentally.

A. I can't deny it, because I wasn't there when the troops were en masse. I came after the troops had moved out.

Q. We were told the troops were there only thirty days. That was also told us. I only mention it.

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Don't you think you are mistaken about the distance that the beach was from the camp?

A. Well, it was 4 miles to the town and 3½ to the camp.

Q. Well, I don't think the beach is more than 3 miles from the town, and the camp is between the beach and the city.

A. Well, I don't know: on the straight road it is about 2 miles past the lighthouse to the hospital camp.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Well, as I understand you, it wasn't that the beach was restricted, but they were only allowed to take a company at a time?

A. Yes, sir. Some people got drowned there. They dared each other to go in so far and they got drowned.

Q. Your hospital was there, as I understand it, after the troops were gone?

A. Yes, sir.

NEW YORK, November 26, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF W. H. BALDWIN, JR.

Mr. W. H. BALDWIN, JR., upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Mr. Baldwin, will you kindly give us your name, residence, and business occupation?

A. W. H. Baldwin, jr.; business address, 32 Nassau street, New York; president of Long Island Railroad.

Q. You had the contract for carrying troops and supplies from New York to Montauk Point, I believe, Mr. Baldwin?

A. No, sir; we made a proposition to the Government that if any troops or supplies were to be sent over our road we would handle them at certain specified rates.

Q. Was that put into the shape of a contract?

A. Finally; but there was no exclusive contract, nor practically any exclusive arrangement at all.

Q. You did have a contract?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any narrative or statement in regard to the business done and the way in which it was done over the road?

A. I can state very concisely the whole history of it.

Q. Please do so.

A. I have not prepared it in the form of a paper, but I have it thoroughly in mind and can state it in concise manner, so that there will be no time wasted.

Q. If you will kindly do that it will facilitate matters.

A. Whatever I may say, I have the original papers and can demonstrate it. In the month of May General Merritt sent Lieutenant Hale to see me to talk about using Montauk Point as a recruiting camp. That is the first we had ever heard of it. I even declined to see him, and never met Lieutenant Hale. He came twice, and I even declined to see him twice. On June 2 I got word from General Frank that he wanted to go down to Montauk Point, and I agreed to go down with him the next day and let them see the lands. The letter from Colonel Gilliss, dated June 1, is the request from General Frank to go. It is the first time I had ever heard about either of them. We went there on June 2, and General Frank said, "We are now in war. We want a place where we can take the troops from the Santiago campaign, rest them, recuperate them, and take them in the fall for the Havana campaign, and we would like to use your land here for that purpose." I entered into it very enthusiastically. He said he would take all the troops there by transport, and take them away by transport, and no reference was made by anybody and no thought entered their minds or my mind that any troops would ever be handled over the road. On June 3, at his request, I dictated, in the presence of Colonel Gilliss, a letter giving my views, a copy of which I have here, telling on what terms he could use the property. That was after a meeting with the owners of the property, it not being owned by the railroad company. The owners of the property had declined, as I said before, to permit it to be used as a camp. We had constructed 20 miles of railroad to reach this property, and their plans were to have a very large summer colony there. We had spent a very considerable sum of money in the development of the land and had drawn maps, copies of which I will show you presently, which will indicate the expenditure of fully a million dollars in preparing it.

We had spent \$600,000 in a railroad to reach it, nothing else being on that road; approximately nothing; but the owners of the property entered into it just as patriotically as anyone did anywhere in the country during the last six months, and it was that point of view that controlled entirely in the matter, and there were outside owners who had nothing to do with our railroad who had to be considered, and therefore what was considered by the Government itself a nominal charge was made for the use of the property, which property is easily worth a million dollars, prospectively, for us. On June 3 I dictated a letter, and I read two clauses in it to Colonel Gilliss. I said, "If there is anything in it which does not meet with your entire satisfaction, please telephone me. I do not mean in any way to be arbitrary, and the reference to exclusive transportation is to prevent outside boats from landing at the dock and to preserve all the rights and legitimate business which belongs to us. Of course there is nothing in it which would not permit you to handle your troops and supplies on your transports and vessels."

That first letter took about ten minutes to dictate, in Colonel Gilliss' presence, and with which he was entirely satisfied at the time. He talked with General Frank at Governor's Island, and he came back next morning and he said General Frank wanted it changed in two or three respects, as it seemed there were certain restrictions in it. Exactly what they were I can't say: they were simple. I was busy in a directors' meeting at 12 o'clock, and he wanted to go back on the 1.15 boat, so as to send word to Washington, and I told Colonel Gilliss, "Fix it just as you want it." And he told me the points raised by General Frank, and I changed the letter to just the form exactly that General Frank wanted it.

Then that leads up to the question of a contract which was officially prepared and came in later. Then here is a letter from Colonel Gilliss, saying he had forwarded the report, which was satisfactory, and here is a letter of June 8 from me to Colonel Gilliss, in which I told him that I must have several days' time before any troops are moved there, so as to get facilities ready for the station. All the way through in our conversations, either in Washington or here, I had said that the prerequisite for the whole thing was the demand on my part that I was to have two weeks' notice, because there were no facilities for taking care of the troops. On July 12 Colonel Gilliss wrote, "It looks to me very much like the Montauk camp would not materialize. I have heard nothing officially. I return sketches, etc." On July 30 we held off our development. We had been working there with Italians and gangs of men, etc. We had delayed everything on account of this. On July 29 I told Colonel Gilliss I wanted to know if they were going to do anything. He said, "I have sent a copy of your letter (my letter) of July 29 to headquarters with a request for any information they can give." Then we approach August 2, when I was invited to Washington and met the Secretary of War, and he talked with me then about using this property? I called attention to all that had gone before, which then was before him at that time, on August 2, and we approach the period when we began to do business. That all leads up to this contract.

On August 2, then, I was in Washington, and the result of that call was that I should go to Montauk on the 4th with two members of the Quartermaster-General's Office, Messrs. Clinton Smith and Quartermaster Patten. They were to look over the property with me and to say whether it was all right, especially with respect to the water supply, and so Thursday—on Thursday afternoon, the 4th—I received, on my return from Montauk with these two representatives, who had not then indicated what they were to telegraph to Washington. I received a message from the Quartermaster-General to the effect that troops and horses and mules were on their way from Fernandina, and that message I think is on its way to me here now. I gave the message to Captain Patten because he had no instructions, and he wanted some authoritative thing to show to begin his work. They asked me what they should do and what was to be done, and I told them if they would meet in my office next morning I thought we could lay plans. On Friday, then, the next morning, I had in my office—having arranged it during the night—contractors of every description, well men, carpenters, etc., and by noon of that very day contracts were made for all the engines and pumps and piping and building of the buildings; and everything complete, that ever was let, was done in my office in the course of three hours' time. I don't know whether any reporters are here or not.

Q. One of these gentlemen represents the Associated Press and the other the New York Sun.

A. I don't speak of these things from any personal pride at all. This all has an important bearing on the inception, the beginning of it. That work of three hours in my office that morning had the effect of forwarding the work at the camp, according to their own statements in my presence, at least two weeks—that is, in the ordinary course of business it would have been necessary to delay the work

that we did there and were able to do through our machinery and to help in every possible way. The next day was Saturday, the 6th, and I immediately rushed all kinds of supplies for our own work, and had over 200 men, and we had rails and ties sent there immediately and began to lay tracks. On August 7, which was Sunday, the first train of supplies appeared, and on Monday morning troops and mules from the Southern camps appeared. That was all done between Thursday night of the 4th and Monday morning of the 8th, practically three days, so that you see it was a sudden rush to the Point. Now for an item showing what we did in those few days. The railroad company laid 22,800 feet of track and 4½ miles of siding. It was necessary to use 5,500 yards of filling. We put in a water tank and water supply for our own use, a 50,000-gallon tank, steam pump, etc., 1,500 feet away from the terminal. We put up bunk houses for 100 men. We erected tents, two stables, restaurant building 100 feet by 60, waiting room for passengers, two express sheds, and freight house with 17,500 feet of floor surface, and facilities for feeding and sleeping 275 of our own men. That was all completed within seven days and much faster than it was needed for Government use. The Government at that time was necessarily without help. It was impossible for it to have tools and men and wagons, etc., on that short notice, and during that first ten days we did practically all the work, and we did a very large amount of work for the Government. We built roads that were necessary for them to begin. We hauled, in a small way, lumber that we had there for our own use. We furnished the men from our own shops to lay all the piping for the waterworks system. We put 50 men at work on the buildings, to hasten the work on the buildings, and generally supplied the lumber and men and did everything to hasten that first work.

During that first week, after about six days had passed, and all these mules and horses and men had come in from the South, General Young determined he couldn't take care of any more, and we had notice of a very large number of cars on the way to us. It was raining very hard for three days; it rained excessively. They had no tents in which to put the men, and General Young demanded that they should be stopped en route, and they were stopped for thirty-six hours, so that he could catch up. We now come to one or two incidents connected with it about which you will ask questions, probably, and I will answer them. The Government has been severely criticised because it has been said there was no water supply. Everyone knows who knows Long Island that you can get a perfect water supply anywhere on that island, and we had observed at two points on this property small wells with 4-inch pipe that would furnish 30,000 or 40,000 gallons every twenty-four hours, of water of which they had the analysis, and their conclusion that the water was perfect was well warranted, and after events demonstrated that. We furnished the men to put in their waterworks system which eventuated, and, as you know, they pumped a million gallons of perfectly pure water a day from a 10-inch pipe, without any surface water running into it, as there is a great substratum there of as pure water as can be found under the surface of the earth.

The scare of no water was started deliberately and maliciously by a newspaper correspondent, who, by his own confession, had never been on the ground and never knew anything about it, and boasted of his enterprise in forcing the Government to act. Before coming to the question of operation on the railroad, I will speak of another chapter. We will assume for the moment that the troops and supplies and all had come there, and that on September 2 there began to be a wave backward of people coming away from there. Then the Long Island Railroad was called upon to move troops from Montauk to Long Island City, and I had the honor to be made the president of the Red Cross, so as to be in charge of its work at Long Island City, and I may say that during the first two weeks I had stayed personally at Montauk, from morning until night, and night after night, I didn't go to bed, and didn't pretend to, and after two nights and days in succes-

sion I did not sleep in my endeavor to aid the Government, as well as our own work, in this serious predicament in which I saw them placed. When the troops began to come through Long Island City, the ladies of the Red Cross Society, with our assistance, organized to take care of the sick and convalescents who were en route, and we averaged to take care of about 200 men each night, men who could not proceed any farther after their arrival at Long Island City, the journey and the excitement of getting away, the weeks of moving from camp to station, and the fact that they all came in in the evening instead of coming in earlier in the day, tending to put them in a very serious condition—critical condition.

Q. Long Island City is what distance from Montauk, and how far from New York is Montauk?

A. One hundred and twenty-five miles from New York, at Thirty-fourth Street Pier in New York, and we run the ferry between the two points. We immediately organized to take care of 350 men—thoroughly organized—with trained nurses and doctors to care for the men as they came off the train, and I personally met every train and saw that the men were properly cared for. That was a piece of work that President McKinley and others looked over on their way to New York, and General Sternberg visited, and was a necessary sequence of conditions as they existed out there. It was really my personal aim to stop them from coming, rather than to take care of them. I wanted to prevent their coming, as hundreds of men were coming, in a condition that did not permit of their traveling, and that finally was stopped. After General Sternberg had been there and had seen the condition of those men he personally looked out for that. Many of them persisted in coming, and made false statements as to their condition when they left. They wanted to go on home, and of course hundreds of them were too weak even to have started, but they were well cared for there and sent immediately to hospitals throughout New York, Brooklyn, and Long Island City with ambulances that we had and ambulances from the various hospitals. In passing, the railroad company looked out for sanitation. We had immediately purchased, the first day, full fumigating outfits—six outfits—and of course fumigated everything, baggage cars and all that pertained to this particular traffic. Now, as I see that I have here the maps, I want to stop a moment to show you a little more clearly what we are talking about. The first thing I want to show you is where Montauk is. Just at present it may be of interest.

(At this point the witness laid before the commission a series of maps and photographs, which he spread out upon the committee table and by which he explained in detail the location of Long Island City, Montauk Point, the siding and lines of railway of the Long Island Railroad, the location of the many points of interest connected with the camp, such as the various hospitals, the railroad station, the pump and well, where the various regiments were quartered, etc.)

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Is that a fresh-water lake?

A. It is for horses and cattle.

Q. It is a little brackish?

A. A little brackish; yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Where was the well?

A. It was sunk here [indicating]. It was sunk through two strata.

Q. That was a million gallons a day?

A. Yes, sir; but just a little hole dug about 6 feet square until you get down 20 feet, and then a 10-inch pipe was sunk down through the ground, and from that 10-inch pipe they had that enormous million gallons pumped, and all they could pump was a million gallons a day, and in pumping a million gallons a day they couldn't reduce it.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Is that a wrought-iron pipe?

A. Wrought-iron pipe. I was responsible for the water supply, because I had shown the Government that at this point here [indicating] that we had a well three years ago, and from a 4-inch pipe we pumped 30,000 gallons of water a day, and they tested it, and it showed no loss at all. I put in a pump here, a steam pump, and it pumped every day 30,000 gallons full capacity.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. How many grains did I understand you to say there were to the gallon of sodium chloride?

A. Fifty.

Q. We had a witness who testified there were 90 grains to the gallon.

A. The witness was misinformed, or probably deliberately lied, as so many do.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Was water pumped from there into the tanks?

A. Not that I know of. Here was the difficulty in the beginning. I never saw any pump. We started a well near the pump. You can go a few feet from that pond and sink down below that strata and find water as cool as ice. It is too cool to drink fast. Its temperature is from 43° to 45°. We dug down below the sea level to show that to Messrs. Smith and Patten—to show that water was there, and Colonel Forwood, who saw that later, was delighted. He said it is perfectly filtered water; this is gravel and sand, and it is a perfect filter. I had a pump out there in twenty-four hours after we had notice, and it was right on the ground. The pipes were put in in order to get water for the cattle. We figured that the whole 25,000 men couldn't use up more than 200,000 gallons a day, and the drinking water could easily be obtained from this well.

By General BEAVER:

Q. When was the main well and pump in operation?

A. I can't give you the date of that. It was not more than six or seven days after we started in there.

Q. It was before the 16th?

A. Yes, sir; and they used to haul water here before they got the pipe system in. That land has been a grazing ground for two hundred years. Now I show you some photographs that will show you the uplands. There is another view of the same thing. There [indicating] were the terminals of the Long Island Railroad on that August 4, when we got word that these troops were on their way. The new road was only built two years ago. This was all embankment, 4, 5, and 6 feet high. I immediately, on notice of that, drew this plan. I just moved that around here [indicating] and laid out track capacity for 350 cars—382, to be exact—so that a team could get to every foot of track in the whole yard, and I laid out various buildings, the use of which I will detail to you, for the railroad. This was all put in more rapidly than the Government could use it. Sunday night that first track was in. A train came through with supplies, and, as I have said, if that train had come five minutes earlier, it couldn't have got in; and after that first train came in, we worked that night and got the second track in, and then we put in these tracks much more rapidly, and at no time were we ever pushed for room. The Government put these buildings over here [indicating] for supplies. Standing on the hill and looking down in the valley this [presenting photograph] gives you an idea of the camp after about two weeks. It shows the way it looked after we got it going. We now come to a question of the movement of the business on the railroad. As I said to you, no one had, until the time I got that message—no one had ever suggested such a thing as that we were to handle any troops. A clause was put in the contract, or in this proposition, this letter,

stating the terms on which we would handle troops, on the theory that it was for men who might go on furlough, who wanted to go home, and I said, "We will put that at a low rate, so they can go home;" and we made it a cent and a quarter a mile. If I had been asked by the Government to handle troops as we did, I should have been tempted to decline, not but that we were ready to give every ounce of strength to the Government at that time that we could, because the whole feeling prevailing in our board of directors and everyone connected with the railroad was one of the most lofty patriotism, and no sordid motives guided us at all. We expected they were coming in to use that property and then go off again by water. I say we made the lowest rate that any railroad company ever made, and when they did come upon us we said nothing about it and handled them. The Long Island Railroad runs 650 trains a day. In August and September we were running 1,346 trains a day over our road. I don't mean Coney Island trains. It was necessary in order to handle this business that was suddenly thrust upon us without a moment's warning to engage 215 extra men in just the transportation service, outside of over 200 men in our terminal work at Montauk. We made an arrangement with the Central Railroad of New Jersey and got 10 extra engines, and we got them on a moment's notice, as we couldn't have handled the business with our equipment. We handled as many as 18 special-trip trains in one day over this road. We make the statement unreservedly and unqualifiedly that from the beginning to the end of the whole performance there was no delay on troops or commissary supplies or supplies for the Government, and that it was all handled in a special service and in just as good service as an express service, only on freight trains at freight rates. We didn't go into it carelessly. There is a statement of every movement of troops for each day, in printed form, showing when they left and when they arrived, and what the troops were, and the cars and men and time received, etc. Here is a statement showing the horses, wagons, camp food, and hay and quartermaster's supplies, lumber, wood, etc., that was handled during the last twenty-four hours, and a statement showing the number of cars unloading in the past twenty-four hours at Montauk, the number of loaded cars on hand at 8 a. m. every morning, and the empty cars. Maximum business at one time was 220 cars, on September 5, and we had capacity of 382. The only delays, and they have appeared in prints, and subject, I suppose, to this statement, this report, were delays to express matter for about five days and the movement of certain regiments coming out, the First Illinois Regiment and the District of Columbia regiment. The delay to express matter for five days was due to the published statements in the papers that the Government couldn't haul away the stuff that came there in cars, and they weren't able to haul it away as it came. We had bought every Studebaker wagon in New York, amounting to 18, and had bought 50 horses, and suddenly there came on us great loads of stuff to haul and deliver.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. By express?

A. By express. Great loads addressed to individuals; addressed to the Government. The contractors couldn't get their stuff delivered; they couldn't get it receipted for, and they turned over to us great loads of stuff, so that we would deliver it. We did the best we could with that also. During the latter part of August the friends of the soldiers from all over the country, believing that these men were starving, had sent supplies of all kinds, and we had three solid carloads of packages that were addressed to different troops and soldiers, who were either dead in Cuba or were on furlough, or at least were not there, and the pitiful sight of our wagons trailing over these hills, trying to find these men, was enough to make me weep.

Q. And some of it perishable goods, I suppose?

A. Yes, sir; perishable goods. Much good liquors and cigars were taken, and we have suffered from it ever since. They were taken. I never suffered so hard as I did for about five days trying to dispose of a rush of goods sent to persons who were not there; and the liquors were not in such condition that we could tell who they were from; and we would go down the street and try to find John Jones, and they wouldn't know whether he was there or not. But we did feel the responsibility and tried to find those fellows, and there was a delay at that time, but it didn't last over that time. The other delay, I am prepared to admit, was the delay of the Illinois regiment. We had no more connection with the delay of that regiment than anyone here. We were instructed on Tuesday afternoon that they would be moved on Thursday, and under no circumstances they would move them before, because the transportation at New York City could not be supplied until noon of Thursday. On Wednesday morning, about 10.30, we heard indirectly from Montauk that the First Illinois were breaking camp. We called up the local quartermaster and he said, "Under no circumstances move them; they can't take care of them if they come here." That afternoon about 3.30 we heard from Montauk that they were down at the station, and we sent word to the quartermaster, "Here is a predicament and here is trouble;" and Senator Mason was there to save the day. And it was simply out of pity, because we had no right to do it, we took cars out of our regular service and pushed up some 13 or 14 cars, as I remember. Is that right, Mr. Porter?

Mr. POTTER (who was present with Mr. Baldwin, but who was not sworn). Yes, sir; 17 cars.

Mr. BALDWIN (continuing). And we told them we would take them into Long Island City that night, but they would have to stay in the cars and would have to wait for this transportation, but just to get them a place to sleep, and to get them out of their difficulty, we would do that, and we started them out in the early evening and brought them slowly to Long Island City to get them through at daybreak, and a boat was sent from the Jersey City shore, and that afternoon, sometime, they left for the West. Probably the worst criticism that the Long Island Railroad had during the camp was on account of that matter. There was similar difficulty with the District of Columbia troops, in which we were not involved at all. We only went beyond the ordinary business method, and that out of sympathy and out of pity, because of somebody else's fault.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Who is to blame for that first?

A. I certainly wouldn't say. I am to blame, I suppose. Colonel Kimball is not. He instructed me under no circumstances to—

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. (Interrupting.) And if they had remained in camp they would have got to Jersey City just as soon?

A. Yes, sir. Maybe a little better. It was the interference of outside connections. That is the only delay we had, and the next thing is that you have spoken about the slow movement of trains. I want to picture to you something. No railroad in this country handling troops aims to run them over 25 miles an hour, excepting in particular cases. All through the South, where they handle extra heavy train loads, they go but 25 miles an hour. We averaged less than 25 miles an hour in all the trains that ran from Montauk. Some of the trains would move slowly. I want you to picture to yourselves a machine like the Long Island Railroad, with 1,350 trains moving in the daytime—no night trains—on a schedule that is laid out so carefully that every advantage of side track and every advantage of time has to be taken into consideration, and each thing has to move exactly right or the whole thing would go to pieces, and then have suddenly injected upon it.

without notice of preparation, this enormous movement of heavy trains, and you see immediately the danger that exists. The responsibility of our heavy traffic and the responsibility of handling these troops safely to their destination was the one sentiment that prevailed on the Long Island Railroad about that time. I want to say again, we were not fully equipped to do our own maximum business under our own points of stress, and we took upon us, or there was thrust upon us, this additional load, which we all willingly did, and did it as well as we could, and I may say, sir, that we did every bit of it without injuring a soul.

Q. Didn't have a death?

A. No; nor pinch a man's finger from any cause or accident on the railroad. The question of whether they moved 25 miles an hour, or 40 miles an hour, or 42 miles an hour, which is our regular schedule, I think is hardly to be considered under those circumstances. I will also add that we put on a special schedule to Montauk, so as not to disturb our regular schedule. If we had attempted to run these special Montauk trains and mixed them up with our regular car service, nothing would have gone and everything would have been stranded. As it was, our regular trains moved right on time, or approximately on time, as near as may be, with any railroad in its operation, and this additional business was made to fit in safely with the other service. It was the only thing that could have been done. One little slip would have caused a serious tragedy. To show you, then—I want to say here that I am prepared to stand any cross-examination on any of these questions—to show you the motive and the spirit that prevailed with us—of course, theoretically, it was our harvest to bring excursions and people there to see the soldiers, and within forty-eight hours after I went to Montauk, on August 6, I gave telegraphic notice to everybody on our road not to sell a ticket to Montauk if he could help it, and that order prevailed for three weeks. It was done out of nothing but the high motive that I did not want to see a crowd of excursionists in there harassing and embarrassing the Government in its attempt to straighten out that difficult problem. I did not even reduce the rates for three weeks, and then there were so many relatives of the soldiers who wanted to go who were turned away from the ticket office because they could not afford to pay the rate that we put in a reduced rate and invited everybody to come; that is, after things were practically straightened out; but we made no attempt to make money out of it at that time. I declined to permit any whisky to be sold on the premises, and I want to inject right here that I do not suppose there was ever any camp or ever any camp meeting where such absolute order prevailed, such absolute discipline and good order prevailed, as there was on the flat where the railroad and the troops came into contact. With the thousands of men about there, there was no drunkenness, and I had five deputy sheriffs, whom we put there at our own expense, to keep order, and every suspicious character was run out of the place without regard to the Government, and my statement is, there was perfect discipline and perfect order on the grounds, which were reserved by me in this contract, so that I could see myself that there was order there. I can't stop my story without saying that the work done by the Government and such men as Colonel Kimball and General Ludington and General Young in those first two weeks was superhuman. It was an enormous amount of work that was done by them. It was, as everybody knows, a perfect tragedy. Each day seemed worse, but it was not because of any lack of attempt or desire on the part of those who were there to do the work, and do it as quickly as it could be done, and the work accomplished within the first two weeks, under the circumstances and conditions that surrounded it, was a great deal more complete and far beyond any calculation that might have been made if anyone had assumed that it could be done. It could not have been done if you had sat down in cold blood to figure it out. But it was done, and in view of the terrible embarrassments that hampered it, it was really a phenomenal piece of work. I referred to embarrassments. That is, we were to have had ten days' or

twelve days' time to have been in shape for the—I mean the troops that were to arrive from Cuba, but these 8,000 mules and horses and the troops that came from the South in those first seven or ten days took up all the slack there could be made, so that when the transports did come in, you see, there was nothing ready for them, because everything had been used up.

Q. About how many troops were there that came from the South, from Tampa and Georgia and from other places?

A. I can't state that exactly. I shouldn't say over 3,000 men in those first ten days, but the mules and horses, there were as many as 8,000 mules and horses.

Q. You say there were as many as 8,000 mules and horses?

A. Yes, sir; I think 7,000 mules and 1,000 horses. Of course they took up a good deal of room and time and the wagons had to haul them fodder.

Q. And there were about 3,000 troops?

A. I think that is all we took in in that earlier part. They still came in from the South as late as September 2. The other persons to whom I wish to refer in order to have you get the right view of our part in this matter are the men on the Long Island Railroad. I talked with them when this first began and told them what was coming. I told them the difficulties, the serious situation of the Government, the responsibility which they had to themselves and the Government and to humanity, and I urged upon them loyal, cordial work and support, and I will say to you that the most beautiful picture I know of in connection with this whole war was the devotion and the sacrifice and the hunger and the work and the life and everything that is beautiful of the men on that little Long Island one-horse railroad you are talking about. We lost five people; they died. They didn't die from being at Montauk, but in three cases out of five from carrying and helping sick men. My own brother stayed there night and day from the beginning to the end of the camp, and stayed until the last troop went, and he was stronger than a bull and yet fell in utter collapse, and is to-day. It was life. It was not sordid motive, and there was not a sign of it from the beginning up to this moment in this whole camp.

Q. You are speaking of the operating men on your road?

A. Yes, sir. There were as many heroes there as there were in some of the places during the war. It was a fearful job and a fearful responsibility. We passed along with the daily criticism, fortunately, without paying attention to it, because it was untrue. The only fear I had was that the daily attack of newspapers, in their lack of information—that it might embarrass our men and cause some serious wreck. Fortunately, by calmness and good judgment, the men hung together, and it was nothing but devotion to the cause that prompted the operation of our road under the circumstances. It was more than human. I have nothing further to say with respect to the railroad unless you have some questions to ask.

By General BEAVER:

Q. I have the agreement, Mr. Baldwin, entered into on the 2d day of August between the Montauk Company of New York and James Gilliss, the assistant quartermaster of the United States Army, on behalf of the United States, which is signed by James Gilliss, assistant quartermaster-general, the Montauk Company, by W. H. Baldwin, jr., vice-president, and the Long Island Railroad, by W. H. Baldwin, jr., president. In that agreement there is this clause: "The military authorities in charge of said camp will not contract with or employ any other carrier for transportation facilities for troops or freight between said camp and New York or points on Long Island, and that no vessel owned or controlled by private individuals or corporations shall be permitted to land at or use the present or any future docks on Montauk Point for passenger or freight traffic between the camp and New York or points on Long Island without the permis-

sion of the railroad company; it being agreed, however, that any Government transport or vessel may discharge and load troops or supplies in any such dock or docks," etc. Did the railroad company enforce that and refuse their consent to the use by the transports for the landing of supplies for the troops, such as milk or fresh vegetables, or anything that might have been right in the immediate neighborhood?

A. They enforced absolutely the proper interpretation of that clause.

Q. What is your interpretation?

A. The interpretation is best answered by the experience as to what the Government actually did do and the fact that there was no question raised by the railroad at any time. That clause was, as I said to you before, dictated just as you would sit down and dictate a letter—not a contract—at a time when Colonel Gilliss came to the office, and he stated that they wanted to use it and asked what we would do for them, and our motive was to prevent any of those outside carriers coming in and running excursions in there and dumping them there, first, because from a business point of view it would be our business, if there was any; and, secondly, because the Government itself was anxious it should not occur; and Colonel Gilliss being dead, I do not want to quote anything he may have said. I don't want to make any statement that Colonel Gilliss may have made, because he is dead, but the evidence was that he wrote in a letter that he was very anxious that that clause should be put in, and I had the same idea—to keep wild excursionists out of it.

There is a steamship line running from New York to ports near by, and we didn't want them to be running in with a lot of excursions, and there was never any desire or need for them. The Government never wanted them, and up to this date there has been no desire nor request for them. When I submitted that contract in the first letter to Colonel Gilliss I said, "I have tried to express it in such a way as to be entirely satisfactory to you. If there is anything in it that doesn't meet with your entire satisfaction, please telephone me. I do not mean in any way to be arbitrary, and the reference to exclusive transportation is to prevent outside boats from landing at the docks, and to preserve all the rights and legitimate business which naturally belongs to us. Of course, there is nothing in it which would not permit you to handle your troops and supplies on your transports and vessels. I am at your command day or night." Further than that, I said to Colonel Gilliss, "You are wide open here, and you can do business from New York or other points on your own vessels, and the only consideration we shall get will be the supplies to the camp." He said, "Colonel Kimball is located in New York, and it will be natural for supplies to go from there;" and he said, "I think you need not worry about getting your fair share of supplies." There never was any question but what the Government had a perfect right to handle every bit of its supplies. In fact, I urged in the first view this, and I said to them, "Get two or three large loads of lumber, send up piles, send up hay, send up grain by water. Have it standing there so that you will be able to have the supplies there."

When I saw Colonel Hecker at the Manhattan Hotel, I said, "Colonel, take the troops by boat; don't send them over the railroad, and it was because it was such a strain upon us to handle it and we didn't want it." And he said, "No; he would have to send it by rail;" He preferred to send it by rail. They did charter the steamer *Shinnecock* for some twenty days and carried a large number of troops to New York that way. It cost between \$8 and \$10 a head that way; it cost \$1.16 to carry them over the road. There is an item for consideration. That clause was left in its vague way because it was in the original letter.

Q. That was within the power of the railroad, of course; it could not be done without the permission of the railroad? Did you ever decline to allow vessels that were used for legitimate purposes, say they had been wanted to bring milk from

Long Island, or anything of that sort—was there anything in this agreement or in your interpretation that would have prevented that?

A. Outside boats?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir. You are speaking about milk. Do you know who got that milk?

Q. I don't know anything about it.

A. I furnished the first milk that was furnished the camp, and I got the first milk for several days that went to that camp, and I suggested this milk supply for the whole thing. I bought 2,000 gallons of milk a day for the men and sent it there, and it was my suggestion. There was no need of milk from any other point or other supply from any other point. The Government had a perfect right to run its boats or vessels from any of the sources of its supply, from New York or New London or anywhere else. They ordered their supplies at noon in New York; they were put on freight cars in the evening and they were switched and sent to the camp—

Q. (Interrupting.) There has been some complaint made on the part of several witnesses, and on the part of those who drank the milk, that when the milk came down from New York it was sour? Do you know anything about that?

A. The milk was in charge of a man who represented the dairies that supplied it. The milk arrived from the dairies in New York State at New York at 12 o'clock. That is night's milk. It was hauled over to our Long Island City depot and arrived there about 1 o'clock.

Q. In the morning?

A. Two o'clock in the morning. It left there at 4 o'clock and was at Montauk at 8.30 or 9 o'clock, in refrigerator cars that were always used, and the statement that the milk arrived there sour is false.

Q. I don't know that it was claimed that that was habitual, but there may have been instances?

A. I never heard of it, and I was right in touch with it. The difficulties were that they had more milk than they could use, and the car was obliged to stand on the track and stay over night because the number of wagons on hand were short and they wouldn't deliver it, and the milk would get there one day and I have known it to be delivered the next day, but there was no possible way by which it could be spoiled. The milk was furnished by the Beakes Dairy and by the Borden. The Borden Dairy milk you can put in a can in the month of July and let it stand there for fifteen hours in the sun and it won't turn. They will guarantee it for twenty-four hours. I wouldn't risk it twenty-four hours, but it's pure milk. I bought it and went all over it thoroughly with them and had a chemist to watch it to see that it was right.

Q. What was the source of the ice supply, do you know, and what was the amount that was carried into the camp daily?

A. I can't tell you that, but if you call Mr. Potter, I think he can tell you. He is here.

Q. Did you visit the hospitals at all—the general hospital, the detention hospital, and several division hospitals?

A. I did, frequently.

Q. Were you familiar with the details of the governing of them as to supplies in any way?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then, if there had been a shortage of ice or milk or anything of that sort, it would hardly have been brought to your attention?

A. Not in any way officially.

Q. Did you hear incidentally that they were at any time short of milk and ice and supplies of that kind that were essential to the proper running of the hospital?

A. In the first two weeks, yes. I sent the milk and had others send the milk and arranged to send men there with cans of milk.

Q. What was the distance from Montauk to New London, or to the Connecticut coast, or to the Rhode Island coast?

A. To Newport and such points, about 45 miles; to New London I think it is 27 or 28 miles.

Q. In the case of a scarcity of milk and ice and fresh eggs and vegetables, etc., might it not have been an advantage to have a supply coming in from that direction?

A. No, sir; there is no place in this country where you can get 2,000 gallons of milk on an hour's notice, as we did, except New York City; and it was a large supply that was needed to put onto the transports the minute they got into the harbor to give these men something to eat that they could eat and to keep a large supply for those who were not in condition all through the camp—not in condition to eat the regular army supplies—and it could not have been obtained from any other place.

Q. I don't mean the regular supply, but the supplemental supply.

A. In the first two weeks and a half it would have been well if it had come from anywhere.

Q. That is the thought I had in my mind.

A. There is no reason why it should not.

By General DODGE:

Q. Nothing to prevent it?

A. No, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was any application made to bring it in from any other place?

A. I never heard of it.

Q. It has been stated they could have had more milk and ice if it could have been brought by boat from the north side of Long Island Sound or from Newport, and when asked why it was not so brought, we were informed that the contract made at the taking of Montauk for a camp precluded the getting of any supplies except over the Long Island Railroad.

A. Whoever informed those persons were ignorant of the conditions of the contract, and the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Meiklejohn, spoke to me about that one day in August. He said he had seen it in the papers, and asked me if I had had any such relation in my mind. You will see in the New York Herald a statement by the Assistant Secretary of War that they had a perfect right to carry supplies from anywhere. There never was any question in their mind, but some subordinate might have heard a rumor through the newspapers or some other source that there was such a prohibition and drew his own conclusion; but as a matter of fact a tugboat did run from New London regularly with supplies for the Massachusetts troops, supplies that were sent from Boston and Connecticut, and no one thought of raising the question; it never entered our calculation; didn't have to think of such thing; didn't even discuss it; never was raised except in the papers, and they talk about a contract that was signed, and there was no contract, nothing but my letter, and they didn't even need the letter.

Q. If anybody had applied to you for permission to ship goods from New London, would you have objected to it?

A. Not if the Government wanted them. It says there "with the permission of the military authorities," but the quarantine was so strict that many of the boats that came there were not permitted to come in. I have come in myself from Greenport on a tug, and I couldn't get in for two hours.

Q. Why not?

A. Quarantined; it didn't make any difference where they came from; it might have come from anywhere; they wouldn't let them in.

Q. They were not in contact with the vessels. As far as I can see, there is no reason in the world why the quarantine officials should have made the slightest objection to people coming in from the other side of the Sound. They had nothing to do with the transport?

A. There was a good deal of something in the air around that place that permeated everything. I had not the slightest doubt I would have yellow fever. That was in the minds of all our men—that we were all going to have yellow fever or typhoid fever, or something.

Q. The detention hospital should have been protected, of course, and nothing should have come in except in the proper way, by quarantine, and the difficulty lies with the Government for not maintaining quarantine outside as the first step in protection; but certainly vessels coming in from Boston, Newport, New London, and New Haven, to run in there and deliver supplies, there was no reason for quarantining them?

A. I had nothing to do with them.

Q. I asked you hoping you could explain why the quarantine officers did do so.

A. That, of course, I had nothing to do with.

By General BEAVER:

Q. There is this, though, in my mind, Mr. Baldwin, that whilst there may have been no objection to vessels coming into Montauk, there may have been objection on the part of New London authorities from having vessels coming from Montauk to New London?

A. That may be. No one had any doubt that we saw nothing to look forward to at Montauk. We saw nothing but an exodus of our people on Long Island. They said they would go if the camp was selected, and in the face of that we permitted them to go there. It is almost impossible to face the world of things at that time and the fearful tragedy that was going on at that time. It was terrible.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Wasn't that the reason why you didn't want to have people going there so soon?

A. No; that was not it, because there had been no transports in there.

Q. It was a nuisance?

Governor BEAVER. It would have embarrassed and delayed the operation of the camp.

Q. There is nothing in that contract that prohibits people from going there?

A. Nothing that prohibits, except any outside transportation line in direct competition with us. It was always open to any of the Government boats to do anything—to go anywhere. It was wide open.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was it your understanding of this clause, Mr. Baldwin, "It being agreed, however, that any Government transport or vessel may discharge and load troops or supplies at such dock or docks, and that vessels may take or discharge passengers thereat, from or to other points than those hereinabove excepted, with the permission of the military authorities," that the military authorities could give them permission without your permission?

A. Certainly.

Q. That meant that if the military authorities of that camp had wished to bring anything over from the west shore they had authority to do that without word from you?

A. Certainly; and they did. That is an absolutely wide-open contract for the Government to do just what it pleased. Of course I didn't want any excursion steamers or these tramp steamers coming along the shore of Long Island and doing an excursion business down there or taking the small amount of supplies which would be used at the camp, coming there in competition with us in view of the fact that we were going to spend at least \$20,000 in preparation for it.

Q. But as to other points, the whole thing was in the control of the Government?

A. The Government could have handled all the troops and supplies and everything connected with it between Montauk and New London and the New Haven Road and never touched our tracks, and we had nothing to say. There never has been any question of that from the beginning to the end, except by certain persons who were misinformed. There was a criticism on a matter of rates that was not covered by the contract on express rates, and a very bitter article was published about the railroad and the rates charged for express. I was noticing that in the month of September, when we should have been better off than any other time, we did do a little better, \$13,000, eleven of it for the Montauk business, and our expenses in connection with it were \$10,000 increased, so that we hauled all the stuff for nothing, absolutely nothing, and we are not through with it yet.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Then the testimony that the trains were from two to three hours late is not true, is it?

A. No, sir: the trains that were run to Montauk were run on a special schedule; they left at certain hours and were not scheduled to arrive at any particular minute, for the reasons I have explained. They were run to the best advantage possible under the conditions of our heavy traffic. The average time for such trains, as I have said, would be 25 miles an hour, and the average time made by these trains was less than 25 miles an hour, though they made more than 25 miles an hour and used less than five hours in the main. Many trains moved in three hours, and many in three and a half, and some in four and four and a half and sometimes five hours, but they were special trains injected to take care of that service. They would start late out of Montauk, fifteen, twenty, and thirty minutes late, because poor sick fellows were seen coming down a hill and would be carried in beds, and we would receive them, and along the road would take off two or three and carry them into another house, and at Jamaica would transfer 10 or 15 and send them into Brooklyn, and we would come in when we could; we were simply serving the best we could. Of course, we were late on that theory, but we were safe.

By General DODGE:

Q. As far as furnishing the supplies there, all kinds of supplies demanded for transportation to the camp, did you ever have complaints of delays in this direction?

A. We had one; I can't give you the date; the newspaper men said to me that the commissary department were out of supplies, out of bread, and that the other railroad company was blockaded and could not handle the goods, and that was the reason. The fact was that there was a Sunday intervening and that the supplies they had ordered were ordered on Sunday and naturally couldn't have got there until Tuesday morning. The next Sunday we took the precaution to notify them there was a Sunday coming, and two weeks later there was a Sunday and holiday, and we took the precaution to notify them of the two days, but outside of that we never ought to have had any criticism, and after that particular case the commissary department—in the commissary department there was always plenty of supplies there, except by the neglect of some local man.

Q. Neglect of some local man?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I think you have made your full statement; there is no other statement or suggestion you desire to make, is there?

A. I only want to say that any difficulties that did exist were all due to the fact that we didn't have or there was not given a notice of ten days or two weeks that the troops were going there, and that after we did start in superhuman work was done, and I think as well as could be under the circumstances.

NEW YORK, *November 26, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF ELEANOR L. COE.

ELEANOR L. COE, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Please give your name.

A. Eleanor L. Coe.

Q. Your occupation?

A. I was simply a volunteer nurse.

Q. You were at Montauk during what time?

A. Between August 29 and September 27.

Q. About a month you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What duties were you occupied with during that time?

A. I was at the detention hospital, in the diet kitchen.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us whether in the detention hospital the tents were very crowded?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Would you know it, being in the diet kitchen: would you know anything about it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were all the men properly cared for, so far as you know?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was the nursing proper for them, as you think?

A. As much as could be under the circumstances.

Q. Was the nursing done by female nurses or by male nurses?

A. Male when I went there, and female shortly afterwards.

Q. Soon afterwards?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the care was better when the female nurses came in?

A. Yes, sir. There were nine volunteers came the day I got there.

Q. Do you know of your own knowledge any instance of neglect on the part of any doctor or nurse?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were you at the diet kitchen able to provide the necessary special diet for the sick?

A. When we first went there, no; afterwards, yes.

Q. How long was it before you were able to get your diet kitchen in running order?

A. We started the first day and fed about 500 sick men.

Q. The first day?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long before you were able to feed all the men?

A. We did not have cooking utensils until about a week and a half afterwards.

Q. But you were able, nevertheless, to do everything that was done?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you able to have ample supplies for your diet kitchen?

A. We did and we didn't.

Q. In what respect?

A. The supplies came, but some of them stayed at the station for want of conveyances to bring them up.

Q. Had the detention hospital ambulances that could be used for the purpose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they so used?

A. I do not think we had enough wagons to bring them in.

Q. Were these supplies furnished by the Government, or Red Cross Association, or National Defense Aid, or whatever the society was termed?

A. I think they were furnished by all.

Q. You asked no questions, so you got them?

A. No, sir.

Q. You were not particular from what source they were furnished?

A. No, sir; as long as they came; that is all we wanted.

Q. Did you have occasion to know anything about the sick in quarters in the camps?

A. I went through every one of the wards every day.

Q. I am not speaking about the hospital now, but the men outside of it.

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there room enough in that hospital to properly care for all the sick that went into the detention camp?

A. I know nothing about the detention camp, but the detention hospital had good accommodations.

Q. Do you know whether or not these accommodations were beyond the demands made upon them; in other words, whether they had vacant beds that could be filled at any time?

A. No; at the beginning, I think all the beds were filled.

Q. And the beginning was as you saw it the 29th of August?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So far as you know, every cot was taken?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you anything to tell us about any matter that is not covered by that general statement; that everything was done, in your judgment, that ought to have been done?

A. No; I think I have given everything excepting the want of conveyances for our articles.

Q. Were you ladies yourselves properly taken care of?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have no complaint to make for yourself or for your sisters on that account?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you receive other than courtesy from everybody you came in contact with?

A. Courtesy always.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF LEONARD W. JOHNSON.**

Mr. LEONARD W. JOHNSON appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your name and address?

A. My name is Leonard W. Johnson. At the present time—and where my contract is dated—is North Cambridge, Mass.

Q. To what contract do you refer?

A. The contract issued from the War Department at New York in regard to hospital service as a contract nurse.

Q. Is it in writing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you it with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you let me see it, please?

(Paper handed General Beaver.)

Q. Have you any objection to this going on our record?

A. No, sir.

(General Beaver read the contract, as follows: "Contract for service as nurse. This contract entered into this 29th day of August, 1898, at New York City, N. Y., between Major N. S. Jarvis, brigade surgeon, U. S. V. A., and Leonard W. Johnson, of North Cambridge, in the State of Massachusetts: Witnesseth, that for the consideration hereinafter mentioned the said Leonard W. Johnson promises and agrees to perform the duties of nurse at Porto Rico or wherever needed, and the said Major N. S. Jarvis, brigade surgeon, U. S. V. A., promises and agrees on behalf of the United States to pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Leonard W. Johnson the sum of \$30 per month, and to furnish one ration in kind per day and medical treatment during the period from the date above stated; and it is further agreed that the said Leonard W. Johnson shall receive transportation while on duty and at the termination to the place of making of this contract, provided this contract is not annulled for neglect of duty, in which case no transportation shall be furnished, all of which shall be his full compensation. This contract shall continue until determined by the Surgeon-General or chief surgeon of the Army or in the field. Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of Clarence L. Sandies. (Signed.) N. S. Jarvis. (Seal.) Leonard W. Johnson. (Seal.) Indorsed voucher for pay November 1st to 12th, 1898, inclusive, \$12. Approved and contract annulled by me November 12th, 1898. C. C. Byrne, Col. and Ass't Surgeon-General, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon, Department of the East, Governors Island, New York, November 12th, 1898.")

Q. Does the time for which you received pay represent the time for which you were in the service?

A. From the day I was sworn until the day the contract was annulled.

Q. Why was the contract annulled?

A. On account of sickness. The charges I wish to prefer are against the Quartermaster Department, coming back.

Q. What did you do in accordance with this contract?

A. I went to Ponce first and Coamo afterwards.

Q. Were you in the hospital, in either of these hospitals, as attendant?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did you find these hospitals?

A. I think in both cases the hospitals were as good as could be, considering our facilities.

Q. What previous experience had you as a nurse?

A. I had had some in a private capacity. My mother is a practicing doctor and I had studied a little medicine myself, not in college, but privately.

Q. Did you become sick in Porto Rico?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What with?

A. Malaria and rheumatism, and afterwards had dysentery.

Q. When did you leave there?

A. I left Ponce the day my pay is given there.

Q. That is the 12th?

A. I received \$61 before that.

Q. November 1 to 12 you were paid at Governors Island?

A. I received money before that.

Q. But these \$12 received between the 1st and 12th of November represent the time you were coming North?

A. Yes, sir. The other was made there.

Q. Then you had served from the 29th of August, or about that time, until the 1st of November in Porto Rico?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What vessel did you come on?

A. The transport *Berlin*.

Q. Who was the sailing master, the captain?

A. I don't know his name.

Q. Who was in charge of the boat or quartermaster's department?

A. Captain Swantz.

Q. Who was the medical officer?

A. Dr. Crosley. He was acting as substitute for some one else.

Q. From what point did that boat sail?

A. From Ponce, and touched at Santiago, and from there came to New York.

Q. How long were you in coming in?

A. I think just twelve days.

Q. What experience had you aboard the vessel that you complain of?

A. In the first place, after being taken sick at Coamo. I was quite sick, and I was relieved from duty. Then I was sent from there to Ponce. I was sick enough to go down in the ambulance, and was lying on my back. I think there were 40 went down at that time. After being there a week at Ponce the *Berlin* came in and we were ordered aboard her to be sent home. My order relieving me from duty had not been canceled, and I was sick when I went aboard. There was nothing said until after we got away from port, and then the quartermaster informed us that whether we were sick or not we had to go to work, and from that time until we reached New York we had to look after the patients. In fact, there was none taken except those that were supposed to be able to take care of themselves. Mr. Sanders and myself had to take charge of these men, with the assistance of some of the other men aboard the boat, privates of different regiments, and orders were given to put those men in irons if they would not help us, and we were under those orders ourselves.

Q. How many sick men were there on this vessel who required the attention of nursing?

A. Twelve men required it all the time.

Q. And how many were there to wait on them?

A. Mr. Sanders acted as steward in charge of the diet and I acted as steward in charge of medicine.

Q. How many attendants did you have?

A. That depended on how many we could take out as able to help themselves.

Q. How many did you pick out?

A. None, regularly. If we had a man not able to get ice, we would get it for him; the same way with other supplies.

Q. What did you do as steward in charge of the medicine?

A. I gave all medicines prescribed by Dr. Crosley.

Q. To those patients?

A. Yes, sir; and others that required them.

Q. What was the condition of the patients? Were they able to care for themselves?

A. Nearly all of them were confined to beds.

Q. Were they confined in such a way as you had to use a bedpan, or could they go to the closet?

A. There were two that were so sick that they were compelled to use the bedpans.

Q. So you had 2 very sick men out of the 12?

A. Yes, sir. What I mean is that there were some that had to stay up perhaps all day and part of the night. Of course we lost our sleep, and not being well, it told on us.

Q. How often did the malaria assert itself in your case?

A. I had more or less malaria until I reached a fairly cool climate.

Q. How often did you have a chill?

A. About every night.

Q. What was your condition through the day?

A. I would be weak.

Q. Feverish?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you paid for this all the time?

A. Yes, sir; not that I wished it, for I would have preferred not to receive pay coming back, but I was forced in it.

Q. Were those men that you were compelled to wait on sicker than you, in your judgment?

A. I think three were. The rest, I think I was sicker than they were.

Q. How many had you aboard your vessel?

A. The paper states 150. I do not know myself.

Q. Who was the officer who threatened to put you in irons?

A. I received that order from Dr. Crosley. He stated that he had been given that order to give us to transmit it to those under us and it would affect ourselves also.

Q. Was the Doctor in good health?

A. Yes, sir; I think he was, except he had seasickness.

Q. Do you know where the Doctor is now?

A. He was on the *City of Berlin* that left.

Q. Was he a Regular Army officer, or did he belong to the Volunteer Army, or was he a contract surgeon, or what?

A. I do not know. The report was he was a substitute for the regular doctor of the boat.

Q. You don't know what position he had in the United States Army?

A. No, sir; I do not.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What strap did he wear?

A. He did not generally wear any.

Q. Did you ever see him with a strap on his shoulder?

A. He wore a white officer's coat.

By General BEAVER:

Q. How was your vessel provided with medical supplies?

A. I think it was quite well supplied.

Q. How was it provided with commissary supplies for feeding your patients and for your own sustenance?

A. Most of the men—that is, privates and sergeants—soon became sick with the ration furnished by the quartermaster at Ponce. Our men drew our supplies from the steward of the boat: he was quite kind, and he gave us stuff out of his personal supplies.

Q. Did you have soup and liquid diet for your patients?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They did not suffer?

A. They never told us so.

Q. So that your only complaint was that you were compelled to wait on these 12 sick men, you and your companion, when you thought you ought to be in bed?

A. My reason for making complaint is, I think I might have been really better. Coming back, work, I think, has made me worse. My contract states that there was no further compensation in any way. Of course I was required to look after the men, but I think I have been ill-treated. I see no reason why I should have gone to work.

Q. When they were out on the ocean and having a number of sick men, and you and your companion were the only two men available for the service, what do you think of that; is it reasonable or unreasonable?

A. That was done when the boat was loaded, and they knew that when they were in port.

Q. When you came north on the 12th of November you received your pay from Colonel Byrne, assistant surgeon of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That covered the entire time of your voyage?

A. It did. I have been paid in full.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Did you make any protest to the doctor and tell him you were not able to perform the duties?

A. Yes, sir; and we were told if we were not satisfied we could go ashore at Santiago, and we said we had no means of reaching home, and he said he did not care.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT.

Dr. WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, upon request, appeared before the commission and was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us your name, profession, time of practice, and present residence?

A. William H. Prescott, physician and surgeon. I live at 285 Marlboro street, Boston. I was in the class of 1884-85 at Harvard Medical School, and my degree was given to me in 1888, after going through the hospital.

Q. What position, if any, did you occupy during the late war?

A. I was sent by the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association to Camp Wikoff to take charge of the distribution of supplies that they would send to the Massachusetts soldiers in camp there.

Q. Will you please tell us in your own way what you observed at Montauk Point; what difficulties, if any, you had in securing the men you went after;

whether you were aided or otherwise in your efforts to get the men; what the condition of the men was, and everything in regard to that?

A. I left Boston on the 15th of August, arriving at Montauk on the 17th, with the late Hon. Sherman Hoar. We were taken in charge by Captain Chase, provost-marshal. He took me up to the General Hospital and introduced me to Colonel Forwood. I asked for permission of Colonel Forwood to erect a diet kitchen. I was told that no diet kitchen was necessary. I then offered my services as a volunteer physician, and was assigned to three wards as acting assistant surgeon. Each ward contained about 35 patients. I found the hospital in a great deal of confusion. There were a few doctors, fewer nurses, and a few Hospital Corps men. There were a few medical supplies. It was very hard for the first week to get any medicine, but I never thought that any of the sick men suffered on that account. There were few cots, but plenty of blankets; there were no sheets or pillowcases at first, except what the Red Cross had. The doctors averaged as well as they do in any large city; there were some poor men, but as soon as it was found they were poor they were sent away. There were some very good men, which brought up the average above what it is in a large city. The nurses and Sisters of Charity did their work thoroughly and conscientiously. There were not a sufficient number of nurses when I first went there, but they gradually improved, until when I came away there were plenty. The Hospital Corps men were not efficient; the majority of the male nurses sent from the different States were not efficient; they cared more for their own comfort than what they were to do for the sick men. The plan of the hospital was a good one—the carrying out of the plan of the building and hospital. The carrying out after it was built was not well done, owing, in my opinion, to the lack of executive ability of the man in charge.

Q. Who was he?

A. Col. W. H. Forwood. The men in charge of the different departments in the hospital were good, able, and had a good deal of executive ability. The food was good. At first there was difficulty in getting sufficient to eat for the officers in charge of the camp, but that was partly due to the fact that the officers were so busy that they could not wait until the food was ready for them, and in explanation of that would say that there was only one kitchen and we had to provide food for the patients. There were three or four hundred when I first went there, and they increased rapidly and we had to provide for them first, and after that the men who were taking care of them came in. Personally I could not wait for breakfast, because I had to be here, there, and everywhere. The Second Massachusetts came in soon after I was there and I had charge of distributing supplies which the Massachusetts Aid Society sent for them, and then the regulars, after the Second Massachusetts, were taken care of. The camp was a beautiful one. The water was good and sufficient in quantity both for man and beast. The water in the ponds where the horses were watered was brackish and at first the animals would not take it, but they soon got used to it and I saw no ill results. The water in the wells was sufficient for the camps, except when the pipes broke, and that was something no one could guard against. The first break in the pipes occurred the Friday after I reached there, and the only water in the hospital was some Hygeia and Apollinaris water which I had sent from New London. The sinks were well constructed: they were well covered twice a day. There was very little policing in the hospital at first; it was difficult to get men from the regiments around who were sufficiently strong to do the work. There was very little disinfection carried on which was worthy of the name, because of the ignorance of the male attendants, and that constituted a serious menace, in my opinion. The water in the wells was never contaminated, in my opinion: surely not before the filters were put in, which removed the danger affecting the water distributed to the different parts of the camp.

Q. Will you let me interrupt you, Doctor, please. Will you be kind enough to tell me the date you were in that hospital service?

A. I arrived there on the 17th of August, and left on the 6th of October.

Q. You were, then, there nearly two weeks?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, as regards the medicines you spoke of as being short, in what respect were they short? Was there a shortage of all articles or a few articles?

A. Shortage of everything.

Q. Do you know whether any reason was assigned by those in authority why there was that shortage?

A. That the supplies had not come.

Q. Do you know whether or not supplies were on hand and could not be delivered?

A. No.

Q. I am asked by Governor Woodbury to ask you how long that shortage continued?

A. I can not state exactly. I should say about ten days after the 17th of August.

Q. After that was there an abundance of medicine?

A. As a rule; yes, sir.

Q. Was that abundance furnished by the United States Government or relief societies?

A. I suppose by the Government.

Q. Now, as respects the overcrowding that has been spoken of, did you observe the overcrowding?

A. There were a great many patients in the tents, but I always supposed you could get a great many patients in a tent.

Q. Do you know the number—how many men were put in a hospital tent?

A. I think the greatest number I saw was eight.

Q. Do you know what the regulation number is?

A. I don't know.

Q. Now, as respects the nurses, is it or is it not practicable or possible to get good male nurses in any considerable number anywhere?

A. I think it is not possible to get them in any considerable number.

Q. Then the fact that they were not there does not necessarily mean that they did not make the efforts to get them?

A. No, sir.

Q. And those men, as you stated, in your judgment, they were not proper nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did this difficulty as respects the nursing continue during your entire stay there?

A. I think the difficulty about the male nurses was not removed.

Q. Were the female nurses there—say twelve or fifteen days after you went there—a sufficient number to take care of the sick in the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they were so cared for?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As respects policing; did you observe any gross neglect in reference to removal of excreta?

A. At first.

Q. What was the difficulty: were the vessels left open, or not removed, or emptied, or what?

A. Everything. The vessels sometimes were emptied right outside the fly.

Q. Did you yourself observe an instance of that?

A. I did, sir.

Q. Had orders been given with reference to the proper policing of the camp and hospital?

A. I don't know, sir; I think it was, sir.

Q. Did you yourself observe the higher officers of the camp—that is, the chief surgeon, Dr. Forwood, and the surgeon in charge of the hospital—did you observe them making frequent visits to the hospital and wards in the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was the attention of each or both called to these matters?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any correction made of the abuses complained of?

A. Not at once.

Q. Do you know whether or not there was at any time during your stay there ample tentage for the sick of that camp in the general hospital?

A. There was never sufficient tentage at the general hospital for all the sick in camp.

Q. Was there a sufficient amount of tentage at any or all times to answer the requirements of the very sick that were brought to the hospital?

A. In my opinion, yes, sir.

Q. Did you of your own knowledge know of a sick man being refused admittance because there was no space?

A. I don't know how sick they were.

Q. Do you know of any man being refused?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see any of these men yourself?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion while there to visit the regimental hospital?

A. I did.

Q. Did you find any in these regimental hospitals so ill that they ought to be transferred to the general hospital?

A. I should say yes.

Q. Do you think it was possible with the conditions existing in the regimental hospital to care for the very sick men in the regimental hospitals or tents of the men?

A. Do you mean the regimental or division hospital?

Q. I mean the regimental hospitals.

A. In those which I saw I should say they could take care of every sick man in the regimental hospitals.

Q. Without detriment to the men?

A. Without detriment to the men.

Q. They were prepared, then, to get along without suffering to the men?

A. In my opinion, I think so.

Q. How long was there any division hospital?

A. The matter of dates is rather—

Q. In a general way?

A. I should say the first division hospital was erected in September.

Q. Was that prepared for the reception of patients?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it overcrowded, so far as you observed?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there, in your judgment, any reason for believing that the men in the hospital were not properly cared for?

A. No, sir.

Q. As respects the doctors, medicines, etc.?

A. I can not say about the medicines.

Q. As respects that shortage of medicines, were any really essential articles—absolutely necessary drugs—wanting at any time?

A. That would depend upon what you called absolutely essential and necessary drugs.

Q. Will you kindly let me know what you used?

A. We used camphor and opium pills for diarrhea. There was a shortage of those pills. Sometimes we wanted calomel and soda before we started. The camphor and opium, there was a shortage of that.

Q. Was there quinine in sufficient quantity for the men?

A. In the first part of the time we didn't use much.

Q. You did later?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then it was there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not the general hospital wards were visited largely by outsiders?

A. A great deal too much.

Q. Would it have been better to have excluded a large number of the visitors?

A. I should have excluded everybody.

Q. Do you know why these men, women, and children were not excluded?

A. Because it was difficult to tell who had relatives there and therefore a right to go, and who had not and therefore should not be allowed.

Q. Were you familiar with the sending away of the men on furlough during the time you were there?

A. I was.

Q. What class of men were selected to be given furloughs and sent away?

A. At first the patients were sent away on the recommendations of the physicians who had them in charge. Afterwards a board was appointed to see every man who was recommended for discharge.

By General DODGE:

Q. For furlough or discharge?

A. For either, and recommended whether he ought or ought not to be allowed to go.

Q. Do you know whether orders were given as to the class of men who were given furloughs or discharge?

A. Each officer was told what kind of men should be allowed to go.

Q. Those able to travel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was this order carried out?

A. Not wholly.

Q. Can you give us any reason why that order was not obeyed?

A. For two especial reasons. One, because the physicians who were there did not realize, could not realize, the condition of the men under their care. They had come from Cuba. Their cerebation was slow and poor. They had malaria. They were perfectly well, perhaps, one day and were recommended for discharge or furlough. Another reason was, because the physicians in charge of the men were overruled by the desires of the men and their friends and relatives to get home.

Q. Are we to understand, then, that importunity produced its ordinary results?

A. It always does upon those who have not had experience in institutional work.

Q. And as a result men were sent away who were not fit to travel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After the board was established did the same condition of things prevail?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were there any men sent away under the action of that board who ought not to have been allowed to leave?

A. In my opinion there was not.

Q. What time was that board established?

A. I should say about the 5th of September.

Q. Had a large number of men already been furloughed?

A. Yes, sir. The men who were furloughed were given their furloughs at the hospital. Then they had to walk down to the station, which was at least a mile and a half. When they reached the station, instead of having the quartermaster's and commissary department in or near the station it was about 150 yards away. That is not a great walk for a well man. But when you walk 150 yards in sand up to your ankles, it is a pretty hard walk for a well man, and it is a very difficult thing for a sick man to do, and by the time the train was ready to leave the men who had a furlough had a chill and were sick and should have gone back to the hospital. They could not be made to go back because they were furloughed and outside of their jurisdiction, and I have even tried to get men to go back to the hospital, but could not do it, because he was not amenable to reason: he refused; he was going toward home.

Q. There should not have been any difficulty in having all necessary arrangements made at the hospital, as respects their transportation, or the money, etc., given them for themselves?

A. Personally, I think that thing should have been done at the station.

Q. Rather than at the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For what reason?

A. Because the men were in such large numbers that they had to get the tickets down there and had to be sure that the men after they got their tickets got on the trains.

Q. Would it not have been practicable to have the commissary and quartermasters at the hospital to get these men the necessary transportation and travel money at the hospital before leaving?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether any effort was made to have such arrangements as that perfected?

A. Never to my knowledge.

Q. At the very last, some men had to take this course of going to the station?

A. It was changed afterwards to right near the station.

Q. They were compelled during the whole time you were there to go to one or the other place to get their money?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did the men walk from the hospital, or were they carried in ambulances or wagons?

A. Such as could went almost entirely in wagons.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in sending them in ambulances or wagons at that time?

A. Not if there had been ambulances and wagons there.

Q. That is the question I want to ask you. Was there a sufficient number of hospital ambulances and wagons there?

A. Not as many as were necessary.

Q. Do you know any reason why ambulances and wagons were not there?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any official information as to the reason why they were not there?

A. No, sir.

Q. You recognized the difficulty, but you had no official information as to the reason therefor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Besides the policing and nursing and the discharging and furloughing of the men, do you know of any other evidence, of not to say, perhaps, neglect, but defective organization and the consequent injury to the men?

A. I don't understand your question.

Q. Was there any other evidence to your mind that the officers in charge were not as efficient and active as they should have been?

A. Yes, sir; there was.

Q. What were they, please?

A. The man in charge of the detention hospital, when I first went there, was under the influence of liquor almost every day, continuously.

Q. Will you be kind enough—in writing—to give us his name?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did he remain in charge of the hospital after you went there?

A. I should say about a week or ten days; I can not tell you exactly.

Q. Did you see any other evidence of any medical officer or officers in that condition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the division hospital or in the camp?

A. Mostly in the division hospital.

Q. Will you be kind enough to give these names in the same way to us?

A. Those names that I can remember.

Q. Were those officers relieved?

A. At the general hospital they were relieved as soon as they were found out; they were all relieved, to my own knowledge.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know whether they were of the regular establishment, volunteer or regular organization, or contract?

A. Some contract surgeons and some Regular Army.

Q. Now, as respects the difficulty that there was in the removal of the Massachusetts men from Montauk, are you familiar with the conditions that have existed and the difficulties there were in getting the men away?

A. I don't know to what you refer.

Q. It has been reported to us that certain Massachusetts men were gotten away only after certain difficulties and delays. Do you know anything about that?

A. I really don't know about it. I don't know what you mean.

Q. For instance, it is said certain Massachusetts men were sent for. It was promised to the proper authorities that they would be removed to the State of Massachusetts, but they were not turned over at the proper time; there was a delay of hours and perhaps days occurred before they could be gotten away. Do you know anything of that sort?

A. I think it was Colonel Goddard, who came from Providence and was told he could get some Massachusetts men, but he did not.

Q. Do you know why?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were they turned over to him?

A. There were some men turned over to him, but they were turned over to him by the general in charge of the camp instead of the officer in charge of the hospital.

Q. Had the surgeon in charge of the hospital received an order to turn over the men of the Massachusetts regiment?

A. That is what I understood; I didn't see the order.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you know why the surgeon in charge of the hospital refused to turn them over?

A. No, sir; I do not.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. In your judgment, what were the essential difficulties in the way of properly organizing and running that hospital during the time you were connected with it?

A. I think the first difficulty was the lack of appreciation of the task which was to come to those who went to Montauk. The fact that a hospital of 500 beds was ordered when the whole Fifth Army Corps were to come seemed to me to be one of the first causes of trouble. The second cause was the lack of executive ability, as I have said before, of the man in charge. The other cause was the lack of adequate transportation facilities between New York and Montauk. All of the rest of the difficulties I believe to be due to the trouble of getting such a camp established and started in such a hurry.

Q. Now, will you be kind enough to amplify a little on the second and third of your objections: that is to say, the insufficiency or lack of executive ability on the part of the surgeon in chief and the transportation facilities?

A. The surgeon in chief could not delegate authority apparently to any of his heads of departments, and therefore it was necessary, in order to accomplish anything, to get his signature to the order. That necessitated delays for the very slightest thing sometimes for hours. As an illustration of what I mean, Colonel Goddard, of whom I have already spoken, came with a ship to take away 100 or 125, or thereabouts, of the men that came up to the general hospital, and he was kept waiting for half an hour while the surgeon in charge discussed with a laborer how many days he had worked repairing a pipe, and then writing out his conclusions on the back of a piece of paper.

Q. Was this interview with Dr. Forwood or the doctor in charge of the hospital?

A. I was speaking of Colonel Forwood. Major Heizmann had charge of the hospital; Colonel Forwood had charge of the construction and general oversight of the hospital, and Major Brown was executive officer.

Q. Now, go on, if you please, sir.

A. Again, there was no guaranty that any orders that were given would not be recalled in a few minutes or in a few hours for the first few weeks at least after I was there. There were few, if any, written orders. In my opinion, no hospital can be run without written orders, and I have seen Colonel Forwood tear up a written order in the face of the man to whom it was given.

Q. For what reason?

A. Because he had changed his mind. Another evidence to show he could not give up his authority. I heard him tell Major Brown that he would give him charge of a detail of physicians for those getting well. Said Major Brown, "Then I will send Dr. Mueller to the division hospital." "Didn't I tell you you should not send him there?" Therefore, no one felt they could do anything without a written order, and then they were not sure it would not be torn up.

Q. Was Dr. Forwood's office in the hospital or remotely from it?

A. At first he had a desk right next to the tent, in the tent next to the tent Major Brown occupied; but he had charge not only of the general hospital, but the division hospital and the other hospital, and he would be gone from the general hospital perhaps for hours and it would be impossible to find him.

Q. And are we to understand that nothing could be done there except on his order, either verbal or written?

A. That was the condition when I first went there.

Q. Do you know whether that was in accordance with his instructions or whether he did it of his own will and pleasure?

A. I don't know what you mean by his instructions.

Q. From Washington.

A. I don't know, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. How long did that last?

A. Well, you have discovered, herhaps, before now that dates and items are very hard for me—I think about the 8th or 10th of September.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know what time Dr. Forwood was relieved?

A. I think about the 20th of September.

Q. So correction was being made before he was relieved?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And changes you spoke of?

A. No written change, but things were going so much better that they did not need them.

Q. Now as respects transportation you spoke of?

A. The Long Island Railroad is for the most part a one-track railroad and it did splendid work in taking care of supplies and the people coming to Montauk. It deserves the greatest amount of praise for the fact that there was not any accident, but a one-track railroad can not do everything. It could not take care of all the supplies and all the people who wanted to go to Montauk and all the people who wanted to get away, and it was absolutely necessary to have other means.

Q. Do you know whether or not there was from New London, New Haven, or Newport steamers running in there with supplies?

A. Yes, sir; they were. The boat which belonged—which was furnished, rather, by the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Society, of which I had charge, made two trips a day from New London to Montauk with supplies.

Q. Were any objections raised to your coming to the dock at Montauk?

A. Never but once.

Q. What was that occasion, please?

A. There were four doctors and four other men who came with supplies. They landed them at the quarantine station and the objection was perfectly natural, perfectly proper one, that no passenger should be allowed to pass through the quarantine station. I made no complaint of that. I said that was the only time.

Q. Was that quarantine restriction imposed early during the time you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it, in your judgment, a wise provision?

A. It was.

Q. Was there, think you, any danger that disease might be spread abroad through the country if a quarantine was not maintained at Montauk Point?

A. It might have been.

Q. It has been stated that the quarantine officers were in the habit of preventing vessels coming in from New York there and landing their supplies, not once, but many times. Do you know anything about that?

A. I have heard that was so.

Q. The reason assigned was this one you have given—that it interfered with the quarantine arrangement.

A. That was one reason.

Q. Any other?

A. Another reason was that they did not obey orders which the quarantine officers had given them.

Q. Do you know whether any objection was made on the ground that the railroad company had entire charge of transportation?

A. I never heard that; not from the steamers that came. I heard it given as the reason why a line of steamers was not established between New York and Montauk.

Q. But not to steamers from New London to Montauk or Long Island?

A. That's right.

Q. Do you think it would have improved conditions if vessels could have done so?

A. No, sir.

Q. The excluding of these vessels did no material harm to the sick?

A. I would modify that. Unless the food that was brought was distributed judiciously and under the care of the regular officers it might have done harm rather than good to the men at Montauk.

Q. Do you or not know of your own knowledge whether or not harm was done by the provisions of one sort and another being brought in?

A. I know that some of the men in the hospital were killed, in my opinion, by the food given to them by the visitors who had no right there.

Q. Do you or not know of any instance of actual starvation in that camp or hospital or detention hospital or anywhere in the bounds of Camp Wikoff?

A. No, sir.

Q. You, of course, are not familiar with the fact that starvation has been claimed to have been the fault of many deaths. Do you know what is the reason for the cause of these complaints, which, we understand, are unfounded?

A. The men who had stayed a long time in Cuba, who had either typhoid fever or malaria, were unable to retain upon their stomachs the food which was provided for them. For instance, I saw a number of the Ninth Massachusetts take two glasses of milk and could not retain it more than five minutes. That was when I first came; and it is to that fact, in my opinion, that the great trouble from starvation occurred at Montauk.

Q. Was the proper food for men in that condition provided at that camp in sufficient quantity?

A. Not always by the Government.

Q. For what reason? Do you know?

A. The inability to get supplies there.

Q. If not by the Government, was such food provided from outside sources?

A. A great deal of food was provided from outside sources for the men in different parts of Camp Wikoff.

Q. Was there a sufficient amount of proper food brought in that camp for the individuals you have spoken of?

A. At first, no.

Q. How long does the time "at first" cover?

A. Perhaps ten days.

Q. After that there was an abundance?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of proper food for the men in that condition?

A. It is hard work to say "proper food." There was not enough milk for some time.

Q. For how long?

A. You mean provided by the Government?

Q. No, sir; we are talking now in general.

A. I should think fifteen days.

Q. Was there any good reason, so far as you know, why milk was not furnished in sufficient quantity during these fifteen days?

A. No, sir; there are two reasons. One was the lack of transportation facilities; the other was the inability to obtain milk near enough to keep it from being sour.

Q. How were those difficulties overcome? You say the difficulty ceased after fifteen days or thereabouts.

A. Mostly overcome by having carloads of milk furnished.

Q. Was there any difficulty in having carloads of milk come from the first day to the last?

A. No, sir.

Q. Whose fault was it, then?

A. It was not ordered.

Q. Was all that was ordered supplied?

A. As far as I know.

Q. Did you, of your own knowledge, know of any single instance of any individual not receiving his proper food and, as a consequence, dying?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know of his not receiving proper food and his being made seriously worse thereby?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was the hospital supplied in sufficient quantity with the necessary food for the very sick prior to the 1st of September?

A. No, sir.

Q. The diet kitchen, which was established along that time, did it or not supply food to those desperately ill or practically ill?

A. I don't understand your question.

Q. There were three classes of patients there: those that could be fed with only a small quantity of milk; then another class that were able to take the army ration; then there was an intermediate class that who, while not so ill, yet could not eat the ordinary food of the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they were fed from the ordinary diet kitchens?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After they were established, was there any difficulty in feeding any of the men of the classes mentioned?

A. Not so far as I know.

Q. Do you know anything about the condition of the men that came on the *Olivette*?

A. I did not see the *Olivette*.

Q. Who was familiar with the condition of the men?

A. Dr. E. H. Bradford had charge of the landing.

Q. Have you anything further to say to us as respects Camp Wikoff, at Montauk, while you were there which has not been touched upon in your examination?

A. I do not know that there is anything I can say, except I consider the General Hospital at Camp Wikoff as good a field hospital as could be found anywhere.

Q. What have you to say as respects the detention hospital, or did you see it?

A. Yes, sir; I visited it—I was going to say almost every day; I do not know but what I did every day. I consider that after the first ten days it was a well-managed hospital.

Q. What have you to say as respects the division hospital?

A. Good.

Q. And as respects the care of the men in the hospital tents—you have already stated that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you anything else to say or suggest what should have been done, if any?

A. In my opinion, the Army Medical Department should be put upon a business basis and the departments of the Army so conducted that it does not take three months in the ordinary times of peace for requisitions to go through.

Q. When you speak of being put on a business basis, please explain in what respects a change should be made.

A. It seems to me that the men who have charge of the Army Medical Department in its various forms should be physicians who have executive ability.

Q. Are we to understand that in your judgment executive ability was lacking in the Medical Department of the Army, not with reference to a single individual, but to the whole organization?

A. In my opinion the majority were lacking in executive ability.

Q. Please explain in detail what you mean by executive ability.

A. Well, that is pretty hard to tell in a few words.

Q. I know, but if you will give us an intimation of what your own views are, because on that you base the statement.

A. The main point lacking in a man who has not executive ability, in my opinion, is the inability to delegate authority to the men under him who have charge of the different departments.

Q. Was not such authority delegated in the Medical Department of the Army in the various grades from Surgeon-General down?

A. That is an opinion I formed mostly from hearsay and results.

Q. And that opinion is what?

A. That it is lacking.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were you aware of the fact or not that Colonel Forwood, when he arrived at Montauk or within a day or two after he left for there, had full power to purchase anything or do anything that was necessary to accomplish the object of his being ordered there?

A. I was told so.

Q. Were you aware that as soon as the order for the hospital of 500 tents was made there was an order immediately following to make it double?

A. No, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. At the time you arrived there, the 17th of August, at that time, can you give me an idea how many hospital tents there were up in that general hospital?

A. Yes; I can tell you exactly. There were 16 wards and each ward accommodated about 30.

Q. How many tents?

A. There were about 5 to each ward.

Q. That would be 80?

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. What answer did Colonel Forwood give to you in not accepting your proposition to establish a diet kitchen?

A. He showed me where three kitchens were to be put and he said he would not need a diet kitchen.

Q. Did he establish these kitchens there?

A. He never established the third one. The diet kitchen, which I had the honor to help establish, was put where he was to put his third one.

Q. Don't you think that would be a necessary adjunct to that camp?

A. I think so.

Q. How long was it before you got it?

A. Two weeks.

Q. Did it answer its purpose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he give you any satisfactory answer why you should not put it up?

A. That was the only one.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. He finally allowed you to put it up?

A. He did not give it to me to put it up, he gave it to a woman.

Q. That shows the power of a woman.

A. Mrs. Mott, who was the wife of Dr. Valentine Mott, of New York, and who did such good service in feeding the men who came off the transports, went to him one day with Mrs. Willard and said, "Doctor, is there anything you want done at the station?" He said "Yes, there was." He told her what he wanted. "Is there anything else?" "Yes." "Is there anything else?" "Yes." "Is there anything more?" "No, nothing more." "Well, now, Colonel Forwood, I would like permission to erect a diet kitchen," and Colonel Forwood had to put his name down. To me, that was one of the nicest things that happened there.

Q. Doctor, you spoke about being obliged to refuse patients admittance to the hospital. How often did that occur, and how many patients were refused?

A. I could not give you the exact number of times or exact number who were refused, but I should say it often happened, at least half a dozen times, and the number refused perhaps amounted to 40 or 50.

Q. Was there any room in the division hospital at that time?

A. Most of the refusals came from the division hospitals. I was at the general hospital. The delay in establishing the division hospital was another cause of trouble.

Q. How long did the want of care of the excretions of the patients continue?

A. In my opinion they were never properly taken care of.

Q. Well, how many times were the excretions emptied upon the ground, to your knowledge?

A. I never saw it but once.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What was done in that case, nothing?

A. I have heard of nothing.

Q. Did you have bichloride?

A. Bichloride of lime was used.

Q. Did you have bichloride for bedpans?

A. After a while.

Q. How long?

A. The worst of it was over in two weeks.

Q. Do you know whether Dr. Forwood or any other officers of the camp apprehended the number of sick that were to come to that camp, whether it was underestimated, or whether they had a proper apprehension of the number?

A. I think it was always underestimated.

Q. I think that accounts somewhat for the want of provision for their care that you mentioned in the hospital accommodations?

A. Yes, sir; I think so.

Q. Do you know whether or not there were plenty of tents there at the time that might have been erected?

A. I don't think there was.

Q. Were 300 hospital tents put up there on that point, to your knowledge?

A. Three hundred hospital tents were never put up in the different hospitals.

Q. Were there any large number of hospital tents in the camp?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Would a tentage for 4,000 men have been sufficient for the care of the seriously ill there during the time you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Suppose you had a hospital of 1,000 beds, would it accommodate all that were there?

A. In my opinion, it would. I would say also that in my opinion 75 per cent of the Fifth Army Corps were not well when they came to New York.

Q. Were they needing actual hospital care or rest?

A. Rest.

By General DODGE:

Q. What proportion of that army do you suppose needed hospital care?

A. I should say at least 40 per cent, on the basis of 21,000 men.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Doctor, was there any lack of food other than milk and broth at Montauk at any time, to your knowledge?

A. I don't think there was. There was in certain regiments at certain times, but the reason of that was they did not know how to hustle to get it. Mr. Cushing and I told a number of the men how to get their rations.

Q. How much suffering was there on account of lack of food supply?

A. The amount of suffering was very difficult to estimate. To put it the way I should want to put it would be this: The amount of suffering of the men at Montauk and other places can never be exaggerated; the amount of needless suffering due to the incompetency of the men who had it in charge has been very much exaggerated.

Q. The suffering—was there any of the suffering, in your judgment, caused by the disease to which they were afflicted when they came from Cuba?

A. Mostly.

BOSTON, MASS., November 29, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. LAURA A. C. HUGHES.

DR. LAURA A. C. HUGHES, appeared before the commission, and was sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Doctor, will you kindly give us your name, profession, length of time you have been practicing, and your residence?

A. My name is Laura A. C. Hughes; regular physician, graduated in 1895; No. 397 Boylston street, Boston, Mass.

Q. Were you at any time during the past summer in a position to see anything of the condition of the sick of the United States Army or its hospitals, or anything of that sort?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you, please?

A. Detention hospital.

Q. Camp Wikoff?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What length of time did you stay there?

A. I arrived there the morning of the 28th of August, and remained there until the 30th of September; about five weeks.

Q. During that time you were on duty in the detention hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the nature of your duty?

A. Superintending nurses.

Q. Female nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had you charge of all the nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many were there on the 2nd of August, and how many were there during the time you were there?

A. I brought with me 8 female nurses; including myself, 9. We were to be a party of 10, but at that time there were no female nurses in the detention hospital. During my five weeks there the nursing corps amounted to about 68, I believe.

Q. Does that include the 9 that went first?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were no female nurses when you arrived?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you took charge of the nurses of that hospital, in what condition was the hospital as respects the care of the sick, particularly as to the nursing of the sick?

A. The nursing was done by the Hospital Corps men—that is, the regular Hospital Corps men. U. S. Army, and some male nurses with the Red Cross had been sent who were, I presume, regular nurses—males nurses; perhaps three or four of them, and the Hospital Corps men.

Q. In what number were these Hospital Corps men?

A. I do not know the exact number.

Q. Fifty or 100?

A. Possibly 20.

Q. How many patients were there at that time?

A. At that time there were 4 long pavilion tents with a capacity of 36 in each tent, and 3 rows of small tents, 21 in a row, with a capacity of 5 in each tent.

Q. There were about 500 patients in the hospital—between 450 and 500?

A. Let me see: to be very exact, I should think there might have been between 400 and 500.

Q. You may safely estimate there were 400 patients?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And about 20 men to take care of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there many seriously ill in those hospitals?

A. The patients there were considered the most serious. They had the contagious diseases.

Q. Were the patients at the detention camp received immediately from the transports on landing?

A. Yes, sir; diphtheria and measles were in the isolated camp still belonging to the detention, and yellow-fever suspects and the convalescent yellow-fever patients were brought there.

Q. Who was in charge of the hospital at that time?

A. Major Ebert; but only about twenty-four hours.

Q. Who followed him?

A. No one; he followed someone else who had it previously. He had been down about two weeks, and Major Ebert had charge about twenty-four hours when I arrived.

Q. Oh, yes; he continued in charge?

A. Yes, sir; he went on duty about the same time I did; the same day or the day before or the night before.

Q. Will you kindly tell us what provision had been made up to the time you came there for the care of the 400 men? Were the tents floored?

A. Most of the tents were floored.

Q. Were the men on cots or beds or lying on blankets?

A. Most of the men were on cots.

Q. Properly supplied with bedding?

A. I think they were.

Q. At that time?

A. At that time.

Q. And did they continue during the time you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any scarcity at any time of bed linen, sheets, pillowcases, etc.?

A. There was a scarcity of literally bed linen.

Q. What arrangements were made during the time you were there for the cleaning of sheets, pillowcases, etc.?

A. Well, during my five weeks, until within the last two weeks, everything had to be burned, as there was no laundry. We never had one in connection with the hospital. The bedding was sent to the fumigating hospital on the hill, and afterwards it was sent to some far-off laundry.

Q. That was within the last two weeks?

A. We had returned to us laundered linen, towels, pillowcases, sheets, etc.

Q. Prior to that you had nothing returned?

A. That's right.

Q. It was fumigated or sent elsewhere?

A. I could not follow that.

Q. Was any considerable number of sheets burned up?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If the sheets and pillowcases had been properly laundered, would there have been a scarcity?

A. Probably not.

Q. Did you find the men considerably incommoded by the absence of sheets and pillowcases?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were they perfectly comfortable in their blankets?

A. The average person was. There were cases of bedsores—cases that had, for instance, the dysentery cases—it was difficult to keep them comfortable.

Q. Were they supplied with blankets in sufficient quantity so that they would not be seriously incommoded?

A. Yes, sir; there was an abundance of blankets.

Q. Were you able to get a fair supply of sheets for the cases you spoke of—bedsores, dysentery, diarrhea, etc.?

A. Yes, sir; afterwards we had an abundance.

Q. Was that an inconvenience or a natural suffering?

A. Inconvenience.

Q. Did your duties as chief nurse lead you to visit the wards frequently?

A. Yes, sir; we went over every ward in the hospital three times a day while I was there.

Q. Did you observe any marked lack of cleanliness on the part of those so far as the wards were concerned?

A. During my first week there the floors of the tents were not kept clean, but I felt always that that was due to the Hospital Corps men. They had not been trained as we had in hospitals as to the necessity of clean floors, etc.

Q. Had they been trained over so well, could they have kept a 400-bed hospital clean with 20 men?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was any effort made to increase the number of Hospital Corps men?

A. Immediately. A detail was sent over immediately from the different regiments.

Q. Was it large enough to render the necessary services?

A. Yes, sir; it was very large.

Q. Could you use it properly or not?

A. Very well, indeed.

Q. Now, as respects the trained male nurses, were they of any service to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they continue in service or soon terminate their contracts and go away?

A. They terminated their contracts and went away.

Q. Were they efficient or inefficient as a body?

A. The Red Cross men were quite efficient.

Q. Did you observe in your various visits that proper care was or was not being exercised in the removal of the excreta of the men?

A. Yes, sir; proper care was not exercised at first. The Hospital Corps men knew nothing about the conditions of typhoid fever, etc.

Q. Was there any disinfection of the excreta when you were there?

A. There was an abundance of chloride of lime, but the men did not know how to use it.

Q. Were there receptacles of the bed excreta left open in the wards?

A. There were no receptacles for the excreta the first week. It was thrown between the tents until we explained to the men the danger.

Q. Were there not even bedpans?

A. There were bedpans, but the men continually emptied the bedpans between the tents. I used to get it all over my boots; but as soon as we talked to them and explained to them the danger they were emptied elsewhere, providing that man was left on duty the next day, but if he was put on police duty and another sent, we had another to train.

Q. Was the surgeon in charge acquainted with the fact that the excreta was being dropped between the tents and alongside the tents?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Was any formal complaint made to him by yourself or anyone?

A. Yes, sir; and he endeavored to stop it immediately.

Q. How long did it take to change that condition?

A. Three or four or five days, on account of the change of details.

Q. After this?

A. After one week we had no difficulty, and Major Ebert secured ash barrels, that were put outside the tents always. As soon as Major Ebert learned of this he made every effort to secure iron ash barrels, and they were emptied three times a day.

Q. Did any serious inconvenience arise after the time you spoke of?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were the tents overcrowded?

A. Never for twenty-four hours at a time. They might have been for four or five hours.

Q. Did you at any time see men lying out in the open?

A. That never occurred in the detention hospital during my time.

Q. Was there sufficient tentage to answer all requirements?

A. Always.

Q. Do you know whether or not a sufficient supply of medicines was on hand in that hospital?

A. That is a very hard question to answer. As you know, as a medical man, every doctor has his hobby. The day I went there one patient was dying and no one had a hypodermic syringe or a catheter for two weeks, and the ordinary things the women took with them.

Q. Are we to understand that two weeks went by without any doctor supplying himself with a hypodermic syringe?

A. They seemed to have none. After that there was an abundance.

Q. Do you know whether or not there were in the hospital chests a sufficient quantity of hypodermic syringes and catheters to answer all requirements?

A. At that time I did not know the contents of the hospital chest.

Q. If they were in the chests, they were not taken out?

A. They might have been taken out and appropriated.

Q. How many doctors were in the hospital at the time you arrived for 450 patients?

A. I ought not to answer that question, for I really do not know—perhaps six or seven.

Q. Do you know while you were there there was an actual scarcity of doctors?

A. I am sure not while I was there; there was a scarcity of nurses.

Q. Were they efficient and attentive?

A. Fairly so.

Q. Starting from the officers in charge and going down to the last appointed contract doctor, how many of those doctors were properly qualified to take charge of the sick in the hospitals?

A. Of course Major Ebert was very well qualified. At the time I went there there was a Dr. McAbbott, from probably a transport. I think he was a regular Navy man, and he was volunteering his services in the emergency, and was a very capable man. I found there were three or four others who were capable and some that were, like many doctors you would meet anywhere, more or less faddish.

Q. Did you of your own knowledge become aware of the fact that some doctors were not competent to perform their duties because of their habits?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many?

A. One.

Q. Will you be kind enough to write out his name at your convenience?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether any action was taken to relieve the hospital of this individual?

A. I understood—in fact, Major Ebert told me he sent for him to annul his contract. He was out of the camp at the time, and he presented his compliments and said he was ordered to Porto Rico.

Q. You did not know anything after that?

A. No, sir; there were two others had their contracts annulled.

Q. On account of inefficiency or drunkenness or what?

A. Peculiarity, perhaps.

Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, of any instance of gross neglect on the part of anyone in reference to any sick man in the hospital?

A. This surgeon I spoke of, who did not give the Major a chance to annul his contract, at one time neglected part of his ward for thirty-five hours, but that was not known outside the ward.

Q. Was the capacity of the hospital at all times sufficient to receive the seriously ill as often as they arrived?

A. We were obliged to put men on floors instead of cots perhaps twice in the five weeks over night, and the next morning the rush was relieved, and those on the floor were transferred to another hospital.

Q. Did you see men sent away on furlough?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know in what condition they were when they left?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any men sent away who should have been retained and not sent away?

A. If we had had the accommodation of a city institution, it would have been much better to have kept these convalescents longer, but in a temporary hospital, as that was, that could not be arranged, I might say, any better than it was.

Q. Was not that hospital so organized and administered that it was possible to take all necessary care of the sick that were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then why should they have been sent away because of things lacking that might have been found in an ordinary city hospital?

A. We expected more from the transports, and we must have the room of the men who were in a fair condition to travel. The public demand was so great that the men had to be removed.

Q. Are we to understand, in your opinion, many men were furloughed, not because it was right and proper, but because of the impertunity of friends and relatives and officers?

A. And their own demand; yes, sir.

Q. Was there much pressure brought to bear upon the surgeon in charge of that hospital to discharge men, do you know?

A. At one time we had orders given to the surgeon in charge of the hospital to transfer them to other hospitals, and he was, of course, obliged to comply with the orders, and that pressure was brought to bear.

Q. Did he send away men unfit to travel?

A. Yes, sir; in compliance with orders.

Q. No order would have been issued to compel him to send away a man who was not in a condition to travel?

A. I think we all felt at the time that many of the men who were transferred were not in a condition to travel.

Q. Was this order received from Washington, or from the surgeon in chief at the Point?

A. It was very difficult for us to find out where the order came from. The next immediate officer above Major Ebert was Colonel Forwood, but we understand he got it from higher authority.

Q. You had not in the detention hospital—you had no man brought in from the camps; they were sick men brought from transports?

A. We had them from the camps also.

Q. What was the object of the detention hospital?

A. After about the second week we were not in quarantine—perhaps three weeks; people were allowed to go and come without passes.

Q. That quarantine was raised?

A. About the third week in September.

Q. About that time it became a general hospital practically?

A. Yes, sir. The time the Ninth Massachusetts were in camp several of their men came from the camp.

Q. Governor Woodbury asks in regard to what you have just said in regard to the men you thought not fit to travel. As I understood, they were transferred to other hospitals and not given furloughs outright?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In order to clear the way for other patients coming in?

A. Partly that and partly on account of the orders not to admit any more to the detention, and perhaps the public clamor about the equinox.

Q. Did I understand you to say that an order was issued not to receive any more men in the detention hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About what time?

A. About the fourth week.

Q. What was the reason for closing up the hospital?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not these transfers were made because other various hospitals asked that men might be sent to them, and because it was thought that they would do better in these hospitals than in the detention hospital?

A. The reason at the time was that the Government paid \$1,000 a day for the *Shinnecock* and the vessel must be filled up, when we objected.

Q. And yet they were sent because the ship was under contract and therefore she must be used; is that it?

A. That was the answer that we got.

Q. Do you know of any instance of men being refused admittance to the detention camp who had been brought there from the various camps in the vicinity?

A. I know of but one or two cases, and that was the last week, perhaps, when we were really cut down in the help, and they were sent to the general hospital.

Q. You don't know, then, of any cases of that sort occurring during the first two or three weeks of your stay there?

A. I don't know of any.

Q. Did you find that your nurses during the time you were there were efficient?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they carry out your orders thoroughly?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did the men suffer in any respect because of neglect on the part of your nurses?

A. No, sir; there was one complaint about one of the Red Cross men nurses once and his contract was annulled the next day. He was a graduate of Bellevue. The female nurses preferred to stay there rather than be transferred.

Q. So far as you observed, was there anything left undone that could have been done, or was there anything done that should not have been done?

A. The transfer of patients in all stages of suffering, I think should not have been done at that time; otherwise I think they had very good care.

Q. What objections, if any, did the men make to their transfer? Did you hear them?

A. Yes, sir; many of them objected very seriously. The New England patients objected to being transferred to New York, Pennsylvania, and Fort Myer, when they were liable to go. When taken aboard the *Shinnecock* we had a number of Illinois and Michigan volunteers, and they objected to being taken to New London and dropped off at Memorial Hospital.

Q. Was that on account of the place to which they were going, or anywhere at all?

A. The place.

Q. They were ready enough to leave if they could go where they wanted?

A. Yes, sir. I have a letter from Major Ebert, who speaks of the work of the nursing force there.

Q. Was your diet kitchen early established after you went there?

A. Yes, sir; I have a report of Major Ebert. I started it myself.

Q. Will you leave a copy of that report with us?

(Report handed to Dr. Conner).

DETENTION HOSPITAL,

Camp Wikoff, September 10, 1898.

TO THE SURGEON IN CHARGE OF DETENTION HOSPITAL.

RESPECTED SIR: I herewith submit the record of the work of women nurses at this hospital to date. On Sunday, August 28, 1898, I brought nine graduate nurses, which I had selected with care. They were, I believe, the first women

nurses who came to detention hospital. We were received most cordially by the officers in charge. A large tent, cots, mattresses, blankets, water, and a basin were provided at once.

We found four long pavilion-tent wards, with capacity for about thirty-six patients in each, and three rows of small tents on the hill. Each tent averaged five patients, and there were twenty of these small tents in each row. One nurse was assigned to each pavilion tent, one to each row of small tents, one started a diet kitchen, and the ninth (myself) took general supervision of nurses, with nursing especially sick ones, and helping out generally.

The next day, August 29, six graduate nurses arrived from New York. New wards had been erected during the twenty-four hours and new patients admitted. So far as the nurses could be distributed two were assigned to each ward, their duties being to carry out the doctor's orders and be responsible for the cleanliness of the patients, and the wards and the feeding also, the same as in all large, well-appointed hospitals.

August 30.—More nurses came in answer to telegrams. They, like the New York nurses, were comfortably settled by night, with sufficient bedding, etc. More wards had been erected and these nurses went on duty wherever most needed.

September 1.—Sixteen nurses came from Michigan, eleven of whom were immediately assigned to night duty, it being the first time we could spare a woman for such duty. The women on duty during the day had remained on until any hour at night that their services were required.

September 3.—More nurses arrived, more pavilions up, and the nurses were assigned to the places most needed. Since Sunday, August 28, no tent has been without a woman nurse.

Now that we have a larger number of nurses, more detail can be attended to, which could not be done at first. At present writing there are 14 pavilion tents, with a corps of 50 nurses. Of this number 14 are on night duty, one for each pavilion. There are yet a few convalescent patients on the hill, in small tents, who are attended during the day by two graduate nurses, but who are not ill enough to require a woman night nurse.

Whenever a doctor has asked for a "special" (nurse) he has had it.

The work has grown rapidly in all departments. The diet kitchen has now two trained nurses and two untrained women helpers on duty, besides some Regular Army men, who have been detailed to help. Nothing is wasted, and everything can be had for the asking. Soldiers, doctors, and nurses have but to ask. Care is taken not to give convalescents injudicious diet when they stray into the diet kitchen.

So far as possible, and with exceptions of emergencies, which arise when nurses are taken ill or needed for "specials," we try to keep the nurses at the same post, so as to facilitate matters and harmony all around.

Considering the rapid growth of the work, and the frequent emergencies which of necessity must arise in a hospital like this, everything has run fairly smooth. I have to report two nurses on the sick list to-day, and two who have resigned on account of ill health.

Respectfully submitted.

LAURA A. C. HUGHES, M. D.,
Superintendent of Nurses.

True copy of report handed to Maj. Rudolph G. Ebert, surgeon, United States Army, surgeon in charge detention hospital, Camp Wikoff, at Montauk Point, Long Island, New York, from August 28, 1898.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF GEN. ADELBERT AMES.**

Gen. ADELBERT AMES was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Your name?

A. Adelbert Ames.

Q. Residence?

A. Lowell, Mass.

Q. What rank, if any, did you hold during the war with Spain, and what previous military experience did you have?

A. I was brigadier-general of volunteers in the war with Spain. My previous military history: Appointed at West Point in 1856, graduated in 1861; in the civil war, and colonel of a Maine regiment August 29, 1862; brigadier-general of volunteers on May 20, 1863; commanded brigades and divisions in battle; retained one year after the war, first half, commanding at Lowell; second half, headquarters at Columbia, commanding western half of South Carolina; appointed lieutenant-colonel in Regular Army in 1866; reorganization of the army, military governor of Mississippi; resigned in 1869-1870; out of service until last June.

Q. Where did you serve during the war with Spain, General?

A. I had orders on the 5th of July, sailed on the 6th from New York, reported to Shafter on the 10th; remained with the Fifth Corps until disbanded at Camp Wikoff.

Q. How long were you at Camp Wikoff?

A. My ship, I think, was second to arrive. Left on the 20th of September, after all the troops of my division, which I happened to command there, with the exception of one regiment, had been ordered off.

Q. What day did you disembark at Camp Wikoff—remember?

A. I think the 14th.

Q. Where was your command placed after you disembarked?

A. General Kent had the division. He left, and I commanded his division. Encamped at the southwest corner—near the ocean—of the entire camp ground; in command of brigade.

Q. What provision had been made for your reception at Wikoff when you landed there?

A. My troops, my brigade, found their tents pitched, and, I think, had tent floors.

Q. What proportion of your command was sick?

A. I can not say. I don't have the doctor's report.

Q. In a general way?

A. There were very few that were really well. That is, they were—it was a detention camp from beginning to end.

Q. What proportion of your men went to detention hospital when you landed?

A. I don't know. I don't think a large number.

Q. Did you visit the hospital?

A. No, sir; not allowed to go around it.

Q. How long did your command remain in the detention camp?

A. About five days. Three days was the limit. Certain causes had delayed us a couple of days.

Q. What provision, if any, did you find for your men when you went into the general camp?

A. Very good. The tents were up. The camp had been laid out and the tents pitched, and Colonel Young, the engineer, was very ready to serve us in every particular that he had means of doing.

Q. What was the character of the camp, General, in your judgment, considering the purposes for which it was established?

A. In my judgment it was a most excellent camp, and I have been in a great many.

Q. Both from the view-point of preserving the balance of the country from infection and of recuperating the men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent were the men of your command provided for by the commissary department?

A. There was no serious suffering, though perhaps there might have been delays and occasional deficiencies. The men were well kept.

Q. Did they so regard it—the reliable men of your command?

A. I think so.

Q. Of what did your brigade consist? Of volunteers or regulars?

A. After we left the detention camp I had the First Division of the Fifth Corps. They were all regulars. There had been—the Thirty-fourth Regiment had been a part of it—the Seventy-first New York, rather, was part of the division, but it soon passed out.

Q. To what extent were the men ministered to by local beneficiary organizations?

A. You mean in—I imagine very little in the essentials. If you want me to go on, I can only say they were in great sympathy—perhaps we were all—you know how the feeling had extended latitudinally and longitudinally; the locality was somewhat hysterical about the sick; perhaps the general country was—people there brought in a great many luxuries.

Q. What was the general effect of the distribution of those luxuries upon the men? Was it beneficial or otherwise, in your judgment?

A. I could not say that. I was not near enough the men to know about the effect on them. I only know the officers of the Regular Army never complained. A grand set of men! They joked about the Seventy-first getting so much, and that was little.

Q. Did you, at any time, visit the general hospital after you were transferred from the detention camp?

A. I did.

Q. What was its condition in general?

A. I don't know that I can give you any valuable answer to that. I went in obedience to an order from General Wheeler, who commanded it, to interview Colonel Forwood, medical chief at that point. From my personal knowledge I do not feel qualified to express any opinion as to its condition—in fact, I did not examine it for that purpose.

Q. What was the purpose of your examination, or of your interview with Colonel Forwood?

A. General Wheeler detailed me, in reply to them, in instructions which he gave me—instructions of a telegraphic nature from the War Department, from the Secretary of War, upon a complaint in the shortage of medicine—General Wheeler instructed me to ascertain that fact, and in the furtherance of that order I went to see Colonel Forwood.

Q. Remember the date?

A. No; I don't remember the date. I think it was about the 22d of August.

Q. What did you find in making that examination?

A. I found—you want me to draw a picture?

Q. Yes; as fully as you can.

A. I found Colonel Forwood standing behind a table with a pen in his hand and from ten to fifteen men in front of the table or standing, waiting upon his action with his pen, apparently. When I showed him my order and instructions, the men were dismissed and we had some conversation, and later on he sent me to Major Heizmann. I found him at his desk attending to papers, with nobody waiting on him. I told the Colonel the object of my visit and asked him to make a report, which he promised to do, as to deficiency of medicine.

Q. Did you examine the medical storehouse at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. From what you gathered from Colonel Forwood and Major Heizmann, was there or was there not a deficiency of medical supplies in the medical department at Camp Wikoff at that time?

A. I did not question Major Heizmann on the subject. The only object of my order was to ascertain as to the deficiency of medicine. I communicated with each one of my regimental surgeons—I had eight regiments—and communicated with them and ordered them to report on that simple question of deficiency of medicine, and their reports came in—their reports came in, and they reported the situation exactly, the quantity of medicine on hand, etc. I sent those reports to division surgeon, Major Wood. Major Wood made his report on those regimental reports. When I received it I sent it and them to Colonel Forwood. Colonel Forwood returned them with his report. His report was somewhat pointed at Colonel Wood—Major Wood—and I sent Colonel Forwood's report to Major Wood. Major Wood replied to that, of course, to me. As there was a little acrimony between the two, Colonel Forwood and Major Wood, I did not think it necessary to permit them to exchange compliments any further on a subject so outside the larger part of the question. Then I made up my report from the regimental surgeon's report, the division surgeon's, and that of Colonel Forwood on that, and those reports, the originals, and my report I forwarded to headquarters.

Q. As to personal acrimony, I do not care about that. But was there agreement as to the facts in the case, as to the lack of a sufficiency of medical supplies?

A. There was a deficiency of medical supplies, and the "suffering," one of the words which Colonel Forwood used, is due to the fact—is the claim—that Major Wood had not done his duty in making his requisitions and gathering in the supplies. Whether there was any suffering or not, of course it was not for me to ascertain: but they seemed to agree between them that there was a deficiency. I think there is no question about that.

Q. Between Colonel Forwood and Major Wood?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not in the storehouse?

A. No: I was not capable of telling what was in store, or whether the right kind of medicine.

By General DODGE:

Q. I understand there might have been plenty of medicine at Montauk Point?

A. My action was to ascertain what the regimental surgeons had for use with the regiments, and they claim, as their reports show, which I forwarded, that they were deficient in medicine. General Wheeler, who was division commander, acquiesced in their statements and admitted the report that he had attempted to get medicines and failed, and when I forwarded these various reports to Colonel Forwood, Forwood's reply was that Wood had not made proper effort to get medicines.

Q. He claimed he had plenty of medicines on hand that might have been issued from proper requisition?

A. I have a copy of Forwood's letter here. He said they were not at Wikoff, but at New York City.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Did you say you had Forwood's letter with you?

A. In my report. I have a copy of my report.

Q. We shall be glad to have that, General, if you will give it to us.

A. The whole thing is in my report as I wrote it.

Q. We would like the part containing Colonel Forwood's statement in regard to the reports from your regimental surgeons, indorsed by the division surgeons.

A. I say in my report:

"The situation is easily observed by the letter of colonel and assistant surgeon-general in charge, W. H. Forwood, of September 6, in reply to my letter of inquiry concerning the distribution of medicines and medical supplies previous to the 28th of August. He says—this is Colonel Forward—'There has been no depot of medical supplies here and whatever was given out came from the liberal quantities ordered for hospital use;' that is, the regiments got their medicine from that ordered for hospital use; the camps out of detention applied to the general hospital and those in detention applied to the detention hospital. I have been informed by those officers that they complied, as far as practicable, with every request made by the surgeon in charge of the sick in camp. When the troops landed here they were short of medicines, medical stores, and appliances. It was the duty of the regimental, brigade, and division surgeons to make daily requisitions through proper channels and obtain a new supply for their command.

"The report of the general surgeon, First Division, that there was a lack of these things in his command only implies the necessity of these and shows that he failed to act promptly in this matter. The distress and suffering which prevailed in Major Wood's command failed to appeal to his sympathies or to enlist his prompt assistance. The leave—Major Wood had applied for leave of absence—was properly refused by General Wheeler. After considerable effort we succeeded in getting him to send in a requisition for supplies that was approved without alteration, and sent to the depot in New York, with authority to issue at once all requisitions for medical officers, for whatever command; they were approved and forwarded in the same way. As soon as it was possible to organize the division hospital this was ordered, and to hasten the arrival of supplies extraordinary measures were taken, and on August 29 four carloads were ordered by telegraph and reached this point on September 2 in charge of special messenger. The regiment brigade allowed regiments light and other articles to be obtained at the quartermaster's depot."

That is a copy from his reply to Major Wood.

Q. He didn't state whether or not he had supplies for his general hospital—a supply of medicines and medical supplies for his general hospital?

A. No; he didn't. That is——

Q. You didn't inquire?

A. No; I was not called upon to do that.

Q. Do you know when the lack of medicines and supplies, complained of by Major Wood, was supplied by the reply to his requisitions sent to New York?

A. I think the supplies came in very soon after this. My inquiry ended on the 28th. I think about the 1st of September they came in; how much, or how extensively, I don't know.

Q. Was there any complaint after that time on the part of the medical authorities as to lack of supplies?

A. I think there were none.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you remember whether this matter was taken up or not by General Wheeler and others at Camp Wikoff?

A. Before I made my report General Wheeler had gone and General Bates was

in command, so that that camp was rapidly dispersing at that time. The troops were going away.

Q. This dispatch referred to is Montauk Point, August 30, 1898, which appears to have been General Sternberg's. He appears to have taken this up August 28.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. General Wheeler sends this dispatch:

"Forwood has shown me Colonel Wood's telegram and his reply. Wood and all division surgeons told me to-day they had no difficulty in getting medicines for respective divisions. Reason Wood did not get medicines was he did not send for them as directed by myself. Wood can get all the supplies he needs."

That is August 30?

A. That was after the 28th.

Q. In answer to the dispatch of August 28?

A. I think myself they had no trouble after that time.

Q. The letter of Colonel Forwood would seem to indicate that the supplies came in answer to Major Wood's requisition about the 2d of September?

A. Apparently.

Q. Colonel Forwood, in his statement to General Sternberg, here claims there was plenty on hand there. All they had to do was to go and get them at the hospital?

A. This is the letter to Sternberg. I have his letter here that I wrote. I think that is rather more accurate at that time.

Q. From your knowledge of the conditions as they existed at Camp Wikoff, General, state whether or not the commissary and quartermaster's departments were efficiently administered and whether or not they contributed to the extent of efficiency to the welfare of the troops at the time and subsequent to the time of their arrival.

A. These departments did very well there. There were deficiencies, partly due to the bad condition of the roads. An immense quantity of material had to come in, but there was no serious stealing, in my judgment.

Q. Was the care and provision made for the reception of the troops greater or less than troops ordinarily receive in a time of war?

A. They were greater.

Q. They were based on the well-known condition of the troops about to arrive from the South, I suppose?

A. I doubt if the condition of the troops is understood. I think General Wheeler testified there were not 10 per cent well: in fact, they were about all sick, and the majority helpless, but they were very well cared for.

Q. The fact that the tents were all pitched and floors in them—that provision had been made in view of the fact that they were coming, to a greater or less extent, broken up?

A. Yes.

Q. Ordinarily—the public do not understand this, but we understand it—ordinarily, if they had come from a distance and gone into camp they would have carried their tents with them and put them up themselves?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Government had provided for them better than usual, then?

A. Exactly.

Q. With the knowledge that you had, General, and your previous experience, what additional provision could have been made by the Government for the comfort and health of those men coming from the South that was not made—putting yourself, if you can, in the situation of the heads of departments, with the knowledge which they had at the time?

A. Well, I don't know. It is hardly fair to go over the ground now and attempt to criticise. I might have made tent floors. Some troops had those; others didn't.

How extensive that deficiency was I don't know. I made no effort to ascertain those facts. I suppose the only serious deficiency might have been the medicine—that is, if we are to accept what Major Wood and Colonel Forwood speak of as distress and suffering as a fact. Of course, if, as I have suggested elsewhere in my official report—if medicines could have been brought down by water and steamboat and have reached Wikoff, and the medicines distributed as from any wholesale store in New York or Philadelphia, and distributed at the very hospitals; but whether troops actually suffered, as physicians seem to think, or surgeons seem to think, for want of medicine I am not prepared to say.

Q. So that whatever lack there may have been in those supplies you would attribute largely to the matter of transportation?

A. I know the Government was suffering everything without lumber for the opening of the camp, and they didn't get it because of inefficient organization wherever they failed to get it, in my opinion. Of course, I express no opinion as to the hospital, for I know nothing about hospitals. I am only speaking of troops as troops, not as sick men.

Q. Have you any other suggestions to make, General, concerning which I have not interrogated you especially?

A. No.

Q. We are trying to fix the responsibility. If you can help us we will gladly welcome any suggestion you may have to make on the general subject.

A. I am not inclined to criticise. We have just made our peace with Spain and we are all rejoicing, and I am so much of an American that I am rather inclined to pass over these deficiencies now and stand by my country and let these small things pass. Of course, as military men, we all have our opinions about things in general and in particular, but I can not suggest anything that you gentlemen don't know all about. If I could, I do not want to.

Q. That is all right.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. E. G. BRACKETT.

Dr. E. G. BRACKETT then appeared before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, time of service as a doctor, and where you live.

A. E. G. Brackett; 133 Newbury street; graduated in 1884.

Q. Your residence you gave?

A. Boston.

Q. What opportunity did you have of seeing anything of the military details or medical care of the sick and wounded during the late war with Spain?

A. I was sent down by the Volunteer Aid, leaving here about the 25th of July, and I reached Santiago somewhere around the 3d or 4th of August. I don't know the exact date. I was there in the city some time.

Q. You were in the city some time?

A. Yes; until about the 15th of September.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in what condition you found matters medical in Santiago and vicinity when you arrived there.

A. Perhaps the best method by which I can now describe it to you is this: In the early week or ten days there was a great dearth of supplies of medicine and of food for the sick. I found particularly the most difficult things to obtain were quinine and such medicine as is needed for intestinal troubles. That, I should

say, I noticed until about the 10th or 12th of August. You see—if you will wait just a moment—my care was not with the sick at all at first, therefore I have to give you what I happened to see. I had no experience in the early part—

Dr. CONNER. Speak louder.

The WITNESS. In the early part of my stay there I had no definite thing to do with any of the sick. The only thing is what I saw in my goings in and about there, and such things as I was thrown in contact with. I happened to know that particularly, because I was asked by White (or Wood) if I could get those things for him, and I know the difficulty I had in getting them, and particularly those two medicines or classes of medicines which I was trying for we had to buy at local places in small quantities throughout the city.

Q. Specify what medicines you bought at that time.

A. I bought quinine; I bought different preparations of bismuth, scilla. I could not give you all; there is quite a list; perhaps those were the most important.

Q. At that time you could not get any bismuth or any quinine?

A. No; we could get some scilla, but thought we would better buy this additional case, as it was well to have all that could be had. At the little hospital at Alameda, some time about the 12th or 15th of July, I know they—I mean the Government—had but very little prepared food; so that a few bottles of malted milk that I happened to have with me were very acceptable to them; and at one time, when I asked them, perhaps about two ounces of stimulant were all they had in the hospital. These are facts I am giving you. My work was not with the medical department.

Q. What excuse, if any, was given by the Medical Department for not having these necessary articles?

A. They didn't have them.

Q. They gave no excuse for not having them?

A. I didn't ask them.

Q. This, I understand it, was in the first two weeks of August, from the 4th to the 14th.

A. Until the supplies came in from one of the boats—I can't think which one. A number of those things came into the Medical Department, particularly quinine and some subnitrate of bismuth.

Q. Do you know in regard to the supplies at Siboney?

A. I don't know.

Q. Nothing said to you? Who was the medical officer in charge of the depot at Santiago?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Did you have occasion to consult with the chief surgeon of the place in regard to the want of medical supplies?

A. Who was the chief surgeon?

Q. Pope.

A. I don't think he was there.

Q. Where was he?

A. Colonel Lavarre was there.

Q. Did he give any excuse except they didn't have it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether or not there had been supplies in proper quantity prior to the time you made inquiry for them?

A. There were supplies of some medicines, of some not.

Q. What supplies?

A. This man would say, "I had some of this;" the next man would say, "I could not get any quinine for them."

Q. Do you know whether or not any considerable amount of medical supplies had been obtained from any outside source, Red Cross, or anything of the sort?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. As far as you observed, do you think there was decided lack of proper medicines and supplies at that place at that time?

A. Medicine supplies, you mean? Yes, sir.

Q. Hospital stores, condensed milk, and various things used in addition to the medicines proper?

A. It was very hard to get those at that time.

Q. How soon was this deficiency relieved? You say it was at the time of the arrival of the *Harvard*; do you remember that date?

A. The supplies came into the department, I should say, about the 15th.

Q. After that was there any deficiency of medical supplies?

A. Yes; we had then plenty of sulphate of quinia. We got very little bismuth. We were still very short of prepared foods and milk.

Q. Was there any milk to be had in that country?

A. Cows' milk? Not a bit.

Q. Condensed milk you relied upon?

A. Yes.

Q. Did this deficiency continue during the whole time you were there?

A. No; in the latter part of August we had nearly all the medicines we wanted. There was only one other time we had difficulty in getting ordinary medicines. That was sometime about the first week in September, when they were sending off troops—earlier than that—sending off a large number of soldiers, and Major Carr said he was obliged to keep a reserve, because he could not send them off without being properly provided. There were medicines there, but, as a consequence, he had to be a little careful in using all the medicines. I don't think they were abundant at that time at all.

Q. Were you on duty as a medical officer in any hospital?

A. Yes; at one started there in the latter part of August, called Centrifico.

Q. How soon were you able to prepare it for the reception of the sick?

A. From the time we began in August—about ten days.

Q. How soon were the patients put into the hospital after you began?

A. About a week.

Q. So that for a period of three or four days, it may be, the men were coming in before you were ready to receive them?

A. We were able to take care of them.

Q. In such numbers as they came?

A. Yes; it was a small hospital and one started for officers and for such people who could not be cared for in the ordinary course.

Q. An extra hospital; supplementary?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you at the end of the ten days apparently well prepared to receive all patients?

A. Yes; we were.

Q. So far as you know, there was nothing lacking that was needed for the well-being of the sick after you began receiving them in that hospital?

A. Except two things.

Q. And they?

A. One, those medicines that were necessary for the patients who could not retain things on their stomachs, and the other, nurses.

Q. The nurses were the ordinary hospital corps of nurses and detailed men?

A. Detailed men from the colored regiment.

Q. Were they able to do their work with any degree of efficiency?

A. As much as any untrained men.

Q. Kindly disposed?

A. Yes; they were willing.

Q. You had no female nurses at Santiago?

A. None at all.

Q. Were there many seriously ill in your care?

A. I left after the hospital was thoroughly under way, and at that time there were, I think, about twelve.

Q. You had no wounded.

A. No: none at all.

Q. Was the hospital properly supplied with hospital furniture—bedpans, hot-water bottles, and thermometers?

A. Yes, sir. This was a hospital used by patients as a private hospital. An order was sent for its occupancy, and we used all the furniture there in it.

Q. Enough for your purpose?

A. No.

Q. Were you able to supply the deficiency by requisition?

A. A great deal of it; that is, from there and from things I happened to have with me, sent by the Volunteer Aid from Massachusetts. A great number of things were supplied from that source, and also from similar supplies of goods sent to General Wood; that is, supplies sent to him personally from New York.

Q. Do you know whether or not the Medical Department at that time was unable to furnish what you needed?

A. No; they were not, except in some particulars.

Q. What articles of hospital furniture which you speak of as wanting?

A. Syringes. We had one thermometer. A patient bit that one in two, and after a great deal of begging I got another.

Q. From the Department?

A. Yes, sir. They gave me all they could. They didn't have any. They had only two or three there.

Q. So far as you observed, did the men materially suffer in consequence of the want of these things?

A. They would from syringes, but not from thermometers.

Q. You managed to get along in some fashion?

A. We got along without syringes, because the *Bay State* came in and I begged them from them.

Q. Any reason at that time assigned by the officer of the Medical Department why they didn't have anything?

A. No; except they said, "We don't know why we can't get them; we have sent for them." I have been told that many a time.

Q. Was the statement made to you by Dr. Phinney or Dr. Hahn?

A. I think I heard it from both—that they had failed to get supplies, although they had made requisitions. They said, "We have sent for them."

Q. You said the hospital was occupied by Cubans. Cubans or Spaniards?

A. Cubans. I think it was Cubans. It was one occupied by some merchants and people like that. It was a private hospital.

Q. It was not a Cuban hospital, of Cuban insurgents?

A. No; it was a private institution for people of Santiago.

Q. When you came north, how did you come?

A. By the *Segurança*.

Q. Were there any sick on board?

A. Yes; about 40, convalescent and sick.

Q. Who was the medical officer in charge?

A. Bannister.

Q. Do you know whether or not he had obtained a proper amount of medical supplies?

A. No; there was not a proper supply.

Q. Please specify somewhat in detail the deficiencies.

A. I think there were medicines enough. I happened to know whom they belonged to. One of the hospital stewards going home had two cases with him. He told me they had to use from that case. There were almost none of the prepared foods. No kind of food for convalescents. I can tell in detail about that. On the first evening out about 40 men were convalescent, and we found that they were to eat ordinary rations, each soldier, as the steward told me. I said, "These men can not do it." But there was not anything else for them to eat except what the transport had for its own supplies. I went to the steward, being represented by the Volunteer Aid, and asked him to purchase for the Volunteer Aid all the supplies he could for the use of those men, and asked him if they could be bought. He said, "Yes; if there were money." At that time another member, Chaplain McCook, had asked him the same thing.

Q. Of Philadelphia?

A. Yes. We then provided those men with necessary food, and Major Banister and Major ——— told me they didn't see how those men could have come home as they did without that supply of food.

Q. Any explanation given to you why the Government did not supply the necessary food for those sick?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether the ship was inspected with reference to its stores?

A. I can not tell you. I know this: Major Banister told me he didn't know until just a little while before—day before—that he was to have the care of any of those men; in fact, I think it was not understood until a short time before it sailed that it was to take home convalescents, and then he was informed that he would be in charge of those men on board the boat. He had not seen the men until on board; didn't know what diseases they had.

Q. You don't know from his own statement to you whether he made an effort to get other supplies for the sick—those who needed special diet?

A. I could not tell you. I know this, that he had no time, even if he had asked for it.

Q. Do you mean hours—a period of two or three hours?

A. Twenty-four hours. The vessel was to sail at 3 on Wednesday, and I think he was informed at 2 on Tuesday.

Q. You think in twenty-five hours he could not get the necessary things?

A. I don't know his position. I only know his statement to me.

Q. I understand you that had it not been for supplies furnished with money from Dr. McCook those men would have starved? As it was, did they manage to get through the trip without injury?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. None of them were in such condition as supplies on board the boat would not answer the purpose?

A. No; we were able to get such food as they needed.

Q. Do you know whether ice was on board?

A. Could get ice once a day. At last it ran out altogether.

Q. You came to what point?

A. Montauk.

Q. At the time of landing were the men in as good condition as when they embarked?

A. With the exception of two or three, better. They didn't land there. We went to quarantine at New York.

Q. How long?

* A. Thirty-six or forty-eight hours. Then we were released on parole.

Q. Do you know whether or not the yellow fever extended from the cases on board?

A. I don't know. I haven't heard since.

Q. Any deaths on board?

A. No; a man died the next day after landing.

Q. This was as late as the latter part of September or the 1st of October?

A. I think we left on the 15th of September. We were six and one-half days coming to Montauk.

Q. All in all, you were about ten days aboard the ship?

A. We went on board Wednesday and got off Thursday afternoon.

Q. Eight days?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know of any other facts observed by you while you were at Santiago or on the transport, of service to you in determining whether or not proper effort had been made for the care of the sick, and, if not, who was responsible therefor?

A. On board of the transport were six or eight who had been sent from hospitals on lighters, and all of them had to land at Montauk without any clothing whatever except their pajamas. I asked one man why they had not been given clothing. He said there was not time to get it—they had had orders to put them on board the transport that day, and there had not been an opportunity to get clothes for them, because it took longer than the time they had to get them from the supply department.

Q. Was it absolutely necessary that the ship should sail that Wednesday? Could she have delayed until Thursday without serious detriment?

A. I don't know. She had been waiting sixteen days.

Q. Lying sixteen days in Santiago, and not being put in shape to bring men north?

A. I think until twenty-four hours she was not understood to take sick.

Q. What did they expect her to carry?

A. Ammunition.

Q. Have you anything more to say?

A. One of the things which handicapped us a great deal there was lack of nurses. I can only say this, that at the request of General Wood we cabled the Volunteer Aid to send down twenty. We were prepared for them and had places for them all. There were no trained nurses there at the time, and word came from Washington—~~from General Sternberg~~—no nurses needed in Santiago. Therefore, they could not send them. Therefore, we did without them.

Q. Male or female nurses?

A. Female.

Q. Anything else, Doctor?

A. I have nothing else to say.

Q. Do you know anything about the landing of the men of the Second Massachusetts—their reception in this country?

A. I was there when they came here. I saw them come off. I saw them leave Santiago.

Q. In what condition was the ship for their transportation?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know anything about the conditions which prevailed on board the ship coming north?

A. No.

Q. Anything of the conditions under which the men landed here?

A. No.

Q. Did they go to Montauk?

A. The report down there was that they all went to Montauk.

Q. You were in Montauk?

A. In Santiago.

Q. Do you know anything about the conditions under which certain men of the Rough Riders came to Boston while in Santiago?

A. They went on board the transport, and they were about to leave one Sunday night. The men themselves were in pretty good shape. They were pretty well crowded in; but otherwise I should say they left in pretty good shape.

Q. The day before you left Santiago, did you have occasion to see Lieutenant Tiffany?

A. No, I didn't. I think Dr. Bradford received those men when they came.

Q. Have you any statements yourself, Doctor, about the questions asked you—any information to give us?

A. No; not unless you ask something particular.

Q. We didn't know but you might have something—might know something not questioned about.

A. Fault-finding is not one of my faults.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MRS. ELIZABETH BELL THOMAS.

MRS. ELIZABETH BELL THOMAS then appeared before the commission. Being asked if she had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," she was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Your full name, Mrs. Thomas?

A. Elizabeth Bell Thomas.

Q. Your residence?

A. Haverhill.

Q. Whether or not your husband was in the Army?

A. He was.

Q. Is he living or dead?

A. He is dead.

Q. Where did he die?

A. At Sternberg Hospital, Chickamauga.

Q. Have you recovered his effects since his death?

A. I have everything except the money.

Q. Do you know what amount of money he had in his possession at the time of his death?

A. Twenty dollars.

Q. To whom was it delivered?

A. To Mrs. Goldsmith. He gave this money to her at the time of his death.

Q. What did she do with it?

A. She gave it to Miss Elizabeth Dewey, head nurse of section 1.

Q. Have you been able to trace it beyond that?

A. No.

Q. Have you had any communication with Miss Dewey?

A. None whatsoever; not with Miss Dewey.

Q. Have you written to her?

A. Yes.

Q. Located her residence?

A. No. I have written to the hospital but have received no reply.

Q. You don't know whether or not she has returned to the hospital?

A. No.

Q. She was nurse from a hospital in New York, was she not?

A. I think Miss Dewey was. I am not sure; I think she was.

Q. You wrote to the Sternberg Hospital at Chickamauga, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You don't know her home residence?

A. No; I don't.

Q. Had you heard from your husband during his illness?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. From what he stated in his letter are you led to believe he was well cared for, or otherwise?

A. I think he had everything done that could be done for him. I think he was perfectly well attended.

Q. What you are endeavoring to ascertain is the whereabouts of this \$20?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. We would be glad to help you in any way we can, I am sure. We can probably ascertain something in regard to Miss Dewey's residence. We will have a minute made of it and will communicate with you then if we discover it. Have you anything else to say to the commission?

A. I don't know whether you could do anything about his last month's pay.

Q. You will get that from the Pay Department. Have you made application for it?

A. No.

Q. There will be no difficulty about it. That will come from the regimental officers.

A. Yes; I imagine so.

Q. Anything further?

A. No; I think that is all, unless you would care to see a letter which I have had from Major Giffin, the one supposed to have received the money. I have a letter from Mrs. Goldsmith, in which she speaks of Miss Dewey, and Miss Dewey says Major Giffin said the money and valuables were always sent with the body. That was not. I have his letter stating that the money was never deposited in his office.

Q. Then you have from Mrs. Goldsmith that she gave it to Miss Dewey, and from Major Giffin that he didn't get it from Miss Dewey? You don't know her residence?

A. No.

Q. You made no application to the Surgeon-General of the Army?

A. No; there have been several letters written from the hospital, and I have a letter from the Secretary of the War Department saying that he had reported it to the investigating department, and as soon as they report he would let me know.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. RICHARD C. CABOT.

Dr. RICHARD C. CABOT then appeared before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, profession, length of service as doctor, and your residence.

A. Richard C. Cabot; physician; 190 Marlboro street, Boston. I have practiced medicine five years. I served on the hospital ship *Bay State* three weeks in all.

Q. What was that service and where; the dates included?

A. We left Boston on the 5th of September, arrived at Porto Rico on the 12th, stayed there a week, and were a week coming back; three weeks in all.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us where in Porto Rico. In the first place, please tell us whether you had occasion to visit hospitals; whether you saw the sick while on land, and whether you received the sick on board your ship to bring north.

A. We arrived at Guanica, the first place mentioned, on the 12th of September, remained there twenty-four hours; then went to Ponce, stayed there five days; from there to Arecibo. I went as pathologist of the ship. My business was the examination of patients, especially with reference to "microbial" diseases between typhoid fever and malarial fever. The *Bay State* was intended to be of use in any way in which she could. My services were offered to the general in command and physicians in charge of hospitals to assist them in any way in which I could. My time was passed in making examinations, at the request of surgeons of different hospitals, to distinguish between typhoid and malaria.

Q. How large a percentage of the cases that you observed appeared to be typhoid, and how large malaria?

A. Among those I saw in Porto Rico 73 per cent were typhoid; less than 1 per cent were malaria. Out of 277 cases examined in Porto Rico there were but two cases of malaria. The rest appeared to be typhoid.

Q. Did you have occasion while conducting this investigation to visit the hospitals yourself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you observe at Ponce?

A. I was in the general hospital there, at the United States general hospital. During the whole four days, morning and afternoon, while I was there I was treated in the most admirable way in all respects: shown the greatest courtesy by all parties concerned, and given perfect freedom to go anywhere I liked, with or without officers to escort me, to converse with anyone I liked, and avail myself of those opportunities wanted to ascertain the condition of the hospital. In general, I want to say that I found that hospital as fine a hospital as I have ever seen. At the time I saw it, it was a very fine hospital in all respects—perfectly clean, no bad smells—the ventilation was perfect, even in such hot weather as we had it was cool in the hospital. The foods were good, and, so far as I could ascertain from questioning the patients, all was entirely satisfactory.

Q. It was an old Spanish hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I think a stone-wall building?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it built in the ordinary way? With tier in the center?

A. The wards were raised around upon a courtyard in the center.

Q. Do you remember who was in charge of that hospital?

A. Major——

Q. Daly?

A. Birmingham.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the hospital under charge of Dr. Daly? I ask you because we have had some testimony bearing upon it.

A. No, sir.

Q. This is the only hospital in Ponce you visited?

A. I visited also a Red Cross hospital in charge of Miss ——, of New York, in which 10 or 12 officers were being cared for.

Q. In what condition?

A. Admirable. Nothing to criticise.

Q. It was not under charge of the Red Cross entirely, but under charge of the Army, so far as administration was concerned?

A. So far as I understand, entirely under the Red Cross. It was visited by volunteer surgeons of the Army, but I understand the whole thing was under charge of the Red Cross.

Q. The medical attendance was furnished by military establishment, not by the Red Cross?

A. So I understand.

Q. As respects other hospitals you visited, in what condition were they?

A. I visited a Spanish Red Cross hospital, which I think contained only Spanish prisoners, mostly wounded men. I understand it had been established by the Red Cross Society of Ponce itself.

Q. Not under charge or control of our own Government?

A. Not in any way.

Q. What other hospitals at other points did you visit?

A. I saw a small hospital at Guanica, connected with the First Volunteer Engineers. There were some 20 patients. I have nothing to say about that, except that it was admirably managed in every respect; nothing to criticise.

Q. As respects any hospital at any other point?

A. I saw no other hospital under American charge.

Q. As far as you were able to ascertain, were all these hospitals properly supplied with medicines and medical stores?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. No complaints of deficiencies?

A. Not while I was there.

Q. So far as your own observation went, the hospitals were properly equipped, properly administered, and the sick well cared for?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many men did the *Bay State* take on to bring north?

A. One hundred and one.

Q. Sick, wounded, or both?

A. Entirely sick.

Q. Where did you receive them?

A. We received 8 at Ponce and the balance at Arecibo.

Q. In what condition were the men when brought on, as respects their fitness for travel?

A. Excellent.

Q. Any reason why any one of them should have been kept in the hospital there?

A. No, sir.

Q. What conditions were provided while you were in transport? Satisfactory to you?

A. Perfect.

Q. Did your men improve?

A. They all improved with one exception.

Q. Did you lose any cases?

A. No case.

Q. Were they all of your Massachusetts regiment, the Second?

A. Mostly the Sixth; almost entirely the Sixth.

Q. Did you yourself hear from these men any complaint of lack of proper care and attention before you received them on board ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the nature of these complaints?

A. Mostly complaints about food, as to sleeping accommodations, as to medical service.

Q. That covered pretty nearly the whole of the hospital care?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Taken from these various hospitals you have spoken of, their complaints mostly related to their care while in the hospitals?

A. Mostly as to what had happened to them on transports, on their way down or at some other point.

Q. There was no complaint respecting their care in regimental hospitals?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not the regimental officers had such places as they needed?

A. I don't know anything to the contrary.

Q. You don't know anything about it?

A. No, sir.

Q. So far as you were able to judge, you found nothing out of the way in the medical administratton in Porto Rico?

A. No, sir; not while there.

Q. Do you know anything about the condition of the men on the *Olivette*?

A. I saw a good many of them.

Q. When they landed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what condition were they when landed?

A. Something entirely new in my medical experience. Their weakness was extreme. Their color was very striking—a mixture of yellow and brown—new to me. Their emaciation and hollow-eyed appearance was striking.

Q. What had been the diseases under which these men had been laboring, or under which they were laboring?

A. Almost all of them had a form of malaria.

Q. Any considerable proportion of typhoid among the number?

A. There might be one-third.

Q. Was a careful examination made to determine the relative proportion of malaria and typhoid in the hospital?

A. Yes, sir. There were two-thirds of one to one-third of the other.

Q. Do you know whether or not those men had been properly cared for in the transport?

A. I know only by hearsay.

Q. Do you know anything about the condition of Lieutenant Tiffany?

A. Not personally.

Q. Who was his attending physician here?

A. Dr. Johnson, I think. I just heard that. I know several of that name.

By General DODGE:

Q. Of the Second Massachusetts do you know anything of your own knowledge

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't have occasion to go down after they all came back?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know the surgeon of the Second Massachusetts?

A. No, sir; I don't know. Clark, of the regiment, was the doctor formerly.

Q. Of the Sixth? Who was the surgeon of the Sixth?

A. Dow.

Q. Address, Boston?

A. He can be found at—Boston City Hospital would find him.

Q. Is he in service in Boston?

A. I think not. He was not long before.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. GEORGE FRANK CAMPBELL.

Dr. GEORGE FRANK CAMPBELL was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us your name, profession, length of time you have been practicing, and your residence?

A. George Frank Campbell, No. 515 Shawmut avenue, Boston; I am at present a student at the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

Q. You are not a graduate physician?

A. No, sir.

Q. You were in the Hospital Corps during the late war with Spain?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you enlisted in the Hospital Corps, where were you stationed as a Hospital Corps man?

A. I enlisted in the Army Hospital Corps on the 4th of June, 1898, and proceeded to Washington. I remained there for two weeks or so, and then was detached for duty with the army hospital train. The purpose of the hospital train was to transport the sick and wounded on the Southern camps and from transports to the hospitals farther north.

Q. Who was in charge of that train?

A. Maj. Charles Richards.

Q. What was the date of your first trip?

A. We reached Washington on the 13th of June—Friday, the 13th of June.

Q. And went where?

A. From there down to Tampa. We received a train load of sick there at Tampa from the camps at Tampa.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us—although we have seen Tampa itself—in what condition that train was for the reception of the sick.

A. The train consisted of ten Pullman sleepers, one open baggage car, dining car, and traveling officers' car.

Q. How soon were the Pullman sleepers exchanged for tourists' sleepers?

A. They were unfitted for warm climate—they were too warm. The plush was a collecting place for germs, and it was thought advisable to exchange them for tourists' sleepers.

Q. As respects the bringing up of the first sick from Tampa, the first time you were on the train, how many were there, do you remember?

A. The first load we took consisted of about 150 patients.

Q. Were they in a condition warranting their removal from Tampa?

A. The conditions certainly made it advisable to move them from that point.

Q. Their conditions? The conditions at Tampa?

A. At Tampa?

Q. What were they, please—good?

A. Good. Probably the most of the patients were in good condition to be moved, although fever patients. It is unadvisable to move them if possible.

Q. What conditions rendered it advisable to transfer them?

A. In the first place, the hospital was in itself inefficient. The camp, I should say. And the hospital accommodations had not progressed to a point where they could take care of typhoid patients properly; and, in the second place, it was advisable to remove them from a warmer climate and the danger of infection of

tropical diseases, and get farther north. We are afraid of the climate and heat here.

Q. Where was the first train load taken?

A. To Atlanta, Ga.—Fort McPherson.

Q. How long were you making that trip?

A. We usually took about a night and a day on a trip to Fort McPherson.

Q. Were you disturbed at any time in making this trip, or any of these trips?

A. In the first part of the campaign work the sick were moved very rapidly, but it was thought advisable later to reduce the speed of the train and move them more slowly.

Q. Were you on the train at any time when detained for lack of orders for twenty-four hours, at a point between Tampa and McPherson?

A. Not when loaded.

Q. Not when loaded?

A. Never.

Q. There was a delay on one occasion?

A. The delay was occasioned by an accident to the rolling stock of the train. Delays were occasioned by slight accidents.

Q. Do you know whether or not that train was sufficiently supplied with nurses and medical stores, so that proper care could be taken of the sick in transportation?

A. It was undoubtedly, by all inspecting it, agreed the best equipped train for the purpose ever put into campaign in the world. It was abundantly supplied with all kinds of surgical instruments, all kinds of medicines and foods necessary for the care of the sick.

Q. How long were you on this train?

A. Until the 1st of October.

Q. You spoke of instruments. Did you have any occasion to use any surgical instruments? Did you have any surgical operations?

A. No, sir; only minor.

Q. So that fitting it up with surgical instruments was luxury rather than necessity?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you find at any points to which you were sent hospitals unprepared to receive men that were brought?

A. Sometimes; especially at Fort Myer, near Washington, there was delay occasioned in receiving patients, by some misunderstanding on the part of the hospital authorities; but, as a rule, the hospitals were prepared when the train arrived to immediately unload.

Q. At times of delay at Fort Myer were the men seriously incommoded by the delay.

A. Of course on a hospital train it is impossible to treat patients as they ought to be treated and it is of great importance that they be sent immediately from the train to the hospital.

Q. What was the maximum delay that occurred during the time you were on the hospital train?

A. The longest wait we had was from about 5 in the afternoon until 12 at night—half-past 11 at night.

Q. It didn't, then, exceed twelve hours?

A. No, sir. We had regular facilities for taking care of the men.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29 1898.***TESTIMONY OF CORPL. WILLIAM B. KENIBBS.**

Corpl. WILLIAM B. KENIBBS was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Corporal, your full name, if you please, present address, and your company and regiment during your service in the war with Spain.

A. Corpl. William B. Kenibbs; Company A, Seventh Regiment of Infantry.

Q. Where did you enlist?

A. Boston, Mass.

Q. When?

A. May 4.

Q. Where did you serve?

A. In Cuba—Santiago.

Q. In what battle were you wounded?

A. Battle of El Caney.

Q. Where were you wounded?

A. Through the right leg, left side, and through the head, besides other superficial wounds.

Q. Show the members of the commission where your head wound was.

A. Behind the entrance at ear, passing through the pharynx.

Q. Where was the wound in your side?

A. At the left side. A bullet passed through the hip.

Q. Where was the wound in your leg?

A. Technically, 1 inch to the rear, behind the right knee, passing through to the other side, touching upon the left side.

Q. What was your business when you enlisted?

A. With an opera company as a bass soloist.

Q. How did the wound through your head affect your capacity for opera singing?

A. Diagnosed by surgeon to be paralysis of the nerve leading to the vocal cords.

Q. Was your occupation gone as an opera singer?

A. Entirely so.

Q. How did you get back from the firing line?

A. When I was wounded, I fell, plunged forward on top of my gun. I picked that up and loaded it and fired a couple of shots. They took my gun away from me and got me back from the hill—carried from the hill. I lay there for an hour, bleeding profusely.

Q. Had you received no first aid on the firing line?

A. No, sir.

Q. You had no packet?

A. No, sir.

Q. How many packets in your company?

A. We had seven antiseptic packets, and we were instructed to discard those.

Q. What number of men had you in your company?

A. One hundred and nine.

Q. You had seven first-aid packets to 109 men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What became of those packets?

A. They were placed in packs, in some convenient place to carry them, and I don't doubt but in the excitement they were left in those packs.

Q. Did the men discard the packs as they went into action?

A. Yes, sir; about 100 yards from the first shot.

Q. What attempt was made to stanch the blood or bind your wounds on the firing line?

A. Just the assistance of two of my comrades. They made a pressure with a handkerchief.

Q. What was the effect of their attention to you?

A. It caused after a while—it lessened the flow of blood.

Q. Were your other wounds dressed?

A. No, sir.

Q. Which one did you get first? Do you know?

A. The one on the leg.

Q. And the next?

A. The next one in the side. After that one they knocked my hat off. I think that was the charge I got in the face.

Q. At what time did you receive these wounds, as nearly as you can tell?

A. Between ten and twelve hours. I was shot at first—

Q. You paid no attention to that?

A. No.

Q. You kept right on?

A. It made me limp and walk stiff for half an hour, but I pushed right on.

Q. How long before you got the wound in your side?

A. Just as we were behind the ridge, as I was dropping down in position to fire.

Q. How long after you got this side wound before you got the one in the head?

A. I think it must have been about three hours and a half.

Q. Whether you kept on with those two wounds in your body, one in your body, the other through your hip?

A. I stayed and fought as long as I dared.

Q. Did you reach a division dressing station?

A. The dressing station there was a joint one of the Seventh and Twelfth Infantry.

Q. How far back of the firing line was this?

A. I was not conscious, but was told by a man that the distance was approximately 3 miles.

Q. Were you carried back or did you try to walk?

A. I walked about 400 yards, then fell and refused to go farther.

Q. What attention did you get at the division hospital, so called, at Siboney?

A. When I reached the first dressing station they didn't attempt to do anything to me. The next morning the hospital was fired upon. I was moved on the opposite bank. I was carried up a steep bank and fell exhausted. I was then under a tree. I found a shady place. The regimental surgeon of the Twelfth Infantry told me to stay there. He propped me against a tree. My own regiment surgeon ordered me to come up under the trees there. I refused to do so. He came close to me and wanted my reason. I told him I was too weak. He said, "You must." I said, "No; I was told to stay and am going to stay. I am too weak to move." He said, "We will have to carry you." About 2 o'clock that afternoon they carried me. I was taken into a clump of trees and left there. It was two days afterwards before they discovered me. I could not move around myself, though it rained heavily those two nights. The sun prostrated me. I could call nobody's attention, until a man passed by my regiment and discovered me there and had me brought out to where the hospital was.

Q. Did you tell any of the surgeons about the wound through your leg and through your side?

A. Not at that time. Not until on the *Olivette*.

Q. How long before you went aboard the *Olivette*?

A. Eight days.

Q. You had not mentioned the holes on your leg or side at that time?

A. I regarded them as superficial.

Q. All that you called their attention to was the wound in your head?

A. That was apparent. That would speak for itself.

Q. When did you go aboard the *Olivette*?

A. Eight days after I was wounded.

Q. How many wounded were on that boat?

A. I should judge approximately about 300 to 325

Q. Who was in charge of it?

A. Major Griffin.

Q. What assistants had he?

A. One other doctor and two medical students.

Q. What was the condition, in general, of the wounded on that boat—badly wounded or otherwise?

A. Were quite a number badly wounded. There were two amputation cases and quite a few operations. I went into the operating room, which nominally would be the saloon of the boat, and requested to have my head dressed, as it was paining me and there was suppuration both sides. They told me to go back to my berth and they would send for me.

Q. When did they send for you?

A. They didn't send for me.

Q. When did you get your head dressed?

A. At the hospital.

Q. Your head was not dressed during the entire time on board the *Olivette*, with suppuration going on?

A. No, sir.

Q. Any inflammation in the other wounds?

A. Slight, in the leg.

Q. How long were you in making the journey from Siboney to Long Island?

A. Nine days.

Q. You went into the hospital, then, at Long Island, and how long did you remain there?

A. Two days.

Q. Where did you go from there?

A. To Governors Island.

Q. How long were you there?

A. Eight days.

Q. Where did you go from there?

A. I came to my home in Boston.

Q. How long were you here?

A. For eighty days.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. I returned to my regiment in Fort Wayne.

Q. Did you receive promotion in the meantime?

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't enlist as a corporal?

A. No, sir.

Q. You are a corporal now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When were you promoted?

A. On the 24th day of October, when I reached my regiment.

Q. That was pretty rapid promotion in the Regular Army?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why were you promoted so rapidly?

A. Possibly it was on account of lack of competent men for that position, and possibly through some feeling on the part of other noncommissioned officers there.

Q. Who was your captain?

A. The captain is dead. Captain Worden. He died at Denver.

Q. Speaking of Lieutenant Hallock, what was the cause of his wanting you to go to the hill in—

A. I don't know, unless my gruff manner of refusing to go there.

Q. You would have been safe there?

A. Perfectly.

Q. A better place than where they put you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was Hallock a member of your company?

A. He was regimental surgeon.

Q. Who were your lieutenants?

A. Lieutenant at that time was William H. Ruggles.

Q. Hallet was surgeon; regular surgeon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell us now, Corporal, if you please, your experience in the various hospitals. What is your opinion, first, of the First Division field hospital, under command of Dr. Wood—Major Wood?

A. They brought us in on transport carts and laid us—what there were left of us—on the grass opposite the dressing tents. Those who were able to crawl up to the tent were dressed. The other dressing station was for officers. I was taken there—beneath a little shelter of boughs—and left there with other wounded men.

Q. Did the wound from your head affect your cesophagus?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It affected the larynx?

A. It closed that up.

Q. How could you be fed?

A. By means of a pipe.

Q. How often were you fed before you got on board the *Olivette*?

A. Once.

Q. How often were you fed on the *Olivette*?

A. Not at all.

Q. You went entirely without nourishment until you got to Long Island?

A. I had salt and water.

Q. How did you get that?

A. I got that myself, or some of the men got it for me.

Q. There were no facilities aboard for feeding men in your condition?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. Had they food aboard suited to a wounded man in your condition?

A. They had gruel, oatmeal, condensed milk.

Q. But no facilities for getting it into your stomach? How long were you fed in that way?

A. Since July 4.

Q. After coming North?

A. I was fed that way in Long Island Hospital.

Q. When did you begin to be able to take food in the natural way?

A. I practically am not able to yet; that is, I can not masticate anything, not any solid food, such as meats. I am obliged to have it cut very fine.

Q. Are you able to take other food through your cesophagus?

A. Yes, sir; liquid food. I subsist almost entirely on liquids.

Q. What was your experience in the hospital at Governors Island?

A. The food there was very poor, and the attendance was not such as could be desired.

Q. What do you mean by attendance—medical, or nurses?

A. The medical attendance was quite good. The surgeon was efficient. The nurses did not give them any attention they desired.

Q. From the Hospital Corps?

A. Yes, sir. There was, at night, a light kept burning. I asked two or three times to have it extinguished. I was told to put my head the other way and it would not bother.

Q. How often were you fed there?

A. I used to eat about twice a day. They had a very fair soup; I got that every day.

Q. Were you in the hospital at Fort Wayne?

A. Yes; that is, I was not an inmate at the hospital.

Q. What knowledge have you of the condition of things there?

A. I think they were very bad.

Q. In what respect?

A. The facilities for caring for the number of sick men of that regiment. There were no barracks but for four companies, and there were probably four times that number. The facilities were entirely inadequate, and blankets were conspicuous by their absence; there were none at all; so the men slept on the floor. Those who were fortunate enough to possess blankets used those; otherwise, they went without.

Q. Did you get any blankets from the time you left Siboney until you got to Fort Wayne?

A. I brought mine with me. There was no issue of blankets from the time the regiment got to Fort Wayne, which was the first part of October, until last Saturday. There were no blankets of any description.

Q. The men, you say, slept on the floor without blankets?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many were without?

A. In my company there was probably a dozen.

Q. How many were in the hospital at Fort Wayne? How many beds had you?

A. About 30 in the new hospital recently built.

Q. What were the conditions of that hospital?

A. It was under two local civilian doctors. There was quite a corps. In fact, five or six acted as stewards; about as many privates.

Q. Any female nurses?

A. No, sir.

Q. Any female nurses at Siboney?

A. None.

Q. Any at Governors Island?

A. None.

Q. Were all the sick who attempted to secure accommodations at the hospital at Fort Wayne taken into the hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. What knowledge have you on that subject—as to their not being received?

A. When I was appointed corporal, I went on guard. I was not able to stand my guard. I was released and went back to watch. The next day I was placed in charge of quarters and remained almost every day in charge of the quarters. Every day I would have one or two men who had been touched by malaria. I would take them up to the hospital. To have them admitted to the hospital it was necessary to have them examined by the doctor. The doctors were very seldom there, especially in the afternoon or evening. In the morning they would be

there about 11 o'clock. Would hang around for the doctor and get him to sign, and the man would be admitted; but, as was invariably the case, they would give them 5 or 10 grains of quinine and tell them to go and lie down. The men would have to go half a mile.

Q. Do you know what the facilities for feeding men in the hospital were?

A. At Fort Wayne, I don't. I heard considerable complaint.

Q. When were you discharged, and for what reason?

A. I was discharged by reason of certification of disability. I was discharged November 7.

Q. Have you any other statements to make concerning the condition of things as you found them in these various hospitals?

A. If the board will kindly allow me to refresh my memory. There was one occasion of scarcity of provisions. When we received our marching orders on the 3d of June and went to Tampa we received ten days' rations. On the 20th our provisions gave out. We received three days' more June 13. On the 20th those gave out. We were without rations for one day. We received supplies by means of small boats from the Seventy-first.

Q. Anything further?

A. The surgeon in charge of Governors Island hospital—under the General Order No. 116, all sick and wounded soldiers were entitled to first-class transportation to their homes. They didn't receive that. They received transportation, but didn't receive a card ticket. They were obliged to sit up all night. It was dark, and the men suffered from the cold and discomfort. That, in connection with that wound, brought me down to 98 from 186 pounds.

Q. Anything further?

A. That is all.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. MILES STANDISH.

MILES STANDISH was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, profession, time during which you have been practicing, and your residence.

A. My name is Miles Standish; physician; I live at No. 6 St. James avenue, Boston; have been in practice since my graduation in 1879.

Q. State to us whether or not you had any direct acquaintance with the medical matters during the late war with Spain.

A. Allow me to tell my story. I would much prefer to tell my story, because then it will be evidenced why I want to tell it.

I have for ten years been the commander of the ambulance corps of the militia in this State, a pretty strong organization, corresponding to the Hospital Corps of the United States Army. Secondly, when the war broke out it was supposed that we might be called into service. At the time the troops were mobilized, at first, we were ordered out with the troops to South Frammingham—detachments of it. At that time I supposed it was going to be my duty to furnish hospital corps men for the Army, which subsequently proved to be the case. The difficulties of furnishing suitable men for the Army under the law are not slight. I do not think it is fully appreciated by the people criticising men furnished as hospital corps men during the war. When we were expecting our order I had a corps of 63 men.

I asked first who would volunteer to go. They said they would volunteer provided the organizations went. When we were at Framingham a surgeon-general of the United States telegraphed to the governor of this State, asking him to furnish 175 hospital corps men and 15 hospital stewards with the Massachusetts troops. I was detailed by the governor to raise those men. I was given an office in the State House and was asked to fulfill the request of the Surgeon-General.

Noncommissioned officers of my ambulance corps were placed there, volunteers were asked from my corps, and we began to organize and had a number of applications. In the course of two or three days we had 150 to 200 applicants. This was at the very beginning of the mobilization of the first troops. After two or three days' time we received a telegram from the Surgeon-General of the United States asking us to stop proceedings. The telegram stated that there was no authority under which Hospital Corps men could be enlisted for the Volunteer Army, and that we must stop. I procured the law, and found out to my astonishment that Congress had organized an army of 30,000 men and had forgotten the Medical Department—no provisions for providing any hospital corps, surgeons for general hospitals, or surgeons for division hospitals. There were division surgeons, brigade surgeons, and three hospital stewards, but there were no hands for the Medical Department at all. So we stopped the proceedings. My men were told they were not wanted—the Government did not want any Hospital Corps men at all. So we disbanded. Then in the course of perhaps two weeks or so Dr. Bushnell—I think he is assistant surgeon, or something or other of that sort, in the Army—came to my office, bringing a letter from the Surgeon-General of the Army, which he read to me, or a portion of it. In that there was a request to see me, as captain of the volunteer organization in this State, and that I ask such men of my corps or others as I thought properly qualified to enlist in the Hospital Corps of the United States Army, for three years, as privates of the regulars, with the verbal promise of the Surgeon-General that, in accordance with an order issued by General Miles, they should receive their discharge at the end of the war. So I called together my own militia troops and made the proposition to them—they should enlist as regulars, privates of the Regular Army, for three years, with the verbal promise of discharge at the end of the war. A good many men were willing to go previously, but did not seem to like the conditions. As a result of the letter about one-third of the men said they would not go. So I informed the enlisting officers here that the men would not go.

I was informed that no men could be enlisted by the Hospital Corps men by any enlisting officer except he had written permission by the Surgeon-General of the United States that he should be enlisted. Nevertheless, we started in to organize and to get what men we could ready. At last all my men received from the Surgeon-General their permit, and a telegraphic dispatch saying, "Pullman's car for forwarding." Then I received a request of Surgeon-General that perhaps I could find those other men; my men absolutely were successes: those other men, would they come? So in my individual capacity I wrote to the other men who had applied to me to enlist in the Volunteer Hospital Corps, individually, and asked him to come to see me and I would tell him how to get into the Hospital Corps. Most of them came. A large number of those men were medical students—young professional men in practice only a year or two, but good men; or were clerks and employees—men provided to do any duties of the Hospital Corps. Some of them were cooks, etc. When I proposed to the medical students to enlist three years, with the verbal promise to be released at the end of the war, hesitated; he didn't care to establish a record as a private in the Regular Army. So that all the most desirable men that we had we could have sent; I could have sent a great many of them, but they refused to go on the conditions imposed by Congress—in the Regulars of the United States Army. Many others were willing to go—many

others. Of every one of those I looked up the record—medical reference, character, capability, and that sort of thing. Before that time the Surgeon-General sent a telegram to all enlisting officers in this State saying that any man recommended by Capt. Miles Standish should be enlisted without any permission from the Surgeon-General's Office in Washington. That threw upon me all the men that applied. I looked them up. A large proportion of these men were unfit. They either indulged too much in alcohol or had a bad record and were unfit.

I wrote to their sponsors every time. The result of it was that by the united efforts of General C. and myself we managed to raise and send to the front 90 men, as I remember. They were men who were fit, and men willing to accept the conditions. Many men who were willing to accept the conditions we did not want. Those we wanted would not accept the conditions. That was inevitable, when Congress passes a law with no volunteer medical department condition. As I understand it, there was a bill introduced into Congress after the passage of the original act, providing for a hospital corps and a volunteer corps. That bill was simply vetoed. If anybody knows why these two things happened, they know why there was a mighty lame Medical Department.

That is the thing I wanted to say. I gave up hours of my time, without rank, honors, or compensation for myself, to get valuable men to go—such men as wanted to go under the conditions.

Q. Do you know, Doctor, of your own knowledge, anything in regard to the work done by any of those men you did succeed in enlisting and sending out?

A. So far as I know, they have all done well. Some have returned with regiments, and, as far as I have heard, all have done well.

Q. Did you have any personal observation of any camp hospitals during the war?

A. Yes; at Montauk Point, a short time.

Q. How long?

A. Twenty-four hours or less.

Q. Be kind enough to give us, in your own way, the results of your twenty-four hours' observation at Montauk, as respects the fitness of the house or hospitals for the work called upon to do and the character of the work that was done there.

A. Of course I was there the last part of the time. I was not there when the battle seems to have been high?

Q. During the time you were there what were the conditions? Were the hospitals properly administered? Were the men taken proper care of? Had they proper supplies?

A. I really had no opportunity to judge very much about it. It seemed to me they were overcrowded—much overcrowded—but as to the care taken of the sick and their supplies and that sort of thing, I had no opportunity to know; in fact, I didn't investigate the subject at all.

Q. Had you occasion to observe the condition of the men sent to Boston for medical care?

A. I saw nearly all of them.

Q. In what condition were they when they arrived?

A. They were very sick men, as a rule.

Q. Were they in proper condition to be transported to this city, or would it have been better to have left them where they were?

A. It depends upon where they were. If in Santiago, I think it was better for them to come here.

Q. If at Montauk, what have you to say?

A. It was a very difficult problem to say what men could be transported and what men could not. When I went there Colonel Almy, in charge, said, "Will you pick out the men to be transported?" I said, "By no means." Then he pro-

ceeded to explain to me that the men would sit up there smoking, reading, playing cards, and be apparently convalescent, and perhaps utterly go to pieces on the transport, at not a great distance. He was unwilling to say any men could bear transportation, except so far as they seemed better than the others.

Q. Have you observed any of the men after being brought to this city? Has his view been a correct one?

A. From what I hear, it was so. I saw men as they arrived here. I don't know how they arrived, except when on the *Lewiston*. I know that one exception.

Q. Tell us how you know about that particular case?

A. There is no need of going into the affair as to what happened to the *Lewiston*; but we arrived at Montauk Point in the middle of the day. Dr. Shea, physician of the board of health, had charge; an ambulance corps man, myself, and other physicians went with him. We went to the hospitals and asked for those men—such men as would bear transportation. We enforced that very rigidly, because—at least, it was the indication of the ambulance corps in this city—it seemed to me a great many had landed who could not have been benefited by the transportation; so we distinctly repeated over and over again to the surgeons in charge that we wanted men who would bear transportation. We wanted Massachusetts men, but would take anybody that they thought proper to send to the city hospitals in Boston. Lists were made up that night by the surgeons in charge of the various wards. Personally I went to see very few patients. Dr. Shea went to see some. The acting assistant surgeons in charge of the wards made a report during the evening to the surgeon in charge, saying they had so many men who would bear transportation. A great many surgeons, loath to pick out men who would bear transportation, said that cold weather was coming on, and troops coming home, and it was thought best to get off what men they could. So that was the way it was left, and it was determined there were sufficient men for our ship. Next morning, when the patients were delivered to us, a very large number of them had to be brought aboard on litters, the wharf being rather long—not so very long, but they were unable to walk, and we had to bring them aboard on litters, and some of them were very sick men on the trip. If they sent the men that day whom it was reported the night before—if they did that, the transfer and the wharf must have exhausted them.

Q. How large a proportion of those men on the vessel were ill when you reached Boston?

A. That is a hard question for me to answer. A good many were pretty sick men for three or four days, and many died.

Q. That was the vessel lost?

A. Yes, sir: they had a terrible trip in coming here. It was wrecked, and they were transferred at night.

Q. Were you in your official capacity present when the *Olivette* came in, among the number being Lieutenant Tiffany?

A. That is one occasion at which I was not present.

Q. Have you any statements, further than those you have made, Doctor, that you would like to make before the commission?

A. The only thing I wanted to say was that the law and regulations were responsible for the fact that we could not send forward proper hospital corps men in great abundance.

BOSTON, MASS., November 29, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. HERBERT L. BURRELL.

Dr. HERBERT L. BURRELL was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, profession, length of time you have been practicing, and residence.

A. Herbert L. Burrell; graduated in 1879 in the Harvard Medical School; and I practice here in Boston.

Q. Did you or did you not occupy any official position during the late war with Spain with reference to the Medical Department?

A. I was not directly connected with the Medical Department. I served under the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association as surgeon superintendent of the hospital ship which they equipped.

Q. Leaving out the consideration of the present equipment of that vessel, which we hope is entirely excellent, be kind enough to give us in your own way an account of your service in that and what observations you made as to the condition of the sick, proper care taken of them at various points to bring them back to the city.

A. In the first place, the ship left here on August 6; went to, first, Ponce, then to Guanica. It went out supplementary to the Medical Department of the United States Navy—perhaps as well to say as an aid. She was to render supplementary aid in the United States medical army and navy. There were some cases of starvation in the women and children at Clinica, which we relieved. I made inquiries as to the troops stationed at Guantanamo. There were some necessary supplies and some luxuries; and then we went to Santiago. It may be interesting to know that it was extremely difficult to get any information whatever at either Port Ant—or through the natives in the Navy at Guantanamo or by direct wire or from Chin—directly of Santiago. Apparently all information had ceased, and when I went in there I had no idea what the exact condition of Santiago was—that is, from a sanitary standpoint. It was very important to know that, because if it were seriously affected it would have been improper to have placed a ship in there. We could have turned around and gone to Porto Rico and accomplished good there. As a matter of fact, what we did in Santiago was to furnish a great many supplies from hypodermic needles down to mattresses, sheets, pillowcases to the general hospital and to the so-called "yellow-fever" hospital, and I believe other things went over to Siboney.

We started with 101 patients of the Ninth Regiment—Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers—and of that number 2 died—that is, 1 died in Santiago Harbor.

In regard to the condition of the sick at that time, which was approximately—6 and 7 are 13—between the 15th and 20th, the date is not exact in my mind just when it was, after what was known as the "exodus," in that condition which you would expect after a war and with the conditions, the diseases, everyone sick, many of the officers sick, and it was very difficult indeed to get any definite or accurate information from any source whatever, and it was only by working very energetically that one was able to obtain it. In regard to supplies it was very obvious—that is, from the presence of supplies. For example, on the *Relief* large quantities of bacon rested there, being spoiled by the sun, that for some unknown reason to me it was impossible to utilize, whatever the reason may have been. The same was true of mattresses. There was a great deal of difficulty, apparently, in getting the supplies, which apparently existed, delivered to places where they belonged. I, myself, think that was largely due to the illness at that time; the

inevitable number of persons and the tremendous amount of illness among the troops disorganized everything.

Q. What in regard to the medical supplies?

A. The medical supplies were not adequate; that is, if I can judge from the demands made upon them. For example, at one place I asked—in fact, I would like to say this right here: The greatest modesty was exercised by everyone there in regard to the question of supplies. Apparently there was no direct proportion to the need: that is, for what were urgently needed; people were modest about asking for them. Then what was striking, for example, in one hospital, I was told they had one hypodermic needle for 60 patients. Some things, as you can readily understand, were in excess, I suppose; at the time I reached there quinine was in enormous quantities. Previous to this time there had been none.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit many of the hospitals in Santiago, and in what condition did you find them?

A. From a sanitary point, overcrowded; but from an expediency standpoint, all right. That is, I mean by that, had I been in the position myself, I unquestionably should have been obliged to overcrowd them for expediency.

Q. Have you knowledge of the conditions rendering that overcrowding necessary?

A. None, except proof apparent—general condition. Probably everyone you met there was more or less ill or had been ill or was convalescent. Everyone was “rattled” by the existence of yellow fever, and I don’t think I can say anything beyond that, because I don’t know; it is a question of fact. I suppose you are after fact.

Q. So far as you observed these hospitals, were the sick being properly cared for?

A. They were being taken care of as well as a man could do it with what there was there. They were not being properly taken care of from my standpoint; but had I been there, with what they had, I don’t think I could have done any better.

Q. Were any complaints made to you by medical officers that it was impossible for them to get what they needed absolutely for use?

A. Yes; and in several instances I took a good deal of pleasure in telling them how they could do it. It was striking; that was. Many of the volunteer officers, colonels, and many regular officers could not understand how to cut red tape, which it is perfectly possible to do.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit Santiago afterwards?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then you don’t know the ultimate results?

A. In the four days I was there there was steady improvement noticeable from day to day—the cleanliness of the streets; this had all been taken in hand when I reached there, and the streets were being cleaned thoroughly; but, owing to illness of two of the general officers, it was practically impossible for them to pay attention to them.

Q. Did you bring north any considerable number of sick?

A. Yes, sir; I reached here with 99 patients. Their condition—some of them were convalescing from yellow fever, or from what was supposed to be yellow fever. Whether it was or not I have not been able to make up my mind. Others had probably malaria, a small proportion of them being typhoids only; I think two or three cases of dysentery.

Q. In what condition were those men when they reached Boston, as compared with when they left Santiago?

A. They had improved wonderfully—to a wonderful degree. They were literally—when they were taken aboard, although able to get up—were almost childish in their mental condition; it was very striking. And that continually improved as they went on.

Q. Do you, as a medical man, think that condition was due to diseases they were laboring under or due to deficient care they had received?

A. To both.

Q. In what proportion?

A. It is very difficult to estimate the proportion. I, accepting their statements as to improper food, I should say that had a great deal to do with it. It rendered them susceptible to absolute breaking down. I remember very well, in a conversation with Major Ives—many of these cases I should not have taken under ordinary circumstances.

Q. Would any weakness that they had become a consequence if they had attacks of malaria?

A. The consequence would have been both. Therefore it was obviously wise to take the chance of removing them.

Q. As respects—you made a subsequent trip to Porto Rico. In what condition did you find the men there?

A. At Ponce—we went to Ponce, Guanica, and afterwards to Arecibo, and superintended the removal of the patients to Guayama Mountains. It was difficult enough to remove them, too, but that was overcome in the first trip by taking their convalescent patients and thus relieving the congested condition and overworked condition of the hospitals. On the second trip those same patients had improved to a point that they could be moved to Arecibo. Those were the Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers and the First Volunteer Engineers. At Guanica I found an ideal camp—one of the best camps I have ever seen.

At both Ponce and Arecibo, and afterwards at Guanica, we furnished such supplies as were requested, except with one exception, where I had reason to believe that—or I did believe that—the officer in charge of one of the hospitals regarded the ship as a supply ship, to be worked as much as possible. That was proved, simply because he could have cabled for supplies. Transports were coming in every few days. There was no urgency for the demand. That was the one instance where I positively refused.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the hospitals at these several points?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what condition did you find them?

A. At Guanica I found an excellent hospital. At Ponce the hospital I visited was excellent, although again overcrowded. The only criticism that I could make was that I did not think that the so termed brigade surgeons were being properly quartered and looked out for. They were regarded as purely attendants and not entitled to the grade of the position of first lieutenant, to which they are entitled.

Q. That is the only criticism?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you at any point and at any time in your visits to the South observe evidences of neglect, mismanagement, or incapacity, from causes of any kind?

A. No, sir.

Q. Incompetence in the way of causes by drinking, or anything of that kind?

A. I found nothing of that kind—no evidence of neglect which should not have occurred. Neglect was one of the conditions, but I don't mean gross neglect. I mean that the individual had not awakened up to the idea that people were sick and that it was necessary for them to be alert.

Q. You did find that?

A. Many of the volunteer officers, men, from ignorance, inability, lack of knowledge of detail as to how to get things, sank back and stayed, as though there were nothing for them to do. I found evidence of that sort, mostly existing on the part of officers responsible for supplying troops with what was necessary in caring for them—not there, but at Santiago.

Q. Be kind enough to give me at your leisure the names.

A. ———.

Q. As the result of your observations during the summer have you any suggestions to make as to a change in the method of furnishing medical supplies, a change in the medical supplies themselves, or a change in the way in which men will be cared for in the hospitals?

A. The most important thing is to have under the Medical Department responsible heads who can act and act alone, without any reference back. Is that what you are after?

Q. That is part of it.

A. I want to answer what you are after.

Q. We are after any and every fact that you have that can be of service to this commission in accounting for conditions and causes—everything, and individuals responsible for the state of things.

A. I should say that was one of the vital things: that is, as I saw it—the capability for a man to act promptly and on his own responsibility; I mean in the sense of everything having to be referred back to the General Government at Washington.

Q. Do you or do you not know, Doctor, in that connection, whether individuals at Santiago, Porto Rico, or elsewhere in authority had power to do whatever was necessary to be done, expend money necessary to be spent, and to put the Medical Department in its proper condition?

A. I know they did have to refer to Washington—they did cable to Washington for instructions.

Q. Instructions bearing upon what?

A. For example, the disposition of the sick troops, where they would go, etc. I mean sick patients. And in that instance I practically disregarded what I was told to do.

Q. In what other respects would you suggest?

A. I think it is a very serious thing to put a medical man without a knowledge of military affairs into a position where he can get absolutely bound up with red tape.

Q. Explain.

A. I mean this, for example: The appointment of a surgeon who may be a most excellent medical man, but is entirely ignorant as to military methods. If that man is expected to get supplies, unless he is coached by some one, he will absolutely fail. That is as I saw it. He didn't know how to do. It was a new thing to him; and those men, as far as I could see, had not been examined in reference to that very thing. It seemed to me fatal.

Q. Did you observe instances of a man with knowledge of how things were to be gotten and affairs managed put in a position where that knowledge was absolutely necessary?

A. In one instance, where it had a great deal to do with the illness of a whole regiment.

Q. Be kind enough to add that to your list. Anything else to suggest, Doctor?

A. It involves so directly that I beg to be excused. I should be very glad to answer any questions. I have occupied a position where I can judge.

Q. For a considerable number of years you have had knowledge of matters medical with reference to the State of Massachusetts?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What position have you held officially in this State?

A. I started in 1881 as assistant surgeon and went through all successive grades to the grade of surgeon.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 29, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE J. B. HOUSTON.**

Private J. B. HOUSTON was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Give us your name, your present position, and where you live.

A. J. B. Houston; I was private.

Q. Where do you reside?

A. Lynn, Mass.

Q. Private in what?

A. In the Seventh Infantry.

Q. A regular?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you enlist?

A. On May 21.

Q. Of this year?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. In Boston.

Q. You accompanied the regiment from where to where?

A. From Boston: at first I was sent to Fort McPherson, Ga., and from there to Tampa, and joined the regiment.

Q. What company?

A. G.

Q. What captain?

A. Jackson.

Q. Give a résumé of the conditions existing from the time you reached there. Where did you go first?

A. From Tampa—

Q. With the Seventh?

A. Yes, sir. I was wounded at El Caney: was taken from there, in two or three days' journey, to the hospital at Siboney.

Q. Please give a full description. State exactly what occurred from the moment you were wounded to the time you reached Siboney.

A. I was wounded at noon, July 1.

Q. Where?

A. At El Caney.

Q. Where was your wound?

A. Just below the knee of the right leg. I lay in the grass until about 6 o'clock in the afternoon. Then I was removed to the field hospital.

Q. How far from the position you had when wounded?

A. I should say one-half a mile.

Q. Were you carried on a stretcher?

A. For a distance of 100 yards and then on the back of a comrade. At the battlefield hospital we were treated by Dr. Hallock, the regimental surgeon, and on the following morning we were removed to a point back of the hills. We remained there until early dawn of the following day. That was the third day.

Q. What treatment did you receive?

A. I did not receive the first treatment. Those bandages, temporary bandages, had been lost by many of the men to whom intrusted.

Q. So one of the gentlemen just told us—preceding you.

A. On the morning of the 3d I was carried on a litter by comrades to the main

road in front of Santiago, the distance of a mile, I should say; from there by wagon to the division hospital.

Q. Any straw in the wagon?

A. None; no, sir. It was a springless wagon. Several men died on the way from the main road to the division hospital, in my own observation. At the division hospital I was put on the operating table and my wounds were dressed. On the morning of the 4th we were again placed in the wagon. I want to ask—

Q. Anything you know yourself, as rapidly as you can.

A. On the morning of the 4th I was placed in the wagon again and taken down to the general hospital at Siboney. On that trip the men suffered extremely, but there were no complaints. The conditions of the road were such—with springless wagons—no straw—and nothing to protect us from the hot sun; but at Siboney the greatest difficulty we encountered was in obtaining anything to eat of a proper nature, and that by reason of the fact that we had no money. Of course many of us were brought back with scarcely anything on, and very few had any money; but we found that there were supplies there; for instance, bottles of lime juice were seen about the camp, and brought into my ward, and cans of fruit were found at the commissary store. Lime juice could be bought for 50 cents, and other canned goods at from 35 to 50 cents, but with no money whatever we could not get anything to eat for several days there. Occasionally, if you had luck, you would get a portion of a can of corned beef and tomato.

Q. Who was the surgeon in charge?

A. La Garde. Under his immediate supervision, as far as one could see, there were about 1,000 men in camp.

Q. He was the chief in charge. Did he take care of your wounds?

A. No, sir; my wounds were not attended to for six days after my arrival at Siboney. At the end of the sixth day I crawled through the grass to the hospital. The nurses were engaged in binding up wounds, and I had my wounds dressed. That was the only time in fifteen days that I received any attention.

Q. Under cover?

A. Yes, sir; in the tent; but the difficulty there with the men, especially in my ward, was they could get no nourishment because they had no money to buy.

Q. Then there was no food regularly issued, do I understand?

A. Corned beef and tomatoes, but no delicacies. They were purchasable, but not issued.

Q. Of La Garde?

A. Of the steward of the hospital.

Q. Bought at the commissary department?

A. I was told they could be bought at the commissary department, and there were men in the Thirty-third Michigan Regiment, Seventy-first New York Volunteers, and Second Massachusetts who secured some money from men of the Ninth who came in, who were fortunate enough to get money from men of the Ninth, and they did buy those delicacies.

Q. By whom were those sold?

A. I was unable to observe, and could not get on my feet to go out. I was told it was the commissary. There were men who afterwards—one man in particular, who, I was informed, afterwards died, who stated that he put some of the boys in that ward, and if they got back again would advise the proper authorities of that fact.

Q. Made that statement?

A. Yes, sir; and two others in that tent reasonably sure of reaching hospitals in the United States.

Q. Should you judge, from what he said, it was a noncommissioned officer selling this?

A. I should judge an officer, from what was stated to me: of course I had no means of getting to the house.

Q. The only treatment you received during the fifteen days at Siboney was when you crawled up to the tent? The only time your wounds were dressed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All the food that you could get, as I understand it, was the ordinary rations, corned beef, beans, something of that sort?

A. I find no fault.

Q. It was perfectly satisfactory to you? Had you had funds you could have procured delicacies?

A. Exactly.

Q. How long did you remain at Siboney?

A. Fourteen days.

Q. And then went where?

A. On the *City of Washington*.

Q. On the *City of Washington* were you personally treated very well?

A. There were somewhere near 300 sick men on board the ship, and the lack of supplies—the rations issued there, so far as the soldiers were concerned, they found no particular fault, save, that is, as in the case at Siboney, there were better things there we might have had that would have relieved very many soldiers in a weak condition there.

Q. Was your wound a flesh wound or bone?

A. Just splintered the bone.

Q. Was your wound dressed on the way home on the ship?

A. No, sir.

Q. Not dressed but once from the time you were wounded until you got to Fort Monroe?

A. Just bound up by the hospital nurses at Siboney. I tried to give it such attention as I could myself.

Q. When did you reach Fort Monroe?

A. On the 15th of July. I mean to say we arrived at Siboney—I want to be correct—at that time. We arrived at Fort Monroe some six or seven days later.

Q. There did you go into the hospital?

A. Yes, sir; at Fort Monroe; a new hospital had just been erected there. Of course I had plenty of attention, surgical attention and all that. But there Corporal Weincoup, for instance, of the First Volunteer Infantry—he could not retain upon his stomach the food issued to him, and he was taken violently sick.

Q. You saw that?

A. Yes, sir. There was also Sergeant Brown, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. Major De Witt came into the ward—there was food that had been there three days—and said, "How are you men?" We said, "Very well." Along on the opposite side was McKenna, of the Sixth Infantry, a very badly wounded man, and as Major De Witt came along he said he should like some coffee. He answered, "Don't you get water?" "Yes, sir." "That is good enough for you." It so happened an hour later Mrs. General Miles came into the ward. She had just arrived from Washington. She asked him if certain foods sent from Washington had arrived, and he told her they had. She asked him if they had been issued to the soldiers in the ward, and he said no. It was very unpleasant between her and Dr. De Witt. As a consequence, the supplies that Mrs. Miles sent down from Washington were immediately issued. The day following the condition of the food we received had very materially changed for the better, and we also had delicacies, oranges, if a man needed them. The supplies were immediately issued to those men. She came in the following day to see that it was done.

Q. How long were you at Fort Monroe?

A. A month.

Q. Your treatment from this time on?

A. Excellent.

Q. And those other men that you saw?

A. Not always good. I think it was due more to the incompetency of some of the nurses. By the way, if I may be pardoned for going back. In the division hospital at Cuba, the day following the battle, I was lying in the bed, at the far end of the hospital, on the ground, and on the ground by my side were two soldiers of the Second Massachusetts, one dying at that time. He died two hours after my arrival there, on the following morning. Several hospital nurses brought up from the seaboard were in attendance. They brought him—the man who died—brought to him water, whatever he called for, for a little time; but an hour or two before he died he continually called for water, and they would answer back from the tent which they occupied—one of those violent storms had come up—they would answer back from the tent, “Shut up!”

Q. Who was it answering that?

A. The nurses who came up from the seaboard. It created intense indignation among us lying there—that is, as the cry came, “Shut up.” That was nothing in itself. The man died calling for water. It would have eased the last hours of the poor fellow.

Q. Actions of that kind are inexcusable. I want to bear particularly upon the sale of those goods at Siboney. I think some one was responsible for that. This was between the 2d and 10th of July?

A. Between the 4th and 10th. The sales were going on rapidly during all that period.

Q. The sale by the commissary department itself?

A. So I was informed by the nurses and attendants. They said, “If you have got the money, we will get you what you wish of the commissary stores—lime juice at 50 cents, or canned fruit, or malted milk at 35 cents.” Those who had money were fortunate enough to get them and those without did not.

Q. They didn't have any in the hospital?

A. No, sir. Of course the commissary department had a right to do that.

Q. I understand that. What hospital was it?

A. Siboney.

Q. Anything else you can tell us? Have you been discharged now?

A. From my wound; yes, sir. On certificate discharge.

Q. What is your profession?

A. Writer on the Boston Advertiser. Before I came to the Boston Advertiser I was in uniform in the Mexican army, and observed much there.

Q. You knew Captain Jenks?

A. He was wounded through the nose and it passed under his eye.

Q. Did he lose his eye?

A. No, sir; it affected his nasal parts.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMES BOOTH CLARKSON.

DR. JAMES BOOTH CLARKSON was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering “no,” he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, profession, and residence.

A. James Booth Clarkson; doctor; 127 Pembroke street, Boston.

Q. In practice how long?

A. Since 1881.

Q. Were you in any way connected with or had you any means of observing the operations of the Medical Department during the late war with Spain?

A. I was medical agent at Porto Rico for the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in your own way what you observed, and give us anything and everything you may have of interest.

A. I was appointed as medical agent by the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid, with instructions to go down to the island of Porto Rico and do what I could for the Massachusetts and other troops down there. I went down in the *Bay State* hospital ship, and during the time I was on the island I was in Ponce twice; in Guanica twice; in Arecibo five or six days, and in San German and in Utuado six days, where the Sixth Massachusetts were. There seemed to be only light, say general, sickness.

Q. General sickness?

A. Yes.

Q. In all the regiments?

A. I saw the First United States Engineers in Guanica, Volunteer Engineers in Guanica, a battalion of the same, and the Nineteenth Infantry in Ponce, and the detachment out at Rio Piedros, where General Brooke was, and at Utuado was chiefly the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, which was there at the time I left.

Q. What was the medical condition of these several regiments and detachments as you saw them?

A. The condition was best in the volunteer engineers. They seemed to have a smaller number on the sick list than in any other regiment that I saw. In the other regiments they claimed that they had from about 40 to 66 per cent sick. Of course I did not see that altogether with my own eyes; some of it I was told by medical officers and different men I met.

Q. As you saw the sick there were they apparently well cared for?

A. They were as well cared for as circumstances would admit of.

Q. Please explain in detail.

A. I mean to say there was a certain deficiency, probably a very great deficiency, in the number of what I might term the medical supplies, and also the medical staff, including the surgeons and nurses. In a good many parts of the island supplies seemed to be there, but there seemed to be considerable difficulty in getting transport for them, and this might be owing to the fact of a certain general inertia caused by the general amount of sickness. I didn't come across a very great many men down there said to be really well.

Q. Did you see any evidence of neglect on the part of medical officers there?

A. None whatever.

Q. How as respects nurses?

A. The nurses—most of the nurses—not one-half of the nurses that I saw would be Hospital Corps men. The supply nurses were those men who had volunteered to go as such. The volunteer Hospital Corps men had simply had instructions to aid, and were not sufficiently well trained to take care of typhoid patients.

Q. In your several visits to the various hospitals did you notice a lack of care, or, to put it as I want to, willful negligence on the part of the nurses?

A. No. I should not say I saw willful negligence, because very often a man who is told to do a thing and has not been trained does not do it, not because he willfully does not want to do it, but simply because he thinks it is not necessary. When I joined the Massachusetts Sixth Regiment I had charge of the hospital there. We had three hospitals, No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3. Nos. 1 and 2 had about 70 patients, No. 3 about 25, mostly typhoid cases. Probably not one-third of the nurses employed had been even Hospital Corps men, and of the stewards probably only one trained steward out of four.

Q. How great a lack of necessary medicines did you observe there?

A. In Ponce we were told that there was a lack of a good many different medicines in the way of strychnine and opiates and calomel.

Q. At what date was this?

A. September 12; on or about September 12. Then there was an entire lack of clinical thermometers. That, of course, was the greatest drawback in cases of fever. They were supplied by the *Bay State*. When I got to Utuado they had about, counting hospitals and sick corps men, something like 300 on the sick list. Amongst these 300 there was one clinical thermometer, consequently a great many men's temperature had not been taken for many days.

Q. Did you, in the course of various observations, visit one hospital under the charge of William H. Daly, of Pittsburg?

A. No, sir; I don't remember.

Q. It was at Ponce, I think.

A. The hospital I visited chiefly at Ponce was the general hospital, in charge of Dr. Birmingham.

Q. Did you observe anything especially out of the way in that hospital except the lack of proper nursing, already referred to, and medicines?

A. The hospital was rather crowded, as most of them were, but in regard to the medical administration of the hospital, we didn't observe any lack of anything.

Q. Can you say the same of the other hospitals you visited—the general hospitals?

A. Yes; I think the Ponce general hospital was the only general hospital I saw.

Q. When you came—how long were you in Porto Rico?

A. From September 12 to October 22.

Q. When you came north did you bring sick with you?

A. One hundred and thirty, I think, on the *Bay State*.

Q. Was Dr. Burrill one of the surgeons?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. We have a report from that trip. Did you on that trip observe anything you want to bring to the attention of the commission?

A. The conditions on that ship were exceedingly good in every way, and as on the way up—I asked the purser—I didn't see very much absolute medical work, I am aware the ship contained everything that could be required.

Q. Did you hear any special complaints of the men as to their care on the island?

A. The whole time I was on the island and on board the ship I never heard anything from the men or officers except the highest praise of the medical department. Every man said that under the circumstances every surgeon, whether regimental, brigade surgeon, or chief officer, had done all he possibly could.

Q. Any suggestions to make to us here upon the question of medical management of troops upon the field?

A. I have had a good deal of experience in troops generally, both East and West, and think that for soldiers sent and troops required to be under entirely different conditions from any temperate climate the rations require some change. I don't think the ordinary rations are suitable for the tropical climate. Then the men, of course, very largely of the volunteer service, perhaps, require to feel a greater sense of discipline than most of them did, and they want to learn that life in the Tropics is very much more serious than life in a temperate climate. It is all under the heading of what may be called "Prevention of diseases instead of cure." It is easier to bring disease into a tropical climate than to cure when it starts in. Probably it would be a pretty good thing if the officers had some instructions, before being sent down, about a climate of that kind. As to handling themselves, a man knows it is impossible for officers to do everything. When wholesale sickness occurs, as it did with us down there, the men want to have instructions that they must follow out implicitly and not as they think they should be carried out, not to judge our orders simply as "fads." Moreover, the officers, as a whole, may say they are not required to understand the medical officers' suggestions.

Q. Whether during your stay in Porto Rico you noticed this readiness on the part of general and chief officers to pay attention to the medical officers?

A. To a very great extent: there was a disposition that way; but there is always that tendency in regard to the medical department of any army—and I have seen the departments of several to look upon the medical staff in a way that I saw represented in Hartwell's Soldiers' Pocketbook. He says: "Medical advice is a very good thing when asked for."

Q. You spoke of rations, Doctor. What change would you suggest in those?

A. There should be fresh meat as far as possible, instead of salt meat, and then there should be a certain amount of fruit, particularly oranges and lime juice; ordinary white bread instead of hard-tack, and coffee, and milk, cooked; facilities for getting a little light wine and beer; no facilities for getting spirits, except medical. And in addition to that there should be absolutely no fatiguing work, as we call it, done in the Tropics. It should be done by the natives. Soldiers should be kept in good health: not exposed in the middle of the day; not unnecessary marches in the middle of the day; not allowed to get wet more than could be helped, or compelled to carry weights. The tropical conditions do not allow that. The drills in the early morning, to a certain extent, should be suspended, subject to the advice of a medical officer.

Q. Have you any other suggestion, Doctor, to make?

A. I don't think so, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Are you acquainted with the rations used by the English army?

A. I have a fair idea—if I might refer to my notes. The English army ration may be divided into three parts: The regular ration, including 1 pound of meat a day—this includes the bone—or rather three-quarters of a pound of meat with the bone; 1 pound of bread. Then for a stoppage of 3 pence out of his pay he gets extra bread, potatoes or other vegetables, tea, sugar, and milk. Then again, he is enabled to purchase, at a very low figure indeed, cheese, bacon, butter, biscuits; and that will give him, allowing for a proper amount a day, about 10 ounces of meat, about 24 ounces of bread, 16 ounces of potatoes, 8 ounces of vegetables, and a little more than 3 ounces of milk, 1 ounce of sugar, about 0.3 ounce of salt, 0.4 ounce of coffee, and 0.2 ounce of tea, and I think he is allowed a little light beer. Everything in the way of what one may call "hard" work is suspended during that time—looking after tent accouterments, looking after his rifle, and a great many things of that kind that a man is accustomed to do himself in temperate climates. And in addition to that, each company has a certain number of old-fashioned guns and so on, so that he can take a little sport at the company's expense, and amusements that can be done to keep him in a happy frame of mind during the time of peace.

Q. Any other question?

A. I desire to say in addition that the houses raised from the ground are very much better, in my judgment, than tents on the ground.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. CHARLES K. DARLING.

Maj. CHARLES K. DARLING was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your name and rank, your regiment, and your at-home address?

A. Charles K. Darling: Sixth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry: Tremont Building, Boston.

Q. When did you enter the service of the United States during the war with Spain, and how long did you continue it?

A. On the 3d day of May, 1898, and am still in service, on leave of absence.

Q. Where did you serve?

A. In Porto Rico.

Q. How long were you in Porto Rico?

A. Two and one-half months.

Q. What were the conditions there as to food and clothing and medical attendance and supplies for your men?

A. Not otherwise than to be expected in time of war in a foreign country.

Q. Did your men receive sufficient food?

A. No, sir; they didn't at all times.

Q. What was the cause of it?

A. The principal cause was failure to bring it up, lack of transportation, lack of roads through which to bring the provisions. Our course was through the center of the island, over a trail considered impassable by Spanish military authorities. It was, but after the trail had been widened by General Stone sufficiently wide for wheels; but wherever rains caused landslides it was simply impossible to bring up food.

Q. Your march, then, was more rapid than the provisions could follow you?

A. We were pushing ahead rapidly toward Arecibo, under General Henry.

Q. Then the cause of your rapid march—of your progressing faster than the provisions could follow you—was that you were to gain a momentary advantage by it; for that reason, you say; any lack occasioned by that reason was due to state of war, and to be excused?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the quantity of trains if the roads had been in good condition; had you enough trains to supply the needs of your army?

A. I have no doubt: we had three or four pack-mule trains; we had army wagons. Of course, later in the service the army trains became very much used up; the mules had soft hoofs and sore backs; we had also bull-carts; in fact, could get any number; it was simply a matter of rounding them up.

Q. What was the practical lack in the matter of commissary supplies—what part of the rations did you fail to get, or did you fail to get any of the rations at this time?

A. At this time we failed to get much of any; they were left behind; only for a short period—forty-eight hours or something of that sort.

Q. Was there a full amount of rations on the island to be used if they could have been gotten to the front where you were?

A. I think possibly at one time the chief commissary at Ponce was possibly short of rations, but afterwards he had great quantities piled to the ceiling. There were plenty there.

Q. What was the health of your command?

A. At one time the sickness reached something like 50 per cent, but the cases were not serious, except fever. There was a great deal of typhoid fever.

Q. Had you taken typhoid with you?

A. Yes, sir; from Camp Alger.

Q. To what extent was your command affected before you left Alger?

A. Just previous to leaving Alger I was in Boston. I joined one day before the command left. I think we had something like 15 or 20 cases at Fort Myer, but on the *Yale* I think it reached to 30 cases.

Q. From what point did you sail?

A. Charleston, S. C.

Q. On what vessel?

A. *Yale*.

Q. When did you leave Charleston?

A. July 7, I believe.

Q. How long were you on the way?

A. Nineteen days; that is, three days. We sighted the Morro off Santiago July 11, about noon, and then we ran up and down, coasting from Siboney to Morro for the next five days, and then for the next five or six days were in Guantanamo Bay. We sighted Guanica on the morning of July 5.

Q. What rations were issued to you at the time you left Charleston? Do you know?

A. I do not; no, sir. I have my idea about how the matter came about.

Q. Were they distributed to the men, rations for each individual man?

A. For three days. Travel rations were issued at Camp Alger, and then they were issued in bulk at Charleston.

Q. What was the condition of the *Yale* as a transport?

A. It was not fitted for the transporting of troops and had no desire to transport them.

Q. What was she?

A. The old American Liner—the *Paris*.

Q. Belonging to the United States Government?

A. I suppose chartered by them. She was operated—her old officers were aboard, but had ranks. Captain Wise was captain.

Q. Was she run under the Navy?

A. Yes, sir; she must have been.

Q. Was she provisioned, Major, before you left Charleston?

A. Yes, sir; she took provisions aboard at the same time we were landing. We went aboard about 9 miles out. There was a brig alongside, and we took provisions aboard.

Q. What was done with the provisions after they were put aboard? Do you know?

A. Put down in the hold.

Q. Were they accessible to the men?

A. They were not. A quantity was got on deck each time.

Q. Tell us all about it in your own way. We want to get at why you didn't have what you were entitled to, if you didn't get it. There is no occasion for any reserve. We want free conversation. We want the whole story.

A. I am not here—

Q. We understand that, but we are here by the direction of the President to get to the bottom.

A. I think in a very few words I can tell the trouble of the matter. We left Camp Alger under very urgent orders to reenforce Shafter, the Sixth Illinois, the Sixth Massachusetts, and the Eighth Ohio. We arrived at Charleston, and when we got in Charleston we found a hasty expedition for Cuba from Chickamauga. It is not for me to say just by what process our regiment went aboard the *Yale* and not one of General Wilson's command. That, in my mind, had not a little to do with the matter, the manner in which we set out for Cuba. The first troops to get possession of the *Yale* sailed.

We were to be on her three days, probably. For anything that could be foreseen by anyone, we would be on board not more than three days. We were on board nineteen days. For myself, I consider that one of the fortunes of war; that is all. Certain it is that the regiment by not being landed in Cuba escaped serious misfortune. We would have caught yellow fever at Siboney. We stayed on board and endured some privation. She had not been in harbor to take on sup-

plies since the middle of May. I might add that, in my opinion, much of the treatment which the men received from officers of the *Yale* was due to the fact that she had captured the *Albatross*—and, being a fast ship, that was her forte, a prize-capturer, and not as a transport. The men were confined to the spar deck almost wholly. There were 2,000 men on board. Her ice supply was very low; in fact, during the last part of the voyage it was a simple question of ice for the hospital. The men were obliged to drink hot distilled water from two tin cups. They were not allowed to take water in their own cups, notwithstanding we had 25 cases of typhoid fever on board. General Miles was on board during that time, and others can tell better than I what happened. I have no complaint.

Q. How long did your rations last?

A. They lasted until we landed. They had rations enough, such as they were. One great trouble with the *Yale* was the cooking for the men. It was obliged to be done in the second-cabin galley. Almost every one travels first-class on the *Paris*. It was a small place. Finally it got so that the men had but a cup or a cup and a half of coffee, a little hard-tack, and tomatoes. General Miles finally on one or two occasions made them turn over the main galley, and by cooking all night they cooked some bacon for the men.

Q. Was the storage of the ship open to the men?

A. The steerage of the ship was open, but it was a very small compartment indeed—one small compartment forward and two aft. I think the three would hold, possibly, crowded in, 500 men, but the ocean was like a mill pond all the way; simply some rain.

Q. Any bathing facilities?

A. Yes; forward the men bathed, certain hours of the day. Later, when in Guantanamo Bay, the men were allowed to bathe off the side of the ship.

Q. How many days were you aboard the ship altogether?

A. Nineteen, I believe, sir.

Q. What was the condition of your men when you landed at Porto Rico?

A. They were somewhat weak—rather weak.

Q. Broken down by the confinement, in your judgment?

A. Not broken down men; no, sir. Afterwards, when we took up the march, as we did, with heavy rolls, I think the effect of it was plainly seen in the manner in which the men fell out.

Q. What was the capacity of the ship, in your judgment, for a comfortable passage? How many men should have been taken on her with comfort to them, and proper reference to health and effectiveness when landed?

A. That I am unable to say. I am unaware how many staterooms were locked up. There were a few noncommissioned officers. Most of them were permitted to occupy staterooms, and the men were confined to the spar deck. I suppose she would take 500 men, possibly, with ease and comfort, and in addition to a very large crew.

Q. You had 2,500?

A. We had 1,300; then the crew—there was a very large crew, I understand—five or six hundred.

Q. You say the staterooms were locked up?

A. Yes, sir; I understand so.

Q. Were those used for the sick men at all?

A. No, sir. Our sick men were put in the second cabin.

Q. Pretty well forward, were they? What were the facilities for caring for your sick men, medically and from a nursing standpoint?

A. In my opinion, as good as could be expected.

Q. Did you have a full medical staff with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A proper supply of medicines and hospital stores?

A. I have no doubt we had. The ship surgeon was quite attentive to the men. At that stage we had nothing to complain of.

Q. It is stated in a letter which was forwarded to us, Major, that the steerage was locked up and the men not allowed to use that at all. Is that correct?

A. I think not.

Q. That properly relates to the staterooms?

A. Yes, sir; I didn't see that it was any great hardship ordinarily for the men to sleep on the deck. In fact, many officers assigned staterooms found it preferable to sleep on deck. In the month of July you can imagine the condition of the interior staterooms.

Q. You had good water?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Smooth sea?

A. Yes, sir; all the time.

Q. Then, so far as the quarters were concerned, it was no great hardship to sleep outdoors?

A. No, sir; we might have had hammocks for the men, as we had coming back on the *Mississippi*, but it was no great hardship.

Q. How did you land at Porto Rico?

A. We made the first landing at Guanica, on the southern coast.

Q. Any opposition?

A. Small bomb fires, shelled out by Wainwright. It was the firing at something Miles was anxious to know what it was. We landed without opposition practically. The next morning we had a little skirmish.

Q. Were your facilities for landing sufficient to take your men promptly to shore?

A. Yes, sir. We were transported to the *City of Macon* and ran in after the *Gloucester*, and ran into a little bay in small boats.

Q. It is said in this connection that the only place where the men could get into the boat was the passageway leading to the water-closets forward and aft, and there was one small lower portion used as headquarters of one company of the Sixth Massachusetts. Is that correct?

A. No, sir. There were three small places, two aft and one forward. I think one was known as the steerage compartment, but the *Paris* carried almost no steerage passengers.

Q. Was the proportion of steerage to first-class very small?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What closet facilities; sufficient for the comfort of the men?

A. Yes, sir; I think so.

Q. To what extent were the upper decks open to the men?

A. The upper deck was open to the men, and then down on the next deck below the main deck there was a space around just about wide enough for three men to go abreast. Two companies were there. The men had no freedom at all with the interior part.

Q. That seemed to have been retained for the officers?

A. Yes, sir. Miles and his staff were aboard, and General Garretson. Very properly, too. The men could not be expected to go into the library or dining saloon. No one can possibly define the *Yale* as a transport, but as a fast ship, and it was necessary to get quickly to Santiago.

Q. The officers and men of the *Yale* regarded it as a hardship because they could be winning prize money instead of carrying troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you anything further to state that would be helpful to us in reaching a conclusion as to this or any other matter?

A. No, sir; I have not, I think.

Q. How did you come home?

A. On the *Mississippi*, a cattle steamer. She had been fitted for carrying troops by placing hammocks in the hold, and she was in every way comfortable.

Q. How were you provided for your home coming as to commissary supplies?

A. No fault to find.

Q. Vessel comfortable?

A. Yes, sir; very. Comfortable for the men, not for the officers.

Q. You have no complaint, then, as to your home voyage?

A. No, sir: personally I have not the slightest complaint to make in regard to the *Yale*. I am here by invitation.

Q. You simply give us facts.

By General DODGE:

Q. In your testimony you made the statement you were possibly out of commissary stores at Ponce—short of provisions at that time. On what information do you base this statement?

A. I can not answer; still I do recollect that at one time, either owing to a storm or something of that sort, it was said that they had not landed, not got there—many things. I know afterwards I was down there at one time. I know while they had the rations they were short in landing other things, such as the purchasing commissary would give, and I think Colonel Smith at that time—he was depot commissary—said it was due to lack of lighterage or something of that sort. But at the time I was there, along in the middle of September, the buildings at the wharf in Ponce were piled clear to the roof.

Q. My question was simply based on the general statement you made: I wanted you to absolutely define it in your testimony. It is from hearsay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There was a statement made to us of this kind: On board the transport *Yale*, the Sixth Massachusetts, bound for Porto Rico, literally starved the men, while the officers were well fed—any private mustered out will prove those facts.

A. That is a false statement, if I might add a word, in regard to the luxurious manner in which the officers lived. We lived on canned provisions that might have been in the hold of the ship ever since she was made a transport. We had a little meat. The officers lived far from luxuriously. The men were short of rations, but nobody starved, in any stage of the game. We lost about 15 men during the six months—15 or 20 men. The two Fitchburg companies, 212 men, came back with the loss of 1 man, who died at Ponce—a most remarkable record. Porto Rico is a healthful climate, if men take care of themselves. They can live there.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUT. JEREMIAH G. FENNESSEY.

Lieut. JEREMIAH G. FENNESSEY was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Kindly give us your full name.

A. Jeremiah G. Fennessey.

Q. Your rank.

A. Late quartermaster, rank first lieutenant, of the Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

Q. Where did you serve during the war with Spain?

A. From Massachusetts to Santiago, Montauk, and home. Pardon me, if I may say Massachusetts, Camp Alger.

Q. You went by way of Camp Alger?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were the conditions at Camp Alger, so far as your regiment was concerned, as to its supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores.

A. The commissary supplies we had nothing to do with at any time.

Q. You had independent officers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was acting commissary of the quartermaster's supplies?

A. In what particular?

Q. Clothing, tents, and such as is issued for service in the field.

A. When our regiment left Massachusetts the regiment was completely equipped by the State. Every man had two suits of clothes—a light canvas uniform, a complete outfit of the heavy uniform; also rifles issued by the Government. We also went into camp and carried with us 191 wall tents from Massachusetts. These tents were left standing in Camp Alger on the 24th of June, the day we left, by order of the acting quartermaster, and I drew that day a sufficient number of new wall tents to supply the entire regiment, owing to the fact that the new tents would be heavier than the old ones, to meet the climate where we were going.

Q. What transport did you go down in?

A. The U. S. cruiser *Harvard*.

Q. How was it fitted for the transportation of troops: well, or otherwise?

A. I am not competent to pass judgment on that question.

Q. Your best judgment.

A. The vessel was one of the largest ocean steamers, and the men were compelled—perhaps I ought not to say compelled—but most of them were on the upper deck. There was very little grumbling, except the long time it took us to get there.

Q. How long did it take?

A. We started on Sunday afternoon at 2 o'clock.

Q. What day of the month?

A. The 26th of June, arriving at Siboney the morning of the 1st of July, about 9.

Q. Did the men suffer by reason of the voyage?

A. No, sir; not in my judgment.

Q. They were landed in good physical condition for camp purposes?

A. So far as my observation went.

Q. Did you observe the manner in which they were provided with commissary stores? Did you have any observation on that subject?

A. From the time we left the *Harvard*; never on board. On the *Harvard* I think the men were fairly supplied with commissary stores. There were sixty days' field rations for two regiments.

Q. After you landed, how was it?

A. I was detained on board the *Harvard*.

Q. You arrived after General Shafter's expedition had landed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you with the regiment at the front?

A. After the day of surrender.

Q. How did you find the regiment after that time?

A. The regiment suffered.

Q. Did it suffer by reason of the ordinary casualties of war or from other respects; and if in other respects, what respects? Make a full statement, if you please. Tell us everything.

A. Our regiment was landed on the afternoon of July 1, and I, with a detail of

men of each company, was ordered to unload the stores on the *Harvard*. We had 36 men. I suppose 36, but afterwards more than that; also the quartermaster of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, with a detail of his regiment. We were directed to unload the commissary stores, and the *Harvard* was moving backward and forward. It made it very slow work. On the morning of the 2d of July we came out of the harbor at Santiago. The *Harvard* dropped to a point off Santiago. On the afternoon of the 3d of July we received on board 672 Spanish prisoners from — and the *Maria Teresa*. We were then placed in charge of those prisoners, as a matter of necessity, until such time as other arrangements were made. We were unable to land until July 8. We were never enabled to get our stores. Our large tents, cooking utensils, and everything that would conduce to the happiness of the men on board the *Harvard* we have never seen since.

Q. Can you tell why?

A. Owing to the conditions of war at that time.

Q. Who prevented the landing of those stores, of your tents, of your cooking outfit, and of all that sort of thing?

A. Some of the boats were broken. The steam launch of the vessel was broken and wrecked, and I am not in a position to say who is responsible for it. We had 672 prisoners on board the vessel, and a marine guard of 27 or 28 men were sent on.

Q. Did you make an effort to land those stores?

A. Yes, sir. We were prevented by reason of the surf. The surf was very high at times. One of the large boats of the officers the first two or three days while landing approached the propeller and was cut almost in two.

Q. Did the *Harvard* come north then, before the surrender, with the prisoners?

A. The *Harvard* left Siboney. I have since ascertained she came north.

Q. Then she didn't go around to Santiago after the surrender, so as to enable you to get your supplies?

A. No, sir; never landed in Santiago; so I have been informed by letter.

Q. So far as you are concerned, you have never seen them?

A. No, I am sorry to say, because I must account for them in some way.

Q. Were you present with your regiment when it returned?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What vessel?

A. *Allegheny*.

Q. What was its character as a transport for troops, good or otherwise?

A. It was one of the passenger boats of the Merchants and Miners' Transportation Company, running between Providence and some one of the Southern cities. I can not say which. It was a vessel about 320 feet in length. When I went aboard there on the afternoon of the 23d of July the vessel had been thoroughly whitewashed and was in perfectly clean condition. There was either a hammock or good berth bunk for every man on board the vessel. There was room, but it would be rather crowded, I think.

Q. How were the men fed coming on?

A. I wanted to say the majority of the men were sick when we left. Everybody was sick. We had nothing but army rations, and the condition of the men was such that, in my judgment, it was not suitable for them.

Q. Was the medical staff of your regiment with you?

A. No, sir; the surgeon of the regiment was detained with four companies. Only eight companies came up on the first detachment. We had a regular army surgeon detailed to keep us.

Q. His name?

A. Lieut. L. A. Fuller, of the Ninth Infantry.

Q. How many men of your command of the eight companies which you had with you were so sick that they were not able to take care of themselves?

A. When we reached Montauk 187 were sent to the hospital out of about 482.

Q. What was the prevailing disease?

A. Malaria or typhoid, or both. There was such a mixture I could not say. I don't believe anybody knows except the surgeon.

Q. Do you know what effort was made to secure the stores which would have been suitable for the sick men on the ship?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was the commissary officer with you?

A. Yes, sir. I think we got everything the Government had to give at Santiago.

Q. Do you know whether any effort was made to get from the Red Cross or any auxiliary societies there such supplies as the sick ought to have had?

A. There were some supplies sent on board by the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Society. I can not say whether from the Red Cross or not. I might say I got a small amount of stuff from the Red Cross myself in Santiago.

Q. Did the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Society have a station in Cuba?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At Santiago?

A. Yes, sir. They did great work.

Q. Now, at Montauk, what did you find when you landed there; were your tents pitched?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You went into the detention camp first?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Your sick men into the detention hospital?

A. I presume so.

Q. Did you visit the hospital at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. What time did you land at Montauk?

A. The boat arrived there the 31st of August, and the sick men went ashore the morning of September 1.

Q. To what extent was your camp prepared for you?

A. The tents were simply pitched, and that was all.

Q. Did the men have their packets and other field appliances for comfort with them when they came north?

A. The most—some of them—had their blankets; some of them didn't. An order was issued in Santiago that all tents should be left standing there. Many men had left their canteens behind. They were in bad condition, and many of the men had sore mouths. That, we imagined, was due to the fact that the canteens had become foul, and the men had been drinking out of their canteens. A large percentage of the men had sore mouths. What caused it I don't know.

Q. Did you make any effort to draw blankets and other field appliances for the men's personal comfort after you got to Montauk?

A. I personally tried to get cooking utensils, but could not.

Q. Blankets?

A. We had some blankets. Every man had a blanket.

Q. Were you at the quartermaster's depot?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You supplied them with clothing, blankets, and other appliances for the men?

A. The blankets we received. The clothing they didn't have. They came there the day after the regiment left. It left the night of the 3d of September—sick men; held it until that time. That seemed to be the prevailing condition. The officers were not exempt from sickness and they went down as well as the men. I was knocked down twice in Santiago, and got my dose of malaria.

Q. You medical officers held out coming north?

A. We had a contract surgeon, so called, most of the way. Dr. Taylor did good work.

Q. The entire medical staff of your own regiment had been left behind?

A. No, sir; at Camp Alger the staff was divided, under order from superior authority, and we went to Santiago.

Q. One of your surgeons was taken away for detention hospital work?

A. He went to Porto Rico. The other two went with us. Afterwards, in Santiago, an order was issued detailing one of the surgeons: he was sent to the hospital at Siboney. Then we had our surgeon with us to the end; also a contract surgeon who came later on.

Q. Did you have any nurses or hospital corps men other than those of your command coming north?

A. Yes, sir; there were two hospital stewards of the Regular Army—I think two from the Regular Army. Both assistants. I know one was connected with the Regular Army.

Q. Were they helpful?

A. They did great work.

Q. Were your men sufficiently supplied with medical supplies coming north?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know why that was?

A. I could not say. I know they had no stimulants. I paid a large sum out of my own pocket. We had no money down there.

Q. You had not been paid?

A. No, sir.

Q. Just at that point, do you know why it was that the Pay Department, when there, didn't distribute the money, at the request of the army officers?

A. I could not say.

Q. Have you any other statement to make as to your experiences that would be helpful to our commission in reaching a conclusion as to any lack of anything—any administration or maladministration at Montauk?

A. The entire lack of transportation was the whole trouble. I was quartermaster of the regiment. I never had a team the whole time from the beginning to the end. A quartermaster without transportation is the fifth wheel to a coach.

Q. Did you have any transportation issued to your regiment at Camp Alger?

A. We had five teams from there.

Q. Only five?

A. Yes, sir; and I may say, in connection, in Camp Alger everything the Government had there I got.

Q. The object was to give you, as you were going away, your full complement of everything, no matter what came to those who stayed?

A. An order was issued to me to supply separate tents, written on the back of a requisition. Everything I could get quite promptly. The Quartermaster's Department responded to every attempt I made as far as the supplies went.

Q. While you were in Santiago was there a sufficient amount of transportation for the troops?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether there were wagons and mules aboard of the transports which were not landed?

A. I could not say; I am speaking of my own knowledge.

Q. You don't know, then, as to whether or not a sufficient amount of transports had been sent with the expedition, or whether it was not landed?

A. I think if it was sent, it was a crime it was not landed.

Q. Because it could have been landed, in your judgment?

A. It ought to have been.

Q. What was the distance of your troops from the landing point at Siboney?

A. At what period?

Q. During the stay in Santiago, in trenches.

A. Well, the distance down there was very peculiar. A great deal depended upon how many miles a place was, for instance, if an officer had no horse. I went up to General Shafter's headquarters, 9 miles, in the sun, at 120°, and was brought back. About the 13th of July they got the first team in the regiment.

Q. Did you see the chief quartermaster at Shafter's headquarters?

A. No: I saw him at Santiago. He referred me to the quartermaster who had charge of the transportation.

Q. What reason did he give for not supplying you?

A. He had to supply food and rations and money to troops, and could not supply transportation at that time for anything else.

Q. Did he give any reason for it, or did he simply state the fact?

A. He didn't have it.

Q. He didn't say why?

A. No, sir; no discussion about it.

Q. Have you any other fact that you can state that would be helpful to us, or interesting, in this connection?

A. I can not recollect anything.

Q. You understand our position. We want you to tell us everything—nothing to be covered up.

A. The only thing I can express is opinions, and I do not think I am competent to express opinions.

Q. We are here, I suppose, to get facts if you have any other facts which will enable us to get an intelligent opinion.

A. The only thing I can say, in my judgment, the great trouble was the lack of transportation to enable supplies to be sent to troops.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 181. }

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 26, 1898.

I. The court of inquiry, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Tully McCrea, 5th U. S. Artillery, is president, instituted by direction of the Secretary of War at the request of 1st Lieutenant Jeremiah G. Fennessey, regimental quartermaster, 9th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, in Special Orders, No. 249, October 21, 1898, from this office, to investigate certain allegations made in the public press of Boston as to the conduct of Lieutenant Fennessey between July 1, 1898, and September 1, 1898, having considered the evidence in connection with the case, has reported its finding and opinion as hereinafter stated.

FINDING.

1. That the 9th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry was disembarked from the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard* at Siboney, Cuba, on July 1, 1898.

2. That 1st Lieutenant Jeremiah G. Fennessey, the regimental quartermaster, was ordered by the colonel of the regiment to remain on the *Harvard* with a detail of men until the regimental stores were unloaded.

3. That he used all diligence to get these stores unloaded on the 2d and 3d of July until the *Harvard* was signaled by the flagship to pursue Cervera's fleet.

4. That the stores could not be landed on the beach owing to the high surf, and because the captain of the *Harvard*, after three boats had been damaged, refused to land any more stores there.

5. That thereafter the stores were transferred to transport No. 2 (the *Santiago*).

6. That about 10 a. m., July 3, the *Harvard* was signaled by the flagship of the squadron to pursue Cervera's fleet, which it did, leaving Siboney, and that Lieutenant Fennessey and his detail were perforce taken with the *Harvard* in this pursuit.

7. That the *Harvard* returned to Siboney on the night of July 3d with 672 Spanish prisoners on board.

8. That Lieutenant Fennessey and his detail of the 9th Massachusetts Infantry were, owing to the inadequacy of the marine guard, forced by the commanding officer of the *Harvard* to guard the Spanish prisoners.

9. That from this time until July 8th, when Lieutenant Fennessey and his detail were landed at Siboney, no stores could be landed.

10. That on July 8th Lieutenant Fennessey and his detail were landed on the beach at Siboney, and the *Harvard* proceeded north with the Spanish prisoners, taking the stores remaining on board.

11. That the stores that the *Harvard* took away from Siboney were never landed in Cuba, and to this day the 9th Regiment has never received them.

12. That on landing on the beach at Siboney, Lieutenant Fennessey's detail was sent to the front that afternoon.

13. That on landing, Lieutenant Fennessey for the first time learned that the blanket rolls and officers' personal baggage had been left behind at Siboney.

14. That Lieutenant Fennessey remained at Siboney until July 18th, and that he made every reasonable effort to get the blanket rolls and baggage transported to the front.

15. That on July 18th, having succeeded in getting transportation for the last of said property, he himself proceeded to the front and reported to his regimental commander.

16. That Lieutenant Fennessey used reasonable diligence in finding the stores that were landed in Santiago and in transporting them to his regiment.

17. That the suffering of the 9th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry through lack of proper rations, blanket rolls, and company property was not the fault of Lieutenant Fennessey, but due to force of circumstances over which he had no control.

18. That Lieutenant Fennessey performed the duties of regimental quartermaster during the campaign in Cuba as well as any officer of the same experience could have done under the same difficult circumstances.

19. That this court of inquiry has received the evidence of every available officer, enlisted man, and civilian who could possibly give any evidence to prove the allegations made by the public press of Boston against Lieutenant Fennessey.

OPINION.

The court is of the opinion that not a particle of evidence has been adduced which in the slightest degree shows cowardice on the part of Lieutenant Fennessey.

That there is no evidence that he was lazy, incompetent, or neglected any duty which he was required to perform.

That the allegations made in the public press of Boston, referred to the court of inquiry for investigation, are false, unfounded, and malicious.

That Captain George F. H. Murray, Company B; Captain John H. Dunn, Company I; 2d Lieutenant Michael J. Desmond, Company B, and 2d Lieutenant James A. Cully, Company I, all of the 9th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, are subjects for military discipline.

II. The following are the orders of the War Department in the case:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, November 22, 1898.*

The proceedings, findings, and opinion of the court of inquiry in the case of 1st Lieutenant Jeremiah G. Fennessey, regimental quartermaster, 9th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, are approved.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

III. By direction of the Secretary of War, the court of inquiry of which Lieutenant-Colonel Tully McCrea, 5th U. S. Artillery, is president, is hereby dissolved.

By command of Major-General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANK M. JOHNSON.**

Dr. FRANK M. JOHNSON was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to state your name, profession, the time that you have been practicing, and your residence.

A. Frank M. Johnson; 117 Beacon street; sixteen years a physician.

Q. Were you familiar with the conditions existing here at the time of the arrival of the sick, among which number of the sick was a Mr. Tiffany, of New York? Were you present at the time the men were received on the wharf?

A. I was not.

Q. What was your first acquaintance with Mr. Tiffany?

A. I was called here.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in what condition you found him, and the history of his case up to the time of his death, as you observed it.

A. When I called to see him he was lying on the bed utterly prostrated; his temperature was 105°. He was so weak then he didn't care to have his clothes taken off. He looked to me like a man very much emaciated. From the time I saw him until the day of his death he was not able to get out of his bed. His temperature sank below normal inside of forty-eight hours. It kept sub-normal after that. Food, nutrition, etc., failed to be absorbed or show any response on account of his symptoms, and more powerful remedies and remedial agents were used—hypodermic injections and heart stimulants under the skin—but with no avail; even saline solutions. So it went on until death occurred.

Q. How long was that after he came under your observation?

A. About two days or two and one-half.

Q. What did you consider his trouble to be? What was his condition as you observed it?

A. I thought the most marked feature of the disease was inanition.

Q. Resulting from what?

A. In all probability the result of fevers he had undergone and the want of proper assimilated food.

Q. Did he talk with you at all as to his condition while on board the ship before his arrival?

A. No; not particularly. He simply said he could not eat things given him to eat. That is all. He didn't complain much.

Q. If I understand you rightly, you were not present at the wharf when he arrived?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know who was in charge or responsible for those people?

A. I don't know.

Q. What did the death certificate show as to the cause of his death?

A. I signed it "the result of protracted fevers and starvation." I explain starvation by saying from a medical standpoint, which means inanition. Inanition does not mean anything to laymen. I also did not mean to say starvation in the general acceptance of the word.

Q. However it might have been understood by the public at large, you yourself were convinced it was medical lack of—inanition?

A. That he could not get the right food. He could not take up what he did have. In other words, a patient in typhoid fever might refuse Burgundy and canvasback duck. That would be inanition on his part. We could eat it if offered to us.

Q. There was nothing that he was able to take by mouth after you saw him?

A. No.

Q. Nothing at all?

A. No.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who accompanied Lieutenant Tiffany?

A. His brother brought him here.

Q. His brother was with him on the way from Santiago?

A. I don't think he was. I understood he met him about here.

Q. At the wharf?

A. I think so.

Q. He came on the *Olivette*? Do you remember?

A. Yes; he came on the *Olivette*.

Q. Then his brother met him here?

A. One brother went down.

Q. Have you a statement in relation to him that we have not questioned you about—any statement to make that is in relation to the matter? You may know things in relation to him that we have not drawn out; if so, we would be pleased to have you make any statement.

A. If there is anything not clear, I should like to explain it.

Q. I didn't know but there might be some matters connected with it. We always ask the witness that question.

A. I have no complaint. The point was, there was evidently a misunderstanding by the Government, or one of the Government physicians; I was called to task; at least, fault was found with my statement as it originally appeared. The surgeon on the *Olivette* seemed to think that I made a personal statement that reflected on him and on the *Olivette*, whereas in my testimony the *Olivette* was never mentioned—protracted fevers and starvation from a medical standpoint, without stating when and where it began. That I cleared up, because I considered it an absolutely unjust thing to me, to the doctors associated with me in Boston, and also to Lieutenant Tiffany. One point I want to clear, which appeared perfectly inexcusable and very unnecessary and cruel.

I have heard it stated that Lieutenant Tiffany's illness was due to the kindness of friends and indulgence in alcohol when he came to Boston. That is a lie, whoever said it. I have heard it right here in this town. A man in his condition, who sank on his bed and refused to be moved, was not a very good applicant for drink of any kind. He could not have retained it if he had tried to. I simply want to clear the boy's memory; there was nothing of the kind. He didn't have whisky. If he had had it he could not have used it. The little I gave him he could not retain. The point in the whole thing is, Lieutenant Tiffany made a mistake in covering up. He was full of sensitiveness, energy, and courage—you all know his past history and what he did in defense of the Government. A man of that caliber has lots of nerve power. He lived on that, covering up things. He was anxious to get home. That I stated, and believe to-day. That is the history of the case, which, I think, the doctor will agree with me in saying that it is a case in which inanition enters into, when we depend upon hypodermics, strychnine, cocaine—what we call saline solution—inject it into the blood and it stays where you put it, simply making a place; there is not much circulatory life; the heart can not take it up. There is nothing more to be done if you can not get the circulation to come. It was the result of long strain of nervous force and drain. That is the fact, and the moral to be brought out of the thing is this, that when we know a thing and are going to run into this sort of thing, can not some provision be made at the time? Those things are bound to come up. We were going into a country. We knew all about it from a medical standpoint. It was not safe to say that people who went there were not going to meet with all these

fevers. Medical men knew there were lots of these fevers in the South—knew all about it, and all about fever germs. We might have guarded ourselves a bit more. That is all, gentlemen.

Q. The majority of the regiment thought that Lieutenant Tiffany, and one man testified to us—I don't recall his name now (Hersey)—that when he landed at Montauk Point he did eat delicacies there not suitable for him.

A. That does not gainsay anything I have said.

Q. I wanted to call your attention to that, however.

A. I don't know what occurred before I saw him: it would be only conjecture and worth nothing.

Q. Did Lieutenant Tiffany tell you how his sickness was produced?

A. He told me he knew he had had malarial fever. He had been told he had had yellow fever, a mild type.

Q. Was he a man of strong constitution?

A. He might have been. When I saw him he was wasted; hard to conjecture.

Q. You had not treated him before?

A. Looking at the man as I saw him, and the photographs sent to me afterwards, as he was—I should say he was a fairly athletic fellow. Nervous type, perhaps not much physical force back of that. Those people are able to do things on their nerve, and then slump.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF ASST. SURG. HENRY LA MOTTE.

Asst. Surg. HENRY LA MOTTE was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Doctor, be kind enough to give us your name.

A. Henry La Motte.

Q. Your rank, if in the service of the Government?

A. Assistant surgeon in the Navy; on the retired list.

Q. What position did you hold during the late war with Spain?

A. Major and surgeon of the First Volunteer Cavalry.

Q. The Rough Riders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Be kind enough, in your own way, to state what the medical condition of the regiment was during the time you were connected with it, what provisions were made for those who might be sick, what supplies you had, what hospital facilities afforded to the sick. In a word, the medical history of the regiment, so far as you know.

A. The medical department of the regiment was composed of myself, a surgeon; of James A. Massey, assistant surgeon; James B. Church, assistant surgeon; three hospital stewards, one of whom was a graduate of medicine (Wilson); another was a practicing dentist in Santa Fe (Brady); and the third was a druggist from Albuquerque (Rankin). I was not allowed by Colonel Wood, at the time the regiment was organized, a proper number of hospital corps men—privates, nurses. At first I was allowed only 2 men. When we got to Tampa I was allowed 3, and just before we left for Cuba I succeeded in getting another man. I received permission just before leaving for Cuba to distribute hospital corps pouches to the number of 24 among the troops, and to each troop, to be given to the men that would seem to me likely to be of use in handling all their contents.

Q. Allow me to interrupt you there. What are the contents, in brief, of the hospital pouch?

A. There is the emergency pad in the packet. It consists of an antiseptic—two antiseptic pads, and a triangular bandage which can be used in the dressing of almost any kind of a wound, and a safety pin. It contains a bottle of aromatic spirits of ammonia. Some of them contain bottles of chloroform. There are two varieties of pouches supplied us. Each one has a large jackknife, several rolls of bandages, and tourniquets. I should like later to give you a list of these.

Q. You have given sufficient. Were there any medicines in these pouches?

A. No.

Q. What condition was your regiment in at Camp Tampa?

A. We had on the train going to Tampa several cases of measles, but it was of a very light variety, not at all severe, and with the exception of about 20 cases of this mild variety of measles we had no sickness whatever.

Q. At Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were properly supplied with medicines while at Tampa?

A. Before going to Tampa, at San Antonio I got personally from the surgeon at Houston a small box of liquid medicines, and some of those I succeeded in renewing at Tampa, but the larger number of medicines for which I made requisition at Tampa I did not succeed in getting—the salines, phenacetine, and bismuth, I believe, I didn't succeed in getting a particle.

Q. Any reason given you why these things required were not supplied?

A. No reason was given me. The officer in charge of the medical-supply depot had a great many requisitions on hand and he promised to keep the box I was filling open until the last moment in hopes some drugs he didn't have would arrive, and at the last moment he put in all he had and sent it to me. The box which he sent—two boxes—I didn't open until after we got to Cuba, or, at least, not until after we got on board the transport—one not until we got to Cuba. The latter, I believe, contained a sterilizing outfit which I had not applied for.

Q. Were you able after reaching Cuba to transport your medical supplies to the front—to take them with you?

A. The medical and surgical chests I succeeded in getting there the first day from the transport. I believe that I was the only medical officer who did succeed in getting his transports—his supplies—through within three or four days. The reason why I did this was that one of the other officers failed, so I suppose that I was more used to the conditions on board the ship—that I anticipated the attitude of captains of transports, particularly the captain of our transport.

Q. What was that?

A. The *Yucatan*.

Q. Who was the captain?

A. I don't know his name. He manifested a disposition to do just exactly as he pleased, and not as any army or navy authorities pleased. When I was taken from the ship by an order from Colonel Wood to come on board the *Viven*, I gave orders to my two stewards for one of them to sit down on each of the two medical chests and not to be spirited from those chests under any circumstances; that I should consider it ground for court-martial if either left the chests. These men were repeatedly ordered to get into the boats, the chests would be sent along later. They were actually driven from one part of the ship to another, but they dodged around and got back on the chests and sat there.

Q. You got them to the front?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What transportation facilities had you?

A. Colonel Wood succeeded in getting eight mule teams for transportation pur-

poses. On the 23d the regiment moved from Daiquiri. We understood at that time there was the probability of an engagement that afternoon or evening. Colonel Wood refused to give me the use of a mule to transport my two chests, and eventually he ordered me to remain at Daiquiri with my two chests. He took Assistant Surgeon Church, with three or four hospital pouches, with him when the command moved forward. The mules were being led at that time, with two automatic Colt's machine guns, ammunition for them, and stands for the guns, with three days' rations for the men, with several thousand rounds of ammunition about 1,000, I believe—and five mules were to be loaded with the officers' personal baggage, bedding, tents, etc. One mule was to be loaded with the cooking utensils of the officers' headquarters mess. The officer in charge of the mule train, Lieutenant Carter, at first refused absolutely to allow me to have the use of any mules I attempted to get. Finally I succeeded in getting two mules from him. The day we landed I foolishly hurt one of my feet, so that it was rather painful for me to walk, and I desired, if possible, if going into an engagement, to get to the front in as good condition as possible. I was ashamed of myself to get disabled, and didn't propose to get more so if I could help it. I confess that I used somewhat unfair means toward Lieutenant Carter to get him to allow me the use of two mules, but eventually he decided to leave behind a large sole-leather case which we both of us knew contained hunting boots and opera glasses, etc., no larger than either of my two chests. Another had a canvas roll that must have weighed 90 pounds. The former was transferred from one mule, after having been thoroughly sifted over and reduced to one-fourth its original bulk, and put on top of a mule loaded with rations. So I got two mules: one I loaded with my medical and surgical chests and the other I rode.

We left Daiquiri about 6 o'clock, and it rained all that night. We got into Siboney about 3. We passed several of the men of my regiment that had started out in the morning, straggling on the road. The men of the regiment were unused to marching. They had been confined under miserable conditions on board ship and were in no fit condition for a forced march; and as a matter of fact the brigade of General Chaffee, that had started six hours after our regiment started, got into Siboney complete before our regiment did. I got in, as I say, at 3 o'clock in the morning and reported to Colonel Wood I had come up and what I had done. He didn't seem displeased particularly, but told me there would be an engagement in the morning only a short distance out from Siboney; that I would remain at Siboney with my chests; he would take Dr. Church with him forward; that he would have several more boxes of ammunition which would arrive during the nighttime, that he was unable to spare me the mules which I had mounted to acquire. As it turned out, the large roll of bedding left behind belonged to Colonel Roosevelt. I didn't know it at the time. When I arrived at Siboney, Colonel Roosevelt was sleeping under a piece of canvas. He was not very angry at me, but he seemed to think it was pretty hard lines that I should have selected his bedding to leave behind; but as I had not brought a stitch of bedding or clothing at all myself, I didn't think he had any right to complain.

Q. At the time of the fight at San Juan were you on the field?

A. Yes, sir. The arrangement between Colonel Wood and General Young—Colonel Wood told me on the morning we were to start as soon after 5 o'clock as possible. General Young was to take the valley road and strike the strong Spanish outposts at the junction of the two roads from Siboney and get the Spaniards engaged; and then Colonel Wood was to come in and strike them in the flank and start them running. At that time the supposition was that the force would be about equal, but the Spanish position was supposed to be pretty strong, and General Young had said that he would not have made the attempt with such a small number if he had not considered it essential to quickly clear the road, and was

willing to take the chance of quickly clearing the road, but Colonel Wood was particularly anxious to get in just as soon as possible, and I do not believe he had any intention, from the first, of allowing General Young to get into action first.

Q. Who was that?

A. Colonel Wood. As I say, he ordered me to stay behind there at Siboney. I didn't make any preparation at all to stay behind. I packed up my chests, had them wrapped up in my wagon sheets; and then when the regiment was ready to start, the packers found great difficulty in securing the packs on account of rain the night before having stiffened the ropes, and the tying was very difficult with these white ropes, the packers coming from Arizona and New Mexico; they found great difficulty in making the packs stick on the mules. General Wood was stamping around with impatience. I saw a chance there, and I went to him and told him I knew a great deal about packing—if he would order the chief packer to report to me, I would see that the packs were put on as quickly as possible and everything packed drawn up to the regiment. He left me in command of the pack train. As soon as the regiment started out, I packed up my medical and surgical chests and—

Q. You were in command of the mule train?

A. Yes, sir. I think it was Colonel Wood's idea when he ordered the men to report to me, I was to take command of it only long enough to get him out of Siboney, but I didn't consider it that way. We got up the hill and then got tangled up in the Twenty-second Infantry. We saw no path; there were bushes on either side that were very dense, and it was almost impossible to get the mule train through the regiment. The soldiers didn't like to go through, and the mules wouldn't go around them, and I went to the colonel commanding the regiment, and he said he would order one company at a time to give way and allow me to go through, but the packs would be slipping all the time from the mules on account of the bad condition of the road.

There was a great deal of difficulty in getting up the side of the hill; but while I was still tangled up with the Twenty-second Infantry, the order was passed down and given to me by one of the officers—the captain, I believe—of the Twenty-second Infantry, to hurry forward the mules with the rapid-fire guns; that is, Colt's automatic machine guns; they were known as rapid-fire guns by the officers of our regiment. I then got out the three mules that had the guns, the mounts, and the ammunition for them. The colonel of the Twenty-second allowed these to go through; they caught up with the rear of the regiment just before the regiment got to the battlefield; it was some time before the rest of the mules were able to get through the Twenty-second. I hurried along at the head of the mule train. On the way I noticed the men had been throwing away their supplies, even clothes, and then finally I commenced to pass stragglers. By the time I got to the top of the hill on the side of which the battle was fought, 52 men had fallen out. I spoke to every one of them. They explained that they were absolutely exhausted, utterly unable to walk another step. It was a very hot morning, and climbing over the mountains was something they were utterly unused to. Most of the men were used to riding all their lives. Their forced march had rendered them absolutely unfit. The 52 men were almost exactly 10 per cent of the force of the regiment. I knew Roosevelt and Wood were riding at the head of the column, but that they didn't realize how fast they were going or how many men had fallen out. It seemed to me I was justified in calling their attention to the fact that such a large proportion of the force was being incapacitated. Being ahead of the mule train, when we got up with the regiment, I rode through the regiment down to the head and saw Colonel Roosevelt and told him the number of men that had fallen out; that the pace was too rapid; but I don't believe he thoroughly took in what I was telling him, because just at that time they had been informed that they had heard

noise which led them to believe that the Spanish outpost was one side of the road. Instead of replying to my report, Colonel Roosevelt told me to ride back and—

Q. Let me interrupt you a moment, owing to pressure of time. Tell us whether or not you had the hospital establishment in close proximity.

A. Yes, sir; right on the top of the hill, within 300 yards of the firing line. The bushes above and trees above were splintered with the hostile fire.

Q. How many wounded did you receive at this hospital?

A. Just 40.

Q. Did you have an abundance of proper surgical dressings for the care of these men?

A. No, sir; we had very nearly enough; not quite enough. Just what was in the regimental chest, and that was not quite a sufficient supply for 40 wounded men.

Q. Were the men supplied with packets?

A. A few.

Q. Not the full regiment?

A. No.

Q. How soon after dressing were these wounded sent up by you?

A. Some went back immediately. Those who could walk went to Siboney at once. We knew General Chaffee was going to establish a hospital immediately there. Others, who could bear transportation on mules, went.

Q. You had no litters?

A. Not a single litter. General Wood disapproved of my requisition for litters, ambulances, and mules at Tampa.

Q. You had no transportation facilities whatever for the wounded, and they could not get back unless able to walk, or carried by comrades, or put upon mules?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to see any hospitals after this time?

A. Yes, sir; I went back to Siboney the next morning with the last batch of seriously wounded men; I accompanied them and saw them established there. They were very comfortable. It was the best that could be done under the circumstances.

Q. Were there supplies on hand at Siboney to complete necessary dressings?

A. I think there were.

Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether there was a sufficiency of dressing and medicines at Siboney?

A. At that time, but not later.

Q. Did you remain at Siboney then?

A. No, sir; I rejoined my regiment that afternoon.

Q. How long afterwards were you detached from your regiment?

A. I was not detached at any time from my regiment. Just before the battle of the 1st of July I was notified by the aid-de-camp of General Young that I should act as brigade surgeon. I simply understood from that that the medical and surgical reports would go through my hands. General Young was taken sick there that day or the next day. I reported to Colonel Wood, who succeeded him, on the morning of July 1, while at El Poso, that former Brigade Surgeon Hale was seriously ill and unable to take charge of the men we would have to leave at El Poso. I was told that General Young had ordered me to take temporary charge of the brigade-surgeon work. I asked if he wished me to establish a brigade hospital there at El Poso—there were 82 wounded men then in and about El Poso—and he sent word to me to do the best I could. I then saw Major Havard; he told me to establish a brigade hospital there, and to keep my men in it until that night. He countermanded that order and told me to send them to the hospital

the next morning. The reason for countermanding was that right around it was the firing.

Q. How long did you remain in charge of this hospital?

A. The 1st of July, the night, and up to about 9 o'clock in the morning of the 2d.

Q. You were properly supplied with dressings?

A. None except what I had in the surgical chest, which I had replenished after the fight at Guasimas.

Q. Answer all purposes?

A. All practical purposes. We had no water except what we could bring up in canteens at that distance. Of course the operations were limited in character on account of the lack of solutions.

Q. How soon were you able to empty that hospital?

A. About 9 o'clock.

Q. You had sent the men in the rear?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were in charge of the hospital?

A. No, sir; I was wounded shortly after that.

Q. On that date?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the character of the wound?

A. On the top of my head, from shrapnel, from the tree above me. It may have been a piece of coconut. Something struck me about the middle or top of the head, and knocked me down. I suffered from concussion of the brain, and was removed to Major Wood's hospital.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. Four days.

Q. Were you properly cared for while there?

A. Well, from my point of view, no; but my wound was apparently a very trivial one, and I didn't need much treatment. I was put into a tent; some of the men came along and gave me something to eat and washed me off occasionally. Eventually Dr. Stone came and said I must go to Siboney.

Q. How long were you at Siboney?

A. Six days.

Q. What was the character of the attention you received at Siboney?

A. Very poor, because of the lack of nurses; and the nurses in the ward in which Captain Edwards and I were placed were two wounded men, both of them shot through the spine. This nurse I saw was an ex-teamster, discharged from the Quartermaster's Department because of inability and incompetency. Of course this man was no good as a nurse. The place was crowded, and they had no time to attend to anyone except the severely wounded. I did not blame them for not paying much attention to me, but of course wished they had been able to do a bit more for me. I was unable to get any medicine whatever.

Q. During the whole time? No medical officer visited you?

A. Several times a day I saw a medical officer, and I believe it was the intention of the officer to send me something. It may be I did get medicines—there was so much confusion about that time.

Q. You were sent north on the *City of Washington*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How was she provided for the trip?

A. She had a regimental chest—medical and surgical; she had Surgeon McCreery, volunteer, in charge, with Captain Winter, of the Regular Army, as assistant; there was poor water aboard; there were no facilities for properly bathing the sick; between decks they were crowded, and the men who had fever—

a good many—suffered considerably on account of the rolling of the ship. Several wounds were broken open that need not have suffered this way. One man lost his arm because of the inability to stop the hemorrhage. She was in better shape, however, in having intelligent and efficient officers on board, and less suffering than on some of the other ships.

Q. Was there a sufficient quantity of proper foods for the wounded men?

A. No, sir; nothing except the bacon and hard-tack and canned tomatoes.

Q. No medical stores?

A. None at all.

Q. Do you know whether or not any requisition had been made for such?

A. No. But I know this, that Dr. La Garde at the hospital at Siboney said he could not hold himself responsible. Colonel Pope was not there, and the officer put in charge of the transportation said there was nobody to whom he could make requisition for supplies and nobody was responsible for wounded men from the time they left La Garde's hospital until they reached the ship. They had to transport themselves in any manner they could to the side of the ship, where they arrived in any kind of way, and then were put aboard the ship.

Q. Was there no medical officer to superintend the transportation of these men?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there a medical officer there who could have been detailed for that purpose?

A. I believe there were several. There were several navy officers working on the shore, offering their services in any capacity they could be utilized in, and I am sure several lives would have been saved and a good deal of suffering spared if one of the officers had been put in charge of them.

Q. You say Dr. McCreery and Dr. Winter came up with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the time they were ordered on board?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether they should have looked after this matter of shipping the wounded?

A. I think they were not detailed for the boat until after a good many of the wounded were aboard the ship.

Q. There was no proper food for the wounded men on the vessel coming north?

A. No, sir.

Q. Where did you leave?

A. Fort Monroe.

Q. Were you able to land the wounded?

A. Almost immediately.

Q. Put them in the hospital?

A. Yes, sir; in hospitals. The others were put in the tents or hospitals.

Q. Were you one of those landed at Old Point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were your wounds looked after while there, or were they healed?

A. They were entirely healed by that time, but I was suffering from intermittent malarial fever.

Q. How long were you laid up with that?

A. I got sick leave before I arrived and immediately went to the Adirondacks.

Q. Did you ever report to the regiment again?

A. Yes, sir. I went to Washington at the expiration of my leave, and while there I joined a detachment left in Tampa and proceeded north, and remained with them until we got to Montauk Point and until the regiment which arrived

from Cuba got there. The regiment had left Cuba by the time I had joined that detachment in Washington. I had orders to join that detachment.

Q. How long did you remain at Montauk?

A. Until September 9 or 10.

Q. You arrived at Montauk at what date?

A. August 17 or 16.

Q. In what condition were your men when you joined them, and in what condition were they during the time at Montauk, medically considered?

A. They were all of them, with but few exceptions, suffering from some form of coast fever—from malaria, probably mostly from malaria; and I believe that instead of getting better a large proportion of the men were incapacitated from the time of arrival until they left. I was so sick that I was unable to do duty myself.

Q. To what cause or causes do you attribute this increase of sickness?

A. To partial relaxation of diet and drink, and partial indulgence in diet and drink and relaxation of discipline. The condition of the camp was not what it should have been.

Q. In what respect?

A. The sinks were not properly looked after—not filled up every day as in Tampa; they were left open for weeks at a time; one, I believe, had never been filled from the time the regiment went into camp.

Q. Are you speaking of the sinks of your own judgment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to report this fact officially?

A. I didn't until just three days before I left the regiment.

Q. Were you aware of the conditions existing during the weeks preceding?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Whose duty was it to see that that condition of things was reported and corrected?

A. It should have been the duty of the senior medical officer on duty, but the senior medical officer did all of the medical department work. This was Assistant Surgeon Massey, and he was not well and he had every moment of his time entirely occupied at the hospital and sick quarters.

Q. Were you on duty at the time or simply a voluntary officer?

A. On my arrival at the regiment I was placed under arrest.

Q. And remained so?

A. I remained until—just as long as the regulations allow a commanding officer to place an officer under arrest: I think it is altogether eighteen days.

Q. Were charges preferred against you or trial had or the matter dropped?

A. Charges were preferred against me, and at the end of the time when I should have to be released according to army regulations for trial, I was informed that no further action would be taken in the case.

Q. You were released from duty then?

A. Yes, sir. No; I then went on duty.

Q. At what date?

A. On September 5.

Q. Five days later, as I understand you, you left?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you leave the service or were you discharged?

A. I was taken in an ambulance to the general hospital and kept in the general hospital three or four days and then sent down in the *Shinnecock* to New York; then sent to the Grand Union Station and sent to my home.

Q. You have remained there ever since?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you any additional statement or suggestion of interest to us, except what you have said?

A. Yes, sir. On my arrival home, when I proceeded to the Adirondacks to recuperate from malarial fever, which I then had, I wrote a letter to Surgeon-General Sternberg, in which I described the condition of transports in Cuba and described the lack of proper facilities supervising the loading of transports, and requested that I be ordered to Washington to further explain the condition to the Surgeon-General. The original letter I have here, and the actions taken in the case, indorsed, as in the letter returned to me.

Q. Did you receive any answer from this?

A. No. No answer whatever from that. As far as I know, no action whatever was taken. I went to the Washington Government themselves, my leave having expired, and reported to the assistant surgeon-general. He refused to see me. I asked to see him and was refused. I asked to see him to get orders either to join my regiment or do some other duty. I was not allowed to see him. I believed that Montauk Point was a bad place to send men recovering from coast fevers. In the Tropics it is almost a medical axiom that cases of coast fevers of any sort, as soon as able, shall be sent to the mountains, and I wished, if at all possible, to establish an object lesson in the difference between troops sent there to recuperate and troops sent to the mountains; and with that object in view I wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, in which I offered to buy a camping ground in the mountains of Massachusetts and present it to the Government, for my regiment, if it could be ordered up there. That I would personally erect the house and fit it up as a hospital. This is the letter submitted. I believe that was killed by the combined action of the Surgeon-General and Adjutant-General of the Army. I saw the Adjutant-General of the Army, and he was bitterly opposed to the idea. He was very indignant at the idea of suggesting that Montauk Point was not the most perfect kind of spot. It was in regard to only one regiment, as an example, and I think, as I volunteered to relieve the Government of all expense in the matter, it might have been considered.

I also wish to say that when my regiment was mustered out of service at Montauk Point the papers in my case were incomplete, I believe. They, however, were accepted by the mustering-out officer, and the rest of the regiment mustered out. Colonel Roosevelt, who would have been responsible at that time, was mustered out by the service; also Major Mills. Major Mills forwarded these papers to the Adjutant-General's Office, and from the Adjutant-General's Office they were returned to him, with the request that he get further action on them by Roosevelt. The papers were sent to Colonel Roosevelt and by him entirely completed and returned to the Adjutant-General. From the fact that I have written at least six letters to the Adjutant-General and two to the Secretary of War, and am unable to get any action in the case, I am left without any proof that I am still in service. The War Department seems determined to prevent me from getting such proof, and it looks to me very much as though there were a combine to prevent me getting my position established.

Q. What answer did they make to the letters you sent them?

A. I have had no reply to the six letters to the Adjutant General or to the two letters to the Secretary of War; I have had no reply to a single letter written to the War Department, with the exception of one letter which I wrote to the Paymaster-General. He responded promptly. I wish to call attention to the fact that any man—it makes no difference how poor or low he may be—if he writes a letter to the Navy Department he will always get a reply to it. I never heard of a case of a man sending letters and asking fairly important questions and getting no answers to them. The Adjutant-General of the Army, to whom I finally appealed to secure action in my case, notified me that discharge had been issued me, which

was incomplete and sent to Major Mills for correction, and he had sent them to Colonel Roosevelt, and the Adjutant-General advised the mustering-out officer in Massachusetts to tell me that if I could get these papers from Roosevelt my questions would be settled, throwing upon me the burden of doing what I think he ought to do. Colonel Roosevelt, upon my writing to him, wrote me a courteous letter, in which he told me that he had immediately filled out the papers and sent them back.

I have a suggestion to make which may be foolish or may not, but it is something that I have heard mentioned a great many times during this war with Spain; that is, that if the system in the War Department were similar—the system of appointing a bureau of chiefs in the War Department were similar to that of the Navy—there would not be so much trouble with them. They would not be so sure of their positions and they would be more willing to work to keep them. For instance, when I was in Washington I had occasion to go on business to the Chiefs of Bureaus of Medicine and Surgery, in both War and Navy Departments—Bureau of Navigation and Adjutant-General's Office, which practically correspond—and in the War Department I was unable to see the chief, because he was talking to reporters, and in the Navy Department the reporters are not allowed in the office.

Q. Any other suggestion or statement?

By General McCook:

Q. Will you kindly tell us how you became appointed as surgeon in the volunteers?

A. Yes, sir. The Secretary of the Navy had issued an order that retired officers of the Navy should not be placed on sea duty, and I was anxious to see some active service if possible, and on receipt of this order I applied. He said he believed there was no reason why I should not go with the Army. He wrote me a letter to Colonel Roosevelt, and my application was for a position as lieutenant. I had been brought up in the Army. My father was colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry, and I should have liked very much to have gone that way, but there was trouble between the medical officers of the regiment, and when Colonel Roosevelt got to San Antonio, it seemed a way of getting out of the trouble by asking me to come down and be surgeon of the regiment. So he telegraphed me if I would come he would make me surgeon of the regiment. It was not what I desired, but I believed it was my duty, and I was anxious to do that in every way I could.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD ATKINSON.

Mr. EDWARD ATKINSON did not wish to be sworn, but made the following statements before the commission:

I submit the statement of one of the most able men that ever lived around here, who was on the *Yale*, a very strong complaint against the treatment of the troops on the *Yale*. He is exceedingly loth—he is unwilling to give his name, for this reason: He hopes to continue in the service; he thinks it wrong for a soldier to complain, and on reflection he says he has come to the conclusion that what they suffered was due to the incapacity of their first officers rather than to any fault of the officers of the ship, and, therefore, that that being the only cause, I could submit it second hand from personal knowledge of the party. I can only leave it to you. It does not amount to anything. I can not give his name. He is on his back in the Massachusetts general hospital. I think he will go into higher service. I think he is not going to get well. What he expresses is on your file of apparently gross mismanagement of the whole concern. He is a competent witness.

Q. We have done the best we could—

A. I understand that.

Q. Major —, of the regiment, was here before us. Your letter was quoted to him.

A. Having presented the letter, I was bound to come up.

“There are 50 or 60 men, as I understand it, of the regular battery out at Winthrop at this time in this storm, in tents. My cashier is their neighbor and knows about them. They are left there at this period, in this storm we had the other night. They took refuge, some of them, in houses, to keep from freezing. This remnant appears to have been overlooked.”

I can only say that here is my cashier, a competent man, living in the neighborhood, who bears testimony that 40, 50, or 60 soldiers there are in canvas tents at this time in this storm.

Q. Is there any objection to his coming here?

A. No, sir. I will send him right up. My cashier will be glad to come up.

Q. We would like testimony as to facts, of his personal knowledge. We would like to know if Anderson is in command there.

A. There is only one other subject. I happen to have looked into several of venereal diseases and their prevalence and their future prevalence in troops that may be stationed in the Tropics. I have studied social questions a good deal, as some of you are aware, and I have the removal of the cause in my mind, and I urge and personally suggest that that subject be investigated, having reference to troops that must be stationed for longer or shorter time in these tropical countries, and I expect to circulate 50,000 copies of a circular letter in relation to this, giving a social review of the whole question. Day before yesterday I got a little evidence, absolutely official, from a general in command, facts that are perfectly appalling, irremediable, and inevitable—the North is worse than the South.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF DR. DAVID CLARKE.

Dr. DAVID CLARKE was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering “no,” he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, your profession, the time you have been practicing, and your present residence.

A. David Clarke; Springfield, Mass.; and have been in practice thirty years.

Q. Have you had occasion during the past summer to see anything of the military movements or visit any of the camps occupied by troops?

A. I have, sir.

Q. Where?

A. I was in Montauk ten days, from the 17th of August to the 27th of August and the 10th of September.

Q. The 27th?

A. From the 17th to the 27th, and then I was there one day, the 10th of September.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in your own way what you observed during the ten days you spent there in August.

A. Can I recite my business there?

Q. You may tell us anything you will in your own way.

A. The quickest way I can do it will be by reading you important points. May I premise this by saying I was surgeon in the Second Regiment for twenty-three years and medical brigade in which the Second was for two years? Retired about one year ago. This year I was sent on this expedition.

"This is to certify that at the meeting of the auxiliary surgeons of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association, held August 12, 1898, Dr. Clarke was appointed special assistant of this association to distribute certain supplies for that association.

"JAS. A. HILL, JR.

"THOS. W. HYDE.

"ERNEST J. DEXTER.

"Any aid that can be given to any or all of these gentlemen will be greatly appreciated by this association."

There were about 60 cases of goods and clothing and food sent by rail to Saybrook Point, Conn., and were to be sent down in a little launch from Springfield on the Connecticut River. We hired a schooner, on which we loaded our goods on the 16th of August and sailed for Montauk. On our approach—I like to give the facts to show the reasons—

Q. Just as you will.

A. I want to give both sides of the question, and I will be fair about it. We stopped in New London—we could not get over in one day—to get fresh supplies. We expected the Second Regiment on the *Mobile*, for which we stopped in New London to get fresh supplies, such as apples, oranges, lemons, and pears and other fresh fruit, to give the Second when they should arrive. We sailed over in this little launch with a party—steamed over to Fort Pombeoy on the 17th—and as we approached the bay saw *St. L*—. On this was Colonel Marsh, also from Springfield, who had been sent to Santiago with supplies for the Second Regiment. They were then in quarantine; and as we approached the officer—we were anxious to communicate with Marsh to find out where the supplies were, if we could use them for the Second Regiment. We did not understand the exact rules of the quarantine officers, and sailed up around this *St. L*—, and we saw the Colonel and attempted to speak with him. The waves were running so high we were unable to do so, but as we came around the second time the patrol boat, Lieutenant Rhodes, warned us off, and then we found that we were on forbidden ground. Our supposition was that they were in quarantine waters, but we had no idea but what we could speak to them, but not attempt to get aboard.

The Lieutenant ordered us off at a right angle to the steamer quarantined, which it was impossible for us to do with this little launch. We were taking aboard pail after pail of water. He wanted us to hurry off. It was impossible, because we had to use the bail, and in that water the steam was exhausted, and so we made very slow progress. We remonstrated that it was impossible for us to go in the trough of the sea, but were taking a diagonal course. He threatened to shoot us and pointed his gun on us. He had his marines go below and load their two guns, but of course that didn't frighten us at all; I only show you this. We told him we were going off as fast as we could. We were not allowed to land in the bay, and the only place we could see was Peak Bay, 12 miles around. We landed there, and colonel on the governor's staff and myself put on our uniforms—I am lieutenant-colonel by rank, although I have just retired—thinking and hoping that uniforms would pass us where possibly citizen's dress would not. We walked 7 miles on this miserable railroad. There I was directed to go for information to Captain Fuller, and this is his pass:

CAMP WIKOFF, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK, August 17, 1898.

This is to certify that Dr. David Clarke, lieutenant-colonel of the Second Massa-

chusetts, in charge of the *Dolphin*, a launch bringing supplies for the sick, is allowed to land same at this point.

By direction of Major-General Wheeler.

ALFRED M. FULLER,
Captain Second Cavalry, Acting Aid.

With this paper we returned, and the next morning we came into camp and gave this pass to the captain of the little launch, and I proceeded to see Dr. McGruder, in command of the quarantine office of the quarantine department. I told him my mission, and offered to show this I have read to you and the pass. He said it was not necessary. He told me that while the officers as a general rule are not allowed in, I could bring in my schooner, and he told me the place where I could place it. Then I busied myself with watching the soldiers coming in with different regiments, the Seventy-first New York, the Fourth Infantry, and otherwise, until next day, when I went to the quarantine office to consult with them, as I did three or four times a day, to find out when the *Mobile* would likely come in.

I had assurance from Dr. McGruder himself that when the *Mobile* came in I should be allowed to go on this lighter and carry out refreshments, as oranges, grapes, or whatever I chose. He did this with some hesitation, but I told him I came prepared to go on board the *Mobile*, because I knew the doctor and both assistants were sick at the time they left Cuba, and I was going prepared to go on and act as their surgeon. As I have told you, I had had twenty-three years of experience, and knew probably I would be as acceptable as anybody. He promised he would let me go on. The next time he brought me up in a very brusque way and told me my launch was trying to sneak into the harbor. Now, the facts were, as I afterwards learned, this little launch was in Peak Bay, and instead of coming 12 miles she camped inside of the line. These officers, about a mile from there, when we got clear into the bay, these *Ilenc's* officers ordered us back. I told him there was a mistake about it, and I explained. They said, "No: we went to Captain Fuller and received this order." I had found Captain Fuller one of the most finished gentlemen I ever met, and offered to do everything he could for me. General Wheeler was there and said there would be no trouble about landing these goods for the men; that it was a great blessing that people had taken such interest. A man I took to be General Young said, "We are very glad to have you people come and help us take care of these sick men, as they were all sick."

This was written with pencil:

"Dr. McGRUDER: Please allow lighter *Dolphin* to land supplies for sick troops. It will be a special favor to myself, as well as a godsend to the troops, as a purely charitable object; and anything they have done contrary to your orders regarding quarantine regulations has been done from ignorance or misunderstanding.

"Yours, truly,

"Captain FULLER,
"Second Cavalry, Acting Aid."

I will say here that none of these officers would ever look at my passes, but our relations were quite friendly. I will admit that I made myself somewhat of a nuisance by constantly appearing before them and asking if the steamer had come in. I was obliged to watch, because if I didn't I could not get aboard. Meantime, as I said before, I busied myself watching those soldiers that came there in such destitute condition. The *Dolphin* attempted to come in this same day and was ordered out. The corporal knew and the officers knew that the *Dolphin* was expected to come in, but she was ordered out—on the 18th, I think: I won't be positive: there are three days that I am a little mixed on. On the 18th General Blood, surgeon-general of this State, and an old surgeon who had taken my place in the Second Massachusetts: Brown. I met on my way to Southampton, where I was obliged to go and spend the night. I told them that—but I am a little ahead

of my story. When I found that the *Mobile* was in I went to McGruder and heard him make this remark: "The *Mobile* is in a horrible state. There is no vessel that has reached this point in such a terrible condition as this steamer, 10 having died, 3 are dying, and 300 are sick. I want her pulled into the wharf, and I must relieve the congestion by putting some of the sick men off there." I then stood up before the captain, and asked him if I go to the relief of these men. He looked at me a minute, turned on his heel, and never spoke. I looked out and saw the *Mobile* coming in slowly. I rushed to the restaurant there, where I had ordered refreshments for these men, but knowing there was no use trying to get favors from these officers, I tried duplicity and rushed to the wharf and secreted myself under the wharf until the *Mobile* should come in, knowing that as soon as a boat comes in they always put a double guard around. When the boat came to the wharf I came out there. Wheeler was there. I told him my mission, and in conversation with him, he says, "Why don't you go on?" which I did. That night I did as I had formerly done—went out to Southampton to spend the night, 30 miles out. On this way out I met General Blood, as I said before. We conferred with each other in regard to getting supplies for the men. We had consulted with the colonel and officers, and they were very anxious for milk and eggs particularly. We had supplied them with fruit at the wharf. I told the General there that they had kept out this schooner where we had a large supply of goods, and that in the morning I should go in on the schooner and sail her in to Voma Bay or sail her to the bottom. I had influence and passes and promises, and saw no reason why I should not go in. General Blood came in ahead of me. To this day I don't know whether he smoothed the path for me, but he came in the schooner with Lieutenant S—, in the Massachusetts Militia, but didn't go to the war; and Mr. Hyde, he allowed us to get to the *Ilene*, clear inside the bay, and through his megaphone he shouted out, "The *Dolphin* and her crew are allowed in the harbor, and the passengers will go ashore." We were then, I should think, a quarter of a mile from shore. I took—Lieutenant S— and myself took to this little rowboat and one of the crew started to row us there. Then he said, "I want you to get out of this harbor and do it d—d quick." I said, "I am ordered there; I would like to go there." He said, "I have seen enough of you; I want you to get out of this harbor, and right away." I said, "I have passes." He said, "I don't care a d—n for your passes; you get out of here. We will turn the disinfectant hose on you, put you in irons, and send you to Brooklyn." There was nothing to do but do the thing he told me. We turned around and rowed out to sea, in imminent risk of our lives. The sea was high, every few feet we were taking in water, but, as fortune would have it, we were picked up by a launch outside 3 miles, and taken back to Lipper Bay. I found out afterwards that this *Ilene* went out and towed in this little rowboat, and the captain told me afterwards that McGruder had ordered that I should be kept out of the bay. I will say, for general information, that any quantity of men, 1,000 or 10,000, could go in by train, on foot, or by any conveyance; but I was not allowed to land. I went up to — Bay, and was obliged to walk into camp and got in there at 11 o'clock at night. This is my experience with the quarantine office.

Q. Be kind enough in that connection to tell us who this officer was?

A. I can not tell you.

Q. On board the *Ilene*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was her boat of quarantine service?

A. Yes, sir; patrol.

Q. Flying the patrol flag of the United States?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Under the control of the quarantine department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The quarantine department is under the Treasury Department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As I understand it, you were at Montauk some days after this?

A. Until the 27th.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the hospital while there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The condition?

A. The general hospital was the only one I visited—the one I first visited. It was about—the 22d, 24th, and 25th were the days I visited the hospital.

Q. Of August?

A. Yes, sir. The hospital at that time was of course very crude. The conditions around it were very unsanitary. The refuse from the hospital, such as bedding, bandages, slops, banana peels, orange peels, everything of that kind naturally coming from a hospital were thrown out back of the hospital.

Q. How far?

A. Forty feet. There was a passageway in the center—an aisle—on which, each side, were the wards. A ward was 75 to 100 feet long. In the center of this was the distribution department, where the nurses and doctors had supplies. Things were thrown out there indiscriminately. There were not enough nurses to do the work. I don't know as I ought to give my opinion about these things, but the fact is there were not enough nurses to do the work as it should be done, and I could not see that they could do it in any other way than they did do it. The men who were sick were, of course, in a pretty bad state, clothing in bad shape; and the men were very sick indeed, with flies crawling over their eyes—dying men—and their mouths, conditions that ought to have been prevented in some way.

Q. Let me interrupt you one moment. Without an effective nursing corps, would it have been possible to have prevented the conditions?

A. It could have been some better, but I could readily excuse it on the ground of inefficient service. I took dinner with the nurses, and they told me the facts that I had seen—that they were overworked and had to work night and day, and had only a few hours' sleep. Ten or twelve occupied the same tent.

Q. This, as I understand it, was on the 22d, 24th, and 25th of August?

A. I will simply say that when I went back the 10th of September I visited the hospital and things were in good shape.

Q. Did you ascertain at that time how this change had been brought about?

A. Not except from my own judgment. There were not as many in the hospital, and it had given them a chance to improve the condition: to employ more nurses.

Q. During the times of your visits there did you have any opportunity of knowing what sort of care the men were receiving from the medical officers, whether proper or not; anything about it?

A. I didn't, sir. My mission was an entirely different one, not a medical one.

Q. You spoke of the hospital being overcrowded. Do you remember how many men were in any one tent?

A. Some were lying on the floor, some in cots—that was an exception. I suppose the space was 12 or 13 inches wide.

Q. In the middle of the tent?

A. I mean each cot, each bunk, was just wide enough to pass through two cots. It varied according to the width of the tents.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit any?

A. Only my own.

Q. That was the Second Massachusetts? Be kind enough to tell us in what condition you found that camp.

A. First, was the camp of detention. That camp was, to external appearance, cleanly.

Q. You were allowed to visit it?

A. I had permission to go in and out. I was the only one allowed to do that.

Q. Tell us what you will in regard to the detention camp and hospital.

A. That I know nothing about. I can only tell you the appearance. It was policed well when we went into it, and it had been used, and was used afterwards: it was in a fearful condition in one sense. The sinks were a long distance off, and the men came from the *Mobile*, and a great many of them had diarrhea, and were unable to get to the sinks. The men were relieving themselves all around, both in this camp and in the detention, and then there was a general condition of bad odor from different regiments camping there, and that natural débris that would accumulate, that you could not carry away. At that camp three officers, three or four, had floors on the tents. The colonel's and I think one or two tents on each side had floors. None of the regiments had any floors at all. The permanent camp that we took was on new ground. We were obliged to stay, by the way, one day more than they were going to allow us, on account of this other not being ready. So far as I can remember, there was only one sink, but it wasn't half covered; the men could not sit on the pole used for that purpose, so were obliged to relieve themselves wherever they could. There was no service or anything of that kind for covering up this sink; they were obliged to take anything they could get there and throw over these excrements and stand on them.

Q. Was that the condition all the time you were in the camp?

A. That was the condition; yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not any representation was made by the surgeon of the regiment as to the condition existing?

A. I don't, sir.

Q. Do you know whether any officer of the regiment made an efficient complaint of the condition of things?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not it was the duty of the medical officer to report it?

A. I do.

Q. You don't know whether he did? Do you know the method of covering it up? Do you know whether the regiments that had been previously encamped there had followed the same course as the Second Massachusetts or taken care of the sinks?

A. This sink was in the experiment camp.

Q. Were the men of the Second Massachusetts in such condition that no proper poles could have been made?

A. Not by the sick.

Q. Do you know whether or not any effort was made by the regimental officers to have this policing done?

A. The policing was done, such as gathering up things about the camp, like oranges and lemon peels.

Q. But lemon peel and paper and waste matter of that sort is not a comparison with other matter dropped here and there. That is what is called policing.

A. Nothing in regard to sinks, as far as I know. There were no straw mattresses or anything for the men to lie on there, or for the officers. General Alger appeared on the scene the second day we were there and asked the colonel if they had any. He told him no cot, bed, or straw. He wanted to know why it was. He said he had ordered 10,000 ticks and straw for six regiments; but we didn't have it, and the men were obliged to lie on the bare ground.

Q. You were there only a couple of days?

A. I think three days.

Q. Did your regiment—was there any difficulty in getting away from the island?

A. When we were delayed; that is the only time.

Q. From what cause—by what cause?

A. We were unable to get a transport.

Q. When you got a transport, where did you go?

A. New London.

Q. What was the transport—in good condition to carry the troops properly?

A. Yes, sir; in good condition.

Q. After you reached New London of course you had no difficulty?

A. No, sir.

Q. Are the headquarters of your regiment in the neighborhood of Springfield?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did your regiment know it was going to leave for Massachusetts? When it left was there difficulty?

A. No, sir.

Q. When they went into general camp did they know they were going to leave?

A. They knew it forty-eight hours before. It was rumored that they were to leave Friday, but we could not leave until the next day, on account of transportation?

Q. Do you know, or do you not know, whether the officers neglected to take care of the sinks outside, because they expected to leave so quickly?

A. The colonel told me he didn't know there was anything of that kind. He thought they were going to supply them. He asked General Alger, when he was there, for something, but it could not be done in that line.

Q. You don't know whether he went to Pope to ascertain whether these things were there?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. I suppose you understand it is the duty, being an officer yourself, of officers and quartermasters to obtain these things?

A. Yes, sir; certainly.

Q. Have you any additional statement or opinion?

A. Yes, sir; I have—the best for the last; that is, the last so far as I am concerned. I should severely criticise—being a medical officer myself for twenty-five years, and I think I know a little something about the duties of medical officers, and serving in the war of the rebellion four years, which makes me a judge of men and conditions. I criticise the medical officers of Camp Wikoff for the manner in which they allowed dying men to leave the camp. I was obliged to leave the camp every night: I walked. At the quarantine station there were a dozen or twenty tents empty. I tried to beg a chance to stay there, but was unable to get one from the hospital steward there. Excuse me for going back: it was suggested by one of the hospital stewards, who, I am glad and sorry to say, treated me better than the officials, if he were in my place he would apply to Alger.

I telephoned to my people in Springfield and told them my condition, and told them, if they could, to help me. General Alger sent to General Wheeler, but then it was too late. I was obliged to go out 30 miles to sleep, and every night there were more or less sick soldiers on this train. There were very sick men every night on this train. The time I wish to speak of is the 10th of September, the day I went with my family to visit the camp and to show them the sights. On getting aboard this special express train I saw a young man there who looked to me to be very sick, and there was a nice appearing gentleman with him. I supposed he was a physician: I didn't suppose anyone would be allowed to go in his condition without a physician. A gentleman in the Red Cross department, who knew me, called my attention to this young man. I will give his name and all, if you like it. His name was—understand, now, that the father of this young man was anxious to have him go and he didn't care to make any complaint—James C. Webster, Company , Ninth United States Infantry. He called my attention to him,

and I told him the young man was dying. He had dysentery, and was being carried to the closet every few minutes. I tried to get him to lie down, but he was a little off his base and wouldn't do anything of the kind, and spent most of the time in there. I learned that there was a very fine hospital at Yapahanna, about 20 miles distant. I told them he would not live until he got to New York, and they took him off. He lived about two hours, and died. I say that was inexcusable on the part of Dr. Gilhooly, who had charge and allowed him to go away. I wrote him a letter advising him; I told him who I was, and said, "Doctor, as a friend, I advise you never to allow them to go off as this one did."

Q. This man, Webster, was furloughed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that he went by authority of the surgeon, undoubtedly?

A. Yes, sir. There were a good many others of my own regiment that went away, too. Two of them died very soon after. That is all I can think of at this present time.

Q. You don't know whether the father of this young man had tried to have him furloughed before he went there?

A. He got a furlough for the young man at the time.

Q. You don't know whether it was a question of higher authority to get it before they went away? We have some further testimony of this same case.

A. I know that he should not have been furloughed. He should not have been taken on that train. That was three hours out from Montauk. He had been obliged to start from the camp an hour before, and that train didn't get in until 11:30 that night, in case he should have arrived. That was a thing that I never understood—never could understand—why it was that men could not be taken right on the transports, three-fourths of a mile from the camp, and taken on beds to New York City or any other place, rather than on this slow railroad for ten hours—sick men, without proper food or any place to lie down.

By General BEAVER:

Q. In your opinion, as a physician, was there a possibility of Webster's life if he had remained in the hospital?

A. From the reports his father gave me, unquestionably.

Q. The moving of him was, in your judgment, one of the things that caused his death?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was reported to have been in such condition at the hospital? Fair condition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Does it not happen every once in a while that a patient breaks down under no exercise?

A. Very true.

Q. He being apparently in fair condition, if the doctor had absolutely refused him a furlough, and he had been taken worse and died twelve, twenty-four, forty-eight, seventy-two hours after, there would not have been cause for his family to say that if he had not been removed from the hospital he would not have died?

A. Allowing that to be true, Doctor—

Q. The reason I ask was because you say he was apparently in good condition. That condition, you say, was very different from the condition the doctor saw when he granted the furlough. A great number, possibly, were sent away who had no business to be sent; at the same time, a good many men—we have all heard many complaints—are said to have died there because they remained. The doctors would not allow them to go home, where they could be nursed into health. A physician is likely to be censured.

A. That is true; but a man who had ten or twelve bloody discharges a day would hardly be sent away.

Q. Not a very good patient to send away, and a bad patient to keep. I am not discussing this case, only considering the possibility that there might have been some apparent reason why he was allowed to go at the time.

A. That was one of the many cases that I happened to know particularly about, and I think the doctors were anxious to get men out of the hospital.

Q. Do you know if they were very much importuned by relatives, friends, and officials to allow invalids to go away?

A. Not from personal knowledge, but I have no doubt but that they would be.

Q. So, possibly, the man who was in the unfortunate position—they were very anxious to have him let them go, and if he yielded to them he suffered, and if he didn't yield he suffered; therefore, he thought if the men could possibly stand traveling, he might have been induced to let them go.

BOSTON, MASS., *November 30, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF REV. DR. EDWIN S. WHEELER.

Rev. Dr. EDWIN S. WHEELER was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER.

Q. Kindly give us your name.

A. Edwin S. Wheeler.

Q. Your residence?

A. 69 Richmond street, Boston.

Q. Your profession?

A. Clergyman.

Q. What experience, if any, have you had in the military service?

A. I was chaplain in 1863 and 1864, in the department of the Gulf.

Q. Did you at any time visit the camp at Montauk Point, known as Camp Wikoff?

A. I visited Camp Wikoff on the 30th of September.

Q. With your experience as a military officer, state whether or not in your opinion that was a proper camp for the purpose for which it was established; that is, to prevent contagion from getting into the country and to recuperate the men stricken down from the campaign in Cuba.

A. I will answer it by saying I have resided twice very near Wikoff within the past forty years, and am perfectly familiar with the country. I regard the location at Camp Wikoff as ideal in every respect. The drainage is excellent. I should consider Camp Wikoff superior in respect to its location to any camp that I ever knew in the Department of the North.

Q. What was, in your opinion, based upon your observation as to details of the camp, the laying out, or provision, made for the men, and all that, which will be suggested to your military experience?

A. I regard the camp as thoroughly laid out. It was more airy and roomy than any camp I had ever seen. The location of the hospital I regard as excellent. I met General Wheeler immediately upon my arrival at the camp, and he very kindly permitted me to make a tour of investigation.

Q. For general observation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, will you please tell us, in your own way, if you please, what you found in that tour and what your conclusion was as to the camp in general?

A. Of course it was quite at the opening of the camp that I visited it.

Q. What date?

A. The 30th of August.

Q. Two weeks after it had been established; that is, after the troops began to arrive?

A. Yes. I conversed with the surgeons, nurses, and patients from about 10 o'clock in the morning until 5 in the afternoon. With a soldier's experience, I thought I knew how to find my way around. Judging from all the comments I heard and the answers to my questions in reference to the treatment the men were receiving, I formed a very favorable opinion as to the general management of the camp. Whatever it may have been prior to my visiting it, I am unable to state, of course; but at the time I visited the camp I regard the treatment the sick were receiving, the attention on the part of the surgeons and nurses, to be superior to that we received when we were in the service at Baton Rouge and New Orleans.

Q. Did you visit the men in their quarters to any extent?

A. I did.

Q. What condition in their quarters?

A. The hospitals were invariably clean. There seemed to be the utmost care taken by scouring and by the use of the various things to keep a hospital tent sweet and clean. Everything seemed to be done that I thought ought to be done to make the place perfectly wholesome.

Q. Did you visit the portions of the camp which were devoted to the so-called well men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How were the men in their companies, not in the hospital?

A. I found the regulars to be thoroughly contented, doing well. I learned from some of the volunteers—the Eighth Ohio, the Rough Riders, and fragments of other regiments there in camp—they were not doing as well, and I judged from what the men said, they attributed their difficulties to more or less bad cooking on the part of their company cooks. From the regulars I heard no complaint at all.

Q. Did you find any number of men in their quarters, those in companies and regiments, sick and unable to provide for themselves?

A. Oh, yes, indeed; a great many of them.

Q. What was their condition as to comfort? Did they have good tents and blankets?

A. Most excellent. There seemed to be everything provided that was necessary to secure comfort of the sick men. I heard no complaint.

Q. Do you know those men were fed in the hospital; attendants or comrades waiting upon them?

A. I am not able to state in regard to that matter; I was not there long enough to hear any complaint.

Q. Was there, or was there not, any lack of commissary stores, so far as you could ascertain? Did you visit the commissary depot? What was that like?

A. There was not room for the stores. They were completing the structures, if I recollect; building additional ones.

Q. Was there any reason, then, why the soldiers should not have everything which the Government provided for the sustenance of the men in the military service?

A. As far as I could see there was everything there the camp needed to secure their comfort.

Q. Have you any suggestions to make to the commission which would be helpful to us in reaching conclusions about any departments, medical or commissary?

A. Perhaps I was not there long enough to form a very correct judgment.

Q. Have you any further statement you would like to make?

A. Nothing further.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF W. H. SEABURY.

Mr. W. H. SEABURY, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. What is your name?

A. William H. Seabury, volunteer purser on the *Bay State*.

Q. Where were you from?

A. Boston, Mass.; Major Higginson told me to come up here.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state your experience on board that ship, and tell us from the time you left until you got back exactly what you saw, so that we may judge from your testimony the conditions existing?

A. I left about August the 8th on the ship from East Boston and went to Port Antonio, Jamaica, for coal and water, and also for a cylinder—our ice cylinder gave out—and then I went to Santiago.

Q. When you started, what did you have on your ship?

A. Everything money could buy.

Q. For what purpose?

A. To aid the soldiers. I was not limited; I bought all the supplies except the hospital supplies.

Q. And the character of the food was what?

A. Everything was fresh; we had 10,000 pounds of fresh beef, and chickens, eggs, and fresh milk, and I was not hampered in the slightest. I was told to buy what I thought was right and to do what I thought was right.

Q. And they were to be supplied to whom?

A. Anyone who needed them.

Q. Irrespective of the State?

A. Yes, sir. And, also, if the soldiers wanted money, I was to give them money, anyone that wanted money; we were to look out for the Massachusetts soldiers first.

Q. And you got to Antonio and took in coal and water there?

A. There happened to be an ice machine in Jamaica owned by a company that broke up, who let us have their machine, and then we went to Guantanamo.

Q. When did you arrive there?

A. About the 15th.

Q. And you found troops there to whom you could give these supplies?

A. No, sir; we found a warship—the *Vesuvius* and the *Marblehead*.

Q. Did you distribute anything there?

A. Yes, sir; fresh beef and ice.

Q. You gave that to the Navy?

A. Yes, sir; and medical supplies as well.

Q. Then you had medical supplies?

A. Yes, sir; Dr. Burrough gave us those; so I gave the *Marblehead* and the *Vesuvius* fresh beef and ice and milk supplies; quinine and the like, and lime juice.

Q. From Guantanamo you went to where?

A. Caimanera.

Q. That is at the upper part of the bay?

A. Yes, sir; and there I found a company of soldiers from Louisiana in a bad way; I can not remember the company's name; I got receipts for everything I gave; so it is on them.

Q. They were in a bad way?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many troops were there?

A. Only one company.

Q. So you furnished supplies?

A. Yes, sir; lime juice, bread, eggs, and everything.

Q. And from there you went to Santiago?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. Three or four days.

Q. What did you accomplish there?

A. The first place we went was to the general hospital on shore, and asked them what we could do for them, and much to my surprise, in a hospital of 50 or 75 they had no clinical thermometers, and we gave them some.

Q. What else did you give besides that?

A. Bedpans; they had not any bedpans; they took their patients up and wrapped them in blankets and carried them 50 feet to the water-closet in the harbor.

Q. Who was in charge of that hospital?

A. The man who signed my receipt was Dr. Appel.

Q. And to him you gave what?

A. We gave him medical supplies, quinine, clinical thermometers, and 100 suits of pajamas.

Q. When was that?

A. About the last part of August. I think we left here the 8th and got to Jamaica about five days later—that would be the 13th—and then went to Guantanamo, which was about then.

Q. How did you find the condition of the hospital?

A. They were very short of proper food and medical supplies.

Q. Were they wounded or sick men?

A. Typhoid fever. I think there were very few wounded.

Q. From thence where did you go?

A. Then we took on 101 patients there; two died on the ship and one died at the wharf; this was at Santiago.

Q. Having made this distribution you made no further distribution at this hospital?

A. No, sir; there was a yellow-fever hospital at the other side of the harbor, and we divided the supplies equally.

Q. You gave all you had to give away?

A. Yes, sir; but we did not give as much as we could have done. I expected to be gone five or six months, but we were gone sixty days.

Q. Having finished with these hospitals, what was the next step?

A. We took supplies to the sick; we were informed that there were no men in the Second or Ninth Massachusetts in Santiago.

Q. Was that correct?

A. It was incorrect.

Q. You were misled by that?

A. Very much.

Q. Who told you that?

A. They told Dr. Burrough, and he said it was the commanding general.

Q. Having finished with the hospital?

A. We took on these soldiers and came to Boston.

Q. The condition of these soldiers was what?

A. Well, sir, from what I gathered from them, they all complained of starvation—not starvation, but improper food; there was not a sufficient quantity. They said they had hard-tack and pickles for breakfast, and coffee that was not ground—in the whole bean.

Q. What was the general character of the diseases with which these men were suffering?

A. Typhoid fever and malaria I was told.

Q. Were they able to walk to the boat?

A. Two-thirds had to be carried on stretchers; they came into my hospital from San Juan Hill.

Q. Do you know by whose authority they were permitted to go on board—did you notice any papers?

A. Dr. Burrough had all this from the surgeon of that hospital.

Q. Having gotten your men on board, what was the next step; were you well equipped to take care of the sick?

A. Yes, sir; I was on the dock at Santiago. If I had had any idea I was going to testify I would have gotten the names of the soldiers. I saw an immense amount of bacon, a pile 200 feet long and 20 feet high, running out—going to pieces—and there was chloride of lime on it. I said, "What do you do with that?" He said, "It was for them to eat." I said, "Do you eat it?" He said, "Oh, no; we take it to San Juan Hill and bury it." And they had ginger ale—

Q. Who did that belong to?

A. They said the Government. C. L. Carr, they said it belonged to him. He said, before we got there a transport came into the harbor with medical supplies, and he heard of it and went to the quartermaster and asked for permission to get a tug and get some of those supplies to distribute to the hospital. The quartermaster said, "If you want to get them, you can swim for them." And he got a tug and got some of the supplies, and distributed them, and sent the bill in to the Government, and they said they would court-martial him.

Q. What kind of a trip did you have up?

A. We lost two men.

Q. And the number of surgeons on that ship were how many?

A. Four.

Q. What number of nurses?

A. Six female and six male.

Q. And of your 100 men you got 97 back to Boston?

A. Ninety-eight practically; one died out on board the ship the first hour.

Q. What was done with these sick men?

A. Distributed to the hospitals.

Q. And your duty was ended then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you distribute all the supplies you took out?

A. Yes, sir; and we could have given a great deal more if we knew we were coming right back, so I didn't give away as much as we could have done.

Q. You gave all you had?

A. Not all, because we had cut down some of the requisitions.

Q. You cut them down some?

A. Yes, sir; when they made the requisitions we thought we might be there a month longer and could not get them, so I cut them down some; no man went away without anything.

Q. Can you tell of anything showing maladministration in the departments of the United States Government in this war, beyond what you have said?

A. No, sir. I don't see why the Government could not have sent supplies there, and why they were taken down and not delivered. It seems that they were there, but not delivered, and whose fault it was I don't know.

Q. You refer particularly to the hospital ship you mentioned?

A. No, sir; there was food around there that was not delivered; the things were there, but the soldiers could not get them.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. How do you know the soldiers could not get these supplies?

A. They said they could not get them.

Q. That is, the men you met?

A. Yes, sir.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE A. BROWN.

Private A. BROWN voluntarily appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Give your name to the stenographer.

A. A. Brown.

Q. Where do you live, Mr. Brown?

A. Portland, Me.

Q. And during the war you were where?

A. Santiago?

Q. In what regiment?

A. Captain Grimes's regiment, Second Artillery.

Q. Do you desire to testify on some specific point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the subject you come before us to give information on?

A. The conduct of the doctor who was in charge of the ward where I was for about six days.

Q. Where was that ward?

A. In the lower deck of the hospital ship *Regina de Los Angeles*.

Q. Coming from where?

A. It was stationed in that harbor off Santiago.

Q. You were ill or wounded?

A. Ill from malaria.

Q. What is the name of the doctor?

A. Dr. Thomas, from New Orleans.

Q. A contract surgeon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And state what you have to say in connection with his habits and character and work he performed.

A. He seemed to be under the influence of liquor all the time, and appeared very indifferent to the men who were under his charge. In all cases—he asked me day after day what was the matter with me, not seeming to remember. A young man whom I knew personally, Mr. Sanders, who was in my class at Harvard, died there. It seems he was not any worse off than a man who was sick in the same way—with dysentery, and Dr. Thomas gave them up for lost. Sanders died and the nurse took hold of this man and brought him right through.

Q. Was there any other surgeon besides Dr. Thomas on the ship?

A. The regular army surgeon—I forget his name—was in charge of the ship, but he was sick and could not oversee the work.

Q. Was there any hospital stewards on board?

A. One—I do not know his name.

Q. Any nurses?

A. Yes, sir. The rest of the nurses were contract nurses from New Orleans.

Q. How did the stewards and nurses behave?

A. Faithfully, on the whole.

Q. Assisted all they could?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was any report made by any of the men whatever of the conduct of Dr. Thomas?

A. None that I know of.

Q. Is this your first opportunity to make that report?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you report to the battery before you went out of service?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then you had no opportunity to tell Captain Grimes?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is this your first opportunity?

A. Yes, sir. This doctor went north with almost the entire number of patients and a great number of nurses on the *Olivette* when she left—I think it was about August 14—and then Lieut. W. W. Quinton took charge of the ship.

Q. After Dr. Quinton took charge, were the conditions improved to any extent?

A. Yes, sir; very much.

Q. Did you suffer materially from the neglect of this doctor?

A. I think my recovery was retarded.

Q. Is there anything more you can tell us in regard to this case?

A. No, sir; nothing more.

Governor WOODBURY. It may be of some satisfaction to you to know that Dr. Thomas's contract was annulled after he got to Montauk for drunkenness.

The WITNESS. I thought the commission might want to know this.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF GRAFTON J. CUSHING.

Mr. GRAFTON J. CUSHING, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your name and residence?

A. Grafton J. Cushing. I live in Groton, Mass.

Q. Have you been in the military service?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you had any opportunities of coming into contact with the Army or sick?

A. I was sent by the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association to Montauk to help Dr. Prescott. I was there two weeks.

Q. When did you reach there?

A. I went out on the tug *Alert*.

Q. Where did you land?

A. At the only pier there.

Q. What camp did you visit?

A. We were through the—while there—through the whole camp, more or less.

Q. The detention camp?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Detention hospital?

A. Yes, sir; where I was. I never went into the wards. I was distributing supplies.

Q. Then about the general hospital?

A. I lived there with Dr. Prescott.

Q. In what condition did you find things existing there when you landed?

A. When you ask a general question of that sort it seems very difficult to answer. It is undoubtedly—

Q. If I knew what you found, of course we could ask you a definite and distinct question.

A. I mean if you ask as to general conditions it is hard for one to tell. I can tell you of the various things.

Q. Well, what was the condition of the camp, for instance; was it clean or dirty?

A. Clean; admirably situated I thought, and in every way admirable, so far as the location of the camp went.

Q. What was the condition of the men as to health?

A. I thought they were a very sick lot of men in general.

Q. As well those in the hospital as those in camp?

A. Yes, sir. We had rather good opportunities of seeing the men in general. We had a big 4-horse wagon, which was the only one of its kind there, for distributing our supplies and a lot of men would climb in, men who wanted to go off on their furlough or men riding to and from the camp, and we saw a good many men visiting the camps.

Q. What did you specially notice that was reprehensible in the conduct of the camps?

A. The thing that struck me as much as anything was the distribution of what they had there was poor. All the officers there were extremely kind to us. I saw the men at the head of the commissary and quartermaster's departments and the men in control of the transportation, and they treated us with the utmost courtesy. They were splendid men, and ideal men for the fulfillment of their duties. Colonel Weston told me that he had in his commissary department pretty nearly everything he needed, but he had no control over transportation, and the difficulty was to get the things about. If you want me to illustrate I will do so.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. We had one car of our own. Major Knight or his assistants gave us a Government team or as many as we needed. They helped us as much as they could. One day I was getting three or four wagonloads of supplies which I intended to take to the Seventh Infantry, and there was a division which I heard was in need of some of the things we had. It was difficult to find out any particular regiment there. I was wandering about to find the Seventh United States Infantry, and I stumbled into the end of an infantry camp where the brigade, consisting of the Third and Twentieth Infantry was camped. The colonel came down—I forget his name—he was a nice-looking grizzly old veteran, and I asked him if he knew where the Seventh Infantry was, and he was disappointed that the provisions were not for him and he turned his back on me and walked off, and I suspected he might be in want, and I asked for the doctor and the soldier pointed out the doctor. I went to him and asked where his hospital was, and I said, "I might leave some of these things for you." The doctor gruffly replied he had no hospital, and then the colonel came back and very civilly tried to give me any information he could. I said, "If you need these things I will leave them all here." They had no wagons. They had left the detention hospital only a short time ago, a day or two. Nearly all their officers were sick. I think only six officers were left in the brigade. They were two or three miles from the center of distribution and they were getting only the army ration, which a sick man could not eat, so I left them all the bread, fruit, and vegetables I had. The next day I was rather disturbed about them. It seemed to me they really were in a poor condition, and I went around the next day and said to the colonel, "If you will give me one of your officers I will take him down with me and see what I can do in the way of introducing him to the commissary and quartermaster there." Then I went to the Seventh Infantry and asked the colonel of the Seventh for an officer, and they both gave me an offi-

cer, and I took them down to lunch at the lunch counter and spent the afternoon in introducing them to the quartermaster and transportation men. Colonel Weston said, "The Twentieth are very much interested; they will give you anything." General Bates then arrived, and I told him what I knew about the condition of these two regiments, and tried to get him to take an interest in them, and he introduced the officer of the Seventh to Knight, who controlled the transportation, and I kept an eye on them and gave them what I could spare, and after a certain length of time they seemed to be getting everything they needed. I do not know enough about military affairs to know why it was, but it seems to me incredible that two regiments were landed there without being able to get their supplies. There were other regiments getting supplies and these two regiments were not. I thought in order to get what it wanted a regiment had to have hustling officers. I was told that there was a lack of transportation. The cavalry regiments had their own wagons and used to get around and get their things and were better provided than the infantry.

Q. Then how long had these regiments, the Third and Twentieth, been in camp?

A. I don't know; I should imagine, in detention camp, about two days, perhaps. That is only a guess.

Q. And so far as you know, no regimental quartermaster had attempted to secure transportation for their commissary supplies from the station to their regimental camp?

A. I know nothing about that. I know they had no horses or wagons of their own.

Q. And you took two officers and took them and introduced them to the commissary at the depot?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. Two weeks and two days. I stayed until we came to the conclusion that it was unnecessary to distribute supplies any longer.

Q. Did you visit the hospitals at any time?

A. I was at the hospitals a great deal, but not in the wards.

Q. What was their general condition outside as to cleanliness and appearances of being well administered?

A. I think that the condition was, on the whole, pretty good. The detention hospital did not get into good condition until just before I left.

Q. Was the detention hospital undergoing a constant change as the detention camp was—men coming and going, being removed—or when they got sick men in the detention hospital did they keep them there until they became convalescent?

A. I do not know.

Q. Have you anything else that occurs to you as being worthy of mention that would be of use to us in our investigation?

A. We established diet kitchens. Perhaps Dr. Prescott testified to that. We furnished all the servants, and 19 cooks and all the utensils and the stoves and coal, etc.

Q. At the detention hospital?

A. All the hospitals. We helped them at the detention hospital and at the division hospital.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who was in charge of your hospital there?

A. Mrs. Willard, of the Red Cross. She was a very capable woman.

Q. Have you any other statement, Mr. Cushing, that would be useful to us?

A. I don't know, sir. I have seen more or less; I have seen the question as to whether or not there was enough medical supplies. I know when I first went to the Tenth Cavalry, I thought Massachusetts ought to keep an eye on the colored regiment. The surgeon gave me a full list of medical supplies he wanted. He

took a Government printed list and checked off a very large number of supplies, which I took to Dr. Prescott, and he marked the most important ones and sent it to Mr. Burnett, and he shipped us the supplies.

Q. Those supplies were furnished by your aid association?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not they could not be supplied from the medical depot?

A. That I do not know. Our business—we simply did what good we could, and did not inquire further. We inquired to this extent: I asked Colonel Weston what he wanted, and after that we rather limited ourselves to delicacies—fruits, vegetables, eggs, etc., which were in great demand by the officers, who asked for them for their regiments.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Were you in any way familiar with the moving of the sick here in Boston from the *Bay State* and the *Olivette* and the others?

A. No, sir.

BOSTON, MASS., November 30, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF COL. CHARLES PFAFF.

Col. CHARLES PFAFF, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your name, rank, and address?

A. Colonel Pfaff: colonel First Regiment Massachusetts Heavy Artillery. I reside in Boston.

Q. When did you enter the service?

A. Mustered in on the 9th of May.

Q. Where did you first serve?

A. Fort Warren; and later, Salem; and later, Framingham.

Q. Were you called upon to act in any other capacity than with the heavy artillery?

A. No, sir.

Q. How was your regiment fitted, in general, as to character and quantity of rations?

A. I think perfectly satisfactorily.

Q. Did you have any sickness in your regiment, any considerable amount of it?

A. We had some few cases of typhoid, but nothing that was serious. We lost one man, but that was after we were furloughed.

Q. It did not amount to an epidemic?

A. Not at all.

Q. What was the strength of your regiment?

A. We had 751 men.

Q. And only a single death during the entire term of your service?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any men whose illness continued after the period of their discharge, do you know?

A. I think there were one or two men who were possibly on the sick list.

Q. And are yet?

A. That I would not want to say.

Q. The net result, as far as you know, amounted to simply one man died in your entire command?

A. That is all.

Q. What was the condition of the several forts which you were called upon to man, as far as the sanitary conditions were concerned?

A. The sanitary conditions were excellent, but they could scarcely be called forts.

Q. Were they sand intrenchments?

A. This one we had at Salem was called Fort Pickering. It is an old fort that dates back to 1635. I think—something like that—but there was absolutely no ordnance there at all.

Q. What was the significance of putting your command out there?

A. That is something I have yet to discover. The residents of these different places were clamoring for protection.

Q. The presence of the Massachusetts heavy artillery, without any ordnance, satisfied them?

A. We had blue coats there, and that seemed to satisfy them.

Q. During your term of service, Colonel, did you observe anything in the conduct of the service there on the part of the Commissary or Medical or Ordnance Departments, or the Engineer's Department or the Signal Service, that would help us in reaching a conclusion as respects these various departments?

A. I think our treatment was excellent in every department, excepting possibly, I might say, that we made requisition for some medical stores that took a long time to reach us.

Q. Do you know upon what medical store or depot you made your requisition?

A. I think we put it through the Department of the East.

Q. Send it to New York?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you establish a hospital?

A. We had a hospital at Salem.

Q. Did you have any difficulty in securing the supplies for it?

A. Well, no; we relied greatly upon this Massachusetts Aid Association, and they supplied us with everything.

Q. As you perhaps know, we are in quest of knowledge, and if you have anything that would assist us—of course, we do not care about having the Government indorsed, incidentally, but if you know anything wrong, we would like to know it.

A. I would not like to say—Quartermaster Heizmann was there, and he did everything he could.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who was in command of Camp Winthrop, or was it Fort Winthrop?

A. Winthrop Head. I think Captain Richmond is now.

Q. Do you know anything about the troops there?

A. No, sir; Richmond's battery was there, but was removed from there. Captain Anderson, I think, was the other captain.

Q. You have no statement of your own to make?

A. No, sir.

BOSTON, MASS., *December 1, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. CHARLES L. HEIZMANN.

Maj. CHARLES L. HEIZMANN was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by the recorder, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, your rank, and your present station.

A. Charles L. Heizmann; major and surgeon of the United States Army; stationed at Fort Adams.

Q. What position did you hold during the late war with Spain?

A. I was surgeon at Fort Adams, mustering-in duty at ———, and from the 14th of August to the 13th of October I was in charge of the general hospital at Montauk, Camp Wikoff.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in what condition you found the hospital at Wikoff on the 14th of August, when you took charge of it, especially in reference to the condition—the extent of preparation made prior to your arrival for the reception of the sick?

A. The hospital was incomplete. It appeared to be—every preparation had been made in the way of material—shall I go into details?

Q. If you please. You are one that can give us certain information that we want.

A. The road from the depot to the hospital had not been finished so as to be available after heavy rains. All the wards contemplated had not been erected; but there was plenty of material in the way of tents, but not enough material then; not for several days afterwards; there were several cessations in the work by the carpenters, due to the nonarrival of material.

Q. Let me ask you right there. At the time you reported for duty, how many hospital tents were up?

A. How many wards?

Q. How many hospital tents? Did you arrange them in wards, five or six together?

A. The intention was to arrange eight to the ward.

Q. Be kind enough to tell me how many hospital tents there were.

A. Six or seven wards; they contemplated sixteen. They were to be floored.

Q. Did they floor the tents?

A. The tents were floored. The flooring for the others was in process of erection.

Q. Let me understand definitely. Eight tents you say in a row? Eight tents constituted a ward?

A. I think so; yes, sir.

Q. You had how many wards?

A. The main area occupied by the general hospital was 16. Afterwards they added to it and annexed.

Q. On the 14th of August?

A. When we made the hospital.

Q. You had 16 wards ready for the reception of patients on the 14th of August?

A. No, sir; not more than eight.

Q. That would be 64 hospital tents?

A. Yes, sir. I will not say—yes, sir; 64 at that time.

Q. Was there a good abundance of hospital tents on the ground?

A. There appeared to be. I never knew any delay excepting on account of the flooring, and the tents were always there.

Q. On the 14th of August?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the 21st of August, how many tents?

A. Each hospital had been completed.

Q. You had how many wards?

A. That would be 16.

Q. Sixteen by eight?

A. I am talking of wards.

Q. On the 14th there were 64 hospital tents; on the 21st there were double that number—128?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the first day of September, how many hospital tents were there?

A. There were 17 wards, and there were by the 1st of September, I think, twelve or fifteen, in the annex.

Q. Twelve or fifteen in addition to those already constituted?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were 81 wards before?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That would be 96?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then in round numbers there were 100 additional?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Six hundred and twenty-four tents on the 1st of September?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many men were intended to occupy the tents?

A. Only five comfortably, but often more than that.

Q. There were 1,125 beds?

A. At five; yes, sir.

Q. On the 1st of September?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not at the time the 224 tents were up, there was further tentage at the hospital?

A. Oh, yes; we had to utilize tentage put up for the mess rooms.

Q. Leaving out of consideration all administration wards and tents, how many more tents on the 1st of September than 224 were there that might be occupied by the sick; not erected, but on the ground ready to be put up?

A. How many tents? There were always plenty of tents, as far as my observation went. Always appeared to be plenty of tents. Never any hitch in the matter of tents.

Q. I understand from what you have said, there was delay in securing lumber necessary for flooring?

A. On two occasions the carpenters were not working on account of lumber.

Q. How much delay was caused by the inability to get lumber?

A. On those two occasions—not more than three or four hours.

Q. Then the tents were ready?

A. The carpenters could go to work again.

Q. Do you know how many patients there were in the hospital at the time you took charge?

A. No; I don't remember exactly; I think only 42. The ships had not commenced to arrive. They arrived that day.

Q. Were the sick in it at the time you took charge, the detachments from Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There was ample room at the time you took charge for all the sick then on the island at the Point?

A. Ample room.

Q. When did the transports begin coming in?

A. On the 13th.

Q. Was that practically the first men from Cuba that reported there on the 14th?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time these men began to come in, was the hospital not only prepared so far as tentage and flooring were concerned, but also in respect to cots and bedding?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there a sufficient amount of hospital utensils for all needed operations?

A. For the number of patients.

Q. There has been a great complaint that bedpans were lacking for a considerable length of time—no hot-water bottles—no hypodermic syringes—practically, no thermometers. Be kind enough to tell us how many of each of these articles there were.

A. We were short of those articles. When I said that we were prepared, I understood from Colonel Forwood that requisitions had been made to furnish all these things; but they could not be found. There were only a few syringes, bedpans, water bottles, a few clinical thermometers. Miss Helen Gould furnished a number. Doctors furnished their own. I never could understand why there were a considerable number of medicines short. I never could understand why this delay.

Q. Did you understand from Colonel Forwood that the requisitions had been made?

A. Yes, sir. I never could understand until a short time ago. I met Major Brown, my executive officer, during that period. He told me he was left behind, after I left, to clear up all property. He told me that all these things for which we had been anxiously looking were found under a lot of quartermaster's property.

Q. At the time they broke up the camp?

A. Yes, sir. I don't know how long they had been there.

Q. Did you, at this time, when there was a marked shortage of all these necessary things, make a formal demand upon the Medical Department?

A. Immediately, by telegraph. Colonel Forwood and I together wrote out a long telegram, and a few days after we sent another.

Q. Did you get any answer to that?

A. Not to any telegram; the things commenced to arrive from time to time.

Q. Was the supply at any time prior to the 1st of September approximately ample?

A. No, sir.

Q. To whom was the telegram sent?

A. To Colonel Brown, of New York. When I saw the shortage of certain things, medicines and utensils, the Red Cross Society furnished the camp and invited me to tell them our needs.

Q. So far as you know, the articles that were telegraphed for were received, only slowly?

A. As far as I know, they were received slowly.

Q. You don't know to what extent; were the requisitions ever fully answered?

A. In the course of time, always.

Q. Were the requisitions of avail and did you secure the articles required at any time prior to breaking up?

A. As far as I know; there were a great many things which I purchased.

Q. As the transports came in was there a large or small demand upon you for hospital accommodations?

A. The demand was very pressing and very large, fully up to the middle of September.

Q. You were able to supply the demand?

A. Always, at the general hospital.

Q. In what way?

A. By crowding.

Q. If there was this large number of tents still remaining there unpitched, what was the difficulty in having those tents put up and relieving the crowding which you say existed?

A. They were eventually put up.

Q. Not in time to answer the necessities?

A. There was no overcrowding; there was crowding.

Q. Crowded up to eight?

A. Not in every tent; in some tents.

Q. Was there at any time while you were in charge of that hospital such condition of the hospital that you could not receive the sick men that the hospital corps brought from regimental camps?

A. Never during the day; at night the hospital might be crowded.

Q. What was there to prevent you from having had in reserve 50 to 100 hospital tents erected?

A. They could have been used for hospital tents, yes, sir, if the patients arrived in the daytime; when patients arrived at 10 or 11 o'clock at night there was no one to put up flies

Q. What was there to prevent your having on hand from 20—20, 50, 200, if necessary, hospital tents?

A. That is something I don't know anything about: I had no charge of the construction.

Q. The trouble is simply this, Doctor; there were, as you say, an abundance of hospital tents on that ground and yet the men were refused admission to the general hospital on the ground that there was no room for them. I am trying to find out—what we all are—why, with these tents on the ground, within two miles distance at the outside, there should ever have been a man refused admission to the general hospital day or night, with this surplus of tents.

A. That may have been due to a lack of bedding.

Q. Was there any difficulty in getting beds and bedding?

A. Yes; they were among these stores they found, these stores that were buried.

Q. Somewhere between the supply depot in New York and your hospital the necessary articles—very much needed—were left?

A. At the depot at Montauk.

Q. Who was the quartermaster in charge of that matter at Montauk?

A. Two or three. Knight, Captain Patten (who had charge, immediate charge, of transportation, I don't know—the transportation of persons while Knight was there), and subsequently Captain Parkman.

Q. Do you know whether or not any attempt was made to secure hospital tents in sufficient quantity to supply all demands of that place by Forwood, in charge of the work?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't know whether or not he was aware of the fact that tentage and hospital supplies in abundance had been sent there and were still at the depot undelivered?

A. I don't know.

Q. Is it, or is it not, a fact that men were refused admittance to the general hospital—the night hospital corps—on the ground that there was no room for them?

A. I don't know. Men were refused. It was reported by Major Thompson that men were brought up there slightly sick from camp, trying to get into the hospital on account of good treatment, and he had sent them back. I never heard of a seriously sick man being refused.

Q. Do you know any instance in which six men were brought up to the hospital one afternoon and refused admittance on the ground that there was no room for them; they were taken back to the tents in the regimental camp, and one died before morning?

A. I never heard of anything of the kind.

Q. Do you know anything about the case of a man brought by Dr. Tabor from the Seventh or Eighth Infantry who was refused admittance, and the man was taken back to the tent and died before morning?

A. I never heard of it.

Q. As I understand you, by the 1st of September things began to get in better

shape as respects supplies. You think that prior to the 20th of September you were sufficiently supplied with hospital furniture?

A. Before the 20th of September. I think that by September 20 the supplies were ample.

Q. In every respect?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much of this supply was secured from the benefit associations—the Red Cross, the Voluntary Aid, the Massachusetts Aid, or any other aid association—not from the Government?

A. It is very hard to give the percentage. There was a great deal of the Red Cross property there.

Q. Do you know whether or not any medical department of the Army found it impossible to get supplies of the character we are now considering; that is to say, hospital furniture, beds, cots, mattresses, sheets, pillowcases, blankets, bedpans, thermometers, hypodermic syringes—in short, everything needed in the hospital; whether or not it was possible for the Medical Department to get these things at the time you didn't have them?

A. I don't know.

Q. If the Red Cross and other societies could get these things and had these things on the ground why could not the Medical Department of the Army have gotten them.

A. Because, at first, until the arrival of the Surgeon-General in the latter part of August or in September, it was very difficult—my attention was confined to the needs of the hospital, of various doctors, nurses, and so on. I could not make requisitions myself direct, on Colonel Brown in New York; they would not have been honored. I had to wait until I could see Forwood.

Q. Was he near by?

A. In charge of the organization and direction of everything on the island in the shape of hospitals or anything to take care of the sick. I think he had charge of the construction of camps. He could hardly be found; sometimes I have not seen him for eight or ten hours. There was delay. Whenever I saw him and represented such things he instantly telegraphed; but there was delay until the general surgeon came there, and on my representation he authorized Colonel Brown to honor any of my telegrams.

Q. Did you, or did you not, have a sufficient force of orderlies to enable you to send to any part of the camp properly?

A. I never had any orderlies—not sufficient to do with.

Q. Was any request made?

A. The orderlies would report there every day. Their number was gradually increased to nine, but when you wanted an orderly you could not find them. The discipline was very lax.

Q. Who had charge of the discipline of the hospital?

A. I had.

Q. Were the orderlies ordered to report to you?

A. Yes, sir; some. I ordered them to report to the executive officer. Send an orderly away, that would be the last of it.

Q. Did you take occasion to bring up any of these men to prefer charges against them?

A. Not of orderlies. I have had occasion to prefer charges against my own men.

Q. Were these orderlies when reported for duty to you under your orders?

A. Under my orders.

Q. Therefore it would have been perfectly right and proper for you to prefer charges against them?

A. It would not have remedied things. The next orderlies—the changed every day there—would be from different regiments.

Q. If half a dozen orderlies were put in the guardhouse for ten days, would you have had a continuance of this sort of trouble?

A. It would have had a restraining influence if the guard had been a permanent one, but with temporary guards it would have been useless, as the others would never hear of it.

Q. You therefore think it was impossible for you to answer the demands upon you, because you could not find Forwood?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There was no way of reaching him—you had no means of communication with him except as he happened to turn up?

A. That is all. If I could get an orderly. Sometimes I did succeed in getting orderlies to send to him.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How far were his quarters?

A. He was all over the island.

Q. How far—

A. At the third house, within sight—

Q. Didn't you see him every day?

A. Yes, sir. He usually came to the hospital in the morning. There were constant demands upon his attention. It was the most difficult thing in the world to get conversation with him for even half a minute to represent anything, people were so impatient to see Colonel Forwood—to see some officer there. I never saw anything like it; in fact, when I left there, I thought I was a misanthrope forever. Colonel Forwood, Major Brown, and myself would be talking and six or eight would say, "Attend to me first." It was absolutely impossible to get him aside to represent what was needed.

Q. When you took charge of that hospital, was there any guard assigned to you?

A. Not for the first few days.

Q. After that a guard was assigned?

A. Yes, sir; a gradual increase from 3 posts, 9 men, to 15 posts, 45 men.

Q. Do you think it possible to properly guard and protect and manage the discipline in a hospital of 1,100 beds with 3 men?

A. With the aid of the hospital corps; yes, sir.

Q. Would it not have been perfectly easy to have had a guard there to relieve you from this annoyance?

A. A permanent guard?

Q. Any application made for this?

A. Yes, sir; I made application as soon as I saw the inadequacy. Some of the guard was made up of troops who knew nothing whatsoever. The guard at night knew nothing about instructions in any case of fire.

Q. Did you make a formal demand upon the authorities for a permanent guard?

A. After some time; as soon as I found out that changing the guard was inefficient.

Q. Was your demand answered?

A. There was an attempt made to bring a battalion and regiment there. It was ordered away the same day. Another regiment was ordered away the next day. No effort was made after that.

Q. Was it not possible, in your judgment, for a permanent detail of a sufficient number of men to answer the necessary purpose to have been made from the start?

A. No, sir; I think not. Everybody who came was sick.

Q. Were there or were there not men from the interior posts that could have been ordered there if necessary?

A. That is something I know nothing at all about.

Q. The question is this: I am trying to find out whether the United States Army was in such condition that a permanent detail could be sent there.

A. Yes, sir; I think so. There was at Fort Adams.

Q. Then, as I understand it, was it or was it not practicable at that time for the Medical Department of the Army to have sent there not 1, but, if necessary, 50, medical officers to relieve Forwood and yourself of the duties just referred to, so that you could attend properly to the duties devolving upon you?

A. I don't know the status of the corps.

Q. Was it or was it not practicable to secure a corps of attendants of medical men to go there to relieve, or to be sent officially to relieve, the regular officers familiar with the duties, so that these regular officers could have been sent there to have done so? You and Forwood were the only regular officers there for quite a while?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it not practicable to have had regular officers detailed from some posts in New England or the Department of the East—the Atlantic?

A. The only post I know of regular officers in New England was Trumbull. All the regular officers had been taken away from the other posts in New England.

Q. Was it not practicable for Forwood to have deputed medical officers there to relieve him of a certain amount of annoyance which prevented his keeping proper watch of the hospital and hospital matters?

A. He had to refer everything to the Surgeon-General; the Surgeon-General might have had officers. I don't know the status of the corps. Whether a man could be expected—

Q. Your own duties as surgeon in charge were very largely paper duties?

A. To get the machine going.

Q. Was it or was it not a matter of more importance to have the paper work attended to or the hospital thoroughly watched and cared for, so that there should be no overcrowding on the part of patients, and especially of visitors?

A. I considered it my duty as far as possible to watch that. I appointed an officer immediately in charge of the reception and the taking away of patients, and cautioned him constantly.

Q. During the first three weeks of your stay there how many medical officers under your command reported to you for duty in caring for the sick proper?

A. The first few days only two acting assistants, I think. Before twenty days had expired I think we had fully fifteen or twenty. In the early stage physicians volunteered—I remember two instances, not connected with the Army—to take care of the sick; one placed in charge of the ward, one in charge of the Red Cross.

Q. Were some brought into the hospital during the first few weeks after you took charge slightly ill?

A. There were plenty of seriously sick all the time.

Q. Was there or was there not, in your judgment, a sufficient number of medical men to take proper medical care of the seriously ill during the first twenty days?

A. A part of the twenty days we had sufficient; the early part we didn't have. At one time there were nearly 1,700 patients. At that period I don't remember exactly what it was. I don't think we had sufficient men until midway between the dates.

Q. You had not a sufficient number of men to take care of the sick properly?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know what efforts were made, if any, to secure additional medical men at this time?

A. Colonel Forwood telegraphed. Medical men were ordered there but didn't come. Some regular officers were ordered there but never did report. The orders were changed for some reason or other.

Q. Would there or would there not, in your judgment, have been difficulty in securing a sufficient number of competent, well-trained doctors to answer all requirements of that hospital—to furnish men with proper medical care?

A. I don't know. It would get men away from their practice.

Q. The question was whether such men could have been secured or not.

A. I don't know.

Q. Were you at the time you arrived there, or at any subsequent period within a comparatively short time, informed of the number of sick you might reasonably expect would go there?

A. Never, until they arrived.

Q. It was thoroughly understood at that time that all the army of Cuba was coming home?

A. I think so.

Q. It was reported at the time that there was a very large number of sick men in Cuba?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It was naturally to be inferred by the medical officers of the Army and at Montauk that a large number of sick men must necessarily come upon you?

A. Yes, sir; that was the natural inference.

Q. Out of 17,000 men the probabilities were that there would be a very large number seriously ill?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The hospital accommodation, at its utmost, while you were there was how large?

A. The general hospital?

Q. Yes.

A. The maximum number—could take care of over 2,000.

Q. You could have sheltered 2,000?

A. Yes, sir, and fed.

Q. You were supplied with medical stores sufficient for 2,000?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. These 2,000—the heavy press came upon you in the last of August?

A. In the meantime we had drugs; the Red Cross had furnished hypodermic syringes, thermometers, bedpans, and so on; so the sick could be provided for.

Q. Taking the number you have given us—1,700—which I understand you to say you had between August 13 and September 1—

A. After the 1st of September.

Q. I understand you to say midway between these periods?

A. We talked about the 20th of September. Let me see how I can fix that—very early in September or the last of August.

Q. What percentage of those men required careful medical attention? Half?

A. Oh, yes; fully one-half.

Q. That would bring it down to, we will say, in the neighborhood of 900. Do you think it possible for 900 men to be properly cared for by 20 doctors, the outside number you have spoken of as being there?

A. Yes, if the doctors worked as they did there.

Q. Is it for the best interests of doctors or patients for men to be overworked?

A. No, sir.

Q. In your judgment, is it not a fact that the 900 seriously ill soldiers would have been better cared for had there been a larger number of doctors, properly cared for, to look after them?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that during a very considerable part of the time of stress, when the pressure was upon you, you didn't have more than half, or at most two-thirds, of 20 doctors?

A. I could not say. I think the most we ever had was 20 doctors at the time of the greatest stress; that is, when the 1,700 patients were there. We must have had 20 doctors altogether.

Q. Were these doctors, as you observed them, efficient, or otherwise?

A. As far as I know.

Q. As a general statement?

A. As far as I knew, they were all efficient.

Q. Was any man reported to you as being incompetent, either from want of knowledge, skill, interest, or on account of habits?

A. Two were reported to me unfit because of their habits.

Q. What was done with those men?

A. One was ordered out by Colonel Forwood, the other by myself.

Q. As respects your nursing force, when you arrived there on the 13th and opened the hospital, how many nurses had you—not speaking about outside men—of the nursing force proper?

A. We had 30 hospital corps men. Of those, I doubt very much whether five knew anything about nursing.

Q. Those 30 whom you call hospital corps men were constantly occupied with proper nursing duty, or employed in policing?

A. Except we used them as nurses and as cooks. One or two—two, I think—were cooks, enlisted men, at that time.

Q. At that time, we will say on the 15th of August, how many patients in the hospital?

A. On the 13th?

Q. Fifteenth?

A. The first ship brought in—I could not say; perhaps three or four hundred.

Q. Assuming there were 300 at that time, you had 30 hospital corps men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of these, how many on duty by day and how many at night?

A. Two by day and one by night. They were very inefficient in number.

Q. Speaking generally, was there any considerable portion of the hospital corps men in any way qualified for duties as nurses?

A. No, sir; I think the vast majority of them knew nothing whatsoever about it. They had been enlisted from civil life.

Q. Knowing the fact that a large number of sick were assumed to arrive, that a large hospital was being put in shape to receive them, was it or was it not, in your judgment, a wise thing to provide as a nursing force men belonging to the Hospital Corps, a large proportion of which you state were absolutely unacquainted with any duties required? Was it a wise thing?

A. No, sir.

Q. How did it happen that nearly three months after the war was declared—May, June, July, August—four months—nearly four months after the war was declared, absolutely inefficient men, in a great proportion of those present, were put there at Montauk to take charge of men known to be seriously ill—not only that, but practically a whole army sick?

A. I suppose the Government—they could not get men very wise.

Q. Was there no other way in which nurses could have been obtained?

A. We tried. We sent for more nurses. Nine or ten reported and abandoned us.

Q. On what ground?

A. We didn't look after them sufficiently—beds and bedding.

Q. Has your observation of male nurses gone far enough to enable you to pass an opinion on male nurses?

A. No, sir; I think not. Not until the Red Cross nurses—the lady nurses—came.

Q. Was there not difficulty in securing on the 6th or 7th of August a sufficient number of female nurses to answer all possible requirements at that hospital?

A. I think not. We had all we possibly wanted afterwards. I think there was no difficulty.

Q. Do you know any reason why a considerable number of them—perhaps 50—were secured ready to go and awaiting orders to go, and they were declined, and refusal was given to permit them to go to Montauk for a period of ten days?

A. No; I saw several nurses there. They told me they would come. Why they were not employed I don't know.

Q. Had any provision been made which could by any possibility secure the proper corps of female nurses? They came there on August 7, the time, I think, when the hospital was first begun. Or, take it on the 13th, when you reported. You say the principal purpose was to get the tents and flooring up for the sick?

A. There were no tents then; even the officers didn't have any. We had no shelter.

Q. Had no tents been put up in the general camp—ordinary wall tents?

A. No, sir.

Q. The camps were not ready at that time to receive any men?

A. No, sir. I could not get any tents.

Q. The camp at large?

A. I don't know. I never had time to look outside the camp—never.

Q. During the time the nursing was done by the hospital corps, what was the character of the hospital wards as respects cleanliness, and what was the care taken of the patients' excrements?

A. They showed a great deal of negligence or inability, but kept the wards clean and took care of the excrements.

Q. How long did that condition of things last?

A. Until we were pretty well equipped for female nurses.

Q. Not until the female nurses in considerable number arrived there were you able to take proper care of the hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Means of transport? Any hospital transportation?

A. There were 17 ambulances.

Q. Seventeen ambulances under your command?

A. Under the command of Colonel Forwood, to transport the sick off the ships; deficient in number.

Q. Was there any effort made to increase the number of ambulances?

A. Yes, sir. After a few days, three or four days after, I saw a number of new ambulances on the trains. Eventually we had a large number.

Q. If it had been determined in the latter part of July to establish a hospital at Montauk for 17,000 sick men, there would have been no difficulty in securing ambulances to any needed extent?

A. No, sir; I believe if that camp had been started—preparations made—a week before it was, it would have been fully organized and equipped and received all patients that came there.

Q. Do you know why the beginning of this thing was not in the latter part of July?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you been informed by Forwood or anyone else?

A. No, sir. All I know is when the troops first arrived in Montauk there was absolutely nothing there—Brown was surgeon—absolutely nothing. We had typhoid fever cases, too.

Q. Were you able to have your necessary hospital supplies transported, and as rapidly as you desired, from the station to your hospital?

A. Yes, sir; I never had any difficulty; there were hitches before we came.

Q. Were you supplied by the Government Commissary Department or Hospital Department with proper food for those patients in sufficient quantity?

A. Not at the beginning. The first rations—60 cents—were all soldiers' rations. We had no means of purchasing extras.

Q. You had no hospital food?

A. In the latter part of August—we knew nothing at all about the 60-cent ration—General Wheeler informed me about—it must have been the 18th of—no, about the 25th of August.

Q. The 25th?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Not until the 25th? You received notification on the 25th there was such an order? Do you remember the date of the order?

A. No, sir; I think the 16th.

Q. The 10th.

A. It was dated back.

Q. The general order, 60 cents, was dated August 10. The public order bears date of August 10. You therefore were about two weeks finding out about that order.

A. I arrived on the 14th. This was ten days after.

Q. I didn't mean you personally. Those at Montauk. You were two weeks finding out from Washington that an order of the extremest importance, with reference to the feeding of the sick, had been issued.

A. Yes, sir; and then General Wheeler told me to see the commissaries. The only way I could find the order was to go to the depot, two hours from the hospital. General Wheeler wanted to know how to get this money.

Q. You didn't see the order?

A. No, sir.

Q. You immediately made requisition for the money?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was the money paid you at once?

A. Yes; that is, the supply of reasonable wants of any sick man in the service; the order contemplated, taken with the ration, would have been sufficient.

Q. Sufficient? Take a thousand-bed hospital, as yours was, or similar. Do you think it is possible for the patients in that hospital to use up 60 cents per day per man?

A. I could not tell from individual experience, because I might purchase commissary supplies which amount, have amounted, in fact, to about \$1.20 per ration. A lot of canned stuff—I should think 60 cents would be sufficient; 60 cents per ration.

Q. Think you 60 cents—that ration—would not feed the ordinary hospital patient?

A. It would not take in ginger ale; there was a great demand for that, and for fruit; oranges were very expensive.

Q. You are familiar with supplying a hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear of the patients in any hospital being given apollinaris water as a common drink?

A. Oh, no.

Q. A good many things need not have been purchased?

A. That is the idea.

Q. Did you or did you not have an abundance of ice there at the time you arrived?

A. It was difficult, but we managed to get it.

Q. The effort was directed in what directions?

A. In getting it out of this fund from New York.

Q. Before that?

A. The ice house at Montauk Point was in possession of a very curious character who seemed to be anxious to make money. I personally appealed to him, but he would not open his ice house.

Q. Was it or was it not possible to have purchased ice in New York, New Haven, New London, Newport, Boston, and gotten the ice there in time so it could have been issued?

A. We always had plenty. I telegraphed for ice immediately. I made arrangements with an ice company.

Q. After what date were you abundantly supplied with ice?

A. We absolutely suffered from the want of ice only one day.

Q. How much of ice was furnished you by the Red Cross or other aid societies, and how much purchased by hospitals?

A. I don't remember that the Red Cross furnished any.

Q. As respects milk, were you, in the beginning of your service, able to secure milk as it was needed?

A. Not at the beginning. We probably had enough milk on August 14, but as they came 300 or 400 a day unforeseen we were taken unawares.

Q. Would the matter of anticipating come under your supervision, or Forwood's?

A. Under mine.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty, think you, in so providing beforehand as that nothing should be wanting at that hospital or in that camp?

A. We never had any trouble after we got things started. The little towns west of us were not able to supply milk. We tried that; but we got the milk from New York.

Q. So that milk was supplied to you in sufficient quantity and of good quality?

A. Yes, sir; we had sufficient. We had several thunderstorms, and it had to be watched very carefully.

Q. How often did you find sour milk?

A. We found it quite a number of times.

Q. Could that difficulty have been overcome had you received milk from the North shore, or Long Island center?

A. I think not.

Q. The conditions were such—atmospheric—you think they would have spoiled any milk?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had all the milk you wanted?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long after you took charge of the hospital did you establish the diet kitchen?

A. The special diet kitchen? Probably it was some time—ten days or two weeks.

Q. Was there any reason why there was delay in the establishment of that diet kitchen?

A. I know there were representatives of the societies to establish the kitchen and ready to go to work, but I suppose it was due to the fact that they could not erect tents.

Q. Were there not plenty of tents on hand?

A. I suppose there were. That is all supposition. I know there was a delay in establishing the diet kitchen.

Q. Is it a fact, Doctor, that at that time, certainly before, all the cooking was done with very limited facilities?

A. Yes, sir; very, indeed. And anything special—special diet—would have to be cooked in the ward by the nurses.

Q. And these hospital corps men you have spoken of prepared the diet?

A. We had cooks.

Q. How many?

A. At one time, two; I think, the first week.

Q. And two cooks provided not only the food necessary, but the special food for the seriously sick?

A. No, sir; in fact, I don't think there was any specially cooked food prepared in the general hospital until the diet kitchen was established.

Q. So no ample provision for a kitchen had been made when the hospital was established? A kitchen with two cooks can not run a hospital with 1,000 beds.

A. No, sir.

Q. You don't know the reason?

A. No, sir.

Q. As a result of this, were the meals furnished to those sick, but not dangerously ill, seriously delayed in getting to them and served irregularly?

A. No doubt about that. Inefficient attendance.

Q. Do you know whether any particular nursing was done at night? Did the nurses show their deficiency at night when the medical officers were not about?

A. At all times.

Q. During the first three weeks, before the female nurses came there?

A. Very defective.

Q. As respects your hospital furniture, so to speak: did you have an ample supply of beds, of cots, mattresses, in the first three weeks of your time there?

A. No, sir; men were lying on the floor as late as early in September.

Q. Any difficulty in getting cots and beds in the United States at that time?

A. We telegraphed for them. We knew those were on the way that were found subsequently.

Q. In other words, they didn't come?

A. We expected them every day. The Red Cross supplied them from time to time. The demand was larger than the supply.

Q. It seems from the testimony that we have been getting that the Red Cross had little difficulty in getting what was needed, and to the Medical Department the difficulty was almost insuperable. As respects your supply of sheets, pillowcases, was there any there when you took charge?

A. Yes, sir; enough for that number of patients.

Q. A week later did you have an ample supply?

A. No washing could be done. The soiled linen was thrown out. The laundry commenced fully eighteen days after I arrived.

Q. Was no provision made at the time of your arrival for washing there at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Some trouble in erecting the laundry?

A. I don't know. All these blankets, perhaps, would have been sufficient, but they were burned up.

Q. Do you know whether or not this soiled linen, bedding, clothes, anything of that sort, were kept under the floor of the tent?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the object in putting them under the tent?

A. Because from time to time it was hoped the laundry would start.

Q. Was this advantageous to patients sleeping right over them?

A. I thought it was awful that they should remain there. I protested, but no notice was taken of it.

Q. To whom did you protest?

A. To Forwood.

Q. No notice taken by him?

A. No, sir; I offered to sign a certificate. I urged him to destroy it—to have it destroyed instantly.

Q. Did he follow out your suggestion?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did this soiled stuff accumulate under the tents to the serious detriment of the sick?

A. No, sir; there was plenty of ventilation.

Q. How long did that condition last?

A. Fully ten or twelve days before it was thrown away, and then it was burned up. The laundry had not commenced to run. It was all taken to the laundry and accumulated there, and got to be such a nuisance to the camp that after much ado General Young destroyed it.

Q. No effort made to send this soiled linen away to be cleansed?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you think your men suffered, not in an aesthetic sense, but actually suffered, because they had no clean sheets?

A. No, sir.

Q. Any man allowed, as far as you know, to lie on bedding which had been soiled by typhoid and other excrements?

A. No, sir.

Q. It didn't occur?

A. No, sir; I don't know it didn't occur.

Q. Would you have known it if it had occurred? Did your duties prevent your making proper inspection of wards?

A. It was impossible for me to do so.

Q. Was there any difficulty in having an inspector appointed whose sole duty it would be to see after matters of that sort?

A. No, sir.

Q. That carries us back to the same old point again. As respects the receiving of typhoid excreta, leaving it open, throwing it out, in the first place, around about the hospital; did that occur?

A. Yes, sir; I had to watch that. I went around myself and cautioned the guards; I stationed special guards to prevent it.

Q. They didn't prevent it?

A. No, sir; I never saw anything like it.

Q. Was it or was it not a matter of very decided importance to the welfare of the sick and the welfare of those who supposed they were well to have this typhoid excreta properly cared for?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have a supply of disinfectants?

A. Yes, sir; always plenty of those.

Q. What disinfectants in abundance?

A. Plenty of quicklime and chloride of lime. I bought a lot of that: sulphate of iron. All that sort of thing.

Q. You issued an order as to the proper care of chamber vessels, bedpans, etc.?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. These orders were obeyed?

A. I think they were.

Q. The case I spoke of some time ago to you—two cases taken back to the hospital tent and died there before morning—the case of Hugh Parrott, Eighth Infantry, under the care of Dr. Tabor.

Q. Perhaps his name may remind you now. Do you remember anything about it?

A. No, sir.

Q. You had so many things to look after. Was the hospital at that time furnished with receptacles, galvanized iron or other barrels, to be carted away?

A. I think the first receptacles were wooden, and afterwards we telegraphed for iron and they were used.

Q. Do you know whether, in addition to them, you had received vessels of galvanized iron into which these bedpans were emptied?

A. No, sir.

Q. We will take up the question the Governor suggested. You had an abundance of visitors there?

A. An overabundance.

Q. Any measures adopted to keep this crowd out? I asked you about it earlier in the examination; you said you had one guard of three men.

A. The crowd came after that. It would have taken a corps of troops to run that hospital alone.

Q. Would it or would it not have been practicable to have established a guard at the station to prevent individuals going to the hospital?

A. I think that was done when I first arrived there, and then there were guards stationed to keep the people away from the detention camp.

Q. Was the quarantine strictly maintained in the detention camp?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you or do you not know whether these visitors brought articles of food to patients—given to patients without the consent or knowledge of the doctors?

A. I don't know; it was said so.

Q. Was any official report made to you by the chief of nurses—that was, report coming from the nurses?

A. I don't remember.

Q. How soon did you begin to be distressed by applications for furlough?

A. As soon as the furlough was ordered.

Q. About what time; when was the order issued permitting men to be furloughed?

A. Perhaps about the 24th or 25th of August.

Q. Somewhere along the latter week of August?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there or was there not a strong pressure brought to bear upon you, as officer in charge of the hospital, to grant furloughs to men not fit to travel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have direct charge of that?

A. I had to have direct charge; my signature was necessary.

Q. Did you or did you not find great difficulty in keeping men in the hospital who ought to stay there?

A. Yes, sir; the greatest difficulty.

Q. It has been said that men were sent away from the general hospital at Montauk absolutely unfit for travel—some of them, their unfitness was proven by their falling ill and dying. Do you know whether or not the granting of such furloughs was because you wanted to empty your wards, or wanted to yield to the importunity of patients or friends?

A. Not as far as I was concerned. The system I established was two checks for each man. The doctor had to sign a paper recommending the man for a furlough. That was submitted to me by the man himself. I made an examination, or perhaps warned him in reference to diet, etc. That was until Colonel Greenleaf came there, and then recommended a board of officers.

Q. That was about the 15th of September?

A. Before that, because Greenleaf arrived on the 8th of September.

Q. Forwood left there on the 11th?

A. Greenleaf was in charge several days before Forwood left—three or four days.

Q. Did you yourself see men leaving the hospital unfit to travel?

A. No, sir. I have sent some of them back for certificates.

Q. You never spoke to the men in-transit?

A. Not after a man started for the station; no, sir.

Q. As soon as you signed that furlough he was independent: he could not be sent back by any medical officer?

A. I was confined to that tent all day.

Q. As we have been told, when he got rations and transportation tickets, the individual had to walk in the neighborhood of a mile or a mile and a quarter to the station?

A. Yes, sir; there were not sufficient ambulances. I applied to the Red Cross to get wagons to take them down. The Government proved itself unable to do what the Red Cross was enabled to do—to transport men from the hospital to the station.

Q. Any of the men having been returned from the station supposed to be able to travel?

A. They were.

Q. Did you yourself see the condition of things at the station at any time?

A. No, sir; I never did. I never was out of the hospital but four hours the two months I was there, unless down to the station a few minutes.

Q. The question has been asked if—I would like your reply to it—would there have been the slightest difficulty in appointing an officer—quartermaster, acting quartermaster, or commissary officer—who could have done all this furlough work at the hospital and saved these men?

A. The quartermaster became sick. A young man was appointed quartermaster who had just arrived from Cuba. He was taken sick and left in twenty-four hours; a second man the same way. Then we sent a man there who had just joined the service, but I could not instruct the man, and I took the thing in hand myself.

Q. Were there no officers in all that camp, of all these regular regiments, who could have been there—properly detailed for duty of that sort at the hospital, for the benefit of being at the hospital? As it seems to me—I am free to say—there was not the slightest difficulty in the world in having a lay officer at the hospital instead of having them at the station. It would have saved the men a vast deal of trouble.

• A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would not the hospital have furnished a tent or tents for this quartermaster and commissary at the station, who was occupied with furlough business, and, as we understand it, five clerks or more? Why was it not possible?

A. I could have given him a place.

Q. Would it not have very much facilitated matters?

A. Yes, sir; very much.

Q. Is there any reason at all—you, as an old officer of the Army, know apparently the condition of things—any reason in the world why a very large proportion of the work that you had to do in charge of the hospital might not have been done by a lieutenant? You had to spend your time signing furloughs; could it not have been done by a subofficer or lay officer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had to deal with a multitude of papers. Could not that have been done by somebody else?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If the paper work had been taken away from the Army in a large measure, and only that left for which a professional opinion was needed, would it not have allowed you and every other officer to have taken better care of your hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why was not something of that sort done?

A. We would have to have somebody familiar with the work.

Q. Which is of the most importance to an army, the filling out of a lot of papers or caring for the sick?

A. There must be some papers—the name of the sick, the conditions, etc.

Q. Was there not a system in the hospital of bed cards?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A doctor in charge of the ward?

A. Yes, sir. The bed cards—each doctor had a book to record all that.

Q. Would it not have been perfectly easy to have taken those bed cards and kept a card catalogue instead of entering them in the record book?

A. The books consisted of scraps of paper.

Q. Were you or were you not at times in receipt of orders from Dr. Forwood that were very quickly countermanded by you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it or was it not unpleasant to you in the discharge of your duties that orders were so given that were countermanded almost as soon as issued?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you or did you not know of instances at your own hospital of Forwood's issuing an order and before the man receiving it could get out of the tent he was called back and the order turned down and a change made?

A. I don't remember the incident.

Q. We have had testimony somewhat to that effect. Was there or was there not a disposition to issue and countermand orders there?

A. No, sir. The orders I referred to were getting ready for a number of sick, or to take so many to the depot to ship. Those were the only orders that conflicted a great deal with the running of the hospital. That, I suppose, was due to the fact of the conditions at the depot.

Q. Then, as respects matters of detail, which, as I understand it, Forwood's attention was directed to not a little, were there or were there not conflicting orders issued frequently, so far as you know?

A. No, sir.

Q. The last question I want to ask you is, why, so far as you know, that hospital, amply supplied with empty beds in abundance, with medical supplies in abundance, hospital stores in abundance; in a word, why was the hospital always living from hand to mouth until the very last of it? What was the reason? Was it in the conditions there existing, in the place, in the system? Was it in the individual?

A. I think one reason, as I say, is, the first supplies were buried under the quartermaster's stores; it was partly due to the railroad accommodations: the cars got all mixed up there. One car arrived there with stores for hospital, commissary stores—produce—which was shipped from New York over two weeks before I received notification; it had been at the depot two weeks and lost among the cars there. The day before I left I received a note stating that such a car had been there.

Q. Express freight or ordinary?

A. Rail freight: there was an instance of a car which had been around the depot two weeks.

Q. If I ever knew, I don't know now about the quartermaster's department. Freight arriving at that station, ought it to come direct to you or direct to the local quartermaster?

A. The quartermaster had nothing to do with it; it should come direct to me.

Q. Whose business was it to notify you of the arrival?

A. Freight agent.

Q. Was the freight agent a railroad employee or Government officer?

A. A railroad employee.

Q. Therefore, the railroad not having notified you, you were unaware of the condition of things. This was a single instance?

A. That was one instance.

Q. No explanation given you?

A. None at all; he was much mortified. The agent took the thing up personally.

Q. Did the railroad company, as a rule, promptly notify you of the receipt of hospital stores?

A. Yes, sir; I had an officer every day there, but an officer is a very unfortunate man looking after stores.

Q. Then, with the exception of this one case you speak of, you have no good reason for complaining of the delay of the railroad company?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then as respects the quartermaster's transportation of these stores?

A. The quartermaster brought them up; we had trouble occasionally. There was a good deal of stealing. There were no wagons in connection with a great many trains. There were five or six wagons; those were open. It was very annoying, but the officer whom I had stationed there, a member of the Hospital Corps, was very active in that way. If they went in the morning, we managed to get a delivery by noon; the hospital got it by dark.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us, as the result of your observation, what changes, in your judgment, should be made in the administration of medical affairs, to avoid the delays, the mistakes, the errors of the last war?

A. That question requires a great deal of thought. I think that the matter of transportation should be in the hands of the officers who are responsible, especially responsible, for sick people; in other words, I believe the medical force should have its own quartermaster's department. I think, also, there should be as officers of the Medical Department a number of officers sanitary engineers. Now, for instance, after the engineers took hold there, there was a vast change in the erection of tents, flooring, buildings, everything. We had a young man, an officer of the Engineer Corps, sanitary engineer; it was his special study. It was marvelous the amount of work he could get out of his employees, out of his own soldiers and volunteers, and out of ordinary laborers. I think the Medical Corps should have an engineer corps and a quartermaster's corps of its own.

Q. As respects the Hospital Corps, what about the change in that?

A. I have nothing to say. I think it would have been better to have had a volunteer corps.

Q. The Hospital Corps has not been efficient during the war?

A. When they have nothing to do, they do well. The men who had been in the Hospital Corps for some time were very efficient.

Q. Do you think it possible to teach men, at ordinary posts, in times of peace, the nursing part of it? Your hospital facilities—are they such as to permit of men being trained as nurses?

A. Yes, sir; you can teach them sanitation.

Q. Is it not the fact that the chief attention has been directed to training them for service in the field in the time of action, to make them first-aid men and not nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

BOSTON, MASS., *December 1, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF DR. DANIEL FISKE JONES.**

DR. DANIEL FISKE JONES was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your full name, residence, your profession, and time you have been practicing.

A. Daniel Fiske Jones; 261 Beacon street, Boston. I graduated from the Harvard Medical School in 1896, from the Massachusetts General Hospital on April 1, 1897, and am now in practice.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us whether or not you had an opportunity to see anything whatever of the sick or wounded during the late war with Spain.

A. I did, sir; the first part of August.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us, in your own way, what you saw and where you saw it.

A. I was asked to go South with the Hon. Sherman Hoar by the Volunteer Aid Association. We left here August 4; went to New York August 5. We visited the main hospital on Staten Island, where everything was in very good shape. The same day we went to Fort Wadsworth, on Staten Island, where Major Hall was in charge and he was very badly mixed up; he was in a terrible state—very much overworked. The assistants that I saw were all overworked; had been up all night. He said he didn't know what he could do—no nurses, no doctors. His hospital was full and the tents were full. We didn't see the sick there. From New York we took the train and got to Fort Monroe on the morning of August 6. The day before that the *Oblong* had come in with 46 to 48 sick aboard, one surgeon; I don't know how many hospital corps men. These were being unloaded onto the wharf. The men were terrible sights. They were most of them—I have forgotten the doctor's name in charge; he said they were most of them—typhoid; men were almost naked; their lips, teeth, and gums were covered—their lips were in a terrible condition. It was the most pitiable sight I have ever seen among the sick. They were lying in their own urine.

Q. In the hospital or on the boat?

A. On deck.

Q. Just being received?

A. Yes, sir. They were unloaded from the ship onto a smaller boat, from the smaller boat onto the wharf, then to a flat car, then taken up as near the hospital as they could get, and taken from there on stretchers to the hospital. Among these typhoids I think three had hemorrhages there that day. It was pitiable to see them lying there that way without proper attention all this time—from the time they began to unload—three or four hours. They cried out as they were being carried along and while they were being changed from one place to the other. All held onto their abdomens and complained of pain. In fact, as I was told, there were two cases well along where you would expect hemorrhages. They were taken care of by the hospital. The next day one man died.

That same afternoon the *Lampasas* came in with 116 sick and wounded. Most of them were just simply sick. They were in better condition, a great deal. Fortunately there were some twenty-two Red Cross nurses sent back on the *Lampasas*, not to take care of patients, but as passengers on board of this ship. These nurses were all very tired, very much used up by their work, and what they would have done if they had not turned in and done the work themselves, though not asked to, I do not see. The men when they got there were in very poor

shape. These nurses said they were sent back—ordered back home—because they were not wanted. Most of the men had typhoid, in the third week. It was said positively that the nurses were not sent back to look after the sick. They were simply passengers on this *Lampasas*, and there were 116 sick, and three doctors—Dr. Parke was one. They were all positively used up when they got there, as well as the nurses.

Q. As respects the statement made in regard to the nurses, was it made to you?

A. I talked with the nurses.

Q. They told you so? They were discharged because there was no further use for them?

A. They didn't say so; they said they were sent home.

Q. Were those men from Santiago?

A. From Porto Rico.

Q. Let me ask you, in this connection, whether you had occasion to visit the *Obdam* yourself?

A. No, sir.

Q. You don't know as to her preparation for the transportation of the sick?

A. I went aboard the *Lampasas* just a minute, to find out what they needed in the way of medicines, etc. When the *Lampasas* reached Fort Monroe, Major De Witt told me himself he had not expected the ship to land there; he had no knowledge of it whatever. The doctors particularly had no knowledge of where they were to go. They waited there for some time and finally, after several telegrams had been sent saying it was positively necessary they must be landed, they were landed at Fort Monroe. When they got there, they were out of milk, tea, ice, alcohol, brandy; they had nothing in the way of a mouth wash for these patients. All they had was a little granam, or some such food.

Q. On the *Lampasas*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In regard to the *Obdam*, do you know whether or not there was a medical officer on board?

A. There was one on board.

Q. Do you know his name?

A. I can not possibly tell you now. I have been trying to think of his name.

Q. On the 6th of August?

A. She arrived on the 5th; I was told she did. She unloaded on the morning of the 6th. The *Lampasas* came in on the afternoon of the 6th and unloaded on the morning of the 7th.

Q. Did you have occasion to see these men in the hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what condition were they?

A. Many had bedsores.

Q. In regard to the care taken of them there?

A. I would like to say here that Fort Monroe hospital is a most excellent one in every respect. The tents were clean, comfortable, and looked after in excellent manner in every way.

Q. Do you know from what town or towns in Porto Rico these men came?

A. Most of them came, I think, from Ponce; that was the first landing. Many of the Sixth Massachusetts came on the *Yale*; the first lot landed there.

Q. Do I understand you correctly—they came over on the *Yale*, and were as quickly as possible returned to Camp Alger on account of being sick?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether they were sick when they left Camp Alger or supposed to be—those returned in this short time you speak of?

A. No, sir; some of them were not feeling well. They were not very sick. They were put to bed on the *Yale*.

Q. Were they sick when they arrived at Camp Alger?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Go on, please, and tell us what you wish. Have you said all you want to about Fort Monroe?

A. The statements of these men about their treatment aboard the *Yale*; the food they got was something terrible, and the way they were cooped up there.

Q. Do you know whether or not the *Yale* was a transport?

A. She was a cruiser.

Q. A Government cruiser?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know why she was put upon this special service—transporting troops?

A. I don't know, unless simply because she was so fast. I would like to say there was a long article in the paper at one time, bringing out the fact that Fort Monroe hospital was not properly run—didn't have proper provisions, etc. While I was there the men were all exceedingly happy and contented. The only time—the man wrote this letter at a time when the *Lampasas* came in; there could not be any milk found around the country, on account of a hail and thunder storm; it was impossible to get it. I took a trip around on purpose and could not find any anywhere. The hospital major, De Witt, kept them in most excellent order. From there we went to Cincinnati and rode out to Fort Thomas. The hospital there had just changed hands. The major in charge was not Major Hall, the man who had been in charge. I could not say anything about him. Things were not in proper shape then. There is very little to say there. Since then we went to Chickamauga. In the morning we went out to Camp Thomas. We got there and went to the camp of one of the regiments whose sick list was supposed to be one of the smallest there and whose officers prided themselves on the care of the men; yet, within 50 yards—not more than 50 yards out of the colonel's tents—was a sink entirely uncovered, so far as any board or lumber you could see—

Q. What regiment?

A. Eighth Ohio. We went around there a little. There was some lumber scattered around. The officers, many of them, had not seen any such thing as that, showing that they had not thought of any such thing before. Here, in talking with Major Coggsell, we found that he had found it impossible to get anything from the quartermaster's department. He had sent in requisitions for the simplest things—the most necessary things, in every way; but the requisitions had not been honored and no attention had been paid to them at all. We went to the detention hospital of this division that the Eighth was in. Major Clark was in charge, and Griffin was commissary of the hospital. Clark told me it was made to hold at least, or almost, 225; there had been 275 or 280 patients. The hospital was much crowded in every way for nothing but a tent hospital. He had made every effort—requisitions—he had even been to the quartermaster to see if he could get boards to make floors; all he had been able to get was enough to make an aisle between the cots. There was a single aisle and one board between each cot. The cots were exceedingly near together, so you could just squeeze in by going sideways. We asked Major Clark if they needed any loose netting; the patients were covered with flies. He said they had a supply, but could not use it, the patients were so near together. We asked them if they could not get hospital tents enough where they had so much crowding. He said it was absolutely impossible; he had tried in every way. He had talked with the

quartermaster, who had made a remark which he didn't care to repeat to me; he had told him when the war was over he hoped he would be hung and would be very glad to help him do it. Ice he could only get from the Red Cross; he had tried to get it in many ways from the Government, but could not get it. Requisitions of the most ordinary things he could not get in any way. His nurses were a decidedly sick-looking lot. The men looked sick, the doctors all looked sick. He said his nurses were all worked overtime, and the hospital was so crowded even then that they could not take proper care of the patients, and the patients showed they had not proper care. They were mostly typhoid—a large proportion typhoid. Their lips were cracked, and they were covered with sores. He and Major Griffin were most emphatic in their statements that it was absolutely impossible to do anything in the quartermaster's department—to get anything from them.

Major Griffin was commissary of the hospital. Major Cogswell said it was not only impossible to get things from the quartermaster's department, but he could not get his regimental officers to help him out in any way. The same statement was made by Major Clark, officer in charge—that they would not help him in any way to get these things. He said things were then better than they had been. In fact, that was the remark he made all along, wherever he went. It seemed to be a transitional period. Everything was getting better. When they sent direct to Washington they got the things needed, but otherwise it was impossible to get anything out of the quartermaster. There was an entire lack of unison between the medical staff and the quartermaster. The medical staff seemed to be dependent upon the quartermaster's department, yet absolutely helpless so far as getting anything was concerned. At the latter hospital we didn't see many patients. Major Cogswell said things were going on very well. The site of his hospital was anything but agreeable, as before, a short distance from a small lake or swamp, and in such a direction from the hospital that the prevailing winds blew across this small marsh or pond; his nurses were beginning to get malaria, of a very malignant form.

Q. Did you have occasion to see that pond?

A. No, sir. We were there a very short time. The vegetation in it are those forms that occur in water of that kind. We simply talked with Major Cartwright. He had nothing to complain of apparently, except that. From Chickamauga we took a train again for the North, to Washington. Aboard the train were two officers—I won't attempt to give their rank; I don't remember—of the Twelfth New York, I believe. One of them was so sick he could not sit up; in fact, he was helpless most of the time. One had a temperature of 104° to 105° most of the way up. The other one I didn't know about. I know they went to the water-closet used by all the passengers, and vomited very frequently, vomiting and stooling. They were decidedly very sick men. If I may, I would like to tell of a young man sent up from there. They gave him an upper berth. He was so sick he could not get aboard the car alone. Mr. Hoar helped him. When he found he had an upper berth, Mr. Hoar gave him his berth. When they had to change cars, he was so sick that Hoar and another gentleman had to carry him onto the car. They put him on a truck there, and carried him aboard the train for Washington. He fainted several times along the trip, and he said he was the most desperately ill man he had ever seen; in fact, he heard he died a very short time after reaching New York. We reached Washington, and Hoar saw Alger and General Sternberg. I must say that they offered every means of relieving the men; they offered anything that Mr. Hoar asked them. Mr. Hoar asked for hospitals at Porto Rico and at Santiago, so that typhoid patients would not have to be handled so much, and an order was immediately sent for those hospitals to be established. We went from there to Fort Monroe.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 2, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF COL. CHARLES BIRD.**

Col. CHARLES BIRD, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General WILSON:

Q. Will you kindly give your full name?

A. Charles Bird; colonel; quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers.

Q. Rank of Regular Army and length of service.

A. Major and quartermaster in regular service. I don't know exactly—about thirty-five or thirty-six years.

Q. Colonel, what duty have you been engaged upon exactly since the opening of the war with Spain or just previous thereto; say, since the 1st of April, 1898?

A. In charge of transportation division, Quartermaster-General's Office.

Q. Being in charge of the transportation division of the Quartermaster-General's Office, exactly what character of duty comes under you, understanding that the commission is now seeking this information for record?

A. When the war broke out, General, I had charge of the water and rail means of transportation, and regular supplies, but I was relieved of that shortly after the war commenced and put in charge of the water and rail transportation of the Army. For a little while I ran both. By means of transportation I mean supplying wagons, cavalry horses, and mules, which Colonel Miller took from me.

Q. During the short period you were in charge of the mules and transportation of that kind, what did you actually perform?

A. Well, I was superintending buying a good many mules; that is, giving out contracts for buying mules, wagons, and harness.

Q. Was that work done by yourself individually, or by officers of the Quartermaster's Department serving under the Quartermaster-General?

A. By them, being directed by the Quartermaster-General.

Q. All these contracts had necessarily to be approved by the Quartermaster-General?

A. Yes, sir; but none came in for approval until after I was relieved from that work.

Q. Were those purchases made after advertising in accordance with the law, or were they purchased in the open market on account of emergencies, or were they based on circular letters sent on account of emergencies?

A. I adopted all three plans. Where we could, we advertised in the public press; where we had only a short time I used circular letters; and we bought in the open market where we had to.

Q. In making these contracts, will you tell me what was done after you were relieved?

A. Some of the awards were made before I was relieved.

Q. Were those awards satisfactory to you as the officer in immediate charge of the work?

A. Yes, sir, I think so. We thought we were getting reasonable prices. In the matter of wagons, it was impossible for us to get all kinds of wagons for the Army. They were specification wagons. There were parts that could not be had readily, and therefore we called upon Studebaker and all the principal wagon dealers to submit to us plans of a wagon they could supply to us, also what wagons they had in stock—4-mule wagons to take the place of our escort wagon. We only got a very few.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Tell us right there what an escort wagon is.

A. It is a 4-mule wagon, gotten up for the purpose of carrying escorts to paymasters really. When paymasters had to make long journeys from Arizona to New Mexico they had to take a guard with them, and these wagons were gotten up to take that guard, and always the paymaster traveled with these guards and tentage for the guards. These wagons were used in the garrisons for knockabout wagons.

By General WILSON:

Q. During the time that you were in charge of this branch of the transportation, as I understood you to say in answer to my direct question, the prices paid by you were believed to be satisfactory and reasonable so far as the United States was concerned?

A. Yes, sir; in St. Louis we rejected all the bids for mules. We got bids through regular advertising in St. Louis, and they were high. There was a combination there. We threw them out, and we went into the open market and got them at a lower price.

Q. What was the average price paid for mules?

A. I can hardly tell you, General. I think that the leaders and swings and pack mules were less than \$100.

Q. And the wheels?

A. Up to \$125; along there.

Q. What was the average price paid for the Studebaker wagon?

A. I can not tell you that. That matter was turned over before there was any decision made about the wagons. Colonel Martin was called in to assist me, and it was turned over to Colonel Miller.

Q. That was not in your charge?

A. No purchases were made under my charge.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Who was in charge of that purchase of mules in St. Louis?

A. Col. G. C. Small.

By General WILSON:

Q. During the time you were in charge of this branch of the Quartermaster's Department, were you thoroughly and perfectly sustained in all the work committed to your charge, or were you overruled by higher authority; and if so, by whom?

A. No, sir; not so far as I am concerned.

Q. Then you were thoroughly sustained?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And never overruled?

A. No, sir.

Q. We will take up the question of railroad transportation first. In obtaining the railroad trains for transportation, what did this include?

A. Everything—animals, troops, and freight.

Q. But in making arrangements for transportation by rail, what steps did you take?

A. While they were calling the army together we notified every officer—the officer at Chicago, Colonel Jones, was there—and all the principal depots, St. Louis, Omaha, St. Paul, New York, Chicago, all those principal points. The officers were directed to advertise and to make arrangements with the railroad companies for an economical and quick movement of troops, animals, and freight. These rates were all in—the bids were in before we commenced any movements at all, and when the movements commenced Chicago knew what it could do, St. Paul knew what it could do, New York knew what it could do, and all the principal points knew what they could do.

Q. In making contracts for transportation, was the contract or agreement awarded to the lowest bidder; and if not, why not?

A. Generally to the lowest bidder. We had hard work to get a lowest bidder.

Q. You mean by that—

A. Railroads would combine.

Q. And the same price would be bid by all?

A. Yes, sir; and we broke that wherever we could.

Q. Were the rates given by the railroads the same as were given to the ordinary person who was transporting men and mules, or higher or lower?

A. Much lower. I have furnished the commission with all those rates; I have furnished them with a large table showing that. I would like to say that we made a great many of those movements; scarcely any of them were 2 cents; most of them were 1½ cents, and even some are as low as three-fourths of a cent per mile per capita.

Q. Was the price charged for animals greater or less than that charged for troops?

A. Much less.

Q. And the general rate of freight, was it by the pound or ton?

A. No, sir; where we could, it was by the car; and sometimes by the hundred, where there were small movements, and then by class.

Q. In shipping by the car, did you pay so much per mile or distance?

A. So much per distance. They would bid a minimum on a carload—some of them 20,000, some 24,000; it depends on the class.

Q. In approving the awards recommended by your officers at the various cities or stations, wherever they might have been, were you always upheld by higher authorities in that approval, or were you overruled at any time; and if so, by whom and for what reason?

A. Well, some places I did not like the rate, and told the Quartermaster-General so; and we would tell the officer we were not satisfied with the rate and wanted a lower rate, and if they did not take it up, we would take it up with the railroads ourselves.

Q. That is hardly an answer to my question: I referred to you personally. Were you upheld?

A. Yes, sir; I was upheld.

Q. Now you can add the other part if you want.

A. Whenever we felt the rates were not satisfactory, I took them to the Quartermaster-General, and he stated if we could do better than the officers intrusted with that work we could do it; and in many instances we have refused to have the rates, and found fault with officers who did not get as low rates, and we took it up.

Q. Were you successful in accomplishing more than they did?

A. We found the rates from Chickamauga to Tampa were higher rates than we thought we ought to pay. I took them to the Quartermaster-General and took them to the Secretary of War, and he asked me if I would get a flat rate to New York, and I said I would, and I told him I could beat the rate of the transportation going South. I got a \$10 flat rate; I also got a flat rate for \$8 to Newport News.

Q. What does that \$10 and \$8 flat rate to the uninitiated mean?

A. It meant a rate of about 1½ cents against 2 cents that they were charging on the Southern railroads for the movement of troops.

Q. One and one-fourth cents a mile?

A. About that; I don't say definitely.

Q. In transporting troops, what arrangements did you make when troops were to move over twenty-four hours for the care and welfare of the men from the first through?

A. Well, sir, we understood that every man on every road should have a full seat, and where tourist sleepers could be obtained they should be obtained; and they were used against my wishes. I don't think a tourist sleeper is as good a thing as a day coach with 30 men in it, because with a tourist sleeper you have to put 45 men in it. I have always maintained that where men were going over one night tourist sleepers were better, but where one night the other was better and cheaper.

Q. Were Pullman cars—the ordinary Pullman cars—used under any circumstances?

A. Every man that got a sick furlough was put on the tourist sleeper.

Q. Were they ever used for the transportation of troops that you know of?

A. I understand in the South the Pullman Car Company did not have the regular tourist sleepers, and therefore they put in some of their old Pullman cars. I don't know to what extent they were used.

Q. Did you receive complaints from any officers of any kind in regard to the method of transportation of troops?

A. Not the method. Sometimes we heard the equipments were not such as should have been used. We told them if they sent such equipment that we could not give them our business.

Q. What treatment did you receive on the part of the companies?

A. Very good.

Q. Were they prompt to respond, after the contracts were made, to do what you called upon them to do?

A. Yes, sir; the movements, when they came, there was a rush, and some of those roads in the South did not have the equipment. They could not get it together all at once and sometimes there was some delay. A colonel would be anxious to get his regiment off, and it was because these people had to borrow equipment from one road for another that caused the delay. We have had more trouble in the Southern Association than anywhere else.

Q. Why the Southern Association?

A. I mean the country is divisioned into associations. The railroads put all the roads south of the Potomac, say, in one association: that is called the Southern Association; and they started out at the beginning of the war with a 2-cent rate and bid rates, going down to the lowest basis, a little less than 50 per cent above the rates—a great many roads in the South are land-grant roads—and they adhered to that, and that is what we were trying to break up. We did break it up at Camp Alger here. We compared all the rates in my office and we got a rate from Camp Alger to Tampa at $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents per mile, and when we went to move from Tampa to Montauk Point I said, "Gentlemen, we will adopt your rate South coming North." "Oh, no, you can not do that." I said, "We will adopt the rate. That is the rate you have agreed to move troops back and forth," and they acquiesced, and we brought all the troops up on that rate, and the freight and animals at a lower rate.

Q. Can you recall what that rate was?

A. One and one-half cents, and, I think, less than \$150 a car from Tampa to New York City.

Q. For freight?

A. Animals.

Q. How many animals can you put in a car?

A. Mules, 20; and cavalry horses, 18.

Q. Will you explain to the commission, if you please, the entire arrangements made for the transportation of troops, animals, and freight to Tampa, and to Port Tampa from Tampa?

A. Well, that is a mere local matter, General.

Q. Would not come under you?

A. Yes, sir; in a way.

Q. What I am after is this: There has been great complaint made to the commission of stagnation there at Tampa, resulting from the congestion of cars and the great trouble in getting things from Tampa to Port Tampa. We understand there were two railroads at that time handling the cars, by what is known as the Florida Central and Peninsular and the Plant System. Will you explain to the commission the steps taken by the Quartermaster's Department in getting the troops and animals from Tampa to Port Tampa previous to starting for Cuba?

A. The Plant System owned the line from Tampa to Port Tampa. It was their line. The Florida Central, which is the road you speak of, had their terminal in Tampa. We had very poor facilities for transferring the food and troops that passed over their line to the direct line leading to Port Tampa. The Plant people wanted to cut them out and put a heavy arbitrary on; that is, if their cars were transferred—it was a railroad dodge—they wanted to shut out our shipping stores at all over the Florida Central and confine us to the Plant System, and they put this heavy arbitrary on so they could not handle cars, and in order to overcome that we insisted upon storehouses being built at certain points, and tracks—putting switches in, so we could handle freight and cars over those roads.

Q. By whom were they built. Did the United States build them?

A. Yes, sir; the Quartermaster-General—and Colonel Martin had charge of putting in those tracks. I did not have anything to do with it.

Q. Did the United States do that?

A. I am not sure. I do not know whether they made the railroads do that. The Plant System then held up a high tariff on all freights that passed over the 9 miles of road from Tampa to Port Tampa, and instructions were given, and are still enforced, that not one dollar of pay shall be given to the Plant System for hauling over the 9 miles of road until a proper rate has been fixed. It never has been done. I told them that I would never recommend that a cent be paid to them and that their accounts would be sent to us and we would put them into the Auditor's office and they could look to them.

Q. I understand that no payment has been made to the Plant System for the transportation from Tampa to Port Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They simply hauled them by your orders, assuming that they were to charge what they deemed best, and these charges have been refused by you and no payment has been made?

A. Not to my knowledge. Colonel Moore was sent down there to adjust matters. They had rates for storehouses and dockage and everything of that kind, and Colonel Moore was sent to arrange for those rates. He made all those rates, and I do not know whether he went into the railroad rate or not.

Q. What is your opinion of the cause of the great congestion at Tampa?

A. Sending more stuff down there than they could handle. We were directed to push stuff ahead and we had to send it out sometimes and we could not often send a bill of lading.

Q. In sending it out, you say you could not send a bill of lading. Were the cars marked in any way so the local quartermaster might know where to find each class of material?

A. Yes, sir; we did more than that. We ordered the quartermaster at Jeffersonville, where these supplies were to go from, to send a man on each train to report what cars he had and what were in those cars; and they were ordered to label on the outside with a conspicuous mark, stating whether they contained ordnance supplies, harness, wagons, or whatever it was.

Q. Do you know whether these orders were carried out and invariably if men went with the train?

A. I think so. I don't know why they should not.

Q. What is your opinion of the statement which has come before us and has been freely given that it was impossible to find out from anyone where anything was in those cars, and the class?

A. I did not give these orders until we found out that there was congestion there.

Q. What were the steps taken previous to this congestion?

A. None, only the general regulations. I did not know but what they could handle the stuff going through. I did not know how much was going. I could not tell.

Q. Can you tell us whether there were any means taken by the depot quartermaster at the various stations from which these things were sent to inform the quartermaster at Tampa that car No. 996, for instance, contained so and so?

A. No, sir; I do not know whether they did it or not. I hardly believe they were able to do it?

Q. And therefore when the cars got down there, up to the time of the action by your department, there were no means adopted by the depot quartermaster to find out what was in the car without opening it?

A. Unless the bills of lading had arrived. We had to send shipments sometimes without the bills of lading.

Q. Now, Colonel, leaving the question of railroad transportation, we will take up the question of water transportation. What were your duties in reference to that?

A. I had everything to do with it.

Q. Will you please state what it was?

A. In anticipation of the movement of troops on the ocean—the Army had never done anything of this kind; we had never transported troops by sea; it was something new to the Army of the United States—I took the precaution to send an officer—we had two officers in New York, whose whole duty it was; one whose whole duty it was, and another to assist him—to go to every steamship company and get the name of every ship and get the tonnage and everything about that ship, and we had that long before we were called upon for a ship.

Q. Who were those two officers?

A. Those two officers were Colonel Kimball and Major Summerhayes.

Q. What method did you adopt? Did you take anything in sight that you wanted or did you send to these people to know whether they could spare them and what they would charge?

A. There was not enough in sight for us to take. We had to take what we could get. We took all we could get and then we did not have enough. We went to the Mallory Line, and the Ward Line, and the Merchants and Miners' Line, the Clyde Line, every one of them, every American steamship company that had any ships. We had them to come to our office and made arrangements there in my office between the Assistant Secretary of War and myself. All they did in New York was to report what ships were available and their condition—we could not go there to do that—and they were ordered to fit them out.

Q. Did you take every ship belonging to these lines that was fit for sea duty?

A. Not at first. We took all the Ward Line. Their ships were laid up because Havana was closed and certain Mexican ports. We took all the Mallory Line they could spare. We did not want to break up their lines. We took the best of the Merchants and Miners' Line. They were a little arbitrary. They did not want to give them up, and we said that if they would not give them up we would seize them. The Clyde Line held out a long time, but after a while they begged us to take some.

Q. In making arrangements for chartering the vessels, what arrangements did you make as to the amount to be paid by the United States?

A. I tried to arrange it by tonnage. We tried to pay 15 cents for a gross ton

(this was much more than was paid in the war of rebellion) for 3,000 tons and over.

Q. What does 15 cents per gross ton mean?

A. Say a vessel is 3,000 tons, 15 cents would be \$450 a day. Under that, we tried to arrange for 20 cents a ton; and under 2,000, 25 cents per ton.

Q. So far as you were concerned, then, these prices were determined by the Assistant Secretary of War after a conference with you?

A. Always.

Q. Were these charters always made in accordance with your recommendation as to prices?

A. Yes, the Assistant Secretary of War and I tried our level best to get the people down. The last ships we got we had to pay much higher prices than at first.

Q. Were these prices, in your opinion, based upon existing conditions, reasonable; or, in other words, if you were in private business, under similar circumstances, would you have deemed the price reasonable if you had been called upon to pay it?

A. Yes, sir. We knew that some companies who chartered other ships—they had to charter vessels to take their place and had to pay higher prices proportionately than we did. Mr. Clyde told me himself when I was trying to “jew” him down—he told me, “Colonel Bird, you have got the cheapest lot of ships that have ever been chartered.”

Q. In all this action that you took, until you reached the Assistant Secretary of War, were you sustained promptly and thoroughly by the chief of your bureau?

A. In every respect.

Q. Were any impediments thrown in your way by slowness of action on the part of anyone higher in authority than you in the work committed to your charge?

A. I don't think so. The matter was handled between the Assistant Secretary of War and myself.

Q. And the Quartermaster-General?

A. He acquiesced in everything. He felt the necessity of it and encouraged me in every way. I never took anything to him but what he upheld me.

Q. After the vessels were chartered, then, they passed out of your hands and were turned over to officers in New York for fitting or victualing, or anything of that kind?

A. No, sir; not out of our hands, but under our direction they were fitted there. Some we chartered in New York, some in Mobile, some in New Orleans and Savannah.

Q. What I wanted to get at was this: You and the Assistant Secretary of War personally executed these charters. After that did you personally attend to the equipment and victualing of these vessels?

A. No, sir; we personally directed them what to do—to fit up this ship as to this and that. The victualing on all chartered ships was done by the companies. We had nothing to do with that. These ships were all chartered, and the only thing we did—the first one or two ships insisted upon our assuming the marine risk. I stood out against it and said we would not pay it and would seize the ships if necessary, and in only two cases did we assume the marine risk, and not one dollar has the Government had to pay—not anything. We made every ship assume any damage that happened and each ship had to assume the marine risk.

Q. In chartering these vessels, did that include the officers and crew of the vessel and the entire victualing?

A. Everything but the coal and water.

Q. Now, having got that far along with the charter of these vessels, will you

state to us what action you took in regard to the purchase of the vessels, and how many were purchased?

A. Fourteen ships were purchased—two on the Pacific coast and twelve of them on this coast here. I had nothing to do with the purchase of these ships. I would like to say to the commission that we were forced to buy ships by the action of Congress. I was always opposed to buying ships, but we had exhausted our own resources and there was nothing we could lay our hands on. We were short of vessels. They were nothing but freight ships. Every one of those ships we chartered on the Atlantic coast were freight ships. Some had a little room for cabin passengers and things of that kind, but they were freight carriers and we could not put artificial ventilation in them. We had to depend on whatever we could construct to get air to these people.

Q. Who did have charge of the purchasing of these vessels?

A. I was going to say that a good many of these ships that were purchased I had in my own mind before anybody purchased them. I had a paper in my own hands—an offer from C. P. Huntington to purchase vessels for us—and the day I went to the Assistant Secretary of War I was introduced to Colonel Hecker, who purchased the vessels.

Q. The whole subject was under him?

A. He and I together. I was not consulted very much about the purchase of the vessels; it was put in his hands.

Q. The transports having been chartered and having been put in your possession, what was the next step you took?

A. Fitting them for the troops.

Q. And how was that done?

A. By orders from the Quartermaster-General's Office to the officers at these points I have mentioned, to put up standees as comfortably as they could carry them.

Q. Did you go into details or give general instructions?

A. Went into details.

Q. Then you gave the orders to put up these standee bunks?

A. Yes, sir; the standee bunks, and also to provide ample provision for water.

Q. And the arrangement for water-closets?

A. No, sir; we did not go into that except to put up some temporary troughs.

Q. With reference to the standee bunk, did that include anything in the way of bedsacks, or did you cover the wooden bunk?

A. Wooden bunk. That is the kind I always rode in. The ships that were fitted out on the Atlantic coast were not fitted to go 1,000 miles. They were fitted to go to Havana. They were not intended to go to Santiago. They were intended to carry men in about a thirty-six hour run. On the Pacific coast we fitted these ships up elaborately to carry men 7,000 miles.

Q. What kind of bunks are they?

A. The Turner patent bunk—a wooden frame with a woven-wire mattress; and then another excelsior mattress and pillow was furnished to every man on the ship.

Q. In putting up these bunks they put up one above the other?

A. Three high; and in the daytime it was a settee like that [indicating].

Q. What arrangements between decks and the hull were made on those ships?

A. We had windlasses and portholes and large holes in the deck hatchways. These ships were all perfectly comfortable so long as there was no storm. There was plenty of ventilation as long as they could keep these hatchways open.

Q. In the discharge of the official duties committed to you when in charge of the transportation by rail and by water, and for a short time the animal transportation, were you fully sustained and promptly sustained in all the action taken by you?

A. I think so, sir.

Q. Were prices paid in every instance, so far as you know, the result of competition, where it could be so, and were such prices reasonable from the time you got there, in your opinion?

A. I think so.

Q. Is there anything more you can tell us in regard to your department which will assist us?

A. I do not know anything. I was talking to Colonel Jones about the lighters. I went into that very fully. I had my own plan that I had picked up from a naval officer, and that was the question in our expedition to Cuban waters—to supply them with a lighter of some kind to use in going there. It was an ordinary lighter, drawing a foot of water, that could be lashed to the sides of the ships. It has been done, and men could go on them by the fifties, and they could use them, and if they did go to pieces, it would not be much loss. I suggested this.

Q. To whom did you make that suggestion?

A. To several officers. They did not seem to think it was necessary. It was afterwards adopted. I think General Stone had a lot of them made for them at Jacksonville.

Q. Did you make the suggestion to your superior, Colonel, in your department?

A. I did not make it as something to be adopted, but I said it was a good plan.

Q. Did you make it to him?

A. We talked about it. We were never asked about any of those things. It was only looking out for what we would be called upon to furnish. I went from Boston to Galveston to get steam lighters, and I only found four. One was in Baltimore. It was not finished then. We just bought her. We are going to send her to Santiago to use her there. The others were the *Cumberland*, *Bessie*, and *Laura*. In anticipation they were put there so they could use them wherever they could go.

Q. How many did you send over to Santiago; how many lighters, steam scows, or anything of the kind?

A. The engineer officers with the command started with the *Laura* and *Cumberland*, steam lighters. The *Bessie* they left behind. She went to the Pensacola yards. They started with the steam tug *Capt. Sam* and two lighters.

Q. Whose duty would it have been to supply these lighters—what department of the Government?

A. I felt it was the Quartermaster's Department. Those we did supply we were not asked for. We sent them there in anticipation of their being needed.

Q. In getting scows or anything of that kind, did you call upon any branch to assist you in this matter?

A. Yes, sir; after General Shafter got there he wanted some. We got two of these lighters from Key West. We started out two that we got from the Mississippi Improvement Company, from New Orleans.

Q. The Chief of Engineers, or the Mississippi Improvement Company?

A. From your department. We started them out with the tug *Underwriter*. We started out from Mobile with three, and started out with the ocean tug *Nimrod*. The *Fern* got to Santiago with two of hers, but they were wrecked. The *Underwriter* we sent with her tugs through the Yucatan Pass, and she got over all right. The *Nimrod* lost all her lighters, and she came back by Key West.

Q. Then, really, how many lighters did you succeed in getting there?

A. None. All that got there was the ocean tug *Underwriter*.

Q. How many did you lose?

A. Five.

Q. On account of the storm?

A. We have had the case of the *Nimrod* before the Attorney-General. The evidence is such that they were lost in the storm. They filled with water and sunk.

The evidence was so strong—we have already written to the Attorney-General to send the papers back.

By General McCook:

Q. Do you remember when the order was issued for the first mobilization of the Army?

A. I can not give the date.

Q. How long after the order was issued was the Quartermaster's Department enabled to furnish the transportation of these troops?

A. I don't remember that. We had all our rates long before that.

Q. Do you know of any regular troops having moved down to the depot and delayed there on account of transportation not being furnished with it?

A. At what depot?

Q. Any of the Western depots.

A. The only regiment I know that was held back was a Kansas regiment, and that was done because a road bid \$9 a head to bring these men from somewhere in Kansas. That's the only regiment that was held back and had any trouble.

Q. I am speaking of the Regular Army.

A. I never heard a complaint from the Regular Army. We brought them from the Pacific coast and I never heard a complaint. Some of the roads were changed. They were routed to New Orleans and the orders were changed to go to Chickamauga. That made confusion. We sometimes had to have that route changed to get equipment. You know it is a serious thing to change a regiment's route coming so far.

Q. Transportation was there ready for them when the troops arrived at the depot?

A. I never heard anything to the contrary. I watched that pretty closely and took it up with the railroads.

Q. Do you or not know that an order was issued from your department requiring that all the transportation be thrown upon the Long Island Railroad from New York?

A. I don't quite understand. The Long Island Railroad made a flat rate to haul everything over. They wanted to haul all the troops. I have forgotten now just how that was. They made a rate for a cent a mile with the understanding that they would haul the freight and haul everything that was not hauled by the Government transports or those employed by the Government.

Q. Do you know whether Colonel Kimball received an order to ship everything by that Long Island Railroad, or not to employ any other transportation?

A. No, sir; I do not think he did. The commission ought to understand that. The reason there was any restriction against other lines running there was to prevent excursion boats from landing at those docks. They were not sufficient at the best. You know how much trouble we had with them.

Q. I am speaking about Government freight—horses, mules, and everything connected with it.

A. No, sir; I do not recollect anything of the kind. I know all that stuff was routed from Tampa over the Pennsylvania road, because the Pennsylvania road had a contract to deliver them at Long Island. They had a ferry that crossed the bay. They had to deliver them to the Long Island road, and we had not anything else to handle them. We did not have any ships. Everything that was chartered at Montauk Point—the *Shinnecock* was chartered for moving out the sick.

Q. Do you know what was the occasion for taking the troops from Tampa and Georgia and Fort McPherson and carrying them to Montauk Point?

A. I had nothing to do with that.

Q. You know that was done?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You don't know what was the occasion of it?

A. No, sir. This is my opinion: That the cavalry were all separated from their stock. We had not anything to carry their stock over. The cavalry regiments were dismounted and taken as infantry, and I suppose they wanted to get their horses to these men, and they sent them to Montauk Point, where they were going. I do not know why it was done.

Q. When you established Montauk Point as a camp there, what was the idea of it—what was to be its nature?

A. I had nothing to do with that; that is entirely in another branch. Its nature, I suppose, was to take care of the people coming from Cuba—getting the regiments together. They left part of their troops behind.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. The war being over, might it not have been the proper thing to do to concentrate troops at Montauk or anywhere else?

A. I think so. These horses that went there belonged to the cavalry.

Q. They sent mules and transportation?

A. There were not many mules; a great many went over, and there were a great many mules left behind at Tampa.

Q. Colonel, when did you send the order to seaports to put the numbers of cars on the invoices and mark the cars?

A. Just as soon as we heard there was a congestion at Tampa.

Q. What time was that; was that after the troops started for Cuba?

A. Oh, no; before that. I can not give the date. I can get it for you; I think it is in our reports to you.

Q. We have testimony of the chief quartermaster at Tampa showing the numbers were not put on the invoices and they were not marked.

A. Well, I guess that it is so. A shipment is made to-day and the bill of lading is put in the hands of the shippers, and there are two bills of lading—one the original and the other the duplicate. The duplicate goes to the consignee, and the other is put in with the freight.

Q. Our testimony is they did not receive them?

A. It was beyond human possibility to get that freight out and have bills of lading; it was almost impossible for them to do it.

Q. Do you know why boats were loaded at New York and Philadelphia and sent to Savannah and Charleston and unloaded there to ship by rail?

A. Only to facilitate and save express. We could make better time. I don't know—we took advantage of the ocean steamship at Savannah to ship from New York. We could get the stuff down there twenty-four hours quicker by sea than rail, unless we sent it by fast freight, which was expensive.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. I do not see why you could save time by boat?

A. There was no impediment. There was always a transfer to be made on the railroad.

Q. Cars remained there for weeks untouched?

A. We did not have that trouble up here at Dunn-Loring. There would have been congestion here if they had not gone into the cars.

Q. How is a movement to take place in an army like the movement in Tampa? Is it not the duty of the Quartermaster-General to anticipate all wants of that army and prepare for it without being specifically notified as to each article?

A. We did try to anticipate it. I think we did try to anticipate it. I don't know to what you refer.

Q. I refer to the quartermaster's supplies.

A. We worked night and day. We kept our force going night and day. We have never had a Sunday or holiday or anything, and we did not even have Thanksgiving Day. We worked night and day in that office in anticipation of the wants of the men.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was there any written or verbal contract with the Long Island Railroad that would prevent the Government from shipping by water any of the troops, animals, or supplies to Montauk Point?

A. No, sir: the understanding was with Baldwin and myself. I don't think that contract was ever signed. I don't think it was: it may have been. I said I would never agree to any contract that would not allow us to use our transports to go and come and carry everything that was wanted.

Q. Will you please state whether or not in case of an expedition like General Shafter's to Cuba being ordered by the Secretary of War, and the Quartermaster-General is notified by the Secretary of War of the number of troops that is desired to be transported, whether or not it is the duty of the Quartermaster-General, without specific orders of the Secretary of War as to the character of the transports, etc., that he supposes it is his duty to supply the necessary number of transports to carry the troops and transportation and to furnish landing facilities for that expedition after the arrival at the point of debarkation?

A. Provided the Quartermaster-General is told how many men are to go—and animals—and where they are going to land, yes, sir. That was never done. I don't think they knew themselves where they were going to land.

Q. Then, I understand you to say the Quartermaster-General was never notified as to the size of the expedition?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was he ever requested to prepare for such an expedition?

A. Yes, sir: he was told to prepare—to get all the ships he could to carry as many men as he could to Mariel or Havana, and we did it. We have carried troops, gentlemen. I was in the infantry, and we have carried troops from Arizona down through the Gulf to California and up through San Francisco with the same arrangements I put up on those ships to carry troops over to Havana in thirty-six hours, and I never heard any complaint.

Q. Will you tell me why the Quartermaster's Department did not have a number of vessels there to put in quartermaster's supplies, and did not have quartermaster employees see that the ships laden with quartermaster's stores and commissary stores consigned to some depot quartermaster at Siboney, unloaded there, rather than to go helter-skelter all in one ship, piled one on top of the other, and then no arrangement made by the Quartermaster's Department upon the arrival there to unload these supplies?

A. That, I hold, belongs to the officers. They had unrestricted authority. I remember they asked us for stevedores from New York, and we sent them there.

Q. Is it not the business of the Quartermaster-General to supply these things?

A. Every ship we sent out from New Orleans and New York we had put on board of them at least five stevedores to go with these ships, so as to instruct the common laborers they might hire. The records show that the stevedores went on them and came back—five or six stevedores.

Q. Would that amount to much?

A. It would be giving their labor.

By General DODGE:

Q. Isn't it the custom in all transportation and other equipment that the soldiers themselves load and unload?

A. Certainly. I have always done it. I have been in the infantry, and our men always did it.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. If the arrangements for landing Shafter's forces in Cuba, for transporting stores and medical supplies, were defective, who is to blame?

A. I suppose the officers in the respective departments.

Q. I want to find out as to whose business it was to order sufficient surfboats, sufficient lighters, sufficient means for landing after the troops arrived in Cuba; in other words, was it the business of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish these things of its own motion without any orders at all, or was it General Shafter's or General Miles's business, or anybody else's business, to order them?

A. I do not know whether that would be a proper question—to reflect upon those officers in charge.

Q. You can answer for your own department?

A. I think it would have been wrong for the Quartermaster-General to send down a lot of stuff of that character unless asked to do it. He did not know. He was absolutely ignorant as to what they were going to do. They knew what they were going to do. He did not know. If he expended a large amount of money and sent things down, they might say, "Why did you send all these things down?"

Q. From whom ought these orders to have been issued?

A. I suppose they knew what they were doing there.

Q. Whose business was it—General Miles's business to see that that expedition went provided with everything in the world that they needed and ought to have had, or General Shafter's, or the business of the War Department to do it itself without anybody to call upon them?

A. I think those getting up the expedition ought to see that they had the equipment for it. The Quartermaster's Department is to furnish the equipment which is asked for.

Q. I am not assuming there was any deficiency or wrongdoing, but I am asking whose business it was to see that the expedition left Tampa provided with everything which it ought to have had to carry it to Cuba.

A. If I had been there I would have considered it my business.

Q. If you were in command?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If there were not enough lighters and things of that sort—

A. We were ready. Remember dictating a telegram authorizing the quartermaster at Tampa—Colonel Humphrey, I think—that they had authority to go into any harbor in the Gulf or in the southern Atlantic coast and get any lighters or tugs they wanted.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Do you know what time that order was issued?

A. No, sir; I can not find it.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I understood in answer to my question a moment ago that if the Secretary of War or the Commanding General had notified the Quartermaster-General that he desired to transport such a number of troops to a given point and to land them there, that, without any further specifications from anyone, it would be the duty of the Quartermaster-General to fully equip that expedition?

A. Provided I could get them, and we stood ready to do it.

Q. Was it the business of the Quartermaster-General, without any specifications from anyone, without having received notification that it was desired to transport and land a certain number of troops with all the supplies necessary, to furnish them transportation, without any specifications as to quantity?

A. Yes, sir; but we never got them. It would have been his business if he had gotten it, and we would have done it. That is the reason I got this information in

advance. I went from Boston to Galveston to know what I could get to supply them, and we could get only three lighters. There are plenty of steam lighters, but they draw as much as ships.

Q. How long was it before the Quartermaster-General got information about the movement to Cuba?

A. We were talking about it every day—about the movement to Havana.

Q. When did you take action?

A. The ships were lying there for three or four weeks.

Q. When did you make the effort to get the lighters—at the beginning or end?

A. At the beginning; the lighters were all there.

Q. When was the effort made to get them?

A. These lighters were there long before they left. These lighters were at Galveston before we knew we were going to Santiago. I am the man that had that in charge. I had officers in Boston, Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia, and I had them in New Orleans and Galveston—officers looking out for those things, long in advance, expecting a call. I was there from the very beginning, even before—as I told the gentleman—I thought out that matter of these lighters lashed to the ships, and then the steam-lighter question, and I went so far as to see whether I could get heavy barges and load them with stones and sink them on the coast so lighters could get up to them.

Q. Did you consider there was a sufficient number of transports with the expedition of Shafter?

A. It was all we could get. We got three foreign vessels entered into the American register, two at Mobile and one running to Porto Rico. There were plenty of ships we could have gotten under a foreign flag, but we could not charter them. It had to be done by an act of Congress.

By General DODGE:

Q. You had to confine yourselves to the American ships?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you discuss the question in any way as to who should have command of these transports, whether the Government or Army should control them after they started for their destination?

A. No, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. The first order from you was to furnish transports, say, for the purpose of transporting the army to Mariel, or Cuba?

A. The first order we got was to furnish transports to transport 5,000 men to Cuba. That was the force General Shafter was to take as a reconnoissance.

Q. What was the next order?

A. To get Government transports to take an army. General Miles wanted to take 30,000 or 35,000 men to Cuba.

Q. Didn't you know that the entire force had to be landed, no matter where it struck Cuba, by lighters?

A. Yes, sir; I knew that.

Q. Now, in providing that, was it not the duty of your department, without any further orders, to prepare the lighters for landing this force in Cuba at the same time they furnished transports?

A. That matter was suggested to General Miles by myself. I suggested it to him, and my impression is I suggested taking pontoon trains down and use them.

Q. But you can not use them in the surf?

A. But if they got a little sheltered water they could put the boats out and get some of the lighters up to them. I thought it was a good thing to have them.

Q. Suppose you had taken small launches and put them aboard each one of these boats?

A. They could not carry them. They did not have any davits to do it with. I was at Cramp's shipyard two weeks ago yesterday, and I saw a big piece of iron 9 inches in diameter and I asked Mr. Cramp what that was. He stated, "That is the davit for the *Mobile*." I said, "You don't mean to tell me that it takes such a piece of iron as that?" He said, "Nothing less than that will do." You could not get a steam launch on any of those boats. You could get naphtha launches, which were no good.

Q. They would do for your small boats?

A. You can not depend on them. They would not last in that water. For instance, we bought the *Bay State* from Massachusetts, and they have a naphtha launch on it. They want to get it off. It is unsuccessful—no good.

Q. So your experience is that these small launches were of no use to you in landing troops?

A. We have two at Ponce. We got them from the Navy after the war and are having nine built ourselves with the regular steam engine in them and are putting them on our ships.

Q. It seems to me in New York you can get them?

A. But they have to have davits to take them up.

Q. But couldn't you have them?

A. We did not have time to put them on. We worked night and day. We put gangs of men on in New York and worked them clear until we got to Tampa to put those standees up. The thing was bought to-night and to-morrow she was off to sea. We bought every wine cask we could to put water on them. They had not anything aboard them.

Q. What time was it; up to the 30th of May?

A. I don't remember the date we got them down there. They were kept at Tampa. They laid there for three or four weeks. We had no facilities and could not do anything at Tampa, as there were no machine shops there.

By General McCook:

Q. Did anybody ever suggest to you about surfboats being carried aboard these transports?

A. No, sir; they all had surfboats. Colonel Humphrey told me he had enough surfboats to land all the men. There is scarcely a surfboat but what we had to replace them. They were smashed to pieces landing the troops.

Q. Now, as I understand from you, when Shafter's expedition sailed, or when it was supposed to sail, it had provided three tugs?

A. No, sir; three lighters.

Q. And two lighters were steam?

A. Two lighters were steam and an ocean tug.

Q. If they had them on the coast of Cuba, that, in your opinion, would have been sufficient to land his supplies?

A. They thought so.

Q. As I understand, two of these tugs started—

WITNESS (interrupting). Two of the steam lighters went.

Q. One was lost?

A. Two of the lighters were not steam.

Q. I mean steam?

A. They started with two steam lighters and an ocean tug and two ordinary lighters, leaving behind the *Bessie*—they had authority to charter the *Tarpon*. She was used in the harbor. If they wanted her, why didn't they take her?

Q. What did they get there with?

A. With the *Bessie*, steam lighter, the *Laura*, a steam lighter, and one ordinary

lighter. One steam lighter was left behind, and they lost one of the ordinary lighters.

Q. They started with three?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. One was in Pensacola?

A. Yes, sir; she was sent afterwards. She is at Santiago now.

Q. What is her name?

A. *Bessie*. We sent her down with Colonel Flagg. He took the *Bessie* and the *Surance*, another boat, for landing purposes.

Q. How many reached Santiago?

A. He got through with all these.

Q. Did he take them to Ponce?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did they have to lighter everything in Santiago Harbor?

A. No, sir; not now.

Q. Have they built wharves?

A. No, sir; there is one wharf they can use. It takes ten days to get a ship out of Santiago with an ordinary load.

By General WILSON:

Q. What draft is that tug?

A. Fifteen feet. We are using all our lighters down there now.

Q. They have been made since?

A. Yes, sir. The *Adonis*, built in Baltimore, has been completed and we have bought her.

Q. You made the statement that the transports that were sent to Tampa were all fitted for simply cruising to Cuba?

A. Those, up to the time of the campaign, were sent to Santiago.

Q. And after you ordered them you used them as they stood?

A. Yes, sir; but did not put as many men in them as they wanted.

Q. Why not?

A. Did not have the ventilation. We went to the expense of \$3,000 in chartering ships to put artificial ventilation in, electric lights, fans, and everything of that sort. That was after that; we had not time to do it with them. We did not have time on the first ones. In addition to that, we bought five fans and sent them to Tampa, and they did not have the machinery there to put them on and had to send them back. We have a transport going out on Monday. A gentleman told me it is the handsomest transport in the world—the *Mobile*.

Q. How are these ships coaled—who does the coaling?

A. We did it all. They were coaled in New York, and they made their trip with the coal which loaded them down. We put coal on them everywhere so as to have enough to make a round trip. We did not have coal in Cuba; we had coal at Tampa and Fernandina. Now we have coal at Ponce and San Juan.

Q. You carried coal sufficient for a round trip?

A. We could get coal at \$2.75 in New York and it would cost us \$5 or \$6 South-

Q. You put coal in for ballast?

A. We did at first, but we put granite in now for ballast. We have the *Massachusetts* and *Mobile* now fitted up to carry 2,200 men with ample galleys supposed to cook all the men eat. The deck under the upper deck is given entirely for messing.

Q. How old a boat is she; is she the oldest?

A. I think so. She is the oldest of the lot.

By General DODGE:

Q. Now, as to the ships chartered at San Francisco; how long did it take to transform them?

A. About ten days. On that *Mobile* we put in the same bunk. We have a bunk now, just a frame of iron with a canvas sack. You don't have to put a mattress on it at all. You can take that off and wash it and put it back. All these things move up and in the daytime it is open. On the *Mobile* the frames are all up where the mattresses have to hang in.

Q. Do you prefer them to hammocks?

A. Men don't like hammocks.

By General McCook:

Q. What are the fastenings on the *Mobile*—wood?

A. Yes, sir.

By General Dodge:

Q. You say men don't like the hammocks?

A. No, sir; they don't like the hammocks.

By Governor Woodbury:

Q. Was Colonel Humphrey, during the time he was at Tampa and during the time he was with General Shafter's expedition—state whether or not he was under the orders of the Quartermaster's Department.

A. Yes, sir; I think he was. Humphrey had a good many commanding officers down there. He served a good many people. He did everything in the world to make the thing go.

By General Dodge:

Q. He was under the Quartermaster-General. Was he not under the commanding general of the expedition also?

A. He was General Miles's chief quartermaster. He went there by General Miles's order to have supervision of things, and he commenced and I think he worked with General Shafter and anybody he could to aid them.

By Governor Woodbury:

Q. If the Quartermaster-General had given him an order and General Miles had given him an order to the contrary, which order would he obey?

A. I think he would obey the one who had the most rank, because he would have been in command.

By Captain Howell:

Q. That is one of the questions that bothers me—who did have the most rank?

A. I had too much to do in my office to find out.

By General Beaver:

Q. Is it an open question, in your opinion, whether the staff department is superior to the major-general in the field or whether the major-general in the field, if he differs from the head of the staff department, has the superior authority? Is that an open question or is it settled in the Army?

A. The Quartermaster-General holds the purse string. He says "If I have not the money, he is not master."

Q. That is, if something is ordered from the field by the officer in command and it is in the law, as construed by the Quartermaster-General, he is bound to furnish it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Otherwise he construes the law and handles the money?

A. It is hard to construe the law to fit every case.

By General Dodge:

Q. Will you please make any statement that you desire in relation to your department or any suggestion that you think would be of benefit to the service?

A. I don't know that we have anything, General Dodge. I have gone pretty fully into everything.

Q. You may have some suggestions that would be of benefit to your department from past experience.

A. The only complication that has arisen was in the handling of the steamships. Our department never had anything of that kind to do. We have transported 100,000 people at sea, something that we never did before, and as I have just said, we are fitting up the best transports in the world. A gentleman in my office told me he never saw anything like the *Mobile*. They have a hospital twice as large as this room and everything in the ship a man can want. They have fine bunks with mattresses, and he says he never saw anything like it.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. How do you explain the fact that the *Concho* left there with men that were not authorized to go on that boat?

A. I don't know anything about that.

Q. You were not there when the *Concho* left?

A. No, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Transportation by way of Savannah is the regular line to Tampa and all Southern points?

A. Yes, sir.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 2, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF COL. CROSBY P. MILLER.

Col. CROSBY P. MILLER, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you please give us your full name and rank and department in which you served?

A. Crosby P. Miller; major, Quartermaster's Department; colonel by assignment to the duties in charge of one of the bureaus in the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. What bureau is that?

A. Transportation and regular supplies; all transportation, except rail and water. That covers all matters pertaining to the supplies of wagons, animals, forage, and everything of that kind.

Q. Where is your principal office, Colonel?

A. In the Quartermaster-General's Office, in Washington.

Q. Have you had any practical service outside your office during the war, or have your duties been directed from the Quartermaster-General's Office?

A. Entirely from the Quartermaster-General's Office, with the exception of one week at Montauk Point.

Q. When was that week at Montauk Point?

A. I think the 28th of July when I went up there, immediately after the order was issued making that encampment. I was directed to go up there until Captain Knight was to be the regular quartermaster in charge. Captain Patten had been assigned and went up there two days before, but he was thought not to have sufficient experience.

Q. You went there not with reference to the duties of your Bureau, but had the entire Quartermaster's Department under control while there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent was the Government supplied with transportation—wagons and animals—at the time of the outbreak of the war with Spain? Can you tell us, in general, what was available?

A. We were limited at the outbreak of the war in horses—in artillery and cavalry horses—to the number of mounted cavalry and Indian scouts. For draft purposes we were limited to somewhere about 2,400. I don't recall the exact number. We had on hand really 2,200 draft animals at that time.

Q. And the number of wagons that would be represented by that number of animals?

A. Yes, sir; we had somewhere—we had two classes of wagons, about an equal number: the army wagon, six-mule; and the escort wagon, a four-mule wagon. We had somewhere near 1,000.

Q. What was the number of animals required and the number of wagons required to properly equip such an army as was brought into the field according to the regulations?

A. With the Seventh Army Corps, when they were called out they were not all fully organized, but there were 25 to the infantry, 45 to the cavalry, and 5 to a light battery, which made somewhere about 275 wagons for a division; 275 to 300, according to whether there were three divisions to a corps: say about 750 wagons to the corps.

Q. That would be about 5,000, in round numbers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent were the manufacturers of the country able to meet such a demand?

A. We found at the start it was impossible to get our army wagons according to specifications, because they could only make them slowly. We had to take patterns from such manufacturers who had stock well seasoned. Before the war broke out letters had been sent to all the leading wagon manufacturers, and the department found out how many they could turn out weekly, and we were ready to give out orders just as soon as war was declared. The best we could do was 50 a week.

Q. How many in the country were able to supply to that extent?

A. Well, we had, I think, about seven; the Studebaker, the Toledo, the Columbia Wagon Works, near Philadelphia, a firm in Chattanooga, a firm in Martinsburg, W. Va.

Q. Where is the Milburn Wagon Company?

A. At Toledo. There is a firm at Milwaukee that turned out a number for us. We tried to get wider tires in the South on account of bad roads. Our old escort wagon was not sufficiently wide. We succeeded after a time in getting 3½-inch tires.

Q. Then the maximum output of the manufacturers of the country considered reliable would not have exceeded about 400 a week.

A. No, sir.

Q. That depended not upon what you wanted, but upon the materials they had on hand to make them?

A. Yes, sir; and a good many could not turn out 50 a week. There were only two or three that could turn out 50 a week.

Q. How long, under the most favorable circumstances, would it have required for the Government to secure wagons according to the specifications which you furnished?

A. We could not have gotten them in nine months.

Q. It was a matter of necessity to take just what you could get?

A. Absolute necessity.

Q. How long were you in securing the number of wagons as required for the equipment of the Army as it was organized and put in the field?

A. We started in at first furnishing what the regiments would actually require in camp. We furnished enough for the depot quartermaster and then four for each regiment. It took until well on in July. We supplied the troops ordered to Cuba first and left those at Camp Alger with a very much reduced transportation while they were in camp there.

Q. Do you know the maximum number of wagons that were purchased during the war?

A. About 3,600 of the so-called farm wagons and then a small number of army wagons and the escort wagons. The exact figures are given in my report.

Q. Four thousand would cover it all?

A. I think so.

Q. At what period had this maximum number been reached?

A. Not until about a month ago or a month and a half ago. We have still 100 or 200 that have not been delivered, that have been rejected. They have not completed their contract in accordance with the specifications. They are not all delivered yet.

Q. Did the contracts for furnishing ambulances come within your department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent were the manufacturers of the country able to supply ambulances?

A. That was more difficult than any of the others. The only manufacturers that furnish ambulances at all are Studebaker and the Toledo Wagon Works.

Q. Will you give us about the average cost?

A. Somewhere about \$86 for these farm wagons.

Q. What is the cost of the wagon according to your specification?

A. They run a little over \$100—about \$106. The average for the farm wagon is \$66.28; for the escort wagons, \$78.76; army wagon, \$101.76.

Q. How many of the army wagons, according to specifications, were furnished during the war?

A. We had contracts for 604, but there are 125 of them that have not been delivered. They have been rejected.

Q. That is, they furnished wagons, but they did not come up to the standard, and you rejected them and required others to be substituted in their place?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you have inspectors at the various manufacturers' shops to see how these were constructed?

A. We had inspectors at each one to examine the materials as they were cut and during the whole of the manufacturing of them.

Q. Were these contracts awarded after competitive bids?

A. Only to a certain extent. The first wagons we bought we awarded after telegraphing to these different manufacturers and getting their bids and calling upon them to state the number they could make per week. We wanted to reduce the kinds of wagons as much as possible on account of furnishing separate parts on the field; so if a man could only furnish a small number of wagons, I did not award them to him.

By General WILSON:

Q. General Beaver asked you the direct question how many Government wagons were issued to the troops during the war, and in your reply you gave him the number for which you had made contracts. Am I correct in assuming that you had Government wagons besides that when the war broke out?

A. No, sir; when the war broke out they were all taken into the field for the troops.

Q. There were other wagons with the troops. The natural inference is that that 600 is all that you issued?

A. All the wagons we had at the beginning of the war were in the hands of troops at the posts.

By General BEAVER:

Q. That is—now I understand it. You had no reserve to issue?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now as to the ambulances.

A. We had 96 when the war broke out?

Q. In use?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the regulation allowance to a regiment or battery or troop?

A. Three to a regiment, making 27 to the division; and the wagon transportation, 21 to the division. We had made 500 Rucker ambulances and 50 of the Red Cross.

Q. There were none. I suppose, on hand in the country outside the Army that you could purchase?

A. No, sir; we had to have these made on regular specifications.

Q. How soon were you able to get those, Colonel?

A. They came in pretty slow. I don't recollect the exact time, but we had difficulty in getting our ambulances fast enough at first.

Q. What was the maximum number that were manufactured during the war?

A. Five hundred and ninety-six.

Q. When was the first contract for ambulances made, and with whom?

A. With Studebaker, and made in the latter part of April.

Q. Before or after the declaration of war?

A. After, I think.

Q. Had any preliminary inquiries been made in regard to the subject?

A. I think so. That was all before I came into the office. I am not certain when that contract was made. I found a contract made when I arrived at the office.

Q. When did you assume duty?

A. I think it was the 27th of April when I reported.

Q. When was the first delivery made under the contract? Do you know?

A. I do not. They were delivering them when I arrived. The contract must have been made before the war.

Q. When did they complete the delivery?

A. That I can not tell. We made another contract soon after that. We called for bids and the Studebaker and Milburn people were the only ones that bid. It was given to the Milburn people.

Q. What is the cost of the army ambulance wagon, Colonel?

A. They average \$245 in 500 lots.

Q. You spoke of the Red Cross ambulance and another kind?

A. The Rucker; it is different from the Red Cross.

Q. What is the difference?

A. In the Rucker ambulance, the place where the men lie—they have a place in front between the seats where a man can stand and an attendant can stand to assist the men. It is a heavier ambulance and a little bit longer and requires four mules. They had an idea that the Rucker ambulance would only require two mules, but we found they really required four.

Q. Were you able to supply the troops going into the field with the ambulances necessary under the regulations?

A. I immediately put all they actually required. The distribution of those

ambulances at all times was under the Medical Department. We sent them just where the Surgeon-General decided.

Q. Do you know as to the number of ambulances that were available for the Shafter expedition?

A. I know we had between twenty and thirty down there.

Q. You have no knowledge as to how many went with the expedition, I suppose?

A. No knowledge of my own.

Q. Now, as to animals, Colonel, had you any difficulty in procuring mules in sufficient quantity for the transportation that was needed for the Army.

A. We were at all times able to supply the mules and harness more rapidly than the wagons.

Q. So that did not constitute a feature of the preparations that was difficult to solve?

A. No, sir.

Q. What were the methods pursued in regard to the purchase of the animals and harness? The same as to other quartermaster's supplies?

A. In the purchase of harness, we called for bids in all cases and gave the awards and the large manufacturers turned it out very rapidly. In regard to the purchase of animals, they were all purchased by boards appointed by the Adjutant-General and veterinarians were furnished to assist them.

Q. How many officers did each board consist of and what were the qualifications of the officers to serve?

A. The boards varied. Colonel Aleshire furnished nearly all the horses, both in the cavalry and artillery. He was an expert and continued purchasing for the regular cavalry and for the regular battery and he composed the boards. He had his regular men that had been with him a long time. For the supply of these batteries of volunteers and cavalry troops of volunteers, it was decided to buy as far as possible in the States in which these troops were raised, and boards were appointed usually with one volunteer officer on the board and two regulars, when it was possible to get them, and they made the purchases.

Q. Were the details for those boards made from the cavalry and artillery respectively?

A. No, sir; they were purchased where it was possible. There was an artillery officer for the purchase of artillery horses and a cavalry officer for cavalry horses. They had to take what they could get.

Q. And a skilled veterinarian for each board?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the maximum price and what the minimum?

A. We had to leave that to the discretion of the board, and that was determined by the locality and prices?

Q. Have you the prices paid, Colonel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you kindly give them to us?

A. I have the prices here, really, of every board, and added up. [Witness refers to paper.]

Q. What did they average?

A. Cavalry, \$101.42.

Q. What was the maximum and what the minimum?

A. I have not that figured out.

Q. As to mules?

A. Artillery horses, riding horses—do you care for that?

General BEAVER. Yes, sir.

The WITNESS. Artillery horses averaged \$130.85, and the small horses—those were intended for the Cubans—\$57.46; riding horses, \$126.97; draft horses that

went with the siege battery, \$129.35; draft mules—the other drafts were \$110.05; that, of course, included the wheel and swing and lead; pack mules were \$38.50.

Q. Do you know of any combinations having been formed in any locality to put the price of animals up?

A. The boards had to be on the alert for that sort of thing. If they found there was anything of that kind occurring, they would jump the locality and go somewhere else. We left that to their good sense.

Q. They were not compelled to submit to a combination of that kind?

A. Not at all.

Q. How soon were you able to supply the animals for cavalry and artillery and for transportation, after the war began?

A. We purchased them just as rapidly as we could supply the wagons, and we kept 500 to 1,000 mules ahead all the time ready to send right in. The artillery horses were very difficult to purchase. They had to be specially selected.

Q. In the purchase of mules, did you buy any green mules that had not been broken?

A. We tried not to. The instructions were not to, and in St. Louis, where a good many were purchased, they had them all harnessed up and tried.

Q. As a matter of fact, you did get some?

A. As a matter of fact, when I was at Montauk and tried to hitch up some of the mules, I don't think they were very well broken.

Q. You were able, then, to put the transportation into the field just as soon as the wagons could be supplied? That was the problem, and all the other features entering into it were easily solved?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It was economy to supply the animals only so fast as you could supply the wagons? You would not have to feed them in the meantime?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the present time, Colonel, how is the United States Government furnished with animals for cavalry, artillery, and wagon transportation in case of any difficulty? Could we put an army of 200,000 men into the field fully equipped with an ordinary rush of cavalry and artillery and all field transportation facilities?

A. Not with the number of animals we have on hand now—not 200,000 men. We have enough for the present force in the field.

Q. Have you sold animals since the cessation of hostilities?

A. Yes, sir; those that have been found not fitted for service we have sold. We have not sold any of the good ones. Those taken by the Rough Riders that were not suited for cavalry were sold. A good many of those have been sold. The best have been picked out and kept.

Q. Do you know what the loss was? Have you figured that out—the loss on the average between the purchase and selling price?

A. No, sir; it was a good deal more than it ought to have been.

Q. When you bought, the demand was great and the supplies small, and when you sold, the demand was light and the supply abundant?

A. We sold some the other day in Texas—\$35, at San Antonio—at \$21.60; but that is a fair price, considering the locality and time of the year.

Q. When you went to Montauk, Colonel, what did you find there—the 28th of July, I think you said, you went?

A. I know it was on a Friday; I am not certain whether it was the 28th.

General BEAVER. Twenty-ninth was Friday.

The WITNESS. I found the railroad company had commenced to build two side tracks. There was not a place where you could get anything to eat within 4 miles of the station, and I found it very difficult in getting anything started, because I could not provide for the subsistence of the men. I was authorized to use every

means possible and not to consider the matter of expense at all; to get that place organized as soon as possible.

Q. How long previous to your going there had that been determined upon as a camp rendezvous for the returning troops from Santiago?

A. I am not quite certain, but only a few days—four or five days. Captain Paten had gone out two days before me with an expert builder, Mr. Smith, and I met them at the depot and made contracts for the preparation of the wharf for the vessels.

Q. There was no wharf there?

A. There was a wharf there, but we had to drive large piles before a vessel could arrive at all. We made a contract for building storehouses, and the best we could do was to have them up in eight days, and we ordered large quantities of lumber in there for tent floors and things of that kind—everything we could foresee. I met General Young there at the office, and we went up all over the ground, and he decided where the camps should be, and he made arrangements for digging the wells and putting in the pumps and everything of that kind. The difficulty at first was providing for the men.

Q. Was there anything in the way of transportation facilities in the region—wagons? Were you able to hire wagons or men?

A. Could not hire a thing there.

Q. From what points did you get transportation?

A. I ordered more transportation from Washington when I first went over there.

Q. Was that taken by rail or water?

A. By rail. There was some delay in getting that over. Then I tried to get teams up from New York, which I did.

Q. You were there how long?

A. Five days.

Q. At the time this camp was determined upon had that been considered as a probable thing—the troops coming from Tampa there—or was that an afterthought, or don't you know?

A. I do not know as to that. That was ordered from the Adjutant-General's Office.

Q. At the time you left, what progress had been made toward the preparation of the camp for the reception of the men returning; when did the tents arrive?

A. We had quantities of tents there before I left—tents and clothing, and the different camp sites had all been staked out and we had every carpenter we could get from all those stations down on the railroad and a lot sent in from New York that were putting in the floors for the hospitals. That was made the first thing. The best thing we could do when the Ninth Cavalry came in was to give them their lumber and let them do it themselves.

Q. To what extent had the lumber arrived when you left?

A. We had as much lumber as we could haul. It was a question of teams more than lumber.

Q. Supplies were ahead of the transportation all the time you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You would not agree with a man in New York who told us that houses could be built there in two days?

A. If that is so, then I am a very incompetent man.

Q. Did you make a contract for a specific amount of lumber?

A. No, sir; we ordered it.

Q. Fixed the price by the thousand and then ordered it?

A. Yes, sir; we got bids from the different lumber companies around there.

Q. To what extent was the railroad company able to handle the supplies of quartermaster stores, including lumber and tents, as they came in?

A. They were doing that very well up to the time I left.

Q. They kept ahead of your demands, then, in that respect?

A. I think they did; we had no trouble. The great difficulty was in unloading them—in getting the cars empty—our storehouses not being completed, and not having enough teams to take the lumber right away.

Q. Was the commissary storehouse completed before you left?

A. No, sir.

Q. To what extent was it built?

A. They had the lumber all out, the floors laid, and of course they commenced to put floors on that as soon as that was done.

Q. Looking back at that experience, Colonel, does your afterthought suggest any improvement that could have been made in preparing for the reception of those troops if you had it to do over again: could you do it more rapidly and with greater expedition than you did it?

A. No, sir: if I could have had a few days beforehand to know what was coming, of course it would have been a very different thing.

By General McCook:

Q. Didn't most of the lumber come down there in box cars?

A. No, sir; not while I was there. I don't think any of it did—in fact, I know it did not.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How many army teams had arrived before you left?

A. We had, I think, 25 teams that arrived on Monday, and then came the Ninth Cavalry with about 25 more, and then about the time I left other teams arrived from St. Asaphs, from Washington. I don't think there were over 50 or 60 teams when I left. The teams from New York had not arrived. I was not able to get any teams there without guaranteeing them sustenance for the men and everything of that kind, which I had not.

Q. What day in August did you leave there?

A. I think I left there the 8th day.

Q. How rapidly did teams arrive, and at what dates, at Montauk?

A. I sent one lot of transportation from here, but how many came in from other regiments I do not know.

Q. The testimony before us is almost one way, that there was a great lack of transportation at Montauk Point all the time existing, at least until the middle of September. Most all the ills that were alleged to have occurred at Montauk have been attributed to the want of transportation, in that they said they could not get men from hospitals to trains on account of transportation, and the question is whether that is just testimony or whether the Quartermaster's Department has some excuse for not furnishing transportation.

A. When I left there, we furnished them all the transportation asked for. Colonel Kimball was ordered to get all transportation that was needed—heavy teams. How many were sent up I do not know.

Q. Do you know how many teams were sent up from here?

A. I do not know. I can find out.

Q. I suppose your depot quartermaster would know?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. The Quartermaster-General states here in his report that they made arrangements for 30,000 men at Montauk, including the sick; 30,000 uniforms and underclothing, hats, blankets, shoes, etc. He says the records of his office show that all tentage and clothing arrived before the soldiers arrived there. Now, if he made arrangements for taking care of 30,000 men, why didn't you have transpor-

tation for 30,000 men taken there at that time? Your department evidently had noticed that they were to take care of 30,000 men, and of course it was impossible to handle that stuff without transportation. Why was not sufficient transportation to take care of 30,000 men there in a fair time?

A. I can not answer that question.

Q. You were in charge of such transportation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it not your duty to see that it was done?

A. We sent all the transportation from St. Asaphs that they asked for.

Q. There was no one there to ask for it. The troops had not arrived yet. Why did you wait to be asked?

A. We pushed in all the transportation we had here at St. Asaphs, and in addition to that we hired all this additional transportation and sent it up, the kind of wagons they thought they could use to the best advantage.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you send your transportation on your own motion or in obedience to orders from others; and if so, from whom?

A. It was sent on my own motion, upon instructions from the Quartermaster-General.

Q. What instructions did you receive to send transportation there?

A. No special instructions, except to send what was required and send what we could. The reports I heard was that they had more teams than they could use around the depots.

By General DODGE:

Q. The reports that we have are that they suffered for the want of transportation.

A. I don't think that is so.

Q. Did the quartermaster look to you to supply transportation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, if it was not supplied, the quartermaster-general was not in fault, but you were, or somebody else?

A. I would be at fault if I had not run up the transportation available here?

Q. Was there any transportation available except here?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did Colonel Kimball receive authority or instructions from you to hire all the transportation he could that was needed at Montauk?

A. Yes, sir; in addition to what they had.

Q. When you undertook to hire transportation in New York, what difficulties did you experience?

A. While I was there the question was unless I would guarantee food for the men and care they would not send them up, and if there was a guaranty teams would be sent there. We hadn't any way to provide food for ourselves, except to go 3½ miles for it.

Q. Couldn't you put up tents and start a camp?

A. We did. I made arrangements with a construction company there and they furnished men. I gave them tents and they had arrangements for feeding all their men.

Q. How long did it take to get that arrangement going so that you had arrangements to feed all the men?

A. For feeding these men it took about five days.

Q. So that after five days there was no reason why you could not feed any number of men that it was necessary to send there?

A. Well, all that provision for food belonged to this construction company. I did not have any provision to feed men excepting as I hired them there.

Q. You hired teamsters?

A. I hired 150 laboring men.

Q. Was there any difficulty in feeding your teamsters?

A. We had them in a regular camp there, and bought the rations for them after they were settled.

Q. You had cooks for them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you have distributed these wagons to the different regiments there and let them provide for the teamsters and give each regiment teams there?

A. General Young took the teams out of the regiments' hands and left two for each regiment, and he hauled the stores out for these different things. He thought that a better thing to do.

Q. General Young complained on the stand for want of transportation?

A. That was the great difficulty for the first week or ten days.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. If the Quartermaster's Department was notified that a certain number of troops were to land at Montauk Point was it the duty of that department, of its own motion, without specific orders from the Secretary of War or any one else, to supply that army with tentage, wagons, clothing, etc.?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And was it the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to report to the Secretary of War the progress they were making or not, or were they supposed to do that independently, as you say they were independent of any specific instructions, or had they to report any deficiency?

A. It was their duty, and they did keep the Secretary informed. I was called in by the Secretary as soon as I returned. Colonel Hecker went up there as soon as I left, and he reported also.

Q. What instructions did the Secretary of War give you in the interviews you had with him?

A. None at all.

Q. You reported that everything was being done that could be?

A. I reported the conditions—the difficulties we had had and what we had accomplished, and he seemed satisfied that everything had been done that could be.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Did you ascertain the fact that forty ambulances were on the ground that could not be used?

A. No, sir; I don't think that was true at all.

Q. You think they were all able to be used that were there?

A. Not all.

Q. A good many of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Wasn't there a large number of horses and mules all the time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have use for them?

A. They never were all in use.

Q. How many horses did you have before the army from Santiago arrived?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Was it as many as 8,000?

A. Eight thousand animals?

Q. Yes.

A. Oh, no. With the Ninth Cavalry there came up all the horses that came with the troops that came and the spare animals that did not go to Santiago, and by that time we had gotten over twenty-five wagons from here.

Q. The railroad authorities testified that they shipped from New York to the

South between 8,000 and 9,000 animals. You don't know that there were that many there?

A. You mean those were brought up?

Q. Yes.

A. They were not there when I was there.

Q. You did not see them?

A. I know they were not there.

Q. I am speaking of all horses and animals carried to Montauk.

A. Not while I was there.

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, in the discharge of your official duties in your department were you always promptly and thoroughly sustained in your recommendations or were you handicapped by delays on the part of higher authorities?

A. I have been delayed in getting decisions made.

Q. And the cause of that was what, do you know?

A. No, sir.

Q. Upon whom did that decision depend?

A. In that office it depends upon the Quartermaster-General.

Q. The delay, then, for which you don't know the reason was caused by the delay in getting a decision from the Quartermaster-General?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did that often occur, Colonel?

A. Well, hardly to the extent of interfering with the prompt discharge and prompt supply.

Q. Can you recall any specific instance that you can give us?

A. I don't recall any particular one now.

Q. Did that delay embarrass or worry you to any extent in the discharge of that portion of the branch of the duties committed to your care?

A. To some extent; yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. Colonel, did you make contracts during the war? Did you make or supervise contracts?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For what?

A. For all those supplies that came—why, no; I should not say that—there those contracts were usually made by the Northern officers at the depots and the various purchasing offices. Purchases are authorized from this office, but the actual making and drawing up of the contract is made by some other officer at the various points where these purchases are made.

Q. Were you ever interfered with by any person superior to you in rank in connection with the War Department in the discharge of your duties in regard to these contracts?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. These contracts that were made by other officers, they had first to be approved by you?

A. Approved by the Quartermaster-General; yes, sir.

Q. Did delays occur awaiting approval?

A. At times; yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Everything that you did was known to the Quartermaster-General?

A. Yes, sir; always.

Q. Everything done by his orders?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. In making contracts for wagons, ambulances, and animals and all the supplies that came through your office, state whether or not any contract was made at any time at the dictation of any person upon grounds other than those which were for the good of the Government.

A. Never.

Q. Was there or was there not any influence, so far as you know, at work looking to the benefit of a private individual out of any contract that was made under your supervision or direction?

A. Nothing with any contract I ever had anything to do with.

By General DODGE:

Q. Will you please make any statement you desire to the commission, or any suggestion you have that you think will be of benefit to the service in the future, or upon any matter we have not called upon you to testify about, or any explanation you have to make?

A. I don't think I have. I would like to look up that question at Montauk Point and make an accurate memorandum. I think I can get at it.

Col. C. P. Miller's statement regarding transportation supplied Montauk Point.

At the time Montauk Point was selected as a camp, the 2d of August, the depot at St. Asaphs had been used for the animals, wagons, and horses destined for the Second Army Corps at Camp Alger. The teams, as fast as received and made up, were issued to these troops.

St. Louis was the large purchasing depot for mules, and as all troops were to go South, it was not thought best to go to the expense of shipping more wagon transportation to St. Asaphs, Va., than would be required for the Second Corps. For this reason there were no Government teams available for Montauk when it was selected for a camp except the few not made up into teams and issued to Camp Alger. Captain Parsons was ordered, on August 4, to equip and ship to Montauk as many teams as he could and as quickly as possible. His first shipment was on August 7, 20 teams, and his next on August 10, 25 teams. In considering the time he took to get these teams off it must be remembered that his wagons were received knocked down, to save freight, and had to be put together, and the mules had to be shod before shipment.

On August 9 Captain Anderson, Sixth Cavalry, arrived with two troops and 25 six-mule wagons. These were available for general uses on the 11th, after they had hauled their stores to their camp.

On August 14 Major Ladd, acting chief quartermaster, Second Corps, was directed to ship 25 wagons and 100 mules to Montauk. At this time there was a train load of mules en route from St. Louis, and as soon as they arrived more teams were forwarded.

The Van Aken Company supplied from 25 to 50 wagons about the 15th. Colonel Kimball hired and sent out 62 heavy teams on the 19th. Altogether the table shows 396 wagons, 1,578 mules, and 232 horses, more, it is believed, than could possibly be used considering the limited space about the depot and storehouses at Montauk.

Of the ambulances there is no record of the number brought with the troops from Tampa and Lakeland, probably not less than 12, and these, with those supplied from points indicated in the table, would make 60. Every available ambulance was supplied.

The inclosed table with these explanatory notes are intended as a reply to the following question: "When it is stated in the Quartermaster-General's report that before a single man had arrived at Montauk there was a supply there of clothing and tentage for 30,000 men, why was not transportation supplied for 30,000 men also?"

I will state further, in reply to this, that the Department did order every available team to Montauk as rapidly as possible; that it could not order in transportation at once for the 30,000 men, because it did not have it available; and finally, I respectfully submit that with the amount supplied there could have been no lack of wagons after the first few days. It is possible that those testifying that there was a short supply were regimental officers, who had the most of their teams taken away from them for general work at the post and were allowed sufficient for camp purposes only. This system for the management of the teams was adopted by General Young, and, while not satisfactory to company commanders, was the only practicable method of making the most of the teams provided.

In addition to the wagons mentioned in the table, six water wagons were supplied before any troops arrived and six more later, more than were used; also, several Dougherty and light spring wagons for the use of the officers.

I find, upon consulting the records, that it was decided to use Montauk as a camp on August 2; at least, the Quartermaster-General was notified on that date; that Mr. Smith and Captain Patten left Washington for Montauk on the night of the 2d; and I left on the night of August 4, met General Young at Long Island City August 5, and took a train for Montauk about 11 o'clock a. m. My testimony before the committee that I left Washington on July 28 was an error of one week.

Referring to the testimony that there were 20 ambulances with broken poles, I will add that in addition to the spare parts that must have been shipped to Montauk with the ambulances, under a general order from the Quartermaster-General's Office to ship a certain proportion of spare parts with all wagons, the following special shipments of ambulance poles were made to Montauk: August 16, 6; September 8, 10. That they had sufficient is shown by the fact that no ambulances came back from Montauk with broken poles.

Transportation shipped to Montauk.

Date.	From whence.	Mules.	Horses.	Wag- ons.	Ambu- lances.
1898.					
Aug. 3	Governors Island				8
6	St. Asaphs	96		20	
7				4
8	St. Asaphs	4		1	
9	Tampa, with Sixth Cavalry	150		25	
10	St. Asaphs	60		25	
11	do	101			
13	Chickamauga				9
	Tampa, with Ninth Cavalry	120		20	
14	Camp Alger	100		25	
	Tampa, with Third Cavalry	107		20	7
15	Van Aken Co		50	25	
16	St. Asaphs	60		25	
18	do	97		24	
19	New York		128	62	
	Tampa, with First Cavalry	286		44	
	Lakeland, with Tenth Cavalry	218		36	
28	St. Asaphs	179		44	
Sept. 3	Toledo, Ohio				5
4	St. Asaphs		18		
3	do				15
7	do		36		
	Total	1,578	232	396	48

Ambulances. In addition to the 48 ambulances noted in this table, there was a number brought from Tampa and Lakeland with troops. No record in Quartermaster-General's Office of number.

WAR DEPARTMENT, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, December 7, 1898.

Gen. GRENVILLE DODGE,

President Investigating Committee.

GENERAL: In reply to letter of the 5th instant, requesting a statement of the transportation furnished Camp Wikoff, the time it was furnished, the time it was sent, when received, when issued, and to whom, the inclosed table gives the amount of transportation furnished and dates of shipment and arrival so far as can be ascertained at this office. The remaining dates of arrival at Montauk I am unable to get. Capt. R. W. Dowdy, who had charge of the transportation, could explain when the transportation was issued and to whom. As I understand the methods at Montauk, the larger part of the transportation was organized into trains under one head and sent out as required to hospitals or regiments.

I have received telegrams and letters from persons at Montauk who were in a position to know if Maj. I. C. Brown's testimony is correct, "that 20 ambulances were in the corral without poles and other parts that were never used and could not be used, and that they remained there until within a week or two of the time he left; that other parts of these ambulances were taken later to put in others; that at no time were they able to obtain from the Quartermaster's Department the number of ambulances required, although requisitions were made again and again for them, and at their general hospital they only had 25 ambulances." I respectfully invite attention to the following statements, written reports, and telegrams from officers and others in better position to know the facts than Dr. Brown.

Colonel Greenleaf informs me that he was at Montauk Point from September 9 to 22, under orders from the Secretary of War, to expedite the transfer of the sick and convalescents from that camp to hospitals in New York and along the New England coast. That he found an ambulance train fairly well organized for use at the general and detention hospitals and that the Fifth Corps also had a supply of ambulances, the same being under the charge of an infantry officer, who was assisted by two medical officers, one Dr. Mohr, in the Fifth Corps, and the other, Dr. Jones, at the unloading dock. The sick were moved nearly every day in detachments varying from 150 to 250, the movement commencing from 1 o'clock each day. He never heard any complaint regarding lack of ambulances, nor was any statement made to him that there were any ambulances out of repair. The shipment went along without interruption and was entirely satisfactory to him.

Mr. Clinton Smith, chief constructor, Quartermaster-General's office, informs me by letter: "I was at Montauk from the 4th of August to the 24th, 1898, and was usually at the corral from two to three times a day to see that my teams were out and to give directions about loading. I do not remember seeing more than two or three ambulances at any one time in the corral but what could have been used, and the greater portion of them were in use. I think that the tongue of one was broken and some other parts were broken in unloading from the cars, so that there may have been a few that were disabled for a short time until they had time to repair them. As I messed at noon for several days during the latter part of my stay with Captain Dowdy, who had charge of transportation, I think that I should have been likely to have heard complaint, if there had been any, in regard to ambulances not being issued or in condition to issue. I think there was some trouble with one of the brakes that was put on wrong, and some of the parts of wagons got mixed by inexperienced men putting them together at the station, but these were soon righted."

Captain Patten, the assistant to the chief quartermaster at Montauk, the first man on the ground and still on duty closing up the depot wires: "There was at all times plenty of transportation. The hospitals had all they wanted night and day. We had 50 good ambulances, 7 of which were never hitched up, not being

called for. No complaint was ever made to me of any lack of transportation. They always had more than they used. Medical stores, commissary stores, and quartermaster's stores came on some occasions loaded in same car, but were always handled so as to get at hospital goods promptly, and no delay in delivery was occasioned on this account."

Major Knight, chief quartermaster, cables: "I never knew of any delay on the part of the Quartermaster's Department in delivering medical supplies. On several occasions certain named medicines were sent for, and as medicines were billed as so many boxes medical supplies, it necessitated the unloading of one or more cars and the opening of boxes to find the package containing the particular medicine desired. The delivery of medical supplies of all kinds was given preference over all other stores. Transportation was ample from August 15, and I never knew of a request from the Medical Department for teams to be refused or delayed. On one occasion three or four cars of supplies for four division hospitals arrived at Montauk in charge of an employee of the Medical Department, who was instructed to divide the supplies in four equal parts. Wagons were promptly furnished to haul the supplies, but they were not made use of for three or four days, as apparently the officers in charge did not want to receive them, having no storage there, or could not agree on distribution. There never were 20 ambulances disabled at one time during my stay at Montauk. All repairs were made as promptly as possible, and as chief quartermaster I spared no means or effort to meet every demand on the department. In my opinion, the prime cause for delay in the Medical Department was due to failure to mark contents of boxes on outside from the very beginning. My desire and idea was to send all medical supplies to the general hospital as fast as they arrived. The chief surgeon, Colonel Forwood, refused to receive only such as he needed; consequently they were left in the cars until wanted. General Williston is a witness to this."

Major Sawyer, chief quartermaster after Major Knight was relieved, telegraphs: "I went to Montauk, September 6, in charge of transportation at that point, and left there October 15. During that period no report was made to me by Dr. Brown or any other medical officer that supplies could not be located. Had such report been made to me, any supplies could have been located in not to exceed four hours. If he had not means of transportation for medical supplies, it was because he did not apply for it, for besides three corrals I had 90 teams for just such demand as this, and these 90 wagons could have hauled cots daily from the station to the hospital if application had been made for them. No report was ever made to me that 20 ambulances were disabled. Had there been, they could have been repaired finally. I do not remember that the medical officers ever made a request for transportation that was not furnished; and if the reports of Dr. Brown be true, all could have been easily and promptly remedied had he applied or reported them to me."

Capt. Marion McMillan, the quartermaster assigned to duty at the general hospital, who reported to the chief medical officer, personally attending to his construction and transportation matters, wires: "No report about broken tongues were made to me by medical officers. Will forward my knowledge of the matter." (See his letter attached.)

From J. W. Ridgway, assistant master of transportation at Montauk, Colonel Moore has the following letter:

"Hon. Governor WOODBURY.

"DEAR SIR: I take the liberty to write you and ask pardon if I have intruded. I write in regard to a remark you made to Colonel Moore, while before your honored board, as to the ambulances at Montauk. If you will allow me, I would say Colonel Moore and Colonel Roosevelt come very near telling the board about

right. We had 50 ambulances at Montauk. Seven of them never had a team hooked to them. There was not a day or a night from August 6 to November 1 that there ever was a delay or a call for an ambulance, but it was out and at the post in twenty-five minutes, and oftentimes less. We had plenty of ambulances and horses and mules to hook to them. At one time I never allowed the drivers to remove their harness, so as the delay would be but slight when called upon. They have been out as early as 4 in the morning and as late as 11 at night. I recall one incident: At night, about 11 o'clock, a call came for an ambulance to go to the beach and get the body of General Wheeler's son, who was drowned, and in nineteen minutes from the time the order was given the ambulance was at the beach, ready for the body. As to the commissary, there always was enough, as I had the supervision over the hauling of all descriptions, and know. I have had teams bring back provisions from the camps, and the answer would be, when I asked the driver why he brought it back, he would say: 'They have all they want, and have not time to burn or bury it.' I would report to Captain Duval at the commissary, and he said: 'We issued it to them. If they don't want any more, why, use it to the best advantage.' This not only once, but several times. If this information is of any service to your honored board, I have no objection to it being used. My occupation at Montauk was superintendent of the corral—received all horses, mules, wagons, carriage ambulances that came to the camp, and assisted Capt. R. W. Dowdy, master of transportation, and after he resigned I was made master of transportation, and now hold the position.

Captain McMillan's written report will be submitted when received. On the 18th of August a telegram was received for certain spare parts for ambulances, viz: Spare wheels, front and hind, platform springs, poles, etc. These were ordered at once by wire and this request was the only one received. It would seem from these reports that this department is not mistaken in its statements that there were sufficient ambulances at all times at Montauk, and that at no time were there a sufficient number broken to prevent the department from meeting all calls and having at least seven in the corral ready for further demands.

The statement of Colonel Greenleaf, chief medical officer of the Army, on General Miles's staff, is, I believe, of the utmost value, as he was sent to Montauk when the pressure was very great, to take the entire charge of unloading the sick and transporting them to the hospitals. If there had been a lack of ambulances, he would have discovered it. Again, attention is invited to the letter of the corral boss, J. W. Ridgway, who was certainly in position to know the truth.

This office has no means of ascertaining the truth of statements like Dr. Brown's except from the reports received from our officers and men in charge at Montauk of the matters in question, and I respectfully submit their reports as the best answer to the questions contained in your letter of the 5th instant I am able to get.

“Very respectfully,

“CROSBY P. MILLER,

“Colonel, Quartermaster's Department.”

Transportation shipped to Montauk.

Date.	From whence.	Arrived.	Mules.	Horses.	Wagons.	Ambulances.
1898.						
Aug. 3	Governors Island.....	8th				8
6	St. Asaphs.....	8th	96		20	
7	Jeffersonville Depot.....					4
8	St. Asaphs.....	10th	4		1	
9	Tampa, with Sixth Cavalry.....	9th	150		25	
10	St. Asaphs.....	12th	60		25	
11	do.....	13th	101			
13	Chickamauga.....					9
	Tampa, with Ninth Cavalry.....	13th	120		20	
14	Camp Alger.....	17th	100		25	
	Tampa, with Third Cavalry.....	14th	107		20	7
15	Van Aken Co.....			50	25	
16	St. Asaphs.....	18th	60		25	
18	do.....	20th	97		24	
19	New York.....			126	62	
	Tampa, with First Cavalry.....		286		44	
	Lakeland, with Tenth Cavalry.....		218		36	
28	St. Asaphs.....	30th	179		44	
Sept. 3	Toledo, Ohio.....					5
4	St. Asaphs.....	6th		18		
3	do.....	5th				15
7	do.....			36		
	Total.....		1,578	232	396	48

Ambulances.—In addition to the 48 ambulances noted in this table, there was a number brought from Tampa and Lakeland with troops. No record in Quartermaster-General's Office of number. Six Dougherties and one buckboard supplied for officers' use.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 10, 1898.*

THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL U. S. ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

SIR: My attention has been called to certain statements of Maj. Ira C. Brown, surgeon, United States Volunteers, made before the investigation committee relative to the ambulance service at Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, Long Island.

I can not think that you feel you have anything to fear in the most searching investigation, but that such erroneous testimony should go uncontradicted is neither just to you, the commissioners, nor the country.

I can hardly think that Major Brown knowingly testified falsely, but that some of his statements are wrong I can honestly assert, and many wagon masters and scores of teamsters can do likewise.

His statements have done you and the officers who represented you at Camp Wikoff a great wrong. In hopes that this wrong may be corrected, I submit the following statement, which I trust you can lay before the committee:

I heard few complaints about ambulances. The ambulances were in my charge and were held subject to the orders of the chief surgeon or those to whom he delegated the authority. Any complaints as to the lack of ambulances or their service would certainly have come to me. I never heard any, except as hereafter stated. I have no records by me, and speak from memory.

At first the ambulance train numbered 10 to 15. The surgeons wanted more, and the number was increased every few days, until about the 23d of August there were some 27 in service. About the 1st of September 15 more were received, and some time later 8 more, making a total of 50. Some of these were never used, because they were not called for.

There was but little damage to ambulances, except in the way of broken tongues. We had spare tongues, and the broken would be replaced at once, except for a short time when the spare tongues had been used up. Knowing that it would take some time to get tongues from the manufacturers, lumber was ordered from

New York and tongues were made by the wheelwrights. At no time was there ever more than a half a dozen ambulances disabled.

The only real complaint I heard in regard to ambulances was in the transferring of the sick from the regiments to the hospitals, and I believe there was ground for this complaint, but it can not be laid at the door of the Quartermaster's Department, for the hospital did not send for the ambulances. During all the camp if there was any order on the corral for an ambulance which was not filled I never heard of it.

From about the 12th of August till about the 25th it was my duty to turn the wagons out for work and to keep them in order. After that I was also charged with their distribution. Before this latter date I can not state as to the use of the wagons, but after that I know that the hospitals were always first considered.

Every morning the surgeon in charge of hospital supplies would come to the point where all teams were assembled and tell me how many teams he wanted. Generally I turned over to him all he asked for. Some days, when hard pressed, I would ask him if he could do with less. If he said "Yes," a less number would be turned over; if he said "No," then he got the full amount.

This surgeon was Dr. Winter, and he impressed me as one of the most efficient medical officers with whom I came in contact. Very many days I said, "I can give you more teams this morning if you can handle them." Sometimes he would take them and sometimes not. These statements I am sure Dr. Winter will confirm.

In submitting this statement I would like to add the following:

In this investigation I have no chestnuts to pull out of the fire. I am wholly disinterested, save as a citizen of the country, and as such I wish to say that instead of censure the country should bestow praise on Camp Wikoff.

The records of your office will show that an enormous amount of supplies for your department were sent there without requests, in anticipation of the needs; and often when supplies were urgently needed they were sent by express.

When the conditions confronted and the work accomplished are considered, I can but think no censure can rest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

R. W. DOWDY,

Captain, United States Army, Retired.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,

Huntsville, Ala., December 8, 1898.

THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to report my knowledge on the matters referred to in your telegram of the 6th instant. Cars with cots in them were brought up where they could be unloaded as quickly as room could be made for them. On account of the great rush for wagons it was at times very hard to procure the necessary transportation, but almost invariably the cots could be delivered at the general hospital the next day. The congestion of the railroad had more to do with the slowness in receiving cots than the lack of transportation, although at times it was very difficult to procure wagons. Several times the chief surgeon told me that the hospital was short of cots, and requested that I procure them if possible. In each of these cases the cots were delivered within a couple of days if any cots were in quartermaster's depot. That is the only report received on the matter from medical officers. In regard to ambulances, I never heard of there being 20 ambulances useless on account of broken tongues, nor were there during the busy season as many as 40 connected with the main corral. There were at first 11 ambulances, 3 of which were detailed permanently to the general hospital and 1 to the detention hospital; the other 7 were sent to the docks to unload transports. Upon receipt of 9 more

ambulances 1 was sent to the general hospital and the other 8 sent to the docks. Later on there were 5 ambulances in the general hospital corral, but never more. There were 21 ambulances at Camp Wikoff beside the regulation ambulances when I left on sick leave on September 3, all of which were in good condition. While I was away, from September 3 to September 17, more ambulances were joined to the corral. About the last week in September and on into October there were many ambulances lying idle simply because there was no work for them to do.

Very respectfully,

MARION McMILLAN,

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 2, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF COL. WILLIAM S. PATTEN.

Col. WILLIAM S. PATTEN, upon request, appeared before the commission, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your full name and rank and department you are in?

A. William S. Patten; present rank, colonel; Quartermaster's Department.

Q. Have you charge of any bureau in the Quartermaster's Department; and if so, what one?

A. I have charge of the supply of clothing and equipage.

Q. What is included under the term equipage?

A. Tentage and minor things, as picks and shovels and spades. They are not alone supplied by that division; they are supplied also by our general supply division, but only such as pertain around the camp—camp kettles, mess pans, etc.

Q. Stoves?

A. Only tent stoves.

Q. What articles embraced under the term "equipage" in the Quartermaster's Department are supplied also by the Ordnance Department, if any?

A. I don't know whether you call them equipage or not, but the cooking kit of the individual soldier and a knife, fork, spoon, and plate were used in field service. You might call that equipage.

Q. Well, are the ovens included in your department?

A. No, sir. They belong to what is termed the regular supplies.

Q. What supply of tents were on hand at the time of declaration of war with Spain?

A. That has been submitted to the board here in a tabulated statement which I prepared, but I could not recall the amount. It would be what is called a reasonable reserve for the forces in service.

Q. Did you prepare answers, Colonel, to questions 5 and 6 propounded by the commission to the Quartermaster's Department?

A. I took part in the preparation of those two questions. I do not know the exact—

Q. One is as to the steps taken to supply an army of 250,000 men.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The facts stated in those answers are correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, absolutely so.

Q. Are you in your department prepared now to supply all the requisitions that

may be made upon you by the Army in the field for whatever is necessary for their use in the way of tentage and supplies?

A. So far as we can foresee, yes, sir. It is a constantly changing situation.

Q. Is the quality of the duck now used in the tents standard army duck?

A. So far as we can control it. No contracts have been made for some time except for United States standard duck.

Q. But the manufacturers of the country are able now to meet your demands for the standard quality, are they?

A. Yes, sir; they are, provided we don't call for them all at once; but they can now put out sufficient duck to meet the requisitions of the Army with the standard quality.

Q. Did you have, during the emergency, any difficulty in supplying the Army with mess pans, camp kettles, etc.?

A. No, sir; there was never a shortage of those things. They could be obtained in an unlimited quantity.

Q. Were there any requisitions unsatisfied, so far as you know, for any time for supplies of that character?

A. No, sir; never knew of any.

Q. Are the contracts for your own supplies made under your personal supervision?

A. Yes, sir. The bids are opened at the depots; they are there abstracted and forwarded with the recommendation of the depot office. They come to my desk, and I go over them and I submit them to the Quartermaster-General with my recommendation, and his action is final.

Q. What length of time is consumed in that routine of submission and approval, ordinarily?

A. There need not be twenty-four hours.

Q. As a matter of fact, how much was there?

A. That varies greatly. I have taken an abstract in, and the Department has acted on it over the telephone where we felt very much pressed.

Q. Were the contracts in your department or in your bureau of the department, Colonel, made upon competitive bids in all cases?

A. There has been rarely an exception this summer where our awards have not been after advertisement, and these exceptions were to meet emergencies; but we have followed it to the extreme, advertising and awarding on the competitive basis.

Q. Do you know of any case in which a contract has been allowed to any other than the lowest responsible bidder?

A. Not a case. There has never been a case in my department.

Q. Do you know of any other instance, outside of your department, which dictated the letting of a contract other than the best for the interest of the Government?

A. There has never been an opening of a contract, hardly, that might not be flooded with Tom, Dick, and Harry looking out for their constituents, etc.

Q. The effect of it was quite another thing?

A. This town is full of attorneys, who presumably make their living in that sort of thing. The evidence is in the papers that can be laid open to anybody and they can take the figures. I even satisfied the New York World.

Q. It is in view of a formal communication addressed to us that I ask you these questions, and in view of our failure to get any testimony from anyone else; so we have been trying to get the facts from the quartermasters—yourself.

A. They consulted me on that overcoat award, and I handed them the papers, and they have nothing more to say.

Q. Have you any knowledge of a contract for hats—for the army hats?

A. There are a great many contracts we have had this summer. We have bought, I suppose, 300,000 or more, after advertising contracts with a number of different parties.

Q. Do you know where the hats were manufactured?

A. Only by the names of the manufacturers. We could not determine that, but they have been mostly purchased in Philadelphia, where we have our best system of inspection.

Q. Mr. Knox, of New York, called upon us while we were in New York and made some complaint of a contract that was let in Philadelphia, which he alleged was let irrespective of the quality of the hat. Do you know the particular contract to which he alluded? Have you had any correspondence with him?

A. I have had Mr. Knox's story from him direct on several occasions.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. I think he complained more about his samples?

A. His complaint was because his hats were not accepted.

Q. I thought he had waived that, but said he did not get back the samples which he submitted.

By General DODGE:

Q. He complained that his samples were better than others.

A. Mr. Knox claimed that his hats were unjustly rejected by the Philadelphia depot; that they were better than those accepted.

Q. Do you know anything in regard to them?

A. I investigated the matter as well as I could, and the result was unfavorable to him, and he not being satisfied with that, I suggested to the Quartermaster-General that he place it in the hands of an officer, and he placed it in the hands of Colonel Moore, of our department, and he spent some two weeks in going to the bottom of it, and he reported that the hats were very justly rejected. Mr. Knox repeatedly made charges of irregularity of the depot: said he could not get his hats in because he would not do this and that, but he failed to offer a single iota of proof of it.

By General BEAVER:

Q. He said that he asked that a secret-service officer be detailed to investigate it?

A. He asked that repeatedly, but he never had anything to investigate.

Q. Was it demonstrated that there was any fraud?

A. That is what he complained of. He never gave any instance where an investigation could be made. There was nothing whatever except the mere fact that the Knox hat was rejected.

Q. You investigated it and reached the same conclusion which Colonel Moore subsequently reached.

A. Yes, sir; only he put much more time than I had an opportunity of doing on it.

Q. Do you know what the difference in the bids was—the bid rejected and the one accepted?

A. In that particular letting I can not recall it; but there was not much difference.

Q. It rested on the question of quality more than price?

A. We have a standard, and only requested hats to be furnished equal to that standard. The inspector rejects everything not up to it.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Were his hats rejected on account of quality?

A. Yes, sir.

General DODGE. One complaint he made was that he could not obtain his samples or papers.

By General BEAVER:

Q. He said, "I respectfully ask that the board return my documents, etc., from General Ludington, and upon their receipt by me a day be appointed on which

I can appear before your board and state that I firmly believe the quartermaster's department in Philadelphia to be rotten and corrupt."

A. That is the part that interested me.

Q. Do you know anything about the documents?

A. Yes, sir. They were turned over and left on my desk. They were the papers, with his old samples and new samples, which were turned over to Colonel Moore, who made this investigation and report. Immediately upon making his report Colonel Moore went to San Francisco on a very hurried trip to attend to personal business, and then Knox called for his papers and his samples, and he was so informed and that steps were being taken to weed out the papers the best we could. We had the samples. The samples expressed from Philadelphia are now over there, and Colonel Moore is now trying to get the papers.

Q. The colonel has returned now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the issue of hospital tents to Chickamauga?

A. To Chickamauga? I know that all the tents were issued after the camp was established.

Q. How many hospital tents were sent to Chickamauga? Will you please look at that statement and see whether it correctly states the shipments made to Chickamauga and states the dates correctly? [Paper handed to witness.]

A. Yes, sir; I recognize that.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the date of transportation?

A. They were received frequently. When there was an emergency we directed that they be sent by rail.

(Witness here filed a copy of the statement, showing the quantity of tentage ordered to Camp Thomas, dates, and, as far as can be ascertained from the Quartermaster-General's Office, the dates on which shipments were made, which was marked "Exhibit W. S. P., No. 1, December 2, 1898.")

The WITNESS. The time between the receipt of the order and the receipt of tents, if telegraph is used, might amount to a great deal if they needed them badly.

Q. The total number of hospital tents shipped to Chickamauga, as appears by this statement, was 753?

A. Yes, sir; hospital tents.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Where were those hospital tents mostly shipped from?

A. Mostly Baltimore, and some from Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, and St. Louis; they furnished the most of our tents. These separate shipments show calls, either from the camp or the Surgeon-General's Office, to ship in those amounts.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were there any requisitions made upon you for hospital tents that you could not immediately fill?

A. There was never a call made, that was approved by the Surgeon-General, that was not shipped immediately.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you have calls that were not approved by the Surgeon-General?

A. There have been instances—one from Santiago for 1,000. He said 500 would be more than he could use, and I sent 500. That is why I said, "Approved by the Surgeon-General."

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, in the discharge of the official duties assigned you, which, as I understand, is the department pertaining to camp and garrison equipage and clothing, was your action in every individual case approved by the Quartermaster-

General and your superiors, or were you handicapped in any way by delay on the part of your superiors in acting on your papers?

A. In my position as assistant and adviser I can hardly claim to have been handicapped, but my recommendations were not always accepted by my superiors. My superior is a very painstaking man. My recommendations were not always approved. Otherwise I can not see any occasion for my recommending. Why shouldn't I act?

Q. Was there any delay in the issue of materials in your department upon any request, based upon the action of your superiors in not approving your recommendations?

A. Well, possibly.

Q. Can you recall any individual instance?

A. No, sir; not individual. It would take more explanation than a mere answer to the question to put that clearly.

Q. The disapproval of your recommendations, was that in the case of the award of contracts?

A. Generally, where it has occurred, it was not in the amount.

Q. Not in the price, but as to quantities?

A. As to quantities.

Q. Was your recommendation for a larger quantity than approved or smaller?

A. Where there has been any difference of opinion it was less.

Q. That is, your recommendations have been lowered?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There has been more complaint made as to your department. We are digging simply for facts; that is all.

A. If conditions had been a little different than they have turned out, my recommendations might have been very wrong.

Q. You feel satisfied that the disapproval was to the advantage of the Government?

A. The motive was at the time.

Q. Was there any delay due to nonaction in regard to your recommendations that embraced the Department in any way?

A. I do not know of any instance now.

Q. Now, Colonel, I would be glad to hear anything you want to add.

A. No, sir.

Q. You spoke—

A. Of course the situation then was a very trying one to the department. All responsibility rested on the Quartermaster-General, not on me; and naturally he might be more conservative in having that responsibility.

Q. You were perfectly satisfied with the results in your official position in charge of that division?

A. I do not know that any of us were satisfied. We could have done it a little better.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, looking at it from what you know now, was your recommendation right or wrong?

A. Looking at it from what I know now, we could not have piled in any too much stuff.

By General McCook:

Q. Who was the manufacturer of this canvas in Baltimore: have they more than one mill?

A. The Woodbury and Mount Vernon. You probably get as fine duck from the Mount Vernon as anybody. Then there are some other makers.

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, in regard to the canvas that was first issued for the tents, perhaps you can give us some information as to why that was not equal to the standard quality?

A. We bought all the tents we possibly could get hold of. It was simply to get the tents the best we could. The instructions were to get as near the standard as possible. The few mills could not produce them.

Q. When did you commence to get the standard qualities—as the manufacture was sufficiently advanced?

A. I do not think we had any trouble since——

Q. After the middle of July?

A. No. Even the best duck does not stand in that Southern country more than three or four months. You can put your fingers through it at the end of that time.

Q. You have sufficient camp and garrison equipage now for an army of 250,000 men to go into the field at once?

A. Outside of what they have?

Q. Including what they have in use in good order.

A. Yes; I think so.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Can any means be taken with any other canvas in preparing the standard canvas or getting any other canvas to stand that Southern climate?

A. I do not believe there is anything in the way of canvas. We are trying now different grades. We are trying a twill which will be an excellent one.

Q. Trying any sizing?

A. We are trying not to use any sizing. The more sizing, the quicker the mildew.

Q. There is nothing to prevent the mildew?

A. We have never discovered anything.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Has not that been the trouble down there about sizing?

A. Unquestionably.

By General DODGE:

Q. We have had a great deal of complaint in the difficulty of obtaining clothing for the soldiers. Will you tell us with what rapidity you furnished this and what your difficulties have been in not furnishing it?

A. When the first call came, I had not arrived at the office. The troops were mustered in everywhere and, I understand, upon an order from the War Department they piled their requisitions in. There was such a mess, I do not think it was ever acted upon at the location. When I arrived there, the 15th of May, they were concentrating troops into these camps. The only thing that could be done was to ship clothing in bulk to the various camps, and I often started sheets, which I kept on my table all the time, judging of the amount of men to be concentrated in the camp, and as fast as articles were available shipped them in bulk to those camps, guessing what might be wanted, as troops were being rushed into these camps, trusting that they might be needed there; and I knew of every shipment made from the beginning to the end in that way, and supposed at Tampa they were being well outfitted and was surprised to learn later on of the railroad congestion and that the supplies had not been utilized there for weeks.

Q. They were in the cars?

A. In the cars. Chickamauga was served the same as other camps. It depended on them to distribute the clothing. This sheet shows [witness reading from

paper] there were 41,000 blankets shipped into Chickamauga: there were 61,500 blouses shipped. That is a blouse for every man that was there, and a great percentage was supposed to go equipped; and so the list goes on. Shoes, 109,912 pairs at Chickamauga.

Q. I do not recall any testimony that they did not have these things there, but that they could not get them because the sizes were not what they required.

A. The sizes were always assorted, according to what we have found in twenty-five years meets the regular demand. We found that the volunteers did use a smaller run of sizes, and we reduced the schedule on everything very much, but even then, in this and that, certain sizes accumulated; and then they called for special sizes, and we sent them at once.

Q. That depends on locality, sometimes?

A. Yes, sir. The Western men are large men, and the Southern men are very small.

Q. We found, in adjoining camps, one regiment complaining that they could not get enough small sizes, and another could not get large enough.

A. I had complaints from regiments at Tampa that they could not get coats big enough, and everybody else complained that they could not get them small enough.

Q. What is the quality?

A. The Army standard is probably the best shoe that can be made. When this rush came on we bought 118,000 shoes in the open market, the best we could find. Many of them were very unsatisfactory—for instance, as to shape—because it just takes so long to produce a shoe, cut it out, make it and dry it, and if you get it inside of a month you have a rush shoe.

Q. So the poor quality of shoes were those you purchased in the beginning? Are you able now to furnish the standard shoe?

A. Yes, sir; and have been for a long time. Then, again, all of those shoes were bought at the point of muster. I have had a report of 1,200 men mustered in this morning barefooted, and they were authorized to buy the best shoes they could get right there. You could not relieve them if you had them in the storehouse here.

Q. What system did you follow for furnishing the troops with suitable clothing for the climate?

A. That has been a very difficult proposition, because they would not stay in one place long enough. I don't think the question of what is suitable for the troops has yet been determined. The first thing I did was to reduce the weight of trousers from 22 to 16 ounces, and took the lining out of the blouses, and that was done in May, and we furnished them light underwear; later on canvas suits were furnished. The question as to the desirability of these suits is not determined yet.

Q. By the canvas suit do you mean the khaki suit?

A. It was called khaki; it was a light-weight canvas. There is no such thing as khaki in this country. It is obtainable now, but was not then.

Q. What kind of clothing are you furnishing the troops going now?

A. Light-weight underwear, unlined blouses, and light-weight trousers, and we are about to have a quantity of khaki suits. Its desirability is yet to be determined. Some think the unlined blouse is preferable to the close cotton garment.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Is the outside shirt a woolen shirt?

A. Yes, sir. We have just reduced the weight of that now.

Q. Have you had any consultation with the medical officers as to what is best to wear next to the skin?

A. Frequently.

Q. What is the general consensus of opinion on that subject—that woolen is the best?

A. It varies with about everyone you talk with.

Q. Does not the Medical Department agree upon it?

A. No, sir. I individually would advocate a light woolen undershirt for all conditions, but everyone does not agree with me.

By General DODGE:

Q. What, in your opinion, so far, is the best suit for the Cuban campaign, for instance?

A. Well, I think a light cotton suit, something on the khaki order, provided a light woolen undershirt is worn with it; and again, an admirable suit is the canvas or cotton trousers and blue flannel shirt. General Lee's corps wore them in Jacksonville all summer and found them very satisfactory.

Q. That is, without a blouse?

A. Without a blouse.

By General WILSON:

Q. Were you able to obtain this light-weight goods, to which you refer, in time for General Shafter's army, when it went to Santiago?

A. They were shipped over there about the time he went. They were not made use of until after the fight, I understand.

Q. Then they did have them after the fight?

A. They were there. They came home with them.

Q. Were they used by the troops that went to Porto Rico?

A. Yes; supplied them there with them, or sent on the ships at the same time.

By General DODGE:

Q. We have seen some statements here of the troops going, now that they are arriving in Cuba, with heavy garments.

A. They are arriving there with unlined blouses and light-weight trousers and underwear.

Q. Have you heard any complaints from those troops?

A. No, sir; not a word. It is the purpose to put these light cotton uniforms down there shortly, shortly before warm weather comes.

Q. What would be the color of them?

A. Khaki. The word khaki gives it the color, which is a yellowish brown.

By General MCCOOK:

Q. Khaki means the color and not the material?

A. Yes, sir. In the English service they have used it twenty years, and in India.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What time did the Quartermaster-General's Department advertise for bids for clothing or purchase clothing in anticipation of the wants of the new army that was to be put into the field; when did it commence?

A. I could not give the date, because it was just prior to my—

Q. Was it before the declaration of war or afterwards?

A. I do not know.

Q. Could that be ascertained?

A. Yes, sir. The first instructions to advertise is a matter of record.

Q. So it happened after you went there?

A. Before I went there.

Q. Did I understand you to say that you shipped sufficient clothing to Chickamauga, so that the troops could obtain upon requisition all that they required at any time?

A. I can only state the actual amount that went there.

Q. Give me some dates, please?

A. (Witness referring to paper.) On April 30, 25,000 blouses; May 9, 10,000; May

15, 15,000; May 29, 10,500. Shirts, D. B. flannel, April 30, 9,000; May 9, 10,000; May 15, 10,000. Shoes, 2,500 April 30; 10,000, May 9; 10,000, May 15; 3,400, May 17; 30,000, May 20.

Q. Where did the issue come from?

A. Mostly Philadelphia.

Q. Trousers?

A. Trousers, April 30, 1,500; May 15, 3,000; May 29, 3,000; May 30, 1,000; 5,000 June 5, and 3,000 on the 14th; total amount, 68,900 pairs, and duck trousers 11,000.

Q. Colonel Patten, if you had had the matter of procuring the clothing in charge, please state whether or not you could have obtained the quantity of clothing that you ultimately obtained in much less time?

A. No, sir. It could not be done in much less time. It was done with a great rush. If you take the item of shoes, it represents an average of 6,000 pairs a day from early spring to fall, and in the first part of the rush they averaged more.

Q. Can you take Montauk Point there, and show us the kind of underclothing you shipped there, and when you shipped it?

A. We shipped to Montauk Point, August 4, 20,000 blankets and 20,000 summer drawers, 20,000 hats, 20,000 pairs of leggings, 20,000 ponchos, 20,000 D. B. shirts—

Q. What does D. B. mean?

A. Dark blue; [continuing] 40,000 cotton stockings, 40,000 cotton undershirts.

Q. Sleeveless?

A. Yes, sir; it is as heavy as the one I have on now.

Q. How light were those gauze shirts?

A. We called it a summer cotton undershirt. It is not a gauze; it is a heavy cotton undershirt.

Q. Is it as heavy as what we call balbriggan?

A. Yes, sir. Now all this clothing for 20,000 men was delivered to Montauk Point before any troops were landed there.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. These were shipped on the 4th of August?

A. Fourth of August, and rushed from Philadelphia; 12 carloads, and it was delivered there before the troops arrived.

Q. Was it unloaded there?

A. It must have been unloaded.

Q. It was not in that congestion of the line of cars?

A. The tentage and all that was delivered before there was any sign of congestion. I followed it through by wire.

By General DODGE:

Q. How much have you brought back from there?

A. I have shipped away a good deal. I have not the sheet.

Q. There was a great deal?

A. It was not drawn to any great extent.

Q. What time did you ship the bedsacks there?

A. On August 6, 10,000 bedsacks.

Q. When did they reach Montauk?

A. They ought to reach there in twenty-four hours. The other stuff was not there.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. There is complaint about not getting straw for those bedsacks?

A. I did not have anything to do with furnishing straw. It is pretty hard lines when you can not get straw around a big military camp.

By General DODGE:

Q. We have a great many complaints from ladies who looked after the troops as to the quality and weight of those undershirts that were used by the troops there in September and October, the troops making very great complaints against them on account of their being gauze shirts.

A. How late were they issued?

Q. They said in September and October.

A. Our greatest effort was to get something there they could wear in hot weather: that was the demand.

Q. And they didn't even take all of them?

A. Nothing like it; we shipped back a great number. I heard there were some there suffering for the want of blankets, so I shipped 10,000 on the 26th of August. There were about 20,000 under-garments, shirts, drawers, and stockings, deeming it a proper outfit for 20,000 men. There were 20,000 blouses and 20,000 trousers.

Q. How many blankets were there?

A. Thirty thousand. We carted away a great many afterwards. It is very easy for a soldier to get up sympathy for the want of a blanket; but when he finds that he is to have it charged up against him on the clothing account it is another thing, and they would not draw these things for that reason.

Q. It was to the interest of every soldier to get everything he could from sympathetic women rather than from the Quartermaster's Department?

A. Yes, sir. He had to pay practically for everything he drew from the Quartermaster's Department—that is, if he had not drawn the garment he would have gotten the money. The same condition existed as to tentage.

Q. Did the quartermaster have inspectors at the manufactories of clothing and tents?

A. We employed inspectors on everything that we purchased. We had a great many inspectors. We didn't allow any contract without an inspector right at the work.

Q. Have you any complaints from the new camps—Huntsville, Anniston, Lexington, and Knoxville—in relation to the want of clothing at those camps?

A. Nothing in the light of complaints. We have had urgent calls from them in every instance.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. You have found a great many who admit that they have received their winter underclothes. Have they been furnished with all the blankets that they needed?

A. There was no trouble about blankets.

Q. Overcoats?

A. Overcoats were shipped very early to all the camps.

By General DODGE:

Q. We had complaints from one or two stations—one was Lexington; another was Huntsville—that when they would send a request for certain sizes, they sent them large numbers of other sizes, so that the reason soldiers were out was because they did not have the sizes they wanted. You made the statement that there were not small sizes enough. Has any complaint been made of the goods you furnished?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who by?

A. By any people. I guess there is something bad in every class of garment.

Q. By officers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By men?

A. We did not get at the men.

Q. What has been the character of those complaints?

A. In one of the companies a number of shoes might give out. That will happen to the best shoemaker in the United States. The only thing you can do is to replace them.

Q. How as to the trousers?

A. We have had complaints of defective trousers.

Q. Made by officers?

A. It would have to come to us through officers.

Q. By the commanding officer of the regiment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have these complaints been general?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have they related to specific cases?

A. Specific cases; and whenever they came to our notice they have received attention.

Q. How do you account for these deficiencies?

A. Sometimes they are not well founded; but where they are, they are the natural defects which will occur in a large amount of any article.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You purchased goods which were not the standard?

A. Yes, sir. We had to do that to get them.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Well, these cases were not attributable to design, fraud, or corruption of any kind?

A. No, sir.

Q. You have had no shoddy?

A. None that we were aware of.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Colonel, we noticed at Lexington a number of new tents condemned. Were those the ones that were purchased early?

A. I could not say as to that particular case. Wherever we can get hold of a case like that we investigate it to find out what the trouble is.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Were those goods returned to you?

A. Wherever we could get hold of them.

Q. Did you receive them in any quantity?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then you resupplied good ones?

A. Yes, sir; and where it was promptly reported to us we returned them to the contractor.

Q. It has been in your experience where making great purchases of quantities some things would be defective?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That can not be avoided?

A. Yes, sir; some trousers might pass an inspection that were not sewed up rightly, and as to shoes, if you pay \$8 a pair for shoes, if you get a large quantity, some of them will be defective.

Q. What do you pay for shoes?

A. Our contract price for shoes is about \$2.25. That calls for the best shoe that can be made?

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do I understand where a shoe is early found defective on account of manu-

facture or on account of leather that you issue another pair to the soldier without cost to him?

A. Immediately; and we would have no trouble whatever in the contractor taking back that shoe.

Q. Is that so with other articles of clothing?

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. How is that defect ascertained? Is there a report to be made by officers as to whether it is defective?

A. No, sir; we do not care for that—just have the men simply send the shoe. It may be due to a soft spot in the leather.

Q. That comes out of the contractor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you get many?

A. No, sir; but we did get some.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You didn't get any from volunteers?

A. They even got on to it.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Suppose a soldier in Havana was to have a pair of shoes that were defective, as you say, what would be his duty to get a pair of shoes that would not be charged up to him?

A. An officer of his regiment should go immediately to the quartermaster and ask for another pair.

Q. And the Government does that?

A. Yes, sir; and it is no expense to the Government if it is promptly done.

Q. That same rule applies to defective clothing?

A. In any issue by the Government that is defective—that is not what it is represented to be. We find a majority of the shoes returned—one man wrote and complained about his shoe torn out on the toe, and he said it was usually the left toe, and I sent for some shoes, and in many instances they were burned. They were not used to camp fires. He didn't burn them out immediately so that he noticed it, but kept at it, getting his shoes too near the fire, and in three days it was so burned that it broke.

By General WEAVER:

Q. In the purchase of tents, when you purchased without regard to quality, did you have them inspected in every instance and marked by the inspector?

A. That was the intention—that they were always inspected.

Q. In Jacksonville especially we found a variegated assortment—green, purple, and blue shirts—just adjoining each other; was that owing to the urgency of the case?

A. Owing to the early purchase, where we did not get a fabric with our requirement of indigo dye, which is very difficult to get, and it seems to be the only thing that will stand the weather, although we have a great deal of opposition in the trade on that score.

Q. Is it difficult to determine in advance, where you don't have indigo dye, whether the color will change or not?

A. If we don't get indigo dye we have no test to determine whether it is a good or poor dye. That is one of the strongest arguments to the trade to hold onto indigo dye.

By General DODGE:

Q. That goes into the overcoat, too?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. It is no trouble to discover that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How—acids?

A. You can not rely on that; they have gotten up to that. We have to boil it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Will you please make any other statement to the commission or any suggestion you have which you think will be of benefit to the service or give us any information which we have not drawn out from you that you think will be of interest to us?

A. I do not think of anything, General, that I can state.

By General McCook:

Q. You made no contracts yourself?

A. No, sir.

Exhibit W. S. P., No. 1.—December 2, 1898.

Statement showing quantities of tentage ordered to Camp Thomas, Ga., dates, and, as far as can be ascertained from the records of the Quartermaster-General's Office, the dates on which shipments were made.

Date of order by telegraph.	Date of shipment.	Common.	Conical.	Hospital.	Shelter.	Wall.	Irregular.
April 27					30		
April 30		625			25		
May 9			200		5,000	50	
May 15		50	80		25	75	
May 17	May 18-21	1,029	150	153		348	
May 23	May 25	387	2		3,300	51	8
May 24		34			7,200	110	
May 27	May 28	55				52	
May 29	June 1	500				125	
May 30, 31*	do	119			10,000	1,049	76
June 1	do				400		
June 2	June 4-7				10,000		
June 6	June 7, 8, 9	1,039				250	
June 8					10,000		
June 15		1,400					
June 16	June 17				13,000		
June 17	June 18	50					
June 20		100					
June 22		600					
June 30	July 1				15,000		
July 4	July 5			50			
July 7	July 8			50			
July 12	July 16	500					
July 16	do	500		30			
July 19		380					
July 24	July 25, 26	500					
July 29	July 30	400			40		
August 2	Aug. 4				100		
August 4	Aug. 5	400					
August 5	Aug. 6				75		
August 7	Aug. 12	400					
August 8					25		
August 9	Aug. 9				100		
August 11		400					
August 24	Aug. 25				50		
Total		9,768	432	753	73,925	1,140	84

* Record only of partial shipment

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 2, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JAMES M. McKAY.**

Capt. JAMES M. McKAY then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by the recorder of the commission.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your name and rank, and residence?

A. James M. McKay; civilian; my residence is Tampa, Fla.

Q. Did you have any position in the Army at any time; and if so, what?

A. I was assistant to Colonel Humphrey, who was chief quartermaster of General Shafter's expedition in charge of ocean transportation, giving out and loading and discharging transports, both at Tampa and on the Cuban coast.

Q. Were you his assistant simply as employee or an officer?

A. I was his civilian employee.

Q. What is your business?

A. Well, I am a shipmaster. I have been trading on the coast of Cuba, between Florida and Cuba in the coast trade since 1876, when I was appointed captain on the Plant Steamship Line, commanding one of their boats for eight years. On the 1st of September, 1894, I was appointed by President Cleveland as United States marshal for the east district of Florida, from Fernandina to Key West. I was relieved from that position on March 9, 1898.

Q. When did you come into the Government employ as Colonel Humphrey's assistant?

A. I reported to General Shafter and Colonel Humphrey on May 4, 1898.

Q. And continued how long?

A. Until the 30th of August, 1898, with the exception of ten days that I was away from the expedition.

Q. To what extent did you have charge of the loading of transports at Port Tampa?

A. Well, I had the superintending of the loading of stores—of the commissary stores, quartermaster stores, wagons, mules, and artillery.

Q. In general, how were those stores loaded? Did each transport go with a certain number of rations—complete rations—or did you put the bacon in one ship and the hard-tack in another, and the beef in another, etc.?

A. Nearly every ship was loaded with the complete rations. I have all that data at home; not thinking I was coming before the commission, I left it there.

Q. You had a certain number of complete rations on every ship?

A. Yes, sir; some of them had 100,000 rations aboard, and some had more.

Q. Were you familiar with the capacity of the ships that were loaded there with supplies and troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Both as to the tentage and as to the capacity for comfortably caring for the men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As to the men, who went aboard, were the ships overloaded or did they have about what they could comfortably carry, having the health of the men especially in view?

A. The most of the ships had what they could comfortably carry, but I think there were five that were a little overcrowded and a number were taken off and put on others that were not crowded. That was before we left Port Tampa.

Q. So that when you left Port Tampa, the ships were, in your judgment, simply loaded as they should have been without being overloaded?

A. That is my impression.

Q. How long were they aboard before they sailed?

A. Well, we loaded them up, and were to have sailed on the 7th. In fact, part of the ships had been started from Port Tampa and were down the bay 30 miles and took their position, as they were to be convoyed by the navy. That night there came an order from Washington, I think, calling those ships back, and I was ordered to put all of the ships that we could possibly get into the canal, so that the men could stop there if it was necessary to do so. I got in about nineteen ships out of the lot. After a while the officers in command complained that the ships were too close together. The ships in the middle (they were put in three tier deep)—in the middle ships the troops were not getting sufficient air. General Shafter then ordered me to open them as much as I could. It was a canal with an embankment on each side. This canal was 200 feet wide, and ships were on the average 40 feet beam. We separated them, so as to get all the air possible into the troops; so then the next morning the general ordered us to take them out of there and anchor them out. They laid there with the troops aboard until the 14th, and we sailed on the morning of the 14th.

Q. By taking them out of the canal, it was simply for the men to go ashore and get exercise and air?

A. Yes, sir; we had a steamer that would carry 200 men—the *Cumberland*; and I suggested to Colonel Humphrey to let her make trips along the fleet every two hours, and let all go ashore that wanted to. I have seen, I guess, as high as 300 men aboard, and she made these trips every two hours from early in the morning until dark.

Q. If the ships had been left in the canal, would it have been possible for the troops to go ashore with more celerity and convenience?

A. Yes, sir; they could have gotten ashore without much trouble, but there was no place to stop anywhere, except on the vessels. They had no covering.

Q. I mean simply for the sake of exercise?

A. Yes; but at nighttime, when they had to sleep aboard those vessels, it was suffocating. They could not stand it. It was extremely hot weather. The ships were put out to make it more comfortable for the men.

Q. What was the effect of that long imprisonment on these ships—we will use that term: it is not the exact term—confinement. What was the effect of that on the health of the men?

A. I can not say that there was any sickness of consequence on the 14th.

Q. Did it show itself when you reached Cuba?

A. No, sir; we had this hospital ship, the *Olivette*, that had a signal flying, going around from ship to ship every day. She took off very few.

Q. The men were in fair fighting condition when you reached Cuba?

A. That is my belief. Of course the fact of staying so long at that place was some discontentment to the men, being there without action. Whenever I passed backward and forward they wanted to know when they were going away from there. They were anxious to move.

Q. Do you know, Captain, as to how the medical and quartermaster's stores were loaded; were they loaded so that each vessel's troops would have the supply of medical and quartermaster's stores and commissary stores that they would need when they landed?

A. That is my impression. I don't think there was an overabundance of medical stores aboard. I doubt if there was any supply of medical stores outside of these panniers to the best of my recollection.

Q. Didn't they have the supplies there at Tampa?

A. That, I could not tell.

Q. How about the ambulances—do you know anything about the manner in which they were loaded?

A. The first order was to take 30 ambulances. That was changed down to 10, and then to 4. We had 4 with our expedition, if I recollect aright, and there were 4 with General Bates's command that came from Mobile, and a few days afterwards there were 10 more that reached Daiquiri on the *Louisiana*.

Q. Do you know why the order was changed these several times?

A. Well, I can not tell why the order was changed, but I do not think we had any more capacity to carry wagons. We had a lot of escort wagons, and it was my impression that they were to use these in place of ambulances.

Q. In loading the transports, how many wagons—not escort wagons, but other wagons—were allowed for each regiment?

A. That, I do not know. I know the number put aboard.

Q. How many were put aboard, all told?

A. We put aboard at Port Tampa 124 wagons, and then General Bates's command had between 60 and 80—I can not say positively—it was somewhere between 60 and 80.

Q. Did you have the animals necessary for all these wagons?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they loaded—distributed among the vessels as each was loaded, or did you put the wagons on one vessel, all you could, and put animals on others?

A. Most of the animals were put aboard the *Cherokee* and *Iroquois* and some went on the *D. H. Miller*. The *Cherokee* and *Iroquois* had no mules, but the *Miller* had all mules. We had mules on the *Gussie* and mules on the *Whitney* and the balance—there was a lot of animals with General Bates's command. They were good ships. The *Gussie* did not lose an animal on the way. The *Whitney* lost about seven.

By General DODGE:

Q. How many animals did you ship, all told?

A. My impression is when that expedition went down, outside of General Bates's, there must have been 1,400. If I only had the data I could tell exactly. I had what each ship was loaded with and everything. The artillery horses were loaded aboard the *Comal* and the *Berkshire* and the *Allegheny*.

Q. And you had a list and knew what was aboard each ship, had you?

A. Yes, sir; as well as the chief quartermaster, who had a sheet also.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Had that been indicated in advance, or did you make the memorandum as they were loaded?

A. The memorandum was made when they were loaded.

Q. How was that as to troops; were the vessels upon which the several organizations were to embark indicated and the name furnished to those several organizations, or did they go ahead en masse.

A. It was indicated what vessels they should go on and the commanding officers had orders what vessels they were to take—some military officers, where they thought that their vessels were overcrowded—General Shafter ordered an investigation and also to investigate what boats were not overcrowded, and they were changed around that way. There was one transport we didn't expect to put any one on, but we were to put forage on it, but there were four troops put on her, the *Manteo*, after we found some vessels had more than they could take.

Q. In general, Captain, were the vessels comfortably fixed for the transportation of the troops; had special efforts been made to make them so?

A. Yes, sir; for the limited time they had. There was a great hurry to get the

expedition off. Every day—two or three times a day—a telegram would come for me from Colonel Humphrey to hurry up matters as quickly as possible. If we had had more time we could probably have made things better.

Q. What arrangements were made in advance for disembarking troops after you reached Cuba, and the stores also?

A. We figured before we left Tampa how many boats there were with each ship and what was the capacity of each boat. I think I have that here now. (Witness here handed paper to General Beaver.) (List of transports, showing number of small boats and carrying capacity of same, marked Exhibit J. McK. No. 1; December 2, 1898.)

Q. The *Alamo* had four boats, carrying 80. Is that 80 the total?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You could land 80 men with these four boats at once?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Besides the crew?

A. Yes, sir; that was the capacity allowed by the inspectors when the vessel was inspected.

Q. The small boats connected with all the transports numbered 153?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the total number landed at one trip was 3,434?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That would make 3,434, all told?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Those boats were propelled by oars?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that the Quartermaster's Department made out in advance the troops which were designated to go aboard each of the transports?

A. I think that was done. The list of transports was submitted to General Shafter, and I think he designated the troops. The chief quartermaster reported to me what each transport would carry, and then designated what troops should go on these transports.

Q. The typewritten part of this statement was what was designated in advance as to what was to be done?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For instance, the *Alamo*, designated No. 6—headquarters, band, Companies C, D, E, and G, Tenth United States Infantry; Companies C and E, Engineer Battalion, headquarters Second Brigade, Col. E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was General Shafter's designation what was to go aboard that transport?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that is true as to the others in this list?

A. Yes, sir. I would not like to submit that as part of my evidence, as there may be errors in it.

Q. What I want to get is the fact, if it be a fact, that all this was outlined and furnished in advance as to the transport which was to carry the regiments and companies and headquarters and bands being designated before they went aboard the ship?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. Did that order go out to the troops?

A. It undoubtedly did, because they went aboard those vessels.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. And did each colonel know where he was to go?

A. He must have known, because he went right down and marched aboard these vessels.

By General DODGE:

Q. Take the First United States Volunteer Cavalry, did you know what ship they were to go upon?

A. The *Yucatan*.

Q. That was their orders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The testimony before us was the Rough Riders seized the *Yucatan*?

A. They didn't do anything of the kind.

Q. The colonel of that regiment knew what boat he was to go upon?

A. He knew that the *Yucatan* was designated for those troops.

Q. And the colonel of the regiment knew it?

A. He must have known it. He marched right aboard.

Q. Were you there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did anybody go aboard and seize her and bring her in?

A. No, sir. She was placed right in the canal alongside the dock, and I had all the stands built.

Q. General BEAVER (referring to paper): "*Yucatan* designated No. 8, headquarters band and companies C, D, G, and B, Second United States Infantry, First Regiment U. S. Volunteer Cavalry." That was all designated before anybody went aboard?

A. Yes, sir; that was designated.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was anything taken off?

A. I don't think anything was taken off the *Yucatan*. I have a memorandum in my grip at the hotel now.

By General BEAVER:

Q. From what you say, and from your knowledge, was it possible that orders could have been given, "You go down there and go aboard the first boat you can or you won't get to Cuba?"

A. No, sir; nothing of that kind. Everything went along in good order. I had ships in here for these troops to load on.

Q. Did they go aboard in an orderly way?

A. Just the same as anyone would go aboard from a dock to a ship. There was no confusion or anything.

Q. I suppose there was some confusion there in a great body of troops?

A. I did not see any. The officer would designate—I would see everyone of the regular troops come and the officer would designate what part of the troops he would take.

Q. You say there was no confusion?

A. I say emphatically there was no confusion. They must have loaded inside of an hour from the time they got there.

Q. Had these supplies been put aboard these several boats before the men went aboard?

A. The men were the last things to go aboard with the exception of one ship, and after the men went aboard that one we put 60 private horses aboard, and I had orders on the night before we sailed to rip out a lot of berths that they didn't think were in a proper place for the men to go, and I built stalls for 60 horses to go aboard, and it was ready by 7 o'clock in the morning.

Q. What were the horses for?

A. They were horses belonging to the different officers.

Q. You had artillery horses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many?

A. Four batteries.

Q. Captain, will you send up that statement that you have as to the transports?

A. Yes, sir; it is only a little memorandum.

Q. Have you any other statement—you said you were not quite sure about this?

A. I am not quite sure about that. The typewritten part was what was designated first. What I mean—I am not sure that was the amount of troops—at least the number that I have in pencil.

By General DODGE:

Q. That is the order that came to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You got that from Colonel Humphrey?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in general that is the way they were loaded?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. You know that came from General Shafter; or isn't that Colonel Humphrey's work?

A. I am satisfied it was this way. Colonel Humphrey asked me, "What is the capacity of the different ships?" I made out a memorandum and gave him what I thought was the capacity of the ships, and he sent it to General Shafter, and he issued the order designating what troops would go aboard the vessels. I did not see the order, but I understood that from Colonel Humphrey.

Q. The quartermaster designated the capacity?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the commanding general designated the troops to fill that capacity?

A. Yes, sir. These vessels were placed along this canal about nine vessels at a time. Then there was room on the front of the dock and the other side for taking eleven to twelve vessels altogether that we could load at once.

Q. Where would that order be found—the order designating what troops would go aboard the different vessels?

A. I judge that General Shafter issued the orders to each commanding officer what ship he would go on, and designated the same thing in a general order to Colonel Humphrey what troops would go on certain ships.

Q. And this list was furnished to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you loaded them in accordance with it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In loading the transports, Captain, were the stores of the quartermaster and commissary and medical departments kept separate?

A. Yes, sir; they were put down in the lower hold of the vessels, except the medical stores, which were put up above.

Q. What was the rule in loading? What was their effort—to get the heavier stuff below?

A. Yes, sir; the bacon and stuff like that was put in the bottom of the vessel. We commenced to load the vessels I guess three or four days before they commenced to put the troops aboard.

Q. Did you have a sufficient number of stevedores and laborers?

A. All we could work with the accommodations on the dock; that is, with the number of ships we had there.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Could you pick out the commissary supplies without disturbing the medical supplies, and vice versa?

A. Oh yes, sir; and without touching the ordnance.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were all three loaded separately?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did the camp and garrison equipage go?

A. Some went down in the same hold, but in the forward part of the boat, some went on the upper deck and some between decks.

Q. We have had testimony before us saying that these stores were all mixed up; that you had to move medical stores to get commissary stores, etc.

A. That is not correct.

Q. Were you present when the articles were unloaded?

A. Yes, sir; I was not present at every ship.

Q. Did you find any difficulty in loading the stores of the several departments?

A. No sir; we found no difficulty whatever. The only difficulty was when we wanted some ordnance stores; we had to search over the ordnance stores. We had to search, for instance, if we wanted shrapnel; we had to look through shells, maybe.

Q. But medical supplies were not mixed with ordnance?

A. Oh, no, sir.

Q. Then there was as much order in the loading of the supplies as in the loading of the troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you know what was on each vessel?

The WITNESS. In the way of stores?

General DODGE. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir; the chief quartermaster had a list of it and has it now.

Q. When you landed in Cuba if he wanted a certain thing, you knew what vessel to go to and where to find it?

A. Yes, sir. If we wanted sand bags for filling up for batteries—there came an order one night to send out 30 of these bags. I sent the boat right out and got them and sent them right ashore.

Q. If any person went there and was at a loss to know where to find things, it was because he did not go to the right person?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know how many of those lists were made out, Captain, of the loading of the ships?

A. No, sir, I do not know. I know the chief quartermaster had one and I had one, and it was supposed they would call on either one of us for what they wanted.

Q. Do you know whether the captain of the vessel had one of the sailing lists?

A. They did not have the statement. The officers of the ship knew where these were.

Q. Did the captain see the boat loaded?

A. They did not pay any attention to it. It was left to the mates and they knew where the articles were.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did they have bills of lading?

A. No, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. That depended upon their personal knowledge?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I want you to explain. We have testimony that a great many of these ships were loaded with supplies that were never taken off them at all?

A. That is true. They did not require them at Santiago at the time—before the capitulation—and they wanted these ships to go north with the sick and wounded as quick as possible, and it was a rush to get the sick and wounded away from there to get attention, and we had to take some of these ships that had supplies aboard.

Q. You unloaded the shelter tents?

A. Yes, sir. We lost a lighter on the way down. Why the captain did not get her I don't know. He said it was so rough he could not find her again. From the sea we had, I don't think that was the case, but that is what he said. We had a towboat—*Capt. Sam*. We missed her more than anything else. She was the one to be used to carry instructions from the quartermaster to the different transports. For some reason she broke down and then of course we had no towboat, but we had a steam lighter—the *Bessie*. The *Bessie* started from Pensacola and broke down and went back, but she came to us afterwards. We had the *Laura*, the *Chamberland*, and the *Manteo* and another boat, a flat lighter, that carried about 200 tons. We had plenty of facilities for discharging this stuff and getting it ashore, but since we hadn't the dock room—after putting in on the beach there was always a surf rolling in there. There was always strong winds blowing at the time, and there was only a little dock that we could depend on at Daiquiri, and that was only the size of this room, and we had to discharge the stuff there and carry the stuff on hand cars 350 feet. At Siboney we had a little dock and the sea washed it up, and then the engineers' department built another dock that permitted the coming down on a railroad of a car, and we could lay the lighters alongside that dock and transfer the stuff into this car. There was always, of course, a surf heaving in there, and there was always a sea breaking on the beach, and it was with considerable difficulty that we got the stuff ashore. I presume that is one reason why the tentage was not landed. It was more important to get the rations and other things ashore than the tentage at that time, especially as they could not get it to the front, not having transportation enough and the roads being so bad. The roads got so bad there after the first week with the heavy rains that it was almost impossible to get the wagons over it. We used pack trains. All the stock we unloaded we had to put them overboard to swim ashore, which we got ashore in forty-eight hours, pretty near all of them. We landed the stores at Daiquiri, at the dock there.

Q. How near did you get your ships to the shore?

A. There was only one place in 40 miles that a ship could anchor. We had to get them up within 700 yards. We had to let the ships head to sea. Some days they would part the lines, and we had to keep men there all the time to keep from breaking these lines. The day we landed the siege guns—I don't think I ever had such a day as I did to get these guns off. I mounted the guns on the carriage while in the slings from the ships. If I had not done that I would have had a good deal of trouble. There is always a surf heaving there.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. To what extent did you use the ship's own boats for the landing of the troops?

A. They were used the first and second day. The navy let us have their boats the first day also.

Q. Were you engaged from the time you went there until after the battle, and how long after the battle in unloading stores—daily?

A. Yes, sir; every day, working night and day.

Q. Did you have any difficulty in getting the transports into the bay to unload?

A. You see there was no bay. It was an outside coast and open roadstead.

Q. Did you have any difficulty with the captains of the transports?

A. No, sir.

Q. We have evidence to show that they were refractory.

A. Well, they never disputed an order given to them by the proper authority. There was a good many of them giving them orders that had no right to. There was a good many people thought that a vessel could go right up to shore and anchor.

Q. Whose business was it to give these ships orders?

A. Colonel Humphrey and I. Of course General Shafter would have. You see the water on the beach up to the shore—these ships carry 125 fathoms of chain, which is 6 feet to the fathom. You let go your anchor in 100 fathoms; before that anchor can fetch up your ship would be within 40 or 50 feet of the shore. If there was a strong wind they might go on a rock. The shipmasters all knew it was difficult. As I say, there was only one place a ship could anchor with safety and that was along the iron pier of the iron company at Daiquiri. It was 80 feet from the water up to the top of it.

Q. The medical department has testified to us that they were unable to get the quartermaster's department to land their stores, and they suffered greatly thereby. Can you tell anything in regard to that?

A. I know this much: There were couriers came into Daiquiri at nighttime with orders from General Shafter to get supplies, and they did not have a large amount of medical supplies down there.

Q. Did you refuse to land medical stores whenever ordered to be landed by any medical officer who you judged had the authority?

A. No, sir; if a doctor came to me and said he wanted medical supplies from a certain ship I would send out and get them for him without any order.

Q. What knowledge had you of the amount of medical stores?

A. My knowledge was only from seeing this stuff put aboard the ship. Of course, I did not see every package put aboard.

Q. Did you see many cots put aboard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see ambulances?

A. Yes, sir; there were eight in the expedition that went down with us and four afterwards.

By General BEAVER:

Q. How many civil employees had you at Tampa in loading these boats?

A. I don't recollect how many. You see, the labor that was furnished was under contract with the Plant people, and they furnished all the stevedores and paid them.

Q. Did you take any of these civil employees with you to Cuba?

A. We took about 140.

Q. So you had 140 experienced stevedores?

A. Yes, sir; laborers, and we had bosses with them.

Q. And beyond that you depended on the troops?

A. The troops helped us the first two days we were there, but they wanted all of them for the front. After we arrived there our men began to get sick—the stevedores began to get sick, the teamsters got sick, Colonel Jacobs himself got sick, and many of his men got sick, and that crippled us.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Were the stevedores colored?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What price per day?

A. We paid them \$35 a month and rations.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Could you get any men to take the place of those that got sick?

A. No, sir; they would not work for love or money. We got men at Santiago. At Daiquiri we could not get any.

Q. What was the objection—they didn't want to work?

A. They didn't want to work. Their excuse was they had to go to the front with their command and had not permission to stay away from their officers.

Q. They wanted rations?

A. Yes, sir; when General Shafter went up to have a conference with General Garcia, he signaled to send rations there to them because his men were there and had not anything to eat. We loaded a boat and sent a boat up to the beach, and they would not step down in the water. We had to put it up on the beach.

Q. Were the commissary stores unloaded at Daiquiri as rapidly as they were needed by the troops?

A. Yes, sir; I think so, to the best of my knowledge and belief. I don't think there was any time that there was less than 15,000 rations there.

Q. That is, in advance of what had been issued to the troops?

A. Yes, sir; just as fast as the pack trains could load up and go out, they would take them to the front.

Q. How soon did your wagons become available for hauling?

A. About forty-eight hours after we went there. We commenced to discharge the mules the same day we discharged the troops.

Q. How about the rations at Siboney?

A. From the time I was there the storehouse looked full of rations.

Q. You saw Colonel Jacobs at Daiquiri?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was he an efficient officer and understood his duties?

A. I suppose he understood his duties. He was confined to his bed.

Q. Did you get sick down there?

A. Yes, sir; and I have not gotten over it yet.

Q. With yellow fever?

A. I hadn't yellow fever. I had malarial fever. That is worse than yellow fever. Santiago is the sickest place I have ever seen, and I have been going from one place to another there twenty-five years.

Q. Were you raised in Florida?

A. Born in Mobile and went to Florida.

Q. Captain, looking at that whole expedition, with your experience, were the provisions that were made before you started, in your opinion, sufficient for disembarking troops and supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And if you had taken the lighters and the other facilities that you had and landed them there, would you have had any difficulty in landing them in time?

A. No, sir. Our great trouble was in not having wharf facilities, and you could not get wharf facilities there because the whole coast was in an exposed condition. You could not wait to have a dock built strong enough to lay up and discharge, which could not be built under a year, I don't think. They had to use what they had as much as possible to the best advantage.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the movement between Tampa and Port Tampa on the railroad?

A. I did not have anything directly, because that came under the quartermaster.

Q. You knew about it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the difficulty, if any, at Tampa in regard to the quartermaster's supplies?

The WITNESS. In getting them out?

General BEAVER. Yes, sir.

A. Well, they were blocked, and had so many cars on hand there and their track space was so covered that they could not get them out. When they called for a car it would probably be twelve hours before you could get it. Sometimes we were detained waiting for these cars. Captain Quay called for them, but they could not get them down in time. They had so many cars on the tracks that they could not get them out, so we would have to wait.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did that interfere with your outfitting your expedition?

A. I can not say it interfered with the outfitting.

Q. You ultimately got all you needed?

A. We got all we could carry.

Q. The congestion of these cars—some regiments have testified that they were there as many as twelve times to get things to equip their regiments and could not find the cars.

A. I expect part of that is so. I don't know, of my own personal knowledge.

Q. Your work is confined to Port Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You knew about the congestion in Tampa, too?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If these cars as they came in had been unloaded and the tents put in one place and the food in another and the uniforms in another, as fast as they came in there, wouldn't that relieve the congestion?

A. They did not have the space at Port Tampa.

Q. I mean Tampa?

A. Yes, sir; they could there.

Q. The equipment for the troops was not carried to Port Tampa. You had a large number of troops camped around Tampa. They needed uniforms; they needed guns, a great many of them; they needed tent equipment. If these cars had been unloaded when they came into Tampa where the quartermasters of these various regiments could have come with their wagons and gotten them, would it not have relieved the congestion much?

A. They had all the warehouses they could get in the town. They asked me if I knew of any vacant houses. They could find nothing. Everything was taken up. Of course they could have put the stuff outside and covered the stuff with tarpaulins.

Q. And the regiments would have known where to get everything?

A. That I am not qualified to say.

Q. What complaints were made to you by officers in regard to not unloading their supplies?

The WITNESS. You mean their tentage?

Governor WOODBURY. Anything.

A. I never heard any complaints, because the supplies were being unloaded as fast as they could. There was some complaint about camp equipage, but think they had it there. There was a Michigan regiment's tentage laid there until the capitulation and was never taken.

Q. Then there was no complaints of any medical officer about their supplies?

A. No, sir; I never had a complaint from a medical officer but one. An officer came down and wanted to get supplies for a Louisiana regiment.

Q. That was a request, not a complaint?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you meet Dr. Munson?

A. He was there.

Q. Did he apply to the quartermaster to render medical supplies?

A. I doubt if he ever applied to the quartermaster. He never did to me or Colonel Humphrey. I understood he never did with him. General Shafter tried to get a steam launch from the navy for Colonel Humphrey and the navy refused to give it to him. They could not spare it. There is something I would like to state here about Admiral Sampson's report. He said, "On account of the wandering proclivities on the part of the transports, there was some confusion in discharging the troops at Daiquiri." The wandering proclivities of the transports was caused by the navy headquarters ship. I was on the ship that afternoon after the consultation of war—or whatever you call it—was made to make the landing, and after they left the ship Maj. Henry S. Kilbourne, of General Shafter's staff, steamed up alongside the *Seneca* and said, "The order of sailing has been changed. You will take your position in the left-hand column and they will lead the *Seneca* and you will steer south-southeast," and he went off. The south-southeast course takes the ship off the coast of Cuba about 6 points. He never gave any orders how long to steer that course, but just left the captain to make his own decision what was best to do. Another ship, the *Knickerbocker*, whose troops were to land the first thing the next morning (the troops of General Lawton's division), he got off 35 miles from the point of disembarkation and he didn't know what to do. It was the orders given by the navy that night. We could not find the *Knickerbocker*, and the general asked me to look after her, and she did not appear for twelve hours afterwards.

Q. He kept on his course, south-southeast?

A. Yes, sir. The captains did not know where they were going to discharge the men. Some of them thought probably they were going to Porto Rico. It was in that direction that Porto Rico laid.

Q. How did the ships come to turn around and come back?

A. He found there was none of the ships with him. We had to just let the ship float and put the men in these boats about a mile or about a mile and a half off there. When you get twenty-five ships in a cluster they cover a large space. They have to be a safe distance apart so as to avoid collision.

Q. How long were the ships laying at Daiquiri: how long were they under the orders of the navy?

A. Just the first day the navy left us after we were there.

Q. Who was in charge of the ships from the time they left Tampa until they reached Santiago?

The WITNESS. Of the convoys?

General DODGE. Yes, sir.

A. Captain Hunker. I can not think what ship he was on.

Q. Were the captains of these transports under his orders?

A. They were under the orders—yes; they were under his orders.

Q. Directions were given by the navy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To obey these orders?

A. Yes, sir—and kept their positions as well as possible.

Q. There has been a great deal of testimony before us of the confusion at Tampa, and also at Santiago; especially, nearly every officer that was at Tampa has testified as to the confusion there. I suppose you have seen and read that testimony. A good deal of it—General Wheeler testified as to it. What have you to say as to that?

The WITNESS. Confusion on the transports?

General Dodge. Yes, sir; loading and putting the troops aboard.

A. Well, sir, I can not say that there was any confusion there at all. The troops knew what ships they were to go on, and went aboard those vessels and they loaded up very rapidly. After we got this order to go back and not start, the stock was all discharged again and then reloaded again. I think General Shafter got the order on Monday night to proceed as quickly as possible and we commenced Monday night to load up that stock, and we left on Wednesday.

Q. Did you know how long you were going to stay at Tampa when you took the stock off at Tampa?

A. No, sir; the order was to remain there until they could find out whether the navy officer of the *Resolute* had reported to Washington. I suppose the Spanish fleet was lying in wait for us.

Q. That was the cause of the delay?

A. Yes, sir; that they were in the St. Nicholas Channel, and they held us up until we could investigate and find out whether that was true.

Q. When the ships first came from New York, did you commence loading as soon as they arrived there?

A. Some of them; yes, sir. Some of these transports were chartered by the Quartermaster-General in southern waters, and then they came to Tampa and I had orders to fit them up in a certain way. We fitted them up with berths to the best of our ability and we put in there coffee urns and water-closets.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you know then where you were going?

A. No, sir.

Q. When did you first know you were going to Santiago?

A. I did not know that until we had passed Havana. I heard it whispered around, but had no positive knowledge until after we passed Havana, and then a great many did not believe it. They thought they were going to Porto Rico.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. You mean troops on board?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you load the *Iroquois*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Wasn't there a good many medical supplies went aboard her?

A. There was some.

Q. Did you load the *Cherokee*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Didn't some medical supplies go aboard her?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were the medical supplies at Santiago taken off the *Iroquois* and *Cherokee*?

A. Yes, sir; they were off the *Cherokee*, I know, because I took them off myself.

Q. Were they taken off the *Iroquois*?

A. The *Iroquois* went down to Siboney. I was to discharge her at Daiquiri, and I had orders to send her to Siboney, and she went there to carry sick soldiers. Now, what they did there I don't know.

Q. You didn't take the medical supplies off her at Daiquiri?

A. No, sir; I don't think I did.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How many cubic feet of medical supplies besides cots were there on those vessels—how much space?

A. If you take everything what you call medical supplies, cots—

Q. I mean medicine.

A. Well, I don't recollect seeing anything of the medical supplies except a box of bandages, except these paniers; that is on the first expedition. Later on we got down a lot of quinine and other stuff, discharged from the *Olivette*. I should say there were about twenty-five of these paniers.

By General DODGE:

Q. Didn't the *Olivette* sail with you?

A. Yes, sir; she was a hospital ship.

Q. Didn't she have medical supplies on board her?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you unload any part of her?

A. No, sir; she was under a doctor—Major Appel—but I took off her our horses. She had 15 horses aboard her.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you know how many medical supplies she had aboard her?

A. No, sir; I do not know. She was a hospital ship, and she ought to have had a quantity on her.

By General DODGE;

Q. How many ships can lie at Port Tampa and be loaded at once with stores and then troops?

A. You can load 24 or 25 vessels with troops at once.

Q. Could you at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many could you load with stores?

A. You could not load over 13.

Q. Could you load 13 with stores at once?

A. Yes, sir. The canal is long enough to take nine lengths of ship, one right ahead of the other, and then over on what they call a little slip you could put two more—that's 11, and one around the dock—12, and the other side another; that's 13.

Q. How much water can you carry in there?

A. Up at the end, where I used the *Cherokee* and *Iroquois*, which were light-draft boats, 15 feet.

Q. How long has that been completed?

A. I don't know that she is completed yet.

Q. Was it deep enough to leave 13 vessels in there at once?

A. You can only lay 9 in there at once. I had 19 ships in there with three tier deep. One of those vessels, the *Manteo*, I think she was intended to carry stores, and they only sent down four companies aboard her, and when we got down there we used her as a lighter as she was a light-draft ship.

Q. How much did she draw?

A. About 8 feet.

Q. Did you use any other?

A. We used the *Cumberland*—

Q. What was that?

A. She would hold 65 horses. Then we had the *Laura*. There was a lighter boat that would carry 80,000 gallons of water and 200 tons on deck; then the *Bessie* that started with the *Laura*; she came on after that, and we had her too.

Q. What was the other boat that you referred to?

A. That was another lighter which General Ludlow had, which was afterwards picked up and taken ashore.

Q. Why did the *Capt. Sam* return?

A. I don't know.

Q. Whose order was she under?

A. The quartermaster's.

Q. So you left Tampa, in your opinion, with your experience, well prepared to land that expedition?

A. Yes, sir; to land the expedition without any trouble.

Q. When did the *Bessie* rejoin you?

A. Just after the capitulation.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Have you found a memorandum which you made yesterday?

A. Yes, sir; I made a copy of it. [Produces letter.]

Q. The first memorandum which you submitted yesterday, containing the capacity of the boats connected with each transport, was that made before you left Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or afterwards?

A. Before. Orders came from Colonel Humphrey to ascertain the number of boats, their capacity for carrying men, and make a report of it, and I sent one to each captain and had him sign his name and place the number of boats on the same paper.

Q. Then the question of disembarking in Cuba was fully considered before you left Tampa, and this inquiry was made in reference to that?

A. Yes. In addition to that there was also an inquiry made by General Shafter whether any anchors aboard of the ship could be used for stern anchors, so as to moor the ship, head and stern, if it could be done. We made the inquiry, and found the majority of the ships had anchors which could be used, but some did not have them. There was not time to get anchors if we desired, because they all had to come from the North; nothing to be had in that country of any kind.

Q. The troops then were all put aboard in accordance, in the first place, with the programme which you gave us yesterday; and the transfers were made subsequently in accordance with the memorandum which you now submit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And these transfers were based upon the reports which you received that some of the transports were crowded?

A. The reports that General Shafter received; and he ordered a number of officials, of which General Lawton was one, to go around and examine and find out if such was the case. Upon their report that memorandum was made out and handed to me, as Colonel Humphrey says there.

(At this point the memorandum referred to by the witness is presented as Exhibit C. The exhibit reads as follows:

"All battalion on *Concho* and *Orizaba* of Second Massachusetts to go to the *Knickerbocker*.

"The Third of the Second Massachusetts on the *Seneca* go to the *Manteo*.

"Two companies of the Seventeenth on the *Cherokee* to go to the *Comal*.

"Two companies of the Second Infantry on the *Yucatan* go to the *Comal*.

"Two companies of the Second Infantry on the *Yucatan* go to the *Clinton*.

"Two companies of the Tenth Cavalry on the *Leona* go to the *Alamo*.

"Two companies of the Twenty-first Infantry on the *Saratoga* go to the *Berkshire*.")

Q. Then the battalion, as you found it, was on two ships?

A. Yes, sir; and all the others now explain themselves.

Q. Has anything occurred to you during the night, Captain, which you would like to state to the commission in regard to the embarkation of the troops at Tampa for Cuba—anything that would give us any information which we ought to have?

A. I don't know as there is. I think I have gone over all the ground—stated the number of lighters, what we received there, conditions, and everything. There is nothing said about the embarkation of the troops coming from Santiago north on the vessels.

Q. Did you supervise them?

A. Yes, sir; and also the embarkation of all the Spanish soldiers that went out of the port of Santiago proper.

Q. That question is not important; we have had nothing in regard to it; it is mere curiosity.

A. Some of the ships have been criticised by the press as being in a filthy condition—one in particular, the *Allegheny*. Now, she arrived a day or two before I did at Montauk Point. Dr. McGruder told Colonel Humphrey, in my presence, that the *Allegheny* was as clean a ship as there ever came into that port, and that the public statements of the press did not emanate from him, and were not correct. I say, emphatically, that she was one of the best ventilated vessels in the transport service. She was denounced as a cattle ship. She was used as a passenger and freight ship by the company that owned her. She was passed upon by a medical officer, and he made his report upon these transports before the troops were put aboard.

Q. Were all the troops which came from Santiago to embark for the United States at the port of Santiago embarked in the harbor?

A. Yes; they were camped out at Siboney before they were brought to Santiago and transferred to the troop ships.

Q. When did you go?

A. About five days after the capitulation.

Q. And you superintended the embarkation of all the troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see every vessel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Make a personal inspection?

A. When she reported as being ready, I reported to Colonel Humphrey and the captain went aboard. Some of the troops went aboard outside of the harbor; some were carried down to Guantanamo and there put aboard the war ships.

Q. Were troops embarked on any vessels which had not been inspected and approved by a board of officers appointed for that purpose?

A. None of them ever sailed out of the harbor of Santiago proper with the exception of the *Concho*. The *Concho* carried up some sick and other troops; they went out first; she was not inspected, I think.

Q. She was loaded at Siboney—that is, all sick got aboard there?

A. Part of them did.

Q. To what extent did you make a personal inspection of the condition of the vessels in which the troops embarked?

A. I can't say that I made any. I would go to the captains and tell them, "When can you be ready for receiving troops? Make statement for certain time—for instance, to-morrow. Or, if you can, give me some more time in which to clean her up." Some of them would require ice; that would delay the sailing of the ship, as of course we would have to get that. And when they would notify me or Colonel Humphrey that they were ready, we would have the doctor go aboard, or a committee, to examine the ship.

Q. Was there a full supply of ice at Santiago for all the transports?

A. Yes; we had two schooner loads there which were sent down by the Red Cross or other people, and the vessels, some of them, put aboard 50 tons.

Q. Did you supervise the loading of these supplies which came with the transports?

A. Now, I would place a lighter, for instance, for the regimental equipage; the officer who was in charge of that regiment I would notify "There is a lighter placed at this wharf for the loading of your camp equipage." I would give him men; in some instances his own men would assist; in some cases the men did not feel like working. I then placed another lighter for supplies—probably have to carry it about 50 or 60 feet. I would say, "Here is your lighter for supplies." When they had their supplies on this lighter, I would then send her out.

Q. Then the supplies for each body of troops going aboard of a troop ship or transport would be put aboard by the regimental commissioned quartermaster?

A. I saw him go aboard the lighter myself.

Q. Was there an abundance of commissary supplies at Santiago?

A. Yes; the warehouses were stocked—walls crowded.

Q. There was no reason why any regiment should not have been supplied?

A. No, sir; they had soups, ginger ales, and in many instances there was a lot of light bread, or wheat bread; two or three wagonloads at a time.

Q. Have you any knowledge of what went aboard the *Concho* at the time she left Santiago?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you remember the fact of her leaving?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know who went aboard of her at Santiago?

A. No, sir. Now, I came up on the *Seneca*, the other ship; I came up north on her, and got off at Hampton Roads, and they allowed me to leave her. She was ordered then to New York. I came on then to Washington, and when I got there—Washington—I had a telegram from Colonel Humphrey to return to Santiago at once. I came home to fix things, and I went right down and went back to Santiago.

Q. What was the condition of the *Seneca*?

A. She had more people aboard of her than I could put in her stateroom. There were a number of them on the floor of her cabin. There were two contract physicians, one of them living in Tampa, who now attends my family; and some of those sick were also in what we call "between decks," in the wooden bunks where the soldiers went when they went to Santiago. I judge there were 25 or 30 of them. There was one young man very bad with the typhoid fever; he was taken up from there and put in a stateroom given up by a passenger. Of course, she did not have ice for only two days. She got a ton from the Red Cross ship, but there was no other ice to be had at Siboney at the time she sailed.

Q. The sick were put aboard of her at Siboney?

A. Yes. They had some other people aboard of her who were used as nurses. Dr. Bird told me that he had taken about 15 or 20 of these men to nurse the sick and look out for them. Now, we had plenty of water, but it was getting down toward the bottom of the tank—perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 gallons in the tank. But in the rolling of the vessel it stirred the sediment up and discolored the water. It was hot, of course, being down in the hold of the vessel, and, having no ice to cool it, made it very unpalatable. I suffered on that account. Some parts of the ship that were under the directions of the crew could have been cleaned better than they were. But so far as the cabin was concerned, it appeared to be in a cleanly condition.

Q. Were the bunks that had been used by the soldiers filled, or only about 25 of them?

A. Only 25 of them.

Q. How many bunks were in the *Seneca*?

A. I guess 600; but there were only about 25 or 30 of the men that were not worse off.

Q. There were stateroom accommodations, or upon the floor of the saloon, for the 25 men in those bunks; and the vessel was capable of transporting 500 or 600?

A. Yes; that is, well people.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What did those have who were on the floor?

A. Some mattresses and blankets. Dr. Bird is better qualified to give evidence connected with the *Seneca*, because he was aboard of her and better acquainted, and had charge of her.

Q. What did they have for food on the *Seneca*?

A. They had soldiers' rations. I saw, before we left Siboney, in the commissary—in fact, I got some of it myself—condensed milk, jellies, and things of that character, two, three, or four days before we left.

Q. Did you have soups, jellies, condensed milk, etc.?

A. Some of it; but that was brought aboard by the Red Cross ship by one of the Red Cross ladies.

Q. Did you have sufficient of these articles?

A. I can't say so.

Q. Can you say that they were not sufficient?

A. No, sir; I can not.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you know of the steward of the boat selling articles to the men aboard?

A. Not on that ship; heard of it on other ships. I saw him selling quite a lot of beer. I saw the officers, etc., drinking beer.

Q. So he had a storeroom from which he sold articles?

A. Yes, sir. You see that ship had been down there about five or six weeks, and they had no means of getting anything outside of the commissary department. No supply to draw from anywhere else.

Q. Did you see the steward selling canned fruits, etc.?

A. No, sir. I doubt very much if they had any canned fruits on board; but I saw these supplies of jellies and canned milk in the commissary at Siboney, because I got a can or so two or three days before that.

Q. But what you had aboard the *Seneca* was put there by the Red Cross Society?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had they a representative on board?

A. Miss Jennings, who was getting a passage.

Q. Did she distribute them?

A. Yes; she performed very able service there.

Q. What nurses were there aboard—detail nurses?

A. I don't know as to that. I was speaking to this Dr. Bird about nurses. He said, "Well, I have taken in 15 or 20 of the best soldiers, and put them at it."

Q. Do you know whether the doctors had medical supplies?

A. Well, he had plenty of quinine and pills, because I got 170 grains myself; sometimes 35 grains per day.

Q. As to other things, you don't know, I suppose?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you make any complaint regarding shortage in medicine?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there a tendency of the increased tone of the atmosphere to bring out the malaria?

A. Yes; probably.

Q. You didn't go to Montauk?

A. Not at that time; the last of August. We left about 200 convalescents there; came up on the *City of Washington*.

Q. Who were aboard of her?

A. Colonel Humphrey and some civilian employees.

Q. Did you visit Camp Wikoff?

A. We were ordered the next day to New York.

Q. Have you any other statement that you would like to make which would add to your previous testimony, or would throw any additional light upon this matter?

A. No, sir; I can not say.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Do you state that the Red Cross had two schooners of ice at Santiago?

A. I don't believe both of them. One was sent by a gentleman North, to General Shafter.

Q. What storage of ice did the Government have for the people who were sick?

A. We used that.

Q. The Government had none?

A. No, sir; I don't think so.

Q. What arrangements did you make at Tampa?

A. We got ice at St. Petersburg; there are ice houses there. We could draw from Ybor City, Tampa, or St. Petersburg, and, in fact, all along that line of railroad there is ice.

Q. All those transports—did they all have ice?

A. All had them full.

Q. Now, there has been complaint from these transports at Santiago that they asked for permission to go to Jamaica for ice and fresh water. Do you know anything about that?

A. I know that we sent one transport there—but it was the *Seneca*—principally to try and get laborers, and what they got the captain had to get by sleight of hand. They refused to allow any laborers to come down. The British consul notified us we would get the Government in controversy if we tried it. He got some water there, but he had to get it very quietly.

Q. Or ice either?

A. No, sir; that was the reason that afterwards they never sent any vessel over there, I presume. And then, again, it was because they could not spare her away from there at that time.

Q. To Montauk Point?

A. No, sir; those who went to Montauk Point—they got ice.

Q. Where did you get that?

A. From schooners, and from what was sent to General Shafter.

Q. From the north?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Donations?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were no donations made by the Government for ice?

A. I don't know about that. Could not say about that. We not only loaded up the transports with all the ice we could carry, but there was ice distributed to all troops back of Santiago; we would send the lighter down and get 30 or 40 tons of it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Then, if the ships did not have ice, it was because they did not have the capacity?

A. Yes, sir; in some instances we put ice into the water tanks; dropped it in there so as to keep the water cool as long as possible, and tried to save the supply they had on board; capacity was small. Now, at Daiquiri, we could get some

water from the water pipes; they would come along the dock, and we watered quite a number of vessels from that dock.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What kind of water was that, captain?

A. Like all Cuban water; quite good; came from springs about 3 or 4 miles from the coast.

Q. Did you see the camp from Guantanamo of the marines?

A. I saw it at a distance.

Q. They all had tents, did they not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any sickness in that camp that you know of?

A. Not that I know of. It was right down at the point where you go into the bay, on the right-hand side.

Q. You did not go in?

A. No, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. You stated yesterday in your testimony that you made an application to the Navy Department for lighters, and that they declined to give them to you?

A. Colonel Humphrey told me that he made a request from General Shafter to get one from the navy, and that the General notified him afterwards that the navy could not spare them.

Q. Where were you on duty from the 24th of June to the 10th of July? Which point on that coast—Daiquiri or Siboney?

A. I came on the *Seneca*. I left there the day before the capitulation, the 16th.

Q. That was from the 24th of June until the 16th of July. Whereabouts were you on duty?

A. I was on duty principally at Daiquiri. Part of the time I would go down to Siboney to superintend the work four, five, or six hours; would go back to Daiquiri when I got the chance.

Q. Did you have anything to do with putting ashore the Siboney hospital and the cavalry hospital and Wood's division hospital—these three hospitals, tents, equipment, etc.?

A. We took off the *Louisiana* the hospital outfit and sent it down to Siboney, but did not go with it.

Q. How did you send it there?

A. By one of the steam lighters. Then I took another one off the *La Grande Duchesse* and landed it at Daiquiri.

Q. What became of that?

A. That was moved away from there, but I don't know how.

Q. Did you take off any medical supplies?

A. Yes; some.

Q. In what quantity?

A. I can't recollect that.

Q. There were men in charge of the hospital, so that you took off the entire hospital upon the ships?

A. Yes; I wanted to take that off—the surgeon and the equipment he had—the day I discharged the *Louisiana* of the packers, the ambulances, and the pack train and he said that he did not feel justified in leaving there until he got orders to do so.

Q. Therefore it was the hospital department that kept them from being taken off?

A. Yes, sir; and I didn't know he was taken ashore until a couple of days after that.

Q. Did Colonel Pope, the surgeon of that division, make any application to you to take off medical stores or hospital supplies?

A. I never saw Colonel Pope from the time he arrived there until he took transport to Santiago.

Q. Do you know anything as to this fact: "The only transportation that was given to us was a small rowboat, which was turned over to Dr. Pope and used by him for the collection of medical supplies to the transports. This was taken away after accomplishing nothing, but was directed to return immediately to the ship, where it was needed for other purposes?"

A. Never heard of it.

Q. Dr. Munson, who was in charge of the transportation and landing of the hospital supplies—did you meet him?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. He testifies that he requested of Colonel Humphrey, or one of the majors who was quartermaster, transportation, and it was refused him.

A. I never heard anything of it.

Q. That he was told by them that the Medical Department had to rely upon its own energy and provide its own transportation?

A. Well, of course I am not qualified to answer that, but I know this: A courier came in there at 8 o'clock at night from headquarters to get medical stores from certain ships; we went out and got one of them, and the other we could not find. I also had notice from Colonel Humphrey that just as soon as I could get hold of certain other ships—as soon as I could find them—to get medical supplies of them.

Q. So you had orders to take these supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long before you got hold of them?

A. Not more than a day.

Q. If any medical officer, or courier, or any order from any doctor had come to you, being there in charge of the unloading of ships, asking you for medical supplies, was it your orders to refuse, or would you let them have the supplies?

A. Yes, sir; promptly.

Q. So that if you received an order any day after you landed there, and received any request from any doctor, there was no trouble about getting them ashore in a day?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the doctor know that fact?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there not an order printed that you had charge of that matter?

A. I can't tell you.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Were you in uniform?

A. No, sir; I was around the ships. Every day I was on the whole fleet and giving orders to the different captains, and telling them when I received orders.

Q. Yes. You don't know whether an order was issued that you were assistant?

A. I don't say.

Q. Were you recognized so?

A. Dr. Pope consulted me about a hospital ship. I took him down and showed him the *Olivette*.

Q. You are satisfied that you were the one to do it?

A. He knew all the time, because I was the man he consulted about the hospital ship and other things.

Q. Who came to you when you moved the supplies for the hospital from Daiquiri to Siboney?

A. There was a doctor who came down—I don't recollect his name. We went out that night and got those stores, and then tried to find the *Breakwater*. We could not find her before the next morning. We got the *Breakwater*, but don't

recollect the name of the doctor. This was the hospital outfit. They wanted to fit it up—fit up the *Breakwater*—to send up North with the troops.

By General BEAVER:

Q. To whom?

A. He would either have given some orders there or telephoned me instructions.

Q. Was that before the doctor knew you or not? You were bound to know who the quartermaster was?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What other quartermaster was on duty there on the shore besides Humphrey?

A. Major Jacobs, at Daiquiri, until he was taken sick.

Q. Who after him?

A. Captain Starr, one of General Shafter's aids.

Q. Major Jacobs knew the position you occupied?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The *Olivette* carried 9 boats—8 metallic and 1 wooden boat. Could there have been landed medical supplies with these?

A. Yes; they were capable of carrying anything.

Q. Were none destroyed?

A. No, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. How long was the *Olivette* in arriving there at Siboney?

A. As we passed an island the *Gussie* had the stock aboard. She signaled that she was short of water, and the General sent to me and wanted to know how he could water the *Gussie*. I said there were two ways—take her in tow by the *Olivette* and steam ahead very slowly, passing her hose through the *Gussie*, and water her that way; or, if the captain did not think he could do that, to take her into Allentown, on the island, under the lee, and then water her alongside; and as we passed that island the order was given and she was convoyed in there by one of the naval vessels. We went on and she overtook us the next day at about 11 o'clock.

Q. Just before you left?

A. Yes, sir. She was within a half mile of the *Segurança*.

Q. How large was she?

A. She carried six men.

Q. How many men did it take to man a boat in that service?

A. Four.

Q. There is testimony that says the quartermaster made no effort to assist the medical department; that transportation was entirely done by the commissary and other departments?

A. Well, sir, I can not tell. When Colonel Humphrey gave his orders we did get them ashore. Of course, I can not tell what passed between him and Colonel Humphrey.

Q. Was Colonel Pope on the *Olivette* all this time?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. The medical department turned over supplies that were not shipped from Tampa? Was it possible?

A. I can not tell. Everything was brought down there that I knew of.

By General WILSON:

Q. In unloading these transports at Tampa with troops, etc., for the Santiago campaign were you given a reasonable time for that purpose?

A. There was a great deal of hurry at the last. They were anxious, because the admiral was cabling for assistance as quickly as possible, and that the orders were coming from headquarters to hurry the expedition up.

Q. What admiral?

A. Sampson.

Q. Where did you get your information?

A. When talking with Colonel Humphrey. Yesterday I stated that none of the supplies were landed while the troops were aboard, with the exception of the *Concho*. But there was one other ship which occurred to me last night, the *Orizaba*, in loading up the siege guns. That was the only vessel, I think, that I know of. In talking to Colonel Bird in regard to the lighters, the colonel told me that he had neglected to state about the *Manteo*, as he considered her especially good on account of her capacity, and as being a good lighter, one of light draft.

By General DODGE:

Q. From where?

A. Mexico. She was owned by the Ward Steamship Company; a very efficient boat, under the American flag.

By General McCOOK:

Q. Will you be kind enough to state what was the route of the *Allegheny* before the war?

A. She ran from Portland to Baltimore. She carried passengers.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is there any additional statement which you desire to make, or anything that will give us any additional information?

A. No, sir. I can only repeat that when we left Tampa I considered that we had an abundance of everything for landing the expedition successfully and promptly, although when we arrived there the wharf facilities we did not have.

Q. Do you consider that after you arrived there you had facilities to land what that army needed?

A. Yes; if we could have gone into a quiet harbor. We could, of course, have landed a great deal more stuff than we did. It was because the lighters were knocked about so, and putting the lighters where they could not work as rapidly, as if the conditions were as I mentioned.

Q. Those ships that came down from New York, or wherever they were chartered before they reached Tampa—did each one bring five stevedores?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they remain?

A. Some did; some did not,

Q. What became of them?

A. Left at Tampa.

Q. How many went with the *Seneca*?

A. About 40.

Q. Were they efficient men?

A. Yes, sir; good. In addition to that there were over 100 negro laborers—men accustomed to handle freight. They had to have someone direct them.

Q. Roustabouts?

A. Yes, sir; good laborers.

Q. Were the crews of those ships willing to aid in the handling of freight and boats, etc.?

A. Yes; they were largely so. But, of course, it was understood by the crews of the vessels that they would not handle cargoes. But the officers and heads and others showed a disposition to do all they could. I never had but one captain hesitate to obey an order, and he did not do it because he did not want to, but

because he was afraid of putting a ship into a too dangerous position. I told him I would assume charge, and the Government would be responsible; and he said "All right," and I went ahead and discharged the cargo. There was no harbor to go into. There were about 40 of them, and, of course, they would still do in the nighttime, so as to be able to get into a position to be safe, in case of bad weather. It was the hurricane season; there were heavy squalls, and it blew pretty strong, and you don't want to be too close together on account of dangers from collision.

Q. Did you have any other messenger or signal?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there any signal officer aboard?

A. They were removed afterwards.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Was there no naval officer aboard?

A. There was a midshipman.

Q. He had no charge of the ship?

A. No, sir. We steamed in three columns; the *Segurança* was the center ship in the center column. There were war ships also; more on the right than on the left. They had scouts as well, who scouted in the morning to protect them, and there were also vessels in the rear. And then there was a signal officer aboard each ship signaling orders as required.

Q. Those signal officers left the ship when they got to Cuba?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you desire to change your testimony in relation to the officers that were aboard the boat?

A. I would not like to testify positively that it was Captain Hunker; but it was a naval officer on a naval ship.

Q. And the name of the ship?

A. No, sir; I can't remember; I believe it was Captain Hunker's.

Q. The *Annapolis*?

A. The *Annapolis* I think he was captain of. Yes; I think it was.

EXHIBIT J. MCK. NO. 1.

List of transports, showing number of small boats and carrying capacity of same.

Name.	Number of boats.	Car-rying capacity.	Name.	Number of boats.	Car-rying capacity.
		Men.			Men.
Alamo	4	80	Morgan	5	75
Allegheny	3	75	Olivette	8	160
Aransas	5	90	Orizaba	6	120
Berkshire	3	75	Rio Grande	5	90
Breakwater	5	75	San Marcos	5	132
Cherokee	6	120	Santiago	4	80
Comal	4	80	Saratoga	5	90
Concho	5	100	Seguranca	6	108
Clinton	4	60	Seneca	7	140
City of Washington	4	80	Stillwater	4	50
D. H. Miller	5	100	Vigilancia	6	120
Florida	4	90	Whitney	6	90
Gussie	3	60	Yucatan	6	150
Iroquois	8	160	Laura ¹	None.
Knickerbocker	3	60			
Leona	5	84	Total	153	3,634
Manteo	2	35	Steam lighter Laura	400
Matteawan	4	125			
Miami	4	80			3,434

¹ Steam lighter, capable of carrying 400 men.

Troops on board the following named transports.

Steamer.	Designating No.	Troops on board.	Officers.	Men.
Alamo.....	6	Headquarters band, Cos. C, D, E, and G, 10th U. S. Infantry; Cos. C and E, Engineer Battalion; headquarters 2d Brigade, Col. E. P. Pearson, 10th Infantry.	33	574
Allegheny.....	17	Cavalry division, Maj. Gen. Joe Wheeler; Lieut. Col. J. H. Dorst, adjutant general.	14	80
Aranzas.....	27	3d Infantry.	2	13
Berkshire.....	9	Light artillery battalion: Light Battery A, 2d U. S. Artillery; Light Battery F, 2d U. S. Artillery.	14	368
Breakwater.....	29	One regiment, 3d U. S. Infantry.	20	467
Cherokee.....	4	One regiment, 12th U. S. Infantry; headquarters and three companies of 17th U. S. Infantry.	35	852
Comal.....	7	Co. I, 7th U. S. Infantry, and Light Batteries E and K, 1st U. S. Artillery.	10	284
Concho.....	14	One regiment, 4th U. S. Infantry: one regiment, 25th U. S. Infantry; headquarters 2d Brigade.	53	1,064
Clinton.....	32	Cos. D and I, 3d U. S. Infantry.	2	169
City of Washington.....	16	One battalion, 21st U. S. Infantry; one regiment, 24th U. S. Infantry.	33	751
Chamberland.....	31			
D. H. Miller.....	19	Cos. E, G, and H, 7th U. S. Infantry.	8	280
Florida.....	15			
Gussie.....	3			
Iroquois.....	25	Headquarters Cos. A, B, C, D, and F, 7th U. S. Infantry; Cos. C, G, H, and K, 17th U. S. Infantry; headquarters 2d Division, Brig. Gen. H. W. Lawton; Capt. H. C. Carbaugh, adjutant general; headquarters 3d Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. R. Chaffee; First Lieut. F. L. Winn, assistant adjutant-general.	38	722
Kanawha.....	34			
Knickerbocker.....	13	Headquarters and two companies of 2d Massachusetts Volunteers.	32	588
Laura.....	33			
Leona.....	21	One regiment, 1st U. S. Cavalry; one regiment, 10th U. S. Cavalry, headquarters 1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young; Capt. Robt. Sewell, adjutant general.	51	910
Manteo.....	26	Two companies 17th U. S. Infantry and two companies 2d Massachusetts Volunteers.	10	265
Matteawan.....	26	One regiment, 20th U. S. Infantry; Troops F and D, 2d U. S. Cavalry; Independent Brigade; Brig. Gen. J. C. Bates; Maj. John A. Logan, adjutant-general.	32	731
Miami.....	1	One regiment, 6th U. S. Infantry; one regiment, 9th U. S. Cavalry.	55	919
Morgan.....	30	Major Rafferty and Troop C, 2d U. S. Cavalry.	3	69
Olivette.....	11	Hospital.	3	35
Orizaba.....	24	One regiment, 22d U. S. Infantry; Batteries G and H, 4th Artillery. (Siege Artillery Battalion.)	35	622
Rio Grande.....	22	One regiment, 3d U. S. Cavalry; one regiment, 6th U. S. Cavalry; balloon signal detachment, Maj. J. E. Maxfield.	49	882
San Marcos.....	18	Cos. A, E, F, and H, 2d U. S. Infantry: one regiment, 10th U. S. Infantry; 1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. H. S. Hawkins; Capt. W. E. Horton, adjutant-general.	38	1,237
Santiago.....	2	One regiment, 9th U. S. Infantry; one battalion, 10th U. S. Infantry; headquarters 1st Division, Brig. Gen. J. F. Kent; Maj. A. C. Sharpe, adjutant-general.	57	739
Saratoga.....	20	One regiment, 13th U. S. Infantry; headquarters, band, and Cos. C, D, E, and H of 21st U. S. Infantry; headquarters 3d Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry.	38	635
Segurança.....	12	One regiment, 1st U. S. Infantry; balloon signal detachment, Maj. F. Greene; headquarters 5th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Wm. E. Shafter; Col. McClenard, assistant adjutant-general.	...	477
Seneca.....	5	One regiment, 8th U. S. Infantry; two companies 2d Massachusetts Volunteers; headquarters 1st Brigade; Col. J. J. Van Horn, 8th Infantry; 1st Lieut. Fred Perkins, assistant adjutant-general.	32	656
Stevens.....	35			
Stillwater.....	28	Troop A, 2d U. S. Cavalry.	3	69
Vigilancia.....	23	One regiment, 71st New York Volunteers.	44	954
Whitney.....	10			
Yucatan.....	8	Headquarters, band, and Cos. C, D, G, and B, 2d U. S. Infantry; one regiment, 1st Volunteer Cavalry.	43	773
Total.			819	16,158

BOSTON, MASS., December 2, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWARD H. BRADFORD.

Dr. EDWARD H. BRADFORD was brought before the commission. Being asked if he had any objection to being sworn, and answering "no," he was duly sworn by the recorder, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us your name, your profession, time you have been practicing, and your residence?

A. Edward H. Bradford. I have practiced as a physician since 1876. I reside in Boston.

Q. Did you have occasion during the summer to observe any of the wounded or sick brought to Boston?

A. I saw the sick that were sent to Boston to the care of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association. There were nearly 1,000, and I saw them in the way of directing their assignment to the different hospitals. They came in various lots, and I saw them in that way.

Q. Can you remember the names of the vessels?

A. Yes; the first was the *Olivette*, which came directly to Boston, touching at Montauk, but not landing. Then the next was the *Bay State*, which brought some direct from Santiago; and the next was the *Relief*, which brought some from Montauk. Then there were two trips of the *Bay State* from Porto Rico, and then there was a consignment from Montauk on the *Lewiston*, which was shipwrecked and the sick brought by train. Then there were some consignments by train from Chickamauga, and also small numbers by train from Montauk and New London.

Q. These several consignments that were brought to Boston, were they or were they not under the care of physicians?

A. I think they were all under the care of physicians with the exception of one consignment of furloughed men who came from Santiago. They had only a few sick.

Q. Tell us in what condition you found the sick, speaking generally.

A. They varied considerably. Those from Santiago were noticeably much more sick than those from Porto Rico or from Montauk, the Montauk lot and the Porto Rico lot being noticeably convalescents. The Santiago lot were very sick; those that came on the *Olivette* were the sickest; those that came on the first trip of the *Bay State* from Santiago were nearly as sick, but not quite so; the number of very sick ones were greater.

Q. To what are you inclined to attribute that?

A. Of course, largely to the diseases; entirely to the diseases.

Q. It has been charged very largely that men were starved, both in Cuba and in transport.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you, or did you not, observe anything which would lead you to infer that the men had not food?

A. On the trip up—of course I have no idea what the condition was in Santiago; but the condition of the transports—of those two transports—the *Olivette* being the hospital ship—I should say that they had very good care. I think I can say rather more—excellent care. When we boarded the *Olivette* down in the bay with the health officer, Dr. Shea, she was carefully examined, because we were afraid then of yellow fever, and Dr.—Major—Appel, took us all down. We saw the galleys and all the arrangements there. The men were very sick and all emaciated. All had the "Santiago" look of every convalescent from typhoid, dysentery, etc. We made a careful inspection, and the owners of the transport explained to us that she was well supplied with doctors, and she was well supplied,

as far as I could see, with provisions. There was a lack of efficient male nurses, which the doctor explained to me—those he had detailed to him were inefficient and had been seasick, and the doctors themselves had to sit up at night to prepare the delicacies for the sick. I think it was Dr. Brown—I can't remember his name—who was assistant there who told me that he had not slept for two nights, in making beef tea. We were taken to the bunks. The ventilation was good, the vessel was well policed, considering what she had gone through, and fully as tidy as you could expect. There were a number of very sick men. The doctor explained to me that he had to take what was given to him, and several had died on the voyage and there were five who required very careful transport because he considered them very sick, and one of them, I think, died immediately. I should say that the lot from the *Olive*—one-third of them were dangerously ill, one-half could walk, stagger across the deck. There were none that you would consider able to walk in Boston, but I can say that with the exception of what was complained of by the surgeon in charge—the inefficiency of the attendants—it seemed to us that they had been well looked after, as well as could have been expected after a voyage; not as well looked after as those on the *Bay State*, because the ship was not as luxuriously fitted as the *Bay State*. The latter you may consider luxurious; not as well looked after, I should say, as on the *Relief*, also an unusually well-equipped hospital ship.

Q. Do you remember the condition at the time of landing of Mr. Tiffany, of the Rough Riders?

A. Yes.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us, because his case has attracted a good deal of attention, as, as you remember, it was charged that he died of starvation.

A. I can remember particularly his case, because I have thought a great deal of it since. When I heard that Lieutenant Tiffany was on board, without knowing him, but having mutual friends, I thought I would look him up and see what could be done for him. I went to his stateroom and was introduced to him. I told him that I should be glad to be get a private room at the hospital for him and see that everything was done. He assured me he was doing very well indeed; there was no need of his going to a hospital; his friends were going to meet him; he was but slightly ill. I asked his illness. He said he had some little diarrhea, but was much better. He was dressing himself, and afterwards walked about on the deck. He was one of the least ill in appearance of any on the ship. He was very cheerful. We inquired about mutual friends, and he said he was going back to New York. I watched all of the men land, and I was on the lookout for him particularly, but he didn't land, and I wondered what had become of him. I afterwards inquired and it was said that he, being furloughed, would go as he pleased, and was waiting for his brother. I left the ship, but came down in the afternoon at 5 to see Major Appel, and while I was there Lieutenant Tiffany's brother came and inquired for him, and Major Appel said he was in his stateroom, he believed. We sent to the stateroom, and the steward brought brought back a note from Lieutenant Tiffany to his brother saying that he had gone to the Parker House. He didn't report to Major Appel, but went, as he could, being furloughed. It was a very hot day, and apparently he had gone himself and taken a carriage, being tired of waiting for his brother. After this, Major Appel went with me and asked where he could find Lieutenant Tiffany. I said, as he looked so much better than the rest, I didn't think he need have any anxiety on account of Tiffany, as he seemed the least ill of the lot. Major Appel said that in cases of that sort a relapse was liable to occur in all malarial diseases, and he regretted that he had left the ship without informing him where he was. I told him where the Parker House was. Major Appel said he would like to communicate with him if practicable. We tried to telephone him, to inquire. I am not sure whether we did telephone or not. We made the attempt, and after

that I heard no more of Lieutenant Tiffany until I heard he was quite ill. He was emaciated, like all the rest of them. He was no more emaciated than any of the others. He made no complaint whatever to me, but spoke very pleasantly and hopefully in regard to his condition. He dressed himself and walked out on the deck, and we saw him afterwards walking on the deck. I regret extremely that I didn't urge him more to go to the hospital. If he had been a private I would have done so, but being an officer and furloughed, I had no right to do anything at all in the matter, and, in fact, I could not. Major Appel was in the same condition. That, I think, is all that I can say in regard to his case.

Q. You didn't see him after you met him on the boat?

A. No; I saw his brother on the boat.

Q. You had no occasion to see him while here?

A. No: I saw none of them after transferring to hospitals. He struck me as the least ill of any on the boat.

Q. Did he, or anyone on the boat, tell you in regard to the nourishment he had received during the voyage, taken during the voyage?

A. No: none of them talked with me on that matter.

Q. Did he say anything in regard to his treatment on the boat?

A. No; nothing at all. I saw him alone; went into the stateroom.

Q. Made no complaint?

A. He told me—he said he was doing very well. He said: "I am all right; first rate." We had one very sick, and, of course, I was on the lookout to see that none of them died during transport. We made a rule that none should be sent to their homes if we could help it, and all soldiers that were not under furlough we sent to the hospital, whether they looked well or not. Those furloughed, if relatives came, we could not hold them. We had one case that threatened to be as disastrous as Tiffany's. A young man of the Sixth Regiment, from Porto Rico, seemed very well and was furloughed. His father lived in the suburbs and had a carriage and took him home. We took precautions to investigate and see that he was in good condition. There was no one in better condition when the father took him home in the carriage. A few weeks afterwards the father reported to us that on the way out he had a relapse, collapsed, and nearly died, and that by working over him, and with nurses for him, for two weeks, he finally recovered. So, as far as we could, we allowed none to leave these ships except to go directly to the hospitals; and we had no death on the pier or in transport, and the nurses say the one in the *Olivette* that died in the Massachusetts hospital just after reaching there was moribund while on the ship.

Q. Have you any opinion of any sort to aid us in our work—any suggestion?

A. No; I don't know as there is anything. That question is rather a broad one. If there would be another war, I suppose that there are a good many suggestions, but I don't think of anything to make.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 3, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUT. COL. GEORGE W. GOETHALS.

Lieut. Col. GEORGE W. GOETHALS was next called as a witness. The scope of the inquiry was read to the witness. Having no objection, he was sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your name and title?

A. George W. Goethals, captain, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, lieutenant-colonel of engineers, volunteers.

Q. Were did you serve during the war with Spain?

A. At Chickamauga Park from the 30th of May to the 24th of July; from the 24th of July to the 31st of July en route to Porto Rico from Chickamauga; from the 31st of July to the 29th of October in Porto Rico.

Q. What position had you at Chickamauga Park?

A. Chief engineer in the First Army Corps.

Q. And on the staff of General Brooke?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were your duties connected with that staff position?

A. During the month of June I was engaged in making surveys for water. During July I was engaged in instructing troops in reconnoissances, outpost duty, advance guard, etc.

Q. What time did you report to General Brooke for duty?

A. The 30th of May.

Q. What troops were in the camp at that time?

A. The First Corps complete and part of the Third Corps. I don't remember the regiments there. Shortly after that eight regiments were ordered away to Tampa, so that broke up the organization, and then, as new regiments came in, they were assigned to the two corps.

Q. Had you any occasion officially to inspect the camps?

A. No, sir.

Q. Had you any opportunities for observing their condition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the condition of the camp at the time of your first observation in regard to it, from a sanitary standpoint?

A. Well, I did not think the camp was particularly clean. Riding through the woods, for instance, there were evidences of the men having defecated all through the woods without reference to sinks. My attention was particularly called to our own headquarters, which were not in a very good condition as far as policing was concerned.

Q. How long did that condition of things continue?

A. Practically during the time I was at Chickamauga. Our camp was located on Lytle Hill. The sink of the mess to which I belonged was on the crest of the hill; below this was our kitchen, and about 100 yards from it—below—was our mess tent, and below that the living tents. During the heavy rains our sink was flooded out, and naturally the drainage was toward the tents. There were five of us in this mess. The sinks of the other officers were on the reverse side of the slope, so that they did not suffer.

Q. Your camp was pitched "wrong end to"?

A. Just about.

Q. What was the condition of the camps, as you observed, from the standpoint of their proximity to each other—I mean the proximity of the tents to each other—in other words, were they crowded?

A. The camps of the Second and Third Divisions were rather crowded; the conditions were rather peculiar; they were trying to get the regiments located as well as they could for proper drilling purposes; they had to tent the men in the timber, and it was necessary to keep them camped around the drill grounds, so as not to compel them to march too far.

Q. So that, in your judgment, the drilling idea was the reason for putting the men in the timber?

A. I think so; I think that was the main reason for putting the men in the timber—so as to reserve this open space for drilling purposes.

Q. Was it understood that the timber was not the proper place for the tents?

A. I do not know that I had heard that matter discussed.

Q. Then the sacrifice of health was to be made in order to get the grounds for drilling the troops?

A. Practically, yes. The regulars were camped in the open.

Q. They did not need the drill grounds, you think?

A. No, sir.

Q. To what extent were the camps put in the woods, the camps of the volunteers?

A. I think that about all of them were in the timber. The timber down there is open. It is not very thickly wooded. The sound timber is left standing and the brush cut out by the Park Commission.

Q. Was there any general observation of the airing of the tents during the day?

A. Couldn't answer.

Q. So far as your observation goes, did you see any effort?

A. Yes; in some cases they tried to have the bedding taken out and the camp aired.

Q. Was that general?

A. No, sir.

Q. During the time you were there was there any general shifting of the camp so as to put the men upon new ground?

A. No, sir; regiments would go, and new regiments on arriving would occupy the ground recently vacated.

Q. What was the general character of the ground there?

A. Large part stone; on stony ledges, and they had a great deal of difficulty in digging sinks.

Q. Any difficulty in ditching the camps? Was the ground in itself considered without any reference to the surroundings? In your judgment, were they good grounds for camping purposes?

A. All but that stony ground, yes. It is a clay soil, a disadvantage in itself; but we could not get sandy soil in that section of the country.

Q. Outside of the stony ground, what was the character of the soil?

A. Clay.

Q. Clay of such a tenacious character that it would hold what fell upon it?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the depth of the soil which covered the rock, in general?

A. Comparatively thin; because in sinking the water pipe from the pumping station they had to go into rock considerably, and in some cases they had to abandon the putting of pipe into the ground by taking the stone and laying it over the pipe line.

Q. You made the surveys for the water system, did you not?

A. Yes, sir. When I reached Chickamauga the pumping station had already been opened at Chickamauga Creek, but the supply was not sufficient for the number of troops they had there. Then there was talk of bringing in the Crawfish Spring water or the Blue Hole Spring water, and I had charge of the surveys for that water supply from the Crawfish Springs. We ran the line, prepared the estimates for that supply—the idea being to bring in that water and abandon the Chickamauga Creek water; but when I finished that work there was a rumor that the troops were to be removed, and work was stopped. An examination was made of the water and showed it was not so pure; the percentage of albuminoids was greater.

Q. Do the surveys show that the supply of water from the Crawfish Springs was feasible, practical?

A. Yes, sir. Then there was a subsequent report received from Washington concerning Chickamauga Creek water. We made another estimate to connect the water system from Crawfish Springs with the pumping station from Chickamauga Creek. The third estimate was for taking all the water from Chickamauga Creek

and putting in a larger pumping station or plant. But there were several rumors—that the bulk of the troops were to be moved—and the thing gradually dropped off.

Q. What was the character of the water, so far as its being palatable was concerned?

A. It was palatable water. Crawfish Springs is more so than Chickamauga Creek, because it was clearer water.

Q. How were the pipes laid, underground, so as to cool the water, or partly under, or on top?

A. We never had any Crawfish water at all. When I reached there the pipes already put in were on the surface of the ground. They were put under later.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Did you ever see the water from Crawfish Springs roily from the rain?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Right from the springs?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you visit the place where the intake pipes were located in Chickamauga Creek?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the earliest time?

A. I visited them within three or four days after my arrival at Chickamauga.

Q. Was it in operation then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you visited when?

A. Early in June.

Q. Do you recollect whether the dam was put in to dam up the original channel of Cave Spring Creek, and a new channel dug to divert the course of the waters from that run below the intake pipe?

A. There was a dike built.

Q. Constructed at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know anything about the dam giving away on several occasions?

A. No, sir; never heard of it.

By General DODGE:

Q. What was the date of your visit to Chickamauga Creek?

A. Within a week after the 30th of May.

Q. Do you know at what time water commenced to be supplied to the camp there?

A. It was my impression that they had a small pump at work then.

Q. Just put in then?

A. Yes, sir. They had a small pump, subsequently removed, operated temporarily, while waiting the arrival of a larger pump.

Q. Then they had not put in permanent improvements?

A. No, sir.

Q. In your judgment, was there any source of contamination in the water from Cave Spring Creek?

A. I did not go into that at all. They had the dike; and the fall, I understood from Mr. Betts, prevented any back water. Now, if that dam ever gave away, there could have been contamination.

Q. Did you make a sufficient examination so that you can say there could have been no contamination of that water on account of contamination from Cave Spring Creek?

A. No, sir; I made no such an examination.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. After the water had been condemned did they still continue to get water from Crawfish Springs?

A. I did not know of any such order. They hauled water from Crawfish Springs when I first got there. They all considered it the best. We tried to make an arrangement with the owner of Crawfish Springs to take water from his spring, but his rate was \$50 per day per million gallons. The Government considered this exorbitant, as the Government had to build the line, do the pumping, etc. Subsequently the owner requested that we haul no more water from his spring. I saw the analysis of Chickamauga Creek water, and the same of the Crawfish Spring water, and it was considered by the medical authorities that the Crawfish was not as good as the Chickamauga because of greater percentage of albuminoids.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Do you know anything about the condition of the wells there?

A. No, sir; except that we always had full wells after a heavy rain, and as dry days came on the wells would sink; so we inferred that the wells were filled from the surface. We had some very heavy rains during July, and all the wells that had been dry during June were running with water. The wells were full.

Q. Did you ever see the analysis of the wells?

A. No, sir; I only heard of the examination of the Chickamauga Creek water and the Crawfish water.

Q. How long were you at Chickamauga?

A. For nearly two months—June and July.

Q. And came away with General Brooke?

A. On the 24th of July.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What was the difficulty in keeping your headquarters clean?

A. I do not think we had proper police.

Q. Was that a proper example to set before the rest of the corps?

A. No, sir; can't say it was.

By General DODGE:

Q. How many hospital tents were set up at your headquarters?

A. Every officer attached to the corps headquarters had a hospital tent.

Q. How many of them were there?

A. There were four of us: the chief surgeon, the inspector-general, myself, and judge-advocate, subsequently replaced by a quartermaster.

Q. Was that all there were?

A. Yes; that is all I recall now. The rule was that all officers attached to corps headquarters were to have hospital tents.

Q. More than one each?

A. Colonel Huidekoper had two, one for an office.

Q. Was there a hospital near your headquarters?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How close to it?

A. About four or five hundred yards.

Q. What hospital?

A. A headquarters hospital they called it.

Q. That was simply a headquarters hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many tents?

A. Four or five.

Q. Who was in charge of them?

A. Dr. Mason—Charles F. Mason. He was there in charge until he was appointed medical inspector of the First Army Corps about the middle of July.

Q. Where is he now?

A. He is in Porto Rico in charge of the general hospital in San Juan.

Q. Have you been to Porto Rico?

A. Yes; about three months.

By General BEAVER:

Q. The hospital that stood near your headquarters, was that what Colonel Huidekoper called a reserve hospital?

A. No, sir. When they started there General Brooke was in command of the camp. General Brooke was also in command of the Department of the Gulf, and also of the First Corps. When Dr. Mason went there he took charge of what he called the headquarters hospital.

Q. Colonel Huidekoper was simply the surgeon in charge of the First Corps?

A. Yes.

Q. Did General Brooke have different staff officers for the different camps he had?

A. He had his corps and also part of his department staff; the rest of the latter was at Atlanta.

Q. When did you go to Porto Rico?

A. Left Newport News on the 28th of July.

By General DODGE:

Q. In relation to the troops that were camped at Chickamauga, you stated that they were pretty closely camped together?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What portion of that camp was taken up by the occupation of troops and what portion was vacant while you were there?

A. I could not form an idea, because the camps were scattered so. The First Division of the First Army Corps had its brigades strung along the Lafayette road. They were practically in a straight line, one regiment right after another. Then the Second Division was tented on three sides of a square. That was General Poland's division. They were more closely placed than the First Division, on account of the ground. Then the Third Division, they were off in a southeasterly direction and were more spread out than the Second Division. The Second was the most closely camped. I could not begin to approximate the quantity of ground they occupied.

Q. Before General Brooke left there, was any suggestion or order given to you as to changing the location of those troops?

A. Yes, sir; he was going to move the Second and Third Divisions.

Q. Before he left?

A. Yes, sir; we went over the ground with General Wilson, and General Brooke proposed to move the Second and Third Divisions of the First Army Corps closer to the First Division, so as to throw the ground occupied by them over as camping grounds for a part of the Sixth Army Corps.

Q. Was not there a discussion in relation to the necessity of moving the troops that had been camped there—giving them different camping grounds?

A. There may have been, but I heard nothing of it; I had nothing to do with the selection of the ground for a camp.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What did you make reconnoissances for?

A. That was for the purpose of giving the officers an idea of how that work was done. It was merely voluntary on my part; not under orders.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you make an estimate of the cost of these different pipe lines?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was your estimate from Crawfish Springs; do you remember?

A. No, sir; I have no recollection. I made the estimate and turned it over to the chief quartermaster.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Don't you think there was sufficient ground in that reservation to select better sites for camping grounds than were selected?

A. That is merely a matter of opinion.

Q. You are competent to do that?

A. I think all the men ought to have been camped in the open ground.

Q. There could have been better places found, where no such outcropping of stone existed?

A. Yes; the troops ought not to have been camped there.

Q. They covered all the ground, where there was no cropping of stone, with tents?

A. Yes; within the limits selected for the corps. The ground in the northern part of the reservation was reserved for the Sixth Army Corps.

Q. That is the reason they never used that ground?

A. Yes.

By General DODGE:

Q. In relation to the camping of the troops in the open during the long dry season—from the time they went in there up to the wet season—don't you think the camps in the woods were as good as they could have been in the open ground?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But when the rainy season came on?

A. It was bad; a great deal of rain fell during July, but heavy rains are always looked for in June in that country, as I know from having been on duty five years down there.

Q. What part of the country were you on duty in?

A. At Florence, Ala.; and the district I had charge of extended from Chattanooga to the Ohio River.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. You left Newport News on the 28th of July and reached Ponce on the evening of the 31st. How many transports were there in the expedition?

A. We had the *St. Louis*, the *St. Paul*, the *Massachusetts*, and one or two smaller ones. The *St. Louis* left first and reached Ponce first.

Q. How many troops were in the expedition?

A. We had the Third Illinois on the *St. Louis*; then there was the Fourth Ohio, the Fourth Pennsylvania—the Philadelphia City Troop—three batteries of artillery, one troop of regular cavalry, and one troop of regular infantry; and we also had Troop C of the New York Squadron.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Signal Corps?

A. Signal Corps detachments, yes. Headquarters were on board the *St. Louis*, and we went down with the Third Illinois.

By General BEAVER:

Q. How were the transports fixed for the transportation of the troops?

A. I can only answer for the *St. Louis*—in a horrible condition. The state-rooms of the officers were not taken care of at all. The bedding was foul, very bad; ventilation, none at all, and the meals were simply abominable.

Q. The United States Navy vessel?

A. Yes; but I believe the original officers of the boat were auxiliary officers of the Navy placed in charge of it.

Q. Had you any occasion or opportunity to examine the quarters of the men?

A. No, sir. It was bad enough to go down into our own quarters below. Even the officers of the regiments did not care to go down. General Brooke was at the officers of the Third Illinois all the time to get them to look after their men.

Q. Had the men the freedom of the deck for exercise during the day?

A. They had the forward part of the ship and the rear portion. The middle portion was reserved for the officers.

Q. Had you any occasion to observe the condition of the men when you reached Porto Rico?

A. Yes. I was with the first detachment to land at Arroyo. They did not seem any the worse for the trip. There was a great deal of complaint made because they had travel rations, because they were not used to it.

Q. Were they in any way incapacitated for duty by reason of the trip?

A. No, sir; I think not. We had a very smooth trip going down, and I don't think there were many men seasick. There was some sickness on board—fever.

Q. The troops which went on that expedition were all of the First Corps, who had been in Chickamauga?

A. All those with General Brooke were in the First Corps. The artillery were not in camp at Chickamauga, nor Troop C and the Philadelphia City Troop.

Q. You had nothing to do with any of the other transports?

A. Nothing at all; no, sir.

Q. Did you meet any opposition in landing?

A. No, sir; the naval vessel, the *Gloucester*, went in advance of us.

Q. Did the Quartermaster's Department have the facilities for disembarking men and staffs?

A. Well, we found some lighters, three or four, and the first shipments that went ashore were pulled ashore by lifeboats from the *St. Louis*, four men in each lifeboat. Later the *Cincinnati* came up and we had the use of the steam launch. The next day the *Gussie*, quartermaster transport, came up, but she could not get us in to the shore.

Q. At the port at which you landed was there a wharf?

A. No, sir.

Q. Landed on the beach?

A. Yes, sir. We constructed a wharf so that the boats could come alongside and unload, because it was a surfy beach.

By General WILSON:

Q. Who built that wharf?

A. I did, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were the troops accompanied by their commissary supplies on the same vessel?

A. Yes, sir; they were sent aboard ten days before we left, I believe.

Q. Any difficulty about landing the stores?

A. No more than the troops—slow work.

Q. You talk about the ventilation on the *St. Louis*?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you not have the ordinary ventilators at work?

A. Yes; for the benefit of the stokers. The ship is not built for these southern seas, and the temperature is so great in the fire room that they had to turn all the force draft down for the benefit of the stokers.

By General WILSON:

Q. Did you locate General Brooke in the movement from Ponce to San Juan and go with him?

A. From Arroyo to San Juan.

Q. Found the place fortified to what extent?

A. They had quite extensive fortifications along the north coast and the west coast of the island, which embraced the city of San Juan.

Q. Were there a large number of permanent works of defense in the harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you find in your intercourse with the Spanish officers how long they had been in use?

A. Over two hundred years.

Q. Those were all surrendered to General Brooke?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And of course you got the plans when surrendered?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. The Spaniards took them back to Spain with them. We got some plans of Fort Morro.

Q. Were not those plans taken away before you got in there?

A. No, sir; I understand they were taken afterwards.

Q. Did you make any effort to get them?

A. Yes; I was detailed by General Brooke to make an inspection of the fortifications, with the representative of the Spanish engineers, for the commission. Major Gonzales, the engineer officer of the Spanish army, proposed to take us to Morro Castle, but I expressed a wish to first see the detailed drawings of the fortifications. He took us out to Casa Blanco, the headquarters of the Spanish engineers, and produced two drawings of Morro Castle and stated that that was all of it. I was surprised that such a fort should have been constructed with only these drawings, and he told me he was very sorry he could not show me the rest, because they had been packed away. He said he would give them to me. The next day we went to San Cristobal and the works in that vicinity, and I found San Cristobal a beautiful specimen of a Vauban front, with numbers of passages leading around in all directions. I was very much interested and asked for the detailed drawing of that fort. He told me he was very sorry, but all the drawings had been packed away and were not now accessible. I reported the matter to General Brooke, and he said that he would demand them of the Spanish before he left. Afterwards he wrote a letter to General Macias, who replied that those drawings had, together with all the records of the fortifications, been packed up and sent to Spain prior to the war and that the new fortifications the engineers had merely constructed out of their heads. I knew that that was impossible and said so to General Brooke. I interviewed some of the draftsmen at the Spanish Headquarters, and they gave me some few sketches, which I have and expect to submit. They wanted to sell them, but finally the fellow concluded to let me have them. From them I learned that these drawings had all been packed away and put on board a transport the same day General Macias replied to General Brooke's letter.

Q. Then did you understand that when General Brooke wrote to General Macias they were still in Casa Blanco and that Macias sent them away after the receipt of General Brooke's letter and put them on board the transport?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the United States lost all of these valuable drawings?

A. Yes, sir.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 3, 1899.***COL. JAMES M. MOORE—Recalled.**

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Do you want to make any statement to us, Colonel?

A. Nothing further than that I have changed some of my answers—the purport, however, remaining the same—so as to conform better to the questions.

By General BEAVER:

Q. That is the question, Colonel, which we have had before us. In revising the manuscript of your examination, did you change any statement of fact so as to differ from what you testified to before?

A. I don't think I did—anything material. I tried to give further information—that is, facts which I have ascertained after I went to my office and looked at a memorandum I had; but I am, of course, willing to affirm, or swear, that the corrected copy is the truth.

Q. Of course we can understand how in the hurry of our examinations stenographers, particularly those not in the habit of taking testimony, as we go along might get the phraseology a little mixed, and you might want to change that, and there is no objection to that; but of course we could not allow a change as to a statement of fact, unless you were to come before us and state you wanted to correct your testimony in such and such respects. That is, of course, common and usual, and we would be very glad to have you do that.

A. I do not think it is changed materially. If changed at all, I thought—I had been before the Military Committee of the House, and the copy of my testimony was furnished me and I was requested to revise it, and I did so: not altering—changing the phraseology very little and stating facts which I ascertained after examining the papers which I had in my possession.

Q. Well, taking that corrected statement, which is based upon the verbatim report of your testimony, is that in all respects based upon the facts as you wish to testify to them now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so far as your information and belief goes?

A. Yes, sir. The report was garbled. The questions often did not conform to my answers, and one portion of my testimony, the tariff rates, was all mixed. It did not conform to the statement, so I had a duplicate statement prepared, word for word and figure for figure, of the different tariff rates that I submitted and read; but it was a difficult thing for the reporter to get it all right; so I completed that, showing the reductions that had been made in the rates for wharfage and tonnage for vessels, etc., at Tampa.

Q. I suppose it is fair to the stenographer who took that testimony before to say that, so far as my examination goes, I speak very rapidly and it is difficult to take me unless he is accustomed to this work; but if the statement which you now submit is a complete statement of the facts as you desired to testify to them when you were here before, I suppose that will be entirely satisfactory to the commission. You say that is so?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Do you want to call attention, Colonel, to any special matter besides what you have already done? If so, it would be proper to do so.

A. I do not remember anything at present, sir, that I wish to call attention to.

Colonel DENEY. Then I suppose we will take this corrected copy and have it recopied.

What follows is the corrected copy of Colonel Moore's testimony.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 3, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF COL. JAMES M. MOORE.

Col. JAMES M. MOORE, upon request, appeared before the commission and was affirmed by General Beaver, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your name and rank and your place of service?

A. Col. James M. Moore: assistant quartermaster-general, now on duty in the Quartermaster-General's Office.

Q. At Washington?

A. At Washington, D. C.

Q. How long have you been in the Quartermaster-General's Office, Colonel?

A. I have been in the Quartermaster-General's Office since the 28th day of April, 1898.

Q. Have you charge of a bureau?

A. I had charge of clothing, camp and garrison equipage for about three weeks, when I was relieved by Captain Patten and assigned to other duties, embracing money and property accounts, inspection reports, claims, and other specialties, including national cemeteries.

Q. Have you had anything to do with the making of any contracts in connection with the Quartermaster-General's Office?

A. No, sir; contracts are made by depot quartermasters at various stations and chief quartermasters of departments.

Q. Under the direction—

A. Of the Quartermaster-General.

Q. To what extent have the operations of the Quartermaster-General's Office, as connected with the war with Spain, come under your administration? You spoke of the national cemeteries; of course, they are outside of our jurisdiction.

A. The money estimates that officers make are submitted to me for examination. If they are not in excess of the wants of the command, I submit them to the Quartermaster-General for his approval.

Q. Have you anything to do with the payment, or with approval for payment, or accounts made in pursuance to contracts for clothing and things of that sort?

A. No, sir; the accounts under contracts that are made by officers are paid in accordance with the instructions of the Quartermaster-General at the time the contract is made. In other words, the bids are submitted to the Quartermaster-General with recommendations by the quartermaster. The Quartermaster-General or an assistant examines the bids; and if the award is approved, the quartermaster is directed to prepare contracts. The contracts are then forwarded to the Quartermaster-General's Office for approval, when they are returned to the officer who makes payments without further reference to the War Department.

Q. Then the manner in which the contract is filled does not come to your office at all? After the contract is made by the quartermaster he is authorized to pay, and is the judge as to whether the contract has been properly filled?

A. Yes, sir. I will state that there are some contracts that come to the Quartermaster-General's Office for my approval—for instance, contracts for horses, approved by Colonel Miller; transportation, by Colonel Bird; clothing and camp

and garrison equipage, by Colonel Patten, while miscellaneous contracts came to me.

Q. To what extent have you been called upon to approve miscellaneous contracts; how many contracts have you approved, as a matter of fact?

A. Well, that would be pretty hard to answer. Sometimes 25, 30, 40, and 50 in a day.

Q. What did these contracts cover, Colonel?

A. They covered various supplies purchased by the Quartermaster's Department; everything, you might say.

Q. It has been generally stated that in the securing of contracts it was necessary to consult certain supposed influential people or influences in Washington. Have you, in the discharge of your duty, known of any case in which outside influences directly or indirectly controlled the approval or making of a contract?

A. I have not in a single instance, and I do not believe there was any influence brought to bear that influenced any officer of the Army, so far as our department was concerned, in the making or awarding of a contract.

Q. Was it possible, in your judgment, Colonel, with your knowledge of the working of the plans of the Quartermaster's Department, for any person, outside of the contractor himself, to secure any beneficial effect or influence from any contract that was made?

A. No, sir; I do not think there was a particle.

Q. If any contractor paid anything to any person outside for any influence or supposed influence, was that his loss?

A. I don't think there was any such case where a man paid for the influence of another. I don't know of any officer in our department who would allow anybody to influence him; I don't except any individual.

Q. If a contractor had done so, with the idea that possibly somebody would help him, he would simply do that at his expense without securing any influence upon the contracting power?

A. He certainly would fail to secure any contract by any influence.

Q. And if he got a contract, it would simply be because he was the lowest and best bidder?

A. It would be because, in the judgment of the officer, he was the lowest responsible bidder for the class of goods, taking into consideration the kind of goods wanted.

Q. The quality being considered, of course?

A. Yes, sir; the quality always is considered.

Q. Has any complaint been made to your department in regard to any contracts of that character, Colonel, or has there been any reference to you of complaints in that direction?

A. Parties have come to the Quartermaster-General's Office and stated that they ought to have had the award; that in their opinion their goods were equal and their price was lower. In all such cases investigations have been made. I have been detailed in several instances to look into such matters, and I have found in every case the award was correctly made, with probably one exception, and that was changed.

Q. Do you remember a case in which the bid for the regulation army hat was involved?

A. I do, sir. I know all about it.

Q. You conducted an inquiry in regard to that?

A. I conducted an inquiry, and spent a week in trying to get evidence from the best experts in the hat business. I did it with the understanding that their names would not be mentioned, and they were leading hatters in New York and Philadelphia. I went to Mr. Knox's place—I suppose the name I ought not to mention.

Q. The Knox case is a well-known case with us.

A. I suppose it is. I have a full report here. It is not very long, and I think my method of testing the value of these hats was as fair and impartial as it could possibly be. I went to Brooklyn and visited the Knox factory, and secured from Mr. Knox's foreman three hats, taken out of three separate boxes, and had three standard hats taken from boxes in Philadelphia, and they were sent to me.

Q. At random?

A. At random—no selection. I then went to New York. After getting the hats at Brooklyn I returned to New York, and the next day I saw one of the principal hatters, and he, at my solicitation and as a favor, said he would send his foreman from their establishment—a practical hatter—to the Army Building. He came, and I opened the case. I had no one present. I put the six hats on the table and I said, "Please pick out three of the best hats." He did so, and picked out the Government standard. The next day I saw another party, representing one of the largest firms in this country, and he consented to come to the office; and I did the same thing with him, and he picked out the Government standard.

Q. That is, the three hats taken from Philadelphia?

A. Yes, sir; the three Philadelphia hats. They are known as standard samples—a similar hat to the one that Mr. Knox had furnished him as a guide. Five different men came to the Army Building at different days. No man saw the other. There was no opportunity to discuss the matter, and it was a distinct understanding that their names would not be mentioned, although I have the names in my office. After I got through in New York I went to Philadelphia, and two experts there, representing the largest firms in that city, examined these hats, and they selected every time the Government hat, and of the seven experts not a single one at any time picked out a Knox hat. And I can say this, it does not require any expert to see the difference; it is so apparent to any man who has bought a hat. One of the facts I want to mention is, Mr. Knox in a letter referred to a Mr. Brown (an expert in the hat business), who made an affidavit reflecting upon the officers and employees at the arsenal. I went to see Mr. Brown. I said, "Mr. Brown, go to Philadelphia with me and show me the man who told you that an employee had to receive 2½ cents on every hat." He said, "I only heard that." I said, "You have sworn to it." "Well, I don't know who the man is, but a contract man in Philadelphia, connected with a firm, said he was well acquainted at the arsenal, and it was necessary to pay 2½ cents for each hat."

I went to this firm in Philadelphia and saw the members—it is an old-established firm. I was introduced to what is called the contract man, and he said, "I remember Mr. Brown. He came to the office, and I told him our business was that of contractors; that we charge 2½ per cent for our name entering into a contract, and that he, Brown, would have to satisfy us that he was able to fill a contract. He went out, and we never saw him again."

The contractor made an affidavit to that effect: said he never told Brown that he had to pay anything; never knew of a man at the arsenal receiving a cent, and that he had had dealings with the Government for twenty years. This man Brown, Knox says, is one of the great experts in the hat business. I said to Mr. Brown, "You have created a bad impression with Mr. Knox, and I believe you to be an honest man. You come down to the Army Building and let me show you the hats. I will put the hats on a table, and you pick out whichever you think are the best hats." He said, "I will go." He accompanied me to the Army Building, and I took the hats and said, "Pick out three of the best hats." He said, "I can pick them out with my eyes shut," and he chose the Government hats. I said, "You have not selected Mr. Knox's hat." He said, "I don't care whose hats they are." A fairer test of the merits of the hat could not have been made. I was anxious to find out all about it, and I made a thorough investigation of it. I have my report here.

Q. Is your report in duplicate?

A. I can give you a duplicate.

Q. If you were just to give us that and make that a part of your testimony, it would give us the whole affair very fully.

A. I can give you this, with all the affidavits inside. (Paper dated November 4, 1898, Quartermaster-General's Office, Washington, being the report of James M. Moore, A. Q. M. G., U. S. A., to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, referred to by the witness here introduced as a part of his evidence.)

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Does that report show the comparative price that Knox submitted? If not, can you tell how his price compared with the successful bidder at that time?

A. A similar contract was awarded to another party for a shade less than Knox's bid, so that Knox had nothing to pay. If it had been 15 cents a hat, Mr. Knox's bondsmen would have had to pay the difference. The Knox bid being lower, there is no charge against Mr. Knox. He was allowed to get out very easily. My report does not show the price of the hat Mr. Knox agreed to furnish. It was 88 cents, which was less than other bidders.

Q. He was the lowest bidder, but did not have the best hat?

A. Yes, sir; he was the lowest bidder at that time when the award was made, but when he failed, there was another contract let.

Q. Then he was awarded this contract?

A. He was awarded the contract dated May 4, 1898; yes, sir.

Q. Then because he didn't furnish goods up to the standard his contract was annulled?

A. We just let it drop and made another contract for twice that number of hats. This contract of Knox's was for 10,000 hats. These contracts were made every few days so as to divide it up. Bids were invited and contracts made for similar hats at a less cost than Mr. Knox bid; so the Government lost nothing by the rejection of the Knox hat.

By General BEAVER:

Q. The Government got a better quality at a lower price than Knox's price.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Colonel, in making this investigation of which you have spoken, state whether or not you had hearty cooperation on the part of the Government officers at the arsenal at Philadelphia?

A. Yes, sir; I had in every way.

Q. And your action in the matter was approved by your superior officer?

A. Approved by my superior officer.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you returned the papers and samples yet to Mr. Knox?

A. They were returned yesterday, sir. He demanded the sample, even the Government sample. We sent him the standard sample, while he refused to send one of the samples. He had two hats given him. He refused positively to return the hat belonging to the Government, but he refused to allow the Government to retain one of his.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, you have been absent from Washington for some time, I believe?

A. I was at Tampa. I put in the water supply and established Camp Meade. I was there some time, and then went to Montauk Point. I have been on the go almost every day since the 1st of June.

Q. Since the time of this investigation have you not been absent from Washington in San Francisco?

A. Yes, sir; I returned from San Francisco on Thanksgiving Day. I was gone seventeen days.

Q. We had a complaint from Mr. Knox that he could not get his papers back, and a letter from the Quartermaster-General that you would soon return, and he would get his papers and all that belonged to him.

A. Yes, sir; the papers, however, were all in the Quartermaster-General's Office, and the hats were in Philadelphia, and they could send and get them. I don't think he was entitled to the Government sample; he had failed, but it was a matter of slight difference. If every failing contractor had the same attention paid to his claims that Mr. Knox has had it would take a corps of officers to investigate.

By General WILSON:

Q. Has he been furnished with a copy of your report, do you know?

A. He was furnished with nearly the entire copy—an extract; but this man connected with the Town Topics came to Washington and saw the Secretary, and he wrote so furiously I read the Secretary my report, and he said I had better send it to the editor of the Town Topics. He seemed to be interested, and he came to see me, and was perfectly satisfied with the investigation. He said he was satisfied to let the thing drop, but Knox had represented to him that great injustice had been done him. This man Brown made these charges. I tried to get him to go to Philadelphia. I went to see him two or three times, and I said, "If you can not go to Philadelphia, give me the name of the man who told you he had to pay for getting goods accepted in Philadelphia." He said, "It is that contract man; he is the only man." Investigation showed he never told him anything of the kind. He made an affidavit, and there was not a single name mentioned. He made this general sweeping charge of fraud without having a scintilla of evidence.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What did you do at Montauk that would be of interest to us? How long were you there?

A. I was there at Montauk about two weeks.

Q. What days?

A. I was there from the 5th to 20th of September; just after General Shafter got back.

Q. Were you there in August?

A. No, sir. Everything was fairly in good shape when I was there. I was interested in trying to perfect things a little better than they were. The railroad was a single-track road, and for a time was slightly congested; and just as soon as our boats came back from Santiago we used them for carrying forage and the transportation of the sick, and this lessened the congestion of the road, and in a few days after I got there everything was running satisfactorily. I have seen a great deal of unfavorable testimony about ambulances and wagon transportation, which is the greatest mistake in the world. It is due to people knowing nothing about it. There were ambulances in the corral when I was at Montauk which had never been hitched up. There were forty-eight in number, besides many in possession of regiments. There were ambulances in the corral which could have taken any command, any regiment, down to the cars. They were not called for.

Q. Why not?

A. Simply because the surgeon did not call for them. He thought the men might march. There were sick men taken down; there were men who ought to have gone in the ambulance. There was a regiment—out of 182 men there was hardly a man able to walk. I suggested that their blankets and arms and everything they carried and the men should be put in the wagons. They could be put in very conveniently, ten men in an ambulance.

Q. How many ambulances were there unused?

A. In the corral there were 30 [corrected to 7] ambulances that had not been used at all. As far as our transportation is concerned, we never had transporta-

tion during the civil war that in such a short time equaled the transportation we have at the present time.

Q. The complaints up there about that place were that you did not have transportation there for the use of the sick and to transport supplies about the camp. You say these 30 ambulances were there. We have the testimony of Colonel Forwood that those ambulances lacked parts, so they could not be used.

A. Somebody testified there were no tongues. Every ambulance has generally two tongues. In addition to that there were 100 [corrected to 25] or more tongues in the corral.

Q. What time did you first go there?

A. I could tell you the exact date by my report. It was from about the 5th of September to the 20th of that month.

Q. Did you hear any complaint of want of ambulances or want of wagons while you were there?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know how many wagons were being used for transportation about the camp?

A. I could not tell you that from memory, but I was at General Shafter's headquarters, and I saw the quartermaster every day; also went to the corral, and I heard no complaints about the scarcity of wagons or about transportation at all.

Q. If you can, tell the commission how to solve the difficulties when Montauk officers testified they did not have the transportation and could not get it, and the Quartermaster's Department says they were there—plenty of it; they are both telling the truth?

A. I was at General Shafter's headquarters, and sat at the table with his surgeon, Dr. H. S. Kilbourne, morning and evening. I never heard him make any complaint. I talked about transportation and about the sick, and I never heard the slightest complaint about transportation. There might have been, before I got there, some little difficulty about getting all the ambulances they wanted, because they might not have been there. I don't know anything about that. I know ambulances were sent just before I got there, and while I was there I never heard any complaint about insufficiency of ambulances.

Q. Who was the chief surgeon of the corps at that time, Colonel Forwood or Colonel Greenleaf?

A. Colonel Forwood.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You stated in the opening of your testimony, Colonel, that you had charge of the Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage Bureau for a little while at the opening of the war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. State, if you please, what steps were taken to supply the army called into the field—that is, the Volunteer Army—with their clothing and tents and their camp and garrison equipage, such as is used in the field.

A. Before the law restricting purchases exceeding \$250 unless advertised ten days was repealed, the Quartermaster-General commenced to purchase clothing and camp and garrison equipage on short notice of twenty-four and forty-eight hours up to ten days. Telegrams were sent to all the principal cities in the United States for tents from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There was not a large tent manufacturer to whom inquiry was not made for tents.

Every available tent, many far below our standard, was purchased, simply because we could not buy a tent or canvas equal to our own standard. The supply of the Klondike exhausted the canvas market, and the Navy had purchased thousands of yards of canvas, so when the war broke out we could find very little ready-made canvas. The Quartermaster-General purchased every available

tent that could be had from New England to New Orleans and from Seattle to Charleston and Savannah: wherever they could be had they were purchased. Large quantities were purchased in Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, Detroit, New York, and Boston. Everything was done to procure the tents. It was thought better to have a poor tent than no tent at all. We even rented a circus tent, and that was appreciated more than any other tent we had. The clothing, the kersey, could not be procured. There was not a yard of it in the country. It was necessary to have it fabricated. That was done by contract. In order to supply the troops with trousers we bought what we believed the next best material, or as near the original article as possible—as near the Government standard as possible. So it was with the blouse. We did not have so much difficulty with that. We could get flannel where we could not get the kersey. We then bought dark blue pants instead of light blue, the Army standard. We could not buy the light blue. Undershirts and underclothing were purchased, but they were not as good or suitable as the Government standard. They would not wear any length of time, but they cost a good deal less than our clothing. In the matter of hats, we could not procure them fast enough by contract and bought as many as we could buy in the open market.

Q. Do you recall the date, Colonel, at which you began to make preparations for these purchases—make inquiries in regard to tentage and all that sort of thing—was it before or after the actual declaration of war?

A. I was not here at that time. I was stationed in San Francisco, and I did not get here until the 28th day of April: but while not many purchases had been made prior to the declaration of war, the Quartermaster-General had sent out and ascertained where supplies could be had.

Q. He had the knowledge that enabled him to make instant preparation?

A. Yes, sir. There was no hesitation after the thing was decided.

Q. To what extent were the troops called upon to suffer for lack of uniforms—was there any actual suffering that you know of?

A. No, sir. The troops were rushed in so fast at Tampa that it was utterly impossible to clothe them all at once, but just as soon as I got there and saw the situation I telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General a list of all the stores, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and every variety of stores that were needed there, and asked that they be sent by special train. That was done, and in three days we had a special train of 80 cars. They were soon unloaded and the stores and clothing—that came first—were issued to the troops. The general impression had been, even after the troops got into the field, that they were fully equipped. That was not correct. Even a New York regiment was only partially equipped. Some had different colored pants, some had different blouses, some had different hats—we had reports in some cases—they had all the tents they wanted. One State offered to loan the Government tents. The offer was accepted, and it was found it had not enough to furnish its own men.

Q. That arose from the fact that in the National Guard organization it is rather a skeleton than a full organization. They would have 50 men, although the standard is 100 in a company, and two battalions in a regiment, whereas the standard is three battalions?

A. That arose partly from the fact that the men unable to enlist or failed to pass the physical examination remained at home and kept their uniforms that were furnished by the United States. At no time were any regiments, so far as my knowledge is concerned, more than two [a few] days without being partially equipped, if not entirely equipped.

Q. You left that Bureau in May?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that you can not tell us when the Quartermaster-General's Department

overtook the demand and got ahead so that there was clothing on hand, not only for meeting all demands, but with a surplus?

A. Well, it took—to say a surplus, a surplus probably occurred after about two [corrected to three] months, a surplus of some things. The tent business was the hardest we had to deal with, on account of the scarcity of canvas—about two months ago we had over 5,000 [corrected to 800] tents ahead and they are making them right along. The kersey for the pants had all to be made by the Government in order to supply these men, and we had to buy as near the Government standard as possible so as to keep the men well supplied. There was a great deal of clothing destroyed on account of sickness. When men went in hospitals and went away they were given new clothing.

Q. Is there much demand for the Government standard kersey outside of the Government itself?

A. No, sir; I don't think there is. It stood the test of wear in service for a long time and I don't think we have succeeded in buying any kersey equal to the Government standard. The kersey we bought is a lighter material. It is more suitable than the heavier material that has been used.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you consider the uniform that is furnished to troops now in the Southern camps, Savannah for instance, and Athens, a fit uniform for the climate of Cuba?

A. No, sir; I do not. I think that that has been a question that has been submitted to the department commander in Cuba and Porto Rico, and a number of officers here have discussed the subject and they don't agree. I know from my own experience in hunting that a canvas coat is the hottest coat I can wear. I would rather wear a blue flannel blouse. The men rarely wear a blouse in summer. They wear a blue shirt with a belt around it. That is one of the most desirable parts to the uniform, the dark blue shirt, if they wear woolen. I understand now that General Wood has recommended a light material made of cotton similar to that which the officers of the Spanish army wear, a light blouse of brownish color. He has recommended cotton goods and we are looking into that now, and a number are being made.

Q. Are your troops in these camps now not clothed with the woolen blouse and pants?

A. Yes, sir. Also cotton duck and drilling.

Q. I asked you the question if you thought that the uniforms that these troops have now are proper for use in Cuba.

A. Our uniform is the proper uniform for troops in this country, but not for a hot climate; it is said our uniform, with the exception of lighter pants, is better for Cuba during winter months—is better than the light cotton—but cotton is the proper uniform during the summer months. The nights there are cool, and men can sleep under blankets.

Q. You consider the uniforms the troops have in the South are fit for this time in Cuba?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There are some complaints I have here complaining of the uniform that the troops are obliged to wear in Cuba now.

A. I think that the cotton is more suitable in the summer time—eight months in the year—but our uniform, with the probable exception of the pants, which might be lighter, is the best they can wear for the winter. Suitable uniforms for tropical countries are now being fabricated by the Quartermaster-General.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Have you considered the pith helmet instead of the hat?

A. Yes, sir; but they could not be had in this country, and it was found a long

time would be required to manufacture them in Hongkong and Peking. I think in campaigning and actual warfare the felt hat is better. If a man throws a hat aside and another steps on it, it will not be hurt.

Q. How about the straw hat or manila hat in Cuba?

A. I think the manila hat is the better hat. The straw is too light. It does not protect the back of the neck. A doctor who spent some years in Cuba said that the pith he'met or the China hat made in Hongkong is the better hat for a tropical climate.

Q. You stated that the commander of the department in Cuba and a number of officers examined into these questions but have not decided them?

A. They seem to differ about what is best to be worn.

Q. Is that the reason why the Quartermaster's Department has delayed in furnishing them?

A. The Quartermaster's Department has furnished the light uniforms of cotton and, as stated, is making a large number at the present time.

By General DODGE:

Q. Going back to this transportation question at Montauk, we have the testimony of Colonel Forwood—was he there at the time you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The question was asked him if he knew any reason why the sick who could scarcely stand, and only with assistance, were compelled to walk from the wharf to the detention camp and hospital, and he stated that he knew of no reason excepting that they did not have the transportation. Now, the question is asked directly if the Quartermaster's Department furnished him the amount of transportation required as promptly as he needed it, and he said that he was sorry to say that they didn't have it.

A. That must have been during the early stage of the encampment.

Q. This was during the time of the arrival of the troops.

A. Oh, that may be possible. We hurried transportation at every point. Colonel Miller, in charge of transportation, telegraphed for wagons and animals and forwarded by special messenger and it took some little time to get them there. The Quartermaster-General never knew until five days before the troops commenced to arrive at Montauk Point that they were going to have 20,000 men there in such a short time. But they were hurried forward as quickly as they could be gotten there. When I was there there was no scarcity of transportation.

Q. The Quartermaster-General in his report states he was to provide for 30,000 troops for Montauk, and he immediately sent clothing and garrison equipage there to cover that number, and certainly must have had notice of it.

A. I didn't understand it so, sir. He had but five days' notice, as stated. This is a matter of record. The day the site was determined upon by the Secretary of War, the Quartermaster-General sent an officer to erect tents, buildings, etc., and shortly afterwards stores of every character were shipped there. I know the Quartermaster-General had short notice to get these animals from different points. They had to come from Kansas City and St. Louis. The wagons had to be shipped from wherever they could be had; then the Camp Meade transportation and the movement of the troops from Camp Alger took a large number of wagons for transportation, and everything was done, I think, which possibly could be done. We had to have wagons and we got them everywhere. We had to buy wagons by contract and in the open market, and we bought five to eight hundred mules a day, wherever they could be bought.

Q. Where was all the transportation that was left at Tampa: what became of that?

A. That was distributed. The horses that were sent to Tampa, in five days after they got there one-half of them were sick. The larger horses suffered more than

the smaller. In twenty-five days after the horses arrived nine-tenths of them were sick and unfit for any purpose, so far as usefulness was concerned, and the other tenth was taken after that. A Northern horse in that country does not do well. It can not stand the climate. A mule does better. There is a little fly similar to the fly in India, which lays an egg in the skin of the horse, that becomes a worm in a few days, and an ulcer forms, and we have had 500 or 600 horses that were affected by the insect. This ulcer in three or four days would become as large as a hen's egg, and the only thing to do was to try and destroy it with carbolic acid; but in many cases that failed, and death ended the suffering of the animal.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How were the mules affected?

A. The mules stood it better. As a general thing they were in good condition. I got a veterinarian there who had been in Texas, and he said the same fly had given a good deal of trouble there. It was a common thing to have 5 to 10 (corrected 4 to 8) horses die in a day. The heavy artillery horses were sick, every one, without exception. They were magnificent horses when they were shipped. The pack animals were in good condition. There were plenty of packs. Men who had drilled and become experts fitted the pack saddles to the mules, and every pack saddle was numbered.

By General McCook:

Q. Did you use rails or saddles?

A. Both. We used what is called the Moore pack saddle and the Arapahoe.

By General DODGE:

Q. I was speaking of the wagons—the mules and wagons that were left at Tampa after this expedition sailed for Santiago. They left behind them all their wagons and mules, except 120?

A. Well, that transportation remained there, with some exceptions. Some was sent to Mobile, where they had another camp, and shortly afterwards to Jacksonville, but a good deal was kept there expecting another expedition to go out. While I was there I sent four commands some horses and some few packs.

Q. Here is a statement from Colonel Forwood. He says the ambulances came up without the singletrees and the front axles in the corral that were not in, although at that time I don't know whether on account of the exigencies of warfare or what was the reason they could not be supplied. This appears about the 1st of September.

A. I know that all the horses and all the mules and everything they asked for—every ambulance that was asked for was furnished to move the entire hospital—that is, a collection of hospitals. I was at the depot quartermaster's office daily, and was all through the camp, and inspected the horses in the artillery and cavalry; I was up at reveille, and on the go all day. I saw nearly every regiment, and I never heard a single complaint about not having transportation, and I know from my experience in visiting the corral and talking to the corral master, and seeing the animals doing nothing, that there was no shortage of transportation, so far as wagons and ambulances were concerned, while I was there.

Q. Who was the quartermaster at Montauk who had charge of the transportation all the time?

A. Well, there were three or four officers there.

Q. I want the ones in charge of the transportation.

A. The depot quartermaster was Captain Knight. He was there in charge for a time, and he was relieved, and the last officer that came there was an officer that arrived just the day before I got there; he was Captain Sawyer.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I really don't know where he has been assigned.

Q. Can you send me over the list of officers of quartermasters who were at Mon-

tauk from the time it was established until it was broken up, who had direct charge of the transportation?

A. Yes, sir. The depot quartermaster there had in every case the charge of wagon transportation, and he had an assistant, Captain Patten, a volunteer officer.

By General McCook:

Q. Why was it, in the Quartermaster's Department, when a man got down to understand his business he was picked out and sent away? Why was there such constant changes in the location of these officers?

A. Well, I don't know why. There must have been some reason for it. Bellingler was at Tampa a long time. Division and corps commanders made requests for quartermasters, and they were supplied whenever practical.

Q. First, Pope?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He went in there until he got things all muddled up and he was shipped to Manila?

A. In that case, General Merritt applied for him. He applied for Pope, so Bellingler was then sent in his place. Then somebody applied for Captain Sawyer, and he was sent to Montauk. He was there to the end of the encampment.

Q. What became of Knight?

A. Somebody applied for Knight. But where a man was doing his duty satisfactorily I don't recall any removal, except where an officer asked for him.

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, in the later purchases made by you of tentage, shoes, hats, and clothing generally, how do the prices compare with those that you bought before the war under the ordinary contingencies, higher or lower?

A. The prices of articles varied. There was little if any difference in the cost, with the exception of canvas for tents. The demand was so great that the stock in the hands of dealers was exhausted, and as a consequence this commodity advanced, for a short time, about 10 per cent, higher than it had been previous to the declaration of war with Spain. Suitable tentage, shoes, hats, and clothing can now be purchased at a lower price than ever heretofore paid.

Q. You did not get my question. I mean the same class of goods you are buying now. Are you buying the same class of goods now?

A. The same class of goods. There was very little difference in the price. The goods that we bought we had to buy in the open market, and were, as a rule, cheaper than the Government standard goods, because they were not equal to the standard of the Government either in material or workmanship.

Q. Now I will ask you one question. Of course we all understand whenever you acted you acted under higher authority. In your duties have you been handicapped or has the service been embarrassed in any way by the disapproval by anyone higher in authority or slowness occasioned by anyone higher in authority?

A. The Quartermaster-General has invariably approved up to the present time any recommendation that I have made. I do not know an exception; yes, one exception. I recommended that the Knox hat be retained, and he said no. Let Knox have it [corrected to read]—standard Government hat which Knox asked for be retained, but the Quartermaster-General thought otherwise, and it was sent to him.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. You mean the sample?

A. Yes, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. Were there any delays which embarrassed the public service, so far as you are aware, by higher authorities than yourself?

A. So far as I am concerned, there were not, except where matters required some consideration.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. As to the hat, Colonel, I think you were right.

A. I think the hat ought to have been retained.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you anything, Colonel, to suggest yourself, any statement or suggestion you have that you think will be of benefit to the service, or anything that we have not examined you upon that you have information on that will be of interest to the service or the investigation?

A. I have here a statement that I prepared after I came from Tampa in relation to a reduction that had been made in the expense charges made by Mr. Plant, and Colonel Patten told me the commission wanted to ask me some questions about it. I have the whole thing here.

Q. Oh, yes; you made the investigation there?

A. The Secretary of War sent for me and told me he wanted me to go to Tampa to look into everything in connection with our department and anything else I thought of service to the Government, and to do what was necessary for the comfort of the men, supplying them with water or anything in any manner I could, and said he would approve my action.

Q. What date was that, that you had that conversation with the Secretary of War?

A. In June, about the 20th day, somewhere along there. The Secretary was very zealous and earnest and gave me authority to go ahead. I found that the water supply had been put in by Mr. Plant, and charged for at what I considered an unreasonable price. It is fair, however, to state that Mr. Plant, when he put in this extensive pipe, had no idea the troops were going to remain there any length of time, so I went into the subject of water, and I reduced one of his water bills \$22,450.

Q. What was the price he charged?

A. I reduced it one-half. He told me he would not accept it. I said, "Very well, Mr. Plant, no pay at all;" but he finally concluded to compromise at the rate I designated.

Q. What was the price?

A. St. Petersburg water, taken on Government boats at St. Petersburg for one-half cent per gallon, I reduced that to one-tenth of a cent; St. Petersburg water, which is carried 10 miles by boat and delivered aboard transports at 1 cent per gallon; I reduced that one-half. Port Tampa City water, which is supplied to the stock, cost one-half cent per gallon. I reduced that to one-tenth, and water pumped into cars at Ybor City and carried by rail 11 miles to Port Tampa I reduced from 1 cent per gallon to one-half cent. These rates were all approved, and he was paid at these rates. The wharfage on coal was reduced from 25 cents to 20 cents per ton; wharfage on horses from 25 to 20; wharfage of 10 cents on each man going aboard transports eliminated entirely; no charge.

By General McCook:

Q. What did he charge for the men?

A. Ten cents a head. That was eliminated. He was very willing to accept these terms when he came to Washington to consult the Secretary. The Secretary let me go ahead, and he said he would not interfere until I got through and my recommendations were approved, and Mr. Plant has been paid at these rates ever since. Rent of warehouse, hired at 8 cents, I reduced to 5 per square yard. I succeeded in making the following rates of wharfage of 33½ per cent. I then sent to Charleston and Savannah and Galveston and got their rates for wharfage, and I had an abstract made, and I told Mr. Plant's representative that the Gov-

ernment doing such a large business, I thought that he ought to make the rates a good deal lower, and I would go over the subject with him the next day. He said, "We will do whatever you think is right."

The following statement, furnished since, shows the reduction of wharfage at Port Tampa, Fla.:

Articles.	Plant Investment Co.	Charleston, S. C.	Savannah, Ga.	Galveston, Tex.	Rates agreed to.
	<i>Per 100.</i>				
Hay	2c.	2c. per bale	6c. per bale	2½c. per 100	2c.
Oats	2c.	1c. per sack	1c. per bag	1c. per 100	1c.
Flour	3c.	2c. per barrel	3c. per barrel	1c. per 100	2c.
Beef	3c.	3c. per barrel	do	6c. per barrel	2c.
Bacon	3c.	2c. per 100	3½c. per 100	do	2c.
Beans	4c.	2c. per barrel	do	5c. per barrel	2c.
Sugar	4c.	3c. per barrel	12½c. per 1,000 and over	do	3c.
Tomatoes	1c.	do	do	do	2c.
Candles	1c.	2c. per box	2c. per box	3c. per box	2c.
Soap	4c.	do	do	do	2c.
Hard bread	4c.	do	do	do	2c.
Coffee	4c.	do	3c. per bag	5c. per barrel	3c.
Vinegar	4c.	4c. per barrel	3c. per barrel	6c. per barrel	1c.
Salt	4c.	1c. per sack	4c. per bushel	3c. per sack	1c.
Pepper	4c.	do	do	do	1c.
Corn	4c.	1c. per sack	do	1c. per sack	2c.
Baking powder	4c.	do	do	do	2c.
Clothing	8c.	do	6c. per box	2½c. per 100	4c.
Boots and shoes	8c.	3c. per box	do	do	4c.
Ammunition	8c.	do	do	do	4c.
Ordnance stores	8c.	do	do	do	4c.
Powder	16c.	do	5c. per barrel	do	8c.
Potatoes	2c.	do	do	do	2c.
Wagons	do	do	do	do	4c.
Ambulances	do	do	do	do	4c.

These rates will reduce wharfage below tariff rates about 50 per cent. On dockage from the establishment of camps up to and including July 3, date of service rendered, 1 cent per ton gross tonnage, instead of 1½ cents per ton per day, and from and including July 4, 1898, dockage at the rate of three-fourths of a cent per ton gross tonnage.

In the little time I was there I was able to save the Government about \$80,000.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Is that wharfage?

A. The whole thing. The water supply amounted to a great deal. The camp at Tampa, I suppose, extended 5 miles. That is not taking into consideration the command at Port Tampa.

Q. Please state whether or not the prices finally agreed upon and paid were fair?

A. Yes, sir; the prices were low, and I considered fair, taking into consideration the amount of business that was done.

Q. What price was agreed to be paid from Tampa to Port Tampa on goods that had been shipped from other sections of the country into Tampa?

A. That is a matter for future consideration. Mr. Plant told me he would be willing to make a very low rate, and when the question came up, it was thought that the matter could be settled after the war was over. No payments have yet been made. He had, of course, the only road running to Port Tampa, and it ran on the Plant Investment Company's wharf, alongside their boats. This dock of theirs—and the wharf was said to have cost between three and four millions of dollars—he thought they ought to get a fair price for transportation; but when he found that the Government was sending a large number of troops there, his agent told me they would make a very low rate. I am satisfied the company will do what is fair to the Government in this matter.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did the Government have a large warehouse rented from the Plant System at Port Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How large was that warehouse?

A. That is a very large warehouse. They had not completed it while I was there. That which was completed was filled with stores. It was, I would say, probably 400 feet long.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. The troops that were stationed at Tampa—around that city, Ybor City—they didn't have to pay for the water they used, did they?

A. I don't know about Ybor City; but the Government had to pay for all the troops used, just as a citizen has to pay for the water down in the city.

Q. They were charged for the amount of water they used?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All the troops?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They don't pay for it in Savannah, do they?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. And they did not at Jacksonville, did they?

A. I think they did; yes, sir. At New Orleans, when I was there, they did not. The city furnished them all the water they wanted, and gave their race track, which is their exhibition ground, and their exhibition buildings—anything the Government might want—and the water was the most important thing.

By General McCook:

Q. When was that Government warehouse built at Tampa?

A. The Government warehouse was commenced in May and finished in June. It was a very large building.

Q. Colonel, there was nobody in the War Department who interfered with you in your contracts?

A. Not at all. My relations with every official, the Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary and the Quartermaster-General, have all been in perfect harmony, and they have always approved whatever actions I have taken.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 4, 1898.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to Special Orders No. 242, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, October 13, 1898, I proceeded to Philadelphia, Pa., and New York City for the purpose of investigating certain charges made by E. M. Knox, of New York, and to determine by disinterested experts whether the campaign hats manufactured by the party named were equal in quality to the Government standard hat furnished the contractor as a guide.

visited the Knox factory in Brooklyn and was furnished with three campaign hats of the kind that had been rejected under his contract by the depot quartermaster, Philadelphia, Pa., and with a similar number of the Government standard, submitted the six hats to five experts representing the principal firms in New York and two in Philadelphia. These hats were placed on a table together, and the experts were requested to select three of the best hats, considering durability and finish. In every instance the Government standard was pronounced the better

hat; on no occasion was there any hesitancy exhibited in making the selection. These experts were ignorant of the manufacturer of the hats and did not make the inquiry; in fact, said they did not wish to know. No fairer test as to the merits of these hats could possibly be made. Only one inspector was present at the time, and there was, therefore, no opportunity for any exchange of opinions as to quality, etc.

I had difficulty in securing most of these gentlemen connected with the hat trade for the reason that they did not wish to antagonize those in their business, and it was only after promising that their names would be considered confidential that they consented to make the examination. One of the experts mentioned by Mr. Knox (in accompanying papers) was shown the hats and promptly selected the Government standard.

As the inferiority of the Knox hat, compared with the Government standard, has been unquestionably established, and the action of the inspectors, Charles J. Heller and C. H. Gladding, as well as the officers connected with the Philadelphia depot of the Quartermaster's Department sustained, I am of the opinion, and respectfully submit, that further controversy on this subject should end, as it is inimical to the best interests of the service, inasmuch as it establishes a precedent for every failing and disgruntled contractor to oppose the action of the employees and officers of this department.

The statement made by Supt. E. H. Kerwin, connected with the Knox factory, that Charles J. Heller was drunk when he made the examination of hats in that place is refuted by Heller in affidavit sworn to on the 2d instant, marked "A."

Mr. Benjamin Brown, of the firm of Dickerson & Brown, having made an affidavit that the contract man of the establishment of Hood, Foulkrod & Co., Market street, Philadelphia, had sufficient influence with the inspector to get any hats passed that came anywhere near the requirements of specifications, and that he, the contract man, would expect 2½ cents per hat for any contract his firm might secure, I called on Brown at his factory in Brooklyn in relation to his statement. He said he did not know of any employee connected with the Philadelphia depot ever receiving a bribe, or that it was necessary to fee anybody to get goods accepted, and that it was only a rumor. I requested him to accompany me to Philadelphia and find the party that had made the accusation. He said he could not remember who told him, and declined my request.

I then proceeded to Philadelphia and called on the firm of Hood, Foulkrod & Co., and stated what Mr. Brown had charged. I was presented to Mr. Edwin H. Taggart, who has charge of the contract business of this firm. He said Mr. Brown called to see him in reference to putting in a bid for hats on the outbreak of the war with Spain, and he informed Brown that their firm was in the contract business and would take a contract in the name of the firm or in the name of one of the individual members of the firm at 2½ per cent commission, and never informed him that a Government inspector or other employee had to be paid for the acceptance of any goods under their or any firm's contract: states that his experience with the Government employees connected with the arsenal shows that they are worthy, deserving men, and does not believe that they could be bribed or induced to do wrong for any money consideration, nor has he heard at any time that it was necessary to allow a commission or compensate anybody connected with the Government in order that their goods presented for inspection may be accepted.

This statement is substantiated by affidavit, marked "B," which disposes of the hearsay charge, the mere gossip of unsuccessful bidders. (See affidavit marked "C," H. E. Moss.)

It is difficult to realize that anyone in Mr. Knox's position could so far forget himself as to reflect upon the honor of a man like Colonel Furey, particularly in a public resort. This officer needs no defense: his record is too well known to the

Army. He is incorruptible, and has the courage to assert his convictions regardless of the consequences. (See affidavits marked "D" and "E.")

The question is raised by Mr. Knox that if the standard specifications were fully complied with they would not produce a hat similar to the Government standard. The affidavit marked "F," of George J. Ferry, of the firm of Ferry & Napier, of New York City, establishes the fact that Mr. Knox is mistaken. This firm has made many thousands of hats for the Government, and there can be no question about its reliability and the statement under oath.

See also the affidavit marked "G," by James Marshall, who has made a large number of hats for Horstmann & Co., of Philadelphia, Pa., by them furnished to the Quartermaster's Department. He states that the hats were made strictly in accordance with the specifications adopted by the Quartermaster's Department.

Attention is invited to the affidavit of Mr. Edward J. Ryan, marked "H," in which he states that Mr. McFarland, representative of the Knox hat factory, stated that he wanted Mr. Lyon, affiant's employer, to try to fix up the matter at the Philadelphia end to get the hats accepted; to which Mr. Lyon replied, "Get your hats right and they will then be accepted."

Respectfully,

JAS. M. MOORE,

Assistant Quartermaster-General, United States Army.

A.

CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, *State of Pennsylvania*, ss:

I, Charles J. Heller, of No. 823 Chestnut street, hatter, being duly sworn according to law, do depose and say that the statements made by me in my letter to J. V. Furey, esq., colonel, Quartermaster Dept., U. S. A., under date of October 1, 1898, are true, and that the same were made by me when in condition of perfect competency to make them; and that the statements alleged to have been made by one Kerlin in terms and to the effect that I was drunk and intoxicated when I made the examination in said letter referred to are false and untrue.

Further, I wish to state I believe said statements of Kerlin to have been made in malice and with intention to injure my character and business. I have been advised the same are libelous, and that I could have redress in damages.

CHARLES J. HELLER.

Sworn and subscribed before me the 2nd day of November, A. D. 1898. Witness my hand and official seal.

[SEAL.]

FENTON H. MIDDLETON,

Notary Public.

B.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., *October 28, 1898.*

Edwin H. Taggart, in charge of contract department of Hood, Foulkrod & Co., being duly sworn, deposes and says: In reference to a conversation had with Benjamin J. Brown, of the firm of Dunlap & Dickerson, I would state that Mr. Brown came to see me in reference to putting in a bid for hats on or about the outbreak of the war with Spain. I informed Mr. Brown that our firm, Hood, Foulkrod & Company, were in the contract business, and would make a contract in the name of the firm, or in the name of one of the individual members of the firm, at 2½ per cent commission. I never informed him that any commission or compensation of any nature whatever had to be paid to a Government inspector or other employee for the acceptance of any goods under our or any other firm's contract.

Our experience with the Government employees connected with the arsenal shows that they are worthy, deserving men, and I do not believe that they could be bribed or induced to do wrong for any money consideration, nor have I heard at any time that it was necessary to allow a commission or compensate anybody connected with the Government in order that their goods presented for inspection may be accepted.

EDWIN H. TAGGART.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 28th day of October, 1898.

[SEAL.]

WM. W. CRAIG,

United States Commissioner, Eastern District Penna., Phila.

C.

NEW YORK, August 16, 1898.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City and County of New York*, ss:

I, Henry E. Moss, of the firm of Swartz, Jerowski & Company, engaged in the business of manufacturing clothing, and residing in New York City, being duly sworn, doth say as follows:

The firm, of which I am the senior member, have offered bids to the United States Quartermaster's Department, in Philadelphia, and also in New York, for clothing and the manufacture of the same. We did this at the solicitation of Mr. Edmond R. Lyon, whom we have known for a great number of years as a business man of high repute and character, and whom we know to be in the general contract business. We have bid upon several occasions, but have not been awarded any contracts upon our bids. We desire to state that at any and all times Mr. Lyon has stated that the officers and those in charge of the Philadelphia depot would accord to us fair, honorable, courteous, and impartial treatment. We desire to state that in all the intercourse we have had with the colonel in charge of the depot at Philadelphia, together with those in office at the Schuylkill Arsenal, are, in our opinion, men of the highest character and unimpeachable integrity.

H. E. MOSS.

Sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL.]

J. LEVY,

Notary Public 189, N. Y. Co.

D.

NEW YORK, August 16, 1898.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City and County of New York*, ss:

I, William W. Lyon, residing at No. 314 West 45th street, in the city of New York, am fifty years of age, and am engaged in the advertising business at No. 46 Vesey street, New York City, and being duly sworn, doth say as follows:

I was present in the corridor of the Fifth Avenue Hotel some fifteen or twenty days ago. Whatever conversation my brother, Mr. Edmond R. Lyon, had with Mr. Edward M. Knox, I distinctly heard Mr. Knox state in a very loud tone of voice, "I tell you Col. Furey is a damn thief."

WM. W. LYON.

Sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL.]

LORETIA E. HICKS,

Notary Public 189, N. Y. Co.

E.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City and County of New York, ss:*

I, Edmond R. Lyon, engaged in the manufacture of fine furs at 258 Fifth avenue, and also dealing in a general contract business in all the Departments of the United States Government, and residing at No. 200 West 85th street, being duly sworn, doth say as follows:

I have had contracts with the Quartermaster's Department of the United States Government since January, 1877, and have had transactions with Quartermaster-Generals M. C. Meigs, Ingalls, Batchelder, Holabird, Rucker, Sawtelle, Weeks, and the present Quartermaster-General, Marshall I. Ludington, and with Colonels Rucker, Chandler, Holabird, Ludington, Majors Moore, Furey, etc., at the Phila. office and those in charge at the Schuylkill arsenal, Captains Jno. F. Rodgers, Gill; Majors Furey, Williams, and Hathaway. I have at all times faithfully executed and performed to the strict letter of each and any contract entered into by me, of which I take pleasure in referring to any of the living gentlemen referred to above.

During the early part of this year, as far as my memory serves me, in May I was in the outer room of the depot quartermaster's office in Philadelphia, prior to the opening of a bid for drab campaign hats. I entered the room to take note of the prices and names of the various bidders for 10,000 hats upon proposal to be opened at that time. I learned then that Mr. Edward M. Knox, of this city, was the lowest bidder for the above order. As I had previously, eighteen months before, put in a bid for Mr. Knox in my own individual name at a very much higher price, I was rather surprised that he did not pay me the compliment to come and ask me to bid for him, as he did upon the prior occasion.

Happening to meet Mr. Knox one or two days afterward on Fifth avenue, I said to him, "I see you are the lowest bidder for the 10,000 hats." He answered, "Oh, yes; that 10,000 hats was set up for me, as Gen. Corbin is my brother-in-law, and the award will be made to me." Several days afterwards Mr. Knox sent for me and stated he wanted to see me. I went to his office in the front of his Fifth avenue retail store. He desired information from me as to the correct manner of filling out his bonds that were sent to him for signature and proper attesting by the quartermaster's depot office in Philadelphia. I explained to him that the same had to be certified by a notary public as to the correctness of the signatures, and also that the certification as to the surety must be made before a U. S. commissioner as to the correctness of the same. Mr. Knox replied, "I would see them in hell first. I do not propose to go to any damn politician to certify to me. I can buy and sell them all." I said, "You do not know what you are talking about, Mr. Knox. Mr. Samuel H. Lyman is the U. S. commissioner I go before. He is a gentleman—not a politician—and has held the office for a great number of years," and, in a laughing manner, I said, "If Mr. Lyman heard you say he was a politician, he would kill you." He finally got his bookkeeper and superintendent to sign the bonds. They went with me before the U. S. Commissioner Lyman, and was questioned very closely as to their ability to sign the bond for \$2,500, and, if I am correct, made them swear that each one owned freehold property to that amount. As near as my memory is correct in the matter I am almost positive that Mr. Knox stated to me that he would not give any bonds, and so wrote to the Department. If such is the case, it is a matter of record and can be substantiated.

Several days after this I received a call from Mr. McFarland, the superintendent of the Knox Hat Company in Brooklyn, and he stated to me that all his goods that he had sent to Philadelphia had been rejected. I said, "Guess they are not right." He asked me when I was going to Philadelphia. I said, "I guess this afternoon." He said he would accompany me there, and asked me if I would introduce him to the officials at the arsenal. I said, "Certainly, with pleasure." We went to the

arsenal together, but first called upon Lt. Col. Furey, and I introduced him to Mr. McFarland. I introduced Mr. McFarland also to Maj. Hathaway, the officer in charge of the arsenal, and I think Capt. Bingham was present at the time.

The Major, after some conversation with Mr. McFarland, in which he stated that the hats were sent in a very unmercantile condition and manner, referred us then to Mr. Gladding. I introduced the gentleman to Mr. Gladding, and Mr. Gladding, in a very courteous and polite manner, showed him conclusively wherein the hats were wrong, and also the very sloppy manner in which they had been sent, as I saw, myself, a large number of hats strung together with cord, the top box and the bottom box being all broken and the hats were all creased and crushed. Mr. McFarland acknowledged that he was very much surprised, and said it was the fault of their packer and shipper. I did not return with Mr. McFarland, as I had other business there, but saw him two days afterwards, and he said that he would make the proper hats. He then sent some other hats to Philadelphia with a Mr. Kerwin.

I was in Philadelphia at the time. I did not see Mr. Kerwin, but met him on the boat going to New York City about 12 o'clock at night, as I had taken the 10 o'clock train. He said he did not know what to say to Mr. McFarland when he got back. He thought the hats were right. I answered him that he could make up his mind that the hats were not right, and they would not be accepted until they were right. He, Kerwin, stated that he thought influence would get them through. My decisive answer to him was, which I remember very distinctly, "The only influence you can bring to bear there is correct hats, and then you will have an easy matter of it." Mr. McFarland called to see me after this, and I stated to him that it was no use, he would have to get his hats right. In all the conversations with Mr. McFarland he had a very insinuating and insolent manner, trying to impress upon me that it was his impression that it was a question of dollars and cents whether he would get his hats through there or not. I never in any manner, shape, or form said anything to him that he could by implication or otherwise form any idea that such would be the case. I did not think at that time any reason why I should disabuse his mind what he was hinting at. I stated to him, "You had better make six hats correct and send them to Philadelphia." He said he would. I hold a letter from him to the effect that he would make six hats which could not be torn. He made those six hats and submitted them in my presence at the arsenal. The inspector, Mr. Gladding, stated that those hats were right, but he did not know how far the dye might affect the strength of the same, but that in the condition they were then, which was a natural color, they were correct, except that they were not dyed. The first I knew of anything was that he had shipped several dozen hats, of which all were rejected.

Mr. McFarland then called upon me and stated in the presence of my clerks that it would be worth two or three hundred, five hundred dollars or more to get those hats through. My answer was distinctly to him, "Never mind that; you get your hats right, and they will then be accepted," which ended the conversation. I have not seen Mr. McFarland since.

I have seen Mr. Knox on several occasions, as I daily pass his store door, sometimes twice a day regularly, sometimes four times, going to and coming from where I dine. On one or two occasions Mr. Knox has called me in, and on one particular occasion stated to me that Col. Furey was a scoundrel, a corrupt official, and a thief, and he would down him if it took all the influence at his command, and turned to me in an angry tone of voice and said, "And if you are in my way, I will brush you aside." My reply to Mr. Knox was, "You had better be careful what you say regarding the former, and regarding the latter, I'll take care of that, old man; my shoulders are broad, and I'll stand any racket you choose to put up against me."

I did not see him until just after the opening of the bids for 125,000 hats on July 23d. I was walking with my brother on Fifth avenue when I was accosted by one

of Mr. Knox's men, who stated that Mr. Knox wanted to see me. I said I was busy, but was just going down that way and asked him where he was. He said, "He is at the store." I went to the store and found that he was in the back part of the corridor of the Fifth Avenue Hotel with two men, one of whom he introduced to me; he was a Mr. Austin. He said, "Who has been awarded the contract on this 125,000 hats, Lyon?" My answer was, "I do not know; the award has not yet been made." He asked, "What are the bids?" As this was a matter of public property, I told him. His answer was, "Oh, Ferry & Napier will get it," and stated how the other bids, such as Horstmann and Thomas, were dummy bids for Ferry & Napier, and then hollered out in a loud tone of voice as he passed me that the colonel in Philadelphia was a thief. One of the men who were present at the time asked me who was this go-between. Mr. Knox turned to me and winked his eye. I immediately turned and said to him, "Don't you dare to make such an attack upon me; if you do, I'll make you take the consequences," and left him. I have not seen him since.

I understand that he made the remark that I came into his office and stated that for \$300, or some amount of money, I would have the thing fixed for him in Philadelphia, and that he ordered me out of his office. I desire to state that no such remark was made by me at any time whatever, and Mr. Knox knows it.

In conclusion I desire to state the character of this man is well known. Whenever he can not ride roughshod over others, he seeks to maliciously malign them, as per the case against him brought by Mr. John H. Spellman in 1894 for \$50,000 for defamation of character and slander, in which Mr. Knox gave an interview to a reporter of the Herald and the Recorder and then denied under oath that he never gave any such report. I have in my possession a true and correct copy from the supreme court of New York in this case, and also a true report from the records of the police commissioners of N. Y. City, regarding the issue with Mr. Knox after not being awarded a contract. These I can produce at any time.

I trust that the reputation held by me at the Quartermaster's Department, U. S. A., for the past twenty-odd years shall be, and is, an answer to any malicious falsehood this man has told against me, for the purpose and motive of which I know not.

EDMOND R. LYON.

Sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL.]

LORETIA E. HICKS,
Notary Public 189, N. Y. Co.

F.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *County of New York, ss:*

Personally appeared before me, Wm. R. Hilbert, a notary public for the city and county of New York, this the 29th day of October, 1898, George J. Ferry, who deposeth and saith that he is the senior partner of the firm of Ferry & Napier, doing business as manufacturers of hats at 21 and 23 West Fourth street, New York City; that commencing in the month of January, 1896, his firm (in the name of Wm. Wolfarth, an employee) manufactured for the United States Government 40,000 drab campaign hats under a contract dated December thirteenth, 1895, (that he was informed later some of these hats had been adopted as standard samples), and that the standard specifications were fully complied with in the manufacture of the entire contract.

GEORGE J. FERRY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me the 29th day of October, 1898.

[SEAL.]

WM. R. HILBERT,
Notary Public, 147, N. Y. Co.

G.

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,

City and County of Philadelphia, ss:

James Marshall, of Fall River, Mass., being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is a member of the firm of James Marshall & Brothers; that the campaign hats made by the said firm of Marshall & Brothers for Wm. H. Horstmann Company, of the city of Philadelphia, and by them furnished to the Quartermaster's Department, U. S. A., were made strictly in accordance with the specifications adopted by said department on the eleventh day of March, 1897. Further this deponent saith not.

JAMES MARSHALL.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this second day of November. A. D. 1898.

[SEAL.]

JOSHUA R. MORGAN, *Notary Public*.

H.

NEW YORK, Aug. 16th, 1898.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

City and County of New York, ss:

I, Edward J. Ryan, residing at No. 88 Bedford street, New York City, being duly sworn, doth say as follows:

I am engaged by Mr. Edmond R. Lyon, 258 Fifth avenue, New York City, as salesman for the western territory. While sitting in our showroom in the latter part of June—the day or date I do not remember—the following conversation occurred between a Mr. McFarland, representative of the Knox Hat Company, and Mr. Edmond R. Lyon. Mr. McFarland was anxious regarding the acceptance of hats to the arsenal in Philadelphia, for which his house had a contract from the United States Quartermaster's Department. Mr. McFarland stated to Mr. Lyon that something must or would have to be done, and made inference—of which I do not exactly understand—to secure the delivery and acceptance of hats, and wanted Mr. Lyon to try and fix up the matter at the Philadelphia end to get the hats accepted; and the answer Mr. Lyon made, which I distinctly heard, was: "Get your hats right and they will then be accepted."

EDWARD J. RYAN.

Sworn to before me Aug. 16, 1898.

[SEAL.]

LORETIA E. HICKS,
Notary Public 139, N. Y. Co.

BOSTON, MASS., December 3, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF COL. JOHN F. MARSH.

Col. JOHN F. MARSH, not sworn, as no lawyer was present, testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name, rank, regiment, and service you have had.

A. I was lieutenant-colonel of the Twelfth New Hampshire Regiment, and—do you want my whole service?

Q. Only in this late war with Spain.

A. I had no rank in the late war. I am a citizen.

Q. Be kind enough to give us your name and residence.

A. John F. Marsh, Springfield, Mass. I have prepared some notes which I will read, if you wish. Last June I left Springfield, the 5th, and returned the 18th. I went to Chickamauga, spending a day there looking over the camps. I heard com-

plaints that the water supply was deficient and also that it was impure. I noticed that the sinks were offensive. This was observable as I rode past on the public roads of the park. Some of these offensive sinks were quite near the traveled road and were used without protection and in full view of the passers by. The ground appeared too hard and rocky for a camp. From Chickamauga I went to Jacksonville, spending several days there. I heard no complaints at Chickamauga or Jacksonville that the rations were not sufficient in quantity, but some complaints that the potatoes were bitter. I investigated some of these complaints and found that potatoes originally good were allowed to spoil by remaining uncovered in the sun. This, after the potatoes had been issued to the company. Bad cooking had much to do with all the complaints I heard and investigated. Parker House standard of cooking didn't seem to be in vogue.

I was at Port Tampa on the 12th of June and went on board the *Orizaba*, transport No. 24. She was very much crowded, but, as some change occurred before sailing on the 14th, this may have been remedied. The health of the troops at all these places seemed to be excellent. On the 12th of July I left New York on the *St. Louis*, and on the 23d we anchored in Hampton Roads. The *St. Louis*, with steam up, ready to sail at an hour's notice, waited several days before troops came on board. Captain Goodrich, U. S. N., commanding the *St. Louis*, told me, and said he had informed the proper authorities, that he could accommodate 802 men and their officers, and hadn't room for any more men. The Third Illinois Volunteers, 1,200 men and their officers, came on board, also General Brooke and staff. Sailed July 28; landed at Porto Rico August 2 and 3. The men, as many as could, remained on deck day and night, and, as it rained occasionally, it was not a comfortable sleeping place. The rains, however, were light, and the motion of the ship so steady, that less inconvenience was experienced than reasonably might be expected. Hot coffee was served, but no food for the men was cooked on the ship. I talked freely with the men and officers of the Third Illinois Volunteers, and concluded that the men were not properly rationed, but whose fault it was I couldn't decide. The officers were undoubtedly good citizens at home, but, to use a slang phrase, they didn't know as soldiers, from colonel to second lieutenant, how to keep a hotel. Cans of baked beans, issued as weighing 3 pounds each, weighed 2½ pounds, and six of these cans were given to a company of 100 men for a meal, about 2½ ounces to a man. There was no question but what the men were hungry, but they were so enthusiastic over the idea of landing in a few days at Porto Rico that I think hunger didn't trouble them much.

I landed at Santiago August 7, and the same day went out to the camp of the Second Massachusetts Regiment. I found the camp badly located and in a most unsanitary condition: a very large percentage of the men and officers sick. There was not even a show of military discipline. The tents, located without order or regularity, were, with two or three exceptions, without ditches to turn away the water from the inside, where the men were compelled to lie on the ground or close to it. There appeared to have been no inspection of the regimental camp by those higher in authority, and the colonel commanding seemed to have neglected every precaution necessary to preserve and protect the health and efficiency of his regiment. Fresh beef was allowed to lie on the ground, a cloth under it, in the sun for hours, black with flies, there being no cover over it, before it was distributed. The order of the camp was bad. General Shafter knew nothing of the condition of this regiment, so he said, until I informed him. I found it difficult to get necessary information of a very simple character from Colonel Humphrey, chief quartermaster at Santiago, and I heard many complaints of this official. I left Santiago August 10 on the *St. Louis* for Montauk Point. Two regiments of United States Infantry, the Ninth and Tenth, and two companies of the Seventy-first New York Volunteers came back on the *St. Louis*, something like 800 men in all. The troops were well cared for, receiving their food from the ship at a per

diem rate, as agreed with General Shafter before leaving Santiago. At Montauk Point the troops were sent on shore after a thorough fumigation, one man having died of yellow fever a few hours before our arrival. The quarantine officers controlled everything connected with the landing at Montauk. All but nine sick men had been taken off the ship, and these were left without an attendant. Seven of these men could walk with assistance, but two could not stand up and were almost in a dying condition. All were said to have yellow fever. Half an hour after the troops left a hospital steamboat came alongside to take off their sick men. Not a man from the hospital boat would come near the sick men, and men from the *St. Louis* helped them down the plank; that is, seven of them; two were carried down on stretchers, more dead than alive, and laid down on the upper deck of the boat—on the cold, wet deck, without even a blanket under or over them, and in this condition, the wind fresh and cold, the steamboat started for the shore—Camp Wikoff. From the deck of the *St. Louis* I watched, but saw no one go near the poor fellows lying uncovered and helpless.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us the name of the hospital boat.

A. I don't know.

Q. Would you know it if you were to hear it?

A. I didn't get the name of it; boats were constantly coming out and going away.

Q. I want to find out, if possible, whether it was or not the quarantine boat *Elaine*.

A. It was not; that was a kind of patrol boat; this was a side-wheel steamboat—a white boat.

SPECIAL NOTE BY DR. CONNER: Ascertain the name of this boat, whether quarantine boat or whether belonging to the Army; I am quite sure it will prove to be the quarantine boat; I do not think the quarantine boat would allow any other boat to go in to that ship.

A. They didn't while we kept in quarantine, and while there my friends came and they drove them off.

Q. It was on this occasion that Clarke, of your city, came to see you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He testified before us that they ordered him off, very gruffly?

A. I don't know anything about that; they ordered everybody off; there were a number of boats came up, knowing I was on the *St. Louis*—wanted to interview me; I only recognized one person, that was Col. Roger Morgan, of the governor's staff; I knew him by his dress.

Q. Be kind enough to tell us in what condition, from your standpoint, were those various camps—in bad order, badly policed?

A. At Chickamauga: I went down there as the guest of Captain Rockwell of General Brooke's staff; I intended to stay there two or three days with him. I got there in the morning; everything was infernally dusty there and dirty. I went from there that night, and had to promise that I would come back in the morning, but I didn't do it without qualification. It took me two hours to get cleaned up. In riding through I thought—with the exception of the bad odors from the sinks, and those badly constructed sinks—they were in general—everything appeared to be in very good condition.

Q. Did you notice that the camps were very much crowded, that several regiments were crowded together, and that the men in each regiment, their tents were closely pitched?

A. That command was considerably scattered. I asked Colonel Clough why it was so scattered. They said there were 40,000 men there. He said the reason was the ground was hard and rocky; they could not put down sinks; they had to spread around to find any place in the earth to cover up with.

Q. Did you notice whether in the camp of the First New Hampshire the tents were very closely put together?

A. Pretty near. I have seen tents that way in service. I don't see any particular objection to it, if they were properly pitched.

Q. Can you give me a little more in detail your experience with Colonel Humphrey? What was the occasion of your interview?

A. I went down to Cuba, or Santiago, as representative of a Volunteer Soldiers' and Sailors' Aid Society, of Springfield, and incidentally, also, of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Society, at the request of Chairman Hart. There were supplies on the *St. Louis* for the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Massachusetts. These supplies were all addressed to the surgeons of the regiments, and while they were put in such a way on the ships that they held Captain Goodrich responsible for them, there was a private understanding with Hart that I should look after them and watch the captains. It was quite well, perhaps, that I did, because the captain was relieved on the *St. Louis* at Guantanamo Bay, and I never saw him afterwards.

After a promise had been granted for an agent to go down on the *St. Louis*, I took that promise as simple authority. I had a letter from the governor of Massachusetts. I went to Washington and saw the Secretary of War and got authority from the Secretary of War, with the indorsement of Ludington, to go about where I could conveniently. I came in there from the camp of the Second Massachusetts on Tuesday afternoon, expecting the ship would be around from Guantanamo Bay Wednesday morning. She could not come in on account of her size. I went down Tuesday afternoon where Colonel Humphrey was to see when the lighters would go off. He seemed to be considerably rattled. I think it must have been from ten to fifteen minutes before I got a simple answer from him. He said he had no orders—didn't know. I said, "About what time? I know you have orders: Shafter told me so. I know you are going to send off lighters in the morning. I shall stay here until you give me a suitable answer." After a long time he finally said about 8 to 8.30 in the morning. I was down there then, and the little lighter steamboat *Tarpon* was there to take on board two companies of the Tenth Infantry. I went to the ship 7 miles out. When the little *Tarpon* was unloaded the captain commenced to throw off the line. He knew I had a lot of freight I wanted to take there. He knew my authority; but he said he could not do it. The first officer said, "Very well; I will put a squad of marines on board and take possession of the boat and run it." Then he said, "I will take the supplies." I think he said finally I might go to Colonel Humphrey. You will understand what that meant. I said, "No, I shall go to Shafter." Pretty soon after I met Major Miley, of Shafter's staff. He wanted I should go to see Shafter. He said there were a great many complaints against Colonel Humphrey. I had heard a serious complaint against him the day before from Captain Warner, agent of the Red Cross. He said, "Damn him, if he had not worn soldier's straps I would have knocked him down." It seemed to be a bigger ship than he was capable of attending to, or he was "rattled." That is the amount of it. He didn't offend me, because I wouldn't be offended.

Q. You got the stores landed?

A. I took off the *St. Louis* 22 demijohns of liquors and wines; one disappeared, although I was watching things as close as I could.

Q. You could not sit on 2 demijohns at once?

A. No.

Q. You were able to get transportation for these supplies so you could distribute them?

A. I had made arrangements with Colonel Clark, of the Second Regiment, to have men there in the morning. I had to go back to the *St. Louis*; my clothing was all there; but so little attention was paid to these supplies by the commanding officer of the Second Massachusetts Regiment if I had had my clothing there I should

certainly have stayed. I have conversed with a good many and think they got some supplies.

Q. Have you been in the volunteer service?

A. I was five years in the regular service.

Q. During the late unpleasantness?

A. In '61 and '66.

Q. Then, Colonel, you know what their volunteer regiment had to go through, and certain fomentation, like sweet cider scum, had to come to the top. This war was not long enough to get the scum off. So far as your observation went at Arroyo, no preparation had been made for landing of troops whatsoever?

A. Didn't appear to be.

Q. How long were you on the island at Porto Rico?

A. Only there a day.

Q. Did you have occasion to observe the condition of things while there, on shore?

A. No, I could not. I simply went there with the Third Illinois.

Q. How long were you at Montauk after you did effect a landing?

A. I could not land at Montauk; was not allowed to land. I had to go to Philadelphia to get off the *St. Louis*. Dr. McGruder would not let me off. When we were released from quarantine I could not notify anybody; he would not take me. I asked him to take me on his boat. I liked Dr. McGruder very much. He was very much of a gentleman. He seemed to me a capable man.

Q. Do you know whether or not he was on this white boat?

A. He was not; no, sir.

Q. Did there seem to be any officer in command?

A. No, sir. They seemed to all keep out of the way. They were in deadly fear of these men on board. One poor fellow—he belonged to the Ninth Infantry—was practically in a dying condition. I stood there near him when they carried him off.

Q. Have you any other matters of interest to give us?

A. I don't think I have.

Q. As the result of your observation, and being a soldier in two wars before this and of course familiar with what a man should be—as a result of your observation have you any suggestion to make as to any department or the management of any department in the future?

A. I think that the commanding generals in this war were too old. I think some of their staff were too old.

Q. What was the character of the tents?

A. A large part were wall tents and some shelter tents. However, those who had shelter tents could have had the other kind if they had cared to.

Q. Who was the surgeon of that regiment?

A. Dr. Bowen; he died. I went to the regimental hospital. A little stream ran near it and I naturally took a look at that stream to see if polluted. I called the colonel's attention to it.

Q. Who was in charge of the hospital?

A. I don't remember. It was, I think, a contract doctor.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit any other hospital at Siboney?

A. I went to the division hospital.

Q. Under Dr. White?

A. I don't know who the doctor was. Where Dr. Bowen was sick at the time. I suppose the division hospital of the Second Division. Everything about the hospital was in what I would call bad condition. Such a rank growth of vegetation not cleaned up ought to have been cleaned up. Vegetation was growing and decaying all the time.

Q. This was about the 10th of August?

A. I went out to the camp August 7 and returned the afternoon of the 9th. I was in Santiago the 10th.

Q. Were there at that time when you saw the regiment enough well so that a proper detail could have been had to clean up things?

A. Oh, yes. The camp was badly located. There was one trench through the camp. They were both sides of this trench.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 5, 1898.*

COL. J. G. C. LEE—Recalled.

Col. J. G. C. LEE was recalled by the commission and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Were you chief quartermaster of the First Corps at Chickamauga, or Camp George H. Thomas?

A. I was chief quartermaster of all the forces at Camp George H. Thomas.

Q. Who had charge of the quartermaster's depot?

A. I had; I was the chief quartermaster.

Q. When was the first invoice of tents received at Camp George H. Thomas?

A. I am unable to state that; it was a matter which would come directly under the officer in charge of stores; it would not come through me.

Q. Can you tell how many tents of different kinds you received at Camp Thomas during your term of service?

A. I have not the papers with me.

Q. Do you know the number of hospital tents received?

A. The total number, you mean?

Q. Yes.

A. I do not; I can tell you the total number issued. I can answer very clearly by a list of all the requisitions that were filled for hospital tents during the entire occupancy of the camp.

Q. Filled as made?

A. I should say there may have been days when we could not fill them all on that date. There were no requisitions unfilled as I now recall it.

Q. What was the maximum delay in filling any requisitions for hospital tents?

A. I do not recall a single instance.

Q. In which there was delay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any delay in filling requisitions for tents for the officers and men for the several commands as they arrived?

A. There was delay in filling the medium tents for both officers and men; that was explained in my last testimony. I have brought the orders to show that at the outset there was not a sufficient number to meet the demands of the troops. The Secretary of War sent an order to General Brooke, and he in turn to me, restricting the issue of tents to the minimum allowed by regulations; that was explained in my previous testimony. We restricted it at first to six, which is the number of men to a tent allowed by regulations, but as fast as the tentage came in we gave them at the rate of five and four; at the last, four men in a tent. There was never a time when it was not adequate for officers.

Q. Were you at Camp Thomas before the arrival of troops?

A. Yes, sir; I arrived there on the 19th day of April, and before the arrival of any troops, and went over the entire camp.

Q. What supply of tents was on hand when you arrived there?

A. Not any; it was only three days after the order for the mobilization of the troops.

Q. The first troops were the Regular Army?

A. Yes, sir; they brought tents with them.

Q. There was no necessity for supplying them?

A. No; they had enough to cover them.

Q. At the time of the arrival of the volunteers were any tents on hand for distribution?

A. My recollection is that some had arrived. If I had known of these questions I could have referred back to my records and found the facts.

Q. To what extent did volunteers come with their tents?

A. Some would come with enough tentage, but a great diversity of shapes and kinds of tentage; others would come illy supplied. I took the precaution when one day had elapsed between the departure of the regular troops and the incoming of the volunteer troops to require a report to be made on the arrival of each regiment of the number of tents and the field transportation. I entered that upon a book and upon a sheet, and this book and sheet were kept up day by day so we would know exactly what each regiment had.

Q. Was there at any time during the continuance of the camp any lack of shelter for any of the troops, sick or well, who were taken to Camp Thomas?

A. Not beyond what I have stated. There may have been times immediately on their arrival. I think in the main troops were adequately sheltered, both sick and well.

Q. What was the quality of the canvas?

A. Good canvas. There was no canvas not good, except some purchased in Chicago.

Q. So that in the main the tents issued to the troops were of the standard quality of canvas?

A. Yes, sir; I think so; I am sure of it. Well, this should be modified by saying that much of the tentage brought by the State troops was old and worn; but that was replaced by new as soon as possible.

Q. You did not inspect it?

A. No, sir. That which came from the States I can not answer for.

Q. You have stated, I think, Colonel, that you can not recall from memory the number of hospital tents issued at various dates.

A. No; but I can give you a list.

Q. Can you give us the number issued prior to the 10th of May?

A. The 10th of May—there had been none issued before the 10th of May. The troops did not arrive there until the 13th of May.

Q. What was the first issue of hospital tents?

A. The first issue of hospital tents to hospitals, you mean, don't you?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I find the first issues of hospital tents to have been made on May 13, 17, and on May 27 there were 16 to the First Division of the Third Army Corps.

Q. I think probably it would save time just to give us the dates of the various issues to the several hospitals?—Dr. Conner wants to know the issues made between the 20th and 30th of July and August 10, 20, and 30.

A. I think it would take too long, sir. Let me explain to you, in justice to the Quartermaster's Department, that those issues were ordered on those dates and bore those dates.

Q. Does your memorandum which you have there show the dates of the requisition upon which the tents were issued?

A. I have got the date of the requisition.

Q. Is that memorandum in duplicate?

A. No, sir; this is one I had drawn off a long time ago, so that I could relate the issues.

Q. Then it would not be convenient for you to allow this to go on record?

A. I would very much rather have it copied by my clerks and send it to you.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What I want to get is simply a tabulated statement of the dates of requisitions and the number of tents required and the dates of issues, so that we can determine how many hospital tents were issued there, on what dates, and what period after requisitions were made.

A. I want to state to you in connection with this that there was never any reduction in any hospital made by me of requisitions for hospital tents. In the regiments which were reduced they asked for unheard-of quantities and improper quantities. It is a matter I want to touch on. I have brought here, also, the whole statement of what was drawn by the regiments. I have got every regiment here, and that I will furnish you. I also have here drawn up a list of the entire number of hospital tents issued at Camp Thomas to the forty-three regiments of volunteers there. There were 224 hospital tents; there were seven or eight hospitals, notably the two that have been most talked about—the Third Division of the First Corps and Second Division of the Third Corps. The First Division of the First Corps had 24 and the Second Division of the Third Corps had 96. They had 35,200 feet of lumber, an average of 366 feet to a tent, when it requires 204. We knew the lumber was taken by those to whom it was issued and stables built for their horses, in some instances. We knew that the tentage for regiments, for which the allowance was fixed at two, had five, and that commanding officers largely lived in hospital tents, contrary to rules.

Q. How many hospital tents, issued for hospital purposes, were used by commanding officers, corps, division, and regimental?

A. I do not know. It was quite a common occurrence, but it was the inspector's business, not mine. There were plenty used at headquarters; there was no allowance at brigade headquarters, and yet there were always some there.

Q. The adjutant-general would want a hospital tent for his office, if he could get one?

A. The use of hospital tents begins at headquarters. The brigade staff is small and their work is light, but when it comes to a division more space is allowed, and there it was allowed, one for the adjutant-general and one for the chief quartermaster.

Q. Colonel, can you specify the cases, either at hospitals or elsewhere, in which the lumber used for floors was used for stables?

A. I can not; it was reported to me just in general terms. The Second Division hospital of the Third Corps had 96 tents and 35,200 feet of inch boards and 12,000 of scantlings.

Q. Can you tell prior to what date that issue was made?

A. The first issue to that hospital was, on June 22, 5,500 feet of boards and 1,200 of scantling; on July 14, 5,000 feet of boards and 1,000 scantling; July 30, 2,200 feet of boards and 1,000 of scantling; on August 13, 1,500 feet of boards and 750 feet scantling.

Q. Colonel, suppose you have that tabulated off: the amount of lumber issued to each, and the dates received, and the dates the orders were given?

A. It is well to state and fair to state that lumber was not always on hand. It was a thing we didn't keep a large stock of on hand, as we didn't know exactly what amount would be ordered. Several days would sometimes elapse before the lumber could be brought to the camp.

Q. Do you know how many hospital tents were issued to the reserve Hospital Corps?

A. These we always ordered on the date on which the requisition reached my office. The first reserve hospital of the First Army Corps had 66 hospital tents. The Third Corps had no reserve. The Sternberg Hospital had 183 tents. Within three days from notice I had 100 additional tents. We had them as soon as they were ready for them.

Q. What was the date at which the first issue was made of the Sternberg Hospital tents?

A. They called for these on August 6 and 9. They told me they would want them, and on the 9th they were delivered to them on that day; and in ten days 80 more were delivered. I noticed Dr. Giffin stated he had 40 reserve at the last not set up.

Q. Are the requisitions as they were made for hospital tents on file in the Quartermaster-General's Office now?

A. No, sir; they are in my hands.

Q. Will they be turned over eventually to the Quartermaster-General's Office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A serious complaint was made by the assistant surgeon in charge of the Ninth Pennsylvania that at a time when they had 90 men in quarters, with temperatures ranging from 103 to 106, the colonel and the surgeon went to your quarters and asked for a tent from your department and you refused to give it up?

A. I desire to make a statement of that whole matter which can be readily proved by disinterested witnesses. I have brought here to show you the order of the Secretary of War by telegraph to Major-General Brooke at Chickamauga. [Order read.] I have brought further an application, dated June 7, made by me, because there was a good deal of uncertainty and indecision as to what would be issued to the regiments and what would be issued to division hospitals. I sought information on the subject verbally, but could never get it. [Reading.] "There is much uncertainty in this office." This was sent to the chief surgeon, who returned it. [Reads orders.]

Q. Who is that signed by?

A. Lieut. Col. Albert Hartsuff.

Q. The Medical Department then undertook to regulate the allowance of tents, irrespective of the number of sick?

A. Yes, sir. On the 2d day of August, after the division hospitals had been established, Colonel Dougherty, of the Ninth Pennsylvania, came to me and asked for hospital tents. I turned to the books that had been kept, and said, "Colonel, you already have two and a half times the allowance of tents given to your regiment, and are not entitled to more." They said they wanted more, and I told them to bring their requisitions to the division surgeons and have them properly approved. The doctor said the division surgeons are absolutely incompetent. I said, "Doctor, that is pretty strong language to use about your seniors." I thought such conversation should not be made before clerks and orderlies. "Well," he said, "I repeat it. They are absolutely incompetent."

Q. What division were they in?

A. I think the Third Division of the First Corps. That is my recollection—Third Division, First Army Corps. I again remonstrated with him for using the language he did in front of clerks and orderlies and others as being subversive of good order and military discipline. I said, "Doctor, you are using very strong language, and I beg you to cease it." But he reiterated it again, and we then passed on to the subject of the tents. I told him I could not issue any more tents. He said it was very bad, as the sick were lying around. I told him I could not issue any more tents unless on approval of the chief medical officer and commanding general. He said something about it being inhuman. I said, "I am stationed here by the Secretary of War to observe orders and regulations." He went away and came back, and, as I say to you, the tent was full of people waiting. Then he

came back and said he had a private tent stored in Chattanooga which he would like to get. I said, "I can not undertake to tear that storehouse to pieces, with its 76 regiments of stuff there, to get you a tent; it might be on top and it might be on the bottom." He was not satisfied with that. He wanted his tent, which proved to be some sort of a marquee tent. I said, "The trouble with you gentlemen is that the hospital tents allowed to your regiment are not being used for their proper purposes." These facts are easily established. I can not remember who was in the tent at that time, but it turns out that two gentlemen were present who have written to me and offered me their testimony—Mr. Adler, of the Chattanooga Times, and Mr. Betts, of the Engineer Department. I want you to know these facts, for the papers stated that you said that I should have been taken by the neck and thrown out.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What I did say was that they did not take you by the neck, as I would have done had my men been lying around sick and dying for want of shelter.

A. I told Colonel Doherty that I was there simply to carry out orders and regulations and that I was not the commander, and if he chose to apply for that tent to the commander he could do so; I would not recommend it. He was called upon to store that stuff, and it was not within my authority to order it out of storage, nor would I have recommended it.

Q. Did he inform you that there were 94 sick in quarters?

A. They told me, I do not remember what number. They said they had the sick there, and said they had the division hospitals overcrowded. We were simply carrying out orders, as a good soldier is required to do, and if they wanted more they should have made applications through proper channels.

Q. Did they inform you that the division hospital was full?

A. I don't know that they did; but even had they done so, I could not have issued more hospital tents. Now, if they had made out requisitions through their commanders instead of coming to me—

Q. Although at that particular date you had no hospital tents?

A. No; I had none.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you state that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If you had hospital tents, would you have issued them?

A. No, sir.

By General BEAVER:

You were bound by that order as much as they were?

Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Would you not have had the right to extend them authority in this case where they had so many sick?

A. I probably could have done so, but in a matter of that kind I would not have done it without the authority of the commanding officer. The commanding general's orders required me to hold them to the regulations. An officer of that regiment who knew all about it told me that they had plenty of hospital tents, but that the commander was living in one and messing in another.

Q. What was his name?

A. I do not like to say. It was an officer of his own regiment, a very sensible and active young officer. The clerks can tell you. He told us three days afterwards that the colonel had "coughed up" one of his tents, as he termed it. Hospital tents were only drawn for the use of the sick.

Q. Whose business was it to correct that abuse?

A. I should have considered it the business of the commander.

Q. Was it the business of the inspector-general?

A. It was his business to report it.

Q. How does it happen that nobody took any notice of it?

A. You are quite as capable of answering that question as I am. This did not exist in all regiments, but it did in some.

Q. There was an inspector-general there, was there not?

A. Numbers of them.

Q. And it is his business to report anything that is wrong?

A. I should think so.

General DODGE. Was this after the middle of July?

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did Captain Arrasmith have anything to do with the issuing of tents?

A. Nothing at all. He was a commissary officer.

Q. Now, in reference to the tentage, I want to read some of the testimony of Major Jenne, who was medical inspector of the Third Corps, and afterwards division surgeon of the Second Division, Third Corps. [Reads testimony regarding insufficiency of tentage for hospitals.]

A. He is supposed to have done this himself?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. That was some of my assistants, I suppose.

Q. You might answer about the tentage.

A. In the first place, I would like to ask what division that is.

Q. Second Division, Third Corps.

A. First let me explain to you one thing that the doctor says there, in which he certainly has made a statement differing from what the other surgeons will tell you. He says the flies were used from necessity, not from choice. I think any surgeon will tell you the custom of putting hospital tents up is to put one and then another, covering the space between with the flies.

Q. He says he was obliged to use them.

A. They all wanted them that way, and they all flooded that space between, so the patients convalescing can occupy that space. Is it the Second Division, Third Corps?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I want to say one other thing about this; all this kind of rambling talk that this officer makes can not be answered, because he states no facts and dates. In reply to all that I have records, and they certainly can be quite as much relied upon as a man's memory. One other thing, an officer coming for tentage will bring a certain number of wagons. He may have wagons enough for all that he wants, and he may not have. All those conditions come into the question of drawing those supplies from the storehouse. A great many other persons may have been waiting. I merely make that statement to make the matter clear. The Second Division, Third Corps, hospital brought in other requisitions, one dated June 2, and on June 6, 20 hospital tents were issued to them. Their next one was dated June 21 for one, which was issued on June 22. Another came on July 6, and an order was issued on that date for 12 tents. The next issue was on July 17 for 3.

Q. I want to know how many they made requisition for?

A. That is the number requisitioned for.

Q. I want to know because he says he did not get what he requisitioned for.

A. There was never any reduction on these. I don't think of a single instance in the whole camp.

Q. He might have requisitioned for more and it have been approved for a less number by somebody higher up?

A. That might be. On July 23 he requisitioned and it was acted upon for 12; on the 30th for 10; August 3, 10; 13th, 20, and subsequently 6 and 2. Ninety-six tents they drew altogether.

Q. I would like to see whether those requisitions were not reduced by Colonel Hartsuff or somebody.

A. My recollection is they were not; I don't think there ever was an instance in that way.

Q. I wish to call your attention to requisitions for lumber. I will read you some of the testimony of Dr. Jenne. [Reads.]

A. Let me answer that. That requisition was made on the 9th and reached my office on the 13th and was acted upon on the 13th.

Q. [Reads:] "Lumber was issued too late to be of any use."

A. Well, here are the estimates and here are his requisitions. The lumber was at first reduced, because they called for a great deal more than was required to floor the tents.

Q. What he says in regard to the flooring of the tents is correct, I suppose?

A. I don't know who he got his authority from. It is very vague and indefinite. Moreover, anticipating that, I had bought up a large bill of lumber and piled it up there for that purpose, so it would be ready.

Q. Can you tell when that lumber was called for?

A. I have no means here of verifying that, because the material was in the hands of subordinates. On August 12, I think, Captain Young was in charge of the lumber. It was not always on hand, for we could not tell what was coming. It was quite expensive, and we bought it carefully, so as not to have any excess.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to state the dates and the amount of lumber which was issued to the Second Division, Third Corps, hospital?

A. I can only tell you the dates the requisition was received and when ordered issued. I can not tell you whether it would be on hand in the hands of a responsible officer.

Q. Can you give us dates?

A. Yes, sir. On the 22d of June a requisition came for 5,500 feet and 2,500 feet of scantling, and the scantling was reduced to the amount necessary for the boards, to 1,200 feet. That order was given that day for issue. The next lot was that that came in July 14. It was ordered issued that day, 2,000 feet. Then on the 14th they asked for 5,000 feet of boards and 1,000 feet of scantling, which was ordered issued. On July 30 a requisition was received, and ordered issued the same day, for 2,200 feet of boards and 1,000 feet of scantling. Now, this one he speaks of was received on the 13th—4,500 feet of boards and 933 feet of scantling. Another one was acted on the same dates for 1,500 feet of boards and 750 feet of scantling. August 26, 13,000 feet of boards and 6,000 feet of scantling. On all requisitions for lumber in excess of what we had on hand steps were taken to get it immediately. It is well to explain to this commission that we were on a single line of railway, and not a very strong railway at that, so we could not always get our supplies down over that 13 miles of road as quickly as desired.

Q. As I reckon it, it would be 20,700 feet that was issued prior to the 14th of August.

A. That seems to be the amount.

Q. That will floor about how many tents?

A. About 100 tents; 204 feet is the exact amount, but we allow 220.

Q. Then flooring was issued for 100 tents?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After the lumber was sent to the hospital, under what authority was the work done? Was it done by the Quartermaster's Department?

A. I am inclined to believe, although not positively, that they relied upon the hospital corps men to lay their floors.

Q. Was it not the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to lay these floors?

A. Well, if the Quartermaster's Department had been asked to, it would have been done, but they were not asked to.

Q. I mean as a question of law.

A. I think so. We were never asked to, in any instance.

Q. No call was made upon the Quartermaster's Department for carpenters to do this work?

A. Not in the division hospital. We did the work in the Sternberg and Leiter hospitals. They were general hospitals.

Q. Is it probable, think you, that the hospital corps men, that were picked up in various places and used for various purposes, could lay these floors?

A. If they had the men to do it they could, and if not they could not. No call was ever made upon me for that.

By General DODGE:

Q. If a call had been made from the division hospital, wouldn't it be made upon the quartermasters of the divisions?

A. Yes, sir; it never reached me.

Q. Isn't that work generally done by details from the division?

A. There are large numbers of hospital corps men, and I am inclined to think they relied upon them.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. As a matter of fact, the floors were laid, weren't they?

A. Yes, sir. We did it at the Sternberg and Leiter, and I know wherever those things came up, we took hold of them and handled them at once.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Have you any other statement that you wish to make in regard to any of the other operations there that you have not been especially interrogated about?

A. I will say, in general terms, from the beginning of that camp to its end I believe that every man there, from the commander down to his last staff officer, was earnest, zealous, and vigorous in the discharge of his duty and did all that was possible for humanity to do with the means at his disposal. We did not always have the things, but the foresight of the old officers there brought to that camp sufficient supplies for their command and distributed them as rapidly as could be done. It is not possible, in my opinion, for any human kind or any set of men to have all that an army of that size would call for ready on the spot. Those men were impatient. They had no idea of the work required to get those supplies together; and if they were not on hand the moment called for, impatience would be manifest; but it made no difference; we treated them kindly. I thought it was very universally done by everyone without loss of temper, and it should be commended; and while you may have officers come before you with complaints, there are thousands of officers that if they came before you would tell you they have never been treated better. I met one at Oil City, in your State, the other day, and he thanked me for the pains I had taken to instruct him in his duties. I went down nights and got the quartermasters of brigades and divisions together and instructed them so the work would fit in together, and I am bound to say of the thirty-nine quartermasters in those regiments, brigades, and divisions that thirty-five, at least, would tell you that they had been treated well and that every possible effort under the sun, at great personal sacrifice, was made that they should become familiar with their duties. I think you are mostly soldiers, and that you will all agree that every man in such a position does his best to fill the bill. It is no personal equation. He does his best. I think you will agree with

me that what is issued to the soldier should be carefully scrutinized, so as not to make an improper drain upon the public money. I would tell them when they came after things. "I want to give you all you need, but you are weighing yourself down, and if you want more afterwards, come in and get some." In that I kept them down to their real needs. That was always our aim.

By General DODGE:

Q. There has been considerable complaint made as to not complying with the order for the boiling of the drinking water at Chickamauga, and the statement is made to us that this was found to be impracticable because there were not enough water boilers or other receptacles to store the water in, and not until near the departure of the troops was this remedied. How soon were you notified of this necessity of furnishing boilers and barrels?

A. Of course I can not tell you the exact date; but as soon as it was made manifest, or as soon as it was ordered, generally boilers were furnished. I have never seen water barrels furnished in large numbers to the troops in a field before, but they were furnished there in large numbers. We commenced with 24 to a regiment and ended with 60, I should say. They would come in and request barrels; and as soon as they were ordered, within three days afterwards, I had more barrels than were ever before issued. We brought 500 or 600 there within two days.

Q. You had more than were ever issued?

A. Yes, sir. I do not think any general order was ever issued; it just grew up, and I think was asked for in the Third Division of the First Corps first. Some men said they did not want boilers; they could use camp kettles, as we had done in olden times. I devised a boiler that could be set upon their cook stove—a buzzacott oven in a group of four, and they could boil a barrel of water very quickly.

Q. I would like to ascertain when this application was made and on what date you had a sufficient supply of boilers.

A. I do not believe it will be possible to fix that date quite because the requisitions were made verbally, and some said they would use camp kettles.

Q. It is stated here that it was enjoined upon them in June.

A. I do not think a requisition was made for boilers until August, and then it was not known to be generally determined on, but as soon as it was the surgeon made it known to me, and I had them made right then and there.

Q. Now, there has been another statement by a great number of witnesses, general officers and surgeons, that the utter lack of suitable disinfectants and antiseptics for the sinks was one of the principal causes which led to the spread of typhoid fever?

A. Well, there is a law of Congress requiring disinfecting to be done by the Medical Department.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. I would like to inquire whether lime was expected to be furnished by the Quartermaster's or the Medical Department?

A. By the Medical Department, and was so furnished; we transported it quickly.

Q. I would like to ask whether the Quartermaster's Department furnished transportation to and from the hospital, or whether the Medical Department was expected to furnish its own transportation—did they have such transportation?

A. There were a large number of teams issued to the division hospital, the reserve hospital, and the ambulance corps. Those were given to them for their use.

Q. Was that at the beginning?

A. Teams were not there in the beginning in sufficient quantity, but as soon as they arrived they were given to them.

Q. The question I want to get at is whether when the teams got there the division hospital had sufficient transportation to transport its materials?

A. My judgment is they had, but I can not tell positively.

Q. Can you give us the dates it was furnished?

A. Yes, sir; I will. [Makes note.]

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Can you show how much lime, during your administration at Camp Thomas, was transported to the camp?

A. Yes, sir, I expect I can; but I will have to write to Captain McCarthy for that. All disinfectants are required by law to be furnished by the Medical Department.

By General WILSON:

Q. Do the regulations of the Army authorize the issue, for use of corps, division, or brigade headquarters, of hospital tents—for their own use?

A. No, sir; not for their own use or as mess tents at all.

Q. Were they issued, by you, for that purpose at Chickamauga?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were they kept by the officers for that purpose, to your knowledge?

A. They were.

Q. By whom were they issued?

A. The ones I know to have been used came there in this way. They were not issued from us; they were brought there. For instance, General Brooke, when he came out from Fort Sheridan, brought tents for his headquarters, and that was the first. General Wade's headquarters got theirs at Tampa in some way. General Breckinridge drew them directly from me; he came there with his staff officers, and they drew 12 tents.

Q. How were they issued?

A. I think probably on requisition.

Q. Did you have the right under the regulations to issue them?

A. No.

Q. Then you took the responsibility?

A. I fancy I had instructions in the case.

Q. Then it was a violation of the regulations for General Breckinridge to have them?

A. Yes, sir. While General Breckinridge remained at corps headquarters they were used for that purpose.

General WILSON. In camp or garrison the regular allowance is three tents for general officers, and for field and staff officers, above a captain, two wall tents, and for other captains or officers one wall tent.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 5, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. IRA C. BROWN.

Maj. IRA C. BROWN then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you give us your name, rank, and date of commission, and the places at which you have served during the late war with Spain?

A. Date of commission, August 7, 1898; major and brigade surgeon; served at Tampa, Fernandina, and Montauk.

Q. Will you please tell us what time you went to Montauk, and what duty was assigned to you?

A. I arrived at Montauk on the night of August 7, left camp on the forenoon of August 8, and on the 9th or 10th I was made executive officer, and served as such until the 16th of October, when I was made surgeon in charge in the general hospital, and served as such until November 16, when it was closed.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us the duties of the executive officer?

A. The duties as performed by me were, having general supervision over all the departments, to see if all orders were executed: all orders practically went through my department.

Q. What orders were given to you upon assuming charge, or at a subsequent period, respecting the policing of the camp?

A. Up to that time there was none. That was looked after by the details sent from the regiments to do the guarding and policing.

Q. Under whose orders?

A. General Young's.

Q. They reported under orders from him, but when they reported who did they receive orders from?

A. From me.

Q. In the first place, what was the character of the details sent you?

A. Originally there were three men sent from each company over the entire command, and latterly one battalion was sent.

Q. About what period?

A. Prior to the middle of September.

Q. What was the number of detailed men sent you for hospital protection and care?

A. Hospital protection is a guard that was sent: the first two or three days we had 9 posts, and about a week later 20 posts, and in addition to that 100 men were sent as a policing party.

Q. Were these details sent under your orders—examined subject to your orders?

A. Examined subject to my orders.

Q. Who was the commander of the detail?

A. Major Meacham, of the engineers.

Q. What orders were sent respecting the care of the hospital?

A. My instructions were to constantly police in and around the hospital.

By General WILSON:

Q. Will you state whether volunteers or regular engineers—draw the line?

A. Volunteers; the Second Volunteers. They were instructed to properly police in and around the tents and at a distance of 100 feet.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was this done properly under these orders?

A. It was very much so; in fact, the best policing I ever saw.

Q. You know nothing of the condition of affairs prior to you going there?

A. Nothing; I was the first man at Montauk and the last man.

Q. What were the orders respecting visitors?

A. At the beginning there were none, visitors went in pretty much as they pleased, but after that the guards were put on.

Q. What time was that?

A. About the 15th of August I issued an order that no visitors were to be allowed in the hospital without first getting a pass from my office: the guards were put on at the hospitals to prevent their going in there. The reason was that

the doctors complained of the men being annoyed, and things being given to them that they ought not to have had by kind-hearted people.

Q. Was this order obeyed?

A. It was.

Q. How thoroughly?

A. Occasionally a woman got through, but I never heard of a man

Q. Was there or not great confusion in the hospital during the first two weeks you were there?

A. I did not see any great confusion; there was lots of work, but it went on.

Q. I mean in consequence of the visitors?

A. Yes, sir; I asked the provost guard to include the hospital, and for a time it was done, and it simplified our work very much; but by somebody's order, I never knew whose, the guard was relieved and the people began to flock in again.

Q. Did you apply for a reissue of the order at that time?

A. I did not make direct application. I talked the matter over, of course, generally with the officers. We rounded them up three or four times a day, or as many times as necessary, and it was talked over, and we thought if a guard was put on the main entrance and the kitchen it would be sufficient.

Q. Did it prove to be so?

A. Only partially.

Q. Did you then apply for a change of orders or alter them yourself?

A. I did not alter the orders as far as the provost was concerned; I simply doubled the guard at the entrance, and I believe from that time on very few got through without an order from my office. There were people coming there who really had a right to go in, such as relatives and friends, who had an interest in the patient and were not looking for a hero to worship.

Q. Was the guard changed daily or a permanent guard?

A. It was changed daily.

Q. Do you or not know whether application was made for a permanent guard?

A. There was an application for a permanent guard in September, and one battalion was sent there. They remained one day of twenty-four hours, and then received orders to leave Montauk, and we went back upon the old order.

Q. Was it not possible to have another permanent guard?

A. Not at that time. I think that was the last regiment there, or the last two battalions.

Q. Do you or not know whether the application was made for a permanent guard by the chief surgeon?

A. No, sir; I do not know what the chief surgeon did. He talked with me at the beginning, and I asked him for 100 men, and they thought that was too much, and there were nine posts sent up of three men each.

Q. Do you know whether there were any complaints in relation to the policing or care of the hospital?

A. I only know that after the first visit of the Secretary of War all policing was turned over to me.

Q. When was that?

A. Some time the latter part of August.

Q. Were all the orders that you received verbal or written?

A. Usually oral.

Q. Were not written orders issued to you by any of the authorities?

A. Yes, sir; General Wheeler issued one or two orders.

Q. Relating to what?

A. To my duties generally as a policing officer, and then another addition was made to my work—looking after the special diet of the sick, also the clothing of the sick, to see that all were properly clothed when they left.

Q. Were the orders frequently changed?

A. I do not remember as to that. They may have been changed when necessity arose.

Q. It has been stated to us that orders were issued and countermanded almost as soon as issued.

A. I only remember one instance when a verbal order was issued to me to get a certain number of soldiers ready to ship by a certain boat, and when I reported the number, on account of the condition of the men the order was changed.

Q. Do you know of any other conditions of that sort existing—that is, in regard to the surgeon in charge of the camp, not relating to soldiers, but in regard to other details—that were countermanded almost instantly?

A. No, sir; I do not remember.

Q. It has been stated that very often men did not know what to do: an order was received one hour and countermanded the next?

A. I never found any trouble of that kind.

Q. Your orders were specific and definite?

A. I was kept busy attending to mine.

Q. How about those orders in regard to the wards?

A. They were generally carried out to the letter.

Q. Do you know what orders were issued in regard to the care of the dead?

A. Yes, sir; I know all about it.

Q. Please tell us about it.

A. That came under my administration and was part of it. The orders were, as soon as an orderly or anybody reported that a man was dead, that report should be immediately sent or taken to the doctor; and that he should visit this man and certify whether dead or not. If so, he was to be taken immediately to the dead-house, and then he was to be given a bath and a nightshirt or set of pajamas, and a uniform put on him and put in a coffin, and his name, rank, regiment, company, etc., put on him, or in a bottle in the coffin. Some were put on the outside.

Q. Did you have occasion to see whether such orders were or were not obeyed?

A. Whenever I was at the deadhouse, which was two, three, or four times a day, sometimes oftener, that was always carried out.

Q. Do you or do you not know of men being put into coffins nude?

A. I never knew of such a case. Now, about the 9th, 10th, or 12th of August, probably the middle of August, or at least after the first arrival of troops in Cuba, the orders that I issued on the order of General Young were to burn the clothing of soldiers who came from Cuba, and there was one who died—or two, perhaps—that there were no uniforms put on. The clothing they had was not the right sort to bury the men in, and those men had a suit of pajamas. There was no man buried naked. I got an affidavit from both of the keepers of the dead-house, or attendants, who were far above the average you would find in such places. I looked into their veracity in the town in which they had lived for a long time and found they were trustworthy. They made affidavits that such a thing never took place; and the Rev. Father Percelli—he was there constantly—and the Rev. Mr. Flaherty, another Catholic priest, who was there some, also wrote me an affidavit that such a thing never took place, and I have those.

Q. Do you know of any visit by the canon of the cathedral at Garden City?

A. Canon Bryan?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I inquired about that, and the other clerical men say they never saw him around there. He was running another religious mill over near the camp. He would send for 25 women, and when I inquired what for, he would say he was going to have a service and wanted the women; but I never let those women go, because they had to go through a negro regiment and one white one to get there.

Q. You say you never saw him?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did he ever report to you the condition he found those dead in in that morgue?

A. He did not. I never saw the gentleman that I know of.

Q. Did you keep outsiders from the morgue?

A. Yes, sir; the morgue was also under guard, and I frequently had requests for people to be admitted. Unconsciously, several times, newspaper men got in, but I never regretted it, because they told the truth and found nothing that was not perfectly right, and instead of being harmful I thought they did good, because they explained away some of the things.

Q. Do you know Mr. Cleveland Moffett?

A. I do not know anything about him. He took a snap shot of me, but never visited the morgue.

Q. Did you see the photographs and were they not correct.

A. They were not pictures of the general hospital; they may have been of the detention hospital.

Q. Did those two men, or not, serve out their time?

A. They served from the beginning to the end, most efficiently.

Q. It has been stated to the commission that two men who had charge of this morgue after the publication of the Rev. Bryan's article disappeared and never were seen again?

A. Oh, nothing of the kind; they were there as long as there was any business in the morgue.

Q. Do you know the names of those who were sent away without their clothing?

A. Without uniforms?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I do not know; they were marked, but I do not know the names.

Q. We have sworn testimony of a body being received in Chicago absolutely nude, without a particle of clothing on it.

A. I remember of hearing of that. I do not think that case was at the general hospital. I heard the rumor that one man went from the detention hospital, but if a man's word is worth anything and affidavits are worth anything, there was nothing of that kind at the general hospital.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. This man was not even in the hospital?

A. That never happened at the general hospital.

General DODGE. This is a case in Chicago. There are three cases before us.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. We have evidence that one body was put in a pine coffin, with the liver, brains, etc., put between the legs.

A. Nothing of that kind ever happened. I had two men who did the post-mortem work. They did the work well. They were young, conscientious men. I talked with them frequently about the condition of the bodies, and they said you would have to hunt for the marks they left on them.

Q. As far as you know, was anything removed from the body and left out?

A. I do not know of a case where what was removed from the body was not put back.

Q. As respects the disinfection and care of the excreta, what were your orders?

A. The orders were verbal ones, that we were to use due diligence in keeping the ground thoroughly policed and the sinks in as good condition as possible, and it was thoroughly done. The ground was policed during the light hours of day; the seats were disinfected every hour during the day and every two hours during the night. I had large barrels with a solution of copperas and quicklime, and every hour it was covered with this copperas and lime and then a little earth.

Q. Were the typhoid and other excreta emptied just outside of the tent on the ground?

A. Possibly it happened once, but I investigated and could not find even once. I gave orders that all those orderlies leaving the tents should be watched, and if seen dumping it on the ground they should be arrested. I never knew it to be done.

Q. Was any man arrested?

A. Not for doing it, but for halting to do what he evidently had in mind. He was arrested and brought before me and taken to the guardhouse.

Q. What action was taken?

A. In the case I remember he was fined a month's pay and sent to the guardhouse.

Q. For not immediately emptying the vessel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long a delay before this man was arrested?

A. He just simply halted on the way on the bridge.

Q. How long a halt did he make?

A. He halted and was leaning over the bridge, and he evidently intended to do that. We simply disciplined him for what he intended to do. My impression was he intended to empty his pan and wash it there.

Q. What did he give for a reason?

A. Only that he was bending over there and had the pan outside over the railing.

Q. Do you know whether or not the receptacles or excreta were left outside the ward for a considerable time?

A. The bedpans were left outside occasionally. I do not know but in some wards habitually, but they were treated in this way: A solution of chloride of lime was put in before they were used and afterwards before they went to the sink. We had a hydrant we used to thoroughly cleanse them, and they were put in the sun frequently to dry and prevent molding.

Q. Were any left outside?

A. Not more than an hour. I do not believe they were left at all, because there never was an hour they were not used.

Q. Was your attention ever called by Dr. Thompson to a statement in regard to that?

A. Was he on duty there?

Q. No, he was a visitor.

A. No, sir. There may have been one doctor there on duty that did. One of the doctors surprised me a little when he spoke to me, and he came to me and I went immediately to the ward and said a few things to the hospital orderly that he understood, and I looked at the bedpans.

Q. Would you or not have seen, in all probability, any gross neglect in the carrying out of your orders in reference to the care of the excreta?

A. I certainly would.

Q. You say you did not observe any?

A. I did not observe any neglect.

Q. What supply of hospital bedpans, commodes, and vessels did you have there in the beginning?

A. Technically in the beginning, I think we had 4, but we had very few men then, only what I brought from Tampa. There was perhaps 10 or 12 bed cases, and the balance were walking cases. We had 3 or 4 commodes at that time—I assume you want the worst conditions—at one time in a ward of 30 patients there were only 5 commodes.

Q. Were there at any time less than five?

A. We had great quantities. I shipped away almost a carload.

Q. I do not mean at the end; I wanted to know whether the statement that there was one or two bedpans only to a ward was correct or not?

A. I do not think correct; I had at least four.

Q. By ward you mean how many patients?

A. Thirty.

Q. Those tents had five beds each?

A. Yes, sir; that was the capacity.

Q. What number of thermometers did you have in the hospital when you had 400 patients?

A. I had a gross—roughly estimated.

Q. Were those thermometers in use in the wards or not?

A. The thermometers were issued by me to either the nurses or doctors who came after them. All I required was that they should sign a slip for it.

Q. Did you at all times have a sufficient number for use in that hospital?

A. That would depend upon what one would say is a sufficiency. There seemed to be a great desire on the part of nurses and doctors to have a great supply on hand—three or four at a time—and whether that would be sufficient, three or four to a ward, when there is a great number of patients—say 30 or 40 to a ward—I should say there should be five thermometers. I should say that would be sufficient. Nurses could hardly take temperatures quicker than that.

Q. At what time did the female nurses get there?

A. I should say about the 15th of August.

Q. Was it a fact that you had enough at that time?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. Is it a fact that the only thermometers at that time were those the nurses carried with them?

A. Oh, no; we had plenty of thermometers until the latter part of September; there were two or three days we were a little short, but there was never a time but there were enough for all clinical purposes.

Q. It has been stated there were practically none during the first two weeks the nurses came here.

A. That is not true; it was the latter part of September.

Q. How was it as respects your supply of medicines; would you know about that?

A. That came under my department.

Q. What have you got to say about it?

A. When we came there, there were no supplies, and they were building the hospital. When I came on, I brought a medical chest and field chest and three boxes, all drugs that I secured at Fernandina. We had medicines plenty for our needs. In the meantime some drugs were got together, and there was no scarcity of drugs until about the time of the arrival of the transports, when they commenced to ask for drugs from the regiments. They seemed to think they could get most anything they wanted from the general hospital, which, as a matter of fact, they did. There seemed to be no time at Camp Wikoff when there was not a sufficient quantity of drugs for all purposes.

Q. By that you mean what?

A. For the proper care of the sick there was at times certain drugs that certain doctors wanted and prescribed, but there was never a time when a doctor who used therapeutical knowledge could not use this or that as a substitute.

Q. Do I understand from you that all the drugs called for on the supply list were in sufficient quantity all the time when you were there?

A. They were there at all times, but I did not know it. I found drugs shipped to us in the beginning were on hand in the quartermaster's department. They were covered up with a lot of plunder and never found.

Q. When drugs were shipped to you was notice also sent to you?

A. Yes, sir; telegraphic notification.

Q. Every time?

A. I do not know about that, but it was an almost daily occurrence.

Q. If you received notification from New York of medical supplies sent to you, how was it possible that they should be buried up and not found until weeks afterwards when the camp was cleaned up?

A. Well, in this way: The cars would come unmarked and the bill of lading does not show the number of the car and we would go and open the cars and find quartermaster's stores in there after looking all through them. Cars came all mixed up with medical stores. We had a medical officer in the yard constantly during the hours of activity or daylight, looking out for our supplies, opening cars and looking in and trying to find our stores.

Q. If you received notification of the shipment from New York, was any effort made to find these articles?

A. The notification was this: "This day received by the Long Island Railroad Company, so and so." The railroad company landed these things in all kinds of shapes. They would say, "I think the medical supplies are in this car; go and find it." And we would go and find hay or commissary stores, and we could not get anything and would find it perhaps away in the back, but I had no cases of sick men suffering for want of drugs.

Q. When you did not find the drugs at Montauk, what steps did you take to find out where they were?

A. We made application to the railroad company.

Q. Had you made application to the railroad company, or quartermaster, or anybody, for these cases, which you say you found buried up under this stuff—any effort made to trace them?

A. Well, I do not know. So far as we were concerned we made application to the railroad company to have them traced, and they frequently did; for instance, there was a large quantity of supplies—commissary supplies—and delicacies that were five weeks on the road.

Q. Did it take five weeks to come from New York?

A. It did.

Q. How long did you say it usually took?

A. Three or four days usually from New York to Montauk.

Q. In that case did you apply to the railroad to trace the shipment?

A. We made complaint that the goods had not arrived, and they made search at the New York end.

Q. Did you know what time these articles were shipped that you found when the camp broke up?

A. I do not remember the date, but they were the very first shipments, probably about the 15th of August.

Q. And this was three months later?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in the meantime no effort was made to find them?

A. Oh, yes, sir; I went personally through the warehouses of the quartermaster and could find nothing. I found three or four bales of blankets there covered up. These things we knew had been shipped. The medical purveyor in New York said they had been shipped. The storehouse was piled so full the men could hardly walk through it.

Q. The regiments were supplied with medicines through you, were they not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not serious complaints were made that supplies could not be had at the general hospital?

A. There were no complaints made to me that they could not get the drugs. All that was required by me was that they write out all they wanted and sign

their names. They would come to me sometimes perfectly helpless. I would say if they would write out what they wanted and sign it, they would be put up by the drug clerk. They would say, "Well, now, can't you send it over, we have no teams." I would say, "Have you not two well men in your regiment?" Then after they came from Cuba they seemed to have lost all the snap they had.

Q. Did you at all times have all the supplies absolutely needed?

A. Yes, sir; in small quantities. They would sometimes want enough to last a month, and I would say, "I will give you enough to run a week, but you can come again after that time." They were given that quantity always.

Q. Now, how rapidly were those tents put up; how fast to accommodate the men coming in?

A. On the 8th of August the first tent went up, the first four in fact, and the Sixth Cavalry we put in there; and from that time the tents were erected as fast as the sick arrived, and there never was a time when the sick were not covered.

Q. Do I understand you to say that you were prepared at all times to receive all subjects for proper care?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I understand that you would have serious sick men apply for admission and be told there was no room?

A. They might have been told there was no room for cases like theirs. Thus, cases frequently were sent to us diagnosed as appendicitis, for instance.

Q. How often did that happen?

A. Three times in three months.

Q. Did you know of any case where a man was so diagnosed and died before morning?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know anything about Hugh Parrott's case?

A. I remember now I was called on that case: that was a case from the Eighth Infantry. That man died a little ahead of time—that is, I mean before he was expected to die. He was taken unexpectedly. Application was not made to have him brought into our hospital. That was it, as I remember it. There never was a time when they received orders from me to refuse admission, day or night, to anybody seriously sick. There was plenty of room for those. Now, this man's application may have been received by the ward superintendent, but it never was by me, and the doctor must have stated that he was not so sick but that he could be taken care of in the regiment, and then the man suddenly died. A man may be walking around and suddenly die, but I never blamed the doctor of the Eighth Regiment, and he was never refused admission to the general hospital.

Q. The statement is made that he was refused because there was no room for him, and he was taken back to the camp and was dead before morning.

A. I have no remembrance of such an occurrence.

Q. Were you at all times prepared to take care of all who applied there?

A. Yes, sir. Frequently men would walk up and say "I am sick." All wanted to go there, because that was the Mecca, and we had everything in God's world to eat.

Q. Was there any reason why you should not have had sufficient tents up and ready to receive the patients?

A. We did receive them.

Q. I didn't ask the question that way. I want to ask you if there was any reason why you should not have been ready to receive them there. Men were being treated in the regiments with a temperature of 105°.

A. There was no reason why tents should not have been put all over the island for that matter.

Q. Yes, sir; there was. Was there any reason why there should not have been enough tents for that hospital?

A. I do not know of any reason.

Q. How many tents would it take?

A. There were about 310 hospital tents

Q. In the hospital and its annex?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Does that include the division hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you any idea how many hospital tents were there?

A. No, sir; only approximately.

Q. Well, approximately?

A. At the division hospital there was about 165.

Q. That is 475 tents; now there was a division hospital?

A. There were three division hospitals.

Q. How many tents did they have?

A. They had about 75 tents each.

Q. Was the capacity lived up to?

A. In the cavalry division, I think, it was once. They had about 300 patients, and in the First Division hospital they had 125.

Q. In the other division hospitals?

A. Some regiments had hospitals.

Q. Was not your hospital so supplied with tents that it could receive all those sick in the regimental hospitals?

A. Well, the regimental surgeons felt that we were infringing on their duties a little bit and didn't send them to us. They wanted to keep them themselves.

Q. And yet we have positive statements that men were refused at the general hospital.

A. That application was never made there. The fact of the matter is, people there represented themselves as Colonel Forwood and Major Heizmann.

Q. Would a regimental surgeon be likely to go to Tom, Dick, and Harry?

A. I don't know of but one or two regimental surgeons that ever came there. They usually sent hospital corps men.

Q. As I understand, you had 310 tents and the division hospital 165. How many did the regimental hospitals have?

A. Perhaps 20.

Q. How many did the division hospitals have?

A. The Third Division hospital had a capacity of 300, perhaps.

Q. With the division hospitals?

A. Their capacity was 385; that was never filled but once.

Q. In the division hospital, how many tents did you have?

A. About 165.

Q. In the regiments, how many?

A. I should say 15 would be a conservative estimate.

Q. That covers all the tents?

A. Yes, sir; for the sick.

Q. There is 655; were the hospital tents used for other purposes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For what purpose?

A. Storehouses.

By General DODGE:

Q. At the hospital?

A. At the hospital; that is all.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Is that included in this 165 you have given me?

A. No, sir; there are other tents in the surgical wards; we had a row of 12 hospital tents.

Q. Is that in addition?

A. I did not count that because those are surgical cases.

Q. Now, I have a statement from the Quartermaster's Department that 701 hospital tents had been issued up to the 1st of August; those should have accommodated 4,200 men if all were used for the sick.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, under those circumstances, why should it have been that complaint should be made that they could not get into the general hospital?

A. I claim there never was a time when a man was refused in the general hospital. There was always room.

Q. Did the time occur when there were any vacant beds?

A. No, sir; there were no vacant beds, but we could get mattresses.

Q. What was the trouble in getting cots or beds for these various wards?

A. Lack of transportation.

Q. Did you ever apply for any?

A. We were constantly in need of cots. They were at the station, but it was impossible to get them up.

Q. Why?

A. Lack of transportation.

Q. Had you no transportation at the hospital?

A. We had ambulances.

Q. How many?

A. All told, 40. Twenty were with broken tongues, and, as a rule, we had 20 we could use.

Q. Did you make any effort to get them repaired; did you report it to the quartermaster, and was any action taken?

A. I do not know; I reported it to the next man above me.

Q. To whom did he report, do you know?

A. To the quartermaster.

Q. Did the quartermaster take action?

A. I think he did.

Q. But you never got the ambulances?

A. Yes, sir; we got them, I think, the 15th of September.

Q. Your greatest number of patients was when?

A. I should say, also, about the middle of September.

Q. Was there any wagons there that could have been gotten to transport these things from the station, that you needed so much?

A. I think so.

Q. Was any requisition made upon the quartermaster's department for transportation?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Did you yourself make any requisitions?

A. Yes, sir; I went to the quartermaster and demanded it. I wanted certain transportation to bring up cots, and I would not leave until I had it.

Q. Did you do this sufficiently often to get it?

A. I did it only once, and then I got what I wanted.

Q. Why could you not get this at all times?

A. We had a surgeon there at all times.

Q. But he didn't succeed in doing it?

A. Everybody was fighting to get transportation, and everybody wanted to do the best for his own command. Some wanted forage, and some wanted other things, and it became necessary after a while to send transportation under guard.

Q. Was any representation made by you to the Surgeon-General about the condition of things in the way of transportation?

A. I think I suggested to the Secretary of War, when he was there, if we could get some transportation attached to the hospital for ourselves it would be very convenient, and we got four wagons.

Q. Were they sufficient for your work?

A. They were at the time.

Q. What time was that?

A. We had a great difficulty in the beginning in getting our dead away, but we used these four wagons, and after that we had no trouble but with the transportation for hospital supplies and cots, etc.—there never was any arrangement made except personal solicitation to the quartermaster's department, that I know of.

Q. You say the patients laid on the ground?

A. Without cots, but not without mattresses.

Q. How many at any time?

A. Perhaps 100 at one time.

By General DODGE:

Q. Now, there has been testimony here that the orders at that post were always to respond to any requisition for transportation from the general hospital, and no call was ever made without it was responded to.

A. I think that is true in a measure, as soon as the wagons could get around.

Q. How long would that be?

A. Perhaps four to six hours.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you mean to say that no men were without cots or bedsteads for a longer period than four to six hours?

A. Yes, sir; and that would happen when they came at night. These teamsters would not work at night.

Q. Did that happen when men laid twenty-four hours on the ground?

A. I know of no instance of that kind.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did this happen in the daytime or night?

A. Nighttime.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you get notice of the sick who were coming?

A. Yes, sir; we would get a cablegram that so many sick were coming. I do not think the newspapers touched upon this enough. For instance, the *Olivette* was coming with 75 patients. When they got to Montauk it was 250. How did we know. We provided 10 or 15 per cent more, as an ordinary medical man would. Now, how were we to provide against that?

Q. After two or three transports had arrived in that condition, wouldn't it be prudent to expect the rest would come in that same condition?

A. Yes, sir; and we did, and went ahead to provide for them. We did not take the statistics sent us.

Q. About 1,700 patients was the most at any time in your hospital?

A. One thousand seven hundred and twenty.

Q. Now, what would have been the difficulty in preparing for twice 1,720 at your hospital?

A. Well, there were no unsurmountable difficulties, but the kitchens were here and there. Now, to begin to enlarge a plant—to double it would not have been impossible, but it would have been necessary to knock down all our kitchen works and remove and rebuild them.

Q. Could you not have left the kitchens just as they were and built around them?

A. If we could have got the supplies there, but when that railroad took five weeks to get things to us I don't know how it would have been.

Q. That occurred in how many instances?

A. I don't know as that long usually, but there was a great deal of difficulty.

Q. Was there any other difficulty?

A. At the very beginning the carpenters would not work in the rain.

Q. Well, after that period was there any difficulty in getting men?

A. No, sir; I don't think so.

Q. Was it not a question simply of extra work whether you had a capacity for 1,700 patients or three times that; you had plenty of room there?

A. Plenty of room.

Q. Was there not tentage on that ground, with 6 in a tent, for 4,200? Was there any serious difficulty in having a capacity for 4,000 patients on the 16th of August?

A. Yes, sir: it would have been impossible to get the stuff there to have got the beds and tentage ready.

Q. The tents were there on the 16th. How long would it have taken to get the tents up?

A. It would have taken ten days.

Q. Would it not have been easy to double that force?

A. There was this difficulty: All expected to be quarantined. They would say, "Suppose we are quarantined. We want to get out." We would try to smooth it over.

By General DODGE:

Q. We have a communication here from Mrs. Clemmie Gillow. I will read it. [Reads letter.] Do you remember those circumstances, and can you state the facts?

A. You have not the latest edition of that. The nurse in charge of that ward when Lieutenant Gillow was brought in went to him and said, "It is the orders that you deliver up your money and valuables." He gave up \$37, I believe, and he wanted to keep his watch, and she said, "No; you will have to deliver that up also." He did this under protest. I learned this, mind you, from rounding up everybody afterwards, and she took this watch and said in the presence of other nurses, "Isn't this a lovely watch? I have offered him \$20 for it, and he would not take it." One of them said, "That is a man's watch," and she said, "It is pretty, though; I like the looks of it," and it ended up there. The day before the Lieutenant was transferred his wife made a demand on Lieutenant Clarke, who was in charge of the safe, and he looked over his books and said he hadn't anything of the kind. In the meantime this nurse had left the hospital; she had returned to her home in New York; and the nurses thought that the whole of the nurses would be disgraced if the previous history of this nurse was not known, so they came to me and told me of certain things that I have related. She heard of it, and she came to Montauk, and in my presence said that while the safe was open she had put this watch and money in it while there was nobody there. As a matter of fact, the safe was not open unless Lieutenant Clarke or Arrasmith was there. I was not quite satisfied. A letter then came from the mayor of some little town, and I commenced to investigate and found that this nurse had made application to become a member of some guild in New York to which nurses belong, and in her reference which she had to give her character was looked up, and it was found that at different times she had been in the Tombs for theft; consequently she was not allowed to join this association. I was referred to this secretary. I communicated with them, and they confirmed what the others had said, and while they said, "We do not want our names mentioned in this matter unless it becomes necessary, you may use these letters." Another communication came through

the Adjutant-General's Office in reference to this same subject, with a statement from Lieutenant Clarke that the watch and money were never put in the safe in his presence, and with this evidence it was sent in just before I left Montauk, and that is the status of this case at present. The watch nor the money never came into the possession of the Lieutenant. I might say, however, that the Lieutenant was not a man of means, and when it came to my notice I gave him \$20, having collected \$12 from the Massachusetts Aid Association, I put in the balance of \$8 myself, so that he went away with \$20.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. I have found the Rev. Mr. Bryan's communication: "The dead tent at Camp Wikoff was perhaps 300 yards from the hospital. The bodies of those who died through the night were brought out usually on the mattresses they died on, were hastily washed, and put into cheap coffins that did not cost \$5 each. There was no lining in the coffins and in scarcely a single instance was so much as a pillow put under their heads. The only exception that I can recall was when a young man whom I had been much with while ill was put into the coffin I personally got a pillow and adjusted it under his head. Generally blocks of wood were put into the coffin to hold the heads up. Sometimes coffins were too short and limbs were simply bent to compel the bodies to go in. Where the bottles were that Major Brown mentioned, I have no idea. They were not in the coffins, neither were the suits which he speaks of. I wonder where the clothing went to which he says he gave out. It did not go on the bodies of the dead soldiers. Almost everyone of those were buried in nightshirts, and these the attendants rarely took the trouble to button on the bodies, but threw them over the top. The naked body lay flat upon a board on the coffin bottom. There was not only no bottle, but the only records made were lead-pencil marks on the tops of the coffins, marks that the damp earth would soon obliterate.

"Two men who were Bellevue Hospital badges seemed to be in charge, and I watched them morning after morning. They gave the least possible time to each dead man, pushing the filled coffin out into the hot sun, where the dead wagon, after a delay of sometimes as much as six hours, came and got them. The men who nailed the coffins up sat on the lids and told indecent stories, swore, and spat tobacco juice in all directions. I was so shocked that I once rebuked the men, but little good came from it. The gravediggers were a lot of Bowery toughs or some other toughs. Major Brown says the service of the church was read over each dead soldier. Again this is not true. Let me tell you what was done. Each afternoon at 4 o'clock the Protestant chaplain, part of the time only a layman, began to read burial services in the cemetery. He stood near one open, or partly open, grave. The other graves were left uncovered. The service was read once for all who were buried that day, Protestants and Catholics alike. After he was through reading the Catholic chaplain began to read, and he read his service once for all, in one case as many as eight, Catholic and Protestant alike. Soldiers are, I believe, entitled to have the flag of their country wrapped about their coffins, taps at the grave—a military funeral. These poor Montauk boys had no flag and no taps." What have you to say in regard to these various things?

A. The first man who died at Camp Wikoff was J. Knox Green, of Texas. He belonged to the Rough Riders. There was no chaplain at the hospital at that time, and I could not find one. I read the service over his grave and immediately made application for a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain. Father Fitzgerald and Rev. Mr. Bateman, both regular chaplains, were sent the next day, and their services continued until both were sick and had to leave, but in the meantime other Protestant and Catholic clergymen had arrived and took up the work, the Rev. Purcelli and his assistant, Rev. Mr. Flaharty, for the Catholic, and the Protestant clergymen, I don't remember their names. Two of them read the services every afternoon

and stood side by side in burying the dead. If they had been kept twenty-four hours—I was determined to keep every body twenty-four hours—and telegraphed at once to the parties interested—fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, or whoever it might be—that So-and-so was dead, and asked what disposition be made of the bodies; and if I got no answer, the burial followed officially at 4 o'clock. I visited the morgue and graveyard quite frequently in fact, laid out and selected the place. In stepping around from my tent around the corner I have seen a clergyman there, two or three of them, reading the services, and they would read the service until after 5 o'clock.

In ordering coffins I ordered them 6 feet and 6 feet 2. There are very few soldiers, as you know, over 6 feet 2, and while I don't know that men 6 feet and 2 inches were put in coffins 6 feet in length, I don't believe it. So far as pillows are concerned, I don't believe they did have them. They had blocks of wood, and, so far as I am concerned personally, I believe it is better. Where you expect to take bodies up again there is less liability of a stench by making a bad matter worse by having a lot of decomposed feathers under their heads, and this was not by my order, but it seemed to be by general consent so far as burial is concerned. When a man died, the doctor had to pass judgment. He gives a report to me and I keep it in my books, and the doctors are always sent for, and the nurse was compelled to record it in the books—the time, regiment, and everything, practically a descriptive list of the man. Now, they were taken out there, not on the mattress alone, but the whole outfit. The mattress was destroyed and the bed disinfected and then returned, and they were stripped of clothing—no question about that, because when we gave a man a bath we took off the clothing to give it to him, whether dead or alive, and he was bathed properly and put into a coffin not costing over \$5, I presume, but painted to the imitation of rosewood or something of that kind. They were put in a coffin the shape of an ordinary coffin. They were put in metallic caskets to be shipped, hermetically sealed, and the expenses paid, transportation and all, by the Government, and clothed in their uniform. The undertaker went usually. The doctor wrote up a descriptive blank for one uniform outfit, etc. I O. K.'d it, and it was issued.

Q. Have you anything further to say of the men in charge of the morgue?

A. No, sir; that did not alter my opinion at all. They were the best men I have ever seen. I had experience. I never saw men work more carefully than those there.

Q. Who had charge of the furloughing of the men?

A. The orders furloughing the men were signed by Major Heizmann.

A. As respects their being sent down to the station, were they sent on foot to find their way alone.

A. I think in the very beginning of the furloughing friends would come there and ask Major Heizmann for a furlough of the men. It would be investigated and at that time the testimony of the doctor in charge was taken, and I believe that the doctor, unaccustomed to the persuasive ways of women, did injustice to the soldier and let him be taken away. But while the doctor was perhaps a little at fault in giving way to those pleadings, there was just as much fault on the part of the people when told that it was better to stay there. A little later, when furloughing was becoming a feature of our work, a board was appointed, at my suggestion.

Q. At about what date, please?

A. I think about the middle of August. They also passed upon the men fit to be transferred to the other hospitals. Those men were all men of experience and all were at least majors, and from that time on I heard of very little complaint.

Q. Were any men furloughed or transferred to other hospitals in opposition to the opinion of this board you speak of?

A. No, sir.

Q. How large a percentage was sent away who were unfit to travel?

A. You mean furloughed?

Q. Either furloughed or transferred to other hospitals?

A. No. Let me see. All those that were transferred by the recommendation of this board were fit to go. It was safe to go.

Q. Before this board was instituted?

A. After this board was instituted, all that went were fit to go. Previous to that, perhaps a half a dozen got away that ought not to have gone; but they would not wait; they would put out themselves.

Q. It has been stated that a considerable number of men that left Montauk on furlough broke down utterly and were unable to travel farther. Do you know anything about that?

A. I don't; but it has been so stated.

Q. It has been stated that men sent to the hospital with temperatures in the second or third week of typhoid were transferred to other hospitals.

A. I don't believe it, because I had frequent interviews with this board. I gave it as my opinion that I did not believe in removing the patients except in the first week and up to the beginning of the second week. There was very little probability of perforation then, and I have yet to hear of a case that died as a consequence of this transferring.

Q. Will you state whether any men were compelled to go away on furlough or were transferred against their wishes?

A. No one was compelled to go on furlough, but men were selected to be transferred without consulting them.

Q. Why were those men sent away?

A. To make room for men expected to arrive in a more serious condition.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in having a sufficient number of beds to accommodate these typhoid patients and those expected to arrive soon?

A. It would have been practically impossible to have kept all the patients at Montauk, because there were 10,000 men, more or less, in the general hospital, and it would have been impossible to build a hospital to take 10,000 in the time we had to do it.

Q. How many sent away were in the second and third week of typhoid?

A. Well, you know it is hard to determine many times the exact week a man is in typhoid, but so far as human ingenuity could tell, there was none.

Q. The statement is made from New York that many were sent who never ought to have been permitted to leave their beds. They were in the second or third week of typhoid, seriously ill, and could not have been benefited by being transferred, and were entirely unfit subjects for removal.

A. Of course, if a doctor of reliable standing said that I would be inclined to believe it, but I do not know anything about it. When they left us it was the belief of this board that it was perfectly safe to transport these men.

Q. How many men in any one day went through the hands of this board, so to speak?

A. I think the largest number was 108.

Q. How long, think you, would it take to examine 108 men and determine whether proper subjects to transfer or not?

A. Well, these three men usually started in at 10 o'clock in the morning and they would be able to make a report incomplete, but usually we got the figures of how much transportation would be needed, and they would make a partial report by half past 3 or 4 o'clock, and we would be able to commence to ship.

Q. Was this the ordinary average daily number?

A. Oh, no; that is the maximum; the minimum was perhaps 20.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in having the men who were fur-

loughed paid off and given their transportation and commutation money at the hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why was it that they were sent to the station to wait sometimes for hours in order to get this?

A. Well, I do not know how that was done. I know that an order was issued, by what commanding officer I do not know, but such an order was issued along about the latter part of August or the 1st of September, so they could be fixed out at the hospital.

Q. Who by?

A. I think General Wheeler: I do not know.

Q. Was that obeyed?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I mentioned to the hospital quartermaster the fact that such an order had been issued. He said he knew it, but he said, "I am sick and going home," and he went. They sent another man there who did not know anything about it or about anything.

Q. Who was he?

A. I don't remember. He was a young man, a second lieutenant.

By General DODGE:

Q. Just a detailed man, not a regular quartermaster?

A. No, sir; and before he could get inspiration he was taken sick. Another man was sent, and finally I got so thoroughly disgusted with the whole outfit that I tried to make arrangements with the quartermaster at the station to come at a certain hour, and we did that from that time on.

Q. What was the time set for him to come?

A. Two o'clock in the day.

Q. Now, what time in the month?

A. I think the beginning of the second week in September.

Q. How long were they detained at the station, as a rule?

A. I should say from ten to twenty-five minutes.

Q. Did you have occasion to visit the station?

A. Yes, sir; frequently.

Q. Did you or not see a considerable number of men in line?

A. I have seen a good many at the station waiting for a train, but after the time that the quartermaster made that arrangement there was very little delay.

Q. What time was this arrangement made, when the place was only 150 yards away from the station?

A. The quartermaster's office?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Why, his office was in the north end of the long building or storehouse, which was, I should say, 150 yards from the station.

Q. How long was it before the office was changed to the station itself?

A. Well, about the time I arranged to have the men get their papers.

Q. Was it reported to you that men waited for hours for their papers?

A. Up to that time; never after that.

Q. Why was not the laundry put up there earlier in the history of the hospital?

A. A representative of the American Laundry Company came there at the very beginning, during the first three or four days, and commenced to talk laundry. I told him I believed it necessary, and to see Colonel Forwood. He saw him. Colonel Forwood invited me into the conference, and we talked it over together. He told the man to come the next day, or second day, I don't remember which, but at least by the second day it was arranged specifically, and everything was ordered

by telegraph for this plant, and while they agreed to have it there in nine days, it was between three and four weeks before we got it in operation.

Q. Was it over four weeks from the time you began receiving patients?

A. Just about.

Q. Was it ever in perfect working order?

A. Yes, sir; afterwards it was. After they changed the pump. It was put in at first too small. It was not quite large enough, I think.

Q. How long before this change in the pump was effected, you speak of?

A. Along the middle or latter part of September.

Q. So that four weeks elapsed before it was in proper working order?

A. Before it was in perfect working order. We got considerable service out of it for white clothes with the small pump.

Q. What did you do with the soiled linen before that?

A. We burned it up.

Q. When?

A. Every day.

Q. When did you commence to?

A. About the 15th of August.

Q. When was it, then, that the soiled linen was pushed back under the tents?

A. It was not.

Q. We have positive testimony that it was.

A. They are mistaken. I saw that in the paper. If you had been at Montauk, you would have seen that at once. It would lead anybody to think that a board was taken up and it was pushed in under.

Q. No; they say it was at the end. More than that, we have testimony that it remained so for a period of ten to fourteen days.

A. Where this linen was put, it was thrust there by the policing party, expecting every day that this laundry would be working and it could be carried away. Now that was shoved under the floor. It was from 12 to 14 feet from the ground to the floor. There was no serious danger at all. I do not know by whose order it was done—not mine; but it was ordered out.

Q. Did you order it out?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At what time?

A. Well, some time after the 15th of August.

Q. How long after?

A. I could not say how long. I ordered it out and carted away to the laundry, and ordered it boiled, and General Young came along and ordered it burned up.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Explain how that was 14 feet from the floor to the ground?

A. The hospital was built on a ridge, and it was built off at right angles from the walk, over the valley, so that at each end of the ward it was from 12 to 15 feet from the ground. It was built upon stilts like.

Q. The soiled clothing was simply put in a room there made by nature?

A. Yes, sir; not under the floor at all, practically.

Q. Tell us whether the clothes could have been put under the floor as we understand it?

A. No, sir; they could not.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. By whose orders were they burned?

A. General Young's.

Q. During all this time it was impossible to have the clothing cleaned or washed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How large a quantity of bedclothing was destroyed at this time?

A. I do not know at that time. There was about 6,000 blankets altogether.

Q. Did you have sheets and pillowcases?

A. Oh, great quantities.

Q. And bedding?

A. Several boxes were never used.

Q. From the time you went there did you have sheets and pillowcases for all your beds?

A. No; I think not.

Q. Was there any difficulty in getting these things? If so, what?

A. There was very little difficulty in getting them. We got large supplies during that time. Our supplies had been burned and we got from the Red Cross Association a great number of sheets, pillowcases, pajamas, and blankets.

Q. Was it necessary for the United States Government to fall back upon the Red Cross for bedding for these hospital patients?

A. No, sir; I don't think it was necessary.

Q. Why was it done, then?

A. It was a mere matter of convenience.

Q. As a matter of convenience you got these things? Ought not you have been able to get them from the Government?

A. They were ordered and on the way, but they did not get there.

Q. Yet the Red Cross was perfectly able to get all their supplies there?

A. Yes, sir; but they brought it up by boat. They came in on the 11th—10 tons.

Q. Could not the United States Government have sent 20 tons, if necessary?

A. Yes, sir; but they sent it by rail.

By General DODGE:

Q. What time did the Government ship it?

A. They were ordered when Colonel Forwood first went down there. He had discovered the condition of affairs and he thought he knew what was needed, and made his requisitions accordingly. The Surgeon-General says, "Here's New York 100 miles away. There is a medical purveyor; you can have everything you want," and we did.

Q. Your theory is, it was ordered from New York, but did not reach you?

A. It didn't reach us.

Q. The testimony is here from the quartermaster and the railroad company that their records show there was only one shipment that did not reach there, and that there were numbers of cars there that were never unloaded when the place was broken up.

A. They ran cars in there where it was impossible to get at them. I know the goods were shipped, because I got the invoice.

Q. The testimony also of the quartermaster and the president of the road that each of two tracks were so placed that wagons could drive to every car, and his plans were presented to us to show that fact. It is singular that those cars on the track there were never unloaded.

A. I have got the plans of his yards in my head. I don't care what he has got on paper. I have walked around there in sand up to my knees. The tracks ran northeast to southwest. You could not get to them, even the railroad company. We would get to them sometimes, and find hay in them. Back of that, if we had power enough to get over it, were medical supplies and blankets. They had no switching when we first went there, and our animals stood howling to get out.

Q. What date?

A. August 8.

Q. I am speaking of the arrangements there afterwards.

A. They never had any arrangements. When we first got there one of the road

masters said, "I didn't know until fifteen days ago that this thing was going to happen." They could have built all over that prairie in that time, but they didn't.

Q. What percentage of your hospital bedding and furniture did you receive from the Red Cross?

A. Well, we received from the Red Cross about 3,500 blankets, and about twice that number of sheets and twice that number of pillowcases, and perhaps 3,500 suits of pajamas.

Q. Who was responsible for the hospital, Major Heizmann or yourself?

A. During that time, or at the end?

Q. All along.

A. From the first, Colonel Forwood; midway, Major Heizmann, and latterly myself.

Q. Major Heizmann was relieved at what time?

A. October 12.

Q. And it was after that time that you were responsible?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were papers passed transferring this hospital property?

A. No, sir; no papers were passed. It all fell on me finally.

Q. Did you give any papers?

A. No, sir; I have taken it up now as "property found," and got it straightened out.

Q. Now, as respects your milk and ice—how did you get it?

A. Well, at the very beginning, on the way from New York to Montauk, I ordered milk from every station to be sent twice a day for the sick, and when I got there my milk came right along in sufficient quantities. Still, the supply of ice at that time was very small, and the milk would sour; but I rustled around and got some, but the milk kept coming, and I duplicated the order, until finally we were getting 2,000 and 3,000 gallons a day.

Q. Did you ever improve on the ice?

A. Oh, yes, sir; we finally got ice in great quantities. About two-thirds of the time we had ice in great plenty and the other third we were shy.

Q. Was that at the beginning?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much of the supply of milk and ice came from the Red Cross?

A. I do not know of our getting milk from the Red Cross, though everybody was sending milk there. There was milk there until there was not room to get around. There are cans enough there now to start two of the biggest dairies in the United States.

Q. How much ice did you get from the Red Cross?

A. The Red Cross, I think, furnished four or five carloads.

Q. Every day?

A. No, sir; all told. There was some arrangement between Mr. ——— and Major Heizmann by which some was given, but after awhile the Major commenced to purchase ice.

Q. How long would that ice last you, supposing you had the means to keep it?

A. About four or five weeks.

Q. So you had four or five weeks' supply from the Red Cross?

A. Yes, sir; I think so.

Q. What time did you receive the order allowing 60 cents a day per man for the sick?

A. My impression is at the first visit of the Secretary of War.

Q. Can you fix the date? I have heard that referred to a great many times.

A. I could if I had my books here.

Q. Was it in August or September?

A. In August.

Q. Do you know how late in August?

A. I should say between the 20th and 25th. The Surgeon-General came about a week later.

Q. They were not together, then?

A. No, sir; the Secretary of War was there twice or three times and the Surgeon-General once.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Was the Secretary of War there in September?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was he there twice?

A. I think he was there three times.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was it after his first visit that you got orders for ice?

A. Yes, sir; he told us to get all we wanted to.

Q. What time did you get the 60-cents-a-day order?

A. I think Order No. 116 carried that.

Q. What date was that order?

A. I think along about the 10th of August.

Q. Do I understand that this was dated back to the 10th and you got it later?

A. No, sir; it was issued on the 10th, but we didn't get it until the 24th.

Q. It took you two weeks, then, to get such an order?

A. I am not so sure it was that long—I can not remember. The books would show.

Q. Did you receive enough money under that to run your hospital?

A. Yes, sir; it ran over. I have \$1,542 now.

Q. Is 60 cents a day enough to provide for any man in hospital?

A. More than enough.

Q. Is it in addition to the regular ration that makes it sufficient to answer the purpose?

A. Sixty cents is the outside figure.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. When a man arrived at Montauk, he went into the detention camp, did he not?

A. If he had a clean bill of health; the soldiers went into camp, and the sick came to us.

Q. If he did not have a clean bill of health, where did he go?

A. He remained there.

Q. If he got sick?

A. Yes, sir. He was usually taken to the detention hospital.

Q. When he went from his own camp to this detention hospital, did he have to have any paper?

A. He should have a transfer paper. They did not always do that. They simply gave the regiment and company.

Q. Was there any order to that effect existing there?

A. No, sir, that is a regulation.

Q. In point of fact, do you know whether they gave a man who went to the detention hospital any paper at all?

A. It was not customary at any of the hospitals.

Q. They didn't do it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, he would go to the general hospital if very sick?

A. Yes, sir; frequently sent in an ambulance.

Q. Would he have any paper?

A. No, sir.

Q. Any descriptive list?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did he have a statement from the doctor?

A. Very frequently.

Q. The doctor in the detention camp?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Giving their company and regiment?

A. Yes, sir; they could give him a transfer slip in the regiment where this man originated. It should be sent with the patient, giving the information of his rank, name, regiment and company, and their diagnosis.

Q. Then the doctor would have to furnish that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then was it the duty of the doctor to send a diagnosis?

A. No, sir; but he should.

Q. In what form?

A. Either pin it on the person of the patient or send it by the attendant.

Q. Then when he got to the detention hospital, what was done then? Was he supposed to be sent to the general hospital?

A. That was not exactly the way it went, but they would send this slip saying, "Not a fit subject for the detention hospital." When he came to the general hospital, they would take that transfer slip and incorporate it in the book and turn it over to the executive officer.

Q. Supposing a man goes from the general hospital to New York, what would be done then?

A. Well, the physician that ordinarily books the man's name, rank, regiment and company, and the diagnosis of the case puts it on this card, which is tied in the buttonhole of the patient.

Q. That stated what was the matter with the patient?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. We have proof that it was not done.

A. I know it was done; it was my order.

Q. We have the proof that the man was put in an ambulance and went to the detention camp hospital, and then went to the general hospital and from there to New York; and when he left the general hospital, the tag was put on with "malarial fever" and he had typhoid fever, and he died in two days.

A. That may be so.

Q. Do you know who was in charge from the 27th of August to the 5th of September?

A. Major Heizmann.

Q. Whose business would it have been in this particular case? The name of the man was Dobson; have you heard of it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know anything about the Dobson case?

A. Yes, sir; he was evidently mistaken in the diagnosis.

Q. He evidently had typhoid fever. His tag said "malaria." They simply bundled him into an ambulance and took him to the general hospital and then sent him to New York; and when he started for New York, they pinned onto him a "malaria" tag, but he did not have it; he had typhoid. But it had been diagnosed as malaria. What I want to find out is if there was any possibility of the doctor of the hospital to which he was sent knowing what was the proper diagnosis.

A. Yes, sir; that was a rule supposed to have been carried out in every instance. Of course now and then it might not be, but they were all supposed to have a regular transfer slip, when they went to New York to Major Appel, so he would know, and his records would show what we thought of it, and as a double safeguard the man was tagged.

Q. The proof here of Major Cox, and the captain of the company, and by the quartermaster-sergeant, and the mother of the man is that nothing of the kind was ever done; nothing of any kind, either a descriptive list or anything.

A. I could see how that happened. They would send to us a man unconscious, without any papers whatever, and suppose us to get from an unconscious man his descriptive list. He would die sometimes before he would regain consciousness, and we would never know who he was.

Q. Who was to blame for that?

A. The doctor at the camp.

Q. Did he do it right or wrong?

A. He didn't do it at all. He failed to do what he ought to have done.

Q. You say it was a system around there?

A. They took men who were green and didn't know anything about the regulations didn't have time to learn.

Q. Whose business was it to instruct them? Dr. Cox came here and swore that.

A. Well, if he read his papers on file, he would have known what to do. A medical man is supposed to know enough.

Q. That theory would be a very bad one, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, sir; but I would not take any man's diagnosis. I would not take Tom, Dick, or Harry's diagnosis; I want to know myself. I would be very glad to have his opinion. Any man's opinion is worth something. But it would not change an opinion of mine at all.

Q. Don't you think it ought to be the practice of a regimental surgeon to send or write on a paper what is the matter with the man?

A. He ought to be court-martialed.

Q. They didn't do that at all.

A. We were a general dumping ground of the whole world at that time, you might say. They dumped these men there without any descriptive lists whatever.

Q. Did you protest?

A. Yes, sir. We called it to their attention, but they would say themselves, "We can not find who they are." The driver would say he found him down there somewhere.

Q. The mother testified that she spent a whole day trying to find her son. Had you no way of identifying a man?

A. We had no way if a man came to us unconscious. The ambulance responds any time, night or day.

Q. Then the sicker man is the worse treated?

A. No, sir; everybody is treated alike; we do not know one from the other.

Q. You could not do anything for him, could you, if he were unconscious?

A. Oh, no, sir.

Q. Could you diagnose him in that condition?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. You spoke of the regimental surgeon sending a man to the hospital without transfer slips or anything indicating what the disease was. Can the same thing be said of the men sent out of your hospital?

A. I don't believe there was a man sent out of our hospital without a descriptive list or tag. There may have been one slipped through, but I do not see how it could. It was the duty of the doctor to see the slips made out and the nurse to see that it was pinned onto the patient. It was the joint duty of both to see that he was dressed and all ready to go. By that I mean that his papers were correct, that he was properly tagged; and if you could see how a man slipped through very well, I don't. So far as human ingenuity could devise, I doubt very much whether they did or not.

Q. Your records were very much mixed?

A. Yes, sir; very much for a while.

Q. Were bed cards used to indicate the pulse of the patient?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that true in every case?

A. Yes, sir; we didn't have a printed form.

Q. It has been stated to us that these papers may have been torn off from a newspaper or an old envelope, and sometimes the diagnosis may have been put on and sometimes not; is that a fact?

A. So far as the envelope goes, I presume it was true; so far as the diagnosis goes, I presume it was true.

Q. Would it have taken any length of time to get 100,000 bed cards, if necessary?

A. Well, no; but it would take some little time.

Q. At the last, Doctor, what was your system; did you improve upon the hospital?

A. At the last it was as nearly perfect as possible.

Q. Suppose you sent a man to New York; what was done?

A. He was tagged and a descriptive list went with him, and his final papers were sent to the commanding officer. If no commanding officer, notice was sent to the family of the soldier where he had gone and where he could be found, and who to make application to to find about him.

Q. Why didn't you do that in the beginning?

A. We didn't have the data and we didn't have a descriptive list; but when was there a camp in the world in which so much was done so well? The death rate was only 2 per cent; and I have searched the records and you can not find a hospital in the world with a record like that. Everybody that came to it was sick.

Q. You have kept the record up after they got home?

A. No, sir; only in a general way.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I would like to ask what percentage that came to the hospital were unknown to you by name?

A. One-half of 1 per cent perhaps finally, but originally perhaps 10, yes, 15, per cent came in without our knowing who they were or having any means to find out.

Q. What percentage were accompanied by some paper, evidences of who they were?

A. I should say 15 per cent.

Q. And 85 per cent came incorrectly?

A. Yes, sir. We failed to find out, I presume, one-half of 1 per cent. I succeeded in locating all unknown but four before I came away.

Q. How were your records? Were they so a person could come to you and find a patient unknown to you? What percentage could not be found?

A. I should say none.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What was the percentage of deaths from typhoid?

A. There were about 450 cases of well-defined typhoid, "Simon pure" typhoid; of that number about 45 died.

Q. Now, those cases in which complications were present, how many were there, and what was the percentage of mortality?

A. In figuring all the diarrhea and dysentery which usually accompanied that—

Q. Pardon me, I want to know whether you consider perforation a complication or not?

A. I consider it a complication; not a part of the disease.

Q. How about pneumonia?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the death rate of such?

A. There were six cases of so-called typho-pneumonia. Two of them died.

Q. How many of perforation?

A. There were four.

Q. Only four?

A. Only four we were sure of. There was one case that progressed so far that his temperature had been normal for several days and he was on liquid diet, but the quantity had been increased and he was getting along finely. All of a sudden there was a pain in the right side and a swelling in the bowels. The young doctor in charge thought he had a case of appendicitis and called in an older man for an operation for appendicitis. The older man didn't think it was appendicitis, and he died in that way. We had a post-mortem examination and that swelling was a pushing of the gas. It was a question in the mind of the young doctor, but it turned out to be perforation.

Q. All of your perforations died?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many cases of hemorrhage did you have?

A. Eight.

Q. How many recovered?

A. All but one.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you remember of receiving a letter from Jos. A. Tabor, surgeon of the Eighth United States Infantry?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you seen Dr. Tabor's statement in relation to that?

A. No, sir.

Q. I will read his letter. He states this: "Sir, I have a case of diarrhea and general debility, also a case of beri-beri (suspected): the first case so weak that he is unable to get about, and the second case has been sick for the past six weeks, and he is more or less demented. Please let me know if you can admit them to-day, and oblige, yours, respectfully, Jos. A. Tabor, surgeon, Eighth United States Infantry." He states: "I sent this by an orderly, who returned and told me he could get no answer at all at the hospital. I therefore called at the hospital in person and saw Major Brown, urging that I had cases that called for hospital attention at once and could not be delayed. He answered me that it was utterly impossible to receive them. I repeated that if those patients were not received they would die; whereupon he answered, 'Look out there under that canvas. There are 15 desperately sick men, waiting for some one in the hospital to die, so they can get a cot.'" What have you to say in relation to that?

A. As a matter of fact, Dr. Tabor is a very fine man and very enthusiastic, I expect, in his profession. He came to the general hospital frequently. He sent his orderly with that message, and I remember it about in that language. My reply was this: "If you have any doubt about the condition of your patients, would suggest that as soon as you are able to diagnose, or partially so, as to whether they are fit subjects for the general hospital, we would be glad to receive them. We are pretty well crowded, but would make room for more." That went back, and there was a big howl from the Doctor: investigation was started, and I was called as a witness. There was a sort of trial and investigation down there in the Eighth Infantry. I have never seen the Doctor since. I do not blame anybody, as it was simply one of those cases that got to going, and the thing drifted along without anybody being at fault, and the man died.

Q. What have you to say to his statement as to what you said?

A. I did not say that. He must have been talking to somebody else.

Q. "He could not even supply me with that. As a final resort, I asked for simply the ordinary utensils for the bedside, and I could not obtain them. That was the condition of the camp for dereliction, in which the Secretary of War writes this letter concerning me."

A. I have no criticism to make about Dr. Tabor.

Q. What about the other utensils spoken about here?

A. It is so unusual for a man to come in and ask for the usual bedside utensils; that includes everything from an ambulance to a cambric needle; that is based on the principle give to anybody anything that you have, and in such quantities as possible without running ourselves short. Now, I had everything that was necessary to conduct a first-class general hospital or other hospitals.

Q. Now, you stated once that you would deliver any material whenever called upon, to last for a week.

A. Yes, sir; I think that is a very conservative statement.

Q. Were there any reasons why you should never give them what they required for a month? Why was it necessary to bring them there every week?

A. We were not medical supply officers. We did it out of kindness of heart.

Q. You were the medical supply officers of that camp?

A. No, sir; they could get them the same as we did.

Q. Who from?

A. The medical supplies they could obtain the same as we did; but they did not have as much to get as we did. There was never a time that you could not get all you wanted.

Q. All these local surgeons could draw from the depot?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Didn't they come to you and Colonel Forwood to get requisitions approved?

A. Yes, sir; but it was a standing order to get anything we wanted. It was a standing order from the Surgeon-General that we could have anything that money could buy in New York.

Q. Now, there is one other thing. Speaking about the ambulances in Montauk during September, a witness says there was always twenty on hand ready when called for.

A. There was forty, twenty without tongues.

Q. How long were they there without tongues?

A. For about a week before I left; finally some of them were without wheels.

Q. How many ambulances were there then?

A. Some regiments had one, and some two or three. As soon as I found out they had more than one, I got the others; and we had working there, at high speed, I think, about 25 ambulances, all told.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Isn't it a fact that those hospital ambulances were used for carrying strangers and visitors and what not about the camp?

A. As a general thing, no. It did happen in one or two cases, but it was stopped, and the provost-marshal had orders to stop them at once and make them get out.

Q. How long did this go on?

A. Oh, for two days.

Q. It attracted attention very soon?

A. As a common saying, "we were onto the job."

Q. Did you get those things from the New York papers?

A. No, sir; we didn't read newspapers; we didn't have time. We got onto things pretty quick. They got to stealing blankets, and we stopped them pretty soon.

Q. How was that?

A. A man in the employ of the laundry.

Q. Did you have plenty of doctors?

A. Yes, sir; and several on the waiting list trying for a job.

Q. How many cases did you have at one time for a doctor?

A. I think the highest number was 38. Thirty-eight was the highest practically that any one doctor had to visit during the day that was seriously sick. It was arranged finally that two would have perhaps 75 patients.

Q. Do you think any one man can take care of 38 seriously ill?

A. I certainly do.

Q. How much better would it have been if a surgeon had had charge of 19?

A. I don't think a bit better. If a man can not take care of 38 patients, he don't know his business. He don't have to drive anywhere, which we have all done and have had more than 38. With professional female nurses, and all the drugs that he wants, and everything under the sun he wants, if he can not do that he had better go out of the service.

Q. Would it not have been better to have more doctors?

A. No, sir; we had all we needed. We had more than we needed, and sent them around to the regiments, two, three, and four to a regiment, to get rid of them.

Q. What was the character of the doctors you had there?

A. Professionally they were the best lot I ever saw come together. There was not more than two poor ones in the lot, and in less than a day those were found out and their contracts annulled, and this was equally true of the brigade surgeons on duty there. Camp Wikoff was very fortunate in its volunteer doctors and regular doctors. I never saw anything to complain of. They were thoroughly up to date and thoroughly competent to look after the patients.

Q. Were any measures taken to keep typhoid fever from patients?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it, as a rule, practiced?

A. We tried to start it at the very beginning, and to a more or less extent carried it through, but at times they would come in very rapidly, perhaps, and rather than cause any inconvenience we passed them in.

Q. And inside of twenty-four hours they were passed to the typhoid-patient wards?

A. Yes, sir; if it was safe to make the transfer. If it was not, no attempt was made to transfer the sick men.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that frequently transfers were made from one ward to another?

A. No, sir.

Q. It has been so stated.

A. I will tell you how that was. We got notice from the Weather Department that the equinoctial storm would strike Montauk about a certain day, so we wanted to get in out of the wet; so we commenced to transfer them from the canvas to the wood pavilions. There were eight of these canvas pavilions.

Q. How large a number of transfers did that mean?

A. One man was only transferred once.

Q. How many patients were in the barracks?

A. We had 4, and the capacity was 50 each.

Q. What was the length and breadth and height of a barrack?

A. Eighteen feet wide, 128 feet long, and 7 feet 2 inches at the eaves.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Doctor, complaint has been made about the effect of noise on the patients.

A. Yes, sir. Mrs. Lafferty complained of that. The poor woman was very much exercised over her son, and very rightly. About this time, expecting the storm, we were building a shack, the second one from her son. He was passed all harm

or hope in this world. Now, before any noise was reported as going on there she came to me distracted, and said, "I wish you would stop that noise of building." I said, "I will go and see." I asked others in the ward if this noise disturbed them, and they said, "No; not a particle;" but it distracted Mrs. Lafferty. She became beside herself. She didn't know what she was doing. I transferred the men around on the other side, so you could hardly hear them, and an hour afterwards her son died, but it had no effect on her son. I told her that the work must go on, and while her son was worth more than all the others combined, I had no doubt the storm was coming.

Q. Was he conscious of the noise at the time?

A. He was unconscious. Within an hour he died, and he was unconscious when he died.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did the Quartermaster's Department furnish you all the materials that you made requisition for there?

A. I can only answer that in this way: What Colonel Forwood asked for I do not know. I asked for some, and I seized ambulances when I could. We didn't have enough.

Q. You never had enough?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did the sick suffer by reason of the want of ambulances?

A. They may have in the regiments where they had none.

Q. Your sick?

A. Our sick did not particularly. There were delays in getting them away from the boats, long delays. A few minutes seemed to a sick man a long time. They were in a bad condition, worn out and everything else, and it required stimulation and great preparation to keep warmth and life in their bodies at all, and it was a long ways from the wharf to the hospital. I do not think it influenced death.

By General McCook:

Q. It was discomfort instead of danger; there was no hardship?

A. No, sir; simply a matter of waiting.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Doctor, did not the sick on the transports suffer in going to the hospital? It has been stated that the men were compelled to walk through that heavy sand three-quarters of a mile when practically almost unable to stand.

A. I don't believe in that, unless it was some of the bravado of the soldiers walking up to the last with a firm military tread. Some did that.

Q. Did you have sufficient transportation to take them up to the camps?

A. We did have sufficient by making more than one trip. We would only load what we could handle. There may have been stretcher cases. I think the Ninth Massachusetts were brought up altogether in ambulances. They were sick and we fed them. We would bring up a load and go right back, but we would only take them off as long as we had room in the ambulances, but in all cases we got them off without leaving part of them during the night.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was the detention-camp hospital under your charge?

A. No, sir; only so far as the police work is concerned.

Q. Do you know anything about the feeding of any of these regiments when they went to the detention camp?

A. Well, I don't know so much about the camp.

Q. They complained that they would simply furnish the Government ration?

A. That complaint was made by us. The commander determines what is best for the sick men. Now, I think the best judge is the doctor, who understands his business, and so far as the sick at the hospital was concerned they were given such food as was best for them.

Q. You don't know anything about the detention camp?

A. No, sir; only by hearsay. I did not pay much attention to that.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. I would like to ask why, when the nurses came there and the hospital was first established, they were told they would have to wait a week or ten days before you could use them?

A. What kind—trained nurses?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I never heard of that. I advocated female nurses, and it was opposed at first.

Q. By whom?

A. I think Colonel Forwood. You can not say it was opposition, either. That was in the very beginning, when we didn't know just where we were at, and we learned later on. I was of the opinion that female nurses would be a big thing, and he was soon convinced of it. He was not opposed to them. He was finally very enthusiastic. They came there in great numbers. Finally we had 101 Sisters of Charity and 132 other nurses.

Q. Were you able to secure trained men nurses?

A. They were not a howling success. They wanted to mess with the officers, and wanted a brigadier's quarters, and we had a round-up the first day.

Q. How many stayed?

A. Two left the same day they came and the rest stayed there.

By General McCook:

Q. Wasn't the delay about female nurses on account of the lack of accommodations for them?

A. That was a great objection of Dr. Forwood's. It is a question in military camps anyway; but we managed to give them protection and there was no question about it; but it worried him considerably.

By General DODGE:

Q. How do you account for the great number of complaints that have been made?

A. By the statements of people who talked mostly of things they knew the least about, principally women, who are sympathetic. They were nervous and flashy about certain things. They came there, having never seen a hospital and never seen a sick soldier, or anything of the kind. It was not a condition that would inspire a poet, but it was nothing unusual except as to the numbers. It was practically as bad in Tampa, only there was not as large a number, and they thought the soldiers were terribly abused because they did not have feather beds and lamb chops, and all that sort of thing. The fact of giving typhoid-fever patients liquid diet led them to think we were starving them. There was a case where a woman got into a ward where a man had dysentery and gave him oranges. He had had hemorrhages, and we had just got his dysentery checked. We had had a hard time to stop it, and it went through him whole. That is one of the things we had to contend with. The "hero worshipers" wanted hands to hold and brows to rub, and they would get in, and you could not keep them out.

By General McCook:

Q. Did you see any of those "body snatchers?"

A. They had to pick out a certain kind of a man. He had to have a certain kind of facial or physical development; they would not have anything else.

By General DODGE:

Q. What conditions would you have if you were to try it over again?

A. There should be a high fence—10 feet high—of iron, with sharp-pointed prongs at the top, all around the hospital. I think we could hold that, with the aid of the Ninth (colored) Cavalry.

By General McCook:

Q. You say you were at Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What kind of a camp was that there?

A. I don't think much of Tampa. I think I had yellow fever there. It was a continual Turkish bath to me. I lost nearly 60 pounds.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. How long were you there?

A. About seventeen or eighteen days, and at Fernandina or on the road about another week, and at Fernandina about four weeks, when I got away from there for Montauk.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 5, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF LIEUT. COL. M. C. MARTIN

Lieut. Col. M. C. MARTIN appeared before the commission and was read the scope of inquiry, and, having no objections, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your name and rank and where you served during the war with Spain?

A. My name is Medad C. Martin, lieutenant-colonel, of the Quartermaster's Department. I have been on duty in the Quartermaster-General's Office, in charge of the bureau of construction and repairs. In addition to that, I was in charge of the general supplies at Camp Alger during the existence of the camp.

Q. Had you any part in the location of Camp Alger?

A. Yes, sir. In connection with another officer, I was directed personally by the Quartermaster-General to look around the surrounding country and pick what we considered the most suitable location for a corps of volunteers. I did that in connection with one other officer.

Q. His name?

A. Major Seyburn, captain of the Tenth Infantry.

Q. General Miles's staff?

A. Yes, sir; he represented the Commanding General of the Army.

Q. Did you consider the inducements, territorial and physical and business, which led to the location of Camp Alger?

A. It was one tract of land which we found within convenient distance of the city, where we got nearly enough land for the entire corps in one body, so that it could be practically together. It was at a distance back from the Potomac, far enough to be away from the malarial influence of the river. It was on making various inquiries in the country surrounding that we found it was a section of country that had been particularly free from diseases of any kind, according to the testimony of the inhabitants. The ground itself was rolling and apparently well adapted to camp grounds, and it could be well drained. The facilities for getting wood for a large body of men was excellent. It could be gotten on the place. It was located only 2 miles from the railroad, and in our investigation

we found that there was, at the time we selected it, plenty of water on the site from a large number of springs and streams running through the tracts. It was much better water, as far as surface indications go, than any other tract of land we could find of any size; but we did not rely upon those things in our final report. We found that without doubt any quantity of good water could be obtained at a distance of 50 or 75 feet below the ground. In our consideration of this site one objection to it we found was that there was not a place for the men to bathe freely; but we could not find a place that we considered had that facility and the other facilities that this place had, and it was not an impossible matter for the troops to march to the Potomac for a bath, and we had rather an idea that one of the ravines on this camp ground might possibly be dammed up and a large pool made there; but that was never carried out.

Q. Colonel, how many sites for camping grounds did you examine?

A. Personally I examined probably eight or ten. Captain Seyburn examined a great many more than I did.

Q. With reference to the location of this camp?

A. Yes. I was on duty at the Quartermaster-General's Office at that time and Captain Seyburn had less to attend to, and he examined more sites than I did.

Q. And you took his report as to other sites which he did not regard as being suitable?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any other consideration directly or indirectly involved in the location of this camp than those which you have mentioned relating to the body of land, together with the wood, the prospective water supply, the drainage, and all the elements that enter into the location of a good camp? Were you influenced by any person, your superior or any other individual, in the making of this selection?

A. No, sir; the only other consideration that I know of was the very low price at which we got this tract of land.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Three hundred dollars per month?

By General BEAVER:

Q. How many acres were included in the tract?

A. One thousand four hundred in the tract.

Q. Was the lease for any specific number of months, or for the time the Government might desire it?

A. My recollection is that the ground was to be occupied for not less than three months, and at the expiration of three months it could be given up at any time on thirty days' notice. I would not be positive. I know that the Government had the right to occupy the ground for a year or give it up on thirty days' notice, after, I think, three months.

Q. Then you had the control of that land during the summer time, when the crops would be put in and the men would be deprived of the year's use of it practically, by paying for three or four months, if you should desire?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it a crop farm or grazing?

A. Very little under cultivation, sir. Probably half of the 1,400 acres were woodland, and I don't think there was over 75 or possibly 80 acres in all under cultivation.

Q. What was it usually planted in—corn or wheat?

A. I don't know; had some small fields; I saw no small grain.

Q. Any wheat?

A. Don't know; the grain had not come up at the time.

Q. If anything was planted in it, of course that was destroyed by the use the Government made of it, or was it thrown out by the camp?

A. That was destroyed.

Q. To whom did you make your report, Colonel, as to the camp?

A. To the Quartermaster-General.

Q. By whom was the contract made; do you know?

A. By myself.

Q. Did your colleague on the committee on the board unite with you on the board, or did he make his report to General Miles?

A. He did not unite with me on mine. I presume he made his to General Miles.

Q. Do you know as to whether or not General Miles made any recommendation on the subject?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. Were the subsequent results confirmative of your opinion of selecting the ground?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You found in experience just what you expected to find in making your examination, did you? Water could be found at the depth of which you spoke? Good drainage, convenience of transportation, wood, and all the other things?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Looking at it from this end, Colonel, was the ground in itself considered or the location in itself considered as a healthy or unhealthy one? Was the unhealthiness of Camp Alger due to location or other causes, in your judgment?

A. In my judgment, without being an expert at all in such matters, or probably not having as good an opportunity as others, I never considered that the unhealthiness was due to the location.

Q. Have you anything to say in regard to the administration of your department while you were there?

A. No, sir; I don't think that we have any special complaints.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Whose business was it, Colonel, to determine the location of the camp—Quartermaster's Department or the General of the Army?

A. Well, sir, it was frequently done by some staff officers; sometimes by the Quartermaster and sometimes by the engineers.

Q. That is what I want to find out. You say you have an officer detailed by the Commanding General; had he equal authority with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, then, suppose he made a different report from yours, which would have been adopted?

A. Somebody else would have been designated to look after both and come to a conclusion.

Q. Who would finally decide it; who has the responsibility of deciding: Quartermaster or Commanding General?

A. The Quartermaster submitted the report that I made to him to the Secretary of War.

Q. Then you understand that the Secretary of War is clothed with authority to designate the locality of camps?

A. Finally, as he has charge of everything of that kind.

Q. He has more authority than the Commanding General in that regard?

A. If he desires to exercise it, unquestionably he could override the authority of the Commanding General.

Q. You don't know in this case whether Camp Alger was recommended by your colleague or not?

A. I know only in all our conversations that it was a suitable locality.

Q. You don't know whether the Commanding General took any official action on the subject or not?

A. No, sir.

Q. All you know is that the Commanding General designated that?

A. The Quartermaster approved my report.

Q. Then the Secretary of War fixed the location, did he?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. Who owned this land?

A. A man named Campbell, or his wife, owned the ground—Mrs. Campbell.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. You made the contract with some reservations made there by the owner of the land?

A. He reserved the right to use certain roadways.

Q. And the land adjoining it?

A. No, sir; only a roadway 40 feet wide.

Q. Subsequently leased to the booth owners?

A. There was nothing reserved that he could lease to anybody else at all. Well, there was reserved, if I am correct—yes, his residence was in the midst of that tract and he did reserve the land immediately surrounding his residence and his barns.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Who sublet that part of it?

A. If any was sublet it must have been by Mr. Campbell.

General BEAVER. He could not sublet what he had let to the United States.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was there not a clause in your contract by which a certain width on each side of the road was reserved by Campbell?

A. No, sir; there was a certain width of road over which he had the right to pass.

Q. On whose ground were all the shacks and booths that surrounded this camp?

A. There were a good many of them on the grounds that were leased by the Government.

Q. There were a good many placed on the grounds?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By whose permission?

A. By the commanding officer's of the camp, I suppose.

Q. How was it that General Graham could not exercise any authority and put his line of sentinels inside of the booths because the Government did not have that land?

A. There were a number of booths right across the road from this line, and of course the Government had no authority over them. There was a whole row of them across from the camp.

Q. The road was on the line of the Campbell tract, was it?

A. Yes; and I think after General Graham drove them from the land they had been allowed to squat on that land across the road.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You have the charge of the department of repairs, did you say, Colonel?

A. Construction and repairs.

Q. What does that include?

A. Building of barracks, quarters for troops, building roads, bridges, warehouses, forts, wharfs, and repairing same.

Q. To what extent has your department been called upon to construct barracks, roads, bridges, etc., during the war with Spain?

A. We have been called upon in connection with the camps to furnish tent floors and to build camp hospitals, furnish the lumber and material for building sinks, cook houses, and in the present camps in the South, where they are expected to remain at least two or three months in the winter, putting up rough board shelters for the soldiers and the cook houses.

Q. Can you tell us how much lumber has been furnished for the purposes which you have mentioned during the war?

A. I could not tell, because at a great many of these places lumber has been bought on the order of the commanding general of the troops there as emergency required for immediate use before the matter had come to the Quartermaster-General's Office.

Q. How much has been furnished of which you have knowledge—how many million feet in round numbers? I don't expect you to answer it offhand.

A. Well, I should say that at these various camp grounds throughout the country there has been several million feet of lumber furnished for tent floors and things of that kind. The Government has now the contract for 8,000,000 feet of lumber for the use of the troops in Cuba. We have also built several large hospitals—a 1,000-bed hospital at Fortress Monroe, a 1,000-bed hospital at Savannah, a 500-bed hospital at San Francisco, and we have provided in the permanent barracks temporary additions for large hospitals at Forts McPherson and Myer and Camp Thomas. We have spent, probably, well, close on to half a million dollars.

Q. What is to be the capacity of Fort Myer hospital, do you think?

A. I think its capacity now is about 250 or 300 persons. They are all located in the permanent buildings there. The only particular changes that had been made was to convert the riding hall into a hospital ward.

Q. That is, flooring it and ceiling it and putting in steam heat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the hospitals at Savannah and San Francisco and elsewhere of a permanent character are finished, what will be the capacity of the permanent hospitals and pavilion hospitals?

A. Well, of a strictly so-called pavilion hospital, the capacity will be 3,000 beds, and then at these various posts, which are not included in what are called the pavilion hospitals, there is probably a capacity for a thousand more. And then there are various small pavilions at certain posts; for instance, there are six pavilions at Fort Hamilton that will accommodate 200 patients; there are four at Fort Wadsworth that would accommodate 160 patients; there are two at Washington Barracks and at Fort Columbus that will accommodate 80 patients each.

Q. In round numbers, what will be the hospital capacity of the Government for caring for sick soldiers the coming winter in this country?

A. Between five and six thousand.

Q. Are you making any effort in the direction of building hospitals in Cuba?

A. Nothing further than sending down these large amounts of lumber. There have been several suggestions made as to what will be the best methods for construction of the hospitals there, but it is not fully decided yet; but the basis of them has to be tents and lumber; so we are providing those.

Q. Then you are anticipating to that extent the conclusion which may be arrived at by the medical authorities as to what is best?

A. Yes.

Q. What has been done by the Quartermaster's Department: anything in regard to the construction of roads in Cuba or Porto Rico?

A. There has been very little done that has come to the knowledge of the bureau

here. There has been considerable done at Santiago, immediately around the city of Santiago, but General Wood has done that himself.

Q. With his own resources?

A. Yes; very largely. In Cuba we have only taken up the matter of construction of two small pieces of railway track, but nothing else to the other roads, because our information is that the country roads immediately about Havana are very good.

Q. Was your department brought into relation with the efforts that were made by General Stone as to roadmaking in Cuba?

A. No, sir.

Q. General Stone is the Chief of the Road Inquiry Bureau of the Agricultural Department, is he not?

A. I believe so; yes.

Q. And appointed a brigadier-general and put in control of the road construction in Cuba, as I understand; am I correct, or don't you know?

A. No, sir; I don't know.

Q. If you have any statement to make, Colonel, that you think will be helpful to us or of interest, we will be glad to hear it.

A. I was just going to say I would like to look over this list and refresh my recollection, if I have made any errors about it?

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you have anything to do with the selection of any other camp site?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I would like to know if the Commanding General approved that list and what action he took in regard to the report made by Major Seyburn?

A. If he made any, it is undoubtedly on file in the Quartermaster-General's Office or in the office of the Secretary of War; I will make inquiries and see if I can find out anything about it.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you know that Major Seyburn reported to General Miles, and whether General Miles recommended to the Secretary of War that that site be selected?

A. I don't know; I understood that he would recommend it to General Miles, but whether he actually did it or not, I do not know.

Q. Was not there an agreement that you made that he would recommend it to General Miles?

A. I don't know that he made any agreement, but that was the understanding—yes.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 5, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF CLINTON SMITH.

Mr. CLINTON SMITH, appeared before the commission, and was read the scope of the inquiry, and, having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

Q. Mr. Smith, will you kindly give us your name and position which you have in the Quartermaster-General's Office?

A. My name is Clinton Smith. I hold a position—have charge of the Construction and Repair Division, under Colonel Martin and Colonel Hodgson, in the Quartermaster-General's Office.

Q. What work have you done in that department during the war with Spain?

A. We have prepared plans for temporary buildings for different army camps, furnished estimates for lumber, material, etc.

Q. Have you had any personal experience in any of the camps established by the Government during the war?

A. Yes; at Montauk.

Q. When did you go there and how long did you remain?

A. I went to Montauk, I think, the 3d of August; I left the Quartermaster-General's Office the night of the 2d; was at New York the forenoon of the 3d, and went to Montauk the afternoon of the same day.

Q. How long did you remain?

A. I stayed at Montauk until August 24.

Q. For what purpose did you go?

A. I was directed by the Quartermaster-General to go there and assist Captain Patton in doing what we could to prepare the camp.

Q. Now tell us in your own way just what you did in that direction?

A. I arrived at Montauk the evening of the 3d, as I said before; on Thursday August 4, was at Montauk inspecting the ground for the location of wells. The Quartermaster-General instructed me to be sure and see what could be done for water for this camp, as it was the most important thing to be found out. At this time we did not know that the troops were coming immediately. On August 4, I say, I was at Montauk; August 5, Friday, I was at New York making contracts for materials, workmen, lumber, pumps, piping, tanks, sinks, etc., repairing of docks, etc. I left New York at 4 a. m., and arrived at Montauk at noon. On my arriving at Montauk, we proceeded to get the lumber, which went out on a freight train, and the piping, boilers, and pumps, in fact, all of the materials as fast as we could get to the site designated, and put them in position.

Q. Were the materials for which you made contracts in New York, including lumber, piping, pumps, boilers, etc., properly shipped and received by you at Montauk?

A. Yes, sir; they went with me on the train the same Saturday morning that I went to Montauk.

Q. Were they rated as special freight?

A. Yes; they went on what I think they call the paper freight. They had one passenger car filled half full with papers, which were distributed along the road. We were due there about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning, but were delayed until noon on account of this heavy load.

Q. So that this material which you purchased was delivered as soon as it could be?

A. It could not have been done any quicker.

Q. Now, how soon was it utilized; for instance, how soon did you begin to bore that well, and how rapidly was it done?

A. We commenced the afternoon that I arrived there with a large gang of laborers—Italians—that were secured from the Long Island Railroad to come, and we commenced to sink it immediately—worked nights and Sundays.

Q. How far did you excavate the earth?

A. In what time?

Q. How far down did you go with the excavations before you put your drill at work?

A. We first dug several test holes at different sections of the camp from 6 to 8 feet deep and then tried to drive well points to secure water. We found that the strata was clay and gravel in alternate layers, and beneath was generally a thick layer of heavy bowlders, which would prevent us from driving the point, and therefore there was only one way to drive and sink the wells.

Q. And did you sink your wells by digging or drilling?

A. By digging. Just dug a regular well about 10 feet in diameter.

Q. How deep did you carry that?

A. That was carried down about 15 or 16 feet; then we had to plank it or curb it. I can give you the depth here [referring to paper]. The depth was 38 feet and had 6 feet of water.

Q. You were not obliged to resort to a drill at all, then; just carried it down by picks and shovels?

A. We resorted to a drill the last few feet.

Q. How long did it take you to complete the well?

A. I think the well was completed and the pumps running about the 14th or 15th.

Q. Troops began to arrive from Tampa about the 9th, didn't they?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much water did the wells supply?

A. The wells supplied at that time all that a 6-inch pipe and a Dean pump with 10 by 6 cylinders—about 300,000 gallons per day.

Q. The pump supplied all that was necessary for the camp?

A. We first put in a pipe at every point for temporary purposes, not for drinking purposes, but for cooking or any other purposes. This was used a few days before the pumps of the main well were completed.

Q. Did you have charge of the laying of the pipe lines?

A. I did; yes, sir.

Q. Were they laid in time for the use of the several regiments as they arrived?

A. Yes, sir; they were.

Q. How were the water facilities afforded to the troops: pipe run into each regiment, and a faucet for each company or for the entire regiment?

A. In some cases there were two or three faucets among the regiments. It was intended to put a number in, but by the time we got through there we had not time to fully complete it. The idea was to run several out, from one to three for each one.

Q. What else was done there under your direction, Mr. Smith?

A. My principal business was to see that water was furnished and laying of pipe lines. The water supply was my general business, although when I first went there I was compelled to see that lumber was gotten for the general hospital; also to see that the storehouses were erected, and docks repaired, etc.

Q. How rapidly did the lumber arrive?

A. As rapidly as we could take care of it.

Q. When did they begin the construction of the commissary storehouse?

A. I think they commenced them the next Monday morning after my arrival there, which would be the 8th. I think they commenced it about the 8th. I am not positive about the date.

Q. Had you any difficulty in securing carpenters, or did you not look after that part of the work?

A. Colonel Miller, and he did most of that work; the ordering of carpenters was done by Colonel Miller and Colonel Hecker.

Q. In doing the work which you had on hand, will you state whether or not you considered that you had done it in a reasonably short time under the circumstances?

A. I think we did it very rapidly; we prided ourselves in getting out a very quick job under the circumstances.

Q. Anything else that you have to state in regard to the work there that you would like to tell us?

A. No, I don't know of anything.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What do you know about the land transportation, teams, etc.; how many there were and whether sufficient or not?

A. There were plenty of teams for me when I first went there. I secured teams from the Long Island Railroad Company; they had a large number of teams and Italians working there on the road, and the president of the Long Island Railroad Company, Mr. Baldwin, gave me permission, if it was an actual necessity, to use those teams. If we were short of teams I had the privilege of using them. I could state to you that the greatest difficulty in getting teams appeared to be for the general hospital; there was some complaint about that, but my orders were to put all of our energies to supplying materials, men, and teams for the general hospital, and I obeyed them to the best of my ability, so much so that a great many times our pipe and stuff was delayed—the men waited for them to get lumber and material to the general hospital.

Q. What day did the first troops get there?

A. The first troops arrived there about—I can not tell exactly—I think about August 7 or 8.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Where did they come from?

A. Somewhere in Florida. We did not expect any troops there, but unexpectedly they commenced to arrive by rail, and they blocked us.

Q. Horses and mules came first?

A. Yes, sir; a large number of horses and mules arrived there. We were blocked so that we could not get our lumber, piping, and things on account of the large number of cars shipped in, freight and forage, etc.

Q. Have you any knowledge how many trips were taken South for the troops?

A. I could not answer that. A large quantity of mules, men, and horses and wagons arrived and a large amount of transportation; so much so that the president of the railroad was afraid that there would be a congestion and blockade.

Q. Did not interfere with your work?

A. Yes, it did somewhat.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know anything about the transportation established to the hospital up to the 15th, 16th, or 18th of August?

A. In what respect, please?

Q. Colonel Forwood telegraphed the Surgeon-General that there were tons of supplies at the depot that he could not get for want of transportation?

A. Yes, I think about that time there was some talk from Colonel Forwood about not having sufficient teams, etc., but it was very temporary. For instance, Colonel Forwood went to the quartermaster one afternoon and said that he must have more teams for delivering material, as he had a new order to increase the size of the hospital and he was unable to get the teams at that time; but in a very short time afterwards there was a large number of teams there waiting.

Q. Hours?

A. Yes, a few hours afterwards.

Q. Was there at any time any protracted delay in furnishing transportation, as far as you know?

A. I don't know that there was. I think every effort was made to supply the general hospital with everything that was possible in preference to anything else.

Q. Who supplied the workmen necessary for the erection of the hospital tents? Was it the Quartermaster's Department or the Medical Department who got the carpenters, workmen, etc.?

A. Colonel Miller ordered some carpenters from East Hampton; then he got some from New York.

Q. It was then under the charge of the Quartermaster's Department, not the Medical Department, securing men, etc.?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it often the case that the Medical Department, having received tents, etc., has to provide the men to do the work, nailing floors, etc.?

A. Yes, I so understand. A great many times they were short of carpenters, etc., but they were gotten as fast as they could.

Q. Do you know as to the ability to put up tents as readily as they were needed?

A. I think the tents were put up as fast as they were required. The camp was completed—

Q. Speaking of the general and detention hospitals?

A. The first detention hospital, started by Colonel Forwood, was very nearly completed before the arrival of the troops, but he enlarged it, and that portion was not completed.

Q. Was there at any time any material delay because of the nondelivery of lumber?

A. Not that I know of. There were short delays—

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Were you delayed in getting lumber from New York to the camp?

A. No, sir.

Q. How much of a delay did those troops from the South cause you in regard to the construction of the hospitals—how much did they throw you back?

A. I could not answer that positively, because I was not in a position to know. Of course it blocked the tracks and delayed us somewhat.

Q. Several days?

A. Yes; I should say so.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Had those troops been kept away a week longer, would the hospitals have been completely put up and ready for the reception of patients?

A. Well, I don't know as I understand exactly what you have reference to.

Q. As I understand you, the coming of the troops did delay the work. Had these troops been kept away a week longer, would the hospitals have been completely put up and ready for the reception of patients—been in such condition as to receive the sick?

A. I could not answer that.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. You say that the arrival of the troops delayed your work by several days. Do you mean that the arrival of these troops actually delayed your work by several days? What do you mean by several days? Was your work stopped, or delayed partially? How many days did you lose on account of those troops?

A. I could not answer that, Governor, because it was scattered along in such shape. There were heavy runs, and the roads were extremely muddy and very difficult to get transportation over them; so much so that when the troops went there for their heavy forage they cut it up and made it nearly impassable. We could only draw 200 feet of lumber at a load.

Q. Now, Mr. Smith, the troops from Tampa, I believe, commenced to arrive the 9th. Is that correct, General Beaver?

General BEAVER. That is my recollection.

Q. You say the detention hospital was completed by the 14th—that is, by the time the troops arrived from Cuba?

A. I could not say.

Q. Well under way?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What I wanted to know is whether you were delayed one, or two, or five days on account of the arrival of these troops. Just say what number, as near as you can. Those hospitals had been constructed in the meantime?

A. I don't know, Governor; I would not be able to answer that definitely.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 7, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF PAYMASTER-GENERAL THADDEUS H. STANTON.

Paymaster-General THADDEUS H. STANTON then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your full name, rank, and position in the Army?

A. Yes, sir; Thaddeus H. Stanton. Paymaster-General of the United States Army.

Q. What is the rule in regard to the time of the payment of the troops?

A. When I went there I started in to pay all the Army monthly. We succeeded very well in doing that.

Q. Has there been any delay in the payment at any time of any of the troops, either in the United States or serving elsewhere; and, if so, why?

A. The principal delay we have had was in Cuba and Porto Rico. The reasons—I do not know what ought to be said about that. The commanding general there declined to have the troops paid. I have some papers here, one particularly [reads from paper], report from my chief paymaster, Sniffen, which reads as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Santiago de Cuba, August 10, 1898.

Major SNIFFEN, *Chief Paymaster.*

SIR: The colonel of the Eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry prefers that his regiment be not paid.

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Here is another:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
August 11, 1898.

To the CHIEF PAYMASTER.

SIR: The commanding general approves the request of the colonel of the First District of Columbia Volunteers not to have his regiment paid until after return to the United States.

Very respectfully,

E. J. MCCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Q. No reasons given?

A. No, sir; that is all. [Reads.]

AUGUST 10, 1898.

Maj. C. C. SNIFFEN, *Paymaster.*

SIR: The light artillery brigade will not be paid here in Cuba. By command of General Shafter.

MCCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

August 11, 1898.

To the PAYMASTER.

SIR: The commanding general approves the request of Maj. L. M. O'Brien, commanding Seventeenth Infantry, not to have his regiment paid until after their return to the United States.

Very respectfully,

J. C. GILMORE, Jr.,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Those are samples.

Q. Was your department ready to pay? Did it have the paymasters on the ground with the money to pay the troops in accordance with the rule established?

A. Yes, sir; and with a million and a half of money to pay these troops I had eleven paymasters there. I succeeded in getting about one-third of them paid before it was stopped. I have had the paymasters follow them up and pay them there at Montauk.

Q. If there was any failure to pay in accordance with your rule, then there was no fault on the part of the Paymaster's Department?

A. No, sir; not a particle. The same thing about payment of troops at Porto Rico. I sent down a party of ten, I think it was—or twelve—paymasters on a vessel with a million and a half dollars to pay up Porto Rico. It had been stopped at Santiago, and they were kept there quite a little time. For some reason they were detained there. Finally General Miles telegraphed not to bring them there, as the money might be infected. Wanted to come to the United States and send another vessel.

Q. Infection to the United States didn't seem to count?

A. I told him the money from these vessels was taken from the treasury of New York and never went ashore at all; and it went on until the President finally ordered the vessel back—ordered it back to Montauk—and in the meantime two paymasters were left there, with the yellow fever, with their clerks. I sent another party to Porto Rico to pay, and they succeeded in paying.

Q. This occasioned delay?

A. Yes, certainly; the Seventy-first New York Regiment never was paid at all down there. They came home without pay.

Q. Was there any time during the continuance of the war at which your department did not have the money and the officers ready and willing to pay in accordance with the custom which you have mentioned—payments every month?

A. No, sir; we had plenty of money and were ready to pay.

Q. Good deal of criticism has obtained throughout the country as to the character of the appointments made from civil life in the various departments. Will you state, if you please, what the character of the appointments during the war in your department has been?

A. Well, we have had some splendid officers appointed; some were fairly good and others not very good. That would be the same as in any other department, of course.

Q. What has the rule been?

A. As a class, they have been good; they have done their duty well.

Q. How many were appointed during the war in your department from civil life?

A. We had altogether 91; but a number of them resigned and declined to accept their commissions, and it left about 87; now about 82 or 83.

Q. What percentage of these would you say were inefficient?

A. Well, I should say there would not be over 6 per cent.

Q. Governor Woodbury wishes to know if you had any inefficient officers in

the regular establishment before the appointment of these gentlemen in the volunteer service?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What would be the percentage there?

A. Well, out of twenty in the regular corps I only think of two just now.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What do you do with your inefficient officers?

A. Inefficient officers in the regular establishment?

Q. Either.

A. In the volunteer service we try to get them mustered out. In the regular service they must be deprived of their commission by process of law, court-martial, etc., but they generally escape.

By General WILSON:

Q. Have you ever made charges against any of these inefficient officers?

A. No, sir; never had sufficient reason to do so; could not get hold of them, in other words.

Q. Is it not customary to prefer charges for simply inefficiency?

A. No; worthlessness.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 7, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF COL. FRANK J. HECKER.

Col. FRANK J. HECKER then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give us your full name and rank and date of your appointment?

A. Frank J. Hecker; colonel and quartermaster of volunteers; appointed on the 8th of July.

Q. Had you any previous military service?

A. Yes, sir; the last few months of the last war.

Q. What was your business at the time of your appointment?

A. Manufacturer.

Q. Where?

A. In Detroit, Mich.

Q. What was your special province in the Quartermaster's Department during the war?

A. I was placed in charge of the division of transportation.

Q. Limited to any particular transportation, by rail or water?

A. As to all transportation, by rail and water, in a supervisory way.

Q. What facilities for water transportation did the United States possess, under the control of the Quartermaster's Department, after the breaking out of the war?

A. None, sir.

Q. What efforts were made, and how soon, to secure water transportation—or the means of water transportation?

A. That was previous to my connection with the department. Many ships were chartered for the first Cuban expedition, and, as I was advised when I was called

to Washington in the matter, all ships that could be chartered had been chartered. There were no more available ships for charter under the American flag.

Q. Did you subsequently learn how many had been chartered, Colonel?

A. My recollection is 46—I may be in error—I think there was 46.

Q. Did you have any hand in the purchase of vessels?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many did you purchase, and when?

A. Seventeen in all.

Q. Between what dates?

A. Between the 25th of June and about the same date in July; about thirty days.

Q. Were you commissioned the 8th of July?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You made some purchases before you were commissioned, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Under what authority did you make those purchases?

A. The authority of the Secretary of War.

Q. I suppose you did not enter into the service before you were commissioned? When did your employment under the Secretary of War begin?

A. I was called here on the 19th of June by telegram from the Secretary, asking me to come to Washington the earliest day possible.

Q. Yes; and in pursuance of that call, when did you begin, under his direction, to make purchase of vessels for ocean transportation?

A. The 21st of June. [Witness refers to his diary to verify the date.] No, sir; the 20th of June.

Q. What were the directions of the Secretary in pursuance of which you entered the service to which you have referred?

A. I found a very considerable number of tenders of ships for sale; the Secretary asked me to investigate those, and, with the assistance and in consultation with the constructing marine engineer, we examined all papers that were submitted.

Q. Now will you tell us, in your own way, Colonel, if you please, and in narrative form, what you did in regard to the purchase of these vessels; the mode of inspection; the way in which negotiations were carried on for their purchase, and the result? That is a matter about which there has been a great deal of discussion, and we would like to be as fully informed as your present recollection enables you in regard to the matter.

A. To give you an absolutely full statement, I ought to have reference to the records in the Quartermaster-General's Department. I can, however, from my memory and my diary, give you a general—

Q. I think that will be enough.

A. The general way in which it was done?

Q. Well, if we should, in the course of the examination, find that it was desirable to have them, you could furnish them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, if you go on in a general way, as my question indicates, I think it will be all right.

Captain HOWELL. I think it is an important matter; I think it would be proper to give him until this evening to answer it, and have him here this evening. It is a very important matter, and he can't carry the things in his head.

The WITNESS. To give a detailed and absolutely correct statement of the purchase of the ships, it would be impossible for me to give it from my memory.

Dr. CONNER. I would request that he be allowed to put in his answer this evening.

Colonel DENBY. By 2 o'clock this afternoon

Governor WOODBURY. If he has a list of the quartermaster's purchases—the dates and the prices paid—if he wants any other information than that to refresh his memory—

The WITNESS. I think not, sir. I think that would give me all the information I need. The Quartermaster-General's report would enable me to answer absolutely and correctly the question which you ask.

[The witness then examined the Quartermaster-General's report; also Colonel Kimball's report; also testimony of Colonel Kimball; papers filed.]

By General McCook:

Q. All of these purchases were made in Washington?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All charter parties were made here?

A. Yes, sir. Here are the ships that I purchased. These are reported by date, number, with capacity and tonnage, but the prices are not given, except of such as Colonel Kimball paid for.

General BEAVER. I think it would be wise to allow him to examine that, and if the stenographer will just read him the question asked, I think he will be able to give us a connected history of the whole transaction.

The WITNESS. The general history I can now give you, but as to the prices, etc., as I told you, I should dislike to be wholly dependent upon my memory as regards several of the ships. Ah, I have it here. I think I can answer your question. At all events, I will make an effort to answer it fully.

[The stenographer here reads the question.]

A. Beginning with the 20th of June, I examined all the tenders which were placed before me by the Department of ships offered to the Government; the reports, accompanying the tenders, of officers of the Quartermaster's Department and of the Naval Department, as to the physical and mechanical condition of the ships, their measured dimensions, displacement, and power. Ninety per cent of the ships tendered the Government were found wholly unsuited because of their age and unseaworthiness, because they would require immediate and extensive repairs to machinery, or because it was not practicable, in the short time at the disposal of the Department, to ventilate them, even partially. Those ships which it seemed probable could be used were very carefully analyzed as to their fitness for the work. A very important factor was the readiness with which they could be changed over from their former condition for transport use. The all-important necessity to be considered was that of ventilation, and after that their seaworthiness. Parties claiming to be representatives of the Beaver Line steamers, running between Montreal and English ports, tendered their entire fleet, and it was considered as one of the most promising propositions we had. I made an appointment with the representative of the steamship company to meet me in Montreal and inspect one of their ships then in port. Mr. Kirby—Mr. F. E. Kirby—the marine architect and shipbuilder, came with me in a consulting capacity.

Q. Where is his place of business?

A. In Detroit. He is connected with two large shipyards. He is the consulting engineer of the Detroit Dry Dock and Wyandotte Iron Works. I submitted his selection for the service to the Secretary for his approval; selected him as being, for the requirements of the time, the best equipped, the most able engineer or man that we could have; and I think his afterwork has fully justified his selection. On reaching Montreal we found that the ship which I had expected to inspect had sailed that morning previous to our arrival. I found that the company was practically insolvent, and the line was being run by the bankers through a committee. I spent the entire day with the committee, or representatives from it, and they made impossible conditions, such as that we would have to take over the ships in

Montreal, pay for them there before we took them over; but finally consented to our depositing with their New York banking representatives the sum for each ship as she was to be delivered in Montreal. Nothing came of these negotiations. On the 21st day of June the prize ship, the *Panama*, was sold at auction in New York, and purchased by an agent of the Department, by a representative for the Department, at my direction, for the sum of \$41,000. The limit I gave him to bid on that ship was \$50,000.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. When you say the prize ship, you mean the ship taken during the war with Spain?

A. Yes, sir; the Spanish prize ship captured by our Navy. On the 24th of June I closed for the refrigerating ship *Port Victor* for \$175,000. Their asking price had been \$250,000.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Give the size and condition of the ships, please.

A. I will have to refer to the Department records.

Q. All right.

A. On the same day I closed with the Netherlands Steamship Company for the *Obdam* for \$250,000. I can give you the size from this data here.

Q. From whom purchased; is it there?

A. No, sir; it has only the tonnage here.

Q. From whom purchased? That is the question I would like to know.

A. I will give you that later. I shall have to refer to the records. [Witness referring to the records.] This ship was engaged in the trans-Atlantic service; was partially loaded at the time, in her regular service. The same date closed for the steamship *Scandia*—then at Port Arthur, in China, having taken a Russian command there. Her purchase price was \$200,000, delivered in San Francisco—subject to an inspection of her hull and machinery on arrival there proving satisfactory. The same day closed for seven ships with the Atlantic Transport Company—the *Michigan* and *Mississippi*, for \$350,000 each; the *Manitoba*, *Mohawk*, *Mobile*, *Massachusetts*, and *Minnewaska*, for \$660,000 each—the purchase from this company being of seven ships, costing \$4,000,000. On July 7 the steamship *Roumanian* was purchased, costing \$240,000. On July 8 the steamship *City of Berlin* was purchased, costing \$400,000. On July 10 the seagoing tug *Britannia* was purchased, costing \$40,000. On July 25 the *Gypsum King* was purchased, costing \$150,000. On July 25 the steamship *City of Chester* was purchased, costing \$200,000. I have not the date upon which the *Arizona* was purchased. I inferred it was July 16 from this date here. She was on the Pacific coast.

By General BEAVER:

Q. In the purchase of these seven vessels, Colonel, as I understand it, you were acting with the engineer, the consulting engineer, who was in the employ of the Department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you employ any intermediary agents or did you deal directly with the owners of the vessels?

A. We dealt directly with the owners of the vessels, or with the parties who represented the owners when we could not get at the owners. The first effort in each transaction was to get at the original owner—the actual owner. Many of the ships offered were loaded down with intermediate options—of those purchased perhaps one or two of them, for all I know; but I know a large number had options on them; in some instances several held options on the same ship.

Q. In how many cases, and what cases, did you deal with others than the owners of the vessels; can you recall that?

A. [Witness referring to memorandum book again and then to the other papers.] I think there are only two, sir; the refrigerating ship *Port Victor* and the ship purchased in the Pacific, the *Scandia*; she was purchased by the attention of the Department being called to her by a naval attaché in Berlin. Her condition showed up fairly well in Lloyd's Register. She was then at Port Arthur. In communicating with the general agent of the company—the Hamburg-American Line—in response, I think, to a telegram I sent him, an agent called on me in this city.

Q. City of New York?

A. No, sir; Washington. And it was a question of her delivery; they wished to sell her to us at Port Arthur, and we to take the marine risk of the delivery in San Francisco. I felt that the risk was too great, though we needed her very much, and her price was apparently low. I made it a condition, and would only consider it, that she be delivered at San Francisco and her machinery and hull be subject to inspection there. That part of the negotiation was through—the name has escaped me, but I can give it to you later—a representative who was instructed by the general agent in New York to see me about it.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was it Droob; was that the name?

A. No, sir; the *Port Victor* was presented by an agent, and all negotiations were carried on with him.

By General McCook:

Q. He was a former assistant of the Navy?

A. Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Q. What was this *Port Victor*?

A. A refrigerating ship.

Q. Was she in the Australian trade?

A. She was sent here for sale, and a bill of sale and a power of attorney were in the captain's possession.

Q. English register?

A. English register.

Q. She was withdrawn from her former East Indian service?

A. She was withdrawn from her former East Indian service and sent here to be sold. Their asking price was \$250,000. After an inspection of the ship was reported on I did not feel justified in paying more than \$175,000, and in two or three days' negotiations they came down to that figure.

Q. The Atlantic Transportation Line was under the British flag, too?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before you purchased her was the *Chester* under the English flag?

A. American; the *Chester* and the *Berlin*.

Q. Did you know what these vessels cost in Belfast?

A. They did not submit that, sir.

Q. You bought those from Mr. Baker?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. President of the company?

A. President of the company.

Q. And the purchase of the vessels transferred them, of course, to the American flag?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was the necessity for these vessels so great, Colonel, that you paid more than they were worth?

A. I don't think, sir, that more than their value was paid in any instance.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. You always got them lower than the asking price?

A. Yes, sir; very materially in the case of the Atlantic Transport Line. I happened to have on my desk this morning, and picked it up and brought it with me, the proposition from Mr. Baker to the Secretary of War, tendering the entire fleet. In that fleet were seven old ships not suited for our service; ships built before 1889 and 1890, and ships with no refrigerating equipment. The seven ships we purchased, and for which in the aggregate the sum of \$4,000,000 was paid, were tendered on the 21st of June, for \$4,800,000. I have the tender here [produces it]. After their purchase, which was on the 24th of June, the president of the company, Mr. Baker, handed me this copy of a cable message from Bernadine, which reads as follows:

"Newspapers here reported sale before your telegram received. Under the circumstances, no use now endeavor make fresh terms. You do not appear understand. Ellerman alone wants sell. Wilson, Furness prefer not to sell. The conditions can not be altered. In the event of purchase, you pay cash. You must satisfy Sanderson; joint agency is what he wants. Other conditions same as cabled you June 20. You read our cable June 20 wrong. You must fulfill contracts. Word half referred to New York pier. We consider if you do not purchase Wilson, Furness we shall be ruined. We regret can not congratulate you on price obtained. You told Pirrie on no account would you sell twin screws for less than \$5,000,000. Pirrie says we have no choice in the matter. Must buy Wilson, Furness; otherwise it must be you must abandon New York trade. Both sale, contemplated purchase meet with approval of Williams.

"Bernadine, London, 6, 25, 98."

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. But was the trade with you already closed?

A. Yes, sir; had the Secretary's signature to it.

By General WILSON:

Q. [Referring to name forgotten by witness shortly prior hereto.] Was that name of the Assistant Secretary Soley?

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. That seems to show that the owner complained of the prices paid—the prices at which the ships sold. You don't know by whom these vessels were made?

A. Yes, sir; they were built at Belfast. They were made by the Harlan & Wolf Company, twin screw; electric light. Five of them were approximately 6,000-tons measurement. Each ship of the seven had cold storage. Capacity for beef, 1,000 tons.

Q. Double bottoms?

A. Yes, sir; one of them ran on the coral at Porto Rico, and stayed down there for about five weeks; after she was gotten off she was taken to dry dock. I inspected her there, and she had two sprung plates; admitted water very freely, but the second bottom would have held her up for a voyage across the ocean.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Single or twin screw?

A. Twin screws.

General McCook. Twenty-seven feet of water.

Q. Has the Department now more than it needs, Colonel Hecker?

A. I am hardly competent to answer that, sir. I am just back. I think, in a general way, they are short now, because three of these ships are being refitted, armory is being put in, modern water-closets, shower baths, woven-wire bunks, and a general refitting, so that they will carry 2,400 men each. The *Mobile* is

out now—should have been out in October, and that makes the Department short for the time being. We are short of ships in a general way.

Q. Only temporarily?

A. It is only temporary. Yes, sir; only temporary.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Colonel, in the purchase of these ships, did you purchase any upon which options were held by other parties?

A. I think not, sir; but that is only an opinion.

Q. Did you purchase any of them from parties who held options?

A. In the case of the *Port Victor*, I think so.

Q. Do you know what the option price was in the case of the *Port Victor*?

A. I do not, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. That was the ship you bought for \$175,000?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You can't tell, therefore, what price, above what the owner received, you paid for any ship you purchased?

A. The *Panama* was purchased at auction. That price, of course, was the bidding price.

Q. And the auctioneer, of course, got his commission, I suppose?

A. Yes, sir; and I paid the parties we used in New York \$200, thinking it best that the Department be not represented by an officer in uniform. I was referred to these people as being reputable men, and I paid them \$200, which was in addition, of course, to the \$41,000. The seven ships of the Atlantic Transport Line were bought directly from the owners, from the president of the company; no intermediate. The *Roumanian* was bought from Baldwin & Co., of New York, the agents of the Allan Line, and I think large owners of the Allan Line. The *Obdam* was purchased directly from the general agent of the Netherlands Steamship Company in New York. The title was passed through the intermediary of our consul at Antwerp, I think, where the headquarters of the company are. The *Berlin* and *Chester* were purchased directly from the president of the International Steamship Company. The *Scandia* was purchased, based on a cable sent from the naval attaché at Berlin calling attention to her, and stating that she could be purchased for \$200,000. I asked by telegraph the general agent of the Hamburg-American Company at New York, and he sent to me a Washington party, whom I have not seen since. The conditions were to deliver the ship in San Francisco, and payment only to be made upon inspection at San Francisco. The money was collected directly by the general agent in New York.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You spoke a little while ago, Colonel, of purchasing vessels at their value, and not above. In purchasing these vessels, did you fix the value in view of the demand which was made for them, or upon their intrinsic value?

A. Largely based on their intrinsic value, as computed by Mr. Kirby. We had, in the case of the Atlantic Transport Line, full blue prints and working plans.

Q. And the prices represented their value? Did the great demand which there was for them influence the prices asked?

A. I fancy their asking price was influenced by the great demand. The old hulks that were offered us for all sorts of prices were thrown out. Many of them would have been scrap heaps from the day we took them, had we taken them.

Q. What I was trying to get at, Colonel, was whether the Government paid anything because of the urgency of the demand; and if so, about how much?

A. I don't think anything was paid for them because of the urgency of the demand.

Q. The prices paid would have been a fair value under ordinary circumstances of trade?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. In other words, there were plenty of ships offered, so that you could take your choice. Is that it?

A. Yes, sir; plenty of ships offered; the matter of choice was much influenced by the physical condition of the ships.

Q. You were not compelled to take any because of the urgency of the demand then existing?

A. No, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was there any instance, Colonel, as far as you know, considering the fact that you purchased from the first owners direct—could there have been, under the circumstances, any influence outside the Government and the contract parties which determined the purchase of those vessels?

A. There was not a single instance where any outside influence determined the purchase of a single vessel.

Q. Was there in any instance a possibility, looking at it from a human standpoint, as you judge it, for any third party to be benefited by these sales?

A. In the case of the *Port Victor*, in the case of the *Scandia*, there certainly was. To what extent, I can't judge—could not at that time.

Q. The profit, if any, which was received by third parties, was it or was it not in the course of legitimate trade?

A. It was in the course of legitimate trade.

Q. Was it possible for any third party to have been benefited in any other way than in the course of legitimate trade in the purchase of any of these vessels made by you?

A. No, sir; it was not possible.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Have you got through with the list of vessels which you have purchased? Did you get through with the list of tugs which you had purchased?

A. Excepting the *Arizona*. I am undecided about that purchase. The purchase was largely made in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of War, in the case of the *Arizona*.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Have subsequent use and experience justified the purchase of those vessels at the prices paid for them, respectively, in your opinion?

A. Yes, sir; they have.

Q. What has been your duty, Colonel, since the 25th of July, when the last purchase was made, and where have you been in the service?

A. I have been engaged in connection with the transportation division of the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. At what points?

A. Here, at Montauk, and in Cuba.

Q. With your experience, Colonel, will you state, if you please, whether or not, in your judgment, the United States Government is provided with transportation sufficient for the needs of the service?

A. In my judgment the present transport fleet is adequate for the service under present conditions, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Q. Have you examined the vessels lately fitting up with a view to determine whether or not they are properly fitted for the service for which they are intended?

A. I have not. I have only just returned from an almost continuous absence since the 3d of October. I have been here three days since the 3d of October.

Q. Upon what vessel did you go from Havana?

A. The *Mascotte*; that is one of the Plant Line.

Q. I thought she was one of the fleet of "M's." All begin with "M."

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. By what officer of the Army, if any, are those transports commanded?

A. No officer of the Army.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Who looks after their equipment?

A. The depot quartermaster's department in New York; a special branch of it, of which Major Summerhayes is in charge.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. And San Francisco?

A. Colonel Pope, of the Quartermaster's Department.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. You did not purchase the *Corsair*?

A. No, sir.

Q. That was done before you went in?

A. We have no ship of that name.

Q. It is the *Gloucester* now.

A. In the Navy.

Q. You had nothing to do with it?

A. No, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What is the general condition of the quartermaster's department at Havana, Colonel, with reference to the facilities for unloading stores and providing for them at that point—wharf facilities, storage facilities, etc.?

A. There has recently been constructed a small pier at Playa Mariano for the purpose of landing troops destined for the vicinity of Havana. In the bay of Havana there is one good storehouse which the department has taken and is using, but there is much objection raised to the use of any storehouses there—to the landing of any troops or stores in Havana Bay.

Q. By whom?

A. By the medical officer, on the ground of danger of infection. I think the danger is exaggerated, but there it exists—there it is.

Q. Better err on that side?

A. My own personal opinion is, I doubt it. However, a contract has been made for the building of a deep-water pier in Havana Bay, and a short piece of connecting railroad, 6 miles long, connecting this pier with the Matanzas line of the united roads, and by this means escaping the present warehouse conditions and the harbor conditions on the west and south at Regla. The pier is going to be constructed at a point on the east side of the bay which can be isolated from all danger of fever. It is to the south of Casa Blanca, and by means of the railroad connection is made with all the Havana railroads outside; all towns—Guanabacao and all those towns. That road is to be completed within sixty days—by the 10th of February.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the purchase of any other supplies, or with the chartering of any vessels for transportation purposes?

A. Yes; while at Montauk I chartered two tugs, one steam lighter, three excursion barges, double decked, and one steamboat—a small one—used in connection with the landing of General Shafter's corps.

Q. And used for that purpose only?

A. And used for that purpose only.

By Colonel DĒNBÿ:

Q. Landing where?

A. At Montauk. They came in the large ships and had to be lightered in.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you have anything to do with the *Shinnecock*, or control of it while it was in service?

A. Colonel Kimball chartered the boat. I requested him to secure the boat for the service. That was over the long-distance telephone. The *Shinnecock* was used for the service.

Q. Under your control?

A. She was under the control of the commanding officer there; she was under the direction of the officers in charge of the camp—chartered for that purpose.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was the price paid for the charter of these vessels, in your judgment, reasonable?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the Government received value for what it paid for them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If there is anything else, Colonel, which you would like to state which will be of use to us in our investigation, I hope you will take the liberty to state it.

A. I think not, sir; I think you have covered the ground.

By Colonel DĒNBÿ:

Q. Did your connection with these ships cease after you bought them?

A. No, sir.

Q. Who had charge of the transportation of the Army at any point—say from Tampa to Santiago? Who furnished the transportation?

A. Our department did, sir; the division with which I was connected.

Q. Who designated the ships which ought to take the troops?

A. The commanding general at the point of embarkation in the case of the movement of the army corps from Tampa to Santiago.

Q. He would not designate the ships that came there; he would simply designate the troops that ought to go aboard the particular ships?

A. He and the depot quartermaster would make out the list. There were twenty-five or thirty ships in the bay.

Q. Who selected the ships—did you?

A. No, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Who sent them there?

A. They were sent there before my connection with the service, which began on the 20th of June.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the actual transportation of the troops?

A. Yes, sir; ships were required at Savannah to transport a command; I ordered a ship there.

Q. You selected the ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And ordered it to go to Savannah?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who saw to it that the ship was properly fitted out?

A. Major Summerhayes and Colonel Kimball, of New York.

Q. Did you have anything to do with that?

A. As respects the purchased ships, I directed much of that during the early days of July.

Q. Then, who had charge of those ships that brought the troops from Santiago to Montauk? Who selected them?

A. The officers at Santiago.

Q. Who furnished them?

A. They had been detained there for the transportation of the army corps there, and were still there and being unloaded as rapidly as could be.

Q. Well, who picked them out and took back the troops from Santiago?

A. I could not say. The depot quartermaster in each case, with some staff officer of the commanding general, would naturally do it.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Those transports were under the control of the commanding general?

A. Yes, sir; everything.

Q. And those transports remained over at Santiago—they were directly under the control of General Shafter?

A. Under his general command, directly under the quartermaster there. The quartermaster is responsible and furnished all transportation.

Q. And the order of their going and coming was from General Shafter, presumably?

A. Presumably so.

Q. Had you anything to do with the supplying the ships with any subsistence of any kind?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it your duty to see that the ships were properly fixed up with ventilators, with bunks, with anything?

A. It was in the case of the purchased ships. Yes, sir.

Q. Why was it confined to the purchased ships?

A. Because the others were in service—were in commission before my time of service.

Q. And did you see that those ships were properly equipped in every respect?

A. I did in New York. They were turned over for service; they were put in condition; ventilators put into them where possible; bunks were put in and hammocks swung.

Q. In other words, you fitted them up for the transportation of troops; that was, then, part of your business?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then these same ships were used to bring back the troops from Santiago?

A. I was not at the other end; I was at this end.

Q. Had you anything to do with the transportation by rail?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What had you to do with that?

A. The arranging for rates; the sending of instructions to the chief quartermasters in the various departments under the Adjutant-General's order directing certain movements from one point to another.

Q. How did you fix the rates? Did you have bids?

A. We had bids, or asked the chief quartermaster to take bids and report them.

Q. Were you at the head of that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you controlled the rates for transportation, did you?

A. No, sir; the railroads controlled them.

Q. You helped, did you?

A. The rates were much in excess of what they should have been, I thought.

Q. How did you meet that difficulty?

A. In several instances by making contracts here in Washington for the transportation instead of having them made at the initial points.

Q. Did you make reasonable rates—what you consider reasonable?

A. I think so. I would like—I must refer to Colonel Lee's testimony, given about six weeks ago.

[Major Mills handed the same to witness and he read it through.]

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a personal statement on this testimony of Colonel Lee. I will make it very briefly. Perhaps differences ought not to arise between officers—ought not to come before the board; and yet there is an injustice done to me. The rate I found in effect when the movement of General Brooke's command was ordered by the Adjutant-General was something in excess of \$13 from Chickamauga to Newport.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Per man?

A. Yes, sir; \$13 per man.

Q. Was that in ordinary cars or palace cars?

A. That was in tourist sleeping cars, for the use of which, however, something additional is charged. In every instance I discussed the matter of the rate with the Quartermaster-General and my associate, Colonel Bird, and suggested that the rates be obtained here in Washington. That was done, and we secured a rate from the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company of \$8.

Q. You mean for the same service?

A. For the same service. The Southern Railway Company came in and wished to change their tender to the \$8 rate. This I declined to permit, considering that it would be unfair to the road which made the rates at \$8, and that brigade was shipped over the Chesapeake and Ohio. The next was General Grant's, and it was given to the Southern road at the \$8 rate.

Q. How much greater was the distance by the Chesapeake and Ohio? How much longer were the troops en route than they would have been by the Southern Railway?

A. There is a direct line of the Southern Railway which they never use by way of Bristol, because it is over a very mountainous district, full of sharp curves, etc., and that has been held up and is referred to here. The other route is one shorter than the Chesapeake and Ohio, but nowhere compared to 172 miles. If you wish, I can give you the details this afternoon. In the case of the diversion of the New York command, that was done at the request of the State officials. They wished them to be sent around by the way of Buffalo. We protested against that; we did not favor it.

By General McCook:

Q. How did they get on the road, then; who sent them that way?

A. We protested against their diversion; but they wished them to go around by the way of Buffalo, and it was their desire.

Q. The price was the same?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I understand Colonel Lee's testimony had credited your department with having made a lower rate, and really of having been a benefit to the service. He made some criticisms?

Mr. HOWELL. He did in regard to the freight. He said your rate was cheaper to the passengers, but he preferred to have it all together—the freight that went and the passengers. There was 150 pounds allowed to each soldier.

Colonel DENBY. Colonel, we don't all remember Colonel Lee's testimony. Would you refer to the page in the testimony and read over any portion to which you object, so that we can know exactly what your objections are? Then you can make any objections you please.

Extract from testimony of Col. James G. C. Lee read by Colonel Hecker during his examination.

"Q. In regard to the contracts, did you receive any order from any superior interfering, in your opinion, with the proper discharge of your duties down there?

"A. Not that I recollect. The utmost liberality was shown by the Quartermaster-General to me, and the utmost confidence by General Brooke. When I went to him with a statement that a thing had to be done, I do not recollect of an instance in which he did not approve my recommendation.

"Q. You never received any order in relation to these contracts that was against your judgment in the discharge of your duty at all?

"A. Well, in one or two instances, perhaps, personally I might have done differently from what I was directed to do. For instance, I would get an order to purchase mules; then would come an order stopping it, and an order to get them from St. Louis; but when I reported that the mules I got there were better mules by reason of their having been bred there from better mares I was sustained and told to go on; and I do not recollect any serious interference. I felt that with both ends as busy as could be they naturally did not always exactly understand each other. But I do not recollect any serious difficulty. When the transportation of regiments was referred to me there was some difficulty, and I had to meet varying conditions, and I said that one officer had better do this. If it could be done better in Washington, it should be done there. They said there was no disposition to interfere with me, and I was allowed to have my own way about it.

"Q. Did you advertise for this transportation?

"A. No; I asked rates of the initial roads, but they were pretty nearly invariable. The Southern roads combined on a contract scale, and their rates were always the same. If in any case they were not, I took advantage of that and asked rates, and we kept the railroads well in hand. Of course, there was great rivalry between them, and in the main they were very tractable—behaving very well.

"Q. You had nothing to do with the chartering of vessels?

"A. Nothing.

"Q. All I want to know is whether anybody superior to you in authority ever interfered in any way from Washington in the discharge of your duty in the matter of contracts?

"A. I consider in the shipment of troops that interference from Washington with a man of my experience, by men who were juniors to me, was not warranted, and I made a very vigorous protest and they were not disposed to interfere.

"Q. Who were those who were interfering—your juniors?

"A. They were in the Quartermaster-General's Department.

"Q. He was not your junior?

"A. No.

"Q. I would like to know who those juniors were; I think the committee would like to know.

"A. Well, it is—I have no desire to make any question about this. It is over, and after I made my protest they receded from their position; in other words, this is just the fact. Any man here knows, as you know, that I have transported troops very successfully all my life.

"By General McCook:

"Q. I know that.

"A. When I say these young men were interfering from Washington, I knew who was doing it. A dispatch was received from the Quartermaster-General, but

when the papers were sent in these dispatches were not signed by him. The men who were interfering were conducting the transportation.

"By Governor WOODBURY:

"Q. Are we to understand that somebody else signed the Quartermaster-General's name, and he did not do it?

"A. I would rather you would send for the papers.

"Q. Then you decline?

"A. No, if you insist. I have a belief they were signed by other men, but do not want to raise this question with my department.

"Q. I want to know whether anybody, while in the discharge of your duty as chief quartermaster at that camp at Chickamauga, who was your superior, interfered with you in any way in the proper discharge of your duties under the law.

"A. I want to make that very clear, that when the regiments were sent away I got the advantage of a large reduction. There were regiments to be shipped the latter part of July or the first of August to Newport; when this thing began, and then I found I had to conform to different conditions that were bothering me that were unnecessary, in my judgment, and I at once made a vigorous protest that if somebody else was going to take charge they must do it; that there could not be two in charge, as it would cause confusion.

"Q. What was the reason, in your judgment, for that interference?

"A. I do not know; but when I felt the results I made a vigorous protest, and they said I should not feel sensitive about it; they did not wish to interfere.

"Q. To whom was that protest made?

"A. To the Quartermaster-General, who has always, I believe, sustained me fully, and who desired to sustain me in every way.

"Q. You spoke about juniors interfering with you?

"A. Those were in the transportation branch of the department.

"Q. Who was that officer?

"A. Colonel Hecker has had some control of that, and Colonel Bird; and both are colonels now by assignment and both junior to me, of course.

"Q. There were complaints made at the time, in the papers, that a lot of troops were sent by the Chesapeake and Ohio, about 172 miles farther than a direct line.

"A. Longer than that, I think. Yes, there were two complaints; one was sent to Newport News, and the other to New York by a long route. There is where the trouble began. There was an order to carry them to Newport News, from Chickamauga, by the Chesapeake and Ohio road, and, of course, that was by a longer route.

"Q. By 172 miles?

"A. More than that. And then the roads made a vigorous protest, and we got orders to take the troops by way of Richmond. Then we had orders to distribute as equally as possible, and to ship them both ways.

"Q. As soon as you made your protest, you were immediately sustained and had no further trouble?

"A. Yes; General Ludington has sustained me in everything. He has given me the largest freedom of action, and I think when any matter came to him he has treated me fairly.

"Q. Was this office of chief of transportation a new one?

"A. During the war the Quartermaster-General's Office was divided into seven divisions. One man was placed in charge of the transportation branch. He was not called the chief of transportation, but was simply in charge of the transportation branch. Now, I have understood that Colonel Hecker and Colonel Bird were in charge of this branch—who were colonels by assignment in the volunteers. I did not know that there was to be anybody to be assigned as chief of transportation. I have never seen the order at all.

"Q. That work of transportation comes within the duty of the Quartermaster-General?

"A. Yes; the Quartermaster-General has charge of all transportation in the Army.

"Q. Then, the appointment of a chief of transportation outside of the Quartermaster-General is new, is it?

"A. I do not say that any such appointment has been made. If it has, it is new.

"Q. Colonel Bird is in the service?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And Colonel Hecker?

"A. Colonel Bird is a major in the Quartermaster's Department, and has the volunteer rank of colonel.

"Q. Colonel Hecker was a civilian?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was he appointed Assistant Quartermaster-General?

"A. No; he is a colonel and quartermaster in the volunteer service.

"Q. Stationed in Washington?

"A. Yes. His station is here, and he is on the new commission to Cuba with me. I have never met him.

"Q. What was your attitude in the matter you have alluded to, of interference?

"A. That it should not be managed from two centers, but from one or the other. And their position was receded from, and it was placed right in my hands again.

"Q. What was the nature of the interference? Had you made arrangements for transportation?

"A. To make that clear, I will tell you when I make arrangements for transportation it is always done as a whole and not as a part. You understand that when I ask them to transport 10,000 men and 10,000 tons of stores they will give me a rate on both; but if I ask for a rate on 10,000 men and get a rate there will be an entirely different state of things in case of freight. In other words, if transportation was made here for men, and I was required to make transportation of freight, I would not get the special rates. I said it ought to be done together and done by one person.

"Q. You wanted to have them both made at the same time, so that you could get better rates?

"A. Yes; when it is all done together we get everything at better rates. I was told a flat rate for passengers had been made a very low one—\$10; \$10, I think it was, or \$8—very low. I was telegraphed to, and it was a rate to break the power of the combination down there, but nothing was said about freights. I asked what freights had been agreed upon. They then told me to make the freight rates. When I ran against the freight rates I found they were pretty stiff about tariff rates—no particular concession. They could not lower them; and then I insisted that these rates should be made together; that if I had to be interfered with I could not get good results, and immediately they said there was no disposition to interfere with me.

"Q. Then you went on and made those rates together?

"A. Yes; after that. We then returned to the flat rate made at that time. Then we had instructions to obtain flat rates all over the country.

"Q. That was a flat rate for passengers?

"A. For passengers, and agreed upon rates for freight.

"Q. Together?

"A. Together.

"Q. You got them from different companies?

"A. Yes; that was when the trouble began about that. After fixing the passenger I still had to make the freight rates, and found it was much better to make these as a whole.

"Q. This rate that they arranged for here, was it the same rate or a lower one?

"A. I think it was a good bargain.

"Q. No loss to the Government?

"A. No; not at all.

"Q. I understand there was no loss caused, but you objected to the division of these two things?

"A. I objected. There was no loss in the passenger rate. The passenger rate was undoubtedly a very good bargain, as the roads had combined against us. I think that part was exceedingly good. I never knew how it was brought about. Then I had to take up the freight rates, and by reason of the passenger rate having been made I considered that we were more or less in the power of the roads on the freight rates."

By General BEAVER:

Q. The longer route was at a lower rate?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Well, Colonel, what have you to say as to the comments made by Colonel Lee?

A. Well, I wish to state, Mr. Chairman, the facts as a personal matter. I don't want to go into any controversy.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I didn't consider that Colonel Lee made any criticism so as to be severe. His idea was in making the contract for freight and passengers together to get a better rate for the Government, and he thought you had made a rate for passengers and not regarded the freight.

A. When you move a command you simply provide for that brigade. Now, you can't apply the 150 pounds allowance for a man to the horses, but we have applied it to everything else. In the movement of troops and large supplies of quartermaster stores the stores come independent of the movement of the brigade.

By General McCook:

Q. You lowered the price \$5 a head?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. And your price prevailed all the time?

A. Yes, sir; to Newport News.

Q. Eight dollars per head by brigade?

A. Yes, sir.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Your action was approved by the Quartermaster-General?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was your superior?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What price did you pay for tourist and ordinary Pullman sleepers, in general?

A. The prices, sir, were for the trip. Chickamauga to New York was one price; Chickamauga to Newport was another price.

Q. Have you in mind any of these prices?

A. I am in error, sir. The only price was for Pullman sleepers—for first-class sleepers for officers. The specifications for transporting troops provided for the furnishing of tourist sleepers, or, failing that, a full seat in a first-class passenger car for each soldier.

Colonel SEXTON. I believe that the Colonel stated that the contract calls for tourist coaches, and, not having them, that Pullman coaches of a cheaper grade—old, worn out—be furnished.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Did you have anything to do with rail transportation at Montauk Point—making contracts?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know anything about the provisions of that contract with the Long Island Road and the Quartermaster's Department?

A. In general terms, yes; the contract was made by the Quartermaster-General.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the president of the Long Island Road, Mr. Baldwin, at any time, in regard to the transportation on his road?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please state whether or not there was anything in that contract which prevented the transportation of troops or supplies by water from New York or other points to and from Montauk Point.

A. My recollection is there was nothing in the contract to prevent that; but that is only my recollection. I know that troops and supplies were transported to and from Montauk by water.

Q. By what class of vessels? Controlled by whom?

A. In some instances by the Government; in others, the vessels of private parties.

Q. Did Mr. Baldwin ever request you to move troops from Montauk Point by water rather than rail, or say that you were privileged to do so?

A. He stated his entire willingness for us to move them by water.

Q. From Montauk Point?

A. From Montauk Point.

Q. Without restricting you as to the method or means of water transportation?

A. Without restricting us as to the method or means of water transportation.

Q. Then by that you consider that the Government was not under obligations to send its troops by the Long Island Railroad away from Montauk?

A. It was not under obligations to send its troops from Montauk Point by the Long Island Railway.

Q. Were you familiar with the terminal facilities of the Long Island Railway at Montauk Point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please state whether or not they were amply able to transact the business that was given them by the Government.

A. [Witness referring to his memorandum.] Between the 1st and 15th of August additional side tracks were laid and put in usable condition, and after, say on the 13th of August, there was no time when there was not side tracks and terminal room sufficient for the Government's requirements.

Q. Were those tracks so arranged that wagons could be placed at all the cars there for loading and unloading?

A. Not all the cars, but most cars; most of them.

Q. Most of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It has been stated by various persons that there was confusion—great congestion—so that supplies could not be unloaded when they arrived there. Will you please state what you know in regard to that—to what it was attributable?

A. There was congestion in the first half of the month, between the 8th and the 15th, caused by the side tracks not being in usable condition. Cars in switching would get off the tracks and block things for several hours; that would occur two or three times a day. Troops would come in by rail from Long Island City more rapidly than they could be unloaded at Montauk and camped. Animals would come more rapidly than they could be unloaded and taken care of; in fact, there was a congested condition there from the 5th to the 15th.

Q. Well, subsequently how was it?

A. There should have been no such congestion as there was there.

Q. Did you take personal control, or were you fully acquainted with the conditions which existed there at the terminal points?

A. On the days I was there. I was there from the 11th to the 16th; again the 24th and 25th of August; and I was there again the 3d, 4th, and 5th of September.

Q. How much delay, if any, was there in getting supplies to Montauk on account of the condition of the Long Island road—a one-track road—or in getting troops out of there over that road, so far as your knowledge extends?

A. There was very little delay in getting supplies to Montauk. There was delay in getting those supplies placed at the warehouses where they could be unloaded.

Q. What was the cause of that delay, Colonel?

A. Before the 10th of August the storehouses were not completed.

Q. And subsequently?

A. Between the 10th and 15th the side tracks were in such bad condition.

Q. What proportion of the cars were unloaded at the storehouses and what proportion on the sidings?

A. It was intended that all commissary stores should be unloaded at the commissary house; all quartermaster's stores at the quartermaster's house, and tentage and lumber from the cars.

Q. How far were those intentions carried out?

A. I could not say.

Q. What about land transportation? Do you know anything about the teams?

A. There were many teams there. I think there were enough.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the transportation at Tampa?

A. That was before my time.

Q. Please state whether or not in any case the routing of troops was based upon other considerations than those advantageous to the Government and for the well-being of the troops.

A. In cases that I have any knowledge of, the routing of troops, in my opinion, was in every case for the best service of the Government and the care of the troops.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Colonel, do you refer to the testimony of Colonel Lee there in regard to your position? Was there an order assigning you to a certain specific duty?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In regard to the transportation of mules and horses from the South to Montauk, do you know anything about that?

A. In a general way. I was at Montauk during a part of the time they arrived there.

Q. You did not have anything to do with the transportation of those troops that came from Tampa and Georgia and other places?

A. In a direct way—no, sir.

Q. Could you ascertain the number by referring to the records, or would it not come in your department?

A. The record is probably there. I have been away sixty days.

Q. But you can ascertain this and give it to us this evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What I wanted is a statement of the number of troops and the number of horses and mules that were carried to Montauk Point from the South, not including those from Santiago.

General McCook. Wagons and wheeling transportation.

Colonel DENBY. It seems to me that General Dodge has already asked for that. I think he has asked for all that.

The WITNESS [reading]: Would this cover it—animals and wagon transportation?

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. From the South. Now, Colonel, I want to ask you in regard to your appointment. Do you know that there has been some comment on account of some favoritism in appointing you? I want to know whether you were selected by Secretary Alger on account of your business qualifications.

A. I can not say what influence was used, sir. I was appointed against my wishes.

Q. You did not make any application?

A. No, sir; I protested against it, and I hesitated so far that when the officer of the Department who administers oaths of office called on me I declined at first to take the oath.

Q. And you accepted it to avoid embarrassment to the Secretary of War?

A. To him and the President. The nomination was made without my being consulted about it, and I knew nothing of it until a gentleman came in to congratulate me on my having been confirmed.

[Here is the order creating the division of transportation. General Orders, No. 122, War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 18, 1898.]

[Paper referred to here filed as a part of witness's testimony and marked Exhibit F. J. H., No. 1, December 7, 1898.]

There were moved from the Southern camps—Tampa, Port Tampa, and Fernandina—to Montauk Point—54 officers, 3,405 enlisted men, and 4,663 horses, and 842 mules, and about 125 wagons.

[Witness filed paper here as part of his testimony, and marked Exhibit F. J. H., No. 2, December 7, 1898.]

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Any ambulances?

A. Yes, sir; the ordinary ambulances were with those. I didn't look at the number, but I am positive from personal knowledge—I saw them arrive—there were the ordinary equipment of regimental ambulances.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Have you anything further which you wish to submit?

A. The *Arizona*, bought on the Pacific coast—here are all the papers in the case—cost \$600,000. It was purchased directly from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and taken out of their Pacific coast service.

By General McCook:

Q. Do you know whether that is the old *Arizona* that belonged to the National Line?

A. Yes, sir; the same boat, but rebuilt, reengined, and reboilered.

Q. Where was that done?

A. In England, before she came out.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. What is the tonnage of that boat?

A. Five thousand tons. We had much difficulty in getting ships on the Pacific. We had chartered everything that we could charter and there were calls made for immediate transportation, and if the commission has the time and would like to hear of the negotiation which went through I have the particulars of what was rather an interesting negotiation.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Negotiating for purchase?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the Pacific coast?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. You can state what vessels were chartered.

A. We purchased the *Scandia* and *Arizona*.

Q. You chartered vessels belonging to the Pacific Mail?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What vessels were those?

A. That is in the Quartermaster-General's report.

Q. The *Pekin*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The *Rio*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The *China*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that all?

A. No, sir; we had the *Senator* and all the Spreckels Line that they could spare. They were running to Honolulu. They were the best ships. The *China* is the best ship in the Pacific.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I judge from the way you speak of the *Arizona* that you might have had more difficulty in getting ships on the Pacific coast at a moderate price than in the East?

A. We did.

Q. Did you get as good bargains there as in the East?

A. We were wholly dependent upon what we termed book information and inspection by officers as to their carrying capacity. We had much difficulty in getting machinery and hull inspection, such as we got on this side. Then, we were offered a lot of Klondike tramps, a number of ships that were hastily fitted up on this side and sent around for the Klondike trade. None of those propositions were accepted.

Q. Please state whether or not the purchases that were made there were on as good terms as those in the East.

A. I think they were, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What was the negotiation to which you referred, Colonel?

A. The negotiation for the two ships *Tartar* and *Athenia*. They were first offered to me the 22d or 23d of June at \$1,150,000 for the two. I got their history pretty fully and declined to consider that offer. They came then with an offer of \$1,100,000. Then they sent their representative here who offered them for \$900,000. About that time I learned what they cost. They were purchased in

London and were rebuilt there. They cost originally \$575,000, or the pounds equivalent to that. They spent £44,000 on them, equal to \$220,000, or a gross of \$795,000. They were ships of considerable carrying capacity and were brought around also for the Klondike trade. The very fact that they were offered and urged in the way they were led us here to think there was excessive shipping there and we offered them \$800,000 for them. Then came the question of delivery. They wanted to sell them at Vancouver and we insisted on delivery in San Francisco and offered to pay the cost of bringing them to San Francisco. They were not willing to sell them direct to the Government, and Mr. J. Thomas Burke, of Seattle, was selected to take title, title to be passed there, and he to report here.

When the ships reached San Francisco we would pay for them. That was my offer and they accepted it, except as to San Francisco delivery, and when that was declined we purchased the *Arizona*. Then they sent, instead of an intermediary, an agent of the company here. Previous to that there had been two intermediaries here. We did not want them then, the *Arizona* taking the place of one of them. We would have bought the other for \$400,000, or half of the eight, and I made the firm offer, which was to hold good until the 8th of August, which was declined. Then they took it up for the fifth time through a Washington attorney and tendered both ships for \$800,000. I very frankly showed him that the matter had been gone through and thoroughly thrashed out, but just that very day came an intimation from the Secretary of War that more troops would be needed, and I held good the \$400,000 for the choicest ship until the 8th, as I said. That fell through, and as late approximately as the 20th of September they came after us again. We were, of course, through with it. The matter could be most clearly placed before you if you will let me read you a letter. Here is a copy of my letter sent them July 27:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., July 27, 1898.

Mr. E. V. SKINNER,

Care A. Piers, Superintendent Steamships

Canadian Pacific Railway Company, Montreal, Canada.

SIR: Your communication of 26th reached me to-day. In reply, I can only express regret that we can not see our way clear to a mutually satisfactory understanding with reference to the *Tartar*. You want to sell and we want to buy. But we can not buy the ship on the understanding that we must take her at Vancouver. We are quite willing to pay for what coal there is on her at Vancouver, which you stated was 1,880 tons, valued at \$7,900, and would be willing to allow \$2,400 for bringing the ship from Vancouver to San Francisco. Or, to put it in other words, we would be willing to fix the price of the ship at \$410,000 delivered in San Francisco, with all her equipment, appurtenances, spare parts of every kind, stores, coal, and stewards' stores and supplies except articles in steward's department monogram marked "C. R. P." Title to pass at Vancouver to Judge Burke, as set forth in your letter.

I tried to make clear to you when here the what seemed to us insurmountable objections to taking the ship at Vancouver. I have consulted with the Quartermaster-General, who fully agrees with me in this matter.

Now, as respects guaranty of machinery. You say we have had this ship surveyed on two occasions. The fact is, the ship had never been surveyed by us. A quartermaster who has no technical knowledge of machinery has looked over her with a view to reporting on her space, ventilation, etc. We believe the ship is in good condition as respects her machinery and engines, basing this belief on the rigid rules of the English Board of Trade; but we ought to have a guaranty

of a general nature that at the time of her sailing from Vancouver for San Francisco her engines, machinery, and working parts are guaranteed to be in good serviceable condition.

If, as above, your people are willing to sell the ship we will take her; if not, the trade is off.

Wire me the conclusions reached.

Yours, respectfully,

FRANK J. HECKER,

Colonel and Quartermaster Volunteers, Chief of Transportation.

He wired they would accept only for delivery at Vancouver. I think this gives you a fair idea of some of the difficulties that attended some of these negotiations.

Q. What was the substantial objection to delivery at Vancouver?

A. They afterwards offered to deliver at San Francisco when we were all through. The objection was that the Canadian Pacific at the time were the real owners, standing in a quasi official relation to the Government and feared under the English neutrality laws they would get themselves into trouble.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. They had no right to sell vessels to a belligerent?

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. In all your transactions in purchases, have you made any transaction that does not appear of record in the proper department?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you make any agreement with anybody to pay anybody outside of the figures you stated here?

A. No agreement of any kind with anybody to pay any sum.

Q. Did you agree to pay any intermediary, attorney, agent, resident of Washington or resident of any other part of the country, any sum of money for these ships outside of what you have given us as the prices paid?

A. I did not.

Q. In making the title, Colonel, I suppose they furnished the brief or whatever was necessary to assure you of a good title, and they were at the expense of it in the making of the sale?

A. Yes, sir; most of the details were brought here to Washington and were passed on by one of the judge-advocates. In one case we had to take the title through an intermediary, the Netherland ship *Obdam*. They held that under the neutrality declaration of their Kingdom they could not sell direct and the agent came here with the original documents and they are all on file in the Department.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 9, 1898.

Colonel HECKER recalled.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You have already been sworn. We called you to inquire whether or not you had charge of the transportation of the Spanish prisoners to Spain?

A. I did, sir.

Q. Was the transportation of the prisoners effected by competitive bids?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you then give us, in your own way, an account of the way in which you got those bids for transportation?

A. The day of the surrender by General Toral, the Secretary instructed me to get in readiness, under the terms of the surrender, for the transportation of

Spanish prisoners; but two days after there was some question with regard to the details of the surrender. I had prepared in the meantime an advertisement inviting tenders for transporting, approximately, 25,000 prisoners, 5 per cent of which would be officers, and made specifications under which they would be transported. The advertisement was published in the leading papers of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans. These advertisements were sent by wire. The bids were opened in New York, and there were seven tenders. One tender was a combination tender, embracing all the large Atlantic steamship lines—I think nine in number. One tender was from the representative of the Spanish Transatlantic Steamship Line. One tender was from a junk dealer in Philadelphia; one was from a paper concern, the heading of which was a paper manufacturer; one was written on a drug-house letter form; one tender was from the New York ship brokers, who offered a single ship. We were desirous to close the matter in New York, and it left before me these conditions. Of the seven tenders three or four only came from people connected with shipping. The lowest tender was the Philadelphia tender. There was no representative of it there, and I could not ascertain who he was. The next lowest tender was from the paper syndicate—the manufacturers of paper was on the heading of their tender. I wired the Secretary that the conditions were such that I did not think it possible to close the matter in New York; that I would take the limited to Washington and ask the parties to meet me here at night, and if he could give me half an hour's time I thought the matter could be closed up that night in Washington. The highest tender was the combination Atlantic steamship bids; I think it was \$55 per head for enlisted men and \$110 per head for officers, with what seemed a very dangerous demurrage clause.

By General DODGE:

Q. Where were you sending these people to?

A. From Santiago to Spain. The demurrage clause in their bid was something that could not be calculated on. I did not see how it could be estimated. The lowest bid of all was from the Philadelphia party, but this bid seemed to me to be impossible. The one bid that seemed most likely which could be accepted was from the Spanish Transatlantic Company. I asked that representative to come here that evening. I telegraphed the Philadelphia man to come here, and I telegraphed Mr. St. John, the paper manufacturer, to come here. The Philadelphia man came; I saw him first. His was the lowest bid, and my recollection is it was \$385,000 for the moving of the 25,000 prisoners. I do not recall his name now, but can get the name.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. The party you said was a junk dealer?

A. Yes, sir. I asked him what shipping connections he had. He said he had none. How did he expect to furnish ships to carry 25,000 men under the conditions of the contract? He said he could do it. I said, "You must give me some clear information as to your facilities." "I do not propose to do that; I do not propose to give away my information." "How do you expect the Government to enter into a contract with you for the carrying of these 25,000 men and the proper care and protection of the prisoners, which would be a very important factor: how can you expect the Government to consider your bid; what are your personal means, and who are you?" "I have a storage warehouse in Philadelphia, where I store iron and scrap materials." "You also buy iron and scrap materials?" "Yes, sir." "What is your firm name; what are you worth?" "I am worth \$25,000." "The advertisement inviting the bids calls for a very large bond: are you prepared to give that bond?" "I have not looked at that." I said, "I do not think we can consider your bid at all, sir." He said, "I believe it is very hard

when I have a chance to make some money out of it that I should be deprived of that opportunity." I said, "Well, we have not gone into the business for the purpose of making money." That cleared up that bid. The next bid was from the representative of the Spanish Transatlantique Company, their original bid being, I think, \$60 and \$30.

Q. In the aggregate, how much did that amount to?

A. In the aggregate, for the number that were to be transported, about \$600,000. I said to him, "We have a lower bid, but the schedule of ships which you have and the facilities which you offer to give us makes it preferable that we give you the contract; but I do not like recommending giving you the bid at a higher price than the other bid we have." He then reduced his figures to \$60 for officers and \$20 for the enlisted men.

[The figures originally taken down were \$60 per head for officers, but Major Mills, recorder of the commission, makes the following memorandum: "Spanish Transatlantique Company's bid was \$55 for officers instead of \$60 for officers."]

By General BEAVER:

Q. That was a drop of \$5 for an officer and \$10 for an enlisted man?

A. Yes, sir; and it relieved us from all medical attendance. In other cases we would have had to provide medicines and medical attendants. He assumed that. I submitted the matter to the Secretary of War and recommended that we enter into the contract that night. We did so; a bond for \$250,000 was delivered next day, and the transaction was closed.

Q. What was the aggregate saving between the two bids—the one which they formerly made and the one in which the contract was entered into?

A. You mean which company?

Q. The Spanish company; the Transatlantique Company, that actually took the bid. What was the difference between their bid and the contract—the aggregate difference?

General WILSON. He wants to get at the difference between the original bid of the Transatlantique Company and the amount at which the contract was let.

A. About \$220,000.

Q. So that, while you could not enter into a contract with the Philadelphia man, you actually saved to the Government about \$220,000?

A. Yes, sir; we did not come to his figures. His figures were \$385,000, and just a little simple arithmetic showed me that his bid was impracticable. He did not know what he was doing, or he would have furnished a service which would have been a disgrace to us.

General WILSON. \$385,000 for 25,000 men would have been \$15.40 per head, and that man could not do it.

Q. This transportation, Colonel, included sustenance?

A. Yes, sir; it placed the Government in a most advantageous position, for the reason: It was a Spanish line, it assumed all medical attendance, all police attendance, all expenses of that nature, and we felt, as a respected foe, that it was safer for us to place it that way than under the specifications we made for the army ration, so that the practical working was satisfactory from our Department standpoint. We sent an agent there, a former army officer, who spoke Spanish, to supervise the loading of the persons. He checked each man going on board, with a representative of the Spanish company and with a representative of General Toral. We have certificates from these persons.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What were the reasons which induced the Government to send these people to Spain?

A. I can not say, sir.

Q. Why did they not leave it to the Spanish Government to do it?

A. I do not know, sir; the terms of the surrender provided for it. That is outside of my ken.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You have enough to do without going into that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about the combination companies?

A. The combination companies bid was a very great disappointment to us—that the large steamship companies from New York should combine—the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg-American, the firm of Sanderson & Co., the Cunard Line.

Q. White Star?

A. No, sir; they were not in it.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Pacific Mail?

A. No, sir; three of them were large cattle transportation companies. That they should have combined and made a figure so excessive, and then accompany it with demurrage charges which would have run into hundreds of thousands of dollars, was a great disappointment. They came here to Washington and led us to believe that each one would bid, but the combined bid meant approximately \$1,400,000. [Major Mills, recorder of the commission, gives corrected figures as \$1,312,915.] And then the unknown quantity, the unknown cost of demurrage, there would have been no telling where it would have led us. The following is the clause relating to demurrage:

“Steamers to be dispatched from Santiago de Cuba within forty-eight hours of their reported arrival, or demurrage to be paid at the rate of 60 cents per capita per day, passenger capacity. If passengers are on board during such delay, 40 cents additional per capita per day. Same demurrage rates to be paid if steamer be detained at place of debarkation by quarantine or other causes. Will endeavor to have vessels at Santiago de Cuba between July 30 and August 10, 1898, but desire, if necessary, an extension in time to include the entire month of August.” (Exhibit A.)

By General BEAVER:

Q. And the actual deal was?

A. The actual deal was, I think, \$513,000.

Q. About one-third of what the combination price would have cost the Government?

A. Yes, sir; just about one-third.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did the companies accept the result of your decision without protest?

A. There was a good deal of protest, sir. I was criticised; I was told in New York that the Spanish Transatlantique was owned by the Spanish Government and we were giving the Spanish Government money instead of bullets. I was told that very plainly.

Q. Did this Spanish Company enter upon the performance of their contract?

A. Yes, sir; it was completely terminated early in September.

Q. For the moment I had in mind the evacuation of the Philippines.

A. It was all terminated.

General BEAVER. We have nothing to do with that.

By General WILSON:

Q. Colonel, even if this Philadelphia party had been able to give the proper bonds and had been able to furnish the proper vessels to your satisfaction, you still would have advised entertaining this man's bid?

A. No, sir.

Q. The advertisement provided for army rations?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. The contractors were to furnish that?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You believed at the time, Colonel, that you accepted the bid that under all the circumstances it was the lowest and best bid of a responsible party?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you still of that opinion?

A. I am, sir.

Q. In view of the transaction as it turned out?

A. Yes, sir.

General DODGE. Any other questions to ask the colonel?

General BEAVER. That is all.

General DODGE. Colonel, you can make any statement you desire: just make it in relation to this or your former testimony.

The WITNESS. Mr. President, may I—this is not in my testimony, but my attention was called yesterday to an article in the New York World of November 4 that I would be very glad to refer to if you will permit me to.

General DODGE. You have a perfect right to.

Witness then presented an article dated November 4, which appeared in the New York World, and after permission being accorded by the president, read as follows:

“William E. Ryan’s statement—Abner’s ‘influence’ promised.

“The following statement was made in the presence of witnesses and signed by William E. Ryan, of Washington, D. C.:

“In the early part of the war with Spain I became interested in trying to dispose of transports and dispatch boats to the Government. I came from my home in Washington to New York City and met Mr. Tweedie, of the Tweedie Company, No. 9 Stone street. They are shipowners and brokers. They employed me as their agent to present to the Government for purchase the dispatch boat *Wanda*. The Tweedie Company also put in my hands to handle the ferryboat the *Nevada* which they were then putting in excellent condition.

“That was about the end of May or the beginning of June. I was to receive simply a broker’s commission if I succeeded in disposing of these boats to the Government. I went back to Washington and presented specifications of both these boats to both the War and Navy Departments. The examination of the *Wanda* was at once ordered by Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn. Assistant Secretary Allen, of the Navy Department, ordered the examination of the *Nevada*.

“Subsequently I was introduced to the firm of Bennett & Walsh, ship brokers, No. 18 Broadway. They gave me the specifications of eight ocean steamers available as transports. Having made no progress in disposing of the boats, and being in New York City, a very prominent lawyer, a personal friend, put me in communication with a firm of promoters, who, he said, were very active men.

“They were Davis & Huber, Room 91, Times Building. I told Messrs. Davis & Huber of the boats that had been put in my hands, and said that if they could assist me in the sale of these boats, if the boats after examination proved acceptable, I would be willing to give them one-half of the regular legitimate commission which I was to receive.

“There and then a contract was drawn up to that effect, and it was signed and copies retained by both parties.

"ABNER M'KINLEY'S NAME AGAIN.

"Prior to the drawing up of the contract I was assured by Mr. Huber that his firm was in touch with the leading law firm of New York City, with which Abner McKinley, brother of President McKinley, was connected, and that, because of that, there would be little or no difficulty in selling to the Government the boats which had been placed in my hands as agent. I immediately returned to Washington after this interview and kept myself posted daily as to the conditions that obtained in the Bureau of Transports, of which Colonel Hecker, the business partner of Secretary of War Alger, was the head.

"Some time elapsing, and after a number of telegrams and letters had passed between the firm of Davis & Huber and myself, I again came to New York.

"I called upon the firm of Davis & Huber and they assured me that progress was being made; that the matter of the sale of my boats to the Government had been placed in the hands of the law firm with which Abner McKinley was connected.

"While in New York City on this occasion, I obtained from Bennett & Walsh specifications and necessary data regarding the ocean steamships which they wished to sell to the Government. I handed these specifications over to the firm of Davis & Huber. They presented them to the War Department.

"About this time I formed the acquaintance of the well-known architect, Mr. Mosher, of No. 1 Broadway. Mr. Mosher told me he had one of the fastest yachts in America, the *Marietta*, which he had built for Harrison & Moore, general agents of the Delaware and Lackawanna, in New York City. The yacht was in perfect condition and Mr. Moore was willing to sell her for \$75,000, although she had cost \$125,000, because he was building a larger yacht to cost \$225,000. I was to receive a commission of \$5,000 if the Government bought the *Marietta*, and one-half of this commission was to go to Mr. Mosher. I placed the disposal of this yacht also in the hands of Davis & Huber.

"DID NOT 'APPROACH' THE RIGHT MAN.

"Again I returned to Washington. Through a prominent Republican I was kept informed as to the condition of things in the Bureau of Transports. I was put off from day to day with promises made to me by Colonel Hecker and Colonel Bird, both of the Transportation Bureau of the War Department, but nothing came of these promises.

"About a week after General Miles had landed at Porto Rico I came to New York City again. I called on the firm of Davis & Huber, to compare notes with them.

"Davis & Huber then informed me that if they had to go over the same ground again it would be different; that they had found out the one man to approach, and that by the payment of money to this man they could have sold to the Government some, if not all, of these vessels."

"This man, they told me, was under Colonel Hecker, in the Bureau of Transportation in the Quartermaster's Department.

"WILLIAM E. RYAN."

(See Exhibit B.)

The WITNESS. I would be very glad to know, Mr. President, who this man is. I do not know him; he may have called on me, as other brokers or solicitors did.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you made any effort to find him?

A. I have only seen this article since yesterday. I only saw this yesterday. I have been out to the country.

Governor WOODBURY. That was the first thought in my mind—who is William E. Ryan? We would be very glad to call him here as a witness.

THE WITNESS. I should be very glad to have a strong talk with this firm of Davis & Huber.

GENERAL BEAVER. The difficulty about this is, Colonel, that they did not obtain the contract and they were chagrined that you did not buy this yacht.

THE WITNESS. I declined to buy the *Marietta*. We were buying transports.

GENERAL BEAVER. I can see what you want, Colonel. You would like to know the man in your department who could be approached with money.

THE WITNESS. There is a direct statement from William E. Ryan that Davis & Huber informed me that they had "found out the one man to approach, and that by the payment of money to this man they could have sold to the Government some, if not all, of these vessels." This man, they told me, was under Colonel Hecker, in the Bureau of Transportation in the Quartermaster's Department.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Colonel, is there any man in your department, to your knowledge, who could have been bribed in that way?

A. There is not, sir; and there was no one in the Quartermaster's Department who had, either directly or indirectly, anything to do with the purchasing of ships. There was no one who could have influenced the sale or have prevented the purchase by the Government of a ship.

Q. Do you mean to say that you had sole control?

A. I mean to say that I had sole control, subject to report to the Secretary of War and his approval, and I came in contact personally with the representatives, and where it was possible with the owners, of ships that were found available. I carried on all the communications in person and not through an intermediate.

GENERAL BEAVER. Major Mills, have we a Washington directory here?

MAJOR MILLS. No, sir.

GENERAL BEAVER. Can you get one in the building?

MAJOR MILLS. I will try, sir.

THE WITNESS. Mr. President, the statement is made here that Mr. Huber informed William E. Ryan that he was in touch with a leading law firm of New York City in which Mr. Abner McKinley was associated. Mr. Abner McKinley spoke to me only once about ships, and that was a water-carrying ship, for which we did not have any use at that time. I so said to him, and that terminated it; and that was the only time in which Mr. Abner McKinley spoke to me, and he never addressed me by communication, and I had nothing from him respecting the purchase of ships at any time or in any form except in connection with this water-carrying ship.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What part did the firm of which Abner McKinley has been given as a partner take, if any, in the sale of ships to the Government or endeavor to sell ships to the Government? Did they have any interest in the sale of ships to the Government or endeavor to sell ships?

A. None at all; as to the transports.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Is it a fact that Abner McKinley has business relations with a New York law firm?

A. I do not know.

GENERAL BEAVER. We have had some indefinite information.

GENERAL DODGE. I would state that I have seen a communication. When we were in New York we had all these matters before us. I sent a communication to the New York World, stating to them if they had any evidence in relation to any fraud or any undue influence or anything that would be detrimental to the Government in any contract made or against any officer of the Army, if they

would present the witnesses we would hear that evidence. They sent a letter in answer to that, not stating whether they had it or had not, but stated that it would be *ex parte*; they would not bring it before this commission; therefore we went no further in the matter. It was evidently a letter they did not wish us to use.

General BEAVER. We would have taken care that it was not *ex parte*.

By General DODGE:

Q. The letter was written, I think, because they had not the evidence directly against the officer. The fact of the matter, Colonel, that these people had nothing to do with you seems to me to answer it.

A. It is perhaps likely, Mr. President, that Ryan may have called on me. do not, however, recall meeting him.

Q. There were none of these ships bought?

A. No, sir.

Governor WOODBURY. Of course, the complaint is that they did not sell the ships because they did not have the influence.

Major Mills reported that there is a William E. Ryan at No. 705 Seventh street NE., Washington.

General WILSON. Does the directory state what the business of that party is?

Major MILLS. No, sir; it just simply gives his address.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Is that letter written from Washington?

A. Yes, sir; and I respectfully request that he be invited to appear before your board and give some tangible data as shall prove to you who the person was that was open to money influence. That is the only direct charge that I have seen against myself. I have heard all sorts of stories, but that is the only charge made against me.

Governor WOODBURY. You have not read the papers.

Colonel DENBY. That is not against you.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You are responsible for everything in your office?

A. Yes, sir.

Colonel DENBY. Ryan does not say it of his own knowledge. If Mr. Ryan said there was a man in the War Department who could be bribed, I think it would be entirely proper for us to call him here and ask the question. He states in his letter that "these people have told me."

General BEAVER. I think the Colonel's request is perfectly fair. However, that is a question for the commission to decide.

General BEAVER. If there are any witnesses whom you would like to have called along the line of this examination, we will be glad to consider them if you will give them to us.

EXHIBIT F. J. H., No. 1, DECEMBER 7, 1898.

GENERAL ORDERS. }
No. 122. }

WAR DEPARTMENT.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, August 18, 1898.

The following order of the War Department of July 18, 1898, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 18, 1898.

"A division of transportation is hereby created in the Quartermaster's Department, which shall be charged with the supervision and control of all rail and water transportation.

"Col. Frank J. Hecker, U. S. Volunteers, is hereby detailed as chief of this division, and Col. Charles Bird, U. S. Volunteers, as deputy chief.

"Their reports upon the work of this division will be made direct to the Quartermaster-General.

By order of the Secretary of War:

"R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*"

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT F. J. H., No. 2, DECEMBER 7, 1898.

[From Tampa, Port Tampa, and Fernandina.]

Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Mules.
36	2,082	2,861	842
8	685	964	-----
10	638	838	-----
54	3,405	4,663	a 842

a And about 125 wagons.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 7, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF COL. CHARLES H. ALDEN.

Col. CHARLES H. ALDEN then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Colonel, will you kindly give your full name, what department you are in, and how long you have been in the service?

A. Charles H. Alden, Assistant Surgeon-General. I have been in the service ever since June, 1860.

Q. During the time of the war with Spain, where were you and upon what duty?

A. I was in the Surgeon-General's Office as principal assistant and in charge of the hospital corps and supply division. The hospital corps was given to another officer about the 1st of October.

Q. At the time the war was declared, which was in the latter part of April, what amount of medical supplies were on hand, speaking generally?

A. Of course, you don't mean in figures? We had ample supplies for the Army of the size then existing—about 20,000 men—and enough surplus to provide for Indian camps and emergencies of that character.

Q. Was or was not the Army at this time supplied with about two or two and one-half months' supplies of the semiannual requisition to the 1st of July?

A. Some posts make requisitions the 1st of January and some the 1st of July. Those that got their supplies in January had more nearly a year's supply than the others.

Q. How large a proportion had drawn a year's supply?

A. I should suppose about two-thirds. The posts along the northern frontiers, where the supplies are apt to be lost by snow and freezing, to these posts supplies are furnished in the summer time.

Q. We have been given to understand that requisitions had been made for six months' supplies and approved, and that bids had been asked for at the time the war broke out. Is that a fact?

A. Yes, sir. Twice a year, in March and November, I think, circulars are sent out asking for bids sufficient to supply the depots for six months in advance, but they of course were based on peace-time wants and not what was to follow.

Q. At the time the first volunteer troops came into the field all supplies were on hand, speaking generally?

A. I can not recall just when the first—

Q. Say about the 10th of May.

A. Well, we had—I might answer it in this way. It is hard to say how much we had. In the beginning, as soon as war was declared measures were taken to increase the supplies. War was declared, I think, on the 21st of April, but the difference in time was not great, so no considerable amount had been accumulated.

Q. Did or did not the Medical Department have supplies sufficient to answer the necessities for the troops, say for two or three months, when such troops were called into the field?

The WITNESS. For 250,000?

Dr. CONNER. Yes, sir.

A. I doubt it very much. I don't think it did.

Q. In order to meet the deficiency, was any application made to State authorities for them to furnish State supplies?

A. As soon as the call was made for the organization of the regiments, the Surgeon-General telegraphed to the governors of States, asking them to lend their State equipment and supplies on hand until they could be replaced or supplemented from the United States stores.

Q. Was that request acceded to?

A. A number of replies came in. I can not tell now, without referring to the files, how many, but my impression was—I don't think I saw all the replies—but my information leads me to believe that not a great many States had much of an outfit.

Q. At what points just after the 10th of May were troops aggregated together in large numbers?

A. I can not state. I don't remember now when the volunteers came into Chickamauga.

Q. About the 10th of May were there more than two camps—Thomas and Alger?

A. And Tampa.

Q. Was Tampa so early as this a receiving depot for the troops?

A. I think so, I think the regulars went there and a few volunteers followed them immediately.

Q. What orders were issued and what arrangements were made by the Surgeon-General's Office to provide medical supplies at Camp Thomas and Camp Alger? We will take up Tampa afterwards.

A. They were supplied from two different supply depots. As soon as the Surgeon-General knew that troops were going there—in the first place I had better state that he expected all the regular troops were supplied temporarily at least, and he asked me when troops left their posts that they should take their complete equipments and three months' supplies. Therefore he supposed that the first troops reaching there had a three months' supply to start with.

Q. Did they?

A. Most of them did. There were very few exceptions. Most of them did. Then, to supply the wants of volunteer regiments that had not brought anything with them from the States, a number of what were called advance regimental

outfits were gotten up—chest containing medicines and supplies sufficient for immediate use, and that was done especially because the new medical and surgical chests were not ready until the latter part of May. These advance regimental outfits, containing medicines, instruments, and miscellaneous things, were gotten ready at the depots in St. Louis and New York for the regiments until their regular outfit could be issued to them.

Q. Were these to be used on requisitions or sent without requisitions?

A. They were sent in so many numbers from St. Louis without requisitions.

Q. Were each of the regiments supplied with such equipments?

A. The supplying of the regiments was something that was attended to at the camp and I am not able to state what their arrangements were. I presume that must have been done.

Q. Was a sufficient amount of medical supplies sent to Camp Thomas at the beginning to answer the requirements of all the troops that were there?

A. That is a pretty hard question to answer. I think sufficient medical supplies had been ordered, but there were a good many reasons why their reaching the camp was interfered with. An order might be issued from the Surgeon-General for a large amount of supplies, as was done, but there would be time taken in St. Louis in getting that stuff together, so while some of the supplies could go at once some were delayed. Then the railroad facilities between St. Louis and the camps, especially the railroad branch road, were insufficient for prompt delivery and we had reports of delays in the receipt of goods. I think I can answer that the supplies ordered were sufficient, but that they were on hand just at the time they were needed, I do not think that that was likely.

Q. In the beginning were these medical supplies issued on requisitions made by regimental officers direct from the Surgeon-General, by the supply depot at St. Louis or New York, or was there early established a branch depot at Chickamauga?

A. There was established very early at Chickamauga a branch depot. There have been issues direct to regiments. In some cases where regiments were not attached to brigades or divisions, a good many regiments throughout the United States were supplied direct; and if a regiment made an application direct, where it was seen that supplies would be delayed in reaching them by sending back the requisitions to go through the regular channels, it has been the practice to issue direct, but we would tell them that hereafter they must go through the regular channels of supply.

Q. To what extent was that supply depot supplied with medicine from the beginning?

A. I hardly know to what extent.

Q. It was not long before there were thirty and more thousand men on the ground, reaching, as near as we have been informed, 56,000. Was there at any time in the supply depot at Chickamauga a sufficient amount of medicines and medical supplies to answer the requirements for that body of troops?

A. Yes, sir. We had occasionally reports by officers giving the amount they had on hand when they wanted more, and they were undoubtedly a very large part of the time amply supplied; of course I will not say of every individual article, but after a few weeks there were ample supplies.

Q. How often did you receive reports from that depot?

A. I remember only two reports giving detailed amounts of supplies on hand, but it might be proper for me to say here that the Surgeon-General did not depend upon reports or requisitions, but guarded against the possibility of their being out of supplies. Supplies were sent there without requisitions.

Q. Are we to understand that only twice the office was informed of the amount of medical stores on hand?

A. It may have been more than twice. I only remember twice. They were given the amount on hand on requisitions.

Q. In the beginning, were all the hospital stores, medicines, etc., taken away from the regiments and sent to the division hospitals?

A. I can not speak from knowledge as to what took place in the camp. I think it was done very early; not all the supplies, but one or more of the surgeons, if they had brought any considerable amount of supplies with them—I am not stating this from my own information—

Q. If you will give us what information you have—it is the only testimony we can get.

A. Speaking especially of Camp Alger, I know more about it. I understood early in the organization of the camp the division hospital was started and some of the regiments became very irregularly supplied. Some of the supplies the regiments needed and some they did not, and some of those supplies were taken for the division hospital.

Q. For the present we will consider Camp Thomas. There are certain facts in regard to that I want to ascertain, if possible. As I understand, the supply depot was organized very early.

A. I do not know the date now.

Q. About what date were the division hospitals organized?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Prior to the 1st of June?

A. I could not say.

Q. As soon as these division hospitals were organized, was it not the intention of the Department that all medical supplies for regiments should be issued through the division hospital?

A. Well, it was the theory, but I don't believe it was carried out. My impression is the regiments were directed to the supply depot at Camp Thomas.

Q. Was it or was it not necessary that all requisitions for supplies for the regimental hospitals had to go through the chief surgeon of the division or corps for approval?

A. I am unable to say, sir; I do not know what the regulations were.

Q. Do you know in what proportion articles asked for were shipped, speaking generally?

A. No, sir; I do not.

Q. One of the inspectors-general announced that he had occasion to examine the requisitions from the division hospitals, and he found that only 40 per cent of the articles requisitioned for were approved by the chief surgeon. Do you know anything about that matter?

A. Do you mean that they were crossed out?

Q. Yes, or lessened in amount. There was very constant complaint from regimental officers and their division hospital officers that medical supplies at that camp were very limited in amount and were obtainable only with much difficulty. Can you, from your knowledge as the officer having charge of the medical supplies—can you state whether or not there were ample supplies there, or ordered to be there, at all times; the ordinary articles on the supply table?

A. I can say so after the first difficulty in transportation was overcome.

Q. At about what time?

A. When I say all times and all articles, there may be individual cases—I am speaking in a general way. I can hardly answer that definitely without looking at our records. My absolute knowledge or intimate acquaintance only extends to the relations of the Surgeon-General, so far as the supply department is concerned, to the supply depot.

Q. Do you mean the one at the camp, or New York and St. Louis?

A. At the camp, and of course the supply depot at St. Louis. Of course it is a subject which greatly interested me. I have talked with the officers coming from there and I have read what I have seen in the newspapers, and I can not help but form an opinion in regard to things; but I do not know whose hands the requisitions of the camp had to go through, what their ideas or regulations were as to reductions. There were a good many elements in that. If you desire to have my idea, I will speak about it. I have covered that fully in my report.

Q. Your own reports, then, are sufficiently numerous or definite to show whether or not there were at ordinary periods sufficient medical supplies at the depot at Chickamauga?

A. From the general way that requisitions were filled, we had no reason to believe there was not a supply.

Q. Do you know whether any reports came to your office late in May, or in June, or in July that there was much deficiency of medical supplies at Camp Thomas?

A. Very few reports came to this office in regard to the matter. There were some. I could not speak positively as to persons and days without referring to records, but they did not refer to the supply depots. The difficulties, so far I knew of them, were with the regimental surgeon in the final supply of them and to the hospitals—the regimental hospitals—and regimental surgeons.

Q. Was there not such a force of brigade surgeons, division surgeons, corps and chief medical officers of the camp—was not this a force sufficiently great to enable every man to be instructed in his duty how to get the supplies?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Why were not officers enough sent down there that these men might be instructed?

A. I had not the disposition of medical officers, but it seems to me the reason was there was not medical force enough sent down.

Q. Do you or not know that applications in a very considerable number were made throughout the country, tenders of service, that were not accepted by the Department?

A. I do not know.

Q. The Surgeon-General would know that fact, I suppose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The only evidence we have been able to secure shows that there was a great lack of medical supplies, varying from time to time, but always during the whole existence of Camp Thomas, so far as the hospitals were concerned, and the regimental hospitals as they were organized; and the report that has come to us is, that if a man hustled, as they said, and went down, he could get his supplies, but if he was not a pusher he could not get them; and even when he was trying hard to get them, he did not always succeed in finding them at the depot. Do you know anything about the facts with reference to this?

A. I do not know, but I have heard the same report that you state, but I know nothing about it.

Q. Did you have any medical inspector to look after these matters?

A. The chief surgeons of the camps and corps, the divisions and brigades, were expected to act as inspectors; I suppose.

Q. Expected to, but did they?

A. I can not say from personal knowledge, but I believe the inspections were not as minute as it is desirable they should be.

Q. You are familiar with the workings of the Surgeon-General's Office. Why was there not established a medical inspector's corps, as existed in the war of 1861, whose sole duty it was to go about and investigate just these matters?

A. I can not say in regard to that; that is a matter for Congress.

Q. Was it prevented by an act of Congress?

A. There was no provision for it in the organization of the corps.

Q. Could not medical officers be detailed to act on this duty as well as any other?

A. They could be if the men had been available, but the corps was very short, owing to the amount of work they had to do.

Q. How large a portion of the force was not in the field?

A. I could not say.

Q. Approximately?

A. The matter of medical officers is under the direct charge of the Surgeon-General, and I know of no details connected with it.

Q. Were any efforts made through you, in charge of the supply depot, to see that that camp was thoroughly supplied with medicines other than the answering, approving, and forwarding of requisitions?

A. I said, I think, a few moments ago that the Surgeon-General did not depend upon requisitions, but ordered supplies sent in advance according to his ideas of what they ought to have.

Q. How soon did the office begin to send supplies in advance for the men?

A. I could only say by reference to my reports. It was very early after the arrival of the troops at the camp, but how soon these supplies got there I can not say. At first there was a great delay in the transportation of supplies from St. Louis to Chickamauga.

Q. We have had testimony that at the division hospitals, after a very considerable length of time, there was almost an entire lack of hospital furniture, bed-pans, thermometers, and, if you please, hypodermic syringes, and things of that sort. Was there any reason why these things could not have been there?

A. I mean to say this is the first I have known of that. These are articles that can be bought in the market, and if their wants had been made known to the Surgeon-General I think their wants would have been supplied.

Q. Was not the Department aware of this fact, of the lack of thermometers and hypodermic syringes, not only at this hospital, but others?

A. Not as far as I am concerned. I don't remember that there was any special lack of these articles. They occasionally could not get supplies. They were slow in arriving, but I do not remember that these articles were particularly difficult to get or were particularly short.

Q. It has been testified, among other things, at Montauk, when the female nurses arrived there, there were practically no hypodermic syringes in the place and no thermometers, and they had to supply thermometers themselves?

A. I can not understand how it is, because the officer in charge at Montauk Point had authority to draw on the medical officer in charge of the depot in New York without limit.

Q. Why, of all the supplies that could be purchased—the orders were given that they should be purchased—why were not things on hand when wanted? Take, for example, so small an article as strychnine. There has been, I suppose, a dozen, perhaps forty, complaints from medical officers we have examined that strychnine could not be gotten at one time or another. Is there any reason why strychnine could not be purchased?

A. None whatever; and every requisition that came into the Surgeon-General's Office was promptly met.

Q. We have received testimony that one surgeon at Camp Thomas, finding it impossible to get what medicines he wanted from the supply depot, had to take his own money out of his pocket and send to Chattanooga and buy them there. Do you know of any such conditions?

A. I never heard of that condition. The only way the matter could be settled would be by ascertaining the date of that and getting a report, if possible, and find out what was in the supply depot at that time?

Q. Can such facts be ascertained as to what was in the supply depot at certain dates?

A. I have several reports from them—what officers had on hand.

Q. As I understood you a moment ago, you only had two reports of the supply on hand?

A. Two that I know of. I know a case that came to my personal knowledge on that very point. I think it was the governor of Iowa came to the Surgeon-General and stated he had come from Camp Thomas, and the surgeon of his regiments stated he could not get certain articles; I think one was phenacetine; and he asked me if I could throw any light on the matter; and I happened to have one of these reports on hand from the supply depot at Camp Thomas. It showed the amount on hand just at the time of the visit of this gentleman to Camp Thomas, and this report showed that there were considerable amounts of all the articles that this regimental surgeon stated he could not get at that time at the depot. There was some reason why he could not get them or did not get them.

Q. Is there any reason why an officer in charge of a division hospital should not get what medicines he requires?

A. I do not know the internal workings of the authorities at Camp Thomas. I can not say what the reasons were, but so far as the supply depot was concerned, after the first few weeks, I felt satisfied, with the exception, of course, of a few articles that might be out; but as a rule the supply depot had sufficient supplies for the troops.

Q. How was it at Camp Alger?

A. At Camp Alger the circumstances were somewhat different. It was well supplied.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you receive information at any time from the officer in charge of the supply depot that they were short of medicines or supplies at Chickamauga?

A. We had occasionally a good many telegraphic requisitions. He was expected to make telegraphic requisitions when he was short.

Q. Did he make any complaints that he could not get necessary medical supplies?

A. He could get them, as far as he was concerned. It was only with the transportation of getting them there promptly. There was complaint about the nonarrival of supplies from St. Louis.

Q. Did you get any complaints from the general or the surgeon of any division or any surgeons at Camp Thomas that they were not supplied with medicines and other medical supplies; that they did not have a sufficient quantity for their use?

A. There were difficulties about getting supplies there, as I stated, in the early weeks.

Q. I have asked you if you have received any complaints from them?

A. I have been trying to recall—I can not recall—we must have had some complaints, but I can not recall them. There was this one I was just speaking of. There were others, but very few, as I recall the matter. The complaints were in the nature of nonreceipt, knowing that they had been sent or asked for, but not delivered.

Q. Of course, that is the only reason they would complain—because they did not get the stuff?

A. I thought you meant against the Surgeon-General. I would not say there was none, but there probably were a few complaints—letters that came direct to the Surgeon-General from officers in that camp. I think you have them all before the commission.

Q. Were the supplies shipped any less promptly from the New York depot than the St. Louis depot, speaking generally?

A. I do not think there was any special difference. New York has had the most to do the last few months. Possibly there has been a little difference in favor of St. Louis on that account.

Q. I mean in June and July?

A. Yes, sir; I think that possibly the New York depot was a little more pressed, and there was more delay, I think, in getting out requisitions there than at St. Louis.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Speaking of the delivery of the medical stores at the supply depot and their transmission to the camps or the regimental hospitals, was the transporting of such supplies in the hands of the Medical Department or quartermaster—from the supply depot to the division hospital?

A. Quartermaster.

Q. It was his business to deliver these supplies whenever they were requisitioned for?

A. They were turned over to him by the supply officer in St. Louis.

Q. I am speaking of getting them from the local supply depot at Lytle?

A. I don't know anything about that.

Q. What is the army regulation in regard to that? Does the transporting of these supplies from point to point belong to the Quartermaster's Department or the Medical Department—whose business is it to get things from the storehouse to the patient?

A. If there is any considerable number of boxes, I should suppose it would have to be done by the quartermaster. If there are only a few packages, the surgeon would send his own ambulance or anything he could get hold of to get it.

Q. Now, as to Camp Alger; we started on it and were interrupted.

A. In order to save delay in getting supplies from New York for Camp Alger, a very considerable portion of their supplies were bought right here in Washington and shipped out to them immediately, so I think their wants were somewhat more promptly met than at Chickamauga.

Q. Were the division hospitals at Camp Alger supplied with all proper and necessary medicines and hospital supplies?

A. Certainly the orders given were calculated to provide them in that way during the delays of transportation; I think they were.

Q. Did the office receive any regular reports from the corps surgeons as to the supplies, or the receipt of supplies, and condition of the supplies?

A. Whenever requisition was made, the amounts on hand were always put in, so we knew from that.

Q. The office was not supplied at definite intervals with information as respects the medical wants of these large camps?

A. Only by their requisitions.

Q. Now, you mentioned Tampa. From what depots was Tampa supplied, and to what extent were the supplies sent; how long, as a rule, did it take them to reach there, and what amount was actually received at Tampa?

A. Tampa was supplied from the New York supply depot, being in most direct communication with it.

Q. I want to know how rapidly these articles issued from New York reached Tampa, and to what extent that camp was supplied with medicines and medical stores.

A. I can not tell you how long it took. Of course, it took much longer by way of fast freight than by express. As soon as it was found that there were delays the Surgeon-General ordered supplies sent by express. That has been the case largely ever since.

Q. Were those supplies that were sent to Tampa received in due course of time—that is to say, as compared with articles that would be sent by freight or fast freight under ordinary circumstances?

A. I am informed there was great delay.

Q. Where was that delay, in the supply depot in New York, in the reception of the goods by the Quartermaster's Department, in the delivery of goods by the Quartermaster's Department to the railroad company, in transit, or at the other end of the line?

A. As far as my information goes, it was chiefly on the railroad itself and the terminal facilities at Tampa, in the discharge of freight at Tampa.

Q. As a result of these delays did you or not receive reports of great insufficiency of medical supplies at Tampa?

A. There were some reports of want of supplies, which the general met by authorizing them to buy on the spot. Before General Shafter's army sailed the supplies had almost all gotten there and they were well provided.

Q. Were ample medical supplies and hospital furniture sent with the expeditionary force to Cuba?

A. Yes, sir; there were supplies.

Q. Were such supplies as ought to have accompanied an army of 17,000 men expecting to have fights and necessarily to have a good deal of sickness?

A. I know of no definite reports as to the amounts they took with them. We knew what amount was sent to Tampa. I judged that not all that were sent were taken, because Colonel Pope's report states that he left some of his supplies at Tampa. I can say confidently that the supplies that were sent to Tampa were expected to be ample and sufficient for General Shafter's forces under any circumstances.

Q. The reports that you received then, did they indicate that the army in front of Santiago was properly supplied with medicines and hospital stores—with the hospital supplies of all kinds?

The WITNESS. Before they sailed?

Dr. CONNER. The reports you received from the army before Santiago, while in front of Santiago, after they landed.

The WITNESS. That they had a sufficient supply on the field?

Dr. CONNER. Yes, sir.

A. I should judge not from the reports.

Q. Did you have reports of medical supplies or insufficiency?

A. Nothing definite as to amounts.

Q. What was the general tenor of the reports you received respecting the amount of supplies? Was it that it was very deficient, or it was pretty good, or fully ample?

A. I should say it was decidedly deficient.

Q. Do you know of any reason for that deficiency existing?

A. That the supplies were not landed—all of them.

Q. Is it or not expected that the Medical Department would see to it that its supplies are landed?

A. I don't see how the Medical Department can control that matter.

Q. In whose hands would the control be?

A. In the control of the military authorities.

Q. If medical supplies in ample quantity went on board transports and were not landed, whose business was it to make a fuss about it? Somebody had to make a fuss.

A. It is the business of the Medical Department to draw the attention of the authorities to it, I should say.

Q. Do you know whether or not the chief surgeon of that expeditionary force—Colonel Pope, was it not?—whether Colonel Pope made formal complaint to General Shafter, the Secretary of War, or anybody as to this condition existing?

A. He could not make complaint to anybody very well except to his immediate chief, General Shafter.

Q. Is there any evidence in the office on file to show that he made complaint of the nonlanding; in the first place, not taking the supplies, and in the second place, not landing the supplies he did take?

A. I do not know of any such paper on file. His report is before the commission, I think.

Q. Colonel Pope's?

A. I think so. He goes into the matter fully of supplies, both at Tampa and Santiago.

Q. Do the reports in your own office show that supplies were not on hand in proper quantities?

A. I should say so, decidedly. The evidence from that point was that they were not sufficient.

Q. The evidence we have received is to the general effect that very limited supplies were landed and those supplies that were landed were transported with much difficulty and oftentimes they were not gotten to the front; that there was a very great scarcity of proper dressings for the wounded after the fight; that the medical supplies were exceedingly limited in the hospitals that were organized there; that the Medical Department was not properly equipped for the work it had to do there. Do you know whether these are facts?

A. I do not know from personal knowledge. I only know from general reports.

Q. Have you any of those reports?

A. There are reports. They did not come to my division. I have read reports that would certainly show that condition of things.

Q. If the wounded were not supplied with proper dressings; if the sick had not the proper medicines; if there was a lack of ordinary conveniences of a common hospital, who would be responsible therefor?

A. The person responsible for everything, as I understand it, in the army, is the person in command—the officer in command. Now, there may be reasons amply sufficient to him to make it impossible for the supplies to have been landed. There may have been military necessities of which I am unable to judge.

Q. If this existed, not in the beginning, but during the whole time that the army of occupation was in Cuba, who would have been responsible for that condition? You said before the commanding general, ultimately.

A. Why, of course, he is responsible.

Q. If it was possible for a volunteer association to take supplies to that region and to have those supplies on hand, would it not have been possible, think you, for the Medical Department of the Army to have similar supplies at that place at that time?

A. If the Medical Department, as I understood, took everything they could take with them, I do not see how it was possible for them to take any more.

Q. Do your reports indicate the amount of supplies on hand in the supply depot that was established at Santiago? I believe there was one such, was there not, principally existing at Siboney?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do your reports show the amount of medical stores there?

A. There must have been. I can not recall when the first report was made showing the amount of supplies on hand. I question very much whether one was made very soon. There was constant demand for supplies, which were instantly ordered by telegraph to be sent from New York at the first opportunity, but as to the amount on hand, I don't think there were reports made very promptly. They were too busy to send any such reports.

Q. If, after the capture of Santiago, a vessel belonging to a volunteer organization came in and landed medical supplies of various kinds, was it or not possible for the Medical Department to have medical supplies there?

A. I hardly know how to answer that question. It seems to me that the Medical Department, as organized with its officers, with its facilities, if it had been put in possession of transportation and more vessels and more men to handle the articles and demand them, it would have been possible to do more, but with the agencies we had at hand I do not see what they could do.

Q. If the Medical Department knew as early as anyone else what movement was going to be made; if a volunteer organization (that must of necessity receive its information at a later date) was able to have on hand medicines, medical stores, and medical supplies of various sorts; if at the same time the Medical Department of the Army did not have medical supplies and medical stores, what explanation can be given on the assumed facts that the volunteer organization had its supplies there and the Medical Department did not?

A. The Medical Department is necessarily obliged to confine itself to existing agencies. Thus transportation is managed by the Quartermaster's Department; its subsistence comes from the Subsistence Department; it has a certain number of officers fixed by law; it has to work within certain restrictions. If the Medical Department had been warned in sufficient time, had been given unlimited men and money and left to operate without restriction of any kind as a volunteer organization is, they could and would have met the emergencies as well as they did.

Q. If the Medical Department had appealed to the Government for money, would there have been any difficulty in getting all the money they needed for the proper care of the sick?

A. It was not simply a matter of money, it seems to me. I presume there was no time that the Medical Department has not felt authorized since the war broke out to spend any amount that was deemed necessary.

Q. If the Medical Department had shown that its transportation facilities were altogether too limited, is it or not probable that those facilities would have been increased?

A. I think the question is answered by my stating that the whole emergency was so sudden that there was no time to provide, to anticipate, or to organize for extensive operations. I ought also to say that the Surgeon-General himself had no direct control of the affairs of the department in General Shafter's army beyond supplying them to the best of his ability with officers and supplies, meeting their difficulties as far as he was able to do with the facilities at hand. He could not interfere direct with the condition of things after they were once turned over to the authorities of that army. I think it is due to the Surgeon-General that that fact should appear.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I want to ask you about a question that has been testified to by people here; that is, the establishment of an apothecary corps with a general at the head and colonel, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, and so on down in the military. What would you say as to the feasibility of that?

A. I do not see the necessity for it.

Q. A man here proposes to have a corps.

A. Our dispensing in the Army is very simple. Our supplies ordinarily are furnished manufactured, and also mostly in tablet form, and there is very little use for an apothecary in compounding.

Q. You would not be in favor of establishing such a corps as that?

A. There would be no use in it, I think. Our Hospital Corps manages its business perfectly satisfactory to the Medical Department. Our stewards are taught dispensing sufficient to meet the needs of the military.

Q. You think the present system is sufficient?

A. Yes, sir; there would be no harm in having men appointed simply as apoth-

ecaries, if that was urged and desired; but I should not think it necessary at all. There has been great effort made on the part of the apothecaries in the United States to have a corps of a number of apothecaries. We can get along as we are now very satisfactorily.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you have charge of the Hospital Corps?

A. Up until about the last of September.

Q. Will you state, in your own way, what you have to say of the Hospital Corps, its composition at the time of the breaking out of the war, the efforts made to increase its efficiency, the character of the men secured, and the results of the workings of the Hospital Corps?

A. I shall have to state pretty much what I did in the report I prepared for the commission sent in by the Surgeon-General. He had about 100 stewards and 100 acting stewards, and something over 500 privates in the Hospital Corps at the outbreak of the war. It was difficult at once to obtain additional men, and efforts were made to enlist as many nurses as had been trained as possible—apothecaries, cooks, men who were handy with animals, mechanics, etc. It was found impossible to secure enough men for the entire Army by direct enlistment, and a large number of men were transferred from the line of the volunteers to the Hospital Corps, so there were altogether probably between 7,000 privates at one time; 200 hospital stewards and 400 or 500 acting stewards and about 7,000 privates.

Q. As regarded by you, what were the services rendered by the Hospital Corps as a body of men?

A. The Hospital Corps that existed for the old Army was a well-trained corps mostly, almost all the men had passed through some school of instruction that had been established for the Hospital Corps, but when additional men were needed it was impossible to take time to train them, and we had among them good common nurses, apothecaries, and doctors, but they were mostly men who had no experience in nursing, but we expected medical officers would at once commence their instructions as soon as they got hold of them. Upon the whole, the reports of their service have been as satisfactory as could be anticipated.

Q. What proportion, think you, of the Hospital Corps men made tolerable nurses for the sick?

A. I have not come into contact with the actual workings in the camp and my information does not give me ground for answering.

Q. Are you familiar with the reports that have been received at the office with reference to this matter of the Hospital Corps and the working of it?

A. We got very few reports in regard to their efficiency, etc. The reports that came into us were largely numerical; chiefly numerical. We did not get individual reports. They were general reports, as I remember, regarding the efficiency of the corps.

Q. Did the matter come under your charge at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. To return to the medical supplies for the Shafter expedition, do you or not know what was done with the stores that were sent to Tampa by you or by the order of the department?

A. I only know what Colonel Pope reports.

Q. Do you know whether or not any means were provided for transportation of the sick and wounded and taken along with that expedition?

A. I have no knowledge of it, sir.

Q. So far as you know, were ample supplies issued in accordance with your orders for the expedition itself—hospital supplies, medicines, etc.?

The WITNESS. You mean at Tampa, before they started?

Dr. CONNER. Yes, sir.

A. I could not say as to the issue to regiments and divisions.

Q. No; about the expedition as a corps?

A. I have no reason to believe both from the orders given and from Colonel Pope's reports that the supplies were amply received at Tampa.

Q. Do you know whether or not any of the things sent to Tampa were lost in transit?

The WITNESS. Between the north and Tampa?

Dr. CONNER. Yes, sir.

A. I think everything got there finally.

Q. Do you know whether any formal report was made to your office of the great delay in the receipt of articles ordered sent from New York to Tampa?

A. Yes, sir; there were telegrams noting delay and urging their haste before General Shaffer sailed.

Q. Do you know whether any efforts were made to ascertain why that delay existed and where the articles were?

A. The Quartermaster's Department, immediately on our Surgeon-General's request, as I remember, took means to trace up and urge forward the supplies.

Q. Did they find out where those things were and get them?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Was any report made to you of a delay of over two months between the sending and receipt of articles at Tampa shipped from New York?

A. I do not remember, sir.

Q. If such a thing had occurred, would you have known of it?

A. I think I should. It may have occurred and passed out of my mind.

Q. Was any report made to you of the marked delay in the shipment of goods from New York to Montauk?

A. I do not recall any, sir. As I said before, the matter of the supplies at Montauk was given over entirely to the local authorities. The Surgeon-General took no part in the supply at Montauk. The chief surgeon was authorized to send for anything he wanted, and all arrangements regarding forwarding and shipping—transportation was something outside the Surgeon-General's Office. I don't remember now that there were any complaints, except what I saw in the papers afterwards, in regard to the delays in transportation. They would not naturally come to the Surgeon-General, as he had not ordered the supplies.

Q. Did any part of the work come under your supervision excepting the supplies of the medical corps?

A. No, sir. If you will allow me to explain: I have been many times asked in regard to the transportation and nonreceipt from divisions—transportation and delayed transportation. I feel I ought, in justice to the department that has charge of this transportation, to say there was nothing, in my knowledge, that would lead me to believe that the delays had been caused by any neglect on the part of that department. I believe that it was the railroads themselves and not the shipping where the difficulty was. I have become convinced, from my general knowledge and from what has come to my mind in reports and in one way and another, and I think that such a vast amount of stores in reaching Chickamauga, men and material of all kinds, that it was simply impossible to get there promptly the medical supplies. I thought it due to state this.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you know anything about the *Olivette*?

A. Nothing whatever; never had anything to do with that.

Q. If the Surgeon-General's Department had reported to the Secretary of War that a transport was necessary, or it would be prudent to have a transport to load with ice and delicacies for the sick and with medical stores and appliances to accompany the Shaffer expedition, would he not have granted the request?

A. I suppose he would; but this ought to be said—that it was supposed General Shafter's chief medical officer and he himself would ask for what they wanted to provide for their assistance.

Q. Is it not the duty of the Surgeon-General's Department to initiate any such movements or to furnish what you would call the foresight when such an expedition is about to take place?

A. The Surgeon-General thought he was using his foresight in sending supplies on his own motion.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Would it be necessary to ask the Secretary of War for authority to fit up a ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Couldn't he apply to the Quartermaster-General for the ship?

A. The Quartermaster-General can only do it by authority of the Secretary of War.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know why there was delay in the inspecting of the hospital ship *Relief* and her fitting?

A. I don't know why that was.

Q. The President finally directed it himself?

A. The Surgeon-General fully expected the *Relief* ship would be on hand with supplies and everything necessary for the sick.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Who did the Surgeon-General demand that ship of—the Secretary of War or the Quartermaster's Department?

A. The Secretary of War, because the Quartermaster-General could not act without the sanction of the Secretary of War. I said the Secretary of War, for I know in applications of similar character they are often addressed to the Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 7, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE JAMES E. SMITH.

Private JAMES E. SMITH appeared before the commission, and was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By General BEAVER:

A. Mr. Smith, will you kindly give us your name and the company and regiment in which you served during the war with Spain, and the length of your service.

A. James E. Smith, private, Troop A, Sixth Cavalry.

Q. When did you enlist and how long did you serve?

A. March 17; discharged September 24.

Q. Why were you discharged?

A. At my own request.

Q. Did you enlist as a private or newspaper correspondent?

A. Private.

Q. To carry on newspaper work?

A. No, sir; merely to fight for my country.

Q. Why did you wish to be discharged?

A. Because I did not want to be a soldier in time of peace.

Q. You took it for granted there would be peace?

A. I felt that way.

Q. Where did you serve?

A. Served at Fort Myer, Chickamauga Park, Tampa, and through the campaign in Cuba; about four or five different camps.

Q. Your service at Fort Myer and Chickamauga and Tampa were all preparatory for your embarking for Cuba?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any special instance during your service at either of these places that you wish to speak of?

A. No, sir; there has been nothing in any of them.

Q. You remember the vessel upon which you went to Cuba?

A. The *Rio Grande*.

Q. How many troops were aboard her?

A. The Sixth Cavalry and part of the Third, I remember; I don't think the whole of the Third—one squadron, I believe.

Q. What kind of accommodations had you?

A. Wooden bunks, and I thought it very good.

Q. Had you your full supply of travel rations with you?

A. We were supplied with travel rations on board the ship.

Q. When and where did you land?

A. Landed on the 23d of June at Daiquiri.

Q. Did you have anything of your travel rations over at the time you landed?

A. We had a lot of rations over and we took three days' field rations.

Q. How were you supplied with food during the campaign in Cuba—your company?

A. We had plenty. I have given a lot away to some volunteers.

Q. Was that true as to most of the regulars, so far as you know, that they had what they wanted and they had something over to give to others?

A. That is true. I have seen as many as dozens who had volunteers around our camp taking as many as two meals a day.

Q. They came to you because of the shortage in their regiments?

A. Well, on one occasion there were some men of these volunteers who said they had not had anything for two days; that they were supplied with three days' rations on landing at Siboney—I think that is where they landed—but they made a night march and it was wet and the ration got heavy and they discarded it and of course they had to go without rations.

Q. And you helped them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you observe of the conditions in that respect while in Cuba, in your own command and in others?

A. I have always found plenty of rations in my own command, and the day of the fight we had to discard our rations, and the Cubans came along and picked them up, but we had rations brought to us about 9 o'clock that night.

Q. What fight was that?

A. San Juan, on July 1.

Q. Were you in that fight?

A. I was in that fight.

Q. You got food that same evening?

A. That same evening about 9 o'clock.

Q. How many days' rations were you supposed to have the day of the fight?

A. We had three days' rations issued the day before.

Q. So you had rations the day of the fight and the day succeeding the fight?

A. Yes, sir; the day of the 3d. We had rations including June 30, and three days' rations for the next three days.

Q. And notwithstanding the fact that you discarded it before going into the fight, your commissary brought you up rations that same night?

A. Yes, sir; that same night. All we missed that day was dinner. Of course, I did not care for it, anyhow. We had plenty of other amusement there.

Q. The excitement of the fight kept you up?

A. We did not feel like eating.

Q. Did you have plenty of ammunition for the fight?

A. Plenty.

Q. What did you have during that campaign in the way of shelter?

A. We had shelter tents, and part of the time we had—after the fighting was over, we had the Sibley tent.

Q. Do you remember when the Sibley tent was brought up?

A. Sometime in July, late, probably about the 20th.

Q. Before the Sibley tents were brought up and you were dependent upon your shelter tents for shelter, how did you arrange for your shelter—did you and a companion button your pieces of shelter tents together or did four go together?

A. Two.

Q. What kind of shelter did that make for you?

A. It managed to keep us dry.

Q. Do you remember how those rations were brought up to you on the 1st of July; did you see how they were brought?

A. They were brought up on pack trains of pack mules, and the regiments that they were served to were the Third—there were two squadrons, I think four troops—two of the Third. I was also at Montauk Point.

Q. How long did you remain in Cuba?

A. From June 23, to August 7.

Q. Where did you go from there?

A. Montauk Point.

Q. When did you land at Montauk?

A. Arrived on the 13th and landed on the 14th.

Q. How long did you remain at Montauk Point?

A. Until September 8.

Q. What did you find when you got there in the way of preparation for your camp?

A. We had tents—A wall tents, I think they call them.

Q. Already put up?

A. Already put up and floors in them.

Q. Water supply in the camp?

A. At that time we were using lithia water. I could not see what source it came from. That is what we drank for the first five or six days.

Q. Bottled water?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How were you provided as to clothing during the campaign?

A. I always had enough toward the last. For about four or five days I was bad off for shoes, but I got them.

Q. Where was it that you got your new shoes—in Cuba?

A. In Cuba.

Q. Were you sick during your term of service?

A. I was taken sick at Montauk. It was when I was there I got malaria and was sick a few days.

Q. Did you go to the hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Sick in quarters?

A. Sick in quarters.

Q. Did the regimental surgeon look after you—were you on the sick list?

A. Yes, sir; I was on the sick list several days.

Q. What did he give you?

A. Medicine; and finally I asked him for a sick leave, which was granted me. I told him the climate did not agree with me, and I said if I was sent to Washington I would get better, which happened so. I came here and have been better ever since.

Q. What is your nationality—are you an American born?

A. English and French; yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you correspond with your paper all the time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What paper were you writing for?

A. Different papers—Washington papers.

Q. And all through this campaign you wrote?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you give a fair account of things as they happened?

A. I gave a fair account of things as they happened: I can get clippings to use if necessary.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 8, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF SURGEON-GENERAL STERNBERG.

Surgeon-General STERNBERG then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. General Sternberg, will you be kind enough to tell us your name, rank, and your occupation during the war with Spain?

A. George Miller Sternberg, Surgeon-General United States Army, in charge of the Medical Department of the Army during the war with Spain.

Q. General, we have received a number of printed documents from the reports on hospital ships, reports on nurses, reports on medical supplies, and reports on the Hospital Corps of the Army; these reports that we have received, are you ready to have us accept them as being correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us in what condition, in the matter of equipment, the Medical Department of the Army was at the time of the declaration of the war with Spain?

A. The Medical Department of the Army was well equipped to take care of an army of 25,000 men. We had in our supply depot only such supplies as were an absolute necessity for current use for the year—our appropriations have been cut down from year to year. The policy of the Government has been economy; and I have endeavored to comply with that policy by reducing expenditures and my reasonable estimates were very largely reduced by Congress; they were for the last fiscal year.

Dr. CONNER. May I interrupt you one moment? I am called out for a minute.

Q. At what time, General, were you able to begin making preparations for the demands of the new forces?

A. I commenced preparations, involving no expense, as soon as there was a prospect of war. I immediately commenced preparing models of the field

chests—the full field equipment for troops to be engaged in active operations. I was not satisfied with our field medical equipment and had new medical chests made according to my view. I spoke to the Secretary with reference to the situation of the Medical Department and as to whether I was justified in making purchases in view of the possibility of war, and the policy was that I should wait. I had no authority and, indeed, no money, until Congress had made the appropriation, for making any special preparations.

Q. With respect to the personnel of the Army—were you able to make any changes in that prior to the declaration of war?

A. The personnel of the Medical Department of the Army was reduced about the time I was appointed Surgeon-General, in 1893—against my earnest protest and that of several general officers in the Army. Congress gave us back during the last of the session before the war the number that had been cut off (15 assistant surgeons), but when the war broke out we did not have these—we simply had authority, so that there were 15 vacancies to be filled; and while the number authorized by law was 192, we had those and quite a number of other vacancies to be filled, and quite a number of medical officers were sick, so that the corps for practical purposes was even much less than authorized by Congress.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us how the Medical Corps of the Army is increased; how the men appointed in the service are selected?

A. The medical officers of volunteers are appointed by the President, largely upon my recommendation.

Q. I refer now to the regular service.

A. After an examination. The man must be less than 29 years of age; must be a graduate of a legalized medical college; must have at least one year's experience in a hospital, and he must pass a very rigid examination before a proper medical board.

Q. Was any medical examination made at the declaration of the war or soon after?

A. We had a board in session at that time. Afterwards we had a board to fill vacancies.

Q. How many appointments were made as the result of investigations and meetings held by that board?

A. I would have to refer to the official documents. My recollection is 13, but I won't be positive about that.

Q. Those men of the Regular Army, I suppose, were scattered all over the country, but as soon as it became evident to your mind that war was imminent, what arrangements were made as respects the detailing of those officers or certain of them for the more important positions to be occupied?

A. When war was declared the regular troops were at once rushed from their stations to camps, and the medical officers at those stations, as a rule, accompanied them in the field, and other medical officers were detailed wherever possible to go with the regular troops. Then, of our senior medical officers, on my recommendation, 5 were appointed chief surgeons of corps and were assigned to five different army corps; a large number—36, I think—were, by my recommendation, assigned to duty as brigade and division surgeons. I considered it very important that we should have with the volunteer troops, as far as possible, experienced medical officers. In this respect my only regret was that we did not have enough to fill them all.

Q. I say, by the President?

A. The law calling out the volunteers made provision for a chief surgeon to each army corps, one chief to each division, and one brigade surgeon for each brigade, and I asked immediately for the appointment of these men. The appointments were very promptly made.

Q. Were those men who were appointed—were any of the volunteer appointments made after examination, or without examination?

A. None of them were made after examination. The fact is, we had no medical officers available for examining boards, and the fact that I proposed to select only men who were well qualified led me to think, under the circumstances, that it was best not to wait for an examination, and I did not ask for one.

Q. Do you remember how many brigade surgeons were appointed under that head?

A. I would have to refer to the documents in my office.

Q. Speaking generally?

A. Generally, I should say probably 75.

Q. Was it or was it not necessary that a large number of contract physicians be employed without any preliminary examinations?

A. It was. At one time we had as many as 650. There were urgent calls for them at Santiago and elsewhere, and these calls were so frequent and so urgent that I had to fill them promptly.

Q. These men were appointed by you and contracts given them by you, and was each man properly recommended to you?

A. I insisted upon professional indorsements, and endeavored to procure them in each case, but if you wish me to go on—

Dr. CONNER. Yes, please.

A. I would say the very best professional indorsements sometimes lead to dis-appointment. I have had men come to me who have had admirable letters and of whom I expected a great deal, but when they came before me I was not satisfied with them.

Q. Speaking generally, how did the contract surgeons answer the expectations you had?

A. As a rule they did remarkably well. We endeavored to get men who had only been out of a medical school for a few years. I did not wish them to get their experience at the expense of the soldiers. They were to be men who had hospital experience. I selected men from 30 to 40 years of age who had hospital experience, and I may say in that connection that I had a large number of applications for contracts from men who had served during the last war and almost invariably I put those on what I may call my reserve list. I declined to give them contracts for the reason that in my opinion men who had been old enough to serve during the last war had passed the time for active professional work in the Army. If I had known that our troops were to remain in permanent camps in this country I think it would have been—and it was—a mistake that we did not have more men who had had experience during the war, as that experience would have been of great value in our large camps; but I used my best judgment. Many of those men were necessarily past the age for active work, and almost invariably their applications were put on the reserve list.

Q. As soon as it became known to you that permanent camps were a fact, did you or did you not call upon the men on this reserve list?

A. Not to any considerable extent, because, as a matter of fact, a great many of the contracts were made in those camps by the chief surgeons. I had to give authority to make them at Montauk Point and Camp Thomas and elsewhere. A great many of the contracts were not made by me. I did not know that they were permanent camps until the time passed and the sickness developed so rapidly. I adhered to my principle to get comparatively young men, not only for the reason that I have given, but for the reason that young men who have graduated recently are perhaps more acquainted with the progress of medicine, and I thought they were more valuable for such work as we required.

Q. Continuing the subject of the personnel of the Medical Department for a moment, how large a force of medical officers were you able to send with the corps commanded by General Shafter?

A. Thirty-six medical officers—very much more than a fair proportion—36 medical officers of the Regular Army. The volunteer regiments had their complement as allowed by law—that is, one surgeon and two assistant surgeons.

Q. Of these 36 surgeons, how many were capable of administrative and professional work?

A. There was a chief surgeon, who was for administrative work, and a chief surgeon of each division, who, under ordinary circumstances, was for administrative work, but who was expected to give assistance in the care of the wounded in emergencies.

Q. Of the brigade surgeons, so called, appointed by the President, what proportion of them were assigned to ward duty?

A. There were quite a number assigned to general hospitals, and some were assigned to the division field hospitals. When a brigade surgeon or a division surgeon was available, after his appointment by the President, I asked for his orders and assignment, asking him to report to the commanding general of the corps for assignment. I did not assign men directly to brigades or hospitals of divisions, but they were to be assigned according to the commanding general's best judgment after consultation with his chief surgeon.

Q. Do you know of any instance in which the recommendations of the chief surgeons were not carried out?

A. I do not recollect any.

Q. The contract and assignment was made by the chief surgeon of the corps?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there anything in the rank which rendered it improper for them to serve in the division hospitals?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Did you or did you not have complaints made to you or your chief surgeons for such assignments?

A. I did. There were several of these gentlemen who thought it was beneath their dignity to serve at the division hospitals, and in one instance the question was submitted to me from Camp Thomas through the Adjutant-General's Office. My understanding was that the commanding general of the army corps could detach any officer from his regiment or assign any medical officer to such duty as he thought proper.

Q. As I understand you, the volunteers have a surgeon and two assistants?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How was it as respects the regulars?

A. The regulars had what they could get. It was absolutely impossible to give them a surgeon and two assistants.

Q. As a rule there was more than one regular officer attached to a regular regiment?

A. I think, as a rule, there were two. It was my intention that there should be two, and my details to the corps were made with that intention.

Q. Do you remember whether any had only a single medical officer?

A. I would have to refer to the chief surgeon's report.

Q. Would it or would it not be practicable to have relieved a considerable number of the medical officers, of the Regular Army especially, of office work—administrative work—and assign them to hospital work?

A. It would not have been possible. I have been embarrassed in my own office and elsewhere by the scarcity of medical officers.

Q. Just in that connection I want to ask you whether or not it would not have been possible to have had a large part of the work in hospitals done by line officers detailed for such purpose?

A. One line officer in each hospital could be very useful, and should be detailed as quartermaster and commissary. I don't see what else a line officer could do.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that a large number of the surgeons in charge of hospitals were doing work in signing furloughs, in making out reports, etc.?

A. Signing various papers required.

Q. Would it not have been perfectly proper to have had all the furloughs done by a line officer?

A. I think that might be done.

Q. If it could not have been done by line officers, would it not have entailed extra work on the part of the medical officers?

A. Only that of signing furloughs, because the filling of them out is done by a clerk, and the medical officer would have to decide upon them, so I do not see the necessity for any extra work.

Q. In the hospitals where this difficulty arose, would it not have been practicable to have appointed a board of officers to conduct an examination and designate the individuals to attend to this?

A. Quite so; as a rule that has been practiced.

Q. Was that so from the beginning, or when?

A. That pertained to the direct administration of the several hospitals, and I could have no knowledge of it unless it was reported to me.

Q. The numbers of these reports are not at present in your mind, if any such reports were made?

A. If you will just permit me to say, that during this rush, from the time the war commenced until now, I have been so overwhelmed with work which seemed to require my personal attention that even the reading of reports has often been impossible. They come in and they go to the sanitary division, and even though I read them rapidly, to retain the data in my mind is something beyond my power.

Q. One question. So far as respects reports being made to your office, were the regimental surgeons capable or otherwise?

A. Good, bad, and indifferent.

Q. Was any effort made to rid the service of the bad or indifferent?

A. Not to my knowledge; that did not come within my power.

Q. So far as it was done it was done by somebody else?

A. I have not heard of any dismissals for incompetency.

Q. At what time was it decided that division hospitals should be organized?

(No answer.)

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was not a board of officers, consisting of one regular officer and perhaps two physicians from each State, appointed, who examined these applicants for appointment?

A. On my recommendation, after knowing that the volunteers would be mustered into service, all medical officers were brought before a board to consist of one regular officer and two physicians detailed by the governors of the States, and such boards were constituted in every State.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. So far as the work was done by these boards, was it satisfactory or otherwise?

A. I think it varied very much—satisfactory in some States; not so satisfactory in others.

Q. Do you know of any instance in which the action of the regular officer of the board was in opposition to the action of the other officers selected?

A. It might well have been without my knowing it.

Q. At what time, General, was it determined to establish division hospitals?

A. It was determined very soon after the outbreak of the war, but I can not

give you the date; an order to that effect was published soon after the troops were brought together in the large camps.

Q. Was the idea of having division rather than regimental hospitals a new one or was it a plan that had been acted upon before?

A. It was a plan which had been determined upon during our civil war, and after experience it was found to be a desirable one.

Q. For what reasons were division hospitals thought to be preferable to regimental hospitals?

Q. In the first place, for a military reason—that a regiment having a regimental hospital is not in a good position for active service, as, when that regiment is ordered to be moved, it is tied up to its regimental hospital and can not move with it, therefore the regimental hospital is left behind when the regiment goes away. Another reason is that when you have cases of contagious diseases, like typhoid fever, among the soldiers of the regiments, if there is any neglect to disinfect, the result is that the disease is carried about the camp and you are likely to get up a camp infection and an epidemic. For that reason, and in the case of typhoid fever especially, and measles, mumps, and other infectious diseases, it is apt to spread through the regiment. Another reason is that it is much easier to take care of one well-organized division hospital than of nine regimental hospitals. You may select your best men for administering the affairs of the hospital and your best men for duty in the wards, and if the division moves away you have a completely organized hospital left to care for the sick.

Q. Was it contemplated in the original plan that division hospitals should be practically permanent hospitals, or was it intended as an intermediate state between regimental and general hospitals?

A. The intention was that the hospitals should be intermediate and that the seriously sick, who were going to be sick for some time, should be taken to a general hospital. I have endeavored to carry out this plan, but when we had such a prevalence of typhoid fever we found it was injurious to the patients to move them during the active stage of the disease, and that only those in the very early stages, or those who were convalescent, could be moved a distance by train without injury; therefore it became necessary to care for them in the division hospitals.

Q. In the plan originally formed, was any plan made for general hospitals?

A. At the very outset one was established at Key West, with 1,000 beds. I supposed that the Army was going to Cuba, and that was the nearest point where we could take care of the sick. Another was established at Fort Thomas, near Cincinnati; another was established at Fort Myer, here, to take care of the sick at Camp Alger, and subsequently others were established.

Q. Taking the reverse order of things, from what source were the medical officers drawn that were placed in charge of and in service in the general hospitals established?

A. I placed medical officers of the Regular Army in charge of our regular general hospitals.

Q. And the assistants?

A. Some assistant surgeons of the Army were detailed, and I generally tried to have one assistant surgeon of the Army at each hospital, in addition to the surgeon in charge. There were some brigade and division surgeons who had been appointed and who did not seem especially adapted for field service.

Q. Were those general hospitals that you speak of in active operation prior to the 1st of July?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. What was the effect of such detail of regimental hospitals upon the medical status, so to speak, of the regiments themselves?

A. It, as I am informed, frequently left but one medical officer in charge, which I considered inadequate, and as soon as my attention was called to the matter, I requested the Secretary of War to issue an order that at least two medical officers should be left with a regiment.

Q. Do you remember what time that was?

A. It was not until after my trip made in the early part of September in company with the Quartermaster-General.

Q. Prior to this time the regiments were left with a single medical officer?

A. So I understand.

Q. Do you think it wise to leave 1,800 men to the care of a single medical officer?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would there or would there not have been any difficulty to secure such a number of men for such positions as would have left the medical organization intact?

A. The men could have been secured earlier by making application to me for assistants sooner.

Q. Were such applications early made to you?

A. I do not remember any such application being made to me.

Q. Do you remember how early the applications began to come in?

A. I could not give you the dates.

General McCook. Dr. Conner, will you kindly ask the General from what source he received his authority to employ contract surgeons?

Question repeated by Dr. Conner.

A. Congress, at my request, foreseeing that the medical officers would be inadequate, authorized the Surgeon-General to appoint as many acting assistant surgeons as he deemed advisable, at a compensation not to exceed \$150 per month.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. So the appointments were entirely under your control—made by yourself?

A. The act of Congress says, "by authority of the Secretary of War the Surgeon-General may," etc. The authority given me has been general.

Q. And that left it entirely in accordance with your views as to the necessary number to be appointed?

A. Yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you or did you not, General, get early reports from Camp Thomas that the arrangements that had been carried out establishing division hospitals were causing trouble in the regiments?

A. I do not remember how early. I did not get any reports that made any great impression upon me until I went myself. I would have to look over the reports.

Q. Do you not now know whether there was a strong opposition to this plan on the part of the regimental officers?

A. There was a very strong opposition on the part of the colonels and the regimental surgeons; there seemed to be a desire on their part to keep their sick with them.

Q. In the various division hospitals were the sick of the different brigades put together or kept separate?

A. That was not done, as a general thing. In some camps, when I made my inspection, I found they were endeavoring to do it, but it was not done as a rule.

Q. What was the expectation during the months of May and June in your office, as respects the movements of troops? Was it understood that they were to remain for any considerable length of time where they were then or would soon move away equipped for active operations?

A. The division hospitals were expected to move with the troops.

Q. What was the maximum capacity for each division hospital?

A. My recollection is that the plan at the outset was that the division hospitals should have 250 beds.

Q. Did or did not the Surgeon-General's Office receive reports from Camp Thomas at an early day, or we will say by the middle of July, that the medical hospitals were being overcrowded?

A. By that time we knew that they were crowded.

Q. When you found that the number was exceeded, did you or did you not change over, in fact, by your order, the status of the division hospital from division hospitals to general hospitals?

A. The division hospitals at Camp Thomas were turned into general hospitals.

Q. What was the law or regulations respecting the control of division hospitals; who had control over them?

A. The commanding officer of the division was directly in charge of everything connected with his division, and naturally his chief surgeon was in more direct control, acting by his authority.

Q. Have you or have you not seen an order directing that division hospitals should not be under the commanding officers?

A. Not officially; but I have been informed that such an order had been issued.

Q. What would be the effect of an order of that sort; would it relieve the commanding officer of all control over the hospital?

A. Such an order would relieve the commanding officer of control and place the control upon the commanding officer of the corps.

Q. He was practically in charge of these division hospitals?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Turning back to Camp Thomas, I ask you who made the recommendations for the division hospitals to be made general hospitals?

A. I did. The division hospitals there were made general hospitals—one called the Sternberg General Hospital and the other called the Leiter; the latter was under my orders from the very first. It was reported to me by the chief surgeon that this hotel, now used as the Leiter Hospital, was admirably adapted to making a general hospital, and I accepted it from Mrs. Leiter and at once took charge. The Sanger and Sternberg hospitals were organized as division hospitals and then made general hospitals and placed under my orders.

Q. And then you did not assume the direct charge of the original division hospitals?

A. I had no control of them. It was entirely out of my control or even my power to manage those division hospitals.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. But it was not out of your power to send assistants?

A. I sent assistants when they were asked for. I sent the assistants to report to the commanding general. It was necessary for them to ask, and I endeavored promptly to supply the assistants asked for.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Were the demands for such assistants made promptly by the chief surgeon of the corps?

A. There is no doubt that the sickness increased so rapidly at Camp Thomas and some other places that perhaps they were all surprised by it and that their requisitions for medical assistants and supplies did not really anticipate what was coming, and it is natural perhaps, when they had so many cases to attend to, and while they perhaps thought and hoped that things would be better; the result was that they did not always ask for what they should have done.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. In such a case as that, ought you not have had the foresight to have sent assistants?

A. It is a pretty difficult matter, with a chief surgeon in each camp, who is directly responsible, for me to exercise foresight over the camps in all parts of the country. I exercised the foresight of establishing a supply depot and sending a supply officer there, directing him to make all necessary requisitions.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. You know there was only one assistant surgeon to each regiment?

A. I knew that later. I know that as soon as that fact was brought to my attention I made contracts with the best men that I could find.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was it or was it not to be expected that a medical officer of long experience in the service would reasonably expect, when typhoid fever was prevalent in a body of 30,000 to 60,000 men, that that typhoid fever would extend?

A. That would be a reasonable expectation; yes.

Q. Was that view, so far as you officially know, entertained by the chief surgeon at Camp Thomas?

A. So far as I officially know, I do not remember that I have any record showing that.

Q. It would appear that the disease existed at an early date, that it would slowly but steadily increase, and, after a time, become an epidemic at Camp Thomas. Is or is not that the history of typhoid fever within large camps, and that, unless proper steps are taken to arrest the epidemic, it becomes general?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What steps do you, as Surgeon-General, consider necessary in such a case?

A. An absolute camp sanitation, the perfect policing of the camp, the isolation of the patients as far as practicable, and the disinfecting of all excreta.

Q. Would the carrying out of a plan of that sort lie or be in the hands of the medical officers or the commanding general?

A. So far as the sanitary policing is concerned, all the medical officers can do is simply to recommend; they have nothing to do with the execution of necessary measures, but they can simply call attention to the necessity for the same.

Q. Then, if these necessary measures were not taken, how much responsibility would rest upon the chief medical officer of the corps and how much would rest upon the commanding general?

A. The responsibility of making proper recommendations rests with the chief surgeon of the corps.

Q. And the responsibility of carrying it out?

A. With the commanding general.

Q. Who may exercise his own pleasure?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether a report of the existing state of things and the necessary recommendations to the commanding general were made by him about Camp Thomas at an early date, not after the thing had become widespread and known all over the country?

A. I would have to look over the documents; I do not remember at this moment what recommendations he may have made.

Q. The sanitation of the regular regimental camp, the recommendation rests with the regimental surgeon?

A. In the first place, it is the duty of the regimental surgeon to call the attention of his colonel to the sanitary measures needed; it is the duty of the chief surgeon of the brigade to call the brigade commander's attention to it, making proper

recommendations, and it is the duty of the chief surgeon of the division to make proper recommendations to the division commanders.

Q. Now, if the recommendations of the regimental officers were not acted upon by the colonels of the regiments, upon whom would rest the responsibility of reporting that failure to carry it out?

A. The regimental officer, if he fails to get action taken upon his recommendation, should promptly make a report to a higher authority. One way would be for him to report to the brigade surgeon, who would then verify the facts and call the attention of the brigade commander to it. Another would be to make an official report, addressed to the adjutant-general of the division.

Q. If the recommendation had been made, and the reports became lost and no action had been taken, the ultimate plan would be to communicate with the chief surgeon of the camp, which would go to the commanding general of the camp?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Supposing that report was made to the commanding officer of the camp or his chief surgeon and no attention was paid to it, would he have the right to report direct to you?

A. It would be improper. The proper way would be for him to report to the Adjutant-General of the Army and send his communication through military channels.

Q. Supposing the intermediate officer did not forward it, would that then end the matter?

A. It would certainly not be military for him to report to me; but if under those circumstances he had reported to me, I should probably have taken it immediately to a higher authority.

Q. Was any such report made to you?

A. I do not remember.

Q. You would probably have remembered it if it had been made to you?

A. I think so.

Q. Therefore, if recommendations had been made and not been acted upon before it reached a higher authority and it—

A. If you will permit me to make an explanation about the sanitary condition of Camp Thomas—I first knew of the state of things there from an official inspection which was made by my request. I had heard—I forget how—that things were not as they should be, and I asked to have Lieutenant-Colonel Woodhull make a sanitary inspection of the camp. He made a very thorough inspection, sending in his recommendations. His report was forwarded by me to the Secretary of War.

Q. Do you remember about what date?

A. Some time in August.

Q. Was that just prior to the breaking up of the camp?

A. Some time—a little time before.

Q. His report reached you some time in August, as I understand?

A. I think it was probable that the report had much to do with the breaking up of the camp.

Q. Was there or was there not a corps of medical inspectors?

A. There was no such corps.

Q. Were there or were there not special details made of inspectors?

A. There were special details made. In the first place, Colonel Greenleaf, who at my request was assigned to General Miles as chief surgeon of the Army, consulted with me in advance as to the inspection of the camp at Camp Thomas and of the other camps in the South. Lieutenant-Colonel Smart made an inspection of Camp Alger. He also went to Montauk Point and made a very complete inspection. Then, after Colonel Greenleaf returned from Porto Rico, I advised that he should

go at once and inspect all the camps again, and in accordance with that advice he asked for orders and went all over the camps again, and his reports, which were due to General Miles, gave me to some extent the results. Then I applied for a board of three experienced sanitary experts—Major Reed, of the Medical Department; Major Vaughn, division surgeon and professor of the University of Michigan, and Major Shakespeare, of Philadelphia—and sent them to visit all of these camps, making a sanitary inspection, and to report to me any unsanitary conditions which should be corrected at once, and also to bring the same to the attention of the commanding generals of the camps.

Q. Were those various inspections made at an early date or after the storm broke?

A. It was at an early date as far as some of the camps were concerned, but it was not so far as Camp Thomas was concerned.

Q. Did or did not the chief surgeon of Camp Thomas report that the sanitation of the camp was bad?

A. As I said, I do not remember that he did; he may have done so and I may find it in my office, but I do not recollect it.

Q. Prior to the typhoid-fever epidemic, was any attempt made to isolate typhoid patients at Camp Thomas?

A. That brings up quite a broad question. I can not say that any special attempt was made to isolate further than to send them to the division hospital. We have ample evidence now that at Camp Thomas the early cases of typhoid were not recognized—they were called by some other name, until the patients became so sick that it was evident it was something else; the diagnosis was not usually made until they got to the division hospital, and that failure to make an early diagnosis, mistaking typhoid fever for malarial fever, led very largely to the camp infection.

Q. Is it not very easy to tell what the nature of a case is, whether typhoid or not?

A. If it is easy the profession all over the country have been making mistakes; it is a fact that in civil as well as in military life this is the case, and that these cases often are not recognized until they are in the second week of the disease.

Q. Is it not a fact that a diagnosis can readily determine a case in the course of four, five, or certainly seven days?

A. By the use of the Widal test. Medical officers of the Army are informed in reference to that, but this test has been so recently introduced that the profession generally have not used it.

Q. Can not the ordinary practitioner determine with the thermometer whether he is dealing with the ordinary or typhoid fever during five days?

A. A great many of them do not, and even in Camp Wikoff many cases called malarial fever proved to be typhoid.

Q. Were you officially informed of any measures being adopted by the chief surgeon of the army at Camp Thomas to isolate the cases—separate them—at an early day, or did he rely so far as you know upon reports that came to him?

A. I do not recollect anything on that subject.

Q. Do you know anything about the isolation of the typhoid cases in the division hospitals as respects the general rule?

A. I know that in some of the division hospitals they were isolated in special wards. I think there was an effort made to do that.

Q. As respects the use of disinfectants, what were the orders issued?

A. I issued a circular on the 25th of April calling attention to measures to be taken for the prevention of typhoid fever and other infectious diseases, and that circular was distributed to all of the chief surgeons, and by them to all medical officers.

Q. Did you or did you not receive reports from those chief surgeons as to how thoroughly this order was carried out?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Was it or was it not the duty of the chief surgeon to report in due time whether that order was being executed?

A. It was his duty to make such reports to the commanding general.

Q. Do you know whether that order was strictly complied with?

A. I believe there was an earnest effort made on the part of the medical officers to obey it, and that while the earnest effort was made there was often a failure because agents who ought to carry it out were indifferent and unreliable.

Q. If there were unsanitary conditions prevailing during the occupation of Chickamauga Park by troops, how far was the chief medical officer responsible therefor?

A. He was simply responsible for calling attention to the unsanitary condition of things, but it was evidently impracticable for the surgeon himself to see that these things were changed. In regard to the troops defiling the ground, that could only be controlled by the discipline of the company and regimental officers. It would have been impossible for the chief surgeons, or even the regimental surgeons, to see that these orders were carried out.

Q. Did you or did you not receive reports from Camp Thomas setting forth the condition of division hospitals at an early time when your attention could be directed to it?

A. I received a report from Colonel Woodhull, which I spoke of, and I had received reports which led me to send him to make that investigation, but just the nature of those reports I can not recall. I would have to refer to my files.

Q. During the time that the country at large had heard that Camp Thomas was in an unsanitary condition, and that the division hospitals were not administered as they might have been or should have been, was any official report sent to you of that condition, and of the conditions prevailing between the 15th of June and the 1st of August?

A. I would have to refer to my files. My recollection is that my attention was called to these unsanitary conditions from reports in the newspapers, but I may have some such report on file.

Q. Is it or is it not possible that you have some such report?

A. I think it is quite probable that there may be such reports, and let me say here that during the overwhelming rush of business every officer and clerk in my office has been working up to his fullest capacity. I have recently had quite a number of reports that had escaped me put on my desk; these had been filed in the sanitary division. Some clerk had supposed that I had seen them and they had been filed without my seeing them at all. There may have been some such reports sent me which I have not seen.

Q. Now, general, please, as respects the matter of disinfectants, when they are permitted to be issued, by what department of the Government are the disinfectants sent out?

A. The regulations of the Army provide that disinfectants will be furnished by the Medical Department. The regulations also provide that the routine issue of disinfectants is not allowed. We have tried to impress upon medical officers and line officers that it is a reproach upon the sanitary police of a garrison to depend upon disinfectants except when you have sick in hospitals. There disinfectants should be used to destroy infectious material on the spot. The regulation is given in the Manual for the Medical Department that the excreta should be disinfected at once before being thrown out. If you have the excreta of healthy men to dispose of in sinks, and they are deposited, as they should be, in the sinks and covered with fresh earth, we consider that all that is essential; but when there are prob-

ably cases of typhoid fever, who are also using the same sinks, disinfectants should be used, and it is the business of the Medical Department to furnish them. The disinfectant which has been found by experience to be the most easily obtained is quicklime, and I have recommended the free use of quicklime in sinks wherever needed. For the disinfection of the excreta of the sick in hospitals we use the chloride of lime or trichresol, and also carbolic acid—a very valuable disinfectant—and these we had in our supply depots in large quantities; and they have been issued freely for that use; but they are too expensive to be used in disinfecting sinks, therefore the quicklime is best and most available.

Q. For disinfecting purposes, must this quicklime be drawn from the Medical Department or can it be drawn upon request from the Quartermaster's Department?

A. There was evidently misapprehension about that. It should be drawn from the Medical Department, and I have given orders in all cases to buy quicklime when it was not on hand.

Q. It has been reported to us that at Camp Thomas it was practically impossible to get any quicklime; do you or do you not know whether any application was made to you for quicklime?

A. No, sir; I do not think that application was made to me.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Have we evidence that application for quicklime was made?

General DODGE. Yes; we have at Camp Thomas.

General BEAVER. If he did not report it the Surgeon-General would not know anything about it.

A. My recollection is, and I think I am safe in so saying, that every application for the purchase of lime has been promptly approved by me, and, moreover, I gave general instructions to that effect later.

Q. Respecting the nursing forces, you only have your hospital corps?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had application been made to Congress to increase that corps, or was it a separate corps?

A. I applied to Congress asking for 25 hospital corps privates to each regiment, knowing that many of the volunteer regiments had their own hospitals, and 50 in addition for each division. This would have probably given a sufficient number of the hospital corps for service in the field.

Q. Was that application granted?

A. No, sir. No action was taken upon it.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know why it was not granted?

A. One reason is that the application was made and forwarded through official channels to Congress, and I had expected some action, but I found that the application had been mislaid and lost. It had gone from my office and through the War Department, and where it was lost I do not know; if they had got it earlier action would perhaps have been taken; but it failed to reach them entirely.

Q. In point of fact, is it practicable, think you, to secure by enlistment a sufficient number of well-trained or fairly well-trained nurses for the care of the sick of a large army?

A. Yes, sir, it is, if you have time to do it, and if the army is organized deliberately.

Q. Would the nurses have to be trained after they entered the service, or would it be practicable to secure a sufficient number of well-trained nurses outside?

A. They would have to be trained after they entered the service.

Q. And this necessarily requires a good deal of time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that the training would be secured at the expense of the patient?

A. During peace times our hospital nurses go to a school of instruction for a period of six months for training; we are careful in the selection of the men, and we try to get rid of all incompetent men. That is the method in peace times, but of course when we were obliged to extend the Hospital Corps we had to take such men as were offered and get the best service we could out of them.

Q. Was it or was it not apparent to you at the time of the breaking out of the war that the men secured would not or could not be quickly made proper nurses for a large number of sick?

A. I think so.

Q. Was it not anticipated by you that there would be a considerable amount, if not a very large amount, of sickness among the raw troops through climatic conditions, altogether changing the ordinary conditions so that the nurses would not be familiar with them?

A. I fully expected it.

Q. If such a condition was expected, in what way was it expected by the Department that the sick would be cared for?

A. We expected to use the Hospital Corps men for active service in the field—for first-aid work. They were to be under the control of the chief surgeons, who would instruct them as to emergency work and in taking care of the sick as best they could. They were quite equal to the men who were detailed from the line during the civil war and were well adapted to field work. We had many medical students and some physicians and many others, some of whom were very indifferent, but for the very sick, as I have already said, the intention was to care for them in general hospitals, and to the first general hospital I sent female nurses as soon as we—

Q. Do you remember about what time?

A. At Key West; that was the first hospital established, and female nurses were sent there at once, at the very outset, but they were not sent to division hospitals until they became loaded up with typhoid patients and it became evident that we could not take those patients away and care for them in general hospitals.

Q. Is it not probable that you had been officially informed of the conditions of the division hospitals at Camp Thomas and that the want of proper nursing in those hospitals occasioned applications being made to you for trained nurses?

A. I was prepared to send them just as soon as the necessity therefor was represented to me.

Q. The representations did not come to you until late, as I understand?

A. I do not remember. I sent them to the Leiter Hospital at the very outset.

Q. What was the capacity of the Leiter Hospital?

A. It was only 200, but it was reported to me as being able to care for 300. I had expected to put up tents for 200 more, but after the surgeon in charge, Major Carter, took possession of the building, he assured me that it could not accommodate more than 175, so that it never came up to what I expected of it as to the number to be cared for.

Q. When were the female nurses sent to the Sternberg Hospital?

A. Right away.

Q. That hospital was organized about what time?

A. I am sorry to say I can not give you the date.

Q. It was late, however, in the history of the camp?

A. Yes; it was some considerable time before the camp was left. It must have been a month or more before the camp was abandoned.

Q. I would like to ask you whether or not, looking back upon the condition of things, would you now think it would have been well to have sent female nurses to all of the division hospitals at a very early date?

A. No, sir; at that time we expected those division hospitals to go with the divisions.

Q. Looking back?

A. If I had known at the time that these hospitals would be filled up with typhoid cases, I think it would have been decidedly of advantage to the sick to send female nurses to take care of them.

Q. While we are still upon this subject of nursing, I would ask you how much assistance has been rendered by volunteer associations of any order or name.

A. The volunteer aid associations have been most active. The Red Cross Association, the National Relief Association, with its headquarters in Philadelphia, and various other organizations have contributed very extensively supplies of various kinds for use in the field hospitals and in general hospitals.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that nurses supplied by these organizations were employed on certain occasions to take care of the sick?

A. They have been on certain occasions.

Q. Were they generally employed?

A. Generally the nurses were employed through another agency.

Q. And that agency?

A. The Daughters of the American Revolution.

A. (Continuing.) I was at the time overwhelmed with applications from women all over the country who wanted to nurse the soldiers. Letters were coming in in such large numbers that I was compelled to turn the matter over to a committee of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and let them make selections on the basis of employing only trained female nurses who could present satisfactory credentials as to character and training; they fulfilled that duty for me, and very soon I had a long list of available nurses, and whenever nurses were called for they were selected from that list.

Q. How large a proportion of the female nurses have been drawn from the Roman Catholic orders?

A. A very considerable number. The sisters offered in the same way, and through this same agency Sisters of Charity and Sisters of Mercy have been accepted. I can not give you the numbers, but we have had over 250 of the sisters of the Roman Catholic orders.

Q. Has the nursing that has been done by these female nurses been satisfactory to the Department?

A. It has been satisfactory. I have heard most favorable accounts from the medical officers who have had direct charge of the hospitals.

Q. Do you know whether proper provision was made for their personal care and comfort?

A. I have no doubt that there were times that the provisions made were not as satisfactory as they might have been.

Q. But, as far as you know, was or was not every care taken to protect these women in every way?

A. I believe so. When I made my inspection I found them comfortably quartered in hospital tents, and they were entirely satisfied with their surroundings.

Q. Have or have not at any time in the history of war female nurses been relied upon to do the major part of nursing in military hospitals?

A. So far as I know they never have been relied upon to any considerable extent.

Q. Were they or were they not employed in the capitulation during the siege of Paris?

A. I am unable to say.

Q. What were the reasons which induced you to decide early that female nurses should be employed only in base hospitals or in general hospitals?

A. My principal reason was a military reason, that an army moving or ready to move should be relieved of all incumbrances, and not only the sick but female nurses I should consider an incumbrance to active warfare.

Q. Were or were not reports made to you officially of the great inefficiency of the nurses as a body in the division hospitals of the country?

A. I have had reports of that kind. I think I have had official reports of that kind referring to the fact that many of them were not competent for the work, and I have seen very sensational reports in regard to the matter in the newspapers; but as I have said before, we have had all kinds of men in the Hospital Corps just as we had in the Medical Corps—some very competent and very faithful, and I think that a very considerable proportion of them were competent and faithful.

Q. Do you or do you not know to what extent your efforts to secure nurses by detail were met cheerfully by commanding officers of regiments?

A. I only know through the reports that have come to me. I do not know of my own personal knowledge.

Q. As a rule, you expected them to be made cheerfully?

A. As a rule, the company commanders are unwilling to give up their best men.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Speaking of medical nurses, and while we are on the subject, what was the opinion of the commanding officers as to the presence of females?

A. I have not heard any.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. With respect to supplies issued for the Medical Department, will you please explain, in your own way, how it was that medical supplies were diverted?

A. I can explain, sir, as follows: I admit, in the first place, that there was a real deficiency at times. There was a deficiency at Santiago simply because they failed to land the supplies. At Camp Thomas and at other places there has been at times a failure to get the supplies to the place where they were needed at the time they were needed. Sometimes that failure has been due to the failure to apply properly, telegraphing at the last moment instead of anticipating; the moment a telegram was received at my office I gave orders to send the supplies by express, but all that takes a little time, and sometimes even express companies do not deliver promptly. Then the larger amounts that were sent by rail very often did not reach the point at the time they should have reached it because there was a congestion upon the tracks and at the depots. I may illustrate it as follows: At Camp Alger, within 7 miles of Washington, supplies that had been asked for and shipped promptly from the supply depot did not reach the camp. Tracing it up, we found that they had been sent, and finally it was found that they were lying at Dunn-Loring, within 3 miles of the camp, and they had been there for some days. The supplies were there, and the regimental officers in camp demanding them. That has occurred not unfrequently, no doubt, but I established early in each of the camps a supply depot. The officer in charge of that depot was ordered to make prompt requisitions by telegraph when necessary, and orders were promptly given by me to the supply officers to fill all such requisitions. There has been very little real lack of medical supplies at any of the camps in this country. The great difficulty has been that many of our regimental surgeons, coming directly from civil life, thought that the supplies, which we considered proper for an army in the field, were not sufficient, and if they did not get their various requisitions filled they complained of a lack of medical supplies. Our field outfit is made up as a result of our experience during the civil war, and with the view to having supplies that can be readily transported when the army moves, and in compact form. We have done away, as far as possible, with all fluids in bottles that can be broken and which

would spoil the contents of the rest of the chest, for should we have a bottle broken it might perhaps spoil the whole chest. We have our medicines now as they are manufactured, largely in the form of pills and tablets, and we have what we consider a sufficient variety of medicines in this form for field service, but for the hospitals, the general hospitals, and division hospitals, when they lose their character of field hospitals, I have given them every latitude and have filled requisitions for pretty much everything asked for; indeed, I directed the chief surgeons by telegraph in August (I forget the date) throughout the country to purchase whatever was necessary for the care and safety of the sick. That has been the general order to all chief surgeons. Since the outbreak of typhoid fever, when it was found that their resources were being largely consumed by the large amount of sickness, any failure in the supplies has been owing to delay in transportation—failure in promptly delivering owing to the great congestion in the vicinity of these large camps. We know that at Tampa medical supplies that were destined for General Shafter's army, were lost for some time and it was only a short time before the army moved that they were found, and if it had not been for them that army would have gone away without sufficient supplies, but they got them in time.

Q. Has there or has there not been at all times a sufficient quantity of the necessary stock in the great supply depots?

A. We have not been able to keep any large stock. Our purchases have been made largely from hand to mouth, because, in the first place, of the inadequate storage facilities in our supply depots, and, in the next place, there has been no time for asking for formal bids—purchases have been largely made in the open market in the different cities.

Q. Has there been any difficulty in securing promptly any important drug in any desired quantity?

A. No, sir.

Q. Not at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was the personnel at the depot sufficiently large to enable the work to be thoroughly and comfortably done?

A. The personnel has been increased in all the depots as applied for by the officers in charge, but they have been embarrassed for want of space, and by the rapidity with which large requisitions came to them from various sources, so no doubt there has often been delay at the depots.

Q. By what department are the medical supplies transported?

A. By the Quartermaster's Department. The Quartermaster's Department receives, transmits, and delivers to the railroad companies, or to the express companies, and receives at the other end of the line, and then delivers to the purveyors.

Q. Whose duty is it to notify the other end of the line of what is being shipped?

A. The supply officer should always send an invoice.

Q. Does the Quartermaster's Department receive the goods at the other end of the line?

A. Yes; they are in the quartermaster's care until they are turned over to the medical officer.

Q. If medical supplies are received at a given point, is it the duty of the quartermaster to notify the Medical Department that the shipment had been received?

A. I think so.

Q. Supposing goods are sent and nothing heard from them, where does the fault lie; is it the duty of the quartermaster to report or the depot agent to inquire?

A. I think it is the duty of each. The supply officer should report to the quartermaster that the goods have been shipped; the tracing of them would be the duty of the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. It would; and is the tracing done from the end to the beginning, or vice versa?

A. I think it should be done at either end when a complaint is made of the nonreceipt of the goods.

Q. Now, it has been stated to us that large supplies of medical stores were received at Montauk that were found only after the camp was abandoned, and that under a mass of quartermasters' goods. There was evidently a mistake made; the fault existed somewhere. Was the receiving agent of the Medical Department responsible, or whom?

A. The receiving agent of the Medical Department would have nothing to do with it. The goods were not delivered, so he could not know that they were there and covered up. Evidently a matter of that kind was due to a rush of things coming in and inadequate storage facilities, and whoever was in charge of receiving the goods would be of course directly responsible.

Q. If the supplies were under the control of the Quartermaster's Department, that department would be responsible?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In case a shipment was made of a 200-bed hospital and that shipment never turned up at the Leiter Hospital, where would the fault lie if it was shipped from New York and turned over to the Quartermaster's Department for shipment?

A. The fault might lie with the transportation company; whatever company took these goods would be responsible to the quartermaster, and he should find out where the goods were.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Suppose the quartermaster did not know that the goods were lost. If it was not reported to him, he certainly would not be responsible?

A. It would be the duty of the officer shipping the goods or of the officer who was to receive them to give due notification of loss, and then it would be the duty of the quartermaster to investigate the matter with the transportation company who received the goods.

Q. Was it ever officially reported to you that such a condition of things did exist?

A. I think not.

Q. We have had testimony that an equipment for a 200-bed hospital from the supply depot at New York never turned up.

General DODGE. We have testimony, however, that it did arrive at Leiter just about the time the camp broke up.

Q. Please state, General, whether, in your judgment, it would be preferable, instead of the present system of shipping medical stores by rail, that the medical officer in charge of the supply depot should consign these supplies direct to the ranking medical officer at the station to which the supplies are shipped, and that the depot-supply quartermasters should call upon the Quartermaster's Department for cartage, and then when the goods arrived at the destination the medical officer in charge there should apply through the Quartermaster's Department for transportation to his depot or station, wherever it is, whether that would not place the responsibility with the medical officers who would have had notification of the shipment.

A. I think that time would be saved and complications would be avoided often if the medical supply officers could ship directly to the point of destination without going through the Quartermaster's Department.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Did you ever have any difficulty in the Quartermaster's Department in making your shipments?

A. They are always willing, but they have their own shipments to make. If we had our own business in our own hands we would naturally give it prompt attention.

Q. The quartermaster handles all of the subsistence?

A. Yes, sir.

Dr. CONNER. I did not intend by that question that there should be any change, but that the consignment should be made to the officers.

General DODGE. That is how it is done. The goods are directed to him and the quartermaster simply is the agent for shipping the goods.

General McCook. He keeps his invoices and the quartermaster keeps his bills of lading.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. After the stores have been received at the supply depot, who would deliver the goods to the medical officer, as the medical officer has no transportation?

A. The Medical Department is dependent upon the quartermaster to send them.

Q. If the division hospital is in need of medicine, and it sends a requisition to the supply depot for such medicine, and that requisition is filled, how is the division hospital to receive the goods if it has no transportation?

A. Probably the division surgeon would have to go to the quartermaster of the division and ask him to furnish transportation.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Don't the quartermaster generally assign certain transportation to hospitals?

A. They have ambulance transportation.

General DODGE. Don't the regulations provide so many teams, etc.?

Dr. CONNER. We have testimony that they should furnish them and give the hospitals the preference.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. When you send supplies, do you mark the name of the medical officer on the packages?

A. If a requisition is received from a regiment, the name of the regimental surgeon would be on that package; if it is for a supply depot in a camp, then to the medical supply officer, and the goods would be delivered at the Quartermaster's Department for the medical officer, who would then call on the Quartermaster's Department to take the goods where he wants them.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. In case of difficulty arising owing to the inability of the goods not transported, to whom is complaint to be made—to the chief surgeon of the corps, to the officer at the supply depot, to the Surgeon-General's Office, to the Quartermaster's Department, or where?

A. First, the division surgeon should ascertain and should make his proper application to the supply officer. I think really, though, it is the supply officer's duty, if he has not his own transportation, to call upon the depot quartermaster to send the supplies. There are no definite orders on the subject.

Q. As a consequence of the want of definite orders, has confusion prevailed at times?

A. I have no doubt that it may have happened occasionally.

Q. Was there at any time during the progress of the war any serious want on the part of the Medical Department of medicines, of medical stores, hospital supplies, or otherwise?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Now, as respects the transportation of sick by water: how early did you recognize the fact that such transportation ought to be had and what efforts had to be made to secure it?

A. On April 23 I recommended the charter of a ship.

Q. On April 15?

A. On April 15 I applied for a ship to be used for this purpose. Various ships were inspected with the view of getting one for my use, and among those the steamer *Englis*; the papers relating to her were referred to me, and, as shown in this indorsement, I recommended that this ship should be secured. That was on the 23d.

By General McCook:

Q. When you first make that recommendation, what did you run against?

A. The first proposition was to charter her, and the owners fixed the price at which she could be had; then there was considerable inquiry as to whether it was a reasonable price or not, and I think the Assistant Secretary of War thought it was too much; at any rate she was offered in the first place for charter and he decided to look further, and other ships were looked at.

Q. Who was doing this?

A. It was really in the hands of the Assistant Secretary of War.

Q. Go on now.

A. Major Torney, surgeon, United States Army, who had previously been a surgeon in the Navy, was selected to take charge of our hospital ship.

Q. What induced the President of the United States on May 18 to buy that ship?

A. It was at my request.

A. At your request?

Q. Yes, sir; we had failed to charter a satisfactory ship.

Q. Did you ever see this ship?

A. I never saw her myself, but I had seen plans, had shown them to the Surgeon-General of the Navy, and he spoke of her in the highest terms. She was an iron ship of 3,000 tons, running between New York and Portland, a very fine vessel and newly launched. We had failed to get a ship, up to that time, by charter.

Q. What made it necessary for the President to order the purchase of this boat?

A. Because it had to be purchased from a special fund at his disposal, as I take it—that is my belief.

Q. It is something unusual for the President to issue an order of that kind?

A. Well, he had that emergency fund, and instead of taking the \$450,000 out of the quartermaster's fund—it is possible I may be mistaken about it—it was simply ordered by the President.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Was the ship bought?

A. The ship was bought outright and fitted up.

By General McCook:

Q. What became of that ship after it was purchased by the United States?

A. She was purchased May 18, and the work commenced on June 1, quite an interval before they got to work.

Q. What was the cause of that? Do you know of any reason why there should have been this delay?

A. The delay arose in getting estimates for improvements and for the machinery we wanted to put in her, and the regular army routine in the method of getting the estimates approved; the amount of money it was going to cost to put her in order I think was a little bit startling, and the papers had to go back more than once, perhaps, before the estimates were approved.

Q. Had the Medical Department anything to do with that delay?

A. No, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Were those questions submitted to the Navy or War Department?

A. The War Department. She belonged to the War Department. The fitting out of the ship was directly under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of War, who took general supervision of these matters.

By General McCook:

Q. What did the Medical Department do when this ship was bought?

A. I detailed Major Torney to make recommendations as to what was wanted—an ice plant, steam laundry, disinfecting apparatus, etc., and the way of putting in bunks—and the Quartermaster's Department did the work.

Q. Did Major Torney ever complain to you about any delay in the fitting out of this ship?

A. He did.

Q. Have you got this in official complaints?

A. They were largely in private letters. I have them on file.

Q. You think there was necessary delay in fitting out that ship, don't you?

A. I urged in every way that the work be expedited. It was my great desire that the ship should be on the way at the time she was wanted.

Q. The Navy Department merely superintended it, but the Quartermaster hired the men?

A. Yes; and paid the bills, and our desire was to have a very complete ship; but Major Torney, especially, asked a great deal in the fitting up. If he had been a little more moderate in his demands she could have been fitted up sooner, but after the orders were given (after they had fairly gotten to work) I think they pushed the work as rapidly as they could and accomplished all that was desired. If he had been satisfied with leaving off some of the things that we considered necessary, perhaps we could have gotten it sooner.

Q. In your estimate of that ship, what were your fittings-out that you insisted upon?

A. We wanted a steam laundry; we had to have bunks well equipped, water-closet arrangements, and electric lighting throughout the ship. We required an ice machine, a disinfecting apparatus, etc.

Q. What kind of boats did you insist upon putting aboard of her?

A. Steam launches.

Q. What was your object in having steam launches?

A. We didn't think we could depend upon anything else; we wanted steam launches, or something equivalent, for getting supplies ashore.

Q. How would it have been about getting your supplies ashore if you had been off the coast?

A. We could not have got them ashore.

By General McCook:

Q. Can you furnish Major Torney's report on that ship? There has been a great deal of talk about that ship.

A. We can.

Q. It would be very satisfactory to my mind that the commission should have the reports of Major Torney.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was there, in your opinion, any good reason why three weeks' delay should have been experienced before work was begun in fitting out that vessel?

A. The ordinary official reasons offered on the part of the Department to have the work done at the most reasonable rates and the indisposition, perhaps, to look upon it as an emergency measure; for if even a half of that three weeks had been saved she would have been on her way a week sooner.

Q. Please state whether or not this ship was, at the time you purchased her, immediately delivered to your department, or did she have some trip to make?

A. She was delivered to the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. I meant the Quartermaster's Department.

A. She was delivered to the Quartermaster's Department. She was purchased on May 18; I can not say the exact day of her delivery, but my recollection is that she was in New York Harbor on that date.

Q. Can you furnish that memorandum of delivery?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the case of such an undertaking as to the fitting out of this ship that you desired to be fitted out, was it reasonable to expect that the work upon her could be begun the next day after she was delivered to the Quartermaster's Department?

A. No, sir; it took time to get some estimates; no matter what the emergency may be, time was required to communicate with the persons who were to fit her out.

Q. Please state whether or not three weeks' delay occurred?

A. I don't think so; I don't think that three weeks' delay was considered an unnecessary delay. I don't mean three weeks' time—time and delay are two different things—delay means censure to some one. The ship was delivered on a certain day and it was purchased on a certain day, too.

Q. And a contract for fitting up a ship—it necessarily requires a little time?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Then it would be necessary after the purchase to make plans for all the machinery?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it would be necessary for the men who were to put in the ice plant, steam laundry, etc., to see what they could do it for?

A. Yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was there or was there not, in your opinion, unnecessary delay in the fitting up of that ship?

A. There was a little delay; besides the necessary time for making and approving the estimates. My recollection is that they had to go back, and there was some delay in approving the estimates after they were made.

Q. That delay covers some time; how many days?

A. I don't remember the number of days.

Q. A week?

A. I presume so.

Q. Were the plans being prepared during the time the estimates were being considered?

A. Before the order was given to go on with the work there was a little delay.

Q. Who was responsible for the delay?

A. I am not prepared to say. There was delay due to sending back estimates of the amount it was going to cost, which was rather startling.

Q. In point of fact, what did she cost?

A. In point of fact, the work done and the apparatus placed on the steamer *Englis* cost \$185,000.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Was that delay more than common prudence would dictate?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it not known to your department at that time that the ship was being bought and that immediate embarkation would take place to Cuba?

A. No, sir.

Q. You imagined you had some little time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. No especial emergency was brought to your attention?

A. Not at that time.

Q. You were told by the General of the Army that there would be an invasion of the army in Cuba?

A. No, sir.

Q. You proceeded, then, according to the necessary manner of making the estimates?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during that time do you think there was any unnecessary delay?

A. I don't think there was. I think everyone was anxious to have a well-equipped ship ready for service as soon as possible. It was not until the army had embarked for Santiago that we felt the emergency.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Who was responsible for the delay at the time the *John Englis* was reported upon?

A. The whole matter at that time was in the hands of the Assistant Secretary of War, who wanted to see if some other ship could not be obtained. He was not ready to close with the first offer; but, while I was satisfied with the *John Englis*, I did not consider that my recommendation should be acted upon at the moment. If I had been asked at the time if there was any such urgency that they could not have looked around for other ships I should certainly have said no.

Q. I want to follow up, if you please, sir—before adjournment I would like to ask you, General, whether or not it was finally reported to you whether there was a surgeon or surgeons who were unfit for duty on account of their habits.

A. There was a young assistant surgeon of the Army who had been on duty at Fortress Monroe. I learned that he was getting into drinking habits. He came to my office on his way to Montauk and I had a very earnest talk with him. He was a bright man, well equipped professionally. He told me that I would never hear of any complaint of him again; but I heard later that this man had a relapse of the drinking habit while at the detention hospital. Such a report came to me, but I had no power in a matter of that kind. I reported the facts to the general commanding the camp. It had already been brought to his attention, and it was a matter for him to act upon according to his own judgment.

By General McCook:-

Q. Where is that man now?

A. The man is now at Jefferson Barracks.

Q. Is he still attending the sick?

A. He was not brought to trial.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was he the only one reported to you?

A. The only one ever reported to me. You understand, of course, that in matters of discipline the Surgeon-General is powerless except to call the matter to the attention of the commanding officer, and it is then for him to investigate and decide whether charges shall be preferred. The facts are there for his guidance.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Is that true for a general hospital?

A. No, sir; I am practically the commanding general of general hospitals.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. In regard to the *Olivette*, was she or was she not taken as a hospital transport?

A. She was taken on as a transport by authority obtained from Washington, and a division hospital was put on her.

Q. She was thoroughly prepared for the work?

A. She was a passenger vessel, that had no hospital equipment, and there was no time for making any special preparations; but she was put in as good condition as she could be under the circumstances.

Q. Did she have a sufficient supply of medical stores on board?

A. They put on a supply.

Q. Full supply?

A. I understand that she had the full supply of a division hospital.

Q. Have you any official reports that she was not properly prepared for any of her trips?

A. No, sir; she did good service, considering the facts.

Q. Has she been used as a medical-supply ship as well as a hospital transport?

A. In the way of transporting supplies. She never has had the capacity for taking a number of sick men.

Q. Had she a nursing force on board other than the hospital corps?

A. No, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. General, in the paper placed before us (a memorandum from the Surgeon-General in relation to hospital ships) the statement is made that on the 15th day of April you asked for a ship to be used as a hospital ship, and on the 23d of April you referred that to the Quartermaster-General. It is added that this recommendation for the purpose you asked was not provided, and further on it is stated that on the 18th day of May this vessel was secured by purchase. Are we to understand by that that the President overruled someone who declined to do this, or that this action of the President was simply his action pending the payment for that ship from the general emergency fund?

A. It was simply his action in authorizing the payment. There was no disposition on the part of anyone to prevent it.

Q. Did you get the date of the Quartermaster—

A. I was trying to get that date. They sent to their room to get it, but as I did not wish to keep you waiting here I came over and they promised to send it over.

By General DODGE:

Q. You had knowledge of the order for the concentration of 50,000 men at Chickamauga, did you, when that order was given?

A. I had knowledge of all orders when they were issued.

Q. When you received that order, what preparation, so far as the furnishing of medical supplies, did you make to take care of those 50,000 men?

A. In the first place, the first troops that went were the regulars. They went from their posts. The moment the order was given I had asked the Adjutant-General to issue orders to the commanding officers of the troops that they take their field equipment and three months' supplies. That order was issued, and I had reason to think they took their field equipment and three months' medical supplies. I knew that the field outfit which we were to give the volunteer troops could not be ready, as it was going to take at least a month before the delivery could be commenced, and when it did commence they would go first to the troops that were going to the front. As a matter of fact, they were sent to the Philippine Islands and troops going to the front at once, instead of being sent to Camp Thomas. I sent orders to St. Louis to furnish advance outfits for the regiments to be sent to Chickamauga. These were all I thought necessary, intending to send the full field outfits as soon as they could be ready. I sent a surgeon of the Army as supply officer to Camp Thomas.

Q. Who was that?

A. Comegys; and we ordered these to be sent to him for issue to the troops,

and also other supplies: he was directed to make timely requisitions for everything needed.

Q. When you ordered him to open his depot—his supply depot at Chickamauga or Lytle, wherever it was—did you wait for him to send a requisition for what stores he needed, or did you send from St. Louis and other places sufficient supplies for those troops?

A. Not full outfits for full 50 regiments. My recollection is I sent 25 of our advance outfits: knowing our field outfits could not possibly be ready, I had requested the governor of each State to send the national-guard outfits with each regiment. I asked them by telegraph, and many responded and said they would do so, and I supposed many of the State regiments would go with their full State equipments. Some of them did, and the bills are coming in, but nothing like as many as I had expected from the answers to my telegrams. I am told, for instance—or I heard it mentioned by a medical officer from a regiment—that he was directed to leave the State outfit behind, saying, "The Government will give a full outfit when we reach camp." But the Government was not ready, and depended on the States having field outfits at the beginning to be used until the regular field equipment could be furnished.

Q. Outside of those outfit chests, was not the Government ready to furnish any quantity of medical stores and supplies?

A. We were ready to furnish any quantity of medical supplies and stores as soon as we knew they would be needed; but, as I said, having sent these advance outfits and the field equipments of the National Guard, I thought there would be no emergency in the meantime. But, as a matter of fact, I may say here that the expenditure of medical supplies for these new regiments just thrown into the field was way beyond my expectation; it was far beyond the demands of the regular regiments.

Q. You had long service in the civil war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Didn't you expect when 60,000 men came together at Chickamauga—didn't you know—that 30 per cent would need medical supplies?

A. I knew, of course, there would be a good deal of sickness—fully expected it; but, as I say, I sent these advance outfits, and had orders given to the medical officers about making timely requisition, and I thought that would be sufficient.

Q. An officer has testified before us, an inspecting officer, who made an inspection of the depot there, and he stated that there was only 40 per cent of the requisitions called for there; that the medical purveyor was able to, or did, supply—

Governor WOODBURY. I believe you are wrong about that. He testified that only 40 per cent were filled; he does not say that the supplies were not there. He wants to know if you received complaints that only 40 per cent were filled. He simply said the medical purveyor did not have them. That is Baldwin; his testimony is on page 974.

A. (Continuing.) If there was any deficiency of the important articles he mentioned there, then somebody on the spot was responsible, for there was never a moment that I would not have answered a telegram giving authority to purchase them at the nearest drug store, if we could not send them at once; they could have been purchased at a drug store in Chattanooga.

Q. Now, referring to the order which has been referred to once before here, which was given by the corps commander, relative to the division commanders having authority over the hospitals: do you know whether or not that was made in accordance with the request of the corps surgeon, and that it came about in a dispute of authority between the corps surgeon and the division commander?

A. I heard that was the case.

Q. Did you ever investigate it?

A. I was surprised when I learned that a corps commander had taken a hospital out of the direction of his division commander.

Q. Don't you think that order was one cause of the difficulties had in obtaining these supplies for the care of those hospitals?

A. I should think so. My plan was to make the surgeon in charge and the division commander directly responsible for the division hospital.

Q. Did you have any occasion to give attention to the water supply of Chickamauga or receive any reports in relation to it?

A. Not until later. Colonel Woodhull made reports upon the water supply, and I got a private letter from a physician in Columbus who had been down there; he said there was complaint on the part of the men about getting a sufficient quantity of water at one time. But all those things came to my attention at the time of my making a visit to the camp.

Q. It was not called to your attention in time to take any action in the matter?

A. No, sir.

Q. You stated in relation to the volunteer surgeons, when asked as to their ability to perform their duties, that they were "good, bad, and indifferent." Those reported as "bad" and "indifferent," were they immediately reported to the commanding officers?

A. That was only a general opinion. None were reported to me as "bad" or "indifferent."

Q. Oh, it was only what you heard in conversations?

A. Yes, sir; it was from what I heard, and from what I know of physicians generally. I should think that would also apply to line officers or to any other class.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. General, why did you return to the regiment hospital system?

A. It was only a partial return, because I was convinced that a small regimental hospital, where the regimental surgeons could keep track of trifling cases, such as venereal diseases, and keep them under close observation, or slight injuries, were really necessary.

Q. But where you had such an amount of sickness and only permitted one surgeon to remain with the regiment, wasn't it asking too much for him to look after 150 cases in a regiment?

A. Yes, sir; I think so. There were two tents, with five cots in each, and one for other general purposes, and that enabled them to take care of only ten bed cases. At the same time that that order was made the order was made that two surgeons should be left with each regiment. This order was made at the time of our making the tour of inspection. The Secretary of War and myself and the Quartermaster-General went through the camps; and, after discussing the question of regimental hospitals and hearing the regimental commanders give their views, and the division surgeons also, the Secretary was much impressed with the idea that we should have regimental hospitals, and I felt it was proper we should have such hospitals of limited size. I agreed to one of four tents, and also that two medical officers should be kept with each regiment, and recommended it to the Secretary, and it was at once telegraphed to Washington, and the orders were issued.

Q. Was not that the system of the civil war when the regiments were in camp?

A. In the early part of the war they depended on regimental hospitals altogether; later on division hospitals were organized, and the effort was to keep the regimental hospitals as small as possible. If a regiment is off by itself it must have a regimental hospital. For instance, in going to Cuba, a regiment going by itself must have a regimental hospital, or a brigade must have a hospital, or

in case two companies go alone to some place they must have a hospital; but where regiments are brought together for economy in administration, we think the brigade hospital is the best, with small regimental hospitals for minor cases.

Q. We are apt to remember things of our experience and to think them the experience of others. I know the regiment I was in the last three years of the war had a number of patients, and we had two woman nurses.

A. That was not generally considered desirable.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. General, would it not be practicable in future to carry on a system of division hospitals, and at the same time allow the three regimental officers to remain with their commands, and getting a sufficient number of officers outside to attend the division hospitals? With the camp sanitation and taking care of a few sick, or, say, thirty, fifty, or sixty men, no one man can take care of them.

A. No, sir; not properly.

Q. And if you preserve the regimental hospitals intact and organize the division hospitals separately, would not that be desirable?

A. Yes, sir; two regimental officers at least should be left with the regiment; but where there is comparatively little sickness, as at present in our camps, if you had all three officers with the regiment they would have a pretty easy time of it, and I think one might well be detached for the division hospital.

Q. As I understood you this morning, one medical officer is assigned to a regiment: is that it?

A. It is attempted to have two, one of them a regular officer, if possible.

Q. Now, in case of an epidemic, is one regimental officer capable of taking care of the contingencies that might arise?

A. There is always a provision aside from the officers with a regiment. There are the field hospitals.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Please state whether or not the experiences of four months since the beginning of this war disclosed to you necessities of the service which ordinary foresight could not have determined; that is, whether your experience led you to do things and to recommend things that could not by any means have been recommended on account of want of knowledge at the beginning of your service.

A. Yes, sir; and if you will permit me to amplify, I will do so. I have heard the story of the small boy whose mother was teaching him about the power of the Almighty, and he said, "There is one thing, mother, that God can't do." "What is that, my child?" asked his mother. "He can't make a 4-year-old colt in a minute," said the child. It is that way with the army. You can not make an army in a minute. Time is an element always; we all realize that; there were a great many things that were not what we should have desired, but I do not believe the best organized staff or any amount of money would have prevented many of the things which have been referred to, where the attempt was to bring so many raw recruits together, with officers who were not instructed and medical officers without previous experience; for, no matter how competent, professionally, a man may be, he has to learn how to take care of the sick in a camp. He has to learn to be a medical officer. That takes time. If you will pardon me for that digression—

Governor WOODBURY. No; that wasn't a digression.

By General DODGE:

Q. When you organized, before this Order No. 116—that is, when you ordered the organization of the division hospital—where did you obtain the funds or the provisions to start that hospital?

A. For the food for the sick?

Q. Yes; and for obtaining anything they required.

A. The only provision made by regulations was the regular ration, or the saving that can be made from it. A sick man can not eat his ration—the pork, the flour, etc.—and the hospital gets credit for that.

Q. Can you commute that immediately?

A. No, sir.

Q. Where did you get your money, then?

A. In the first place, every post throughout the country has a hospital fund accumulated from the savings on the rations and contributions from the canteen fund; they range from a few dollars up to three or four hundred dollars. The soldiers were taken away from the posts, and I called in that money and sent it to the chief surgeons to be used for this emergency. Then there were contributions from various sources amounting to \$22,000—from private sources—and I sent \$500 or \$1,000 to each chief surgeon in the field to buy delicacies for the sick until they could get their funds from the savings; I also sent money to each hospital and hospital ship. Aside from those funds, there was no way of obtaining delicacies for the sick, except from the savings from the rations. If a man lives on a milk diet there is a saving from his rations.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Is that matter regulated by law of Congress?

A. The law is that every soldier is entitled to one ration.

Q. Is it regulated by law of Congress solely? Is it so that no other method than you have been talking about can be used in commuting the ration? Is there any other fund that could be given by law for this purpose except the commutation of rations?

A. No, sir; there are no funds under my control that I could use for food for the sick.

Q. Where did you get your 60 cents a day that was provided in Order No. 116 of August 10?

A. That is from the Commissary Department. It seems that by the decision of the Commissary-General rations can be commuted. At first the hospital at Key West found it difficult to get on with the regular army rations and asked for a commutation of rations at 60 cents per diem, and I forwarded the request to the Commissary-General and it was given. That was later extended to the whole Army.

By General McCook:

Q. When did the 30-cent rate get in there? We have been in doubt about that. How did that come in?

(No answer.)

By General DODGE:

Q. What provision—for instance, taking "sick in quarters," men who did not go to a hospital, and can not use the rations—what provision is there for taking care of them and giving them proper food?

A. None, other than can be made by the company commander. A man in a company when sick is in the hands of his company commander, and if sick enough to require special diet he must be sent to the hospital. The company commander has it in his power to buy milk, eggs, and other things and to sell his bacon, pork, and flour.

Q. Suppose he is in the field?

A. There is no provision, then.

Q. Could that not be done?

A. Yes, sir; it should be, I think.

Q. Have you made any recommendations to that effect in your report?

A. No, sir; it is supposed that a man goes to the hospital in such a case.

Q. But, take it in the field, where you have 50,000 or 100,000 men?

A. That would be the case there, too; if a man is so sick as to require special diet he should be sent to the regimental hospital, and if that is not sufficient to provide for him then send him to the division hospital.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. When was the commutation at 60 cents allowed at Hot Springs?

A. That was 30 cents, I think, wasn't it? That is what General McCook referred to awhile ago.

By General McCook:

Q. Up to that time the commutation value of the ration was only 30 cents; then, in a letter from you to E. A. Orr, vice-chairman of the Red Cross Society, you speak of it at the other valuation; but up to that time the commutation value of the ration was only 30 cents.

A. That was only when it was specially authorized. There was no general order permitting the ration to be commuted at 30 cents. At our post hospitals they simply got credit for the real value of the rations; but I think the army and navy hospital had this as a special arrangement.

General McCook. Then that is where it came from—the army and navy hospital.

By General DODGE:

Q. When the Fifth Corps sailed for Santiago—and I understand you to say there were plenty of supplies sent there—was it not your opinion, from the experience you have had, that all that army would be sick down there?

A. I expected a great amount of sickness, and I was very fearful of an epidemic of yellow fever. I knew an army operating near one of the large seaports in Cuba would be in danger of yellow fever.

Q. Did you think, under these circumstances, that those regiments were well supplied with medical service?

A. There were 13,000 regular troops on that expedition, with 36 regular medical officers and 20 contract officers, which is 56 all told, or an average of four to a thousand, with four over. How many were actually on duty with each regiment I do not know, but there was an average of four officers for each 1,000 men.

Q. Nearly every one of these officers that have been before us have complained of the lack of surgeons, and I do not remember of one of them stating that they had two surgeons in a regiment; but one regiment said they had their surgeon changed five times.

A. The distribution of the surgeons was under the direction of the commanding officer. We tried to have the *Relief* there before the engagement, and she had 18 additional medical officers on board—I was seeking to get immune men.

Q. Was not application made directly from there to you for surgeons, stating in effect that they had not a proper supply of them?

A. Yes, sir; they called on me for more medical officers, and I sent them as rapidly as possible.

Q. Was there any arrangement made about giving the men sick in quarters there the proper food?

A. No, sir; that is, nothing done by the Medical Department; and if any arrangement was made to give special light diet it would have to be done by the Commissary Department.

Q. There is no provision in the case of an army like that there for feeding a man on light food unless he is in the hospital?

A. No, sir; not unless he is in the hospital.

Q. When that command was ordered home to Montauk Point were you aware that many would land there with nearly the entire command sick?

A. I was aware of sickness, but I was not aware that a large portion of the men would be sick. As a matter of fact, a large portion of the men who were well on leaving Santiago got sick on the way home, and after they arrived home, from that malarial fever.

Q. Is it your opinion that they would have fared better to remain there until they got over their sickness there?

A. No, sir; I think the movement was very judicious and not made too soon.

Q. They would have got sick there, and it was only from not moving them sooner that they were made sick?

A. The sooner we could get them away the better.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. From your knowledge of the usual workings of malarial fever, might not you have anticipated that many would have taken sick en route or soon after arriving at Montauk Point?

A. Yes, sir; and we sent lots of medicine there. We bought the soluble quinine pills, manufactured by Schieffelin, and two barrels of them were sent to Tampa, so they were not without the most important medicines. That is the principal and most important medicine for the treatment of that fever.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. General, it has been shown to us that at the time these troops started for Montauk there were no medical supplies—proper supplies—on the transports, and that the ships came out unprovided for those sick or that might become sick on the passage; and at the same time that this occurred the Red Cross Society had a ship there with supplies and stores, and one thing and another, and they were given to the men when the army was unable to provide them. Is there any reason why a volunteer association could have had a ship there with such supplies and the United States Army could not? In other words, could not a ship have been provided for the Army just as that was?

A. It would have been practicable to have hired a ship and sent it a month before. As a matter of fact I expected the ship *Relief* to be there.

Q. Would she have been sufficient if there?

A. I think so. She had a great quantity of canned foods and there were canned soups bought from the Franco-American Company. But the Red Cross ship was there for another purpose. She was there to take her stores and distribute them among the Cubans; had been there some time waiting to land them.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did the *Relief* remain there during all the time the army was there?

A. The *Relief* remained there; my instructions were that she was to stay there as a floating hospital and as long as she might be needed, but at the time the wounded were sent away she had most of them on her. Being best equipped she had most of the severely wounded on her, and she brought the last lot of severe cases of wounded and distributed them in New York.

Q. And she had plenty of supplies on board to supply the army with all the medical stores it might require?

A. She had enough for a time, but we sent three other ships. We sent some on the *Olivette*, and, I think, a large stock on the *Breakwater*.

Q. That was after Santiago was opened?

A. Before—I do not remember the exact date. They followed pretty close after the *Relief*. It was not long after the *Relief* went before the *Olivette* was sent with supplies, and then we sent supplies on the *Breakwater*.

Q. The testimony is that during the entire time the army remained there they were short of medical supplies and medical stores?

A. I have given a full statement of what was sent. You will find it on record, and it is a mystery to me how there could be a scarcity considering the quantity sent.

Q. Where did you land them?

A. There was an acting medical purveyor down there, detailed by the commanding general.

Q. Who was that?

A. Well, different ones at different times. Some of the *Relief* supplies and some of the others were turned over to Major La Garde, and—I don't remember who acted; there were two or three changes. That was a local matter, not done by me or under my direction. I sent the supplies there, and they were expected to take care of them and distribute them.

By General McCook:

Q. When you selected Montauk Point for a camp, what was the object of selecting it?

A. I was asked to look at it and make a report?

Q. Who asked you?

A. The Adjutant-General said he would like to have it examined and a report made upon it to the Secretary. I said I should be glad to go, and I took the next train. I fully approved of it as a place for a camp, and I do not believe there is another place equal to it on the Atlantic coast. There was ample space, rolling land, ocean breezes, and a deep harbor, where the ships could come up. The great thing in getting these men home was to prevent the introduction of yellow fever; and the great danger was that it might break out on the transports coming north and thereby introduce it to our own shores.

Q. Well, when that site was selected, did you contemplate the arrival of 70,000 men, horses, and mules?

A. I supposed it was only for General Shafter's troops.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Were the supplies carefully inspected by an agent representing you?

A. Our medical-supply officers are the agents who inspect, and they are instructed to carefully examine all purchases. In ordinary times all medicines are sent to my office for testing. We have a chemist there, and when we make contracts they must be tested; but during the emergency we purchased stores from reliable firms without testing.

Q. Did you receive any complaints that the medicines were defective in character?

A. I do not remember any such complaints, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was there any legislation you asked for in your department pending the war with Spain that was not granted?

A. I have spoken already of the recommendation for a hospital corps for each regiment in the volunteer service, and I had recommended that the chief surgeons of army corps should have the rank of colonel, and the chief surgeons of divisions should have the rank of lieutenant-colonel, so that the chief surgeons of

brigades, divisions, and regiments would not be, as they were, all the same rank. I considered that unfortunate and unjust to the officers placed in those responsible positions, that they did not have more rank. Aside from that, I do not think there was any legislation I asked for that was not given.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Were you supplied with all the money you asked for at all times?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, in the administration of your department, were you at any time hindered or delayed in the discharge of your duty by superior authority?

A. Not to any extent that is worthy of mention—not with any intention, surely. The reason I hesitate over that question is, I did not think you meant the necessary delay which all bureau officers have to experience when seeking an audience with the Secretary. On those occasions there was often some delay, because in seeing a busy man I would sometimes find five or six ahead of me.

Q. Was there any delay other than that incident to unavoidable conditions?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have the earnest cooperation of all your superiors in your efforts to provide for the army's comfort, health, and its care in sickness?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I would like to have you state something in regard to your practically independent authority. Now, is it a part of your duty—first, I understand you are subject to the authority of the Secretary of War?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But is it a part of your duty to initiate the work of your bureau?

A. Certainly, sir.

Q. You have been Surgeon-General through two Administrations?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you expect that the Secretary of War would have sufficient knowledge of the needs of your department so that he could take the initiative in any of that work?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would it devolve entirely upon you to do that?

At It would devolve upon me to do that.

Q. And if the Secretary of War sustains your recommendations and gives you what you ask for, does he perform his duty in regard to your department?

A. I think so.

Governor WOODBURY. That is all I want to ask you.

By General DODGE:

Q. I wish to ask, General, if you have any further statements or suggestions or information that you care to make to us and that will be of interest to the commission or of interest to the service? Make any statement upon any subject upon which we have not questioned you or anything in relation to the war that you desire to say. We will be pleased to hear anything in refutation of any reports that may have come to your knowledge that we have not questioned you about.

A. There is a great deal that might be said as to how we could do better if we had another war. I think. Of course it is hardly necessary to say that we have had to encounter very great difficulties owing to the rapidity with which the troops were brought together and the fact that we had to make an army, a large

army, out of our little nucleus of a Regular Army. The Regular Army was almost lost; and the number of experienced medical officers was so limited, that it has been a constant source of embarrassment to secure officers. I can not make the men stretch out to fill the demands. If we had had an adequate medical corps to start with we could have done a great deal better. I have been obliged to rely upon the chief surgeons of army corps and military expeditions in the field. It is impossible for army officials in Washington to attend to what is going on in the field. I placed the most competent men in the positions of responsibility and they have done nobly, but they encountered conditions which overtaxed their strength. In attempting to instruct men new to the service they encountered opposition. It has been said by some that their requisitions were not filled. In that connection I would say that these new men would come and bring with them a long list calling, for example, for morphia, opium pills, and paregoric; the regular army surgeon would strike out the morphia and say, "There are opium pills; we have them; that is all you need in that line." These doctors then would think their favorite remedies were erased, and they would perhaps go to the aid societies for the drugs. In that way many false reports and misconceptions arose. The regimental surgeon would say, "I am not going to make any more requisitions, when I can go to this society and get what I want." And the agents of these aid societies have been so full of patriotism and loaded up with money that they have urged them to name what would be useful to them. Many of them said, "We would like clinical thermometers, sheets, and mosquito bars." By getting these articles from the aid societies, I may add, they did not have any responsibility; they did not have to give a receipt, and if they were lost or broken there was no necessity of accounting for them? The agents would then write back that they had to give mosquito bars and clinical thermometers; and the inference was that the Government did not furnish these articles.

By Governor WOODEBURY:

Q. General, we have a great deal of testimony on that point, saying they were short of thermometers, hypodermic syringes, sheets, and pillowcases, and bed-pans.

A. At division hospitals?

Q. Yes.

A. There was no excuse for it. If they had telegraphed to my office the order would have been given instantly.

Q. I think we have testimony upon that point—of there being a shortage of sheets, etc., out here at Camp Alger; that a lady nearly connected with the Secretary of War reported that there was a shortage of sheets, and that the Secretary called on you and ordered a supply to be sent there.

A. Yes, sir: I remember the incident. The lady found a patient she was interested in lying on a bed without sheets. The thing was explained. There was no scarcity of sheets in camp—I have forgotten the explanation of it at this time—but at any rate, a lady who is not accustomed to visiting camps will find many things to object to. There are a good many men, such as venereal patients, who need no sheets. On the question of mosquito bars, I ordered that they should be sent everywhere; but I found a majority of the men at the division hospitals without mosquito bars, and I spoke about it: the men said they could not breathe under the mosquito bars in camp. There have been times—I think it was so at Camp Alger—that there was some difficulty about getting washing done promptly. There was no scarcity of sheets, but a scarcity of clean sheets. That was because someone they had depended upon to do the washing had failed them. Those things occur everywhere.

By General McCook:

Q. From your information of the condition of the health of the Army in this campaign—I am not speaking of the climatic influences of Cuba—what conclusions have you come to as to the cause of so much typhoid fever in our Army?

A. Neglect of sanitation in the camps and remaining too long upon one camping ground. It was introduced from the State camps, sometimes men coming in in the incipient stages, and they scattered the germs over the ground, the camp ground, and through the sinks, etc., which soon affected the entire camp.

By General DODGE:

Q. General, do you think you could bring together as many men as were brought together in this war with less sickness?

A. It should be done. If we can educate medical men throughout the country—

Q. No "ifs." Do you think you can put together 250,000 men, uneducated and inexperienced as they were, and have less sickness?

A. I think we could do it now, because I think the lesson has been taken to heart by many men.

By General McCook:

Q. General, were you informed that they were going to assemble 50,000 or 60,000 men at one place as they did?

A. Not until I got it from the newspapers or the orders were issued. I was not informed in advance.

Q. You were not informed that they were going to assemble 50,000 or 60,000 men at one place?

A. Not before the issuance of the order.

Q. Suppose you had known, what order would you have given or what advice?

A. I should have advised against it, in such large numbers at one place, except for a short time. To preserve the health of troops in camp we must have either the civilized method of sanitation, by a complete system of sewers, or else the Indian method, of going away when the camp site becomes foul.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. General if you knew that the United States intended to keep 50,000 men at Chickamauga, and if you had plenty of time and money to make a town practically for them to live in, put good water there, and send in a number of distinguished surgeons to take care of them, you could, under the circumstances, reduce the sickness?

A. It should be much reduced then.

Q. Then these things as to what you could do in future are matters of conjecture, because you do not know the circumstances under which you would have to do that?

A. Exactly.

Q. Suppose, General, you were called upon to keep 30,000 men in the Philippines, don't you think, from medical science and experience derived from the military habits and customs of the other nations of the world—don't you think you could keep those 30,000 people there and not have extraordinary sickness?

A. I believe we could give the necessary directions, which, if carried out, would effect that. We know if we gave them proper clothing and shelter and water purified by boiling or filtration, and proper drainage, and they had a proper diet, and did not indulge in things that should not be eaten, that the health of such a command would be almost ideal. The practical difficulty, however, is to get the men to do what you provide for. A reckless man, if he is

tired and thirsty, will drink from some pool, even though at camp he has a filter.

Q. Then, in your experience, as in all others, it is idle to talk about what you might do once the conditions are laid down. If we had a war with Germany to-morrow, and we had to have 500,000 men in the field—two camps with 250,000 men in each—we might have sickness again then, might we not?

A. Yes, sir; because the education has to be given to each individual medical officer and man.

Q. The questions are not put down on paper for you to answer, setting forth the conditions that: These troops are going to Tampa, where they will stay a certain number of days, and then be transported to Santiago and stay there a certain time; but you and your department do, when the order is given, what reasonable and prudent men would or could do under the same circumstances?

A. Yes, sir; I believe I have done so since the beginning of the war. I have had a pretty ample experience back of me, and if there has been any failure it has not been from want of effort.

Q. You can not tell us of any case where you should have sent medicine and you did not do it?

A. No, sir.

Q. You say you used all the power, wealth, and influence of the Government to protect the health of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You say you have not the power to prevent men having typhoid fever under certain conditions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And if you could make the conditions yourself you would make a paradise where nobody could get sick or die?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in this case you had no notice or time to do that?

A. Yes, sir. In that matter I will say that I have not had time to consider important questions which I should at times have given several hours to. I devoted all the time I had. I have had my assistants and distributed the work among them. They are competent, but there are a great many things on which the chief of a bureau only can act. There are many interruptions that take time. At the outset of the war there were constant interruptions from well-meaning civilians, who came in to aid us, and Members of Congress, who were entitled to consideration; and it has happened to me very often when I wanted to dictate an important telegram, and had pencil in hand, that one person and another would come and I would have to put someone off for a time until I could write the telegram.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Can you tell us anything of the epidemic of typhoid fever which occurred in a regiment stationed at Minneapolis or St. Paul?

A. Yes, sir; there was one there as serious as any we had in any regiment. We had typhoid at Camp Black, on Long Island, and we had it at Camp Alger, and we had it at Honolulu.

Q. Please state whether or not the epidemic at Montauk was any worse than the epidemic in the regiment at Minnesota?

A. No, sir; it was not.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I would like to know how many cases have been presented to you of carelessness or negligence or ignorance on the part of surgeons.

A. I do not know of any that has been made to me.

Q. You have heard of the Parrot case—

A. In the newspapers and letters referred for investigation—I have heard of them; but not in an official form.

Q. You heard of the Dobson case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What would you say if the facts in the Dobson case show that Dobson was not a very strong young man, not very strong, about 20 years old, who wanted to stay with the regiment and march up the avenue instead of going to the hospital; what would you say, if these facts are true, that the physician should have done with Dobson?

A. The physician should have insisted that he go to the hospital; but it is pretty hard for a physician to enforce a thing of that kind.

Q. Suppose, after a physician had found he had typhoid fever, he was ordered to the general hospital, and he was sent there without a descriptive list, and without a word of writing to show who he was or what was the matter with him, what would you say as to that?

A. It was an injustice to send a man away without a statement as to his sickness.

Q. Who would be responsible for that state of things?

A. It is the business of the commanding officer to send his descriptive list and of the medical officer to send his medical description.

Q. Suppose, when this man got to the hospital at Montauk, he was sent to the hospital in New York, still without a descriptive list, without a paper to show who he was, would you consider that was proper treatment?

A. No, sir.

Q. Suppose after he got to New York he was sent to another hospital and they didn't take any care of him there and he was taken to yet another, and he died the next day, somebody should be responsible for that?

A. Yes, sir; I should think so.

Q. Well, don't those cases reach you?

A. If they were to come to me, those individual cases, and I had to investigate them, I could do nothing else. I can only refer them to the person in charge on the spot; that is, those who have cognizance of the facts.

Q. But if you would investigate one case, and finding such conditions existing and put your foot down and announce to the Army that the next time that happened a man's head would come off—his official head would come off, would not that have stopped it?

A. I have made it a practice to refer those complaints to the Adjutant-General for investigation. I have no disciplinary powers. If a medical officer at Camp Wikoff gets drunk, and it comes to my notice, my action is to send it to the Adjutant-General, with a request that instructions be sent to the officer in charge to have charges preferred.

Q. You have no power to put a man under arrest?

A. No, sir; not at camp. Then he is under the orders of his immediate commanding officers. I would have authority to arrest those under my immediate control in my office or in the hospitals under my charge.

Q. There have been individual charges of incompetence or bad conduct; assuredly there have been some cases showing that physicians have been incompetent. It seems to me there should be some authority to reach those people charged with that incompetence.

A. There is authority. It is on the spot where it occurs. If the surgeon of a regiment neglects his patients or shows incompetence, or gets drunk, it is the duty of his commanding officer to prefer charges against him and have him tried right there. The facts would have to be ascertained by witnesses on the spot. If

I got information of a thing directly, I could address a letter to the Adjutant-General asking that charges be preferred by the commanding officer of the camp at the place stated.

Q. Would the chief surgeon at a place report to you that a man was incompetent?

A. Yes, sir; and in that case I would ask the Adjutant-General to have him relieved, or if he was guilty of misconduct to have charges preferred against him.

Q. I understand that in this country a man can not be disciplined without trial?

A. The commanding officer, if he got information that a medical officer was drunk or neglected duty, would place him under arrest, and then consider whether it was advisable to prefer charges.

Q. You tell us you have had no official complaint of anybody under you?

A. I got a letter with reference to a young doctor who had been drinking too much at Camp Wikoff, and I wrote a letter concerning it.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. You were speaking about the boiling of water. Is it practicable in large camps to have the drinking water boiled?

A. It is practicable to boil it, but not to make the men drink it.

Q. Is it practicable to secure sufficient boiled water for a large camp?

A. I think so; it is practicable to secure enough for all that would drink it; there is an apparatus for aerating the boiled water which, I think, is a good thing, but the difficulty is to get them to take it.

Q. Boiled water then, though potable, is not always palatable?

A. No, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is it your opinion that the men sent there first were sent for permanent or temporary occupation?

A. I supposed they were sent there only until they were outfitted to go farther.

Q. From your experience in the war, what suggestions have you to make for the future benefit of your department?

A. We need a greatly enlarged department.

Q. Have you made such recommendations in your report?

A. Yes, sir; a department to correspond to the size of the army to be brought into use, and I think that it might be better if there were some changes in the methods. I think perhaps it would be better for the Medical Department to have control of the transportation of its own supplies. I think delays might often be avoided thereby. There is only one objection to that, and that is we would not have anybody to find fault with if they didn't get there. Then in regard to orders. All orders have to be given through another department. If there is a hospital corps man to be moved here, there, or the other place, the orders have to be given through the Adjutant-General's Office, and that sometimes causes delay. Now, through this war when I wanted anything important or urgent, either from the Adjutant-General or Quartermaster-General, I have gone in person, and action was promptly taken. We have done away with red tape. If anything is urgent, we use the telegraph, and do away with red tape. There was an unimportant message which took seven days to get across the road to reach me. That was because there is an immense amount of work to be done in the Adjutant-General's Office. I think if orders could be given directly by a chief of bureau to his own subordinates it would often be an advantage.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. That is, orders not involving large expenditures of money or matters of much importance?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you any suggestion as to a change of rations for hot climates?

A. I am not prepared yet to say. We are sending a commissioner down to Jamaica, and he is going to ascertain the experience of the English troops there. I have no doubt an improvement can be made in the ration—less nitrogenous food and more fruits and vegetables.

Q. Don't you think some improvement could be made by providing for the maintenance of the hospitals than to go through the custom of commutation of rations by having a fixed sum allowed for patients?

A. I think so. By having it arranged that a man on going to the hospital was to have his ration commuted at once and the surgeon in charge was to furnish proper food there for the sick; the sum now fixed is beyond what we require. The surgeon at Fort Monroe kept an account for two months, feeding his men most liberally and giving them everything that was desired; the average cost one month was 34 cents and the next 35 per diem. So if we could have a commutation of 40 cents per ration all through I think it would be ample. We should have an independent fund for the hospital, a fixed commutation rate for all in hospitals entitled to rations, and make the physician in charge of the hospital responsible for the hospital fund. He makes a monthly report to me, and we keep a close watch over that fund.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Are the female nurses entitled to their washing?

A. They are not, under the contracts made for them.

Q. Do you think out of \$30 a month \$4 should be taken from these nurses for that?

A. I have been getting some big bills for dresses.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you mean for "dresses" or the laundering of them?

A. Laundering. The female nurses are a luxury. There are many things connected with them that make them expensive. Now that we have them in our various camps, I am getting requisitions for bureaus, rocking chairs, and various things of that kind; but I think the pay they receive is certainly not adequate for the service and requirements. We demand trained nurses, and they can do better in a financial way by staying at home and taking care of their patients.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who fixes that price?

A. I named the price and Congress fixed it. I asked that nurses should be allowed \$30 a month and rations, thinking it would be adequate, and we get as many as we desire for those rates.

Q. Would you extend the commutation of the ration right on down to the regimental hospital for each patient?

A. There comes in the difficulty. We do not want to keep the sick men in regimental hospitals, because I think it would be an incumbrance to regiments that were going to move, and if you give it to them, and encourage them to keep their men there, the regimental hospitals would grow.

Q. You would stop it at the division hospitals?

A. Yes, sir; at the division hospitals. But I think there should be some way by which the man's rations could be commuted in some way: say, commuted at actual cost. Then they could use that money for buying milk, eggs, or whatever they desired.

General DODGE. Any other questions?

There being no response the witness was excused.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 8, 1898.***TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. DANIEL W. FLAGLER.**

Brig. Gen. DANIEL W. FLAGLER then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, give us your name and rank and the bureau over which you preside?

A. Daniel W. Flagler; brigadier-general; in charge of the Ordnance Department of the Army.

Q. How long have you occupied that position?

A. Since January, 1891.

Q. How long have you been in the Ordnance Department?

A. Since June 24, 1861.

Q. What position did you occupy in that department during the civil war?

A. I was first in the Army of the Potomac, and then I was chief ordnance officer in the Burnside expedition; then I came back in 1863, and from that time I have been on various duties.

Q. So you have been in the "field" as well as in the office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent—I suppose we have that in your report, but we will get it perhaps in a form that impresses us, verbally—to what extent were the troops armed with the standard rifle?

A. You mean caliber .30 magazine rifle?

Q. Yes.

A. The Regular Army was entirely armed with it, and I think at first three volunteer regiments; one of them was the regiment generally known as the Rough Riders, and one known as the Ohio Cavalry—that is, at first.

Q. Is the caliber the same for cavalry and infantry?

A. The same, and they used the same cartridge.

Q. What as to the gun itself—do the cavalry have the bayonet?

A. No, sir. It is entirely the same in the breech mechanism, but the principal difference is in the length of the barrel.

Q. What is the capacity, if you deem it prudent to tell us—I can see reasons why you should not make it public—what is the capacity of our arsenals for making that arm per day?

A. About 350.

Q. Are they running on that?

A. They are manufacturing a little less than that; they are manufacturing a little over 300.

Q. To what extent were you able to supply smokeless powder to the troops in the field during the war?

A. Should I answer what we did do?

Q. That will answer.

A. All of the caliber .30 cartridges were of smokeless powder. Then the only other infantry arm was the caliber .45 Springfield. I had been experimenting for two or three years on smokeless powder to arrive at or work out a satisfactory smokeless powder for that cartridge, and had succeeded. But when the war commenced—it was late when I got ready to begin to furnish supplies to volunteer troops, and there was a very limited capacity in this country for smokeless powder. We

wanted all we could get for our coast defense; so I at once commenced a large increase on the .30-caliber cartridges. The Navy had to be supplied, and it was generally thought their demands should have some precedence, and they did have some precedence. We increased our product of powder five or six times. The powder manufacturers had a limited plant and increased it as promptly as possible; but that took more time and money than to increase the black or cocoa powder plants. Well, we had to get powder enough in some way; so I at first gave up getting smokeless powder for the caliber .45 cartridges, and we gave up very largely getting smokeless powder for our coast-defense works; but I insisted upon it for our field and siege artillery and the caliber .30 cartridges. In about two months, I think, I was able to get the smokeless powder for the caliber .45, and after that all the caliber .45 were made of smokeless powder, nearly. I had to procure that from private manufacturers. I used my plant on .30 caliber and got the .45-caliber powder from the private owners.

Q. Did you have sufficient for the field artillery and siege guns for the campaign in Santiago?

A. There was enough of it—no, not when the campaign commenced; they took none of it with them. The reason of that was that our appropriations have been barely sufficient from year to year to keep the Army. I had a small reserve of our field artillery; but the batteries that went to Tampa and Santiago took their ammunition with them. They had it at their several posts; and that was all that went to Santiago. As soon as we could begin to manufacture the new ammunition it was forwarded down; but none of it reached Santiago. In fact, no field ammunition, except a very little of it, was used there.

Q. Does the Government manufacture powder on its own account at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. How many manufactories are there in the country that you were able to secure a supply from?

A. At first only three of any great importance.

Q. Was their capacity enlarged?

A. Very rapidly.

Q. Where were those?

A. One was the Peyton Company, at Santa Cruz, near San Francisco; the Duponts, and Laffin & Rand.

Q. Where is Laffin & Rand's?

A. I can not give you the name.

Q. Well, it is only a matter of curiosity. What is the difference in cost between the black or brown and smokeless powders?

A. We have two charcoal powders, the black and brown; and the military powders, that is the black, costs about 18 cents; the brown, that is the cocoa, 33 cents; and we had generally to pay \$1 for the smokeless. The smokeless, however, requires about 45 or say 50 per cent of the weight for the same charge.

Q. So you got 50 per cent more activity or power?

A. Yes, sir; the price for smokeless abroad is a little over \$1; but after the first I paid 90 cents in this country. That is what I am paying now.

Q. That would make 45 for smokeless powder as against 33 for brown and 18 for black?

A. I will have to correct that a little—those figures of mine. The proportion of black powder to smokeless powder would average about four-sevenths instead of 50 per cent, or a little more than that—about 42 to 70. It is different for different purposes, different guns. With the small arms our charge of black powder would be 70 grains, and for the smokeless powder the charge would be 42 grains.

Q. Since the inception of the war did you change the arms of any of the volunteer regiments?

A. We are changing them now as fast as the new arms are being turned out. We have now changed about—there have been issued about 110,000, both carbine and rifles, up to date.

Q. What number have you on hand?

A. About 6,000.

Q. So that you keep them pretty well cleared out?

A. Yes, sir. Those are at the different posts, scattered all over.

Q. Have these magazine-loading arms been in the hands of the troops a sufficient length of time to ascertain whether they care for them properly?

A. We have had no trouble with the regulars. With the volunteers we have not had sufficient experience to determine that point.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Does the use of the arms in actual service, in battle, justify what was expected of them?

A. I think I can say, entirely. We have had enough experience in our campaigns with the regular troops—that is, in the Indian country—to satisfy us; but there was a question about their endurance under the rigors of such a climate as Cuba, and at my request the Secretary of War appointed a board to interview officers at Montauk Point and make a report, which they did, and they said it was the most perfect arm they ever had.

Q. What is the difference in weight between the Kräg-Jorgensen—

A. Our official name for that arm is “caliber .30 magazine rifle.”

Q. What is the difference between your caliber .30 magazine rifle and the .45-caliber Springfield, as it was popularly called?

A. It is very little. I am not able to give you exactly, but is something less than half a pound.

Q. How many cartridges does the magazine hold?

A. Five.

Q. What is the difference in the distance at which these respective arms are effective?

A. Not very much. The extreme range of the two arms is about the same—say about 2 miles. The great advantage of the caliber .30 is the flatness of its trajectory and the greater “danger space.” As against the 2,000 yards there is the blow struck by the larger bullet; it will do more damage if it hits anything.

Q. And the larger bullet holds its velocity better?

A. Yes, sir; the smaller one loses its velocity after 2,000 yards very quickly, and I think after 2,000 yards the larger ball is more effective. For the first 400 yards the trajectory of the .45 caliber is very good. Above that, until you get to 2,200 yards, the smaller caliber is better on account of the flatness of its trajectory.

Q. For ordinary purposes, is the ordinary Springfield as effective in the hands of troops as the new .30—that is, considering the distance usually had in effective work?

A. That is a matter for difference of opinion. Some prefer one and some the other. A very great and immediate question is the morale of the troops; I think it is most important that they should think they have the best arm in the world. In the hands of new troops a Springfield is better, as it is easier to keep in order. One point has had much stress laid on it, and that is the rapidity of the fire, and there the criticisms on the Springfield are very unjust.

Q. Is not the danger of the magazine rifle in the hands of “green” troops that they would fire too fast and waste ammunition?

A. Yes, sir. After a good deal of thought, as you know, we have been paying a good deal of attention to marksmanship the last few years, and probably our little Army is composed of the best marksmen in the world; but if you are going to hit you must aim. A man who picks out his object and loads and takes careful aim will not fire more than once a minute. Now, with the Springfield you can

fire 15 a minute. We only expect to use the magazine in an emergency. The magazine is to give him five cartridges, which he can use a little quicker than by reloading; but if the man will be trained as we want him that will be made a small matter. Very few soldiers will see the time when they need a magazine.

Q. If you had smokeless powder in both rifles, what are the advantages of the Kräg-Jorgensen over the Springfield?

A. The reserve furnished by the magazine for use in a rush; then the flatness of the trajectory is a very important one; and I lay great stress on another—the weight of the cartridge is less and he can carry more. He carries 100 of the smokeless and 50 of the .45 caliber.

Q. And then the soldier thinks he has the best arm in the world if he has a new one?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Which, as you said, makes a very important difference to the soldier?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the difference in the quantity of powder for each?

A. Forty-two grains and 70 grains are the charges; that is, 28 grains less on each cartridge.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Suppose you reduce the caliber of the Springfield rifle, keeping the same simple mechanism, would it not be just as good as the Kräg-Jorgensen, using the smokeless powder?

A. That was a proposition before the Small Arms Board that adopted our magazine rifle, and it was carefully considered and rejected, because we were able to get a better rifle. We made a test and it was not a satisfactory one.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Does the smokeless powder make a report, just as the other?

A. Yes, sir; but it is a different noise.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What is the difference between the two in cost?

A. It costs me now about \$1 more than the Springfield when we stopped making it. That arm would have cost me, three years ago, about \$17 and, say, 75 cents; it now costs me \$13.75; so we have it now to where the Springfield was when we quit.

Q. Is the cost of repairs to the new arms as much as on the Springfield?

A. It should be, but we have simplified that. We are improving it—if this was a free discussion, I would bring in General McCook.

By General DODGE:

Q. Are you making improvements on the .30-caliber gun?

A. Not now; we have made improvements in the manufacture.

Q. But on the gun—is it different from the gun the board adopted?

A. Yes, sir; there are some 17 improvements, and of those, four or five are radical.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Making the gun more simple and more accurate?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What is the difference between the bayonet of the .30 caliber and the Springfield?

A. There are two bayonets. One was like the old triangular bayonet; then there is another called the rod bayonet—the ramrod can be pushed out and the

stock holds it in position, and the end is pointed and shaped to be used as a bayonet. The caliber .30 is what is called a knife bayonet. It is a knife about 16 inches long. It can be taken off and used as a knife or to dig up the ground for trenches and earthworks.

Q. It is then a very much more effective bayonet than either of the others?

A. Oh, I do not regard it as a better bayonet than the old triangular bayonet; but this permitted us to discard the old hunting knives the Army had.

Q. To what extent was ammunition issued to volunteer troops for target practice, or was there any issue made for that purpose?

A. When it was called for. It was authorized, but I do not know what date; they had general authority given to all commanding generals to expend ten rounds a man per month. At first we did not dare to do that because we did not have sufficient supply. At first we were too much pushed.

Q. To what extent did the troops in the field avail themselves of the privilege of using ten rounds per month per man?

A. I do not know that; I only authorized that when the authority was given.

Q. When was that authority given?

A. Somewhere around the middle of the summer.

Q. Dr. Conner wants to know to what extent you regard the bayonet as an effective weapon of offense or defense, considered as a bayonet?

A. Governor, that should not be a question for me to give an opinion on. That would be more a question for officers of the line; but naturally I have paid a great deal of attention to the subject and I have seen them used a great deal during the war, but with the power of the fire of the modern arm there is very little chance of it coming into play. There is something to be said for the morale of the troops. It is valuable in guard duty; there is a little romance about it, and I should think—it is my opinion—that if you leave it to the colonels of the regiments, and there was the question of the knife left out and it was only the bayonet, the majority of the colonels would discard the bayonet.

Q. And thereby reduce the impedimenta which the soldier has to carry?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What do you think in connection with the use of the smokeless powder as to the troops getting closer than they did with the ordinary powder? In a battle would they get closer together with the smokeless powder than with the ordinary powder?

A. It is rather a new question. For some reasons it might tend in that direction, and others seem to prevent it; but I think not.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Has not the theory been that with the new powder there would be no more charging?

A. It was to prevent it.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 10, 1898.*

Brig. Gen. DANIEL W. FLAGLER recalled.

By General BEAVER:

Q. When you left the stand the other day we were speaking of the coast fortifications. Can you recall to what extent the guns in these fortifications were furnished with ammunition at the time of the declaration of war with Spain?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is your recollection in that regard?

A. First, I will state that we had not the amount of ammunition per gun either on hand or at the fortifications that we wanted, and I think I had better give you

a history of the circumstances that led to that state of affairs, and then I will tell you what they were. For the last seven years I have submitted each year to Congress an estimate of the cost of the defense armament; that is, guns, carriages, implements, and equipment projectiles and powder. That estimate has each year been cut down to the amount that we were able to produce economically and in the very best manner. It is limited each year to what the gun-carriage factory could turn out. The gun is the important matter and the foundation; and we have a gun-carriage factory and it is limited. We have a difficulty each year to get forgings to keep that factory employed; and then the carriages, and then the projectiles and ammunition. In making these estimates there has always been a conference with the engineers to find which guns and which carriages they wanted and to make our estimates agree, so that we would furnish what they wanted. Now, it has been uniformly the case that Congress, for good and sufficient reasons, could not follow our recommendations. They had to be reduced because of the condition of finances or other reasons (which was none of my business), and they were reduced. There would be always a good deal of discussion as to which items should be reduced, keeping all the time—to manage the affairs as well as we could—keeping the engineers supplied.

In all the discussions that have come up there has been a prominent point, namely, if an emergency ever occurred we would be powerless, because it takes one and a half years to produce guns (two and a half for 12-inch, and one and a half for 10-inch) from the time we get the appropriations and get the forgings and get the gun manufactured; so if an emergency would arise we would be limited to the guns on hand. I have always urged to allow that gun factory to be fairly well employed, and have myself urged that if they did cut down to not cut down the guns, because we could hasten the manufacture of carriages much faster than the guns. We could contract with private companies throughout the country. It takes a long time to produce projectiles, but we can produce them faster than the carriages, and powder faster than the projectiles; so after the committees were through with me they have made these great reductions in my estimates, and based on that knowledge, not on recommendation, but on information that would be brought out in the discussion of the matter, I suppose, but for some reason or other very small appropriations were made for projectiles, scarcely anything for powder, and much less for carriages and guns. When the emergency did arise, the wisdom of that was shown, because we were able to get out the carriages rapidly as soon as we got the money; and the same way with the projectiles. That was the situation; but when we anticipated this trouble—it was as early as January—I set to work to furnish the guns that were mounted, and would be mounted by, say, the first of March, with what ammunition I could. I had little or no appropriation for that purpose. We had small sums for projectiles, and issued at once to the fortifications about 20 projectiles. I issued 20 projectiles all around for the 8, 10, and 12 inch guns, and for the mortars I issued $5\frac{1}{2}$ projectiles on the average. Of powder, I issued for the guns $6\frac{1}{2}$ rounds to the 8, 3 rounds to the 10, 5 to each of the 12, and 5 rounds to each mortar. Then I retained at the arsenal in reserve—I was able to hold in reserve—27 projectiles for each 8-inch, 4 for the 10-inch, and 105 for the 12-inch (I will speak of that 12-inch later on), $7\frac{1}{2}$ projectiles for each mortar; $5\frac{1}{2}$ rounds for each 8-inch, 4 rounds for 10, and 44 for 12, and 1 round for each mortar, of powder.

The reason we had so large a number of 12-inch is that it is a most difficult projectile to make, and therefore we devoted ourselves to getting these first. It takes longer than the others, but the carriage question had not been worked out until a short time after this thing occurred. We had mounted two 12-inch guns on gun lifts and then it was decided we could make a disappearing carriage for that gun. Although we had the 12-inch guns on hand, the fortifications were built but the guns were not mounted. There were three mounted on barbette

carriages. We had a large number of rounds for these, but we did not have a large number of projectiles. That 12-inch carriage was pushed from the first as fast as possible and very soon we were able to mount enough to consume all those projectiles. What I had urged in my estimates before Congress was that I should provide 45 projectiles per gun (a portion of these are cast-iron, but a large proportion are steel); that is what I estimated for and I tried to procure, and about half as much powder. I don't like to keep that powder on hand. There is another point that ought to be considered. We were working up the smokeless powder for a number of years. The whole world was at it and it takes a long time to get a satisfactory powder for each gun, and I didn't want to accumulate a great amount of black powder. As soon as we could arrive at satisfactory results in regard to smokeless powder I wanted to use that. I did not believe in having as much powder as projectiles. Powder companies can turn it out and it deteriorates if we send it to fortifications—they are in damp climates. We don't want to hold a large amount on hand. It is not necessary. We hold half as many rounds of powder as projectiles and keep the rest in store at central points—at arsenals, for distribution to those points where they may be needed.

Q. Instead of 45 rounds at which you aimed, what was the average?

A. Well, we had generally considerable over 20 projectiles per gun, except for mortars. For mortars we had only about 9, and the amount of powder which I told you, which was very small.

Q. You know by what time the ammunition reached the various points where it might have been needed for coast defenses?

A. These amounts that I gave you should have reached there in a few days. They were shipped, all we could lay hands on, by the 1st of March.

Q. By the 1st of March?

A. I should think so.

Q. You have no definite information as to the time they did reach the several points?

A. It would be in my property returns of each post, when it arrived there.

Q. As a matter of fact, is that gun factory kept constantly employed? Do you get enough appropriations to keep your gun factory economically employed; that is, all the time, with the number of hands that can work at it?

A. It has not been so employed. The appropriations have been generally utilized for either one-half or two-thirds of its capacity. Now we are running it full. I have sufficient appropriations now. The appropriations were usually cut down to not often less than one-half, and probably an average over one-half, and lately over one-half of what was needed to utilize the whole capacity of the factory.

Q. It is a matter of economy, is it not, General, to use your plant to its full capacity, because of the investment which is made and because of the facility with which you can turn out the manufactured article?

A. It is always a little more economical to run it full, because there are expenses not affected by the amount of work you do, generally fixed expenses, as manufacturers usually call them, which remain, no matter how little or how much work you do.

Q. To what extent were you able to supply the department of engineering with the guns which they considered necessary for the proper defense of our entire coast?

A. At no time, especially at the outbreak of the war. You can see that the engineer work, being scattered all over the country, they could employ people in large numbers at each point, and their ability to construct fortifications was practically unlimited, for they could get the money, but it was not so with me. I made gun carriages as fast as I could, and as a general rule the Chief of Engineers, I think, limited his operations to what I could do, and naturally he was

somewhat ahead sometime after the outbreak of the war, but I think that generally, except the 12-inch carriages, everything was furnished about as fast as he was ready for them; but if we had had the carriages we could have gone very much faster.

Q. So that in the end the matter of coast defense comes down to this: That the engineers must depend on you for the guns, you must depend on your gun factory, and that depends on Congress?

A. Yes, sir. I think I can safely say their ability was almost unlimited, but it was useless for them to go faster.

Q. That is, to erect fortifications?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About your ability to furnish armament—

A. [Interrupting.] It was limited to the factories of the country; to the ability of the people of the country to make carriages satisfactorily at reasonable prices; and I think generally the Chief of Engineers made his operations correspond, but he was ready for 12-inch carriages sooner than they could be provided; and I think in some cases the same was true in regard to mortar carriages.

Q. Are they able to furnish more forgings than you can utilize?

A. Not much more. The Bethlehem Company has a plant for large guns. That is the only plant for large guns, and they used some of their forgings in them, but we have many factories that can make the small guns, such as the field guns and rapid-fire guns, and the amount of work that could be performed has, since the work was pushed, been limited to the capacity of the steel works. They of course ran extra shifts, nights, days, and Sundays, and turned out all the forgings they could.

Q. And were you able to consume all their product in your factory?

A. In our factory and in the contracts we made with other parties it has been my custom to put the whole matter before Congress and urge it all I could, and there I said my responsibility ended. "Now I am before you as your expert to give you all your information, and it is for Congress to act." We went as fast as our facilities would allow us. Each year the whole scheme was mapped out. "If we work to our capacity, we will get through in so many years. If you cut it down half, it will take twice as long; if you cut it down to one-third, it will take three times as long."

By General DODGE:

Q. General, have you any suggestions to make or any testimony which you wish to offer to us that would be useful to us in our inquiries concerning which you have not been especially interrogated? If you have, just make a statement as if you had been especially interrogated thereto.

A. I might make this statement. I don't know whether it is in the nature of what the commission would like to hear.

Q. Make any statement you wish.

A. One of the first questions asked me here was to ascertain whether I had had much experience in the supplying of arms. Now, it was the duty I was engaged on specially during our whole civil war. I was chief of ordnance in the Army of the Potomac. The question of what we could do, the conditions of the country in case of war, and whether we could meet the demands of the country for ordnance and ordnance stores has received a good deal of my attention for many years, and I considered it part of my duty to know whether we would be able to supply volunteer armies, and in all the plans I have made and all the study I have given to the subject I have based them on my experience in the civil war—of the time required to raise, muster in, organize, drill, and prepare troops for the field—and I have tried to have the ordnance department ready as far as I was able to do so, and I believed we were able to arm and equip troops as fast as the

country could make them into soldiers; as fast as they were ready to use the ordnance and ordnance stores we could supply them. Generally speaking, I thought we were, and I think our experience in this war has shown that we were. The Rock Island Arsenal was built to meet the wants, but it was based on what we found in the civil war, and I have spent much time on it and have had my attention directed to that when this war was on. But it is a fact that I have not been able to get the plant installed at Rock Island. Then, I always counted on a little warning. If I could have had a month's warning and been that month ahead, I would have had these stores ready faster than they were demanded, no matter how early demanded, but still I would have had them on hand; but as it was, we were a little behind the demand all the time. But the lesson learned is, I think, that Rock Island Arsenal is competent to turn out all the equipment that can be wanted for a volunteer army as fast as they can be made into soldiers.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. How many troops, General?

A. Toward the last I was providing infantry equipment at the rate of 8,000 sets a day, and if I can have my other plant ready there I am sure—I would like six weeks to get in workmen and to get material; there is a difficulty about getting material in this country; our materials are not the army standard articles; the commercial people must learn what they are to get ready—but in six weeks I think I could get ready to furnish equipment at that establishment for infantry at the rate of 10,000 sets per day and cavalry about 750 per day. We did not go as fast as that with cavalry equipment, but in two months I had 4,000 workmen and we were turning out infantry equipment at the rate of 8,000 a day when the halt came.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. General, if you had plenty of money, how long would it require you to fully equip all the coast fortifications already erected or in process of erection?

A. It would require not quite six years.

Q. What is the approximate cost of 10, 12, and 8 inch guns?

A. The 12-inch is about \$60,000, 10-inch about \$30,000, 8-inch about \$17,000.

Q. Does that include the cost of carriage and everything?

A. No, sir; I have had my mind so full of many things lately that I have lost the figures. These are rough approximations.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Including the carriage, what would be the cost of a 12-inch gun?

A. Twelve-inch carriages cost about \$27,000 or \$28,000. I know the 8-inch costs about \$10,000 and the 10-inch about \$17,000.

By General WILSON:

Q. In the discharge of the very laborious and important special duties that have devolved upon you in the last nine months, have you met with cordial assistance from the other branches of the Department in your duties?

A. I have. I can say that without any reservation.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. And also from your superiors? And if not, state wherein.

A. It has not been a question of support. I have not been prevented from performing my duties in any way. In the statement I was making to you of the condition of the country for taking care of the armies I only went as far as the equipment was concerned. Now, I have held that we ought—

Colonel DENBY [interrupting]. What do you mean by equipment?

A. We have horse equipment, cavalry, artillery, and infantry equipments. The equipments for the soldier are his clothing bag, or what is called his knapsack

his haversack for carrying his rations and his plate, knife, fork, spoon, canteen, etc. The horse equipment is a long list, but the principal items are the halter, the bridle, saddle, saddle bags, and a good many articles—boots and blankets, etc. There are about 35 small articles that I do not mention that go with it. These are articles I think it is important to consider in this regard. I did not want to carry them on hand, and the question is, Is it desirable to have equipments ready for an emergency? I say no, because of the immense cost. They deteriorate rapidly, and we are making improvements all the time, and if we were to change them we could not possibly get the money to carry equipment for a large army always on hand. It is desirable that we could, but we would better be ready to make them, and the cost for being ready to make them is nothing compared with the cost of carrying them on hand. Of the small arms we ought to have a proportion of what would be required issued, but we want a large capacity for manufacturing them besides.

Q. Let me ask you, General, would you vary the equipment to meet the necessities of armies in the Tropics like Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines?

A. Not my equipments materially, but I presume the Government should; but that belongs to the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. General, considering the inventions that are likely to take place in small arms, would it be desirable to have a very large stock of the present arms on hand in anticipation of future wars?

A. I have recommended that this country carry about 500,000 standard small arms and have that many ready for issue. If the armory at Rock Island is completed, that armory and the one at Springfield would be ready to turn out 500 arms per day. I estimate the capacity of the one at Rock Island, if the machinery is installed (there is nothing now but the building), at 2,000, and the building at Springfield is sufficient for 500.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is that in your present report?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That has been acted upon?

A. It has been published.

Q. But not by Congress; that is, your recommendation to Congress?

A. To the Secretary of War; it has.

Q. That would go to Congress?

A. It is not submitted to Congress.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. It occurred to me that the possibilities of the next twenty-five years are such that there might be a change in our small arms, and we would not care to have on hand, and it seems to be your idea to have a factory to make arms so you can turn them out in case of war, and not have enough on hand for any war of large magnitude that might occur?

A. I think that we ought to carry about 500,000, and then have this capacity for the manufacture which would be ready to be put in operation as soon as war was anticipated.

Q. Of any class of small arms?

A. Yes, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. What is the cost of the new magazine rifle?

A. It is to-day costing \$13.75.

Q. In this new magazine rifle, do you find the enlisted men can carry that carelessly or are they turned back?

A. Not from the Regular Army. They are able to take care of them. It is more a difficulty with the officer than the enlisted men. The enlisted men require guidance from the officers.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. The volunteers had very few of them?

A. They did not at first. They have them now.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. If you could not use these articles on hand, could you dispose of them?

A. We have always been able to dispose of them. Whether the world is going to change hereafter I do not know. Our great market was Central America and such countries as that. We sold to dealers, who supplied these countries.

By General DODGE:

Q. I want to ascertain if the Government has the power to carry that out without an act of Congress?

A. I will each year make estimates for funds to provide these small arms.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. You don't use the Springfield rifle any more?

A. We will hold it as a reserve until these others I have spoken of accumulate.

Q. Can you dispose of the Springfield rifle now so as to get something for it to reimburse yourself—can you do that?

A. Yes; but it should not be sold until we have reached this 500,000 supply of the standard arms.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Wouldn't the Springfield rifle be the proper arm to issue to the States?

A. It is so done, and it is proposed to continue that.

Q. Is it not the best weapon that can be put into the hands of a State for State purposes?

A. I think so, and I think the organizations of the different States are confident that that is true also.

Q. How large a number of the Springfield rifles would be required for issue to the United States?

A. One hundred and twenty thousand. They were equipped with it before the war.

By General DODGE:

Q. [Referring to paper.] I understand you had on hand 185,000 Springfield rifles when the war commenced?

A. More than that.

Q. This says on hand September 1, 185,000.

A. But I had issued a great many.

Q. You had well on to 400,000 Springfield rifles that could be used by the Government?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. With this number of arms on hand—in the different camps we have been to there has been a general complaint as to the delay in receiving their arms. For instance, you take the Third Division of the First Army Corps; it was August 1 before they were supplied with the number of arms that they required; and you take the Second Army Corps, they also make the same complaint. What was the reason of the delay in those troops being armed with the Springfield rifle as promptly as they arrived in camp?

The WITNESS. Did you say the Third Army Corps?

General DODGE. The first statement I made was in relation to the Third Division of the First Army Corps at Chickamauga. On July 1 they had 4,000 rifles; July 10, 9,000; July 30, 11,000; July 31 they required 285 rifles.

The WITNESS. It might be interesting to go over that whole subject. When it was determined to call out the volunteers I found I had this matter to look out for. It was stated to me that uniformly they were to take the National Guard equipment. The National Guard was supposed to be armed and equipped. You remember they have an inspector, an officer stationed in each State, and we relied upon his reports, and we had reports that they would be ready to take the field. I did not rely entirely upon it and made provision to supply them. I was met by this difficulty as to these arms: They were furnished to the States under the law for arming and equipping the militia, and some of the States bought their own arms. If these troops were called out as they were to be called out and were to take their own arms with them, as soon as they became United States troops their arms and equipment fell under our charge. Under the law I required them to account for them and they became United States property. How were we going to settle with the States? I had prepared a general order to settle that matter which required that each regiment should send to the Chief of Ordnance a requisition stating first the number of men that it had, the number of arms it had, and the difference would be the number that it required. If I could get that requisition, I would then know what each State had furnished, and we must settle with each State in some way. We have to go to Congress this winter to settle that. I had furnished blanks for making that requisition, and I know of no simpler method on earth than to set down the number of men and the number of arms they had, and I would attend to the difference, and if they sent me that requisition they would be shipped to them.

I sent the orders to the governors of the States, adjutant-generals of the States, and every commissioned officer and the mustering officer who mustered them in. Now, as fast as we could get these requisitions they were filled. My responsibility in regard to that filling of requisitions ceased with the shipment of the stores. There was a good deal of trouble at Chickamauga. The railroad and their facilities for handling supplies became swamped and they could not receive these articles. The officers were not used to the business and could not get their articles. I found out afterwards that when arms were shipped to one regiment, someone would take the responsibility of turning them over to some other regiment, and some of the regiments got their arms two or three times. These are the exceptional cases, and they are probably the ones you heard of. But everything was done by telegraph and within an hour. I would get one of these requisitions or find out what was wanted, and telegraphed to have the shipment made, and the shipments were made the same day, as a rule. For the corps out at Camp Alger we were able to attend to things a little better, and we got an ordnance officer out there who attended to his business and went and drilled the ordnance officers of the regiments in their duties and required them to make these requisitions, and the matter was done in an orderly manner, and I learned from General Graham (and he was a hard man to satisfy) that he believed there was no case in which they did not get their articles in the ordnance stores.

By General McCook:

Q. Suppose your recommendations had been complied with to establish a supply depot at Chickamauga, what advantage would that have been?

A. It would have relieved the matter very much.

Q. Why was not that approved?

A. I do not know. It rested between the Commanding General and the Chief Ordnance Officer.

By General BEAVER:

Q. He subsequently, I think, made the statement that he made a mistake in not approving it.

A. Yes, sir. I suggested that Columbia Arsenal should be placed at his disposal, and it was over the mountains and everything became choked. We had a good deal to do at the time. You ask why my recommendations were not complied with. I don't remember the correspondence on that subject. I suggested it.

Q. We get that out of your own reports here.

By General McCook:

Q. Were you interfered with in any way by superior authorities in making contracts for ordnance supplies?

A. I think I have no complaint to make on that score. I could not say no, because it would be too sweeping a reply.

Q. Have any contracts been made for ordnance stores or guns or arms that you have not recommended or not approved?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they?

A. There was one for 10,000 Winchester rifles, and there have been in some cases some contracts for the armament for the fortifications.

Q. How many guns?

A. There was one case for some rapid-fire guns.

Q. Had you experimented with those guns at Sandy Hook—models of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they prove satisfactory?

A. The one type that we had experimented with did not prove satisfactory.

Q. Do you know upon whose recommendations those guns were bought?

A. Yes.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What guns were they, General; what was the defect in the guns or deficiency, so far as you know?

A. It was the wire-wound gun. The one we tested failed. I would say the purchase was based on the recommendations of the chairman of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Were any recommendations as to the purchase of arms made by you over-ruled or turned down?

A. No; I was occupied for a time very much in ascertaining whether arms could be purchased satisfactorily—magazine arms—abroad. We found we could purchase arms, many of them, but they were not good enough. I found no magazine arms, up to the standard required, could be obtained soon enough for our purposes.

Q. Were those Winchester rifles issued to troops?

A. They were not.

Q. Where are they now?

A. They are in store at the Springfield Armory.

Q. What was the cost of these rifles?

A. I don't remember. The cost was more than our rifles. I remember now: the price was \$20.70 each.

Q. Without saying anything in regard to the comparative merits between that and the new magazine rifle, please state whether you consider the Winchester a good rifle.

A. I consider it a good rifle.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. By whose order were those rifles purchased?

A. The Secretary of War.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Upon whose recommendation?

A. On the recommendation of the General of the Army.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were all the arms that were purchased—that you disapproved of—were they purchased on the recommendation of this Ordnance Board?

A. No. Do you refer to the arms we were speaking of?

Q. The other guns—the wire-wound guns.

A. No.

Q. Upon the recommendation of the Ordnance Board?

A. No; not by the board, but upon the recommendation of General Miles. He is the president of that board.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Who composed the Ordnance Board?

A. The General of the Army, an officer of the Engineer's Department, an officer of the Ordnance Department, an officer of the artillery, and a civilian.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Contracts which were made independently of you, General, were in the direction of getting more and of arming our troops more rapidly than could be done under the operations of your department?

A. I have no information to the contrary.

Q. As it turned out the emergency was not sufficient to absorb the arms that were bought; was that the fact or was it because the arms were not considered efficient that they were not issued?

A. I never heard anything said in regard to issuing them. The question never came up.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Were you ever ordered to issue them?

A. No, sir.

Q. What time were they put in store?

A. As fast as completed and inspected. I find on reviewing my testimony that the recommendation and instructions that these arms be purchased contained no stipulations as to rates of delivery, and the order for them simply stated that they should be delivered at the earliest possible date. Up to the present time 8,000 of them have been delivered and 2,000 remain to be delivered. I recall now, and in reply to a previous question understand I have to state, that on the recommendation of the General commanding the Army I was also required to purchase thirteen Sims-Dudley dynamite guns, carriages, and a supply of ammunition—2,300 rounds.

Q. General, we have had complaint made here by the adjutant-general of the State of Illinois, who was in Porto Rico, in relation to the delivery of .30-caliber rifles in Porto Rico of the manufacture of 1896 to the Third Illinois Infantry. He makes the statement and wonders why, if you had them on hand, they were not delivered to them before they went to Porto Rico, and makes the complaint that the troops were not properly armed while the arms were evidently on hand. Why were not their arms changed before they went to Porto Rico?

A. It was not proposed at that time to change the volunteers' arms.

Q. Only as they went into the field?

A. No; it was not proposed to change them at all. They had been armed and equipped with the .45-caliber Springfield, and it was not proposed to change the arms. About the time these troops were sailing for Porto Rico it was decided to change the arms of the troops that went to Porto Rico, and the arms were shipped to be changed as soon as they arrived.

Q. Wasn't it the intention to change the arms of all the volunteers that left these shores for Cuba or Porto Rico?

A. No such intention up to that time.

Q. Then we understand that the volunteers should go to Porto Rico and Cuba armed with the Springfield rifles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the smokeless powder?

A. We were then furnishing smokeless powder as fast as we could. We had smokeless powder when the Porto Rico expedition sailed.

Q. But did these troops that sailed for Porto Rico with the Springfield rifle have smokeless powder ammunition?

A. They probably did not with them, but I sent the smokeless powder there.

Q. For the Springfields?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. We have a good deal of complaint for the slow furnishing of tin plates, knives, forks, etc., to the troops. What was the cause of the delay in those matters?

A. If you go back to my statement about the National Guard being armed and equipped; it was supposed, as they stated, they were armed and equipped. When it was stated they were completely armed and equipped, I made my estimate on having to furnish about one-third their equipment. Generally, I had to renew all their equipment, as it turned out. As I told you, the plant for the manufacture of these stores was not installed, and I had to install that, which took time. Then the demand for tin plate became so enormous that we could not get the tin plate. When I got started I didn't have tin plate enough, and so the demand was three or four times as great as I would have anticipated it should be. Everything had to be renewed.

Q. Did you have to make this yourself; couldn't you get other tin manufacturers throughout the country to make these?

A. I do not think I could have gotten them any faster that way. They would have had to put in these special tools and machines and would not have known anything about it or known how to do it, and as fast as they could be obtained they would be put in there and the rate of production was rushed up to 8,000 per day.

Q. Couldn't they be bought in the market—the tin plate?

A. We haven't any tin plate. It is a meat can.

Q. You are speaking of the equipment for the soldiers?

A. Not an ordinary tin plate. The same way with the tin cup, but those I did buy were thrown back. The men could not use them.

Q. Do you remember about the equipment of the First Ohio Cavalry? We had complaints about the long delay in that—that they never received their equipment until about the time they were getting ready to be mustered out?

A. I could have the case of that First Ohio Cavalry hunted up; it is a long case. There were some misfortunes there. My impression is I shipped the stores to that regiment three times, and when they received stores sometimes they would not have them. That occurred with that regiment also.

Q. They would not receive them—would not accept them?

A. I think they declined—my mind is hazy on that subject. I had too much to do.

Q. As to the First Illinois Infantry, we have had complaints about that. They

complained they were sent to Cuba and were short 300 cartridge belts; the men did not have cartridge belts in Cuba?

A. They were at Chickamauga. There was one thing that these men ought to have taken into account and given the department credit for. When I found that matters were choked and the stores did not arrive at Chickamauga and also that they were condemning equipment they had and wanted new equipment and there was this hurry and there was danger that some troops might be sent to the front without their equipment, I insisted at all times that there should be at my depot in Tampa full supplies of everything a soldier could want, so that by no possibility could troops sail from Tampa without being thoroughly armed and equipped. When they got to Tampa they certainly would get what they needed there and the officers at the camp were informed of that fact.

Q. Then, these supplies were on hand, and the reason they did not get them was that they were in the stations and the supplies did not reach them until they left?

A. There was much confusion at that place.

Q. At Chickamauga?

A. I know all stores were not on hand. As I told you, we were a month behind, and all stores were not shipped as fast as called for, but most of the trouble was due to the cause I have explained—that, although they were shipped, the troops to whom they were shipped did not receive them, or there were delays, or they were diverted to someone else. If they had determined which of the regiments were fit and ready to receive these supplies it would not have been any trouble to furnish the regiments that were ready for them or regiments that were ready to go to the front. When I found that state of affairs I thought there was danger that regiments might get orders which were not fully equipped, and I had a depot established at Tampa in May, so that whatever was done in regard to other points there should be a sufficient supply there, and I am sure that plan was carried out.

Q. One of the greatest difficulties was that you did not have a depot at Chickamauga?

A. And that interfered very much with the efficiency of the operations of the department.

Q. But you did have one at Tampa, where they could have gotten these things before they sailed?

A. I had a very efficient depot there. That was a safety reserve.

Q. We find a complaint from Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, of the Fourth Wisconsin, of the arms that were issued to him. The question was asked him, "How is your regiment armed?" "Caliber .45." "Good or bad quality?" "Very poor." "What previous use did your arms have?" "I do not know, but they had apparently been returned to the arsenal and been repaired. They were worn; parts were broken. We have not been able to get the separate parts to replace them, and I have seen the barrels swollen; something has probably been left in the gun and when it was fired off it swelled the gun." "Were requisitions made for new supplies?" "Yes, sir." "Where did they go?" "To the Chief of Ordnance, in Washington." "Have you heard from them?" "No, sir." I think he said that there were 200 parts required for guns. Have you any knowledge of that?

A. No.

Q. I think it is due to General Flagler to say that there is no testimony before us that any serious difficulty occurred on account of insufficiency.

A. I can look the question up and tell you more about it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Here is what he says. "What previous use did your arms have?" "I don't know, but they have been apparently returned to the arsenal and been repaired." "When did you draw them?" "They were shipped from the Springfield Arsenal."

A. Arms that have been used are sometimes cleaned and repaired and reissued. There is no doubt about this. When an arm is reissued from the Springfield Armory it is the same thing practically as a new arm. We have cleaned and repaired arms at the Springfield Armory. There are two rules made. They must be as good for fighting purposes as new ones; but at Springfield they spend more work upon them and they must come out not only as good for fighting purposes, but they must look as good as a new Springfield. If he got arms from the State the subject of separate parts was a difficult matter to deal with, because new officers could not learn in the short time about making requests properly and getting necessary separate parts and renewing them. It took time for some of them to learn that. The demand for the supply of parts became so exorbitant that in all cases they were not supplied, and there may have been a case of that kind. With him, he must have gotten separate parts as fast as wanted. There were cases where officers wanted separate parts and could not get them as soon as they wanted them. From my memory of it I don't think there was any interference with the efficiency of troops ready to take the field.

Q. What was the great difficulty in obtaining the haversack and the belt—the cartridge belt?

A. First, in regard to the haversack, the inability to keep up with the demand. We were a little behind, as I say; about a month, due exclusively to the fact that this country could not produce that duck. We could not get the duck. The cartridge belt is another matter. It is a tedious subject to explain it fully.

Q. We would like to have the information.

A. We adopted before the war for the United States Army a woven cartridge belt, which could be made by only one concern in this country, by a man who had a patent on it. I regard it as much the best method for carrying cartridges ever discovered by any nation, or better than any other army in the world. As soon as I could make any move at all in getting ready for equipment, and even before, I went to this company to see what they could do and would do to increase their output. They had to procure peculiar and special looms, which took time to manufacture, and they did all they could to make them, and then I went to some other manufacturers. There were other woven belts, and as soon as I could I got many companies to making belts, but of those belts some were about as good if not quite as good as the one I discarded. These other belts were issued to the volunteers, but they wanted the same belt as the Regular Army had, and when issued they would be refused. But this company could not make belts faster. They had to get their looms. They went on as fast as they could. They could not supply one-tenth of them, and it made general dissatisfaction. They said they wanted the same belts the Regular Army had. We had to send troops to the front so fast that I knew something had to be done and we bought such belts as were used for sporting purposes to carry the cartridges; that is, to give the soldier something, which was to be replaced by the new belts as fast as we could get them. I authorized the purchase of an inferior kind, and as soon as I saw them I forbid their issue, but a few had been issued, and that created a good deal of talk. They were issued at Tampa. It took time to supply good belts as fast as wanted. It was the most difficult question I had to deal with. Before the emergency was over we were furnishing them as fast as they were wanted. I proposed to give to the troops, until we could furnish these belts, our old cartridge boxes—special cartridge boxes, and I could furnish these as fast as they needed them, but I made up my mind I could not induce officers to receive them. None of them were issued. The only place I thought I might have to issue them was at Tampa; if any troops got there without belts they would have to take them in lieu of any other belt. That was a thing by itself. I wanted to give them the woven belt, and I gave them the best and nearest product corresponding to that that I could.

Q. Are you now making the .30-caliber gun at the capacity of the Springfield Armory?

A. At the capacity of the Springfield Armory. We haven't any plant at Rock Island.

Q. Well, as to the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications—haven't they recommended a different arm from the Kräg-Jorgensen?

A. They have not.

Q. They approved the Kräg-Jorgensen?

A. I don't know that the matter has ever been before that board.

Q. I see the new board is trying to bring the three arms in the service together.

A. Not quite that. The scope of that board was to ascertain whether it was desirable to have a uniform caliber. They have nothing to say as to arms. The question is whether it is necessary that the three branches shall use the same caliber. That board was appointed to determine whether we should have a uniform caliber of arms.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. General, in your judgment, is it wise that the present arrangement should continue under which the commissary furnishes provisions, the quartermaster transports them, and the Ordnance Department has to furnish tin plates, cups, forks, etc., that are used?

A. I am very firmly of the opinion that we can do no better—that there would be no advantage in any change. The system is that which has grown up from actual experience in our army from the time we have had an army, and whenever anything could be improved or any method had been thought to be improved it has been tried, and the present system is the result of constant trials to improve.

Q. You think it wiser that the Ordnance Department should furnish what it does furnish? The statement was made to us as a ground of complaint that the commissary furnished food and the Quartermaster's Department was called to transport it, and they had to rely upon the Ordnance Department for things with which to eat it.

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You maintain a manufacturing plant now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments do not?

A. No, sir.

Q. If the Quartermaster's Department and the Commissary Department did so they would have to maintain a plant separate from the Ordnance?

A. We furnish a portion of the equipment, and had better furnish it all. I base my opinion on the fact that the Army has tried all these things. The present system is the result of actual experience and not of opinion.

By General DODGE:

Q. We have the testimony of several colonels at Chickamauga, that they arrived at Chickamauga and had no arms and immediately made requests, and they would not be there in a month and even two months, and would not have arms even for the companies to drill with, and their answer to our questions as to the reasons why that was, they could give us no reason why all their requisitions were not responded to and their requisitions received no notice. We have the testimony of one or two division commanders as to that also. If I got your answer clearly, it was that it comes from the fact that the States did not give proper notice that these troops needed these things; was that it?

A. No. I gave you the reason, that I had to have a requisition. Now, when I got complaints that troops did not receive their arms or had not received their

equipment, it was uniformly the case that I had not received any requisition for them. At first these requisitions did not come to the ordnance officer, but they were sent to the arsenal direct; at the same time I understood that the transportation became swamped; that stores were there in cars and could not be found, and then were not delivered to the officers; and then again I found, as I stated before, that arms that did arrive were taken and turned over to others and the Ordnance Department never informed of that fact, or of the fact that troops had already received their arms and had them taken away.

Q. Here is a statement of a division commander: "A great deal of complaint of the First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, about their equipments, arose from the fact that the regiment did not get its ordnance equipment until just before it left the division. The men ate with their fingers, or relied on such crude things as could be improvised out of tomato cans, for several weeks."

A. I have no recollection of that case. No notice of that came to me.

By General McCook:

Q. Had reasonable appropriations, or what you deem reasonable appropriations, been made for the furnishing of seacoast armament during the time you were in the office as Chief of Ordnance, at the time the war broke out, he coast could have been properly supplied with arms and guns, approximately if not completely?

A. It would have been in a fairly good condition. We could have had the work about half completed instead of being in the condition we were in. The total defense proposed would make it practically impregnable. To have that was the thing. The defenses would have made it uncomfortable for any vessel. I think our defense would have been in fairly good condition. I think about half the armament would have been provided for.

Q. Are they being provided now with reasonable dispatch?

A. Yes, sir.

By General Dodge:

Q. Have you any further statement to make or suggestion or information to give us that will be of interest to the commission or benefit to the service?

A. I know of nothing else, except I was stopped in the statement I was making in regard to my plants, about being prepared for them in equipping arms in time of war. I got through with the infantry. I can not supply the field and siege artillery after war arises; we must have it on hand. I would propose in that case, also, as I said before, to have on hand a complement of these guns.

Q. Is that in this year's recommendation?

A. I have been recommending that from year to year. I have been urging it on Congress also. I have urged 1,500 or 3,000 guns on hand, but instead of that we have 150.

Q. From your experience in this way, what suggestion have you to make for the future benefit of your own department, if you have anything more than what is in your report?

A. Nothing more than in my annual report. The greatest difficulty is the lack of officers and these plants that should be installed principally at Rock Island.

Q. Those are the two principal suggestions you think would materially aid your department?

A. One serious thing I labored under in this war was the small room for manufacturing ammunition at Philadelphia. After the civil war we put up there a very fine building and improved that establishment and increased its capacity; the building has been standing there without machinery. Ever since I have been Chief of Ordnance I have been urging a small appropriation by Congress of over \$50,000 to utilize that building. We would put in the fixtures and power and put the building in condition to use, and after that we would have to add the machines.

which would take more money. That would make the capacity of that building—I could have turned out 250,000 cartridges a day. From the little shed that has been there since the war of 1812 I have been able to turn out 32,000 a day. I got it last year, but too late to have that building utilized for this war.

Q. Are you utilizing it now?

A. I am putting in the plant.

By General McCook:

Q. What is the basis of your smokeless powder?

A. Nitrogenized gun cotton.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 9, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. DANIEL M. APPEL.

Maj. DANIEL M. APPEL then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us your name, rank, length of service that you have had, at what stations, and what duties you have performed in the war with Spain?

A. Daniel M. Appel; surgeon, United States Army; entered service August 5, 1876.

Q. The stations, please, that you occupied during the war, and what duties?

A. I reported at Mobile on the 20th of April with the Eleventh Infantry and organized the division hospital there first: was placed in charge for the first few days. I was senior surgeon until Major O'Reilly reported; then I organized the division hospital as soon as the regimental hospitals were broken up, about a week or ten days after the troops arrived there. As soon as Major O'Reilly was made chief surgeon of the corps, I was made chief surgeon of the division, first division of General Coppinger's corps; that was about the 23d of May. I turned over the hospital to Major Viras, surgeon of the First Texas Volunteers. I remained as chief surgeon of the division while General Snyder, General Hoffman, General Bates, General Schwan, General Slade, and finally General Keifer, were in command. I left with the division camp at Mobile after being there from the 26th of April, until, I believe, the 26th of June, when the command or the whole division was ordered down to Miami. I was chief surgeon all the time the division was there and came with the division up to Jacksonville, where they were ordered on the 7th of August, and remained there from about the 26th of July to the 7th of August. I was sick the last few days. The day before we left I went on sick leave with a malarial attack of fever. I had been for two years at Fort Roots, on the Arkansas, where the whole command had suffered more or less from malarial fever, and then going down there to Florida, where there is considerable malaria at that season, I finally had an attack of gastral bronchitis and went on sick leave and came north with the command to Jacksonville, and was ordered up to Fortress Monroe.

Q. How long did you stay at Fortress Monroe?

A. I arrived on the 10th of August; left there on the 19th, came to New York City, since which day I have been there. I arrived there on the 20th of August. Since then I have been in charge of all the sick soldiers that have been received in New York City and vicinity.

Q. And you are still on that duty?

A. I am still on that duty.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us whether you had anything to do with the selection of Miami as a camp site?

A. No, sir.

Q. It was there before you heard anything about it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your judgment, what sort of a camp site have you found it to be? If it proved unsatisfactory, what were the reasons which induced its abandonment? Please tell us in your own way.

A. There were a number of reasons that made it an unsatisfactory camp site. In the first place, there had not been sufficient notification in advance to prepare the camp. There was only a small space there at Miami available for a camp that had been previously broken, and in order to prepare a camp for this whole division, consisting of some 7,000 men, it was necessary to clear a large tract of land, which was mostly covered with very thick undergrowth, and it is notorious that such clearing in a southern clime, in the summer season, is apt to develop malarial troubles, and it is against the laws of the State of Florida to clear ground between May and November; so, excepting the small tract of land in which the town itself is situated and along the land of the hotel, there was not enough ground cleared to locate the troops.

Q. How much ground was cleared before the occupation by troops, and how long was such ground occupied by them?

A. I can hardly tell you exactly how much; there were six regiments there; all the ground for the troops was freshly cleared.

Q. And how long?

A. We arrived there in the latter part of July, one regiment at a time; so I can not mention any particular date we got there. We arrived there in the latter part of July, and left there on the 7th of August.

Q. By whom was this ground cleared, by troops or by laborers employed?

A. By laborers, under the direction of an employee of Mr. Flagler; it was done at his expense.

Q. Were the troops called upon at all to clear the ground for occupation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You established a division hospital there, I understand?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who had charge of it; yourself?

A. I was then chief surgeon of the division; Major Viras had charge of it.

Q. You had occasion to inspect that hospital sufficiently to be perfectly familiar with the conditions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state whether that hospital was fully provided with medical men, nurses, and supplies?

A. It was fully provided with medical men. When we arrived there, there were four acting assistant surgeons. Major Viras, surgeon of the First Texas Volunteers, was a man standing high in the profession, and on that account I selected him to succeed me in the hospital. He was a most excellent surgeon, of experience and ability. The assistant to him was a lieutenant of the regular service.

Q. The personnel, so far as you know, was six medical men?

A. Yes, sir; six medical men.

Q. How many nurses, speaking generally?

A. The number of nurses varied. At Mobile—

Q. I am speaking of Miami.

A. At Mobile I selected nurses and generally got them from the ambulance company which was established there, but on the way down to Miami this ambulance

company was removed from the division and sent to Tampa to go with some of the troops embarking from Tampa, so that when the division came to Miami we had only such nurses as had been in the hospital there, which, at the time, were quite sufficient, because the most serious cases were left at Mobile in the marine hospital. There were left also at Mobile a number of measles cases, but so many cases of that disease prevailed when we got to Miami, and they were in such a mild form, that I did not adopt any stringent efforts to prevent it. They were mild and not serious cases, and I think we had at times from 70 to 80 cases of measles.

Q. How many nurses were there in the hospitals, or, to put it perhaps better, how many sick were there under the care of a single nurse?

A. There was one nurse to each tent. Each tent held from six to eight, sometimes one or two more, but each hospital tent had a nurse—a day and a night nurse.

Q. Was a single nurse by day and one by night sufficient, in your opinion, to take care of the men in that tent?

A. Yes, sir. When they required others, a number of men employed on other duties assisted.

Q. Was the nursing force sufficiently strong, in your judgment, at any and all times?

A. Yes, sir; for the disease we had to cope with; there were no serious cases there.

Q. Now, as respects the hospital supplies?

A. The hospital supplies were at a large storehouse.

Q. At the hospital were the men in tents and under shelter at all times?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. The tents were floored?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was the hospital properly supplied as to the hospital utensils, with bedpans, thermometers for the use of officers, hypodermic syringes, etc.

A. Yes, sir. Sometimes there was a shortage of thermometers. We got an unusual number, so much that I frequently called the attention of the surgeon to their not using too many.

Q. Was the hospital properly supplied with medicines?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of all necessary kinds?

A. Yes, sir; of all necessary kinds.

Q. Was there at any time a shortage?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were you ever lacking in quinine?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were you ever lacking in morphine?

A. No, sir.

Q. In calomel?

A. Sometimes we had a very short supply, but then I bought it at the drug store.

Q. Of strychnine?

A. I don't remember any shortage in strychnine.

Q. Do I understand you, Doctor, that you had a supply depot at Miami?

A. We had a storehouse that belonged to the hospital. We made requisitions for six months' supplies.

Q. Were they filled?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Promptly?

A. It was filled before we left Mobile.

Q. Before you left Mobile—you took all the supplies with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there, so far as you know, at Mobile any cases of neglect on the part of either the doctors or nurses?

A. A few cases of neglect. There was one case—a nurse who got drunk, but of course he was tried for it afterwards. Charges were preferred against him, and he was tried.

Q. Was proper care shown to the sick?

A. Yes, sir. We issued orders for them to be sent right into the hospital.

Q. From the beginning?

A. Not from the beginning, because I had to have the ground floored where the hospital was.

Q. As soon as you began to have the hospital floored?

A. When patients got sick on the way down, we got them into tents before the hospital was occupied.

Q. How long was it before such system was in working order?

A. Two weeks.

Q. And your whole stay was only about 7 weeks?

A. From June 26 to August 7.

Q. I asked this question because it was stated July 25 to August 7 and two-thirds of the time you had ordered such assistance?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You found that satisfactory in every way?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there not typhoid fever at Miami?

A. There were several cases of typhoid; on the way to Miami and afterwards, I think, we had something like 40 cases.

Q. Were those cases isolated?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were they isolated in the hospital?

A. We had what we called a typhoid ward, and as soon as it was possible to decide they were typhoid cases they were moved there, but it was hard to distinguish between the low malarial fevers and the typhoid.

Q. As soon as the distinction was found, separation of typhoids was made?

A. Yes, sir; the cases that were indistinct I directed that diagnoses be made after the expiration of a few days. It was absolutely impossible to distinguish them at all times.

Q. Was the hospital so supplied with medical stores as would enable the officer in charge to have the men properly fed?

A. Yes, sir; at all times.

Q. At all times and in all respects?

A. In all respects; the chief cook was an excellent cook, selected especially for the purpose.

Q. Were you able to supply your typhoid-fever patients with such diet as was necessary—milk, etc.?

A. I got milk from St. Augustine in a refrigerator car at 87 cents a gallon. I ordered it from time to time. At one time we had a shortage in cots. A great number of the men bought cots.

Q. The men in this hospital then, were they supplied with the proper diet—not only quantities—such as was proper for them in their condition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. No shortage of milk?

A. Yes, sir; there would be occasionally, but not sufficient to make them suffer.

Q. Was the hospital left for forty-eight hours without a supply of milk?

A. No, sir; I am sure it was not. It was not left entirely, because we got some from the neighborhood. It was never left twenty-four hours without milk.

Q. It is not a very easy thing to get milk in southern countries?

A. It is very difficult.

Q. How was it in respect to ice?

A. The ice, in the first place, was secured from an ice plant there, but we could not get it in sufficient quantities, so it was brought down from the lake.

Q. Did you have all the ice that was needed for the sick?

A. We got 2,000 pounds a day.

Q. The average number of typhoid-fever patients being?

A. The average number of typhoid-fever cases was 80, without counting the measles cases.

Q. Did you, or did you not, regard Miami as a proper site for a camp?

A. I did not. It was a disagreeable and uncomfortable camp site.

Q. Was it ever officially stated to you or did you in any way learn why Miami was selected as a camp?

A. I understand that Colonel Greenleaf inspected it and approved of it.

Q. How was it as respects the water supply?

A. At first we received the same water that was furnished the town of Miami and I was given two analyses of this water, one made by Professor Chandler, of Columbia, and one by the University of Pennsylvania, which showed that there was a considerable quantity of vegetable and organic matter, but nothing positively objectionable to it; but we found a very good spring on the outskirts of the camp, and as soon as possible water pipes were connected with this spring and a pump erected, and a tank, but it took a long time to do this, as everything had to be sent there. All of this work was done by Mr. Flagler's employees and at his expense. We had no regular quartermasters in the whole camp. They were all volunteers, and none of them seemed to know anything about putting up water pipes and tanks, and I more or less superintended this and directed that the camp be connected with the water, but it was not until the 25th of July that I could report to the division commander that the water could be got at this spring.

Q. Did you, as chief surgeon, yourself observe or, as general surgeon, ever have it officially reported to you that the water supply was insufficient and not good?

A. Yes, sir; frequently that it was insufficient because there was not sufficient pipes on the ground for the different camps, but there was always plenty of water, but not convenient to the camp.

Q. Was the water hauled at all to the camps in barrels?

A. It was not; no, sir; there were pipes leading to each camp.

Q. Before these pipes were laid how were the camps supplied with water?

A. There were pipes there before the troops arrived.

Q. Well, why, then, do you state that the quantity was insufficient: because the men had to go from one regimental camp to another?

A. Because the supply in the pipe was not large enough. It was located at the head of the hill and ran into the different camps some distance away.

Q. Was that the fault of the pipe?

A. No, sir; but the distance the water had to travel. I have a copy here of an analysis made of the different waters at Miami. It is the copy made in Washington. [This analysis was ordered filed as part of the testimony.]

Q. These analyses were made by whom?

A. Dr. W. N. Mew, in the Surgeon-General's Office.

Q. Was your attention at any time, officially or otherwise, called to cases of neglect and ill treatment of patients in that hospital?

A. Yes, sir; there were a number of complaints.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state their character? And if you know of any one specific case, please state specifically.

A. There were a number of minor complaints brought to my attention and made

to General Piper, who was in command of the division, particularly by General Gordon, who commanded the Second Brigade. I investigated personally every complaint that he made about minor matters, and the last time that the General made a complaint against the hospital General Piper sent for me and mentioned that General Gordon had another complaint to make about the hospital. I then stated that I had then investigated every complaint he had made about the hospital and found them all sensational, most of them without any foundation whatever.

Q. Do you remember any specific case?

A. There was one complaint made, and it was on this occasion, that a nurse with a patient sick in bed, the patient having asked the nurse to give him some water, that the nurse had replied, "I will give you a club." Major Arsenard, surgeon of the Second Louisiana, was in an adjoining camp, and he reported the matter. I called on Major Arsenard, and he then informed me that he had overheard this remark and he had at once gone in there. He was visiting a patient of the Second Louisiana at the time. He said, "I asked what it meant," and that they both told him they were friends; it was only a joke; but he had in the meanwhile reported this to the general of his brigade. I interrogated the men and learned that it was simply a matter of a joke and no harm was intended in the matter.

Q. Was there an agent of the Red Cross Association at Miami?

A. Yes, sir; Dr. Kent.

Q. Did he call your attention to cases of neglect?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Did he make any complaints to you of neglect?

A. No, sir. I did ask Dr. Kent whether he could furnish any trained nurses; that I should prefer to have the typhoid cases treated by trained nurses, as most of the nurses I had were recently transferred from the volunteer regiments, and he agreed to furnish me a number of Red Cross nurses.

Q. Did he do so?

A. I received a telegram shortly afterwards from Lieutenant-Colonel Maus, chief surgeon of the corps at Jacksonville, dated July 27, 1898, reading as follows: "Have you authorized employment of Red Cross nurses in the First Division hospital, Seventh Corps? If so, countermand the order."

Q. To what extent was that hospital in Miami furnished with supplies, bedding, clothing for the men, medicines, and to what extent was that hospital supplied by the Red Cross Association, in which Dr. Kent was the representative?

A. Nothing that I know of. The National Relief man sent a large supply—Dr. —, an agent of theirs, was there a few days. After we had arrived there he asked if we could give him a list of anything outside of the regular supplies that he could furnish, and I gave him a list, such as pajamas, toothbrushes, etc., and things of that nature that the men were apt to lose and could not get supplied.

Q. The patients in that hospital were properly supplied with clothing as well as medical attendance?

A. There was always a surplus.

Q. Did you find it advisable to use, or did you use, or did you have to use in the hospital sheets and pillowcases?

A. I did not at first—I never heard of such in a field hospital. During the two months we were at Mobile we did not use them—I went with the Eleventh Infantry. There were 25 sick. The other men marched to the train, but they were supplied with their own clothes and blankets. This division was expecting to go in the field, to go across to Cuba every day, so I did not ask for sheets and pillowcases; I never had used them in a field hospital of twenty years' experience.

Q. Were they at the hospital sooner or later?

A. Yes, sir; there were complaints that the men did not have sheets and pillowcases.

Q. Were such articles furnished by the Medical Department or by the relief society?

A. Some of them may have been furnished by the National Relief Commission, but none by the Red Cross; but I know that the Medical Department supplied some; there may have been a shortage. We expected only to supply cots for 200 beds and we had as many as 340 in the hospital.

Q. Was there any considerable number of men lying on the ground or on the floors of tents?

A. We had at one time a large number of patients and men that were convalescent that I thought could not go on duty for awhile. I advised Dr. Viras to have them lie in some of the tents unoccupied, but which were floored, with the same bedding, in addition to the floor raised from the ground; but these were only the convalescent, not the sick.

Q. Was every proper care exercised in the policing of that hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It was clean, as you observed it?

A. Yes, sir; and I frequently in my inspection asked other officers to come with me.

Q. Did you or did you not have occasion to make requisitions for extra medical supplies while you were there?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. Of course those requisitions were made through you; were they in all cases approved by you?

A. All requisitions were approved by me excepting some proprietary medicines. I remember a great many, such as Ducrot's Elixir, and several other proprietary medicines.

Q. But all requisitions, all the requisitions on the supply schedule of the Army—were all such requisitions approved in full amounts by you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were the supplies received in due time?

A. Yes, sir; the requisitions, if urgent, were always made by telegraph and supplies sent forward by express.

Q. From where?

A. From St. Louis.

Q. Did you have occasion to draw on the supplies at Tampa at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Not at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. During the time you were in Jacksonville were you on duty?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you left Jacksonville you came north to New York?

A. To Fortress Monroe.

Q. Were you on duty there?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then you came to New York?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are we to understand that since you have been in New York City you have had the supervision and responsibility of the sick in New York City?

A. Yes, sir; the duty I was assigned there was the distribution and supervision of the enlisted men sick in the hospitals of the city and the vicinity.

Q. So far as you are aware, what were the reasons to induce the Government to send its sick to hospitals in and about New York City?

A. They first sent them to the military hospitals to which I distributed them until they were filled—Fort Wadsworth, Fort Hamilton, and Governors Island—

and there were so many to be disposed of that the surplus from Montauk—convalescents where they had not room for others—that they sent them to New York City and some to Philadelphia and some to Boston.

Q. It was simply, was it or was it not, on account of the want of proper or sufficient hospital facilities on the part of the Government?

A. Yes, sir; a temporary one, as I understand it. I was sent there after they had started to come to New York City from Montauk, and some of them had arrived there before I did and were distributed in the hospitals.

Q. Did you yourself see the men that arrived or were you simply informed that so many men were coming in?

A. I made it a point to personally receive every transport and every hospital train that arrived in New York City, and distributed the sick.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the sick that came in over the Long Island Railroad? Did you see any considerable proportion of these sick as they came into Long Island City?

A. Yes, sir; I saw every one of them.

Q. There has been very great complaint as to the character of men, that is to say, it has been stated that a large number of men were brought into New York City suffering from typhoid fever in the second or third week, possibly some in the fourth week, stages of that disease; men who were unfit for travel and who were rendered worse by reason of such travel. Do you know anything about this?

A. There were a large number of very sick men who came from Montauk when they were breaking up the camp.

Q. Did they come by rail or by water?

A. Both.

Q. Which, in your judgment, was the preferable way to send them?

A. I prefer to have them come by water, as I always took them off the train at Long Island City on to a boat to distribute them to the hospital. You could take them to the pier in the river nearest the hospitals, and that move was saved by bringing them on the boat.

Q. Do you or do you not know whether it was a necessity to send these men away from Montauk at the time they were sent?

A. I think it was much better for the men. They received better care in well-established hospitals than they could have in the bleak, temporary hospitals at Montauk.

Q. The advantages that would have been secured by putting them in properly well-organized hospitals, did they counterbalance the disadvantages made necessary by the removal of the sick men?

A. Very largely counterbalanced.

Q. In the majority of cases the advantages more than counterbalanced the disadvantages?

A. Yes, sir; not only in the majority of cases—I would say in all except two or three, who got sick after they started.

Q. Did you see any cases that were moribund at the time they came under your observation?

A. Hardly moribund; some of them were unconscious and delirious.

Q. Was it or was it not, in your opinion, good judgment to send delirious typhoid patients away to hospitals to which they were taken which were even better than the one from which they were taken?

A. I can not think that it was not good judgment. I believe it was good judgment to send them where they would be better nursed and cared for.

Q. Notwithstanding the manifest risks of moving an individual under those circumstances?

A. The moving was done with so little inconvenience. They were brought down on the cots lying in the hospitals, never being taken off the cots.

Q. But were not these men subjected to the jarring of the train and the swingings of the boat?

A. I do not think that was a serious objection.

Q. Was your attention officially called to the fact that men were found wandering about the streets of New York in a serious ill condition?

A. Yes, sir; I think that can be readily explained by the fact that most of the cases had relapses after they were convalescent. A number of cases that I furloughed were taken sick at the station, and I made it a rule not to furlough a man who was not sufficiently well to come to my office to get his transportation with a certificate from the doctor at the hospital that he was able to travel.

Q. Is it an unusual thing for these changes to take place in typhoid cases?

A. A relapse? It was the rule among these cases.

Q. Were these men in all cases supplied with a descriptive list indicating name, rank, and company, and nature of disease?

A. In all cases. I brought here specimens of the descriptive list showing the way in which I kept a record [see Exhibit C] of those I sent away, on showing the disposition made of those cases.

EXHIBIT C—Descriptive list.

Haring, Robt. E., Pvt., Co. E, 11th Inf. Arrived from Porto Rico on *Relief* Aug. 20th, 1898. Received at L. I. College Hosp. Aug. 20th.

Diagnosis: Typhoid fever.

Disposition: F. Sept. 17th, 1898, 30 days; Johnstown, N. Y., 65 E. Main st.

[Descriptive list sent to regt. adjt., Milwaukee, Wis., Oct. 20th, 1898.]

Gokey, Jess, Pvt., Co. B, 2nd Wis. Arrived from Porto Rico on *Relief* Aug. 20th. Received at L. I. College Hosp. Aug. 20th.

Diagnosis: Malarial fever.

Disposition: F. Sept. 8th, 1898, 30 days; Oshkosh, Wis., 142 Main st.

Q. I am speaking now of the men that you received, not those that you sent away.

A. When the descriptive lists were received they were noted on the cards.

Q. The point is this, Doctor, that it has been said that a great many men came down with either no transfer slip, no diagnosis card, or a diagnosis which proved to be erroneous. Do you know anything about it?

A. At first there were men brought down on the steamer *Shinnecock* without any lists.

Q. Was it either in accordance with the regulations or was it to the best interests of the men that they should be sent away without any notification of what had been supposed to be the matter with them or what had been done for them?

A. The regulations required a transfer slip with an outline of the history of the case.

Q. Was any reason ever given to you, officially or personally, why men were sent away from the Montauk hospital without these notifications?

A. I never asked for an explanation.

Q. It never was given you?

A. No, sir.

Q. You have already stated that it was in accordance with the regulations, and therefore you must necessarily see that it should have been furnished.

A. I assumed they had been delayed, because the *Shinnecock* brought down between 300 and 400 patients at a time every other day.

Q. Was there not time enough between the several trips of this vessel to find out who was to go, and see that every individual was properly prepared for the trip?

A. I was never at Montauk, so I can not tell you.

Q. Was the distribution of patients made at the New York hospitals, or was it made in accordance with instructions from Washington—the Surgeon-General's Office—or was it made by yourself, acting upon your best judgment?

A. I never received any instructions; I received from each hospital the reports of the number of vacant beds, how many they could accommodate, and made it a point to place the patients at the most convenient places desirable.

Q. Were offers of hospital beds made which were declined by you?

A. There were quite a number of offers made that I did not avail myself of, because I always had more room than we had patients. We never were short of beds. I received a number of offers for hospital beds, but there was such a large number that I could not use them, as I did not have enough patients.

Q. And the selections were made by yourself, according to your own best judgment?

A. Yes, sir; according to my own best judgment. In fact, I was told I would not be interfered with, as I was on the ground.

Q. Did you have occasion to officially report either to the chief surgeon at Montauk or to the Surgeon-General's Office that men were sent to New York not fit to travel?

A. I never made any official report on it.

Q. Although you have already answered the question in a large measure, I would like to ask the question if you saw any men, in your judgment, that should have been kept in Montauk who were sent away; the patients that I speak of, who were delirious and unconscious?

A. I do not think so. I do not know what the conditions were at the other end.

Q. Were the men in the several hospitals in charge of Government physicians?

A. No, sir; under the charge of the hospitals' own physicians.

Q. Were these men properly cared for at the hospitals?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were these hospitals properly supplied with doctors, nurses, and with food supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It has been said that men were badly fed and illy cared for, especially at Fort Wadsworth; do you know anything about the condition of affairs there?

A. Yes, sir; I went in the hospitals there and the men were perfectly satisfied and well cared for.

Q. Did you have any complaints of the men that were at Bellevue?

A. Yes, sir: from the visiting ladies, that these men were being cruelly treated. One case especially I remember, in which a prominent lady of New York came and gave me the names of two men who were in a certain ward at Bellevue, and said that they were being cruelly treated: that the nurse had struck one, and she was very anxious to get them away. She left their address. I looked up the men's cards and went to the hospital, and, after speaking to one or two in the hospital, I went up to these two men and asked them how they were. They were in the Sturgis pavilion of the Bellevue Hospital. I told the men that if they wished it, I would have them moved over to the Roosevelt Hospital, but they both begged and prayed with me to let them stay where they were. The father of one of them—they both came from Michigan—came down to my office the next day and added his entreaties that his son might be left to stay where he was until ready to go home: that he was perfectly satisfied there and got everything he wanted.

Colonel SEXTON. What was the name of that prominent lady in New York? We might have had her as a witness.

General BEAVER. I don't think she was a witness.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You can give me her name, can't you?

A. If you wish it; the name is Mrs. Arnold.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know whether or not any public notice was taken of this neglect and abuse of sick soldiers in Bellevue Hospital?

A. Public notice?

Q. Yes, sir; we had a great many public notices—newspapers and others—of the neglect at Montauk and at various Government hospitals. I would like to ask you if these cases of alleged neglect in Bellevue were called attention to publicly, as far as you know?

A. These cases that I just spoke of were made public.

Q. It was published?

A. Yes, sir; at the time. A newspaper reporter was in my office when this lady came in and spoke of it.

Q. Of the neglect in Bellevue?

A. Yes, sir; the alleged neglect.

Q. Now, as respects the Government hospitals. Are we to understand that all three of these New York hospitals were properly organized, administered, and properly cared for?

A. Yes, sir; there were four hospitals.

Q. I only remember three. What was the name of the fourth?

A. Bedloe Island.

Q. Now, General Dodge requests me to ask, and I ask you, whether you knew those delirious patients, and if you knew anything of their condition when they left Montauk?

A. Simply knew the history of the case. Some of the cases I got transfer slips of later.

Q. Later; not at the time?

A. I mean later in the month. The patients that came later, those that came later, not until September, later in the month.

Q. Were you able at all times with these delirious patients to satisfy your own mind that they were not delirious, but were apparently in a condition to have left Montauk without any danger?

A. I never inquired into that. My duty with the men was that I distributed them to the hospitals. I was met at the different docks by the ambulances of the hospitals and turned the patients over to the doctors and they took them to the hospitals and cared for them.

Q. You had no occasion yourself to verify the diagnoses?

A. I had neither time nor opportunity, and I could not do so.

Q. Do you know whether your attention was officially called to the fact that in a large number of cases the stated diagnosis was an erroneous one, determined to be such after their arrival at the New York or Brooklyn hospitals?

A. A large number of cases were diagnosed as malarial which turned out to be typhoid, but most of the cases had both.

Q. Have you ever known of an error being made in a case of any of these soldiers sent to hospitals in New York or Brooklyn?

A. An error may have been made. Many of the patients in the hospitals were under the supervision of some of the most prominent men in New York City at the time.

Q. Then it is not altogether owing to the want of intelligence or observation that errors in diagnoses were made in Montauk?

A. Certainly not in those cases.

Q. As respects the sending of men away from New York City to their homes, North, South, East, West; did you have charge of that?

A. I had entire charge of it, except from the Government hospitals, from which they were to be sent by the post surgeons.

Q. What provisions were made for their transportation?

A. When they came with their certificate from the surgeons of the hospitals

that they were able to travel, if I considered they were cases for furlough, they had to come to me to get their furloughs, when they were given transportation and one dollar and a half a day travel rations.

Q. Was that done in all cases?

A. Not in all cases; some cases were sent to regiments; some cases belonged to regiments which were mustered out of the service; these were simply ordered there and given transportation.

Q. Were any men who looked sick sent long distances by rail on furlough without sleeping-car accommodations?

A. To every man that looked sick I would give a sleeping-car accommodation. A number of men came from the hospitals that looked to me too sick to take long trips, and those I sent to a military hospital to rest before they were fit to travel.

Q. Do you know of any instance of sick men being sent away from New York City, able to sit up, when sent a long journey without being furnished with sleeping-car accommodations?

A. Frequently.

Q. I mean men who were sick, not so sick that they could not sit up, but too sick to stay up for a period of thirty hours.

A. All cases that came to me from the hospitals I would give sleeping-car accommodations to if they were fever cases; of course if they were surgical cases they would all get sleeping-car accommodations.

Q. Do you know of any case in which a man was sent as far west as Chicago who was so sick that he could not sit up and not provided with sleeping-car accommodations?

A. Not from New York City.

Q. Were any sent away from New York that you were not familiar with?

A. There were quite a number of men who received furloughs at Montauk who would come to New York and who might have relapses.

Q. So that men who have been cared for either at Montauk or other points outside of New York City, or the hospitals of New York City, might travel when unfit to do so, and that without sleeping-car accommodations?

A. There may have been, sir—men who had a relapse after they left on furlough, and who stayed in New York to visit their friends.

Q. Were the hospital trains, as you observed them, properly equipped, properly officered, properly supplied with nurses, and the patients properly cared for?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Could any medical foresight or knowledge have foreseen that these men who had relapses were unfit to receive a furlough?

A. Of course, that is a matter of judgment.

Q. Could any medical foresight determine that an individual, apparently at this moment fit to travel, will in the course of so many hours have a relapse?

A. No, sir; it is impossible. Some may have two, three, or more relapses.

Q. Do you know of any complaint having been made in regard to the care of men on these hospital trains?

A. No, sir; not on the hospital trains—the real hospital trains.

Q. Did any men come under your direct observation who had been brought north on so-called State hospital trains?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us in what condition you found the men, and particularly, if you remember it, refer to the case of a New York train on which a Dr. Lindheim was surgeon?

A. I received that train on the New York Central Railroad, and I congratulated Dr. Lindheim on the care he had taken of the patients and as to the condition of

them when they arrived. There were a number of complaints made and telegrams came relating to the poor condition of the soldiers, so I was particularly careful to go there to meet the train and observe the condition of his men. I congratulated him upon the excellent care he had taken of them on the way.

Q. There was no evidence, then, that he had neglected his business?

A. No, sir; I think that there was much credit due him.

Q. In respect to any other State trains, did you see the New Haven train which came through?

A. I did not see any train that went through. I received the Eighth New York and all the trains that came into New York; none that went through.

Q. Did you find on any one of those trains evidence of neglect?

A. No, sir.

Q. Looking over the report of Dr. Kent, he refers to the water being unpalatable; he did not like the taste. "For God's sake please remedy it if you can." Is that true? "It was very uncomfortable and disagreeable; the condition is pitiable." What have you to say in regard to this?

A. No; I would not call it pure in any sense. Over 10 per cent of the force I had before I left were sick. There were at one time over 1,000 on the sick report, but they were chiefly measles cases or very slight ailments. The camp itself was so enervating that very slight cause would make the men sick. I remember at one time investigating the cause of the sickness in the First Texas—the First Texas I considered the best volunteer regiment I have seen in the service—and the surgeons of that regiment were particularly efficient and careful, and I found that several hundred of the men had had an attack of cuecarisa, a slight fever, and in two or three days they were well, but there is no question about the fact that the camp was so debilitating that the response of the system to any slight ailments was much encumbered.

Q. In your judgment as a medical officer of long experience and as a physician, is it wise to encamp men in Florida during the summer anywhere?

A. Decidedly not.

Q. In this connection reference is made to mosquitoes. Were you supplied with mosquito bars in the hospitals?

A. For the first three weeks there were no mosquitoes, then the pests came on suddenly, when I bought mosquito nets and fastened them in the tents, but the men had none and they suffered a great deal—the men in the camp, I mean.

Q. Was it practicable to use mosquito bars in the hospitals in Florida in the summer to any large extent?

A. Not to any large extent; it was too warm. There was so little breeze that you wanted to get all you could. There were no flies for the first few weeks, and there were no mosquitoes.

Q. You have spoken of the First Texas, I think?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the condition of the Second Texas?

A. The Second Texas had more sickness than any other regiment in the camp.

Q. Do you know any reason for that?

A. No; I was unable to ascertain the reason. I telegraphed Dr. Porter, the State health officer, and the doctor who was in charge of the marine hospital in that section to come and assist—to do what they could.

Q. Were the cases serious or light?

A. The cases were very light. At the time we were in the camp there the newspapers reported that the men were dying by scores every day.

Q. There were 12 deaths?

A. Twelve deaths in a camp of 7,000 men. Of those 6 were typhoid cases who were sick when they came there; two of them (surgeons) committed suicide, and 3

died of dysentery. Those were all the deaths reported in the camp. In the month of July, in lower Florida, I consider that the results in that respect were very excellent. There were complaints about the site of the division hospital, but the hospital attendants themselves, the men living in the hospitals—the stewards—hardly any of them were sick—in fact, I considered it the best site in the whole of the town, and the percentage of deaths was very small.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you ever have called to your attention while you had charge of the hospitals in New York City a statement that 30 of our furloughed men were picked up in New York by different societies or surgeons there and placed in the hospitals? I have a statement from a Dr. Galealend, who had charge of the Woman's National Relief Association. It was testified to before us in New York by Dr. Stimson.

A. These men were picked up—there were a large number of men picked up—these were the cases I just spoke of, men in the hospitals who stayed there, and men who would come down to my office and whom I would send to one of the Government hospitals and who would have a relapse—it was the rule.

Q. There was a serious charge made against the furloughing of men at Montauk before they were ready to travel and that as a consequence the statement was made that these men were picked up on the streets of New York City, lying there, being ill with typhoid fever.

A. There were cases of relapses; in fact, a great many men were sent to me for furloughs who after they received their furloughs had a relapse.

Q. Would you consider the fact that these men who were picked up in New York City after they had been furloughed as evidence of neglect or of improper furloughing at Montauk?

A. No, sir; decidedly not. I think it was unavoidable under the circumstances.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. What percentage of the men who were furloughed after having typhoid fever had these relapses?

A. It is impossible for me to say, because I could not follow up all the men who were furloughed.

Q. About how much? Was it a large per cent or small?

A. A large per cent of men had relapses, but a great many were not furloughed.

Q. I say after men who had typhoid fever were furloughed, what percentage of those men had relapses?

A. I do not understand.

General DODGE. Not particularly typhoid-fever patients, but those who had malaria.

A. There are men now still in the hospitals who came there in July and in August and who have suffered relapses.

Q. The charge, Doctor, is made that men were furloughed that ought not to have been—you state that many of them when they received their furloughs were in proper condition to travel, but had relapses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If the larger per cent had relapses, you would not have been so willing to act? Many of these men certainly traveled and were all right?

A. Many of them did not have relapses, and many of them had relapses before they got their furloughs.

Q. After they recovered, then, from their relapse they went on furlough?

A. Yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know whether or not the Red Cross Society supplied all the milk and all the ice used in hospitals at Montauk when you were there?

A. No, sir; we were getting ice before Dr. Kent arrived.

Q. Were you supplied with bedpans in sufficient number for your hospital?

A. There were plenty in the storeroom.

Q. With ice bags and water bags?

A. I do not think we had much use for water bags.

Q. Do you know anything of the case of one Charles Barrow, of Company N, in a Louisiana regiment, either of the First or Second Louisiana regiment?

A. There were a great many complaints from that regiment—both Louisiana regiments had no regular officers.

Q. The man was so seriously ill with typhoid fever, bed sores, etc. That was not likely to occur with malarial fever?

A. Somewhat in those low malarial fevers.

Q. It was an infrequent occurrence, was it not?

A. Yes, sir; decidedly.

Q. Do you know anything about this case? And further I would say to you that it is reported that the doctor attempted to give him morphine with a broken needle. Was any such case brought to your notice?

A. No, sir. Was this at Jacksonville?

Q. It was at Miami. I understand in Colonel Maus's testimony he stated that the division that had been at Miami had less sickness than the others. You know nothing about this case anyhow, do you?

A. No, sir.

Q. I will ask you if you think that it was advisable if this statement is correct?

A. I have circulars here that I sent out to the different hospitals showing my position in the matter:

“ARMY BUILDING,
“New York City, ———, 1898.

“To the Superintendent ——— Hospital.

“DEAR SIR: Inclosed please find blanks on which accounts for medical services rendered sick and wounded soldiers are to be prepared in duplicate.

“The account must show each case separately; that is, the full name, rank, and regiment of the soldier, the time during which he was treated, the number of days, the disease, the charge per day or week (not to exceed \$1 per day), and the total amount. They must be certified by the proper officer of the hospital and then sent to this office.

“Very respectfully,

—————,
“Major and Surgeon, U. S. A.”

“ARMY BUILDING,
“New York City, October 8, 1898.

“To the Superintendent ——— Hospital.

“SIR: I have been instructed to allow no more soldiers now in the hospitals in New York City and vicinity to go to convalescent homes.

“Please direct all those under treatment in your hospital to report to me when they are able to travel, and send them a notification of their discharge and the diagnosis.

“Very respectfully,

—————,
“Major and Surgeon, U. S. Army.”

“ARMY BUILDING,
“New York City, November 14, 1898.

“The Superintendent, ——— Hospital.

“SIR: I have been directed by the Surgeon-General to procure copies of all records, including temperature charts, of all soldiers treated in civil hospitals. Authority is given me to pay for same at the rate of 10 cents per cap page.

“Please have such copies made of all records of those treated in your hospital.

“Very respectfully,

—————,
“Major and Surgeon, U. S. Army.”

Q. Did you have anything to do with the men that came up on the transports from Santiago?

A. Yes, sir; those who arrived in New York City since August 20.

Q. Since August 20; that included the *Seneca*, which arrived at Montauk?

A. That boat arrived before I was in charge.

Q. What transports came to New York after you had charge of the reception of the sick, do you remember?

A. Quite a large number—the *Minnewaska*, the *Mississippi*, the *Obdam*, the *Portland*, and *Michigan*.

Q. Were you in charge of the office at the time the *Obdam* came up, when Dr. Seaman was in charge of it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us what you know about that?

A. Why, I went out to the ship after it arrived at quarantine, and most of the men seemed to be doing nicely and were well satisfied with the treatment they had received.

Q. Was there any evidence that there had been suffering on the part of the men in consequence of the want of proper food and medicine?

A. I believe there was no complaint made until at that time; the only complaint was from Dr. Seaman, who said that he had to get his supplies from the Red Cross and the National Relief Association; that they got none from the Government. But I believe he explained that since by saying that what he did receive was from the hospital ship *Relief*, and he thought that the *Relief* belonged to the National Relief Association.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did he make that plain to you at that time?

A. Yes, sir; he had an interview which was held at my office, in the room adjoining mine.

Q. Did you hear that interview?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How correctly was that report in the papers?

A. I have heard him make the same remarks that were reported, as I stated in a letter to the Surgeon-General after the interview was held in my presence.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. And the newspaper men reported it about as given?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was he sober?

A. I think so. He came up again this week with his regiment, and he had no complaint to make, he said.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Was he in good mental balance at that time—did you consider him such, or was he laboring under undue excitement?

A. I think he was rather nervous. I don't think he was quite right. He naturally was of a nervous temperament. He had been worried more or less and had not been well. I don't think he intended to make a deliberate misstatement.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. We have heard, Doctor, a case of an alleged receipt given by Dr. Seaman to Dr. Bradley, brigade surgeon, for certain articles of hospitals. Will you kindly look at it and see if it is the copy of the one which you know to be official?

A. Yes, sir. This was signed by Dr. Bradley himself. All such papers were sent to my office, because I am looked upon as being in charge.

Q. That is a correct copy, so far as you know?

A. As far as I remember; I immediately sent it to the Surgeon-General.

Q. Have you anything to do with the transferring of men from Montauk who arrived in New York—the men on furlough?

A. Not the men on furlough. Men who came down on the steamer *Shinnecock* and the hospital train, I transferred those men.

Q. Were those transports, as you observed them, properly supplied with goods and medicines necessary for the care of the sick?

A. I had very few complaints; in fact, as a rule, the men all said that they had improved very much since they started from below. The men sent up as convalescent arrived in New York well and ready to go away. The last hospital ship, which brought 270 cases—84 were older cases—and I think of these 172 received their furloughs.

Q. Did you yourself observe anything which would lead you to think that the ships had not been properly provisioned, had not been supplied with medicines needed for the trip: that the men were not cared for by a sufficient number of medical officers, or the medical officers were sufficiently competent?

A. No, sir; nearly every transport wanted to know what to do with their surplus.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Please state as to the condition of the sick that were brought to New York in the *Shinnecock*, whether they were in condition to make the journey, and if not, what the exceptions were.

A. I think that was included in the question of transferring men from Montauk. They were so well cared for on the *Shinnecock* that I don't think the condition of the man would make any difference in his transfer. The *Shinnecock* is a boat that was especially chartered at \$1,000 a day to bring those men down—selected on account of its being so well adapted as a hospital ship. She was so for twenty-two days, I know, and the vouchers were signed for \$22,000 for that time.

The following letter from Ernest C. Schultz, dated New York, December 5, 1898, was then read and ordered filed as part of the testimony:

“Maj. D. M. APPEL, *Surgeon, U. S. Army.*

“MY DEAR SIR: My attention has been called by some remarks made by Dr. R. M. Terry, surgeon-general of the New York State National Guard, before the war investigating commission, which I think produces an erroneous impression.

“Speaking of the hospital ship *Relief* and of the relations between the distinguished surgeon, Dr. Nicholas Senn, who was on board, and the ship's staff, Dr. Terry says this eminent physician and professor of a medical college should have been consulted with reference to operations.’

“Dr. Senn was invited to all operations and consulted in all important cases. He must have known that the ship's staff was proud to have him associated with them, and frequently they applied to him for advice, which he invariably gave readily and evidently with much pleasure. The young physicians voluntarily and gladly showed him cases of interest and assisted him in compiling data and histories relating to them, not only as a matter of respect and courtesy to one so eminent, but also as a tribute to and acknowledgment of his skill.

“Dr. Terry makes the further statement, absolutely without foundation, that in one case in which Dr. Senn was not consulted an unnecessary amputation was performed. The facts are as follows: A soldier was brought on board suffering from a compound comminuted fracture of the left thigh, which had been dressed on shore. The bones seemed to be in good condition. The splint was comfortable, and the temperature, pulse, and respiration were normal. He was therefore disturbed as little as possible. The condition remained satisfactory until the morning of the third day, when fever and symptoms indicating blood poisoning were observed. By night his condition had become so much worse that the young physician held a consultation with the two senior medical officers of the ship, both surgeons, majors of the regular service, and were of large experience, at which it

was decided to remove the dressings and examine the wound at once. This was done that evening, and a mushroomed Mauser bullet, shreds of clothing, and numerous pieces of bones were removed. As the injury was so serious, the wound evidently having been infected, and there being considerable doubt as to whether, owing to the loss of bone, the fragments could be expected to unite and leave the patient with a serviceable limb, the question of amputation was carefully considered. However, as the ship was only two days from New York, the man was given the benefit of the doubt, and his limb was not amputated.

"He reached New York in good condition, and although Dr. Terry cites this case 'to show that some of the young physicians in the war did not always go about their work with intelligence,' the man's leg was saved.

"Very respectfully,

"ERNEST C. SCHULTZE,

"*Late with U. S. Hospital Ship Relief.*"

Q. Doctor, have you any knowledge of the matters referred to in this letter—personal knowledge?

A. None, personally.

Q. Do you know Dr. Schultze's signature?

A. It was delivered to me personally by him.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. As we understand from you this morning, you had charge of the disposition of the sick in New York; that is, selecting hospitals to which they were to be sent and sending them there. Is that so?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were the reasons which induced you to send men to one hospital rather than to another?

A. I was actuated principally by the facilities for reaching the hospitals, if they were all equally good. It was not my place to distinguish between them. Some were more easily reached by the river, and some could accommodate a larger number than others, requiring fewer trips to get them there; and I did not care to take these smaller hospitals when I had larger ones, as there were three or four hundred men daily to be distributed. We were paying for the *Shinnecock* \$1,000 a day.

Q. It was easier for you to send them to a few hospitals rather than scatter them through many?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you at any time send them to the overcrowded hospitals when others had vacant beds?

A. I telephoned in each case, asking how many each hospital could receive, and I never exceeded the number they sent word they could accommodate.

Q. In sending patients to the hospitals in the city of Brooklyn what hospitals were selected?

A. The principal ones most conveniently located were the Long Island Hospital and St. Peter's. I could land them under cover at Pier No. 22, which is a Government pier, and that was five blocks from the hospital. They could be landed there in fair or rainy weather, because it was covered and always available.

Q. What other hospitals did you send them to in Brooklyn?

A. Brooklyn City Hospital, St. Mary's, St. Catherine's, and St. John's; all in Brooklyn.

Q. Were there any hospitals in the city of Brooklyn to which you did not send patients?

A. There are quite a number.

Q. Do you remember the names of any of the hospitals to which you did not send patients?

A. Another one was the Senior Hospital. There was one—the Homeopathic Hospital—to which I did not send patients.

Q. Why did you not send patients there?

A. I did not care to send anyone there. Personally I would not care to send anyone I was interested in.

Q. Did the authority to select hospitals rest with you?

A. Yes, sir; I had no instructions.

Q. And acting on them, by what you deemed your good judgment, you sent them to the various ones?

A. Yes, sir. When personally requested by the parents of a man I would send some home, or to some special hospital. The superintendent who wrote to me about this Brooklyn Homeopathic Hospital was an illiterate person, as can be seen from his letter.

Q. Do you remember his name?

A. I do not recall it now. He signed himself "Dr.," but I do not remember his name. I think he was chief of the staff. I should like to add: When I was asked by certain parties why I did not send cases to a certain hospital, I answered I did not care to discuss my reasons; that they knew as well as I did.

Q. Was that man's name Simmons?

A. Yes, sir; that is his name.

Q. Did you refuse to send men to any homeopathic hospitals when requested by the patient?

A. Never. I wrote to Dr. Simmons that I would use his hospital when I was in need of beds.

Q. So far as you know you never sent a man on to an overcrowded hospital?

A. No, sir; not that I know of.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What was the price the Government paid per day for these men at the hospitals?

A. Usually \$1. At the Long Island Hospital they received seamen at 90 cents, and they gave us that price. Another charged 60 cents per day, including everything.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Do you know anything of the case of a man named Dobson?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were in New York at the time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The mother went to you and asked to have him removed from St. Peter's Hospital to the Long Island College Hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you order him to be removed?

A. I immediately telephoned to the Sister Superior asking the man's condition, and she said the man was very low, practically in a moribund condition; and I told them it would be inadvisable to change him; but she insisted on the removal, as she could not be with her boy at all hours. And he was changed.

Q. Who made the report to you that the man was in a moribund condition?

A. The Sister Superior.

Q. It is managed by a Catholic order?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And she was of that order?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have the opinion of any physician?

A. She said the house physician of that hospital said so.

Q. Do you know what was the matter with him?

A. It was diagnosed as typhoid fever.

Q. Did you allow him to be removed, knowing he would die?

A. He was so low, and his mother so insisted on it, that I telephoned to the Long Island Hospital, which was only about a block away—400 yards away—that if they could remove him by simply having two men to carry him, without putting him in a wagon, I would allow it. It was warm weather.

Q. Was he carried?

A. Yes, sir; carried on a stiff litter.

Q. He was removed from this St. Peter's Hospital the day after he got there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they would not allow the mother to stay with him the night he came or the next day at that hospital?

A. No, sir; they had some stringent rule.

Q. But is the Government bound by those rules?

A. The patients are, if admitted.

Q. You had no authority to admit the mother during the last hours of the child's life?

A. I had no authority. They offered their services to care for these men. They said the rules of their order would not permit it.

Q. Did you see Dobson before he died?

A. When he came down on the boat.

Q. Did you make any observation of him?

A. There were 300; I had no time.

Q. He was removed from the general hospital at Montauk?

A. At his mother's urgent request.

Q. Was it correct to remove him?

A. I should not have done so.

Q. Do you regard it as the duty of a physician to obey the request of anybody, contrary to his own judgment?

A. Not in all cases. Not when I thought it was a positive injury to the patient.

Q. From what you know of the Dobson case, ought he to have been sent from the general hospital at Montauk to New York?

A. From what I know it made no difference.

Q. Why?

A. Because I think he was so seriously ill he would not have recovered anyhow.

Q. He had stayed in his tent a considerable time after he was sick. He had insisted on staying there. Do you think it proper for a physician to listen to such requests from a patient or his mother?

A. I think where they had so many sick—I think the physician must accept the patient's statement.

Q. Who is to blame in this Dobson case?

A. Nobody. I think he was sick and dying. He had no immediate complication. Heart failure and general collapse were the immediate causes of death.

Q. Do you think if he had stayed at the general hospital at Montauk he would have died?

A. I do; decidedly.

Q. Then you think he was very sick before he left his own camp?

A. Yes, sir; and I think he was one of those cases where the system was so profoundly overcome by the poison of the typhoid that there was no chance for success in treating him.

Q. Why did not the doctors in camp find that out in time to do something?

A. It was impossible to always differentiate malaria from typhoid. Even in the hospitals some of the most eminent men could not decide whether a case was a low type of typhoid or malaria.

Q. Dr. Cox, in this case, diagnosed it as typhoid, but the man had been sick before that and no attention was paid to that, as he represented he wanted to go with the regiment. Dr. Cox was the regimental physician of that division.

A. I think it was his duty to send him to the hospital if he so diagnosed it.

Q. Then, wasn't it his duty to keep him there?

A. No, sir.

Q. Whose duty was it?

A. Surgeon at the general hospital.

Q. Was not it his duty to keep him there and not send him to New York?

A. Not necessarily. He might have thought that he would be better cared for in New York.

Q. Mrs. Dobson was acquainted with you?

A. Not before that.

Q. And she insisted on his being moved?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you tell her he would die?

A. I told her that if anything was done to him she must hold herself responsible; that the physician reported he was very ill and would not recover, and thought it inadvisable to move him.

Q. You made up your mind that the man was going to die anyway?

A. From what I heard; not from a personal examination.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 9, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. A. H. APPEL, SURGEON.

Maj. A. H. APPEL then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by the recorder of the commission.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. State your name, rank, service, and the stations you occupied during the late war between the United States and Spain.

A. A. H. Appel; major and surgeon, United States Army; in the service since 1878; and I went into the field with the Thirteenth Infantry from Fort Porter, from camp at Hampton Roads; was in charge of the division hospital at Tampa Heights, and when we left Tampa was placed in charge of the medical department on the *Olivette*; remained there until the close of the active operations in Cuba with the Fifth Corps at Cuba, and returned to New York with a lot of wounded on the *Olivette*; refitted there and went back again to Santiago and returned with a lot of sick from Santiago, and then was ordered to Fernandina, Fla., to bring a lot of sick, but the ship went down, and I was then ordered to Lee's Corps at Jacksonville.

Q. Where are you stationed now, Doctor?

A. Fort Hamilton, N. Y.

Q. And during the time you were in charge of the division hospital at Tampa Heights, be kind enough to tell us the condition it was in, as a hospital, as respects the personnel, the nurses, supplies on hand, and the general condition of the hospital. In a word, give us briefly and succinctly a history of that hospital. First, what time did you take charge of it?

A. I was detailed on the 4th of May—I think it was the 4th of May; I give the dates as near as I can from memory—and I proceeded to organize the hospital.

Q. And you remained in charge of it until what time?

A. As a hospital until, I think, it was the 8th of June when we started and loaded the hospital on trains for embarkation to Tampa.

Q. Tell us about the hospital during this month?

A. We left Tampa on the 15th, I think. Well, I proceeded to get what I could to establish a hospital, drawing my supplies, as far as possible, from the Quartermaster's Department and the Medical Department, and from the supplies that I had brought in going into the field, and the separate supplies of the regimental hospitals. I had all the assistance I required in the way of surgeons, and we were gradually getting enough hospital corps men—hospital privates.

Q. Please state how many medical officers there were connected with the hospital while you were in charge of it?

A. Besides myself, I had three assistants.

Q. What was the bed capacity of the hospital?

A. We started in with two tents—two hospital tents—and by the time the hospital was broken up I think there was 100 patients—I think, about.

Q. And in the beginning how many beds were in a tent?

A. Six. We had plenty of tentage.

Q. From the beginning?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were your hospital tents floored?

A. Yes, sir; almost from the beginning. I think from the very beginning.

Q. Did you have a sufficient number of cots and bedsteads to answer the requirements?

A. We did.

Q. Were you provided with the proper bedding and bed clothing for your patients?

A. Yes, sir; what I always considered proper bed clothing for the field—plenty of blankets and cots. There were some sheets and pillows. I had not been accustomed to taking that sort of stuff into the field when I went before.

Q. Were your men properly cared for by your assistants?

A. They were.

Q. In every respect?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was your force made up of men entirely, or had you female nurses?

A. No female nurses at that time.

Q. Were the male nurses competent to take care of the sick?

A. They were hospital corps men who had been drilled, and new men. They were not trained men.

Q. Were the new men, in any proportion, at all acquainted with the duties of a nurse?

A. Well, yes; I should say so; they did what they were told to do, and that is the principal duty of the nurses.

Q. Now, was the nursing properly done at night?

A. It was.

Q. How large a proportion of your patients were cases of typhoid fever?

A. I had about a dozen cases, I think.

Q. All told?

A. All told.

Q. Were you provided with the necessary food supplies for such cases?

A. I was.

Q. Were you able to have it properly cooked?

A. We had two Buzzacott ovens for field cooking, and an ice box and plenty of milk and everything.

Q. How did you get your milk and ice?

A. I bought it.

Q. Out of what fund?

A. I bought it out of funds I took along when I went out. I took a hospital fund along with me, and whenever I was out of anything at any time I just bought it and gave a voucher for it.

Q. Were all of your supplies of milk and ice obtained through the Medical Department, or were some of them obtained through the relief associations?

A. At that time all was obtained through the Medical Department.

Q. By "at that time" do you mean all the time you were there?

A. At Tampa Harbor; yes, sir.

Q. Were you supplied with medicines in sufficient quantities?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At all times?

A. At all times.

Q. Did you take them with you or get them after you got there?

A. I took quite a supply with me and got what I needed when I was down there.

Q. On requisition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From the medical supply depot there?

A. Quite a number from that depot, but there were a number of drug stores in Tampa and I never hesitated to get what I needed.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was there any Red Cross at Tampa or other relief associations during the time of which you have spoken?

A. I do not think there was any Red Cross establishment at that time.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. We are to understand that between what you got from the medical supply depot and what you bought you had what you needed?

A. Everything.

Q. Were any complaints made to you by the medical officers in charge of the wards that they had not what they wanted in the way of medicines?

A. No complaints. Occasionally I would be told we were out of such and such a thing, and I invariably told the medical officers under my charge that anything that was necessary at any time I would get, and they were responsible for it themselves if they were ever out of anything.

Q. What time were you relieved from this hospital?

A. I was relieved from the charge of the hospital about the 8th of June. I think.

Q. And you were then ordered to take charge of the *Olivette*?

A. Not directly in that way. We got an order in the middle of the night, about the 8th of June, to break camp and get on the trains. By daylight, or rather 2 o'clock, we got off from the hospital. We took along everything possible, leaving the patients, and got away on the train before daylight.

Q. How large a part of your equipment as a division hospital did you transfer to the *Olivette*?

A. I transferred everything I could take along personally.

Q. Were any patients left behind in the hospital when you left?

A. All the patients were left; I did not take any.

Q. How many patients were there at that time?

A. Speaking from memory, I should say about 100.

Q. You had a sufficient amount of equipment for a hospital for 100 men that you left behind, and in addition to that you had sufficient stores to transfer a considerable quantity to the *Olivette*. Is that it?

A. That is it.

Q. Was it intended that the *Olivette* should be a hospital ship from the beginning?

A. Oh, no; that was an afterthought.

Q. Were any troops taken on the *Olivette* at this time?

A. No, sir.

Q. She was intended, then, at that time to serve as a hospital ship?

A. No; she was designated as a hospital ship, I think, a day or two before she sailed. We went out to look over the ground to see whether any of the transports were suitable for a hospital ship. There were no troops on her. There were a lot of newspaper correspondents, and so they decided to make her a hospital ship.

Q. That was before you were relieved from duty in charge of the hospital?

A. No, sir; afterwards.

Q. How long after?

A. We went to Tampa Harbor, I think, on the 8th or 9th of June. I first went onto the *Comal* with what supplies I could hastily gather together, and from the *Comal*—I think we were on there two or three days when it was decided to use the *Olivette*.

Q. Did you transfer your supplies to the *Olivette* then?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. Did you get additional supplies at Tampa?

A. I think three or four boxes of surgical supplies and outfit came down.

Q. How much of a medical outfit had you on the *Olivette* before you sailed?

A. Well, I think I was pretty well provided; I could not tell, or at least I could not tell from memory just exactly what I had.

Q. No, Doctor, you misunderstand the question. I want to know how well provided you were. If you were to be a hospital ship, you had to have preparations for a number of patients. Speaking generally, how well were you supplied with medical stores and medical supplies of all kinds before you left Tampa?

A. Well, I do not know that I quite—for how long a time do you mean?

Q. No, no; speaking generally, what amount of medical supplies had you—and I tell you why I ask it now, it is because presently I shall ask you what you had at the end of your trip, and what you had to give away when you got back?

A. I misunderstood the question. I had left enough tentage and field equipment behind to run a hospital of 100 beds, but took all the medical supplies there, except one medical and surgical chest—enough to last them at Tampa Heights for a day or two.

Q. Now, be kind enough to tell us how much of an outfit you had on the *Olivette*?

A. She was not a hospital ship, but simply taken for that purpose. I took all the medical supplies, blankets, bedding, and whatever I could get on my transportation. I had my own transportation of 6 ambulances and 6 escort wagons, 4 mules to each—that is, 48 mules—and I took all I could load on those 12 wagons and put them on the *Comal*, and they were afterwards transferred from the *Comal* to the *Olivette*.

Q. None of those stores were left on the *Comal*?

A. No, sir.

Q. On the *Olivette*, then, speaking generally, you had sufficient supplies to establish a floating hospital for how many beds?

A. About 200 patients.

Q. For how long a time?

A. I should say the stores would last two weeks.

Q. Are we to understand that you had a floating hospital sufficient for 200 patients for two weeks' time?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you take all the tents?

A. I took all the tents not in use.

Q. How many?

A. I do not know; a dozen, perhaps.

Q. And how many cots?

A. Thirty or forty. This is from memory and not accurate.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was the vessel so furnished when you went on board of her that a considerable amount of bunkage could be used on the ship?

A. There were 80 cabins on the ship—I think that was the number—and that would give room for 150 patients; and then I thought—this was afterwards; I had the ship fitted up afterwards, and at that time the staff horses were put in the hold, when we got to Cuba we could use that space for patients then.

Q. Were these bunks furnished, or simply the bare boards?

A. All furnished.

Q. So that you had beds on that vessel for 160 men in the cabins and 30 or more cots?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you practically had a 200-bed hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How were you supplied with hospital stores and such articles as are to be gotten from the Commissary Department, such as are needed in the care of the sick?

A. Whatever was necessary we got.

Q. To what extent?

A. The *Comal* was loaded down with stores. From the commissary we had the regular ration, and besides that we had aerated waters and lime juice, and from the Medical Department I got condensed milk and biscuits and that sort of thing for a light diet, besides the regular rations.

Q. Was the ship so fitted with cooking arrangements that cooking could be properly done for the sick?

A. It had the regular galley, which I took possession of.

Q. Was it or not intended to use the *Olivette* to take the sick or such as might be met with on the various vessels of the fleet?

A. On the way out?

Q. Did you have occasion to take any from the other vessels on the way out?

A. I had twelve or fifteen cases on board when the fleet started, but the *Olivette* came back at night and did not start until the next day, but in the night I had a special train take off these cases, and so we went out empty of patients, and we had about 100 patients taken off the fleet by the time we got to Cuba.

Q. What was the character of the diseases that prevailed?

A. Measles, principally, and a few typhoid cases, and some venereal cases.

Q. How large a percentage of the latter?

A. A small percentage.

Q. When you reached Daiquiri you had about 100 patients in the hospital?

A. About.

Q. Were they treated on the *Olivette* until they recovered or were they put on shore?

A. They were not put on shore and they were not treated on the *Olivette* until they recovered; but I was put in charge of the transportation of the wounded on ships going back, and every time I had a chance to ship them back I transferred them.

Q. Did the *Olivette* go directly from Daiquiri to Siboney?

A. Yes, sir; and took the wounded from Siboney after the battle.

Q. When you went to Siboney, were you informed of the needs of those on shore, respecting their needs as to medicine and medical supplies?

A. I did not get any official information.

Q. Were any requests made of you for medicines and medical supplies at Siboney?

A. Practically none.

Q. How long did you remain off Siboney?

A. Until the 24th, I think it was.

Q. You arrived there, what date please?

A. About the 22d.

Q. You were only two days off Siboney?

A. About that time?

Q. Before you started north again?

A. Oh, yes—oh, Siboney?—I am getting mixed up. We got to Siboney on the 24th of June. Word came down that there were a lot of wounded, and we went right up there and took them on the *Olivette*.

Q. From what hospital did you receive these wounded that you put on the *Olivette*?

A. We received them from the shore. There was no hospital on shore.

Q. Were all the wounded after that fight put at once upon the *Olivette*?

A. We took all the wounded from that fight.

Q. How many were there?

A. I do not know. I should say between forty and fifty.

Q. What medical aid had you to take care of that number of wounded?

A. I had on my own staff three assistants, and then other surgeons came aboard, and they helped. I think there were altogether 12 surgeons on board the ship that night—about twelve.

Q. How close in shore were you?

A. As near as the vessel could get without running aground.

Q. And that was about what distance—was it a quarter of a mile?

A. I should say 200 or 300 yards.

Q. Did these medical officers that came to assist you go ashore the next day?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you remain in close proximity to the shore or go out to sea?

A. We were always in the neighborhood. I would occasionally go down the shore a little way, when it was a little hot, to give the patients some air.

Q. Did you at any time lay off Morro, 5 or 6 miles from Siboney?

A. No, sir; we were only there at night.

Q. Were you in close proximity to the shore?

A. All the time.

Q. During this time were any applications made to you for medicines and medical supplies from the shore?

A. Not at this time, if I remember correctly.

Q. You went ashore, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do you know whether there was any scarcity of medicines at that time and place on shore?

A. On shore?

Q. Yes.

A. About that time they were making efforts—our department was making efforts—to get medical supplies from the transports. One officer was specially detailed for that purpose.

Q. Who was that, please?

A. That was Captain Munson. He was detailed to get the supplies off the transports and get them to the troops.

Q. Were any sick on the shore at this time?

A. I think not; I think we had them all on the *Olivette*.

Q. Were any requests sent to you or verbally made to you by officers on the shore for medical supplies to carry to the front?

A. Not to me. They were all on the other transport.

Q. But if they could not be gotten out and you had some on your ship, would it not naturally occur to some one to ask you for them?

A. If they could get at me.

Q. Were you near enough to the shore so that they could readily get at you by taking a boat and coming out?

A. Yes, sir; if they could get a boat.

Q. Did anybody get a boat and get out to you? *

A. I think there were one or two medical officers who did.

Q. Did they get what they were after?

A. They got what I had that they wanted.

Q. Did you have a considerable amount to spare?

A. No, sir; I had 200 patients or thereabouts, and my supplies were for a limited period, and I did not want to run out until my other supplies came down.

Q. There has been testimony given to us that they looked to you for supplies and they could not get to you, as you were off somewhere in the neighborhood of Morro; that they had nothing and you had something. Now, I ask you if you considered it your duty to the men you had to keep what supplies you had rather than be giving them to the men on shore?

A. I was always in sight.

Q. When did you leave Siboney?

A. On the 7th of July, I think.

Q. Arriving there on the 24th of June, I think you said?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you take north with you any sick or wounded other than those you have spoken of?

A. Yes, sir; from the battle of Las Guasimas.

By General DODGE:

Q. How many boats were there attached to the *Olivette*?

A. Six, I think.

Q. Were they suitable boats for landing?

A. Lifeboats.

Q. Was there any trouble in landing supplies in them?

A. Small packages could have been landed from the lifeboats.

Q. Did the Medical Department apply for the use of your boats there for the purpose of landing supplies from the other transports?

A. The Medical Department? No; I do not think they would have got them had they applied; but there was no application.

Q. Could not they have used your boats? The testimony is by some of the doctors that they could not get boats. Now, you belonged to the Medical Department there, and if the chief surgeon or doctor had asked you for boats to bring supplies from the other transports to the shore, would you have let them use yours?

A. Certainly.

Q. They didn't ask you for boats?

A. No, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How large a crew did you have on board?

A. One boat's crew; I think six or seven sailors to work the ship.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. How many days were you occupied in transporting the wounded from the shore to your ship?

A. Every day and all day.

Q. And, although you had six boats as you say, you only had one boat's crew, and so you had practically only one boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could the Medical Department if it had applied to you for other boats—would you have let them have them?

A. It would depend on the time. The *Olivette* and her boats were under the orders of the quartermaster. The ship was not under my control.

Q. Not under your command?

A. Only the Medical Department. The ship was under the orders of the quartermaster.

Q. What quartermaster?

A. General Humphrey. By the way, the ship had to go 30 miles for coal, and she might have been down there when these gentlemen were looking for her.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What did you do with your tents?

A. Put them on shore at Siboney.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Please state first, as clearly as you can, the articles you put on shore at Siboney—articles of use in a hospital.

A. Well, the tents—

Q. How many tents?

A. I don't remember. I do not know how many there were. As I said before, we packed up in the middle of the night and I threw what I could on the wagons, and then I had the hospital corps take down the tents at night, and they threw what was possible on the wagons.

Q. You landed all your tents?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What else did you land?

A. There were cots.

Q. How many, please?

A. All I had.

Q. And that was about how many?

A. Thirty or forty, I imagine.

Q. Were they not required on board the boat?

A. No, sir.

Q. And what else, please?

A. I believe there were some medicines, but I do not remember. I have the invoices for what I turned over. The receipts were never signed for them.

Q. To whom were these stores delivered on shore?

A. They were taken to the reserve hospital there at Siboney.

Q. Under whose charge was that?

A. Dr. La Garde.

Q. And all these things, as I understand you, were then turned over to him?

A. Yes, sir; they were all turned over to him.

Q. Now, having loaded up your vessel, you started north on the 7th, did you?

A. Yes, sir; about the 7th.

Q. Where did you go to, what port?

A. I stopped first at Guantanamo on the 8th.

Q. Did you take any wounded or sick there?

A. Land them, do you mean?

Q. No. Did you take them on?

A. No, sir; I got some ice there.

Q. And right there, please state in general what amount of ice and milk and proper hospital food for sick and wounded men you were able to secure at Sibony in addition to your own stores.

A. Nothing to be had at Siboney.

Q. Well, anywhere on the coast?

A. At Guantanamo I bought some ice and fresh meat.

Q. How much?

A. My bill was \$187; I do not know how much it was.

Q. Did you get them from the Navy or Army?

A. The Army.

Q. Did you have sufficient condensed milk to answer your purposes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then, leaving Guantanamo, what was your next port?

A. We put in at Fortress Monroe.

Q. How long were you in the Roads at Fortress Monroe?

A. I think until the next day.

Q. Did you land your sick and wounded at Fortress Monroe?

A. Excuse me a minute; I think I have got a memorandum about that. [Produces and examines paper.] We left Siboney on the 9th of July and got to Guantanamo the same day; left the same day again and arrived at Fortress Monroe on the 15th, and left same day and arrived at New York on the 16th.

Q. Did you land any of the sick and wounded at Fortress Monroe?

A. One case.

Q. That was all?

A. One case.

Q. How many in all had you on board of sick and wounded?

A. Two hundred and seventy-odd—275, I think.

Q. And how many of these were sick?

A. Oh, I should say about 50.

Q. Did you have a sufficient number of medical officers and hospital corps men to take proper care of these sick and wounded men coming north?

A. We took proper care of them, but I would like to have had more men.

Q. Did you apply for more before you left Siboney?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why?

A. There were none there to be given.

Q. Were there any others on board besides sick and wounded?

A. No, sir.

Q. Any civilians of any kind?

A. You said except sick and wounded.

Q. Leaving Fortress Monroe, you landed in New York the next day and landed your wounded?

A. Yes, sir; at New York.

Q. To what hospitals did you send them?

A. The officers were landed at Fort Wadsworth; the men—the balance—went to the City Hospital, Long Island Hospital, I think, and to St. Peter's. The Surgeon-General came aboard. They took 80 cases at Governors Island.

Q. Your sick were properly and promptly disposed of on arrival in New York?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you lose any men coming north?

A. I do not think we had a death on board that trip. A Cuban or a Spaniard died before we left.

Q. After getting rid of your sick and wounded did you refit at New York?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What amount of medical supplies did you lay in there?

A. Quite a large amount.

Q. Estimating upon the capacity of 200 beds, which I understand was the capacity of your ship—

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Estimating upon that capacity for the ship, did you or did you not refit for a considerable time?

A. Not for the *Olivette*.

Q. For what time did you lay in supplies for the *Olivette* herself?

A. Roughly calculated for a round trip.

Q. Estimating that you would have the same number and character of patients coming back?

A. Based on that; yes, sir.

Q. You took also medical stores for distribution for the troops at Santiago?

A. Yes, sir; to turn over to the medical officers.

Q. How large a supply of medicines and stores did you take for that purpose?

A. About 300 or 400 packages.

Q. Did you understand you were to be a purveying depot upon arriving at Santiago?

A. No, sir.

Q. You were simply transporting them for somebody else at Siboney; is that it?

A. Yes, sir; that is all.

Q. Could you tell for what time you had supplies, based on an estimate of 17,000 men at the other end?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you think you had sufficient for a hospital with a capacity for 400 men for two weeks' time?

A. That I do not know. I had but to transport them. Colonel Brown put them on the ship. A lot of the stores were quartermaster's supplies.

Q. What were these quartermaster's supplies that were put on?

A. Tents, and there was a lot of company property brought up from Cuba and taken back on the *Olivette*. It had not been unloaded, I believe.

Q. Did you have as much space for medical supplies as you would have liked to have had?

A. No. Understand, I should like to have had the whole ship for medical supplies.

Q. Was any application made by anybody for the use of that ship as a hospital transport?

A. When I got to New York I asked the Surgeon-General whether the ship was to be continued in use for a hospital ship, and he replied that the Secretary of War stated that it was to be continued in the use of the Medical Department for that purpose.

Q. Did you or anyone make protest against the loading up of the vessel with quartermaster's stores to the exclusion of medical supplies known to be needed?

A. I made none.

Q. Did anyone you know of?

A. No, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you learn, Doctor, that any ship had preceded you, or was immediately to succeed you, with medical supplies?

A. Before I left there the *Relief* came down there loaded with medical supplies.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. On your return to Siboney to whom did you deliver these medical stores and quartermaster's supplies?

A. I went to Santiago. The medical supplies were unloaded by order of the chief surgeon, Colonel La Garde, and delivered to the officer designated for that purpose, and the quartermaster's supplies were delivered to Colonel Humphrey.

Q. Who was the medical officer designated?

A. Major Sommers.

Q. A regular or a volunteer officer?

A. Volunteer.

Q. Was it a brigade appointment or was he connected with one of the regiments there?

A. I do not know.

Q. How soon and with what character of passengers did you load the vessel to go north again?

General DODGE. Before he answers that I would like to have you ask about the arrival of the *Relief*.

Q. Were you present when the *Relief* arrived?

A. I was there. It was about the 6th or 7th of July.

Q. Was she supplied with medical stores?

A. She had a vast quantity.

Q. Do you know what was done with those stores?

A. I got some. I saw a lot put on shore and a lot transferred to the other transports.

Q. What other transports?

A. I loaded the *City of Washington*, the *Breakwater*, the *Iroquois*, and the *Cherokee*, besides the *Olivette*.

Q. You had charge of putting on these four transports the wounded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you had charge of the fitting or supplying them?

A. I was responsible that they were properly supplied with what could be had.

Q. What provision was made for the diet of the seriously ill and wounded, if there were such?

A. There were medical supplies which the *Olivette* divided up with them; all the ships had medical supplies in sufficient quantity; I would not let them go until they had. They got them from the stores; we could not get ashore. I divided all I had with them, and they got some from the *Relief*.

Q. Were they all supplied for a trip of that length, passengers being sick and wounded?

A. I think fairly so. We had condensed milk, special food, and soft drinks, ginger ale, lime juice, and some farinaceous foods. They were nearly all wounded men.

Q. Were they supplied with ice—these transports?

A. I think they had some ice. The *Relief* had some ice, and I know she gave ice to the *Breakwater* and the *City of Washington*. The *Olivette* had ice. As to the *Iroquois* and the *Cherokee*, they were only to make a short trip to Key West, and I do not know that they had any.

Q. Did they make a trip or go north?

A. I sent them, I think, to Key West.

Q. Were these vessels properly provided with bedding for the sick and wounded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they proper vessels with respect to their ventilation and water-closet arrangements, and the possibility of cooking at the galley, and space for transporting wounded men?

A. I would have accepted them on the whole.

Q. What time did you load up and start north again?

A. Yes, sir—I was going to look up my memorandum—if you will allow me, it will take but a moment.

General DODGE. Ask him, Doctor, if he knows anything about the facts of the trouble of getting stores ashore from the *Comal* this first time. He was under Humphrey.

The WITNESS. I was at Santiago the 1st of August, and we left on the 15th.

Q. General Dodge asks the question about what you knew in regard to the difficulty of landing the supplies at Siboney from the various transports as you yourself observed them.

A. I was not in a position to personally observe much of that, excepting that I knew there was no way—we could not get the supplies landed. Captain Munson was my assistant afterwards, and he was detailed on the 23d, the day before the battle, and an order was issued for him to gather the medical supplies and accompany them to the front. He got what he could; as the transports were out at sea and there was no way to get at them. On one occasion he had some medical supplies from one of the ships, and he told me that an employee there in charge, Captain McKay, refused to take the supplies. That was the only case I know of. This I know through Captain Munson.

By General DODGE:

Q. Captain McKay says he went out in the middle of the night for them.

A. I do not see how he got out to the ships in the middle of the night. Colonel Humphrey could not get out in the middle of the night.

Q. Captain McKay had a quartermaster's steam launch of his own, the *Laura*.

A. That was a sort of a tug or barge, and it was in constant use by Colonel Weston to get commissary stores ashore.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. I think Captain McKay said in his testimony he went out one night and brought some in at midnight.

A. That I had nothing to do with.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Doctor, as I understand you, you were loaded up on the 12th of August?

A. We stayed there until the 15th.

Q. You left Santiago on the 13th of August?

A. We arrived at Santiago on the 1st of August and left on the 15th.

Q. What number of sick and wounded had you on board?

A. Two hundred.

Q. All sick?

A. All sick.

Q. How many medical officers had you at this time?

A. Three assistants, I think.

Q. Were these men seriously ill, most of them?

A. Quite a percentage of them were very ill.

Q. Were you supplied fully with the necessary hospital stores to take care of 200 sick, many of them seriously ill?

A. We were.

Q. In every respect?

A. In every respect.

Q. Were they thoroughly well cared for on the way north?

A. They were.

Q. Did you observe, yourself, what care was taken of them?

A. I saw every patient every day.

Q. How were you supplied with ice?

A. Every day; never without it.

Q. Did you have any on the *Olivette* when you reached Hampton Roads?

A. Second trip; yes, sir.

Q. That is, this trip you are talking about?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have enough to last you until you arrived at New York or Boston?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any occasion for you to get additional amounts of ice there?

A. No, sir; not ice.

Q. Did you get any there?

A. I think not.

Q. Did you make any requisitions at Hampton Roads for anything?

A. We wanted fresh eggs and fresh milk and little items of medicines?

Q. Were your requisitions honored?

A. Yes, sir; I think we got nearly everything we asked for.

Q. Did you get what milk you wanted and needed?

A. Yes, sir; I think so.

Q. In full?

A. I think so.

Q. Did you make requisitions for liquors—whiskies and brandies, etc.?

A. I do not think we did.

Q. Did you have enough on board to last your probable requirements for the rest of the trip?

A. Yes, sir; I think we did get a bottle or two of whisky at Hampton Roads.

Q. Isn't it a fact that upon your arrival at Hampton Roads milk and brandy were requisitioned for, neither of which were supplied?

A. According to my recollection we got milk at Hampton Roads—a boat came off. We got it either at Hampton Roads or Montauk, I have forgotten which.

Q. If you did not get it at Hampton Roads, did you need it at Hampton Roads?

A. Not exactly. It is better to have fresh than condensed milk.

Q. Did you endeavor to get it there at Hampton Roads?

A. I think so.

Q. But you do not remember whether you got it or not?

A. I think we did.

Q. About what date did you arrive at Hampton Roads?

A. We arrived the 19th of August at Fortress Monroe.

Q. And what time in the day did you reach there?

A. 1.48 p. m.

Q. What time did you leave?

A. Same day.

Q. Same evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were ordered to go where from Hampton Roads?

A. To Fort Pond Bay—that is, at Montauk.

Q. By whom was that order issued?

A. The Surgeon-General, I believe.

Q. You arrived there when?

A. Twenty-first; at 6.30 the next morning.

Q. Did you land all your sick at Montauk?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you make any effort to land them there at Montauk?

A. I asked for instructions. We had been ordered to Montauk, and we received orders about the hospitals.

Q. Do you remember whether you laid in additional supplies at Montauk?

A. We got a few additional supplies at Montauk.

Q. Of what character?

A. Fresh goods, milk and bread, and a few bottles of good whisky.

Q. How much milk did you get there, do you remember?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it enough to last for the rest of your trip?

A. There was plenty of milk, I think.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in getting all the milk you wanted at Montauk?

A. Not if we stayed long enough.

Q. How long did you stop there?

A. Twenty-three hours.

Q. And what was the reason that you remained at Montauk twenty-four hours without going on or without landing your sick?

A. I do not know, sir.

Q. Was no information given you as to what was to be done?

A. Not until we got the order to go to Boston.

Q. Did Dr. Forwood tell you he would receive certain of your patients—that he would take certain of your cases?

A. I got a note from him that he would take 30 or 40 of my worst cases. I sent a note to him and got an answer from him in reply next day, stating he would take 30 or 40. We only landed one case at Montauk.

Q. Why did you land only one?

A. It was a special dispensation, a sergeant of the First Volunteer Cavalry. His friends came for him, and we expected him to die. His diagnosis was very doubtful. We did not get the order to go to Boston until the next afternoon.

Q. Was the ship prepared for the trip to Boston?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In all respects?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it a fact that at 10 a. m. you were megaphoned to have provisions and coal sufficient to go to Boston, and that you replied you had sufficient coal, but wanted some provisions, and you were told that in an hour they would be sent to you?

A. We had sufficient provisions; but some luxuries we could have had.

Q. Were the provisions sent to you in an hour?

A. We got some potatoes and milk, I think, and some fresh bread.

Q. Is it not a fact that at five minutes to 10, when you were ordered to Boston, no milk or provisions had been sent from shore and you had no onions on board?

A. Some things were sent out.

Q. Is it a fact that milk and brandy, which were absolutely needed, were wanting, and were not secured from shore?

A. I do not think they did send any brandy, but at the same time we had other stimulants to take the place of brandy.

Q. Did you or did you not, both on Sunday and Monday, ask for milk and stimulants that were not sent to you?

A. I do not think I recollect the circumstances perfectly, whether they were sent or not.

Q. Did you make the requisitions or requests that you should be furnished with them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you do not remember whether those requests were complied with or not?

A. I know there were some things sent out.

Q. Is it or not a fact that your seriously ill were in need of things which you did not get and did not have for the remainder of the trip from Montauk to Boston?

A. I think not. I do not think there was a case there on the ship that needed anything—seriously needed anything that they did not get.

Q. What were the difficulties in the way of getting at Montauk, during these thirty-six hours you were there. all you asked for? Were there not milk and ice and medical stores and stimulants of all kinds on shore?

A. There must have been.

Q. Why could you not get them, then?

A. We had no means of communicating with the shore.

Q. You had six boats?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And one boat's crew?

A. Yes, sir; but we were quarantined.

Q. And you could not communicate with the shore?

A. The quarantine officer took our message ashore.

Q. Was not sufficient communication established with the shore for you to get these things?

A. Yes, sir; we got a few things there.

Q. What were the conditions at Montauk which prevented you sending a boat to the shore, when twenty-four hours later you discharged all your patients at the dock in Boston?

A. There was no reason why we should go on shore at Montauk. We were not badly off for supplies. We had plenty of condensed milk and all the necessary food.

Q. There was a large number of sick and seriously ill on your boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would it or not have been well for these men to have the things not on board your ship which you could have readily secured by going on shore?

A. I do not think it would have made any difference to them.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What kind of stimulants did you have on board your ship?

A. Wine, champagne, and cordial.

Q. Any whisky?

A. Yes, sir; whisky and brandy.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Now, when you reached Boston you discharged your patients at once, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By whom were they received, do you remember?

A. They were received by Dr. Bradford.

Q. Dr. Bradford had entire charge of that matter of receiving and sending away the patients that came off your boat?

A. Yes, sir. I had a telegram from the Surgeon-General that he would meet a ship and take charge of the transportations.

Q. Did you meet Dr. Bradford?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him about any particular case on board your boat?

A. We talked over most all the cases on the boat.

Q. Was there any special case to which your attention was directed, or by you to which his attention was directed?

A. No, sir; I do not think there was any particular case. All the cases were more or less talked of.

Q. Was there any special case that afterwards attracted your attention?

A. If you have in mind the case of Tiffany, it necessarily attracted my attention.

Q. Now, Doctor, in your own way, tell us what you know about the Tiffany case from beginning to end.

A. I will. We took the Lieutenant aboard at Santiago. I got a personal note from General Wood asking me to take Lieutenant Tiffany, who was a convalescent—not in a hospital, but out of the hospital ten days—convalescent from malaria—to take him on board the *Olivette* and look after him on the way home, which I did. He was in pretty good shape; a little fever—100° or 101° his temperature the day he came aboard the ship, caused probably from walking down. That soon disappeared and his fever left him, and he was recovering and got better every day he was on the ship. No time confined to his bed all day, as I remember; and when he got off the ship—oh, to speak of what he got on the ship. We had all a man wanted or needed, sick or well, on board the *Olivette* on that trip, and he was looked after; and when we arrived at our destination he was apparently in very good condition.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did he come on deck during the passage?

A. Yes, sir; every day.

Q. Alone?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What medicines did he require or use on his way home?

A. Oh, nothing. He got a dose of quinine morning and evening for the malaria.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was he eating?

A. Yes, sir; he came for his meals right along.

Q. Did he eat his meals regularly?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he eat what would ordinarily be taken by a convalescent?

A. I think so. I never noticed particularly. I advised him to be careful of his diet. We gave him an example of what he ought to eat, and stated he should not eat too much.

By General DODGE:

Q. Can you tell exactly what you gave him to eat?

A. No; not exactly. We had special diets on the *Olivette*, and the patients could get there about what was necessary for them.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did he prescribe his diet, or did you? And was it liquid or solid?

A. The officers in charge of the wards of the *Olivette*—the regular officer—would send in what was necessary for each particular case, each patient; convalescent diets and the various diets necessary. He did not come aboard as a patient, but as passenger.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you or not observe sufficiently close to state whether his stomach was in an ordinary condition or in a condition of extreme irritation, an extremely irritable condition?

A. The same as an ordinary malarial case.

Q. Is it a fact that his stomach could not retain the food he took?

A. It is not a fact.

Q. Was it ever reported to you that he was vomiting up what food he ate?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is it your opinion that he did or did not have irritability of the stomach so that he could not keep his food down?

A. He did not have it.

Q. He had the food ordinarily given to convalescent officers?

A. Yes, sir. On August 11 he came into the hospital, and on August 19 the report says, "Doing well. Going regularly to meals. Not yet strong." On August 22, "Doing well; general condition improved. Slight improvement." There is nothing to show that he had any inability to retain food.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did he gain or lose strength from the time he embarked until he disembarked?

A. Gained.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. He came on board the boat on the 11th, and his temperature was not kept after the 14th?

A. No, sir; it was normal.

Q. His highest temperature was 101?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he leave on his own account, or how was that?

A. When we got to Boston, I telegraphed to the Adjutant-General that there were a number of officers on board, fifteen or twenty, I think, that had been brought over on the *Olivette*, and recommended that thirty days' sick leave be granted each one of them, as they were still convalescent and not able to return to duty with their regiments. Among these was Tiffany. The answer came back approving the recommendation. I made arrangements, giving each one of them a leave of absence for thirty days, with permission to go to their homes. I told them all I had made this application and the reply I had received. Tiffany was among those who wanted to leave, and I told Mr. Tiffany, as I did nearly all of them, that they were to be very careful in reference to their diet, as patients frequently collapsed or had a condition of relapse, and that he should place himself under the care of a good physician immediately upon getting home. I was busy the rest of the day until 2 or 3 o'clock giving the patients out with their records and turning them over to the hospital people at Boston. Dr. Bradford was taking charge of the cases, and I had them brought out and turned over. The ambulances were there waiting. I do not know exactly when Tiffany left the boat. It was some time in the afternoon. I had told him he had better wait until I got through with the men, but when we came—some one called on board for him, and I sent for him. I think I sent an orderly to find where he was, and it was reported that he had left the ship.

Q. Did you see him afterwards?

A. No, sir.

Q. If he died within forty-eight, or, say, seventy-two, hours, is it or not a fact that his death could fairly be attributed to starvation, as popularly termed?

A. I think not, Doctor. I do not see how it could possibly be from starvation in any sense.

Q. Using language in its ordinary way, could it be said that a man in the condition you saw Mr. Tiffany in when you last saw him could possibly be starved to death in forty-eight or seventy-two hours?

A. I think not, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What conversation did you have with Dr. Bradford, or Dr. Bradford have with Tiffany in your presence?

A. I do not know, Governor. I remember speaking of Tiffany to Dr. Bradford and his looking at him, but I do not remember what was said. We were both very busy, and I had already asked Tiffany to wait until I had disposed of the enlisted men, and we would then look after him, and I think I sent for him later—

Q. Did Mr. Tiffany at any time on the voyage express himself in regard to his treatment on the *Olivette*?

A. Yes, sir; he did. He expressed himself as much gratified at the treatment he received and the attention he received.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you regard him as dangerously ill among the patients on the *Olivette*?

A. I did not.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Could he be fairly called a convalescent when he landed?

A. Most undoubtedly.

By General McCook:

Q. Did anybody come aboard the ship to hunt for Mr. Tiffany?

A. No, sir; I think not. His brother came and inquired for him; I do not think he hunted for him; but if Mr. Tiffany was on the ship we knew where he was. He had a stateroom on the upper deck, and he was there or out on the upper deck; and if anybody wanted to see him Mr. Tiffany could come down and see him.

Q. Did his brother meet him there?

A. I think so. They may or may not have gone off together; but his brother saw him on the ship.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. After landing your passengers at Boston, where did you go next?

A. I was ordered to Fernandina.

Q. How long after you reached Fernandina before the vessel was sunk?

A. The next day, I think.

Q. During the time she was at Fernandina and at the time she was sunk was she under the charge of the Quartermaster's Department or under your command?

A. I should say there that she was under my command, for I was the only commissioned officer on the ship, and there were no quartermasters about, but whenever the quartermaster could get charge of her he would do so.

Q. Under whose orders was the coaling going on?

A. The quartermaster had telegraphed ahead to have the ship coaled at Fernandina.

Q. Were you on board when she sunk?

A. I was, sir.

Q. Was the occasion of her sinking known?

A. We could only guess, of course, as to the ship's sinking. I was never told why she sank; but she was coaling, and I understood a porthole had not been closed, and as she listed—there were two ships together—the water ran in and filled her up.

Q. Would it be necessary to lose a vessel because a single porthole was open?

A. I should not think so; there should have been a watchman.

Q. Was it night or morning?

A. It was 3 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Were you able to get your things off?

A. No, sir. We lost everything except a few personal things which could be hastily snatched. It could not have been over five minutes from the time we got the alarm before she sank, and as she sank in 30 feet of water her hurricane deck was just out of the water.

Q. From Fernandina where did you proceed?

A. To Jacksonville. I was ordered to the Seventh Corps.

Q. Were you on duty with the Seventh Corps for any time?

A. I think for about a month. We arrived at Fernandina on the 29th of August.

Q. What position did you occupy at Fernandina?

A. I was in charge of the ship—the medical department.

Q. But after the *Olivette* sunk, I mean?

A. I was then ordered to Jacksonville.

Q. What date did you report there?

A. Three or four days after.

Q. What duty were you assigned to there?

A. Command of the hospital at Pablo Beach.

Q. What condition did you find that hospital in?

A. I found it in charge of a volunteer surgeon.

Q. What was his name?

A. Major Arto.

Q. Of Louisiana?

A. I think he was.

Q. When you took charge, what condition did you find it in?

A. Well, he evidently had not much experience in running hospitals. There were no records and hardly a sufficient number of nurses or medical supplies.

Q. Was the Pablo Beach a convalescent camp or was it a hospital proper.

A. It was—there was a convalescent camp; there was a lot of patients out in tents. There were two buildings, one large one and a smaller one that we used. I think there were about 300 cases there. It was called a convalescent camp, but I should call it a hospital.

Q. Were these men properly supplied with medicines and stores?

A. After I got there they were.

Q. Were they when you got there?

A. There was some deficiency in supplies.

Q. Of what character?

A. We were short of thermometers and some medicines. I have forgotten now.

Q. Had requisitions been made for these articles, do you know?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do the records show?

A. There were no records.

Q. Did you have any difficulty in getting what you needed promptly after you took charge?

A. After I took charge I got everything that was necessary.

Q. Promptly?

A. With a fair degree of promptness.

Q. What do you mean by that, sir?

A. There was some slight delay in getting supplies.

Q. Delays of hours, days, or weeks?

A. Delays in getting nurses.

Q. I mean delays in hospital supplies?

A. No, sir; no delays that were material, because we would go out and buy them.

Q. Was there a supply depot at Jacksonville?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did that depot have in it what was required by the troops in the vicinity?

A. It was very well supplied.

Q. It is not more than a dozen miles from Jacksonville to Pablo Beach?

A. Eighteen or 20.

Q. Ought there to have been any delay, then, in getting supplies from Jacksonville to Pablo Beach?

A. There was no delay of any moment after I had an opportunity of placing the necessity before them.

Q. How long was it after your taking charge before the hospital was thoroughly equipped and supplied with everything it could properly ask to be supplied with?

A. I could not say the exact date. When I left there it was thoroughly equipped in every possible way.

Q. That was a month after?

A. Yes, sir; about.

Q. Did it take a month to get everything?

A. Not medicines. It took some time to get a sufficient supply of nurses.

Q. No; I want to know how quickly you were able to put the supplies there in proper condition?

A. I can not tell you exactly. I went through the hospital to find out what was needed and made requisitions for them.

Q. How long on an average did it take for the supplies to reach you after you had mailed the requisitions?

A. I did not mail them.

Q. Well, sent them?

A. I once or twice sent a requisition at 2 o'clock and would get the supplies at 4.

Q. Was that the usual custom?

A. Usually about twenty-four hours.

Q. Did it take you twenty-four hours usually to get supplies that ought to be on hand in the supply depot?

A. Yes, sir: there were one or two things that were not in the hospital that we needed that exceeded twenty-four hours.

Q. What were they?

A. Hypodermic syringes, stethoscopes, and thermometers would take more than twenty-four hours.

Q. Were not those things on hand in the hospital?

A. The hospital was not sufficiently supplied when I took charge.

Q. Were they obtainable in Jacksonville, or had they to be ordered by telegraph from the North?

A. We could not get a stethoscope in Jacksonville.

Q. Is the stethoscope a particular necessity?

A. It is possible to get along without it.

Q. Well, don't the majority of men in practice get along without it?

A. I think not; we always have them.

Q. But don't always use them when they have their ears. That I do not look at as a matter of any particular importance. What other articles were there you could not get at Jacksonville?

A. Well, I do not think it was possible to get any rubber cloth in Jacksonville.

Q. Well, what else, please?

A. I do not think there was anything else.

Q. Were the patients at Pablo Beach, many of them, seriously ill?

A. A larger percentage of them were convalescents. There was perhaps 10 per cent of them that were serious cases.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Where and when did you get the thermometers and hypodermic syringes?

A. We got them from the supply depot. They telegraphed for them, and as soon as they came we got them.

Q. When did they come?

A. That I can not say.

Q. After you applied for them and found they were not over at the supply depot, how long was it before you got them?

A. Oh, I don't know—two or three days, I think. I can not say, exactly; just as short a time as it took for them to come down.

Q. From where?

A. Where they were ordered.

Q. Where were they ordered?

A. That I can not say. All medical supplies necessary were sent by express.

By General DODGE:

Q. Some place here it was testified by Captain McKay that he went out to the ship at night when a medical officer came and asked him for some supplies, and he went out and got them for him.

A. I do not see what he got out to her on.

Q. Was not the *Bessie* and *Manteo* there? He testified to having the *Bessie*, *Laura*, *Manteo*, and one other boat there.

A. The *Laura* was the only boat that could get in to the shore.

By General WILSON:

Q. Were there any wounded, sick and wounded civilians on the *Olivette* when she came back; and if so, how many?

A. Well, I can not tell from memory the exact number.

Q. Were there any?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Wounded civilians?

A. Yes, sir; there was Mr. Marshall, of the New York Journal—a very serious case. He was on board and we brought him up on the first trip with his attendant, and I think we brought a wounded Cuban civilian.

Q. And the sick civilians, were they all in the employ of the United States?

A. Mostly discharged employees and teamsters.

Q. And such transportation was authorized by the general commanding?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you ever make any statement about the Tiffany case?

A. No, sir. It is included in my official report, which has not yet gone in.

Q. Then we have the substance of it in your testimony?

A. Yes, sir.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 10, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. VALERY HAVARD.

Maj. VALERY HAVARD, upon request, appeared before the commission, and having no objection, was sworn by General Wilson, and testified as follows:

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Major, will you kindly give us your full name, your rank, and positions you have held in the war with Spain?

A. My name is Valery Havard; major and surgeon, United States Army. I went to Cuba as chief surgeon of the cavalry division, and on July 23 I was detailed as acting chief surgeon to perform the duties of that position until the return of the Fifth Corps to the United States, when, on September 3, I was appointed chief surgeon of the department at Santiago, which position I still hold.

Q. Were you at Tampa for any length of time prior to going to Cuba?

A. I was at Tampa for about two weeks.

Q. What were the preparations you made in a medical way for the expedition of which you were chief surgeon of a cavalry command?

A. I went to each regiment of the division and carefully looked into their personnel, medical officers, and hospital corps men, as well as into their supplies.

Q. What was the result of this inspection?

A. The result was that I found the number of hospital corps men rather small, although perhaps efficient, and the amount of the hospital medical supplies fairly adequate. I found from two to three ambulances, with their horses and equipments, with each regiment, properly fitted out with a driver and medical chests. I also took one of those ambulances, the oldest and lightest, and fitted it out as a medicine wagon—that is, it had boxes placed inside and some shelving and some canvas bags, so that a quantity of supplies and stores could be placed in that wagon and readily accessible at any time.

Q. Was the supply that you found there and prepared as you have already indicated—was it, in your judgment, sufficient for the wants of the cavalry division for any considerable length of time?

A. Not for any length of time.

Q. For what time?

A. It was about sufficient for, perhaps, two weeks.

Q. Were the supplies of such a character that had an engagement, or several engagements, taken place you could have supplied all the necessary dressings for an expected number of wounded for your division?

A. I think so.

Q. Were those supplies—those ambulances, this hospital wagon—taken with your command?

A. No, sir; they were not. They were left behind.

Q. By whose order?

A. By order of the corps commander, General Shafter.

Q. Did you receive a written order to leave these things behind?

A. No; but I was told by General Wheeler, the commanding general of the cavalry, that the ambulances should not go. I insisted upon taking my surgical wagon and that I was told I could take until the very last moment, when I was informed that even that could not go.

Q. Who gave you the information that you could not take that?

A. General Wheeler.

Q. Do you know whether or not an order was issued directing the leaving behind of medical transportation?

A. I am under the impression that such an order was issued. I did not see the order itself.

Q. If it had been issued, by whom would it have been issued?

A. I suppose by the general commanding the corps—General Shafter.

Q. You never received a copy of an order to that effect?

A. I did not.

Q. As respects the medical supplies, what proportion of the supplies that you found in the camp at the time were taken by you or with you to Cuba?

A. We took almost all that I had, leaving but a very small quantity behind for the needs of the men in Cuba.

Q. Did you have with you when you started a sufficient amount of supplies, in your judgment, to answer any reasonably to be expected demand for a period of two weeks' time?

A. Yes, sir; we had.

Q. Were those taken with the expedition to Cuba?

A. They were.

Q. Were they landed after you reached Cuba?

A. They were not; not immediately.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us how much medical stores you were able to land with the cavalry command at the time that command landed, how much you were able to land in the course of the next four or five days, and how much were landed only after the expiration of several weeks?

A. I was on the *Allegheny*, and the *Allegheny* dropped down to Siboney on the 23d of June, so I became separated from the other transports carrying the cavalry. I landed on the 24th, in the morning.

Q. Let me interrupt you. Were the medical supplies that you spoke of on that transport with you or scattered?

A. They were scattered, each regiment having its own supplies.

Q. Yes; now go on, please.

A. On my transport, the *Allegheny*, I had three medical chests and two or three boxes containing various articles, medicines and blankets, and only such things as were deemed necessary for any emergency. I had the assistant surgeon, Winter, and one steward and three or four hospital corps men. We landed on the morning of the 24th, at Siboney. A fight had taken place the previous day. I found the wounded were being brought down to the shore and I at once organized a hospital to receive those wounded, and within twenty-four hours we had all the wounded under shelter, about forty of them, together with many other sick men. We had for those sick and wounded plenty of medicines and plenty of dressings, but as they all came down without blankets or clothing, we were short of blankets; we only had perhaps ten or twelve; we were short of cots. We had no cots except a few litters, and there was no transport in sight from which I could obtain any supplies except the Red Cross ship *State of Texas*, which happened to be there; so I got a rowboat and at once called on Miss Barton, and she very generously gave us whatever she could spare—some cots and blankets and some sick food, also a few cans of condensed milk and malted milk and some soup, which were very useful at the time. That was on the 24th. On the 25th I turned over that hospital to Dr. La Garde, who had arrived with the division hospital, and went to the front and joined my division. That was on the 29th.

Q. Let me ask you there, were you detached from your division at the time—prior to your landing at Siboney?

A. No, sir.

Q. How was it your transport was landed at Siboney and the others were landed at Daiquiri; were they?

A. Yes, sir; General Wheeler left the *Allegheny* at Daiquiri without leaving any instructions or order, so I was left pretty much to my own discretion, using my own judgment as to how my services would be most useful.

Q. Were the headquarters disembarked with General Wheeler?

A. No. I think one aid, possibly, went with him, but the other members of his staff were left behind.

Q. As I understand, you were supplied with a sufficient amount of medicines and dressings to answer the immediate purposes when you landed at Siboney?

A. At Siboney, yes, sir; things that I had with me.

Q. Was there any such lack of medicines or medical stores—dressings—as caused serious harm to the sick or wounded that came under your care during the first four or five days?

A. No; except they were subjected to some discomfort for the want of cots. They had to lie on the floor—a board floor—until I received the blankets and cots from Miss Barton.

Q. Did you take with you a supply of cots and blankets—with the cavalry command—sufficient for the establishment of a hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were they?

A. On the *Rio Grande* at Daiquiri, 10 miles away.

Q. Were they landed at Daiquiri from this vessel?

A. No, they were not. On the 29th I returned to the cavalry division and reported to General Wheeler and explained my temporary absence and also investigated the condition of our supplies at the front and discovered we were very short, because so few had been landed, so that on the 30th I took Surgeon Macfeely, who was to be the hospital surgeon of the cavalry division, and together we went back to Siboney to see what we could get. I had an order for four wagons. The intention was to unload the *Rio Grande* and get our supplies from the *Rio Grande* and put them on these four wagons and bring them up to the front. That was on the 30th.

When we arrived at Siboney we found one rowboat to do the service of all the transports—I don't know how many, perhaps thirty—and there was only one rowboat. We got aboard her with the intention of going to the *Rio Grande* to get our supplies, if we possibly could, although we really had no means of bringing her over, but hoping we might get a boat from the captain of the *Rio Grande*. On the way over I stopped at a transport, I think it was the *Mohawk*, to let off some passengers, and while there one of the members of the crew struck the bottom of the boat with his oar and sprung a leak. The boat filled up and we had to get out as quick as we could. I got aboard the *Mohawk* with Dr. Macfeely, and we asked the captain for a boat to take us to the *Rio Grande* to continue our journey, and he told me that he was absolutely without any means of conveying us to the *Rio Grande*. He had no rowboat of any kind, and he could not even take us back to shore. The only boat he had had just been sunk—the boat I had got on. I did not intend to remain there, and we began to hail and scream at anything in sight. There was a steam lighter in the bay fortunately, which happened to pass within hailing distance, and we succeeded in getting her rowboat, which came over to take us.

Q. What was her name?

A. I think it was the *Manteo*. I stated to the captain the object of our trip; that we wanted to get supplies from the *Rio Grande*. He stated that it was utterly impossible, in view of the wind and the high sea, to go there and do any unloading that day, so there was nothing for me to do but to go there, and as a battle was expected, I returned hastily to the front without absolutely any supplies. I left Macfeely behind with instructions to get the best he could. In the course of two or three days he obtained two wagons' full and he brought them up to the front from the *Rio Grande*, but I don't believe he got all. We had four wagons' full on the *Rio Grande*, enough to establish a fair-sized division hospital. We got part of them, but I don't believe that that ship at that time was entirely unloaded.

Q. When you were at Siboney, and upon your return on the 30th, was there a quartermaster having charge of the transportation at Siboney?

A. I did not see anybody. There was an officer—a lieutenant; I can not remember his name; I think it was a commissioned officer. He was in charge of that rowboat that plied between the shore and the transport; and that is the only officer I can remember, because it is the only boat I remember in sight.

Q. Did you meet an officer—some one connected with the Quartermaster's Department—Captain McKay, a civilian employee? Did you see anyone by the name of Captain McKay?

A. I think I met him.

Q. Was he in charge of the transportation at Siboney while you were there at your vessel on the 30th.

A. I think he was.

Q. Did you apply to him for transportation?

A. I remember I had an order for four wagons, which I handed to either McKay or one of his representatives; I will not be sure.

Q. Did you or not ask anybody in authority for a rowboat or lighter or steam tug or anything that could be had to take your representative to the *Rio Grande*, or any transport having medical supplies on board, to get those supplies?

A. Yes, sir; I did. I have no distinct recollection of the person—the manner in which it was done—but as I went down there for that special purpose, I must have asked the person in charge to carry out my purpose.

Q. Were you or not informed that the only boat you could have was this one boat you have spoken of?

A. This one boat.

Q. Were there any other means of transporting medical supplies from the transports to the shore at that time?

A. There was a steam lighter—I think it was the *Manteo*—somewhere in that bay, but it was not near the shore, nor was it accessible or obtainable, so far as I could see.

Q. So far as your own knowledge goes, was it or not a fact that there was always on that shore an officer with transportation at hand, ready to bring any medical supplies from any transport to the shore when asked for, at any hour, day or night?

A. No; that is not my knowledge.

Q. Is it or not a fact that you had difficulty in obtaining your medical supplies?

A. I had great difficulty.

Q. Did you make every reasonable effort to secure transportation for those medical supplies from transports to shore?

A. I did.

Q. And you failed, except so far as this rowboat went?

A. I failed entirely.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Could there have been a man there who could send a boat for medicines at any time without your knowing it?

A. Well, I doubt that. I should certainly have endeavored to meet him. It was barely possible I should have missed him; but as I went down there for that especial purpose, I must have made endeavors to find somebody.

Q. Did you find an officer when you went down there?

A. There was an officer, as I stated, in charge of that rowboat.

Q. Who was in charge of the transportation?

A. I think Colonel Humphrey.

Q. Who was the chief quartermaster?

A. Colonel Humphrey. He was on board the *Manteo*, and I could not get out to him.

Q. You did not apply to him?

A. I could not get to see him.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. During the time you were at Siboney, running this temporary hospital, were there any means, so far as you could ascertain, for bringing medical supplies from transports to shore?

A. Yes; there were some means at times. There were some launches, and at times there were rowboats, generally in charge of officers, but there was such a demand for these launches and boats by all the branches of the Army that it was with the greatest difficulty that we could avail ourselves of them.

Q. You were the ranking officer at Siboney at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you personally make application to anyone or officially ask for means for bringing medical supplies from the ships to the shore during those first days?

A. Those first days there were very few transports there, only two or three or four, and I was not aware that they carried supplies.

Q. Were the transports carrying medical supplies, as far as you know, still at Daiquiri?

A. Most of them.

Q. And they had arrived at either Daiquiri or Siboney?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you returned to the front on the 30th—was it the 30th or 1st of July?

A. On the 30th.

Q. When you returned to the front did you find that there was a sufficient amount of medicines, medical supplies, surgical dressings, to answer the probable necessities of the cavalry command if a fight took place soon?

A. Yes, sir: there was a sufficiency. They took two or three days to tide over a fight.

Q. Did a fight occur within a short time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there a considerable number of wounded as a result of that fight?

A. There were a number.

Q. Did you have medical supplies and hospital dressings, surgical dressings, sufficient to answer the requirements of the wounded after the fight?

A. Owing to my failure to get any supplies on the 30th I could not establish any cavalry division hospital, which had been my purpose, and on conferring with the chief surgeon of the corps, we came to the conclusion that it would be impossible. There was no available place or site to put up any hospital, so there was really but one division hospital established.

Q. How far away was that from the line of fire?

A. That was between 3 and 4 miles from the line of fire.

Q. Do you know what the condition of that hospital was on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July?

A. Yes, sir; I have a fair idea, of course, as I spent two nights there.

Q. Was that hospital supplied sufficiently with surgical dressings so that proper care could be taken of the wounded that were brought in?

A. I think it was sufficiently supplied with medicines and dressings and stimulants, but it lacked bedding, cots, litters, and food for the sick.

Q. Do you or do you not know of your own knowledge whether efforts had been made to secure proper food for the wounded in anticipation of the fight?

A. I do not know.

Q. There was no effort made in the cavalry division to secure anything of that sort preparatory?

A. We had on the *Rio Grande* all the sick food.

Q. But the *Rio Grande* was at sea. It was of no value. It might as well have been in New York.

A. I did not have it.

Q. So far as your experience as a medical officer has gone, was the absence of this food supply at the division hospital referred to a matter of great importance as respects the recovery of the wounded men?

A. I don't think it was a matter of very serious importance, because we had plenty of the rations, and we also had some sick food. We had some beef extract, and with that and hard bread and tomatoes the cooks made a very palatable soup that the sick rather enjoyed, and they were sufficiently fed, but, of course, not as fully and satisfactorily as though we had condensed or malted milk.

Q. Is it or not a fact that wounded men as a rule in the early days after the receipt of their wound do not require a very large amount of food?

A. Yes, sir; it is a fact.

Q. Is it or not a fact that a moderate diet is advantageous to a wounded man as respects ultimate recovery?

A. I think it is.

Q. How soon were the wounded sent away from this division hospital that you speak of?

A. They were sent down to Siboney about a week after the day of the fight.

Q. They were kept in the division hospital about a week?

A. About a week—some of them. It depended on the nature of their wounds.

Q. Was there a sufficient number of medical officers on the field at the time of the fight and at the hospital at the time of the fight and afterwards to care for the wounded?

A. I think there was. Some of the surgeons that were in the front during the day came to the hospital at night to help in dressing the wounded; so at the time I was there—the two nights—there were enough surgeons. More, of course, would have been beneficial.

Q. Is it or not a fact that medical officers there were completely worn out by their continuous labor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had it been contemplated when the expedition went to Cuba that there would be a fight somewhere at some time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were medical officers supplied in sufficient numbers to answer the requirements with reference to your own division?

A. In the cavalry division I had at least one medical officer to each regiment of three or four hundred men, and I thought at the time that it was sufficient. Before the sickness came I had one to each regiment and two or three extras.

Q. Was it not likely that medical officers would fall sick?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If medical officers, under those circumstances, became sick, would it not seriously cripple the force of medical officers in the division?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was any request made for additional men to accompany the command?

A. I think there was.

Q. Was it granted?

A. I think it was granted, but it took some time for them to arrive.

Q. How long had the cavalry division left Tampa before you had any intimation that you were going to Cuba and likely to engage in a fight?

A. I knew nothing about our destination.

Q. But you had reasonable ground for believing that you were going to Cuba before long?

A. We rather thought we were going to Porto Rico.

Q. Going somewhere where there was a chance for fighting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And where men were likely to be sick?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were you not aware at that time that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago Harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Wasn't this expedition starting for the purpose of aiding the Navy in that?

A. I did not know that. We knew Cervera was at Santiago, but did not know that was our destination. The general impression was that we were going to Porto Rico, and afterwards coming back to Santiago to capture Cervera's fleet in the fall, when the weather permitted.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Would it or not have been well to have had an extra supply of medical officers, no matter whether the expedition was going to Cuba or Porto Rico or anywhere else—a larger amount of medical men than you had?

A. It would have been well, I think. Parts of regiments were left behind, and these men required medical officers.

Q. Is it or not a fact that one medical officer could not discharge the full duties for a regiment in the field engaged in active operations?

A. That is a fact.

Q. Is it possible for one medical officer to properly care for 300 men engaged in active operations?

A. I think it is, under ordinary circumstances.

Q. Now, that makes no provision for accidents, does it?

A. There was, as I said before, two or three surplus medical officers available in case of accident or sickness.

Q. Is it or not a fact that regiments, so-called regiments—battalions, if you please, 300 men or 150—is it not a fact that regiments were not supplied with medical officers during that Santiago campaign: that one man had to look after the interests of more than a single so-called regiment?

A. I believe it happened on one or two occasions; but only for a very short time.

Q. Would there have been any difficulty in securing a sufficient number of medical men for caring for contingencies and accidents there?

A. At Tampa?

Q. Yes; at Tampa.

A. I believe it would have been possible. I wish to say in the cavalry division they had the Rough Riders, which had three medical officers. I believe two-thirds of the regiments had two medical men who went to Cuba and one was left behind. They were very efficient physicians.

Q. Do you remember their names?

A. One was Dr. Thorpe, who had been one of the assistants of Dr. McBirney, and another was Dr. McMasters, who became a contract surgeon afterwards.

Q. Do you remember the names of the surgeons who went to Cuba? Who was the surgeon with the so-called Rough Riders?

A. The surgeon was Major Le Motte.

Q. And the assistants were—

A. The assistants were Church—Captain Church—and Captain Massey. Massey was left behind at Tampa and Le Motte and Church came with us.

Q. Was Dr. Frank Donelson with that command?

A. Not at that time; not as a medical officer.

Q. Now, Doctor, at the expiration of the week you spoke of were the wounded all sent away from the division hospital?

A. Nearly all.

Q. At the end of that week was the division hospital sufficiently supplied with medicines to take care of the sick who took the place of the wounded?

A. Yes, sir. The *Relief* had arrived at that time with an abundance of medical stores of all kinds.

Q. Was there or not at the division where you were the senior surgeon of it any great want of medicines and medical supplies?

A. Not after that.

Q. Was there any means of transportation afforded—the ordinary medical transportation?

A. Yes, sir. The ambulances—at the start we only had three—that came with the expedition. Those were the only ambulances we had in the days of the fight, but a few days afterwards—three or four days—in the first week of July—more

ambulances came, so that the chief surgeon was enabled to send one to the headquarters of each cavalry division daily to bring their sick to the field hospital and also to supply those divisions with supplies.

Q. Those supplies were received from and at the division hospital, were they?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It was the understanding that the division hospital was to be the distributing point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time of the fight how were the wounded transported to the division hospital?

A. Many of them were transported on improvised litters made with poles and ropes and covered over with blankets. That was the easiest and best mode of transportation. The majority of the others were carried in army wagons which were going to the front to carry ammunition and rations, and on their return trip we loaded them with wounded.

Q. How large a proportion of the wounded that were loaded in wagons were seriously harmed by that wagon transportation back to the hospital?

A. In my judgment, a very small proportion. Of course it was an absolute necessity. In thinking over the matter afterwards, I don't think that that mode of transportation, however rough it was, caused the death of anyone. It must have aggravated some of the serious cases, but I judge only a few.

Q. Did any considerable proportion of the wounded have to find their way the best they could to the hospitals?

A. A great many walked, but it was to some extent of their own volition. If they had been willing to wait—there is no telling how long they would have to wait.

Q. Was any considerable number of these men lost on the way and never found, except as dead bodies?

A. Very few, to my knowledge.

Q. Do you know of any individual having strayed off into the jungle and bushes and lost?

A. I do not know of any case.

Q. Was there a case reported to you?

A. No.

Q. Would it have been reported to you if it had occurred?

A. Probably it would have been reported. I should have heard of it in my division.

Q. Do you know what occurred with the wounded of the infantry division?

A. I have more or less knowledge; yes, sir. I have no special knowledge of any one case.

Q. If there had been any considerable number of wounded strayed off or lost or died, would you have heard of it?

A. I certainly would have heard of it.

Q. And did you or not hear of any man in this condition?

A. I heard of one or two men not being recovered for a day or two, but that's all.

Q. Did you or not hear of bodies being found days after the fight, being the first intimation that the men were in the jungles?

A. No, sir; I never heard of it.

Q. On the 23d of July, were you in charge of the whole command as the senior surgeon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what condition was the corps at that time as respects medical supplies?

A. On the 23d of July the supplies were getting low, and, after consultation with Dr. Pope, whose position I assumed, I telegraphed that same day or the next day to the Surgeon-General, asking for some special articles which were getting scant.

Q. Such as what?

A. Such as calomel, for instance, bromide potassium and bismuth, cathartic pills, and half a dozen articles, I think.

Q. Quinine?

A. No, sir; we always had an abundance of quinine at all times, and on the same day I received a cable from the Surgeon-General that those articles and many others had been shipped on the *Olivette*, which was to start on the 30th, but it was detained at New York and only arrived on August 1. This date I have from a memorandum. Before the arrival of the *Olivette* there was some scarcity of these articles I have mentioned. After the arrival of the *Olivette* we had plenty of supplies of all kinds forever thereafter. I heard at this same time, the 1st of August, that a certain drug store in town had a stock of medicine and I went there that day and ordered it all to prevent any possible lack in the future from delays in transports, and from that time we always had plenty of medicines; that is, medicines that were available. It happened, however, that regimental surgeons were careless in making requisitions or taking necessary steps to procure medicines and their organizations suffered in consequence of their carelessness.

Q. During the time you speak of, the 23d, the time you assumed charge, to the 1st or 2d of August, when you were able to get supplies from the *Olivette*, how much deficiency was there?

A. There was a great deficiency in some of the regiments and not so great in others, depending very much, I imagine, on the management and judgment of the medical officers in charge.

Q. How was it as respects the hospital?

A. Well, Siboney was well supplied, and also the field hospital. They had enough. So far as I recollect, they had a sufficiency of articles, but they had none to spare.

Q. Was this field hospital the one organized by Dr. Wood?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any other hospitals besides these two?

A. Not at that time.

Q. So that the hospitals during this time you speak of, prior to the arrival of the stores on the *Olivette*, were supplied with a sufficiency of medical supplies?

A. Yes, sir. I asked Major Robinson, who was brigade surgeon of Kent's division, how he stood as regards medicines and supplies, and he told me during those days his own regiment had a fair supply; they did not suffer for the want of anything, and the contiguous regiment, of which he knew something, also had a sufficiency of supplies, so that the scarcity did not extend to the whole army. It was only in some parts of the corps.

Q. Do you or not know of any requisitions that were made upon you or through you, as chief surgeon, that were not approved by you?

A. No; I think not. All my requisitions, in answer to all my requests calling for medicines I received prompt answers that they would be forwarded as promptly as practicable, and they always came, sometimes rather late.

Q. Now, as respects requisitions that were sent to you from the various commands, sent to you for approval or disapproval, as the chief surgeon of the army there, were those requisitions in all cases by you approved?

A. Yes, sir; in forty-nine cases out of fifty, I should think. Some I had to look over and cut down articles and add others, according to what we had on hand, but we acted generously, according to our means.

Q. Was that cutting down and adding to—did that materially affect the supply to the regiments?

A. No, sir; I think not.

Q. Did you receive requisitions from the various medical officers whose duty it was to make requisitions for medical stores?

A. In the majority of cases, yes, but not all.

Q. Do you remember any regiment or regiments that were especially slow in sending in requisitions?

A. I have not a distinct recollection of that, because I required the requisitions to be aggregated; that is, I required the regiments to send their requisition to the chief surgeon of the division, so they came through the chief surgeons of the divisions.

Q. Consolidated requisitions?

A. Yes, sir; but those were my instructions. However, it often happened that individual regimental surgeons came to me because of the difficulty of finding their chief surgeons or the indisposition of the chief surgeon to approve their requisitions, and in all cases I generally approved their requisitions.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state any surgeon who at any time was unwilling to approve requisitions—requisitions stopped by the chief surgeons?

A. I believe that happened with Surgeon Wood on one or two occasions.

Q. He was the chief surgeon—

A. Of the First Division.

Q. Was there any other medical officer that did the same thing or like thing?

A. I don't think there was. I can not recall any now. The others were Ives, who was always prompt, and Kilbourne. I think both always sent their requisitions promptly.

Q. How much assistance did you, as chief surgeon, receive from the Red Cross or the National Aid Society or any other charitable organization?

A. As chief surgeon of the cavalry division in the first days at Siboney I received, as I stated before, assistance in the shape of coats and blankets and a few cans of food after the day's fight. The 2d and 3d of July Miss Barton came up to the field hospital, bringing with her a good many articles which helped materially in feeding the wounded. I think she came on the 3d or 4th of July. After that I don't remember asking for any assistance. After I took charge as chief surgeon I don't remember asking for any assistance or receiving any from the Red Cross.

Q. Did you officially or otherwise know of regiments receiving from outside assistance—material assistance from the Red Cross?

A. No; I know that private boxes came on transports for individuals.

Q. But do you know whether or not medical officers of the various regiments asked for and received material assistance from charitable organizations—receiving things that the Medical Department of the Army ought to have furnished if asked for?

A. I heard that such things were done, but I have no special knowledge.

Q. Do you remember anything of the visits of Colonel Marsh, a representative of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association, in the latter part of August—I will not say positively as to the date?

A. No; I do not remember.

Q. Do you remember his asking you for assistance in transporting medical supplies to the Second Massachusetts?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you remember anyone asking you for such assistance?

A. No, sir; I think I should remember it if any such assistance was asked for from me.

Q. Was there or not after the stream was opened, after the capture, any difficulty in getting medical supplies from the transports lying outside into the city?

A. Yes; there was some difficulty, some confusion, owing to the fact that there was but one wharf or two wharves and they were always covered with supplies for the various departments, the commissary, quartermaster, and medical supplies, and it was very hard work to separate one from the other and secure means of transportation. It was some time before we could secure a warehouse to store away our things, and many things got lost and stolen.

Q. Was or not your department seriously interfered with in its workings on the part of the Quartermaster's Department for transportation to bring in things?

A. Not at Santiago, because the officer in charge of the supply depot there was also the officer who received the supplies and had them stored away and was generally able to secure the wagons we wanted and the help we wanted. We never had serious difficulty in that respect.

Q. Was the working of your department seriously interfered with because of teams on the part of the Quartermaster's Department to bring in supplies and medical stores from the transports to the shore at Santiago?

A. There were some delays in unloading the transports at times, but not in transporting the supplies from the wharf or from the shore to the warehouse.

Q. No; but I am speaking of bringing them into the wharf. Was the receipt of supplies materially delayed or interfered with by the delay in bringing them from the transports to the shore?

A. No; there was not material difficulty caused by that.

Q. Did you or not have occasion to complain to the chief quartermaster at Santiago with reference to the landing of the medical supplies and the transporting of the medical supplies from the landing to the warehouse and from the warehouse to the various places where the supplies were needed?

A. I complained on two or three occasions of the slow manner in which the transports were being unloaded—that is, slow in unloading medical supplies.

Q. What action was taken upon these complaints of yours, or was there any?

A. There was no special action taken. The fact was that the quartermaster was doing the best he could under the circumstances, owing to the lack of means of unloading. He could not do it much quicker.

Q. Was delivery made much more rapidly after these complaints than before?

A. I think so; yes, sir.

Q. Then the complaints indicated that more might have been done if efforts had been made?

A. Well, I suppose that he stopped unloading other supplies, quartermaster's or commissary supplies, and unloaded the medical supplies instead, on my recommendation.

Q. Starting at the time of your arrival at Santiago and your leaving Santiago last, did you or not, as medical officer, receive such assistance from the Quartermaster's Department as you were properly entitled to at all times and in all respects?

A. Yes, sir; I think I did. I can not remember now that I ever had any serious cause of complaint.

Q. Was there or not, in your judgment, serious cause of complaint, first, that ambulances were not taken; second, that medical stores were scattered on the transports; third, that medical stores on the transports were not landed; and fourth, that you had great difficulty in carrying what stores were landed from Siboney and Daiquiri to the front?

A. Yes, sir; that is all true.

Q. Does that not indicate you were seriously hampered?

A. I thought you referred to the days at Santiago.

Q. I am talking from the beginning to the end of the Medical Department, and it confesses it had supplies in limited quantities. Now, the responsibility for that rests in one place or another.

A. I believe the transports were not properly loaded in the first place, and then there were no adequate means of unloading them at Siboney or Daiquiri, and after unloading them there was no adequate means of carrying the supplies into the interior. There was a lack of ambulances and also wagons.

Q. When the great sickness broke out it developed very rapidly, I believe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When it became apparent to you that the army was going to be seriously disturbed by sickness, did you or not at that time have a sufficient number of officers to take care of the sick that you had reason to believe would fall sick, and had you sufficient stores to provide for them?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. So as the necessities arose you were ready to meet them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did your medical officers respond?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were your supplies there used?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why is it that there was so much difficulty in securing medical attendance and medicines for the sick?

A. I don't think there is any foundation for that report, because after the 25th of July, say, we got plenty of stores—tentage. Quite a number of acting assistant surgeons had been dispatched by the Surgeon-General. In other words, we had plenty of personnel and material, and each division had a properly equipped hospital. In addition to that, we had a large general field hospital, so that I think that our sick in those days were very well taken care of.

Q. Were you or not, Doctor, the chief surgeon of the command at the time the sick were sent north on the transport?

A. Yes; I was chief surgeon then.

Q. Were you chief surgeon at the time the *Concho* and *Seneca* were fitted out and sent off?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it before your time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you were chief surgeon of the command what orders had been issued or what orders by you were issued relative to the inspection of the transports for the care of and transportation of the sick?

A. There was a regular board appointed consisting of three members, one of them being a medical officer of experience and knowledge selected for that purpose, and another a quartermaster, and the other another officer. The duty of the board was to carefully inspect the transports before the troops went aboard and report its condition, whether it was in proper condition for troops to go aboard, and I had a list of medicines and stores and stimulants and bedding made out for the guidance of the officers in charge of the supply depot, and he was directed to furnish each transport with this list of medicines and beddings and dressings, etc.

Q. Was that order of yours carried out in all instances?

A. It was carried out, so far as I know, in all instances.

Q. And then after the 23d of July, when you took medical charge of the command, there was no transport sent away that had not been properly supplied with medicines and medical stores?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Would you have known it if there had been such?

A. It should have been reported to me.

Q. Did your board, so far as you know, as respects any transport, fail to perform its duty?

A. I think not.

Q. Who was the man in charge of that board?

A. Dr. Ives.

Q. Do you know of your own knowledge anything respecting the fitting out of the transports prior to the 23d of July?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you, when you took charge as chief surgeon—did you find any orders

there bearing upon the question of the transports, the supplying of medical stores, etc.?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Were there any orders relating to the matter at all, so far as you know?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it the usual custom there during those days to issue orders verbally or in writing?

A. I think mostly in writing at that time.

Q. A written order—a copy of it—would probably be on file in the chief surgeon's office, would it not?

A. Probably, yes; but as the office had been in the field, the chief surgeon, my predecessor, Dr. Pope, kept the most of his papers with him; so when I took charge of the office, a new building in the city—a different building—I found none of the old records.

Q. Are those records likely to be on deposit here in the Surgeon-General's Office or in Dr. Pope's possession?

A. They ought to be in the Surgeon-General's Office, but I don't know from personal knowledge where they are.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Doctor, from the time you went to Tampa to the time you left Santiago do you know of any individual case of men who seriously suffered by reason of any lack of medical supplies or medical attendance? Can you tell us a man who actually suffered?

A. I do not know of any single, individual man. I know that the wounded suffered at the field hospital from the lack of bedding, clothing, and cots, in a general way, but I do not know that I can single out any individual.

Q. When you say "suffered," do you mean they suffered inconvenience, or their recovery was retarded?

A. I think it was inconvenience and discomfort more than serious harm.

Q. So far as you know, were any lives lost by reason of the failure to administer to them properly in a medical or surgical way?

A. I do not know of any.

By General DODGE:

Q. Doctor, in your opinion, were the wounded there promptly attended to and their wounds properly dressed?

A. As promptly as practicable, as human exertion could do it with the means at hand. There must have been at least a dozen surgeons there working hard all day and night for two or three days, and everything that could be done for them I think was done.

Q. Now, Doctor, had the *Olivette* arrived on the 23d of June, when you were at Siboney?

A. Yes, the *Olivette* had arrived; yes, before I left. I left on the 29th.

Q. Had the wounded in your hospital at Siboney been put aboard her.

A. Yes, sir. So when I transferred my hospital, I only transferred two or three wounded to Major La Garde.

Q. So that the wounded that were at Siboney from the first fight were promptly put aboard her?

A. Very promptly put aboard the *Olivette*. Some of them went there. Most of them came to my hospital for two or three days.

Q. What was the trouble, if the *Olivette* was there, in getting supplies off her that were needed?

A. That was until she arrived—the first two or three days. I don't know the exact date she came, but she either had not arrived or was out of sight when I went to the *State of Texas* and asked Miss Barton for assistance.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did she have any large quantity of supplies that she could spare from her own use?

A. I do not think she had.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. It was intended that the *Oliette* was to be a floating division hospital; wasn't that the intention?

A. I think it was at that time.

Q. Now, as respects the wounded you had at that time at Siboney, did any considerable portion of the wounded sleep on the piazzas or out in the open air?

A. Twelve or fifteen slept on the piazza in the open air.

Q. Were the conditions such that it would be better to sleep under cover or were they nearly as well off on the porch?

A. They were just as well off except when it rained once or twice.

Q. Was any man seriously injured by that?

A. I think not.

Q. Was the air on the porch better than in the house?

A. I think better.

Q. Was the house when you took it supposed to be infected with yellow fever?

A. Everybody around there told me that they had never heard of yellow fever being heard of in that village.

Q. Did you hear afterwards that there had been yellow fever in that village?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Why, then, was Siboney burned.

A. They must have obtained that knowledge after I left.

Q. But would you not, as chief surgeon, have heard of it if it had been such?

A. I made inquiries. It was the thing that suggested itself to me the first thing—and all surgeons—to find out whether they had yellow fever there, and we could not get information that they had had any case for a long time.

Q. Were you the one that had charge of affairs when Dr. Lesser and his family were turned out and the house burned up?

A. No; I was not chief surgeon.

Q. By whose order was that done?

A. I understood by orders of Dr. Greenleaf.

Q. Was Dr. Greenleaf there at that time at Siboney?

A. I think he was at Siboney at that time.

Q. It has been reported to us that the order was issued by Dr. Senn. Do you know whether Dr. Senn had any authority to issue any order of that sort?

A. I do not think he had any right to issue that order. The order would have to be issued by General Miles. Although these wounded were subjected to many discomforts in that barn—lying on the floor—yet there was not a single case of death while I had charge of that.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Major, where was the chief surgeon of the corps?

A. He was there at headquarters—General Shafter's headquarters.

Q. How often did you see him?

A. I saw him frequently, and I remember distinctly he complained of the constant harassing work that kept him there. He wanted to go around and inspect divisions, but he could not find time to do so. General Shafter required his presence there almost constantly, and requested me and other surgeons to call on him for consultation constantly.

Q. Did he keep the medical matters of his corps well in hand?

A. So far as I know; yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. What date did Dr. Pope land from the transport—what date did you land?

A. I landed on the morning of the 24th.

Q. And what morning did he land?

A. He was on the *Segurango*, back at Daiquiri, and I don't know when he landed. It must have been when General Shafter landed.

Q. Do you know when that was?

A. It must have been a few days afterwards. I don't know the date.

Q. You were at Tampa when the transports loaded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What disposition was made of your medical supplies—how were they loaded?

A. Each regiment took its own supplies and loaded them on its own transport. The supplies that had accumulated for the cavalry division hospital were all put on the *Rio Grande* under charge of Surgeon Macfeely, who also went on the *Rio Grande*, and it was those supplies we wanted to get at Siboney.

By General DODGE:

Q. What time did you get these supplies off?

A. Out of the *Rio Grande* we got some off within two or three days—that is, on the 2d or 3d of July—and others were not gotten off for several weeks afterwards.

Q. When were you notified that you were to go aboard the *Allegheny*?

A. General Wheeler's headquarters first went on the *Rio Grande*, and I think it was on the 12th we were notified to go aboard the *Allegheny*. I took one of my surgeons, Dr. Winter, with me and whatever supplies I thought might be required for any emergency. That was on the 15th; but outside of that I had no medical supplies in the hull of the *Allegheny*. It carried mostly horses and mules.

Q. When did you go to Port Tampa?

A. I think we went on the 10th or 11th of June.

Q. Where were you from the time you went aboard the *Rio Grande*?

A. We remained on the *Rio Grande* until we changed our transport and went aboard the *Allegheny*.

Q. Were you long in the canal there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you witness any of the embarkation of the troops there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How was that done? In what manner was it done?

A. They marched on with their equipment and went in, and apparently each one went to the part that had been designated for them beforehand. I can only speak for the *Rio Grande*. I saw troops go aboard the *Rio Grande*. It was done in an orderly fashion without any confusion, and I remember General Sumner and myself made a thorough inspection of the ship as to its sanitary condition, and although it was crowded and it was not in an ideal condition, yet we thought it would do to our satisfaction.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you any further statement to make or suggestion or any information to give us that may be of interest to the commission or of benefit to the service as to your own department?

A. There is only one thing I might suggest in that connection. It is that our supplies, instead of being so scattered, if they had been consolidated, put together in one transport and put in charge of the Medical Department, we would have had no difficulty. It could be made completely independent of the Quartermaster's Department. We should have known where our things were and could have gotten at them.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Suppose the transport had gone down?

A. That would be a reasonable risk that might be taken.

Q. Don't you think it was the proper thing to take medical supplies with each regiment?

A. A sufficient amount for an emergency for a week or so, and in case of any emergency that might be required for that purpose, but the bulk of supplies which were carried in so many different hulls, I think it might be better if they were in one transport.

Q. Do you know what transport your supplies were on?

A. The bulk that was intended for the cavalry division was on the *Rio Grande*.

Q. Do you know what transports the other supplies were on?

A. No, sir; I do not remember. Each regiment had their regimental supplies in the hold.

Q. I mean the supplies of the Medical Department outside of the regimental supplies.

A. There were some on the *Segurança*.

Q. Were not supplies for the expedition put upon the *Iroquois*?

A. I think there was an equipment for a field hospital on one of the transports; I don't know whether it was the *Iroquois* or the *Segurança*.

Q. Have you any other statement or suggestion, Doctor?

A. No, sir.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 12, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ADOLPHUS W. GREELY.

Brig. Gen. ADOLPHUS W. GREELY then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, will you kindly give us your name, rank, and occupation?

A. Adolphus W. Greely; chief of the Signal Corps of the United States Army, with the rank of brigadier-general.

Q. How long have you occupied that position, General?

A. Nearly eleven years.

Q. Will you give us, in a general way, if you please, the scope of your service in connection with the work in the field, what is expected of it, and later what has been done in the war with Spain in supplying the army in the field with the facilities for conveying information from one headquarters to another distant headquarters?

A. The work of the army in the field consisted, first, in connection with the great camps of the country, in establishing for each camp an independent system of telegraphs and telephones, which in turn have been connected with the commercial similar systems of the country, so that each commanding general has been in constant and direct communication, not only with such points in his entire command as he desires to be, but also with the War Department here in Washington and with other commands; second, with the supplying of similar facilities for the armies in the field, notably in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines; third, the furnishing of signal work proper—that is, the signaling work of that kind—to supplement electric signaling in the field; fourth, war balloons; fifth, the establishment of special cable facilities, so that the executive department in Washington might keep in constant connection with the armies in the field. There may be some other phases, but these are the principal ones.

Q. The principal ones?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent did your department supply the commanders of the camps with the facilities for keeping in touch with their corps and divisions and brigade headquarters?

A. To such an extent that there has never been any complaint, either officially or unofficially, that has ever reached me of any deficiency whatever.

Q. Of the headquarters which were connected with the headquarters of the camps, how far down did they go?

A. Well, that rested with the commanding general of each camp; usually there was a telephonic exchange, and the telegraph office had line headquarters or camp headquarters.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. [Continuing.] Then there would be an office at the hospital and quartermaster's office and the commissary office. The commanding general of divisions and of brigades and wherever there was a pumping apparatus generally, and sometimes with a regiment. If a regiment was away 4 or 5 miles, that would be furnished; that is to say, whenever was wanted there was furnished, the idea being to connect brigade headquarters and all higher headquarters, and at all points where the commanding general deemed necessary for military administration.

Q. With what rapidity was the Signal Department connected headquarters in the field with subordinate headquarters?

A. As rapidly as an army will move. There should be no delay more than two or three hours, such as will happen from the breaking down of a wagon or from very bad roads. I may say instantaneously.

Q. That is, the Signal Corps would keep immediately in the rear of an army marching in battle?

A. Well, sir, it don't keep in the rear; it was in advance. Then, James H. Wilson, for instance, had a telephonic signal service established under fire at Alcantara, and when he sent out an officer of my corps to establish a station he directed him to establish one as near the enemy as he could get until he was fired at.

Q. He sent them out without any escort?

A. No, sir; he sent with the detachment a small command and scouting party.

Q. To whatever extent was your staff established at Santiago, after the landing there, communication between the commanding general's headquarters and the headquarters of the division and various commanders on the firing line at El Coney and San Juan?

A. That was done just as rapidly as General Shafter ordered it or permitted it to be done.

Q. Was the expedition fitted out with full complement of Signal Corps supplies and apparatus?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know why that was?

A. Because the commanding general declined to take it.

Q. Was it at Tampa ready to be loaded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know why it was not taken along, the reason that the commanding general had for not taking it along?

A. They never gave me any reason but that he declined to take it. I got my information through my chief signal officer. I telegraphed him and said that I understood that it was not to be taken, and I told him to represent to General Shafter the great importance of taking it, and I was informed finally by postal that it would not be taken.

Q. Who was the chief signal officer with the Fifth Corps?

A. Capt. Frank Green, of my corps, then major, then colonel of the Regular Army, and who was afterwards selected and sent by me at his own special request.

Q. Did that leave the Fifth Corps or the army operating in front of Santiago without any electrical communications between the commanding general's headquarters and the subordinate headquarters?

A. I understand—I don't know officially that it was taken without his knowledge—what we call it or I miles compact cable. It is not intended to be used for any permanent work in connecting an army with a division or brigade headquarters, and to be used where you send out a man where you want to be put in connection for an hour or two and replace it next day with a permanent connection. That was the only material that was taken along with the army.

Q. Governor Woodbury asks if it was used, General?

A. No, sir; I don't know that it was ever used. What was used was that which I supplied independently.

By General DODGE:

Q. What was used you supplied independently?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. What supplies were they?

A. When I learned that there was no telegraphic material going there, I felt it was a duty devolving on me to see to the carrying out of arrangements which would give the executive department in Washington special radio communication with our army in Cuba, wherever it should land, and when I sent down my officer I told him to load up what space he had with telephones and telegraph instruments and especially devised telegraphic wire, very strong, specially made wire, that was specially insulated, so that it could be used anywhere, and it was this supply of wire and these telephones that were used to connect General Shafter's headquarters with his brigade and division headquarters, and also with the war cable which was laid; otherwise there would not have been any action except from this supply.

Q. From what point were these supplies sent?

A. Originally from New York, and then from Key West.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who was in charge?

A. Colonel Allen, an officer of my corps who was eventually leader my orders.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Where is he now?

A. On duty on General Miles's staff—General Miles loaned him to me, as he was the officer I thought best suited for that purpose.

Q. Is he now in Washington?

A. No, sir; he will be here in a day or two more. At present he is on some special work in New York.

Q. There was telegraph or telephone communication then between the coast and the army on the battle line?

A. Yes, sir; there was communication from the Executive Mansion or the War Department to the firing lines on the right, center, and left of General Shafter in the trenches.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. From his headquarters?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before the battles?

A. Yes, sir; we opened communication from Washington over this special system of cables with General Shafter. It was, I think, the 15th or the 16th of June.

one of these days; and we were laying this wire just as fast as General Shafter would have it laid; it could have been laid earlier if it had been ordered. When he left he took the telegraph line with him; he kept himself communicated with the rear. This wire was such that it could be laid in the road or thrown up in the bushes and operated that way. We neither had lances, which we should have had, which were left at Tampa, or anything else to put up lines, so we just put them on the bushes and worked them that way.

Q. What was the strength of the Signal Corps at Tampa assigned to the Fifth Corps, General?

A. I can not tell you. I think when the war broke out I had 36 sergeants available, excluding 14 who were promoted in the Volunteer Signal Corps, and there were some detached men and transferred men that were transferred and detached at the last moment and ordered to duty there. There were two detachments there. My impression is in what made a telegraph and signal detachment. There were about 3 officers and perhaps 28 men, and in the balloon detachment there were two or three officers and about 24 men.

Q. Did General Shafter take these men with him, or did he leave them at Tampa also?

A. He took them with him.

Q. But left the supplies at Tampa?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of what did these supplies consist?

A. There was a complete arrangement for building what we called a "flying wire," about 50 miles in length.

Q. With those lances?

A. Yes, sir; put up at the rate of 2 or 3 miles an hour, according to conditions.

Q. Had you enough force in your department to operate all the lines that you regarded as liable to be erected in the course of the war at the outbreak of the war?

A. No, sir.

Q. There is no difference between the army telegraph and the commercial sort, is there?

A. None whatever, excepting in the Army we have to use some ingenuity and work under disadvantages.

Q. You don't have as complete facilities as in commercial life?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you think there would have been any difficulty in securing telegraph operators from civil life to operate in your department?

A. No, sir; Congress did not authorize a single credit until the 20th of May, and I sent the first company of civilians which was organized in any sort of shape to Santiago, and I think they got there on the 5th or 6th of July; that is to say, thirty days from the time they were in their civil occupations they were in the trenches in Santiago.

Q. What other facilities, General, have you in your department for communicating from one point to another with an army in the field?

A. By heliograph, flags, and lanterns.

Q. For what distance is the heliograph available?

A. Any distance, if you have the sun and a good atmosphere; any distance that you wanted it almost; we have sent messages 184 miles by heliograph.

By General McCook:

Q. That was in the Department of Colorado, was it not, General?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. In this connection, General, I would like to ask if the line that was constructed for General Shafter before the battles was satisfactory?

A. Entirely so. Of course the line was interrupted now and then partly by the ignorance of the men. We had no proper men to patrol it. We should have mounted men to patrol a line of that sort, particularly when lying on the ground; and the men, you know—it is so stated, at any rate—had almost nothing in the way of helping to put up shelters or anything of that sort, and when they saw this line lying on the ground they would come along and cut out 10 or 20 feet of it and use it as a rope, you know. The volunteer soldiers did that and a number of things, and it was thought once or twice that the line was cut maliciously, but I can not say as to that. Outside of that there never was any trouble in the working. There was one complaint made by Admiral Sampson, of the Navy, that a cipher dispatch which was sent by these volunteers over the line by telephone, was not delivered to him in quite as good condition as it should have been. Well, you all know the difficulty of sending cipher words over any telegraph line. Those words all mean nothing. There were some German, some French, and some Italian words; and the message that was complained of—why, the expert officers of the French cable company made seven errors in it, and I believe the volunteers, not wishing to be outdone in the matter, made twice as many more as the French company. That is the only complaint that was made.

General BEAVER. A message in cipher is like a proper name; it means nothing until you repeat it letter by letter?

A. Yes, sir; we all know the difficulty of recognizing certain words over the telephone in Washington even, and these men were working up to their knees in mud at the time, and in all sorts of discomfort; that they had no protection, and errors might easily have taken place.

Q. As I understand it, General, your department was equal to any demand that might be made upon it by the armies in the field, either by way of supplies or in the way of men?

A. There has never been a demand of any kind made that the corps failed to meet.

Q. Did your corps have the heliograph service in Cuba?

A. No, sir; the country does not lend itself to it. It is a wooded country, and you have got to have a prominent point to communicate one to the other. We had telephones and telegraphs. We used a flag in communicating with the Haitian Government. Of course, we had a signal station there, which communicated regularly with Admiral Sampson. For instance, when the navy bombarded Santiago there was an officer stationed at a certain point, where he could see what was going on, and there was one of our men alongside of it, and he telephoned down to General Shafter where the shots fell—whether to the left or the right of such points as were designated, and this information General Shafter telephoned. Thus the signaling to the fleet was at all times directed to the Signal Corps.

By General BEAVER:

Q. The navy was informed as to the effect of each shot, where it fell and what was its effect?

A. Yes, sir. For instance, they would say the shot fell 100 yards to the left of the cathedral or 200 yards beyond it.

Q. What is the weight of a mile of such wire as you use in the field, General?

A. No. 14 wire weighs about 14 pounds. Perhaps what you may want to get at may be better stated as follows: That the 11 miles of complete material—a line of 11 miles and instruments for it—would be carried in an army wagon, making an ordinary load of about 4,000 pounds.

Q. That is what I was going to get at—just what amount of transportation was required to supply an army in the field with the necessary apparatus.

A. Two army wagons would have supplied all that was needed down there.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was General Shafter aware of the arrangements that you had made?

A. He never knew it until he reached the south coast of Cuba. All that work was done by me independently of him.

Q. Was that after you heard of his failure to take the material from Tampa?

A. I had commenced to open a special cable communication with Cuba, wherever our army wanted it, a month before General Shafter left Tampa. I had to go to work and have the table made, get my vessel, machinery, and have it installed, and all that work had to be commenced before a thing could be put in operation. It was only after I learned what was done that I ordered the special wire and material to be taken down.

Q. When did you begin to make preparations?

A. Some time previous. I had before looked over the ground, and I felt that it was my business not only to supply everything that was wanted—knowing that volunteer officers did not know what they wanted—not only to supply these men with what they asked, but with everything I thought they would want, and I took pains to do it by establishing depots and supplies. I did not make the requisitions to be sent to me.

Q. Did you have any funds available for preparation for the emergency which I suppose you, in connection with others, saw was likely to arise?

A. No, sir. When the war broke out I had \$800—all the money I had.

Q. Did you get any appropriation from the national defense fund—the \$50,000,000 fund?

A. Yes, sir. I succeeded in getting some. I think altogether I got from that fund about \$125,000 to \$140,000—somewhere along there.

Q. Was that available before the declaration of war or did it come subsequently?

A. It was available before the war, but it was not used for field work. I got this money for electric insulation and artillery posts, so as to put our own coast in a proper state of defense. I had no money up to the declaration of war. I do not think I had a dollar that could be used for operations outside of the United States.

Q. So that you were not able to anticipate the probable needs of cable and other means of communication with the War Department, for instance, and the other Executive Departments here?

A. Well, I anticipated—that is to say, I had this problem to work out in my mind: I knew just what was wanted and approximately what it would cost, and I had all my information gained, everything of that sort, so that when I did get my money I lost no time in getting to work. I got the sum of \$174,000 from Congress—the money which I used during the war in the field all came from Congress by appropriations excepting \$15,000, which was for war balloons.

Q. To what extent were the war balloons of practical use during our operations in Cuba?

A. For enabling us to see the roads and byways and the general topography of the country in front of our army, which I understand had never been reconnoitered—for instance, the balloons which went up; of course, I am a little uncertain as to the dates; I think it was on the 1st or 2d of July—the 2d, I think—the last time the balloon ever went up it was put up on a skirmishing line and was shot to pieces and fell into the San Juan River—the Aguadores River—and on that occasion there was discovered about 400 yards in front of this point a road which was undiscovered before, and which enabled General Kent's division—a part of it—to be turned off on this road; I can hardly say deployed, because there was no opportunity for deploying there; but this road enabled two lines of troops to advance on San Juan Hill, where otherwise there would only have been one. The discovery of this road effected a prompt movement on the part of our troops to San Juan.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. How high?

A. The balloon went up, I think, only 150 feet. The drag ropes caught in the chaparral there, and they were unable to get it up higher at that time. You know that it was in a brushy country, a very narrow trail, in the bed of a river, and when they got in the bed of this river I believe a trailing rope broke.

Q. How high was it expected to go, General?

A. It ought to have gone up nearly 1,000 feet.

Q. If it had gone up that distance, would it have been shot to pieces?

A. I think not. I have stated in my report, contrary to Lieutenant Maxfield's opinion, who said the balloon could not live there, but who, when he got orders, went with our corps officer, who said that wherever the commanding general expected them to go they would go, and as a consequence they did go; and Maxfield had his horse shot under him in the morning. He went up in the basket and shared all the dangers of the men there in the balloon.

Q. How many ascensions were made during the operations in Cuba?

A. Four were made. The balloon was kept on board ship for about a week. After it got down there neither the balloon nor the party was allowed to land. General Shafter suddenly concluded to use the balloon, and called Colonel Green to his headquarters and told him to go on and get the balloon landed. The balloon was landed that day, and, as I have said in my report, we had material for filling the balloon and inflating it by manufactured gas there in the generator; and then we had compressed in tubes pure hydrogen, which we got after very great difficulty from New York, to supply the leakage, and we expected to be able to put the balloon up and operate it for a couple of weeks, generating gas and supplying the leakage.

Q. Would you carry these tubes with you in the basket?

A. Just underneath the basket, so that when it went down we would turn a cock and load it up again. Colonel Maxfield reported to me that there was only one inflation, when we had expected there would have been six or seven.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. On what vessel did you ship the supplies that were used in the construction of the telephone and telegraphic service which were used before the battles of San Juan and El Caney?

A. They went down on the *Adria*.

Q. Where did she go from and what time did she leave?

A. She went from New York to Key West, and then down to cut the cables off Santiago. She arrived at Guantanamo and established special connections with New York. She was there the day—two days—before General Shafter landed. Then she went over to Haiti to Mole St. Nicholas, where I cabled Colonel Allen to furnish Colonel Green what he wanted of this material.

Q. Did she leave New York before or after the sailing of General Shafter's expedition?

A. Some time before that she was at Key West.

Q. Then she was supplied with all these materials that were used there before you knew that General Shafter had declined to take those you had at Tampa?

A. Yes, sir; but the things we put in at New York were sent down to Key West to be unloaded there. I had difficulty in getting supplies down there, and as she was going there direct orders were given to take this war material to Key West for the purpose of outfitting the command which was to go from Key West, as it was understood at that time.

Q. Did you countermand the order to leave those supplies at Key West?

A. Yes, sir; I told him to take everything along with him that he had.

Q. What time did this shipment leave Key West?

A. She left Key West about—I think it was about the 27th of May; somewhere along that.

Q. Did she return to Key West until after the battle?

A. No, sir.

Q. Well, then, these supplies were really shipped from the United States before you knew that General Shafter had refused to take those supplies?

A. Yes, sir; the order was given. I knew the condition of affairs after General Shafter declined to take them down with him; but I had made this general provision, as I said, in case of anything being wanted, but of course I did not anticipate that there would have been any refusal to take the things along.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Were you supplied with ocean cables to any extent so as to connect the lines that communicated between Cuba and the United States?

A. Yes, sir; I had 60 miles of cable specially manufactured for the purpose of connecting our army, wherever it landed, with the nearest cable system that was in operation on the island of Cuba.

Q. You knew, of course, where the several cables were laid and what their terminals were?

A. Yes, sir; in a general way; of course the exact landing points of cables in the south coast of Cuba had always been kept more or less secret, but we knew within 2 or 3 miles.

Q. Did you have machinery for grappling and securing the cables that you severed?

A. Yes, sir; there was one cable lifted about 4,000 feet, when it broke. Then there was another cable which was lifted over 6,000 feet and taken on board the *Adria* and cut so as to destroy the connection, and later, the apparatus—the French cable company which had been cut between Santiago and Guantanamo, on the south coast of Cuba, and that cable was repaired by Colonel Allen, of the *Adria*, and later we laid 45 miles of wire cable between Playa del Este and Siboney.

Q. Did the expedition to Porto Rico have with it a full supply of field and electrical apparatus?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was made available at once, was it, upon the landing of the troops there?

A. Yes, sir. Of the four or five divisions that were operating in Porto Rico with Ponce as a basis three of them were kept in constant communication with headquarters, and the fourth one it was thought would not need any communication at first, but later they decided to have it, and we established it. The communication was such that three of the commands in the field were notified within thirty-seven minutes after the peace protocol had been signed, and so hostilities ceased—two of them were just going into action. I made it a point to see—it possibly being a necessity that the army in the Philippines were similarly supplied and that their lines in the trenches were operated under fire, and the lines were prolonged and extended during the attack on Manila.

Q. Were you in any way hindered in your operations by superior headquarters; in any way by any of your superior officers?

A. I was not hindered by anybody; no, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did the service suffer by reason of your not taking that material to Santiago, or did you get along well without it?

A. Well, that would be an expression of opinion about General Shafter's operations, which I do not feel competent to express without knowing the whole thing.

Q. The question is simply whether you supplied the wants without having that material with you?

A. The lines to El Caney, for instance, and San Juan Hill, and other points might have been put in two or three days earlier, but of course I know nothing of the difficulties or reasons which prevented General Shafter from laying these lines, except what was stated to me unofficially by one of my officers, that General Shafter on the 1st of July or the 2d of July, with the things which he had expected to go into Santiago, and that he would not need any more telegraph lines. He did not think that the exigencies were such that it was necessary that he should take them with him, but later he needed them. I do not know, as I stated before, the difficulties or reasons—I only surmise those were the ones General Shafter had in mind; that he would not need an extensive system.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Were you hindered or delayed in any way in your operations by those who were your superiors?

A. I was not hindered in any way, but as you can understand, when a great war comes on the Department, and it is not supplied with men or material, that the Secretary of War is to be necessarily convinced that the necessary wants are to be properly supplied.

Q. Yes.

A. [Continuing.] The Secretary at one time before war was declared seemed to think that we had to be very cautious—myself at any rate, as to what I spent and what money was to be given me to spend—it was natural, of course, under the circumstances. However, I got everything I asked for, and was hindered by no one.

Q. And practically you were able to meet the emergency when the emergency came?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any suggestions to make to us, General, that will be helpful to us in our investigations or that would be of use in the future in regard to the operations of the Signal Corps with armies in the field; if so we would be very glad to have you state them?

A. I have nothing further to state to you about armies in the field save what I have said; but as I stated in my annual report it is a very dangerous thing for any commanding general to take an army to any point, or especially into a foreign country, without being provided with ample electrical means of communication with his base and with his subordinate commands. I think our system in the Army is very bad—is obsolete. I think, for instance, that there should be some officer in the American Army whose business it is to see that the American soldier is fed, and this of course is not in the nature of criticism on this war, but I think there ought to be conditions which would enable the commanding general of the forces to be held strictly responsible for the military and provisional part of it; that is, that each department should have control over the supplies and wants of a certain department.

Q. Do you mean by that that our several departments are too much subdivided and too much independent of each other?

A. I think that one department—the Quartermaster's Department, of which there has been the most complaint—is a department that has so much to do that with its present organization I do not see how it can do it satisfactorily. I believe that we should have a supply department with a manager at its head, and three business men should do all this work of paying, feeding, and the other part of it. For instance, take the Paymaster-General. I don't suppose his actual work would cover, even in time of war, more than a few office hours; and I don't see why the Commissary-General—but we know that the Quartermaster-General works until midnight every night during the entire war—and I think that the question of feeding, clothing, and paying of the Army is not a military one but a business one, and one which three business men, if they came together, could devise a system superior to ours.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What would you do with the Medical Department?

A. That is a special corps of which I know nothing. I think that the Inspector-General's and the Adjutant-General's Departments should be merged together.

By General BEAVER:

Q. That is, for a military reason?

A. Yes, sir. For my own corps I have nothing to say much about, because it, perhaps for the first time in history, has placed itself, as I think it has generally been admitted, in a position where it is acknowledged as an absolute necessity, this being an electrical age.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Were any of your officers or men killed or wounded.

A. No, sir; no one was killed. We had one man wounded, and two officers had their horses shot under them. The corps is not armed. I want to say one thing about the corps, and that is the wonderful record which we made, and which the President mentioned in his message, up to the time of the peace protocol: that is, we only had 5 men and officers wounded in the field out of 13,000 men.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Have you any special ideas as relating to your own corps?

A. No, sir: but I firmly impressed on every man the importance of looking after his men and taking care of them. I practically told every officer that the men who came under his command, so far as the Army was concerned, were like a lot of children, and that they should look after them particularly as to their food, bedding, etc.

By General BEAVER:

Q. So your corps was specially instructed as to these things, General?

A. Yes, sir: the officers were, and I made it a point, as far as I could, to visit every one of these great camps and see them myself and that the officers in charge took an interest in their men to see that they were properly supplied with the necessary food and bedding.

Q. Your corps, General, as a general thing, is to a large extent isolated, that is, having quarters of their own?

A. They camp by themselves, as a regiment would do, or as a battery would do, and, in addition to that, you must remember that my men are scattered all over the bad places as well as the good. If a man has got his camp headquarters, the telephone men have properly got to go off 15 to 20 miles—at some of the stations I think they were 20 miles apart, and the men were sent out by themselves and had to take their meals with them, but they were relieved every day.

Q. Had the men who were connected with brigade headquarters, for example—the men at headquarters, did they mess with the headquarters staff, or did they have one of their own?

A. They had their own most of the time. The Signal Corps men are not attached to the brigades. The corps commander says where they are to go. They sent ten or fifteen of them, according to circumstances.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. But, General, did they have to carry their own mess with them?

A. That is a matter of detail. In the great camps they, as a rule, did not. Where a man would be detached permanently to look after something, he would then be assigned to some mess and get his rations at that mess, if he was at headquarters, but the officers in my corps were instructed to use their best judgment to see that the men were well cared for. These are mere details, and the main idea was to see that the men were well cared for.

Q. These electrical appliances, if well used, I suppose, superseded, to a large extent, the old wigwag system?

A. Yes, sir: I never speak of the flag in connection with signaling, because it is the last thing. First, telephone, then the telegraph, then the heliograph, and then the flag.

Q. Instead of being at the head it is now at the tail of rapid communication?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. General Greely, will you tell us how it was that Cervera's fleet was discovered in the harbor?

A. It was discovered by a report from Captain Allen, of my corps, from Key West, from special information obtained by him from Havana. On the 19th of May, the date that Cervera arrived at Santiago—he arrived at 2 p. m., and the fact was made known that very day that the fleet was there.

Q. You knew all about it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did Captain Allen get this information?

A. Through special agents in Havana that were thoroughly reliable; in fact, from the very beginning of the war until the end we got special information every day or two of what was happening all over Cuba, and whenever there was an attack made on the south coast, or any bombardment, or anything of that sort, it was made known to us at once.

Q. How did you communicate between Santiago and Havana?

A. Our confidential men were in Havana, and they were so situated that they knew everything that was going on.

By General WILSON:

Q. In your charge of this department during the war did you or did you not receive loyal assistance from your superiors in the War Department whom you called upon for such?

A. Yes, sir; without exception. I have acknowledged that in my annual report. I never knew of one occasion in my history and in my association with the War Department when there was the same spirit of loyal support and cooperation between the different bureau chiefs as during this war, and all the little petty jealousies, which was the trouble in time of peace, more or less, all disappeared.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, if you have anything more to say, you may make a statement.

A. I want to say that an important part of the work of the Signal Corps during the war was the exercising of a telegraphic censorship, which applied to all the land lines in Florida and to all cables, American and foreign, that had their termini within the limits of the United States. The final work of the corps was connecting all the military posts in the harbors and with the installation of the electrical system in connection with the fire control—this modern artillery method.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What is that, General?

A. The electrical installation of the fire control of the artillery. It is where a man at a distance determines by a range finder the distance of a ship, and he communicates that to the officer in charge of the fire control; and he communicates, after determining the position of the ship, every thirty seconds. He fixes on the instant when he shall fire, and he communicates that to every gun, or a single gun, or a number of selected guns in a battery; and all this has to be done instantly. And that is the electrical work of my corps. It covers all the artillery in this country. The observer first says the bearing is

such a degree and such a distance off, or he gives the angles from his point, and he communicates that to the fire officer, who has a chart of the harbor, and he puts down a dot showing the location of the ship, and thirty seconds later that is repeated; and those dots are connected by a line, and they know it takes so many seconds for the gun to be discharged, and so many seconds for the flight of the projectile; and the officer in that way determines when he wants to fire. It is a complicated system, and applied for the first time generally to the artillery during this war.

Q. Would the observer and the man firing the gun be together?

A. No, sir; they are 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 miles apart. The gun, when it is to be discharged, raises and fires and then drops back into its pit.

Q. In the exercise of the press censorship had you any trouble with foreign powers?

A. No, sir.

Q. They had a French line from Santiago?

A. Yes, sir. The French line—I had to make what we call a “deal” with them; special cable facilities between Washington and the south coast of Cuba. I promised the President that I would give him an hour’s service—I do not know but what we had better strike out about my making a “deal.” I might say we made arrangements with the French cable company, within the limits of strict neutrality, that they should give facilities to the United States Government between Washington and the south coast of Cuba. In connection with that an hour’s service was promised to the President, and the first message that came in came in five minutes, notifying the President that the office was open. We kept that up all the time during the war, and General Shafter was at no time more than twenty minutes away from the War Department during the campaign.

Q. Did you do that in Manila too?

A. I did as far as could be done. The English cable there was closed by the action of Spain and the English telegraph company, which had a special subsidy with Spain, and I got special authority from Spain after the protocol was signed, but my office had it opened five days ahead of them.

Q. Manila was captured after the protocol was signed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why could not that have been prevented?

A. Because Spain would not consent to the reopening of the cable at that time.

Q. Did you cut the cable?

A. Yes, sir; my officer there did.

By General WILSON:

Q. Who was your officer who did the work there?

A. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Who was in charge of the censorship of the press—who was the officer?

A. There was no censorship of the press. It was a censorship of the messages which passed over the military lines.

Q. Were any press messages sent over the military press wires?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they were, of course, subjected to your censorship?

A. Yes, sir; everything was.

Q. Who was the officer in charge of that?

A. I was the officer in charge of that. Everything at all doubtful came to me. I had a subordinate officer in New York in charge of all the cables there, and an officer at Key West, but anything doubtful was referred to me.

Q. Who was the officer at Key West?

A. First, Colonel Thompson for a few days, succeeded by Colonel Allen, who was succeeded by Captain Brady; then Lieutenant Maxfield, succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Squire, succeeded by Lieutenant Squires.

Q. In transmitting messages from the commanding general in the field to headquarters there were they interfered with in any way by this censorship you have spoken of?

A. No, sir; the censorship established, having seized the lines, gave the military messages first call and second the naval messages. They had absolute precedence. They were facilitated by this operation.

Q. They were transmitted, or supposed to be transmitted, just as they were received?

A. They always were. We never exercised any censorship over them. They were exempt from the prohibitions.

Q. Who was responsible for the messages other than those of the war and navy as to what reached the public?

A. My officers were directed to strike out and withhold any message containing information as to pending military movements, or which, on their face, contained information detrimental to the United States, or cipher messages, excepting only that diplomatic representatives of foreign governments were allowed to send cipher messages.

Q. Did only our Government's representatives or foreign representatives to their governments send messages without this censorship?

A. Once or twice there were blind ciphers—apparently simple messages would be filed containing secret information; but most of those cases were detected and dropped, the paper being put into the waste-paper basket.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Had you no officer who had the right to determine whether a message should go or not, or did you refuse all cipher messages?

A. All cipher messages, except army and navy and diplomatic matters.

Q. I think that is wrong. During the war between China and Japan we had the right to send any message after it had been submitted to the inspector.

A. Our cipher censorship only covered the West Indies and the Spanish Main. That did not cover everything that went out of the country. The work was so enormous, and, as you gentlemen realize, there are limits to what any single man can do; and we had only nine officers of the regular corps on duty and I had no regular officer here to help me with the duty.

By General BEAVER:

Q. This general censorship, then, General, was governed by rules you laid down and not by any private feelings of any officers connected with the corps?

A. Not at all. A set of rules was filed with every telegraph company, and over most of the lines the censorship was exercised by the superintendent of the company. The heads of these corporations pledged themselves on that point, and if any message was doubtful they referred it to my officer.

Q. Under the rules as to sending anything which might not be proper for public information the judgment of the officer comes necessarily into play there?

A. Yes, sir; necessarily. Now, violent attacks on the Administration filed to be sent abroad I would not allow those to go. If they were within the reasonable bounds of criticism, I would let them go. Some English papers complained of my dictatorial methods in regard to them, and they made a formal complaint about it; and it was brought up and I was asked to send on a sample message, and they had it here but five minutes when they sent word that the methods of the officer in charge were entirely approved. They were in many cases similar to the telegrams printed in the so-called "yellow journals" throughout this country.

Q. Was your course in that matter dictated by superior authority or were you allowed to exercise your judgment in the administration or control of that office?

A. I acted in accordance with instructions which left me free to act as I thought best. I was informed that I was expected to act so as to avoid friction if possible. There was but one violent attack on me, and otherwise I saw none. General Eckert, John W. Mackay, and Mr. Scrimser said, "Anything you want done, let us know;" and they fully agreed with my action all the way through.

General DODGE. Any other questions for the witness?

(No response.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 12, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. CHARLES P. EAGAN.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES P. EAGAN then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, please state your name, your rank, and the office you held during the late war.

A. My name is Charles P. Eagan, brigadier-general and commissary-general in the United States Army.

Q. How long have you been in the Commissary Department of the Army?

A. Since 1874.

Q. And how long in your present position.

A. Since May 3 of this year—May 4, I should say.

Q. You assumed charge of your department after the declaration of war with Spain?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time you took charge of that department, state, if you please, if you found the troops in the field well supplied with subsistence, or what the condition of affairs was in general.

A. When I assumed charge, the reports in my office show that there was a plentiful supply, present and en route, at all gatherings of troops.

Q. Has there ever been a time since when that was not the case?

A. Never to my knowledge, either directly or indirectly. I mean by that through official or unofficial reports.

Q. What complaints have you received as to the quality of the ration? What is the weak place in the army ration?

A. Outside of the complaints which have been forwarded to the commission by me, the general complaints from mothers and people interested in the troops, also from hearsay, I have received no complaints; but I have received reports showing that about seven-tenths, or 70 per cent, of the officers express a dissatisfaction with the tinned roast beef, etc.

Q. That is the point I was wanting to get at.

A. That is the only thing I can call to mind where anything has had complaint made of it—that is, with reference to the quality.

Q. On investigating those complaints what did you find, as a matter of fact, with regard to them?

A. I sent down the moment the first complaint reached me—or rather adverse opinions, not complaints, nothing has come to me in the form or nature of a complaint, but reports adverse to it—that they did not like it, I immediately had an

inspection of all of it I had on hand at the different posts. I had officers to report to me with a view to looking into it, and they reported to me that it was in good condition and good for use. My idea was possibly some "game" had been played on the department because of the meat being put up in tin. The reports were favorable, and none were made against it on the part of the officers who inspected it. I had some of it brought into my office, and I looked at it and it was good. I will send some to the commission here if you wish it.

Q. How is that canned—by the expulsion of air and then hermetically sealed?

A. It is really boiled beef. The English call it boiled beef, and our Navy uses it, and I asked the Assistant Paymaster-General, I asked him about it, and it was partly on his recommendation that I ordered some. The beef is boiled, sir, and in the boiling a certain amount of the strength is carried off with the liquid and steam. I did not dare to buy it with the liquid. It looks bad enough, but it is perfectly sweet and toothsome and nice, and I hope the committee will look at it. I bought it as a substitute for fresh beef, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Is that the first time you have used it?

A. Yes, sir; our regular travel ration is corned beef.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What made you buy it?

A. The examinations of my predecessor; and I have talked with many officers, they stating that they liked it, and I then asked, "What can you think of to replace it?" and I have some letters from Army officers saying that while they do not like it day in and day out, they do not know of anything to take its place.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Is it, in your opinion, better than fresh beef fried?

A. No, sir; not where you can get it

Q. I mean fresh meat fried in fat?

A. No, sir; the fresh meat is more desirable.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you cause an inspection to be made of this?

A. Yes, sir; the officer who purchased it inspected it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is it inspected on the foot first, and then followed up right to the can?

A. Yes, sir. Furthermore, I have been repeatedly informed that this same roast beef—it is not roast beef, but boiled beef: that is only a mercantile term for it—I have been repeatedly informed that it is sold by grocers to people who keep house.

Q. Well, General, isn't it a fact that one of the greatest objections is because the soldiers who have eaten it did not have pepper and salt with it?

A. When Colonel Roosevelt spoke to me about it I asked him if they used pepper and salt with it and he said no. He said they might as well have the salt ration. I said then that no soldier will march a command on salt meat: that we only used the salt beef on the cars where the soldiers can get plenty of water.

Q. The testimony before us is that it is a palatable dish with salt and pepper.

A. There were oceans of pepper and salt. Its proper use is with potatoes, onions, and tomatoes. They were sent to the soldiers, but that they did not reach the soldiers is a matter concerning the transportation department. One of the objections to it is the grease, but the very fat there is evidence of its prime quality.

Q. The evidence before us is that where used as a travel ration, and pepper and salt is not used with it, it is not desirable, but that if the pepper and salt were used it would be better.

A. Any officer asking for the pepper and salt could have gotten it.

Q. But the pepper and salt, it is not a part of the travel ration—it is not issued with the beef?

A. The pepper and salt is a part of the ration, and should be issued with the beef.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. What is the difference between the canned corned beef and the canned roast beef?

A. None, except that the canned corned beef is made here under pressure.

Q. And cooked longer than the roast beef?

A. No, sir; one of my objections was that it should not be overcooked. They told me it should only be cooked sufficient to preserve it. I found out afterwards, upon investigation, that the liquid which they extract from the beef was sold as a beef extract by one firm.

Q. My impression was that the man who puts it up said that the corned beef was cooked more. They are prepared exactly the same, only one is cooked longer than the other, and when they put it in the cans they put in the things that corn it. One is cooked longer than the other simply to preserve it.

A. The moment I learned that it was in any degree distasteful I would have looked for something to take its place.

Q. I understand the corned beef is cooked an hour and a half and the roast beef twenty minutes?

A. Then the roast beef should be much better.

Q. They also testified that they took nothing from it for selling?

A. I understood differently; but they only cook the meat sufficient to keep it.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Is it possible for this canned beef to become infested with vermin after canning?

A. No, sir; but this may cover the point in your mind: In the case of this canned beef, if one or two cans break open, the odor is intolerable, but it does not affect the meat. Down in Tampa they started in to condemn a carload until it was shown that the odor was occasioned by one or two cans which had broken open. But this did not affect the balance—that is, the cans not opened could not be affected by it. But still the odor in the entire car is sufficient to make you believe everything is rotten.

Q. Have you in your department any difficulty in getting stores from one point to another?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell us about that.

A. There was a case in New York—I would have to refer to my office to get the exact date—where the potatoes and onions for Porto Rico were left on the wharf in New York, and onions and potatoes were also left in the bottom of a ship with other things over them, and when they were brought up they were brought up rotten. I understood there was difficulty in Tampa with regard to the loading, and when I learned it I telegraphed to the commissary to ascertain what was to be done, and I told him to prefer charges against the quartermaster if he was to blame. I have not taken action in any of these cases, only to go to the Quartermaster-General's Office in person, and he has shown a commendable disposition to do what he could.

Q. Would it contribute to a satisfactory administration of your department if the Commissary-General controlled transportation from the point of loading to the point of disembarkation?

A. I think that the Subsistence Department should purchase the food, convey it,

and hand it to the soldiers. I do not think in this country there will be proper service until that is done. Had I the transportation for General Shafter's army, I would have loaded part in one ship and part in another—I would not have trusted all my eggs in one basket—and I would have placed the transports as I did with General Brooke in Porto Rico, and I would have seen that the soldiers would have gotten their rations if human ability could do it. I have a bill before Congress now and hope to get it through, authorizing the Subsistence Department to purchase ovens and coffee-mills and other things, so that the commander of a regiment or a company can go to one department and get everything that pertains to food.

Q. How about the plates and knives and forks?

A. The Subsistence Department should furnish the meals and the implements for cooking and eating them. Especially is that true with volunteers. Then when I sent rations I would send out everything in proportion. In further answer to that, it is only a couple of days ago that I was on the point of asking the Quartermaster's Department to give me two ships, one for Cuba and one for Porto Rico, so that I can keep up the proper supplies.

Q. From your experience in the late war, are you of the opinion that the Army would have been more regularly and fully fed if you had controlled the transportation and the supply of the cooking utensils and the eating utensils with which the troops were supplied by the Quartermaster's Department?

A. I believe that if my department had had that, some complaints which reached me would not have arisen. I have had complaints about coffee grinders. To feed men on coffee roasted and ground is to jeopardize their rations. Everybody knows that when coffee is roasted and ground it begins to lose strength daily.

Q. I wish you would tell us, General, please, about the coffee, and what is desirable in regard to it in issuing it to troops. What is the best coffee to issue to troops, and if green coffee is better, why is it?

A. Green coffee, when the Department purchases it: it purchases by samples. It is compared with other green coffees, and when it is purchased and the coffee is delivered, samples are taken from every fifth or tenth sack to see that the deliveries are as samples. This was a prime coffee we had, and to my surprise when I ordered samples from San Francisco and St. Louis and Chicago and New York, that from New York was hardly fit to buy.

Q. What coffee have you bought?

A. Rio in the East, and in San Francisco Guatemala and Costa Rica coffee.

Q. What prices did you pay?

A. Eight to 10 cents in New York for the green and 11 cents in San Francisco. When you roast it green you get its entire strength and aroma. The moment you grind it it begins to lose flavor. The reason you roast it is to spread throughout each berry a little drop of oil. An inferior coffee well roasted is better than a good coffee poorly roasted. When it is overcooked it is like—well, let me say sawdust. With a view to saving the Department from getting this weak roasted coffee every two months, I put up and made a coffee roaster, and sent one to each company. They are very simple. I had those constructed, and I asked the Secretary to give me permission to buy them, and he did it, and my reports show that the regulars were very much pleased with them. The volunteers, in their ignorance, preferred the roasted coffee which was ground. I never sent roasted and ground coffee that I did not do so reluctantly.

Q. The roasted coffee dissipates its strength and aroma: now, is that more rapidly dissipated when the coffee is both roasted and ground?

A. No, sir; because when ground it is put in tins and the strength is kept in the tin; but on the other hand, God Almighty only knows what kind of stuff is in the tin you have bought for "coffee." You can not inspect it when tinned.

By General WILSON:

Q. Suppose you bought and roasted and ground and tinned your own coffee?

A. I think the Government had better deal with those in the business.

Q. The reason I asked the question is, I was told that was done in the war of the rebellion. The coffee was bought green, then roasted and ground and put up in hermetically sealed tins.

A. I think the coffee roaster is better.

By General DODGE:

Q. What about the mills?

A. The Quartermaster's Department—

Q. Who furnished them?

A. The Quartermaster's Department generally, but within the past few days there are requisitions coming to me for grinders. The bill I have prepared now is that this department is to furnish bake ovens, roasters, grinders, the equipments, table furniture, and the knives, forks, and spoons, so that a soldier can get everything connected with his food furnished by one department.

Q. A soldier now, in order to get a meal, must make requisitions on three different departments of the Government and have three different requisitions approved?

A. I am informed that the Quartermaster-General is to have a conference with me. I went to the Secretary of War and pointed out the advantage of this. At Chickamauga we were compelled to pay 5 cents for 16 ounces of bread. That contract was made because we had no roasters or field ovens. If I had been there I could have had the flour at two and a fraction cents per pound, and I could have saved money and sent the money back to these men to purchase delicacies; but I had to beg and solicit and present reasons in the interest of the soldiers. I am doing the same to-day.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. You were obliged to do that under the law; I mean that the duties and the prerogatives of the Quartermaster-General are made by law?

A. I really could not answer that completely. I did look up the matter of bake ovens. We had a gentleman who was a commissary-general who arranged it with the Department.

Q. Was he formerly in the Subsistence Department?

A. Yes, sir; Commissary-General.

Q. And your department turned it over to the quartermaster?

A. Yes, sir. I presume it was done because the Commissary Department built the ovens and the quartermaster built the outside shell of wood. The quartermaster said to me, "Then you would build these houses?" And I said, "Certainly; I would buy, care for the food, transport it, and put it into the soldiers' hands."

By General BEAVER:

Q. Do you see any difficulties in carrying out the duties of your position?

A. Yes, sir; I am neither happy nor satisfied.

Q. I mean, do you see any practical difficulty in carrying out that proposition?

A. None whatever. If a man is capable of designing a bake oven you can surely give him credit for ability to put a shell outside. I did not understand your question.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Would it not be better for the Government to have the transportation in two different departments rather than in one?

A. I think not, sir. If a transport is going away it is desirable to fill it up. We would do that in any case. Any officer who has the good of the Government

would do that. But we have to look after the soldiers. Frequent communication with the soldier gives him good food. Infrequent communication makes the food pile up and when he reaches it it is not good. It should be so that when either department wishes to use it, or can use it to advantage, that should be done. In that way we have now very little wagon transportation at the frontier posts. I am credibly informed time and time again of the difficulties experienced at the camps in this matter, and I was furious when I saw milk souring at Montauk Point before it could be moved so as to be used.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, you would not give preference to forage over food, if you had charge of it?

A. No, sir. A steamer the other day came from New York to Savannah. Ninety days' rations were there for the commanding officer to take with him to Cuba. There was no room, and hay had to be unloaded so as to put thirty days' rations on board. The commanding officer, Colonel Hulins, of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania, left half of his provisions, more or less, on the dock, and when the complaint came up it was found that there was no room in the ships for them. Over and over again these things are occurring. Any department of the Government can get competitive rates of the railroads of the country. It is certain to have a certain amount of transportation. These transports should be sold as soon as the Government has finished with their use and necessity.

Q. General, in spite of all this you have spoken of, please state whether you think the Army was well fed.

A. I know of no place where there was a deficiency of food anywhere. There can not be considered to have been a deficiency at Santiago. You gentlemen know that as well as I do. It is only within the past few days that a complaint was sent to me about the onions arriving rotten. I send them by every ship, but if they are improperly packed that is another matter.

Q. Do you mean improperly "packed" or stored?

A. Stored, I should say.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is not there a great difference in the length of times vegetables will keep where they are bought in certain climates and certain seasons of the year?

A. In the summer months vegetables do not keep long, but we furnish the best we can get. But even that does not necessitate that four days' time should make them rotten.

Q. Were not your provisions bought in the Southern States?

A. Yes, sir; some of them.

Q. Do you think that even under the best packing and shipping those provisions would have kept over two weeks?

A. I do not think they would; but I think they would if properly ventilated?

Q. I suppose you know that all vegetables and potatoes in the South carried by the railroads are not guaranteed by the railroads for more than four days, and certainly not over a week?

A. Yes, sir; but there was the greatest trouble about the vegetables sent out of New York.

Q. That is, those stored on board ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that on account of them not being properly stored by Government officers?

A. Always on our own transports.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Most of those that reached the fighting line were all rotten?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, spring potatoes that you purchased at that time you could not transport to Santiago when they were seven or eight days on the boat?

A. The supposition was they would get rid of them soon after arrival in Cuba.

By General McCook:

Q. From what point of the United States do the best keeping potatoes come from?

A. Colorado and Michigan, and on the Pacific coast—the Humboldts.

Q. Most of them taken up in the fall will keep some time?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, in regard to the fresh beef furnished to the troops, have you had any complaints as to its not keeping well?

A. No, sir: except the objection to the refrigerated beef at Santiago, which has been rather amusing to me.

Q. Is it difficult to keep refrigerated beef after it is out of the ship or car in a hot climate?

A. It will keep under the best conditions, covered and in the shade, seventy-two hours; that is the contract Swift & Co. have with me for furnishing beef at Santiago. We furnish transportation to them, and they take it out at Santiago and put it in their refrigerator building. We pay for only what we accept, for what they daily take out of their refrigerator at Santiago and deliver to us and we accept.

Q. If the beef is bad, then the loss must fall on the contractors and not the Government?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so, if any of our troops took bad beef, they were helping the contractor and not the Government?

A. Yes, sir; that is it exactly. There is no authority on the part of any officer in the Subsistence Department to receive or accept one pound of beef, or anything else, except it is in perfect condition when it is delivered. At Montauk, when the beef was brought in, I stood at the warehouse and watched them carry it, and the man did not know who I was. They brought up half a beef, and I said to the man, "You go and tell the contractor for this beef that if he puts in another piece of meat like that, I will break his contract;" and I stood there and watched the rest go in, but that was the only piece which seemed tainted, and he said that had slipped in accidentally.

Q. If some beef, as reported at Chickamauga, in ten hours had been found to be tainted, would not that have been returned?

A. No, sir; not when delivered at the Southern camps. That would be at Santiago, but in the United States it is only taken daily and for immediate use.

Q. Then if it had become tainted within a few hours after the delivery—

A. Then it should be returned. I had an issue with Armour & Co. on 8 barrels of pork, and I made a reclamation on Mr. Armour. After considerable correspondence back and forth I got a communication from Mr. Armour, in which he says: "If General Eagan insists upon it, Armour & Co. will restore the 8 barrels of pork." That is the status of the case now. He is willing to give it, but I am afraid to take it for fear he thinks I am demanding it because my department does a lot of business with him. I hold to the principle that if a barrel of pork or anything else is accepted by our officers, and we find in a week or two it is not what it purports to be, I should make a reclamation; and I know of no instance where they complained about doing so.

Q. We found cases, General, at Jacksonville particularly, where it was alleged that the beef had been issued in the morning and before it could be cooked for dinner it was found tainted?

A. It should immediately have been turned back on the contractor's hands. But the contractor might say, "It was exposed to the sun;" and in that case we might not have much of a case against him.

Q. If it had been carried in the open sun instead of a covered wagon—

A. Then we do not have any claim. The point with Swift is that he contracted with us that it should be good seventy-two hours.

Q. So, if it was spoiled under those circumstances, that would be the fault of the men?

A. Yes, sir; I could not set up a claim in such a case.

Q. In a case of that kind, where there was fault on the part of the contractor, it was returned to the contractor, but the man might go without that meal at least?

A. Not at all, sir; it should be instantly replaced by the commissary officer. There is no circumstance under which the soldier loses his meal, unless it is his own fault.

Q. For instance, when the quartermaster-sergeant went to issue that at 10 o'clock in the morning and he discovered it was bad and it must be taken back to the contractor, and he was 4 miles away, then there would be a loss of that meal through not getting the other meat for that meal?

A. Then, under those circumstances, the commissary must issue bacon to him in lieu of it.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You mean to say that if the beef spoils and the commissary-sergeant is to blame, that the company is not entitled to a further supply?

A. Yes, sir; it is.

Q. Who makes it good?

A. The Subsistence Department; they make it good.

Q. But suppose there was no time to get to the commissary depot to get a substitute therefor, then the man loses his meal?

A. Then he should get the best substitute the commissary has.

Q. But he can not get those on time?

A. They are supposed to draw seven days' of fresh and three of salt rations; that, however, is not obligatory on the company. The commanding officer can have eight or ten days' rations issued. The number of days is discretionary with the commanding officer. The usage, in the discretion of the commanding general, is seven to three. Now, if the company cook has the bacon, or if he has not, he can call on the commissary to replace that which is bad with good for the soldier.

Q. You refer now to the bacon or the salt ration?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, General, the regular ration is drawn by the commissary-sergeant. Suppose part of it is spoiled through his own carelessness?

A. Do you mean the company sergeant?

Q. Or the quartermaster of the regiment?

A. If five days' food is delivered to the command in good condition at the time of delivery, they must be accountable for it themselves, but if a board of survey shows a latent taint at the time of delivery that they did not see, the board would condemn that and recommend an issue in lieu thereof. Now, if by improper handling or lack of care it spoils after issue to the troops, the Government can not be held responsible for that which spoils. To cover that point at the breaking out of the war there was no provision other than that some tarpaulins could be used. I asked the Quartermaster-General to have a tent issued to every company, regiment, brigade, and corps; each to have a tent issued to them; and it was issued, and I immediately sent word to all the commissaries about this shelter for the provisions.

By General DODGE:

Q. When was that?

A. Pretty early in the war. When I say early in the war, I should say I did that in a month. I will try and find the date for you. I think I have it in the office.

Q. Then I would like to state a case which has come to us, where evidently the commissaries or quartermasters of the regiments did not understand the authority. Most of the commissaries that have come before us and testified with relation to the tainted meat have testified that after the meat left their hands and went to the company, even if it was tainted there, it was no part of their duty, and they could not change it; but if it was tainted before they delivered it to the company, they had a right to exchange it. But if they turned it over to the company in good order, it could not be replaced, whereas I just understood you to say it was to be replaced if tainted within seventy-two hours.

A. I said that only applied to Santiago and Porto Rico; but in the case you cited, if the commanding officer of that command would say, "I have received this; it is bad now; it could not have been good when I received it," a board of survey would recommend a reissue. Of course, there is a loss of time.

Q. Then the testimony is, General, with every one of your depot commissaries, that they did not even have to have a board of survey up to the place I mentioned?

A. That is right.

Q. And now you say that even though it got to them good, and later it was found tainted, a board of survey could then recommend a reissue in lieu of it?

A. Yes, sir; but when the Government receives from the contractor meat or anything else, it must be good or it must not be received.

Q. Where does the power have to come from in connection with this board of survey to make it binding?

A. The commanding officer is authorized to order the board. I have always found in my experience the commanding officers are very prompt to take action in that sort of thing.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. We had a very bright commissary-sergeant who explained that he knew of meat being delivered fresh and of them carrying it in open wagons and standing on it, and he refused to furnish other meat in lieu of that.

A. Suppose you were the contractor, and you delivered the beef in that condition, then the Government has no claim on you.

Q. But I understood you to say awhile ago that they could draw other meat even where they had received it in good condition and through neglect it had spoiled?

A. I meant to say that where the taint is latent and not visible. There is a responsibility between the end of the contractor's duty and the reception of the food by the soldier. Suppose, for instance, the contractor delivers at Dunn-Loring his beef in good condition to the commissary and the camp is 3 miles away, and the beef is good when delivered, but the commissary has to wait twenty-four or forty-eight hours in order to get transportation to take it to the camp; then that is the Government's loss if it is delivered in any but perfect condition, provided the contractor delivered it to the commissary in perfect condition.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. It comes simply to this: That the meat when delivered by the contractor had a latent defect. It certainly can not be the law that where you deliver prime beef to the commissary-sergeant and he takes it and leaves it out in the sun uncovered for two or three hours that he can come out then and get other good meat?

A. I did not say that. No.

Q. But you spoke of a latent defect. If the meat is defective when it was delivered to the Government, it makes no difference—it makes no difference whatever if the defect is latent or patent. If the meat is good when it is delivered to the commissary-sergeant, and through his neglect it became tainted, the Government would replace it, on the theory that there was a latent defect, do you mean?

A. No; I did not say that. If you will allow me: Take the case where the contractor delivers it absolutely good and there is a delay after the acceptance from the contractor, there is a delay in delivering it the 3 or 4 miles, and you see it is seemingly good, but you cut it open and find it is not. Then the soldier should not get it. But take the case of where it is delivered to the company officer or soldier in good condition and then a man puts the meat in his wagon and hauls it exposed to the sun 3 or 4 miles, and that spoils it, then the case would be different.

Q. I can not see why the Government should not come back on the contractor when meat is found to be in bad condition.

Dr. CONNER. Is it or not a fact that meat in a refrigerator car rapidly undergoes decomposition when taken out and exposed to the air?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long should it keep sweet after the taking out of the car?

A. At least twenty-four hours, if kept out of the sun.

Q. But if exposed to the sun?

A. Ah, that is different. It must be kept in the shade and covered with cloths.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, have you had any complaints as to the hard bread which was issued, as to its being wormy; and, if so, did you find them well founded upon investigation?

A. I do not know of a single case we have investigated about wormy bread. Whenever we have heard anything about that, it is late—it is past and gone beyond. If wormy, it is without doubt because it was damp. I am putting the crackers in tins now, however. They would have been displeased in the Regular Army with the tin boxes. They preferred the wooden ones. They could use the wooden boxes for different purposes around the camps. They came in very handy. I am purchasing now breakfast bacon which costs $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents more per pound because I am satisfied what has been purchased for years and years is too fat.

Q. You are endeavoring to remedy that for the tropical climates?

A. For the soldiers everywhere.

Q. What complaints have you had as to wormy bacon?

A. I do not know that I have had any. The orders for my department were to throw ninety days' supplies for 70,000 men into Tampa. Those orders, to the best of my recollection, were given a few days before my appointment as Commissary-General. We threw the bacon in there. The congestion occurred. I was appalled. We had no storehouses for the Subsistence Department. I sent telegrams to the depot commissary, Colonel Smith, to hire laborers and unload those cars at any cost. I have his reports, if the committee cares to see them. General Shafter went away with 16,000 men. They carried four months' supplies. I will supply the commission with the pounds and ounces they took with them. I learned that some flour was weevily and some bacon skippery. And in the Regular Army I would have sifted the flour and cut off the bad bacon, but with the volunteers it would have prejudiced them. But in the case of the fresh beef spoiling, that was the fault of the Government and should be replaced in lieu with good.

Q. Does canned beef deteriorate?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It is reported here that canned goods were issued bearing the label, "Packed in Chicago in 1892." Do you know anything about that?

A. No, sir; not that I know of.

Q. Don't they guarantee canned meat to last several years?

A. I think so; they guarantee it to last several years, but I would never buy a ten years' supply. In buying we endeavor to get the last crops of vegetables and other things.

By General WILSON:

Q. Is it customary to get the dates of canned stock—that is, when it was canned?

A. No, sir. We tried that in California; we tried to get a bill through the legislature there, but the canned-goods manufacturers beat us out. As a matter of fact, when war was declared there was so little of this canned beef on the market that the Armours brought back a consignment sent to England, which shows how well cleaned up the market was.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. But wasn't it sent three or four years ago to England?

A. No, sir. I wanted so much, and they did not have the whole amount; but they agreed to ship and bring to me a certain amount at a given time, and they sent for this.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was that intended for general consumption or for the use of the English army?

A. I do not know. I was particular to inquire of the Navy about this canned beef, and they spoke so well of it that I bought it. The meat problem, I might say, is a hard one right now. If you feed troops with meat in the Tropics before the animal heat is out of the body, it causes diarrhea. Speaking of this refrigerated beef, I would like to say I am informed that the Waldorf-Astoria and other hotels of that class take this beef and hold it until it grows a beard, and then they shave that off, cut that part off, and that is the prime beef you get. I would also like to state that in each and every case where I gave instructions to the commissaries I told them that there was no valid excuse for not feeding the soldiers. I desire to say that, because it was my theory, and is my theory now—that there is no valid excuse for not feeding the soldiers.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. General, what do you think of the theory that beans kill more men than bullets in war?

A. No, sir; I do not think so.

Q. Do you think they ever cook the beans properly? Isn't it a fact that the cooking in the Army is both vile and despicable?

A. The cooking is not all it could be.

Q. Do you believe the regimental officers ever take care—proper care—as to the beans—the cooking of the beans—feel them, and mash them, to see that they are properly cooked?

A. As to feeling and crushing them, I do not believe they do.

Q. In this last war did you issue beans?

A. I will answer that in this way, Colonel, with your permission: The "dried vegetables" are beans, pease, rice, or hominy, and the company commander can draw for issue what he prefers. They can draw one provided they do not draw the other, or he can take one-half of one or one-quarter of one and the rest of the other.

Q. You furnished the best articles that could be bought for money?

A. Yes; but not fancy articles.

Q. You furnished the best staples?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, men living on those things ought to have been healthy, if they were properly cooked?

A. Yes, sir; if properly cooked.

Q. Then, that gets us down again to the question about beans killing more men than bullets. Isn't it a fact that the cooking is despicable?

A. Yes; and I think the Government ought to procure good cooks, if they cost \$100 a minute. I went to Congress some time in July—

Q. The way they used to do about cooks was to detail some man that never had cooked a meal in his life. Isn't that the way it is done now?

A. Yes, sir; and they think it is amiss for them to have anything else.

Q. Then, if the Government had a set of regular cooks for the men, cooks, like the officers have, for the men, you think it would be a great improvement?

A. Yes, sir; decidedly.

Q. And the men would be better fed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You spoke of green coffee?

A. Green coffee in barracks and green coffee in the field or in trenches are different things. I have spoken for green coffee in my annual report—

General WILSON. Those men around Manila, where it was rainy and muddy, that ground coffee—green coffee—to roast in the trenches there would be no good; and they had green coffee in the beans issued to the troops in the trenches at Santiago?

A. Probably that was because they had not the other on hand at the time. I can not recollect whether it was an official report or what, but I heard the men were obliged to grind the roasted coffee I sent with the butts of their muskets.

Q. General, in the matter of rice, is it not a fact that if it is not very well cooked it is not good diet?

A. No, sir; it is not good diet if not properly cooked. It is decidedly bad then.

By General McCook:

Q. General Eagan, do you recommend for each regiment going into the field a commissary-sergeant?

A. I recommended such a bill to Congress, but Congress did not pass it. I have now in a bill which I have prepared a provision that every regiment should have a regimental commissary and a regimental sergeant. I know of no men in my department that I used—I might say, almost, abused—that I used as I have the commissary-sergeant. I have so few of them. I would absolutely lend them to an officer for a couple of weeks, because they were invaluable. I only had 90 of them and, of course, they would not go around. I sent them where they would be most good. I frequently offended officers by taking them away and sending them to some man who knew absolutely nothing of his duties.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Please state as to the methods of purchases, whether by inviting bids, or how.

A. Just as I was made Commissary-General, and for a short time afterwards, we made some purchases in the open market, and I directed that the commissaries should publish a blanket advertisement, calling for bids for all classes of our supplies for the period of one month, bidders bidding to supply whatever might be required. That is the way.

Q. How did you make these large contracts for beef?

A. By bids awarded to the lowest responsible bidders. The contract with Swift & Co. for supplying the troops at Santiago I made myself. I sent to all the packing houses and beef packers, calling for bids for furnishing the Army with beef. Swift & Co. bid 9.47; Armour 10.37—nine-tenths of a cent per pound difference—and it ranged from that up to 44 cents per pound.

Q. Please state whether any contracts you have made have been influenced by other considerations than the best interests of your department.

A. I positively swear that no influence whatever was exercised in the awarding of a contract by me or, so far as I know, by any officer of my department.

Q. General, I know your theoretical independence regarding your duty. Please state your practical independence of all officers in making the purchases and distributions of supplies. Say, for example, if you knew that 16,000 or 17,000 troops were to arrive at Montauk Point at a certain date, whether you, of your own motion, would send supplies there or send them on the motion of some one else through orders.

A. I was not obliged to wait for orders. In the case of Montauk I sent a man there, and directed the commissary in New York myself. The instant I knew of any movement I set the machinery in motion. In Tampa there were ninety days' provisions and supplies for 70,000 men sent by the Subsistence Department by order of the Secretary of War. In Chickamauga I was ordered to place ninety days' supplies for the command, which, I think, was 50,000 men. Those orders were obeyed. My plan, for the purpose of relieving the commanding generals and the regimental volunteer officers of being obliged to take charge of the stores, to place an officer in charge of the commissary stores, was on my own notion. I received weekly reports from them, and I knew what was wanted and supplied them. This officer delivered to the brigade commissaries supplies for the command for five or ten days, as the commanding general told him, or more if the commanding general told him.

Q. Please state if you have been interfered with by any superior authority so that the soldier has suffered in the receipt of his rations.

A. In absolutely no way whatever.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. When General Shafter went to Santiago, didn't he have the right to order you or some one to send supplies to him?

A. He had a chief commissary whom he could direct to take any supplies he wanted. In the particular case of General Shafter there were far more supplies on hand than they could use.

Q. From whom did the order originally come?

A. From General Shafter for his command.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. He would just say to his commissary, "I want certain supplies"?

A. Yes, sir—one, three, four, or five months' supplies—and he would get them. I have throughout this war kept in touch with my commissaries, and through the weekly reports that came in I knew what was on hand, and I, knowing the troops to be sent to any place, would govern the supplies accordingly.

Q. What do you think, General, of allowing the enlisted man to purchase the same articles of the commissary as the officer does?

A. He has that privilege now. As a matter of fact, these articles for sale were intended for the enlisted man and to take the place, as far as the Government would go, of the old post trader.

Q. Please state whether or not you have had at the various stations at all times sufficient money to pay the commutation of rations?

A. Yes, sir; so far as I know, abundantly.

Q. General Dr. Conner asks me to ask you how soon the provisions of order No. 116 of August 10 in regard to 60 cents commuted for the ration of patients in the hospital was made available?

A. It was made available almost immediately. What I mean by almost immediately is, say, twenty-four hours.

Q. Well, at the different points, do you know?

A. Well, as fast as the orders could reach there.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Is it likely that two weeks' time had elapsed between the issuing of that order and the receipt of that order at Montauk?

A. I would like to answer by expressing the belief that no such time elapsed.

Q. Was order No. 116 distributed by your office—

A. The Adjutant-General's Office distributed those. My commissary there wrote a letter on the 13th, asking if it was 50 cents, and I wrote in answer on the 15th.

Q. Was not there a provision at any time of 30 cents commutation?

A. We have commutations at 25, 30, 50, 60, 75—no, not 75—60, and \$1.50, under different conditions.

By General WILSON:

Q. Ever since we started here on the 24th of September, or something after that, we heard of something that took place before the war and kept up until this 60-cent matter was given, and that was that a 30-cent ration was given.

A. A little explanation of General Order No. 116 I will give: I returned to my office from the Secretary of War's office one day, and I found a copy of the telegram from General Shafter asking for \$2,000 for chickens. Prior to that, on representation of needs of the sick at Key West, the Subsistence Department allowed 75 cents for the needs of the sick, and in other cases 60 cents was allowed. I took the telegram and went to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary said he would furnish the money out of his own pocket. I told him that the Subsistence Department could furnish unlimited cash. I told the Surgeon-General what this should become, and I said it should not become a "hospital fund," and he expressed surprise; and I recommended 75 cents, because it was over there in Cuba that the rations would be commuted, where anything would cost a great deal of money, and General Shafter afterwards expressed his approval of it and telegraphed to the War Department. The Secretary of War at first was going to give that out of his own pocket, as General Shafter had asked for it. I told the Secretary that that was not necessary, as the Subsistence Department could furnish all the money he wanted. I recommended that the 60 cents be allowed to be expended by the surgeons themselves for liquid and solid foods for the men, and I added that the portion not expended in this way should revert back to the appropriation for the subsistence of the Army, and I perfectly understood or believed that that feature would be objectionable to that branch of the service. I made this because during the war the 30-cent ration, when commuted, was not all used, and that money was not turned in, but kept swelling, and after the war it became known as the "hospital fund," and it floated around the country after the war. I did not want this to become a fund at all except to purchase food, solid and liquid, for the soldiers. I think I asked Weston, the commissary at Montauk, why the surgeons did not call for this money. General Wheeler at Montauk had instructions to see the soldiers were properly fed, and he authorized the depot commissary there to purchase many things not authorized by law and not on the list of articles for sale, and I, knowing that all those things would have to be purchased outside of what was authorized by law, objected. Later the surgeons made a requisition for money, as per General Order 116, and it was filled on the next day, the 26th, by the depot commissary at New York.

Q. Please state if the cost of running your department has been greater than you thought; and if so, for what reason.

A. Greater; because the amount of commutation has been greater than usual. The cost was greater during the muster out of the troops; also by reason of their being two weeks in a city in some cases, and I had to board them at restaurants at a cost of 50 or 60 cents a day, and we had to pay clerk hire and telegrams, etc.

Q. Then you have taken care of the soldier wherever he was until he was mustered out?

A. Oh, yes, sir. Where he was to be mustered out and had not his mess gear, we directed him to be subsisted at restaurants; and in cases where they preferred to be at home, then they were given their money for the ration, which was commuted.

By General DODGE:

Q. As I understand your yearly report, your understanding of that order was that it would cover any sick man?

A. Yes, sir; as I explained to them; whether he was sick in the hospital or in quarters.

Q. But that construction, I understand, was not carried out. As I understand the construction of that order, as made by the authorities, it was that it only applied to hospitals.

A. There were a lot of men there not sick enough to put in hospitals, but too sick to eat the regular rations. I sent word to the chief commissary that it was for any man that the doctors thought in a condition not fit to eat the rations.

Q. That construction has not been put upon it by the Surgeon-General, has it?

A. I do not know what he puts upon it. I urged upon him the necessity and importance of this order to the sick. I subsequently had it extended to trains or boats, and on the transports where the men were sick.

Q. Your construction is that any surgeon of any regiment or hospital can draw 60 cents for the ration of any man he thinks not fit to eat the regular ration?

A. Yes, sir. May I read that part of my telegram to Weston, chief commissary at Montauk? "Meantime the most important thing to do now is the question of providing for the troops. General Order No. 116 covers any and all soldiers that the surgeons consider should receive other food than the regular army rations." And later, in my letters to Colonel Weston, I explained that we had such a thing as "sick in quarters" as well as "sick in hospital," and that it referred to men not well enough to eat the regular ration, but not sick enough to be sent to the hospital; that it referred to men borne by the surgeon as "sick in quarters" and whom the commanding officer would not undertake to utilize in any way or call out to drill.

Q. We have a great deal of testimony about men sick in quarters and not in condition to eat the regular rations. Every surgeon and commissary that we have asked about these men—have stated that there was no way of obtaining this commutation of the ration of men not sent to the hospital.

A. Has any commissary testified to that?

Q. I don't know that they have.

A. I have concentrated large sums of money in the hands of old, experienced Regular Army officers. I did not give hundreds of thousands of dollars to young and inexperienced officers just entering the service. I think my chief commissaries were all regular officers. Other officers, brigade commissaries, I would give five and ten thousand dollars and renew it; and to officers of large experience I gave one hundred and two hundred thousand dollars. I think that was a wise course to adopt.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Suppose you have one sick man in a company and he goes to the doctor and the doctor marks him "sick in quarters;" how does the man get the 60 cents?

A. The soldier can do nothing.

Q. Who makes the requisitions?

A. The surgeon in charge.

Q. Would he make a requisition simply for this one man?

A. He would make a requisition for \$100 or \$200. The commissaries must honor requisitions for money.

Q. And when the doctor draws this 60 cents, it must be replaced to the commissary by not drawing a ration?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But where you apply this to one or two men in a regiment off duty it becomes complicated?

A. I think not, sir. Here is a surgeon with nobody sick to-day; he calls on the commissary to-morrow and makes a requisition for \$500 or \$100, and then with this sum he buys each day not to exceed 60 cents a day for each sick soldier in his camp. Then he accounts for the balance unexpended and remaining in hand.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Has any doctor, so far as the records of your office show, drawn sums and held them for this purpose? Regimental doctors I speak of.

A. I could not answer that, sir. I have not had any reports from that. One case I know, where I am confident a regimental doctor took the rations and sold them and the 60 cents, too, and he has brought in in addition that the Government is in debt to him. That is referred back, and I am now considering that.

Q. Was that a hospital or regimental surgeon?

A. I think a regimental surgeon, but I think it occurred in a hospital.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Please state whether or not this practice of commutation of rations for soldiers sick in quarters, which I have no doubt is a wise one, under certain conditions, would not tend to have them get excused from labor.

A. A great many do that, but the doctor looks out for that character of men.

By General DODGE:

Q. I think one of the greatest complaints before us has been from the surgeons of regiments and others that it was impossible for them to obtain proper food for men sick in quarters not sick enough to be sent to a hospital; the invariable answer was there was only one ration they could give to these men, and that was the regular ration. Now, you take the position that order No. 116 covers all those cases.

A. Yes, sir; every one of them. The commanding officer and doctor fix that.

Q. Now, then, in your opinion the best method for obtaining this kind of food for men sick in quarters, but not sufficiently to be sent to hospitals—you think your method would be the most practicable?

A. The most sensible and economical. It is the most sensible, economical, and best for this reason, that the Medical Department has objected to that order simply because they must account for the money they do expend.

Q. What is the most practicable method?

A. Make them obey that order as they will any other.

Q. Have you no better method?

A. No, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. I asked you whether the regimental surgeons have reported to you that they had drawn money for this purpose.

A. Yes, sir; it has been drawn in a great many places.

Q. By regimental surgeons?

A. I did not stop to notice whether they were regimental or brigade. To-day, and at any time since the issuance of that order, the doctors could call for the money; and after that they must show how they expended it. Suppose the doctor had 500 men under his care: 100 are sick, and the doctor is drawing 60 cents for each one of them; then the regular rations issued by the commissary will be for only 400 and the doctor looks out for the other 100. Then the surgeon gives in his

report in a return. He may want to draw for 25 of the 100 the regular army ration and use different parts of that for feeding the whole 100; and in that case his ration return shows for 75 men and he gets the balance—that is, for the other 75 men—in money. The ration return is in every sense a voucher.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Do I understand that he can draw in lieu of a portion of his rations any other portion he wants to?

A. Yes, sir; in this way: The dried-vegetable ration is interchangeable. He can draw beans, pease, rice, and hominy, or one-half of one and the balance of another.

Q. You can draw the entire dry ration instead of any one thing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, one question asked of several doctors and commissaries is as to the fitness of the ration issued at the present time for Cuba—a climate such as Cuba.

A. I have strong views on that question, sir. There are always people ready to advise things for the ration that are nice to the palate. The present army ration is the result of one hundred years' experience by the ablest men in the Medical and Subsistence Departments. It has been subjected to the closest scrutiny time and time again. These people go to the tropical climates, and not finding meat a part of the diet of the natives, conclude it should not be eaten, but that a man in the Tropics should eat merely a few plantains. They do not stop to think that the native, the man standing there before them, is the product of that food. They should stop to think that these people live on plantains. That is a serious error on their part. It is not because the native does not like meat, but because he is too poor to buy it. It is because they can not afford to buy what we feed to the American soldiers.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. One answer to that is the English do not issue the same ration in the East.

A. I think that is not an answer; I think the English ration is substantially ours.

Dr. CONNER. I have the English ration here somewhere; we need not mind about that, I have the list of the English ration.

The WITNESS. Is it not substantially ours?

Dr. CONNER. They issue less meat in the Tropics.

The WITNESS. My views and my intentions are to ask Congress to alter the ration by adding two or two and a half or three ounces of dried fruit as a laxative. It is also my purpose to ask for a slight increase of sugar and coffee.

Adjourned to 10 a. m., December 13.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 13, 1898.*

General CHARLES P. EAGAN, recalled:

By General BEAVER:

Q. At the close of your testimony we were coming up to the question of food for the tropical climate.

A. I am preparing a bill to send to Congress, in which I have recommended that there shall be a slight increase in rice and coffee and an addition of 2 to 2½ ounces of dried fruit, but from all I can understand and learn, I don't think we should change the ration in any other respect.

Q. Decrease the amount of carbon-producing food?

A. I think not, sir. There is a great loss in the forequarters of the beef. It is pretty nearly all bone, and it requires knowledge as to how to cut it properly. There was very little left over.

Q. As to the fatty pork?

A. That is optional with the commanding officer. He can regulate the issue of salt or fresh meat in his discretion. Another thing, if we are going to get beef in the tropical climates, or Florida beef, a quarter of a pound will not go near so far as a quarter of a pound of our beef.

By General WILSON:

Q. Has it ever occurred to you, the propriety of issuing, as a part of the ration, what we call dried beef, which we use at home sometimes as chipped beef and broil it?

A. I don't believe the troops would care for it as a food. I experimented in every conceivable way with the beef—the thermometer there was 120 in the shade—and finally I jerked the beef. The men simply would not eat it at all.

Q. They prefer—

A. They practically fell back on salt meats. The meat was slaughtered at night—1 or 2 o'clock in the morning—and it was fed for food in the morning. I resorted to jerking it, as the Mexicans do, and I found they would not eat it. They did not care for it.

Q. Then I understand that you, as Commissary-General, are still impressed with the belief, and it is your views, that the present meat ration should be continued?

A. I do not think that. The President asked me to telegraph to Manila and get the consensus of opinion of the officers there as to what change they wanted in the army ration. They telegraphed back—I am not certain whether it was General Merritt or Otis; one or the other—they cabled back that they would not recommend any change in the meat ration, but would like a little dried fruit. They were issuing 3 ounces a day. Then General Merriam was asked, and he would not recommend a change. That was in regard to the service in Honolulu.

Q. In Porto Rico or Cuba, would not the fresh fruit, which is so freely grown there, be equally desirable, if not better than the dried fruit?

A. I don't think it would be advantageous or proper for the Government to undertake to handle fresh fruit. It, of course, can be purchased out of the company savings. I am going to recommend that savings be allowed on everything. My theory is, whatever the soldier does not see fit to draw, he shall get the money value in lieu of it.

Q. In view of the fact that you were issuing fresh beef, where would be the difficulty in issuing fresh fruit under similar circumstances?

A. I don't think it is necessary, and I think the Government ought to handle those delicate things with great caution. We handled cheese at one time, and we found that, considering the small proportion that the soldier got, the loss to the Government was enormous. I think fresh fruit can be readily obtained by the company commanders themselves from company funds.

Q. You have met with a great deal of difficulty in the transportation of your supplies, which you told us yesterday. Will you give us your views—I have no doubt you have made a study of it, and you are no doubt aware of the conditions in the British and French armies—as to the propriety of having in the United States a supply corps instead of having the corps as they are now? I believe you understand that in the English army they have a corps which covers the quartermaster's, commissary, and pay departments. I would like to have your views on our having a similar arrangement to that in the French army; and while the German Government is not like it, it is similar.

A. I don't believe one department could fill the requirements of the vast distance and area covered by the troops of the United States. The whole trend of everything to-day is—and for some years back has been—to specialties. I consider it takes a man a lifetime, practically, to be either a good quartermaster or good commissary, as he is now. All my experience points to that. I consider that some

of the departments, notably the Quartermaster's Department, is top-heavy. Now, by having too many different and diverse duties to perform, which practically splits it into a number of subdivisions, which might be called departments, if you add any more to that department, I think you would do so at the risk of efficiency. You would overload officers with work who would cease to become experts in the various parts of their work; and from reading and discussions and study I believe our system is the very best in the world. I would not favor adding to any department any more work.

Q. The English Government, of course, when you speak of area, covers a much larger and broader area than we do when it takes in India. For their supply department they have what they call their administrative department, which covers quartermaster's, commissary, and pay departments. In the German army they have a paymaster attached to each battalion, and he pays the troops, receiving his funds from an officer not above the rank of major, and he is also obliged to take charge of all the paper work, to prepare the estimates, and submit everything of that kind; but when the materials come in, they come to the different officers of the regiments from the supply department. That is my understanding of it. My whole point in asking the question was to get the views of distinguished soldiers like yourself who have been long in the service.

A. I read a great deal and give a great deal of thought to it, and my idea is that our system is the best. I should look with great concern upon making one department out of three. I mean adding any more to one department.

Q. In the German army the quartermaster's department has charge of transportation only?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the so-called subsistence department not only furnishes subsistence and camp and garrison equipage, but all transportation comes from them. That seems to be the very point where you find the failing point.

A. I think that each department of our present system should be enabled to do its whole work, particularly where that department has a great deal of any kind of work. When I suggested to the Quartermaster's Department, for the purpose of security and celerity, that it might be wise to turn over to the Subsistence Department two transports, it was said our vessels might go empty. Referring to the system in the British army, I don't think that the English army has ever been fed and supplied as well as ours. I recall very vividly their utter failure in the Crimean campaign—that is the nearest approach to our Santiago campaign. I am of the profound belief that the Quartermaster's Department has too much to do. The Secretary of War this morning has forwarded, with his very hearty and strong approval, a bill for the Subsistence Department to hereafter build and furnish and provide bake ovens, mess equipment, and those things we spoke of yesterday. I lay down this proposition in practical explanation of my views. I doubt if any one man, acting as Quartermaster-General, can come before this board and answer straight out questions as to what he has in his department. It was very hard work for me to get along with one assistant, but after a while I preferred it, as it forced me to keep a knowledge of where things were. I believe my department, with additions I have asked for in a bill to be submitted to Congress, will have plenty to do if done properly.

Q. Then, to sum up your testimony in the question I have asked you, I understand you prefer the organization of your department as it now exists, provided you can have transportation to control this and the present ration?

A. Yes, sir; and the furnishing of the means for cooking and means for eating.

Q. And that the ration as now issued would be satisfactory in tropical countries, provided the addition could be made of dried fruits?

A. I should think so—at least for a year. If we find there is a real necessity for anything else, then next year we can go before Congress and ask a change. I am

anxious that the law for rations shall continue to be, as it has been, a statute law, because my department would be swept off its feet by everybody who wants to furnish many fancy foods, if it were liable to be shifted and changed every day. As I understand it, Congress has closed the door on the ration question, stating what it shall be, and then, on the other hand, it is left wide open in the discretion of the President to commute when necessary.

Q. Can he name any value he deems best for that?

A. Yes, sir; but in each case it is on the representation of the actual necessities.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. What was the object in Congress fixing the ration? Was it on account of the value, so that there should be only so much issued for the soldier?

A. I presume so.

Q. Please state whether or not you think it would be advisable to have a fixed quantity of certain articles or whether to leave it to the discretion of the Secretary of War to change it as he pleases within certain limits of cost.

A. I prefer it should be fixed by Congress with the qualification that is in it now—that, in the discretion of the President, the components may be changed with due reference to the health of the troops and economy. That is the statute law now. I would prefer that Congress would make it definite and fix it so that Congress alone can make material changes. I believe the interests of the country are best served and the interests of the soldiers in that way. I speak with a good deal of feeling because I have been beset with all sorts of foods, with strong, heavy support behind them. In fact, I declare one firm simply persecuted me to buy food. One well-known Senator (I do not remember his name) proposed it only cost a cent a ration, and I said that amounted to over a million a year, and he seemed surprised. I would make it so that no power in the country could touch that materially, in the interests of the soldier and in the interest of the country. These people that go around the camps and furnish their soups—of course, it is good and they are all willing to make recommendations that they have tasted it and it is nice, but the soldiers do not say they want that in lieu of the ration.

By General BEAVER:

Q. To what extent were the subsistence manual and the manual for army cooks of 1896 distributed for the information of the volunteer troops?

A. We sent them out largely; I would have to look at the records in the office to tell the exact number; everywhere that they were asked for. We distributed hundreds and hundreds and hundreds.

Q. To what extent were your commissary depots supplied with the articles enumerated in Circular No. 1, October 1, 1896, which is a circular of the different articles to be kept on hand for sales, as staples, to officers and enlisted men?

A. They were abundantly supplied and every requisition filled. I called for special requests for those things. In temporary camps it would be a loss to have them on hand. They would not be consumed. They were sent liberally and always promptly filled when required for. As I meant to say yesterday, that list was primarily gotten up for the private soldier. The subsistence was designed and intended to take the place of the sutler, except in the matter of liquors. In the list I would make out I would make many additions to it, but under the statute law to-day neither the President or Secretary of War can add anything to that list. I shall ask Congress to put the additions to that list in the discretion of the Secretary of War. For instance, in making a list of that kind, we find by experience that one article is not consumed at all sometimes. We find by experience that some article in lieu is desired. We can not add it except the Inspector-General says so.

Q. To what extent have these been sent out?

A. Universally. I have ordered a copy sent everywhere.

Q. I have in my hand a circular issued from the War Department, Office of the Commissary-General of Subsistence, Washington, D. C., October 1, 1896, Circular No. 1, showing the list of articles to be kept on hand for sale, as staples, to the officers and enlisted men, which is published for the information of all concerned. Is that official, and has it been issued?

A. Certainly, sir.

Q. That has been issued during the present war for the information of the troops?

A. For the information of the officers—sent to the commissary officers. (Paper just referred to is here filed and made a part of witness' testimony, and is marked "Exhibit C. P. E. No. 1—December 13, 1898.")

The WITNESS. In addition to what you see, we have added ginger ale and mineral waters. The question of beer came up. I am a profound believer that in the interest of temperance the Subsistence Department should furnish beer to the men, to be sold in such quantities as shall be designated by the commanding officer. I believe it will stop running out from the camps and drunkenness. I think the Subsistence Department should meet the reasonable requirements of the troops.

Q. Do you know, General, to what extent the manual for army cooks was issued during the present war?

A. I have no means of knowing.

Q. You got no reports from your subordinates as to the distribution of these books?

A. They are sent for general distribution to anybody who asks for them, and they are promptly provided.

Q. Do you know to what extent the depot commissaries and the brigade commissaries gave that information to volunteer officers?

A. I do not. I have no means of knowing.

Q. We found, I believe, in all our travels and investigations one army cook in a volunteer regiment who knew there was such a thing in existence, and he said they did not use it. To what extent would it be practical and practicable to have a corps of commissary-sergeants instructed in the duties of the commissary department and the cooking of the ration for appointment to volunteer regiments in case of the sudden expansion of our Volunteer Army?

A. Each regiment should have a commissary-sergeant. He, of course, will be a very valuable addition, in so far as the commissaries' duties are concerned. So far as teaching cooking, I do not believe it would be practicable. We are authorized by law now to have a commissary sergeant for each garrison, post, or permanent depot of subsistence supplies.

Q. Would it be possible to have a reserve of commissary-sergeants who could be distributed one to a company or battalion?

A. One to each regiment would be sufficient. The commissary-sergeant now, to be appointed, must serve three years as a noncommissioned officer. He is recommended by officers who know him, and we are careful in our examination. They have proved invaluable, honest, generally speaking, upright, and a valuable addition to the service. That is the reason I am asking in my bill only for one to each regiment. In regard to cooking, I don't think that should be put upon the commissary-sergeant.

Q. But let a commissary-sergeant instruct the company cook how to cut up and quarter beef. They do not understand anything about it. This book shows how that is done. If you had a sergeant in each regiment who could make a class of company cooks, would not that have met the difficulty we have discovered everywhere?

A. I think that would be better obtained by having a regimental school like our class in the Army.

Q. How would an ordinary volunteer commissary—

The WITNESS (interrupting). Oh, you were looking at the volunteer end.

General BEAVER. What I am trying to get at is to bring the volunteer soldier at the earliest practicable moment into relation with his rations, such as your Army has all the time.

A. Such a school under the Subsistence Department, with a certain number as a reserve, would be the correct thing. To meet the case you suggest a school of cooking, according to the regulations issued by the Secretary of War, and a reserve, that would be a pretty expensive thing.

Q. I know, but it would not be as expensive as calling the Volunteer Army in the field and having such a condition as we had?

A. I know. That is what I meant yesterday when I said metaphorically, "I would have good cooks if I had to pay them \$100 a minute."

Q. I can say with our experience if we had a sergeant-major in every regiment who understood all about it, there would not have been any ignorance on the subject of rations or any waiting around for the delivery wagon, such as has been complained of?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You could not get Congress to see that that was money well expended when there was no prospect of war, but there ought to be some system devised so that could be done, so when a volunteer regiment went into the field they could have a noncommissioned officer to know what could be done and to give instructions?

A. That would be good for the comfort and health of the men. I inclosed you extracts from the annual reports from my predecessors for twenty-five years. The commissary-generals asked for cooks, and some of these gentlemen have practically stated in advance that our situation would be, in case of war, what we have had. I agree with Colonel Denby that the whole matter simmers down to the cooking. I would be very glad to follow out your idea and have a school. Several commissary-generals have recommended that in the extracts I have furnished to the commission, but I am afraid Congress would not do it. The nearest approach is to have a commissary-sergeant for each regiment.

By General DODGE:

Q. What is your method of obtaining help at your different depots for aiding the work of the Commissary Department?

A. The officers are authorized upon application to hire the necessary help, clerks, laborers, and so on.

Q. You put no limit on them?

A. Nothing further than they must state that it is necessary. If they stated it to me, I immediately accorded it. I hold them responsible for their representations.

Q. Does that extend further than the depots?

A. It extends to every commissary officer.

Q. Does that extend beyond the clerical force?

A. Yes, sir; it includes the laborers.

Q. There is no limit upon what the depot commissary can employ?

A. No, sir; whatever he asks for, he gets. Of course I go over it and look at the number he has and I estimate he ought to do his work with so much, in the interest of the Government and economy.

Q. We have had some complaint that fresh beef was shipped to Porto Rico, when there was no place where beef could be obtained so promptly and cheaply as in Porto Rico; that the beef there was not of good quality; that is, I suppose, it was tainted.

A. The general complaint is unjust and untrue. The beef was purchased and ordered shipped before any information reached my office that beef could be secured in Porto Rico. General Miles telegraphed that beef could be secured

there, and when his telegram was received in Washington the beef was down at Newport News going aboard ships. There was no more beef sent there by me after that. The complaint about that should come from me. The beef was there and was a fine quality, and should have been taken ashore and fed to the men instead of feeding them inferior beef, and the complaints in my office show that the beef there had animal heat in the body when taken to the fire and gave the men diarrhea. I have sent a refrigerator plant to Ponce now. I know the men should not eat the beef on these islands unless it is first refrigerated. The matter of putting up a large refrigerator plant here, there, and everywhere is a very serious problem. I don't know where to turn, for the interests of the Government or the interests of the troops! There is nobody who can refuse for a moment to favor a refrigerated beef on these islands in preference to native beef when it must be fed out before the meat is cool. It should not have the animal heat in it. I sent the beef to Porto Rico precisely as I did to Cuba. General Shafter telegraphed the President and others expressing thanks for it, and he thanked me personally. I did the same thing in Porto Rico after the beef was purchased and the contract entered into. I had a telegram from General Miles that beef could be procured there. It came back and was thrown overboard in New York. It was not landed. My records show that which was landed was very desirable and they liked it. It was only used, I believe, after the depot commissary reached there. I would like, for the information of the commission, to make a statement in regard to the depot commissary. The depot commissary has to be under the orders of the Secretary of War and the Commissary-General because he may supply a dozen different independent commands. He may supply from San Francisco to Omaha into another man's command. That depot commissary relieves the soldiers from impedimenta. When this depot commissary, Smith, reached Porto Rico, he immediately took measures to feed that beef out. The other commissaries did not take those measures. All through this whole matter there is the matter of interest to the Government to avoid loss.

Q. You had in your department a great many officers appointed from civil life?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have those officers been efficient, or have they performed their duties efficiently, or not?

A. Some of them have performed their duties remarkably well. Take the case of Captain Hyde. He was depot commissary, and he resigned to take effect the 15th of this month. Generally speaking, so far as my reports go, I have been agreeably surprised at their excellence. Some few of them did not do very well, but I attribute that to ignorance. One man got drunk, and he was instantly relieved, and there are one or two I think that stand not very well, because of inefficiency arising from inexperience and lack of power; but, generally speaking, they have done very well.

Q. And they have been satisfactory to you, more so than you would expect?

A. Yes, sir; I desire to say that with earnestness. Of course, the details of just how they do their work, it is impossible for the officer who sits here in Washington to know.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I understand your recommendation is that a commissary sergeant be appointed for each regiment?

A. In each regiment. The present organization of the Army does not permit of a regimental commissary sergeant or regimental commissary officer.

Q. Did you have a quartermaster?

A. The regular quartermaster-sergeant; but in that connection I would state that if I had been here as Commissary-General before, I would have asked that that be done. I got a bill into Congress, but it was so long passing through the

Adjutant-General's Office to get into Congress in time that Congress was ready to adjourn.

By General WILSON:

Q. General, are there any direct specific orders from your department as to the period for which rations shall be issued?

A. No, sir. The issue of the ration is ten days, but it is left in the discretion of each commanding general. It can be modified one, five, or twenty days. My great aim was to relieve the general commander and his officers of being loaded down with an unnecessary number of rations. I didn't desire volunteers to get in their possession more than enough for immediate consumption, as they could not take care of it as the commissary could in the warehouse.

Q. The idea was to reduce?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Some volunteer regiments, who did not know how to handle their rations would live away up one day and the next day they would be starving?

A. Yes, sir. I don't think that they had proper means for taking care of it.

Q. Do you think they can carry three days' ration in the present haversack?

A. I have nothing to do with the haversack.

Q. You know from the size of the ration?

A. I had a ration prepared in Chicago of bacon in three-fourth-pound tins, so the men would make a meal of that and throw it away, so as not to spoil the haversack. I was making these arrangements as fast as possible to provide for the men to carry three days' rations, so that the men could keep their haversacks in a cleanly condition.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You have spoken of the delay in getting your bill into Congress by reason of something in the Adjutant-General's Office. Do you know what that was?

A. The Adjutant-General did not believe with me that we ought to have cooks. I believe he is the only officer I have talked with that does not believe in it. The Secretary of War favored my view.

By General WILSON:

Q. It was because of the individual difference with you?

A. I can not say it was that. It was the usual delay. He would be busy to-day and would intend taking it up the next day. My original bill embraced cooks and commissary-sergeants. That original bill never did go through the Secretary of War's Office. After some delay I prepared another and then rather forced—I pertinaciously brought the matter up, and then it was approved.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Did the Secretary of War have meetings with the heads of his departments regularly?

A. No, sir; not regularly. There has never been any regularity in that. Sometimes he would send for three, four, or five of us. He would send for me whenever he wanted to see me.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Would he send for the General of the Army also?

A. Yes, sir.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you go to him frequently?

A. Yes, sir. Sometimes I could not get to see him. Very often I would interrupt him and he would listen to me and answer me and then turn to the other gentlemen. I have had no difficulty in seeing him, excepting the courtesy of waiting a while until he got through with some one else.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Had your department been delayed or its efficiency been impaired in any manner by superior officers, or in want of cooperation on the part of any departments that you cooperate with, except in the matter of transportation?

A. Nothing absolutely has been put in my way. There have been no delays—not intentional delays—there have been frequently times when I have had no notice to do things, but it was not by intention. There was no obstacle put in my way in the sense in which I understand you. Take the case of General Brooke, about his expedition to Porto Rico. It was talked of, but we understood in a general way that they would probably go. I asked for time to prepare for that expedition. Suddenly on a Wednesday afternoon I was informed that the steamers of the expedition would leave New York on Saturday for Newport News. In this short time I loaded 3,000 tons. A number of stores were loaded in New York and a number in Chicago, which were shipped to Newport News, and my officers worked day and night and we worked faithfully and we got him off, and I understand he was very well pleased with the way in which we did it.

Q. Have you anything else which you can state to the commission which will help us in the discharge of our duty or will help the service in the future, or any statements or suggestion that we have not questioned you upon?

A. Beyond the fact that I believe that my department should be empowered to procure the food and transport it, to cook it, and to provide the enlisted men with the means of eating it, and I don't know of anything else I can suggest. I think my department has been handicapped in a measure all through the war by that. I do not think that the commanding officer should go to one department for food and another for his knife and fork and another department for coffee grinders. I furnished the Government roasters. There was no provision for this in the law at the outbreak of the war. I don't think there is sufficient or proper amount of tentage allowed for subsistence supplies. I don't think the amount allowed is sufficient, but I was glad to get it because I knew tentage was extremely scarce.

Q. Is it your idea that you should be allowed to have charge of that?

A. I don't think that my department should go outside of food and what is germane to it.

Q. Supposing we give every department of the Government the right of transporting its own supplies?

A. I would not do it, because every department has not enough transportation to justify that.

Q. The commanding officer would have more transportation on hand—

A. I would not do it that way at all. If my department had transportation, I would not have that class of transportation. I would only have transportation to give them the food.

Q. You would have to have land transportation too?

A. Certainly.

Q. Suppose there was one department entirely devoted to transportation and nothing else, and all departments could apply to that?

A. The transportation department would not know what the different departments would have to supply until it was done on the moment. Talking of peace times in the Regular Army is one thing, but talking of a whirling campaign, which may happen again, it would not do. The Quartermaster-General asked me, "Please don't send any more if you can." I said, "No; I have stopped sending." He didn't know the vast amount of stores ordered put into Tampa.

Q. You can provide for the transportation of all these supplies?

A. If I had the transportation, my department would not have been a party to the congestion. Every car in my department would have been labeled.

Q. Your department sent to Santiago three times the amount of supplies wanted?

A. That is because General Shafter wanted it.

Q. If you had had the power for transportation, you could not have used it?

A. I would have sent with these troops adequate amount of transportation for it, which would be under the commanding general, which would have facilitated his taking the stores to the men. That transportation would be limited and proportioned to the amount of stores. Then, if the commanding general saw fit to use them for any other purpose, he could do so.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Suppose you have to send 100,000 rations to Santiago, what do you do first - you have no transportation?

A. With your permission I might recall a little incident that occurred in my office with a foreign military attaché. He wanted to know the inner workings of the Subsistence Department. I said I would be glad to answer any question, and he did not know how to begin. As he said: "You buy the stores in Chicago and you turn them over to the quartermaster and take them to Tampa?" "Yes, sir." "And they arrive in Tampa and are turned over to the commissary?" "Yes, sir." "And then they are turned over to the quartermaster to take them to Siboney?" "Yes, sir." "They arrive at Daiquiri, and you turn them back to the commissary again?" "Yes, sir." "And you want to get them to the troops, and you give them to the quartermaster again?" "Yes, sir." He had it technically accurate.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. The shipping clerk in the quartermaster's department at Tampa stated the different quartermasters did not send the number of the car?

A. I don't think they did. The commissary turned them over in bulk, and the quartermaster furnished them as he saw fit.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Was there any hardship in that?

A. The commissary says, "I have 100,000 rations. Send it to Tampa and deliver them to my agent," and he does it. That is the end of it.

Q. That is like I go on a train and put my trunk on—

A. Take the case, for instance, of the commissary. He asks the quartermaster to load them this way and that way. Suppose the quartermaster sees fit to put part in one ship and part in another?

Q. The general ought to command that.

A. The general commanding would be busy and would not have time to attend to it.

Q. As I understand, the testimony before us is that in loading the rations they endeavored to load the complete ration?

A. That was, unfortunately, not done, but was in most cases.

Q. As a general thing that was the method?

A. There was a case in Tampa where a lot of vegetables were improperly placed on transports, and the quartermaster refused to unload them. I had to insist on his unloading them, so that the troops would have them, or prefer charges.

Q. Such mistakes are made in such movements.

A. But why not correct them when such mistakes are found out?

Q. General, is it a matter of law that designates to each department what it shall do?

A. It is a matter of law.

Q. And you have made a recommendation to Congress for such changes as your experience shows is necessary for your department?

A. Yes, sir; the Secretary of War approved it this morning and it has gone forward.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. If this law should be passed, you would be at liberty to order of the Ordnance Department, if they had the plant to make these things—these articles they are furnishing now—or of other parties, just as you chose?

A. I should want to exercise that privilege; yes, sir.

Q. And if they had the plant, there would be no loss to the Government then?

A. None at all. If, on the other hand, articles that that plant can produce are not suitable to the men, I would naturally supply the articles most suitable to the men.

Q. Why I asked that question is because the Chief of Ordnance stated that they had a plant all fitted up, and he thought they could work more economically. I thought if they could furnish the articles fast enough, of course you could order from that department.

A. I would not dispute what the Chief of Ordnance says in regard to cost. I believe as a rule that the Government can not produce anything as cheaply as the technical business man. I do not believe we ought to have a transport five minutes after the necessity is over. When the emergency and necessity is over, I believe we ought to get rid of those things.

By General DODGE:

Q. The testimony is that certain of these things it was impossible to obtain outside. If the manufacturers outside knew that you had, for instance, the authority to purchase these things, your theory is that they should supply the plants and have them on hand always?

A. Yes, sir; and I expect from Pittsburg a complete outfit of aluminum, on account of its lightness and strength, for the soldier.

Q. What do you mean by the complete outfit?

A. Cups, plates, etc.

Q. Can you make aluminum knives and forks?

A. Forks and spoons.

Q. That would be much lighter?

A. Yes, sir. I think it would be better, and I believe in bettering things if you can.

Q. As I understand, the Secretary of War has approved your views?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. There were ships with commissary stores in their holds that made trips to Cuba and back without unloading. Do you know anything of that?

A. I am glad you spoke of that. That comes in line with my idea of transportation. One ship brought back about 11,000 tons of subsistence stores. There were other vessels that came back with rations, some of which were spoiled and some were stolen.

Q. Do you know anything about the condition of those stores?

A. Many were worthless. Such as we could we retained, and the worthless were condemned. The greater danger than all was that they might have been necessary in Santiago.

By General DODGE:

Q. Suppose you had charge of those stores and your ship was lying in Santiago and the general commanded that that stuff be landed?

A. His orders would be obeyed. If it had been under me, I would have found men if I had to take men all night to unload those stores.

Q. Suppose you had control of that ship?

A. It generally goes without saying that the orders of the general commanding will be obeyed, but I am informed that the quartermaster stores were taken off.

EXHIBIT C. P. E. No. 1.—DECEMBER 13, 1898.

CIRCULAR }
No. 1. }WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE,
Washington, D. C., October 1, 1896.

I. In compliance with paragraphs 1226, Army Regulations, 1895, and 69, Manual of the Subsistence Department, the following list of articles to be kept on hand for sales, as staples, to officers and enlisted men, is published for the information of all concerned:

Articles.	Varieties.	Unit of weight or measure.	Kinds or sizes of packages preferred.
All articles which are components of the ration; and the following:			
FOODS.			
Apples	(Canned	Can	3-pound cans; gallon cans.
	(Evaporated	Pound	
Apricots	(Canned	Can	3 pound cans.
Bacon, breakfast	In pieces or sliced in cans	Pound	Canvased, or 1-pound cans.
Baking powder		Can	$\frac{1}{2}$ -pound cans.
Butter		Pound	
Cheese	(American	Pound	
	(Edam	Number	
Chocolate	(Plain	Pound	
	(Vanilla	Pound	
Coffee, extra	(Java	Pound	
	(Mocha	Pound	
Corn, green	(Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
Crabs	(Canned	Can	Pony cans; 2-pound cans.
Crackers	Four varieties.	Pound	1-pound cartons.
Flour, family		Pound	Barrels; sacks.
Gelatin		Packet	2-ounce packets.
Ham, deviled	(Canned	Can	$\frac{1}{2}$ -pound cans.
Ham, sugar-cured	10 to 14 pounds	Pound	
Lard		Pound	5-pound cans; pails.
Lobster	(Canned	Can	1-pound cans; 2-pound cans.
Macaroni		Pound	1-pound packages.
Milk	(Canned	Can	1-pound cans.
Mushrooms	(Canned	Can	$\frac{1}{2}$ cans.
Oatmeal	Two varieties	Pound	2-pound cartons; $\frac{1}{2}$ barrels.
Oysters	(Canned	Can	1 pound cans; 2-pound cans.
	(Canned	Can	3-pound cans.
Peaches	(Evaporated (unpeeled)	Pound	2-pound packets; 25-pound boxes.
Pears	(Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
Pease	(Canned, American	Can	2-pound cans.
	(Canned, French	Can	$\frac{1}{2}$ cans.
	(Canned, fresh	Can	2-pound cans.
Pigs' feet	(Pickled	Kit	15-pound kits.
Pineapples	(Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
Preserves, damson	(Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
Prunes	Not smaller than 70's.	Pound	
Salmon	(Canned	Can	1-pound cans; 2-pound cans.
Sardines		Box	$\frac{1}{2}$ boxes; $\frac{1}{2}$ boxes.
Shrimps	(Canned	Can	
Soup	Four varieties, canned or condensed.	Can or tablet	Quart cans; 4-ounce packages.
Starch, corn		Pound	1-pound papers.
	(Cut-loaf	Pound	Barrels; $\frac{1}{2}$ barrels.
	(Granulated	Pound	Barrels; $\frac{1}{2}$ barrels; 100-pound sacks.
Sugar, white			Barrels; $\frac{1}{2}$ barrels.
Sirup	(Powdered	Pound	1-gallon cans.
	(Maple	Gallon	Pound.
Tapioca		Pound	
Tongue, beef	(Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
SPICES, SEASONINGS, SAUCES, JAMS, JELLIES, ETC.			
Cinnamon	(Ground	Pound	1-pound tins.
Cloves	(Ground	Pound	1-pound tins.
Flavoring extract	(Lemon	Bottle	2-ounce bottles.
	(Vanilla	Bottle	2-ounce bottles.
Ginger	(Ground	Pound	1-pound tins.
Jam, blackberry		Can or jar	2-pound cans; 1-pound jars.
Jelly, currant		Can or jar	2-pound cans; 1-pound jars.
Lime juice		Bottle	Quart bottles.

Articles.	Varieties.	Unit of weight or measure.	Kinds or sizes of packages preferred.
SPICES, SEASONINGS SAUCES, JAMS, JELLIES, ETC.—cont'd.			
Mustard	{Ground	Pound	$\frac{1}{2}$ -pound cans.
	{French	Bottle	Bottles.
Nutmegs	65's to 70's	Pound	
Oil, olive		Bottle	Quart bottles.
Olives		Bottle or jar	Quart bottles or jars.
Pepper, red	{Cayenne	Pound	2-ounce bottles.
	{Chile-Colorado	Pound	$\frac{1}{2}$ -pound cans.
Pickles	Four varieties	Jar	Pint jars; quart jars; gallon jars.
Salt, table		Pound	3 to 5 pound bags or boxes.
Sauce, cranberry	Canned	Can	2-pound cans.
Sauce, table	Two varieties	Bottle	$\frac{1}{2}$ -pint bottles.
CIGARS, TOBACCO, PIPES, ETC.			
Cigars	Four brands	Number	Boxes; $\frac{1}{2}$ boxes.
Pipes, briar-wood	Four varieties	Number	
Pipestems, Weichsel	4-inch	Number	
Tobacco, chewing	1-pound plug	Pound	Butts.
Tobacco, smoking	Four varieties	Pound	Commercial packages.
TOILET SOAPS, KITCHEN AND LAUNDRY MATERIALS.			
Soap, toilet	Six varieties	Cake or pound	
Soap, scouring	For wood or paint, two varieties.	Cake	
Soap, laundry	Two varieties	Pound	
Bluing, powdered		Box	2-ounce boxes.
Starch, laundry		Pound	1-pound packages.
Borax		Paper	1-pound papers.
Metal polish	Paste or powder, two varieties.	Tin or box	3-ounce tins or boxes.
Tripoli flour		Package	4-ounce packages.
TAILORS' MATERIALS.			
Buttons, trousers'	{Metallic, large	No. and dozen	
	{Metallic, small	No. and dozen	
Needles	{Nos. 3 to 9	Paper	
	{Darning	Dozen	
Needlebooks with needles.		Number	
Pins		Paper	
Thread, cotton, white	Nos. 36, 40, and 50	Spool	
Thread, cotton, black	Nos. 36, 40, and 50	Spool	
Thread, linen, white	Nos. 30, 35, and 40	Spool	
Thread, linen, black	Nos. 30, 35, and 40	Spool	
Thread, silk	Sizes A, B, C, and D	Spool	
STATIONERY.			
Envelopes, letter, ordinary.	{Good quality, to match letter paper.	Number	
	{Best quality, to match letter paper.	Number	
Envelopes, note, ordinary.	{Good quality, to match note paper.	Number	
	{Best quality, to match note paper.	Number	
Ink, black		Bottle	2 to 3 ounce bottles.
Paper, letter, ordinary.	{Good quality	Quire	
	{Best quality	Quire	
Paper, note, ordinary	{Good quality	Quire	
	{Best quality	Quire	
Pencils, lead	{No. 2, American	Number	
	{No. 3, American	Number	
Penholders	Wooden, with rubber holder.	Number	
Pens	{Fine	Number	
	{Coarse	Number	
	{Stub	Number	
SUNDRIES.			
Basins, hand	XX tin	Number	
Blacking, shoe		Box	
Brooms, whisk	{Large	Number	
	{Small	Number	
Brushes, blacking	With or without daubers	Number	
Brushes	Daubers	Number	
Brushes, hair	{Large, solid back	Number	
	{Small, solid back	Number	

Articles.	Varieties.	Unit of weight or measure.	Kinds or sizes of packages preferred.
SUNDRIES—continued.			
Brushes, nail	Bone handle, bristle.....	Number	
Brushes, tooth.....	{ Hard	Number	
	{ Soft	Number	
Buttons, collar	{ Double gold plated, with hinge.....	Number	
	{ Double gold plated, without hinge.....	Number	
Can openers	Number	
Chamois skins	2 to 2½ feet square	Number	
Clothes lines.....	Cotton	Foot.....	
Clothespins	Number	
Combs, coarse	{ Horn, medium.....	Number	
	{ Horn, small.....	Number	
Combs, fine.....	Horn	Number	
Combs, dressing.....	Rubber	Number	
Combs, pocket.....	Rubber	Number	
Handkerchiefs, linen.....	{ Fine	Number	
	{ Medium	Number	
Handkerchiefs, silk	{ White.....	Number	
	{ Red	Number	
Ink, indelible	Bottle.....	
Matches, safety	Box	
Paper, toilet.....	Package	
Razor strops.....	Number	
Shoestrings.....	{ Porpoise	Pair	
	{ Linen	Pair	
Towels.....	Linen damask, about 26 by 50 inches.....	Number	
	Huckaback { No. 1, about 20 by 40 in.....	Number	
		Number	
	Bath { Cotton, about 24 by 42 inches.....	Number	
		Number	
	Wash, cotton, about 12 by 14 inches.....	Number	
Towelings	{ Bleached, about 19 inches wide.....	Yard	
	{ Unbleached, about 20 inches wide.....	Yard	

II. A commissary may state on his requisitions the brands which are preferred at his post, and if the cost in any case does not exceed that of the standard approved by the chief commissary, the latter, subject to the restrictions of paragraph 70, Subsistence Manual, may request the purchasing commissary to supply the brand desired.

III. The varieties of any article to be supplied for sale must not be kept on hand at any post in excess of the number for each class, as authorized in the preceding list, and not more than ten varieties of cigars (none costing more than \$6 per hundred), eight of toilet soaps, six of pickles or crackers, five of smoking tobacco or soup, will be provided throughout any Department.

IV. Articles may be purchased in such kinds of shipping packages as the distance from the place of purchase to destination and the nature of transportation may render advisable for the security of the contents in transit. The cost of packages will be included in the cost of stores.

V. Special articles that are not embodied in the above list or can not be procured among the varieties authorized will be provided as "exceptional articles," if called for as such.

VI. Chief commissaries may authorize the commissaries at posts, under their supervision, to purchase such exceptional articles as can be delivered at such posts without any cost for delivery.

VII. In the interest of economy, chief commissaries in authorizing purchases to be made at posts will, as a rule, furnish the post commissaries concerned with a sufficient number of circulars (prepared by manifold process) for distribution to principal dealers in the vicinity of the posts and for posting in public places,

instead of directing them to advertise in newspapers. Such circulars should specify the kinds, qualities, and quantities of supplies needed, and should refer bidders to the post commissaries for detailed information and instructions as to bidding, examination of samples, etc.

VIII. This circular is published by authority of the Secretary of War.

M. R. MORGAN,
Commissary-General of Subsistence.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 13, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF LIEUT. COL. A. HARTSUFF —Recalled.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you kindly state at what time you went to Chickamauga Park and what time you left?

A. I arrived at Chickamauga Park about the 25th of April. I can not state the exact date, but I think it was the 25th.

Q. And you remained there from—

A. I remained there from or until the 25th or 27th of July.

Q. During this time you were the chief surgeon of the command?

A. Of the command; yes, sir.

Q. As chief surgeon, what were your duties, in brief?

A. They were—I had to make the interpretation myself—there was no provision made for the chief surgeon of a command. The law provides only for a chief surgeon of a corps and a chief surgeon for an army in the field. As I say, there was no provision at all. My duties were to be general adviser, as I understood it, to General Brooke.

Q. Anything else?

A. There was nothing specific as to the duties—as to my duties—at all.

Q. But a general supervision of the medical and sanitary condition of the camp came under your charge?

A. Yes, sir; so I interpreted it.

Q. Did you consider yourself as chief medical authority on the subject?

A. I did.

Q. And as such had control of all medical matters?

A. In a general way?

Q. Yes.

A. In a general way, continuously.

Q. And when subordinates were appointed, such as chiefs of corps, as well as probably chief surgeons of divisions or brigades, were they all under your command or control?

A. In a way.

Q. Please explain in what way.

A. I regarded the chief surgeons of the corps on the day they arrived there—I went there—there were no chief surgeons of brigades or divisions; my instructions were to supervise everything on the field. When the chief surgeon of the brigade arrived he was delegated to take charge of the division, and I did not interfere with them in the discharge of their duties.

Q. But you had power to interfere if you thought it proper?

A. I had.

Q. Did these chief surgeons of the corps report as a matter of duty?

A. Personally, I think not.

Q. Do I understand that they did not report to you?

A. They did not report to me.

Q. Did they report to the Surgeon-General?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I do not mean by that that they reported to you for assignment, but did they make formal, regular, and constituted reports to you, or irregular reports to you, as chief surgeon of the Army?

A. Yes, sir; through me to the Surgeon-General. They recognized me as chief surgeon of the camp.

Q. Then you were of necessity acquainted with the medical conditions of the camp?

A. I was.

Q. Were those medical officers at the camp assigned to duty by you: that is to say, recommended by you to the commanding general, and by him assigned to duty or did they report to the commanders of corps and were assigned by the chief medical officers of corps?

A. They were assigned, as a rule, to chiefs of corps, to chiefs of divisions, and brigade surgeons, from Washington.

Q. From Washington, were they?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had nothing to do with the selection of them?

A. No, sir; nothing whatever.

Q. At the time you arrived there, were there any volunteer troops at the camp?

A. No, sir.

Q. How soon did they come in?

A. I can not state exactly; perhaps—I think about the 10th of May; something along there; I can not tell.

Q. From two to three weeks, then?

A. When I went there before the arrival of the volunteer troops there were thirteen regiments of regulars.

Q. The regular troops came there, did they not; and did the men have their regular officers?

A. Yes, sir. They had their regular medical officers with them in most cases.

Q. When the regular troops went away did they take their regular medical officers with them?

A. They did.

Q. Did the volunteer regiments which arrived have their medical officers with them?

A. They did.

Q. How many to each regiment?

A. As a rule, three.

Q. Did these men remain on duty with their regiments during the time they were there?

A. They did not.

Q. For what reason and at what time was a change made?

A. After an order—I can not give you the date of the order—establishing the division hospitals.

Q. Then, in the establishment of division hospitals, it became necessary to have regimental surgeons from their respective regiments and assign them to the different hospitals?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you approximate the date of that order establishing division hospitals at Chickamauga?

A. I can not. The order is in existence, but I do not recollect the date of it.

Q. I understood you to say it was in the month of June.

A. I think it was; it might have been in May.

Q. There was, then, a period of two, four, to six weeks during which time the regimental organizations were undisturbed?

A. Yes, sir. I had received instructions to organize them on a certain basis that the regular regiments were assigned a number of hospital stewards and hospital corps men, and when the volunteer regiments came in there was no hospital organization established.

Q. Did or did not the hospital men come in with the volunteer regiments?

A. They did not. No hospital organization was established.

Q. Did any of them have a hospital organization?

A. Some of them; and in connection with that I would say that I am personally acquainted with the regiments that had an excellent hospital organization; they were quite prepared to enlist with the hospital corps and move into the field; and I personally communicated with the Surgeon-General on that subject and asked him to communicate with the different governors of the several States for authority to enlist these hospital corps men that had been left at home and send them with the regiment.

Q. Was that recommendation acted upon?

A. It was not.

Q. Do you know why it was not acted upon?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know by whom it was turned down?

A. I do not.

Q. Was it in the Surgeon-General's Office or by higher authority?

A. I was on the field and knew nothing.

Q. Have you any information, officially or otherwise, which will enable you to answer the question?

A. I have not.

Q. In what way did you look to the organization of the Hospital Corps in the volunteer regiments prior to the time of the establishment of the division hospitals; was it done by yourself directly or through the intermediation of corps, division, and brigade surgeons?

A. There was no hospital organization.

Q. But I understood you to say you were endeavoring to establish a hospital organization?

A. Oh, they came without organization, absolutely bereft in the nature of organization, and I was personally familiar because I was au fait with the regiments in Chickamauga; some of the regiments have good hospital organizations and some have not, and on the strength of that I communicated with the Surgeon-General.

Q. But what arrangements were there made for the care of the sick?

A. Temporary details.

Q. Details from the command?

A. Yes.

Q. Each regiment furnished a detail for the care of its own men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they or did they not at this time have hospital tents?

A. So far as they could be obtained.

Q. That is what I want to find out—if they were obtained, and whether they were brought in the field?

A. They were not brought in the field as a rule.

Q. Were any requisitions made by you or through you for hospital tents to be supplied for regimental hospitals in the early weeks before the establishment of division hospitals?

A. Requisitions were made of the quartermaster and the quartermaster requested my approval of them.

Q. You had to approve of requisitions of that sort?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And were such requisitions sent through you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know to what extent afterwards the tents were furnished to the regiments?

A. To a limited extent—I can not tell exactly, but to a limited extent.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that one tent at least must be supplied to each regiment at this time?

A. At least one hospital tent was either brought into the service and used by each regiment—at least that number was immediately supplied by the quartermaster.

Q. Then each regiment, as we understand it, and as you know, had at least one hospital tent?

A. I think so, and in most cases more than that.

Q. Now, how were those regiments during these three weeks—because I want to ask a question presently, and will have reference in time as to the establishing of division hospitals—how well supplied with medicines and medical stores?

A. Very few of the regiments came into the field equipped with hospital stores. I have made my reports—I have a record of all these which I propose to leave with the commission—showing that the regiments came into the field with ten days' supply, and in a few cases with more than that. Two regiments, I remember, had more than a month's supply, but very few regiments had nothing.

Q. That being the condition of things, how were the regiments supplied with medicines and medical stores?

A. From the Medical Department.

Q. Of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did the Medical Department of the Army have a purveying depot?

A. Yes, sir; the first time I arrived there—I remember now, on the 25th, from a letter I wrote to the Surgeon-General—I made an immediate inspection of the command—my communication to the Surgeon-General—

Q. On your arrival on the 25th of April there were no volunteer regiments there?

A. My first communication to the Surgeon-General was that the regiments there were not supplied with medicines and stores and the proper outfit. They were very deficient. I asked, on the 25th of April, in a communication to the Surgeon-General, that large quantities of stores and medical supplies be sent at once with dispatch; that was on the 25th of April. On the 26th of April I asked the Surgeon-General that a medical purveyor should report there at once. On the 26th or 27th of April I asked the general commanding, General Brooke, that a medical supply depot should be established there at once, in prospect of volunteer regiments arriving, and because we had a deficient quantity of medicines there already, and that we had to supply the regiments on the ground, and we had learned that several volunteer regiments were on the way. I made no requisitions, because I needed information as to what troops were coming; but asked the surgeon, who was better in touch with that subject, to send large supplies of stores at once; to send a medical supply officer there at once, and a quartermaster to drill a purveying depot, at once.

Q. How soon after this date was the purveying depot established there? How soon was it supplied with medicines, and how soon was its officers detailed for the work?

A. Well, that was early in May. I can not give the date.

Q. But approximate it, please. Whether in the first ten, the second ten, or the third ten days.

A. If you will permit me to refer to those papers here—may I?—I can then tell from those papers. Here is a letter touching upon the question that I wrote on the 1st of May, asking that a medical storehouse and the medical supplies, with a medical purveyor, be sent at once.

The letter was read and formed part of his testimony, as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL CORPS,
“CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA PARK, GA.,
“Office of Chief Surgeon, May 1, 1898.

“To the SURGEON-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, Washington, D. C.

“SIR: I have been unable to learn from the correspondence whether medicines and supplies have been or will be sent to us in bulk to be issued, or whether supplies have been sent direct to organizations on their requisitions only. Supposing the latter may be the case, I have forwarded by same mail several sets of special requisitions. Many of the articles for which requisitions have been made are desired at once.

“Many of the regiments are here from different posts—one or two troops or companies from a post—and therefore it takes considerable time to organize and systemize: all the immediate necessities are being met, however, successfully. It is thought a sufficient supply of tentage for hospital purposes will be here to-day to give a full allowance to all the commands. Mounts have not yet been provided for any of the Hospital Corps, but horses are being purchased, and it is thought the Hospital Corps with the cavalry commands will be furnished mounts soon.

“For my office at these headquarters I have as yet absolutely nothing, no furniture, desks, etc.—we have to write on boxes.

“For headquarters, the Signal Corps, and one troop of cavalry I propose to establish a small hospital. To this end I have 1 hospital steward and 5 privates of the Hospital Corps, mounted; 1 ambulance, 1 set of field furniture, etc.—special requisitions herewith inclosed. I would like to get this hospital in running order as soon as possible.

“The camp is favorably located; help, good. Water supply—from artesian wells—good. To meet the present requirements—I need on 1 hospital steward and 10 privates to each regiment of infantry: 2 stewards and 15 privates to each regiment of cavalry and headquarters—I need 1 or 2 stewards and 48 privates.”)

Q. Now, in respect to that letter, and knowing about the condition of affairs there, why did they not send the supplies according to the necessities?

A. It may have been done on the 10th of May, because here is a communication on the subject, reading as follows:

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL CORPS,
CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA PARK, GA.,
Office of the Chief Surgeon, May 10, 1898.

The SURGEON-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington, D. C.

SIR: Immediately on receipt of your letter, May 7, I wrote the commanding general here that a submedical purvey establishment had been ordered here; that a medical officer had been ordered here as purveyor and requested that a storeroom for medical supplies, 25 feet by 100 feet, be provided at once. There are no storerooms or buildings that can be used as such in or near this park, and storerooms will have to be built for all the different military departments.

As the Surgeon-General knows perhaps better than I do to what extent the incoming volunteer regiments will be supplied, and therefore what supplies will be necessary for this command of 40,000 or 50,000, it is presumed that the supplies necessary will be sent as soon as possible without requisition, especially as Major Comegys can not reach here for several days, and many of the supplies will be required at once or very soon.

The number of Hospital Corps here is limited. I need an experienced hospital steward in my office at once, and the medical purveyor will need stewards and clerks before he can properly receive and issue supplies.

I wrote you in brief on the 8th of what seemed to be necessary in the organization of the medical department of this command, its necessities, etc. I deferred elaborating, and now wait for directions or suggestions from your office. I have not learned whether the volunteer regiments will have members of the C. D., and if so, what number; nor whether it is the intention of the Surgeon-General to send companies of the Hospital Corps here.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,
Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon.

Q. Perhaps I can assist you a little by asking a question. Were there any supplies sent there in response to those requisitions of yours prior to the arrival of the medical purveyor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were supplies there before?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In whose hands were they?

A. They were in my hands.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state at what time they reached you, and in what quantities; what the articles were, in a general way?

A. I can not tell that at all.

Q. Have you any records that will show what was there?

A. Here is a letter of May 10 to the Adjutant-General on the subject.

Q. And the date of that letter is the 10th of May?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, prior to this time there were no stores except such as the regiments might have with them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any demand for medical stores at this time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Those stores that were sent to you, which you reported the arrival of on the 10th, how soon were they delivered?

A. At once.

Q. By "at once" do you mean one day, two days, or a half an hour?

A. Probably that was it; I can not tell you exactly; I do not remember. My duties were multitudinous. I don't remember those matters. I had assistant clerks, etc., to attend to that work.

Q. Who had charge of the delivery of these stores to you—the Quartermaster's Department?

A. The Quartermaster's Department.

Q. Did the Quartermaster's Department promptly deliver these stores?

A. The first stores; yes. On two or three occasions subsequent to that time stores were lost there at Battlefield Station and remained there at the station for two or three days at a time in the mixing up of the cars.

Q. Now, at this time, do you remember the date on which the medical purveyor reported himself to you or to the commanding general?

A. I can not tell that; I do not know. The order was shipped promptly, and took him many days to turn over his property and arrive at Battlefield, and during that intermission I received and issued all the stores myself.

Q. Now, what companies arrived—it was on the 20th of May, according to his own statement—he made a statement that nothing came until the 22d, 23d, or 24th; that is, nothing in the nature of supplies—do you know whether or not that refers to supplies for the depot or whether it refers to supplies in a general way—you

have stated that stores came to you before this that were taken care of by you and issued by you. To what extent were you supplied with stores during these fourteen days between the 10th of May and the 24th of May?

A. I think only this carload that I spoke of.

Q. Were these supplies sufficient for the necessities of the camp?

A. They were not. I was constantly in communication with the Surgeon-General on that subject and notified him of the deficiency.

Q. Whether it was a necessity—some time before Chickamauga Park was to be made a camp site, to be occupied by large bodies of volunteer troops?

A. Yes, sir: I have a communication here on the subject, saying that it was a necessity; that at least 40,000 troops were to arrive there; but we had no definite information in regard to it. I received a letter from the Surgeon-General.

Q. Each regiment would be supplied from the respective States with one month's supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the date of the letter, please?

A. I will find it, sir; here it is—May 14:

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL CORPS,
CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA PARK, GA.,
Office of the Chief Surgeon, May 14, 1898.

The SURGEON-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, *Washington, D. C.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that latest official advices are that at least 40,000 volunteers will arrive in this park—arrivals expected daily, and the whole force should be here in a few days. I have no knowledge of what supplies, if any, they will bring; nor whether hospital stewards and privates of the Hospital Corps will come into the field with the separate commands. So, for the present, I inclose requisition for medical supplies for 20,000 men—there being no supplies here—for three months: also for 4 medical officers, 4 hospital stewards, and 30 privates of the Hospital Corps. The medical officers, stewards, and privates are for the division hospitals, etc.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,
Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon.

That the forces should be here in a few days. I have no knowledge of what supplies, if any, they will bring in the way of hospital stewards—the corps will come into the field with a separate command, so for the approving of requisitions for medical supplies for 40,000 men—there being no supplies here for them during that month—it was not necessary.

Q. The division hospitals were constituted as far back as the 14th of May?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But not established until June?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there, or would there have been, any difficulty, think you, in having sufficient supplies—when it was known at Washington that 40,000 troops were likely to be there—medical supplies sent in such quantity that the wants could have been supplied from the very beginning?

A. That is a question for the authorities here to answer. I do not know. I asked that the supplies be sent there in bulk for that force, but they were not sent.

Q. They were not sent?

A. No, sir; they were not sent.

Q. And, as a consequence, the troops were improperly supplied with medicines—inadequately supplied?

A. Not fully supplied, and in some cases—not a few—where the troops needed certain few articles; but the supplies were peddled out to them very scantily and

very carefully, so as to make them go around and keep them running from day to day.

Q. Then, as you have already stated, there was no provision made in advance for large bodies of troops?

A. None at all.

Q. Did these supplies that came to you early—among the supplies were there such things as hospital furniture, beds, etc., or were they entirely medical supplies?

A. I think in the first place—I do not think there was any hospital furniture at all. I have no knowledge of it. Of course my duties were multifarious, and that work was turned over to my assistant, Dr. Mason, and I am not certain as to that, but I think it was mostly medicine and medical supplies.

Q. During this time that the regiments were carrying on the hospital organization, when they had to make requisitions on you for the necessary articles and the medical supplies, did you or did you not approve the requisitions with promptness and readiness, so that they could get what they needed?

A. Requisitions were never made. It was not necessary to make requisitions. When troops came into the field, recognizing that the volunteer troops were unfamiliar with the routine duties required of them, I summoned every medical officer to my tent, and I had a school there day after day for several hours each day, instructing all the medical officers then and there as to their duties in the matter of camp sanitation, reports, etc.

Q. You are speaking now prior to the establishment of the division hospitals, are you?

A. I am leading up to that now. They had been directed what to do and what was required of them, etc., at these schools and at the close of this class each medical officer responsible for a regiment—surgeon of a regiment—was given printed copies of all papers required to be made out by him, all books and records, etc., and a manual of the Medical Department, and in many cases copies of regulations for the making out of requisitions for all the supplies that they needed. I asked that requisitions should be made in order that every officer should be able to keep his records straight and correct, but soon recognized the fact that they were not in a condition to make requisitions. Requisitions were therefore not required. The only requisitions that came to me were simply on slips of paper, perhaps in an envelope, anything at all, and in many cases without the name of the regiments to whom the supplies were to be furnished appearing on it.

Q. That was during the period—we are not discussing when the volunteers first arrived.

A. An open book account was kept by the medical purveyor with all the regiments.

Q. And these supplies were furnished as rapidly to each regiment on those requisitions or little slips of papers as called for?

A. Yes, sir. The requisition for supplies were filled when we had the necessary articles to supply them with. The only authority that I exercised with respect to the whole thing—because I rode through the camps as frequently as I could and became personally conversant with the necessities and requirements of the different regiments, and knew that certain regiments were fairly well supplied with certain things and other regiments not so well supplied, I was the better prepared to see to the medical purveyor what should go to certain regiments, etc. All were making requisitions for supplies—those having supplies on hand as well as those who had not. It therefore became necessary to know just what regiments had supplies on hand and what had not.

Q. As a result of that, were the various regiments supplied with such medicines as were needed and in such amounts as were required?

A. No, sir; in no case.

Q. That being the case, why was it that the Government did not have medical supplies there for issue?

A. That is a question beyond my apprehension.

Q. Well, did you insist upon it, as chief medical officer of that command, that medical supplies must be furnished there?

A. I did, and communicated with the Surgeon-General, either by letter or telegram, I may say almost daily and sometimes more than once a day, and directed the medical supply officer, as you will find by my communications here on that subject, directing him to keep a supply on hand to meet all emergencies.

Q. But he did not do it?

A. I think he did. I think he made requisitions for them.

Q. But he did not keep a supply on hand to meet all emergencies?

A. The supplies were not furnished him.

Q. Was that deficiency consequent upon failure to order supplies sent there; was it consequent upon the delay in the transmission of the supplies to that point; was it consequent upon the slowness with which the issues were made after they were received, or, lastly, because the supplies could not be had in the hospitals?

A. The communications to the Surgeon-General, by telegrams and by letter, appear there. You will find there a number of letters on that subject saying that we must have supplies at once—it is absolutely necessary—communications and telegrams. The supplies were not there.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. There is a responsibility resting on some one or other—with some person. The point is this upon those on the spot not asking for it: upon the Surgeon-General in not ordering it or upon the supply officers not sending the stores when ordered; upon the depot officer not issuing them when received. At some point or other along that line rested the responsibility. Where does it rest?

A. I was in a delicate position. The supplies were asked for: indeed, they were ordered in several cases from the supply depot, but it took days and sometimes weeks after they had been ordered before they arrived there.

Q. Let me interrupt you just at that point, please. Did you protest against the delay in sending of what you expected?

A. I reported this to the quartermaster on the ground there—that is all.

Q. Was any action taken upon this report of yours to the quartermaster or to the report to the commanding general?

A. I think not.

Q. I want you to go further and state why the delay occurred. You have stated to us that the Surgeon-General issued an order and in some cases that the supply was shipped; that there was delay in some cases in the receipt of these goods; and I want to know how much there was at the shipping depot at Lytle?

A. At Lytle, not an hour.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you know whether the supplies were immediately shipped by the supply depot in New York or St. Louis?

A. Yes; the invoices show that they were immediately shipped.

Q. Yes, in some cases only—in a great many cases?

A. No, sir; by no means.

Q. Why not? Was there any reason for them not being shipped promptly?

A. Some of the articles that were needed—mostly by the regiments which had been ordered out quickly—were medical chests and surgical chests and desks and a certain few things of that character, as you will observe in my dispatches and communications to the Surgeon-General, and I received information from the Surgeon-General on that subject repeatedly that the medical chests, surgical chests, etc., would be sent as soon as they were manufactured; that the contract had been

given to a manufacturer—to a house in Washington—and they would be sent as soon as manufactured; but they were not sent until—we got a very few of them, not to any large extent—until way along in July.

Q. Leaving that aside for a moment, these troops—we are speaking now of a period prior to the 10th of June—these troops were evidently not to go at once; they were in no condition to go at once, were they?

A. No, sir.

Q. In any respect?

A. No, sir.

Q. Therefore, they were not going. Were they likely to be sick if they remained in camp any length of time?

A. The men of necessity had to remain in camp long enough to be thoroughly equipped and properly supplied with quartermaster's clothing, stores, etc.

Q. Therefore, it was fair to suppose that it was not surgical implements or field desks that were wanted, but medicine for the sick?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there or was there not any great delay in the shipping of medicines to these points from either of the depots at New York or St. Louis?

A. I can only say we were complaining all the time for these articles, and we could not get them.

Q. And, as I understand you, as they reached the depot they were shipped promptly and without hesitancy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Taking care to so distribute the supplies that the wants of the camp would be properly met?

A. In some cases, where they were required in a regiment, the request of that particular regiment was not complied with.

Q. For what reason?

A. Because that regiment had pretty fair supplies of the articles, and other regiments needed them more.

Q. The following is a copy from Robert Burns, major and surgeon, First New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, to Maj. Gen. J. C. Breckinridge, Inspector-General of the United States Army, Camp Thomas: "We came into camp here two weeks ago to-day. We have made repeated requisitions for medical supplies. My first requisition was made on or about May 21. Another was made two days later, and others have been made since. The supplies we received were almost nothing." Is that a fact?

A. It may be.

Q. "The medical director told me personally that no hospital furniture would be furnished the regiments, and my requisition for same was not on it." Is that a fact?

A. The supplies that we had on hand and continued to have on hand were very meager indeed, and those supplies had to go over all the camp, and therefore made it a necessity that they had to be distributed where they were the most needed—a handful to one regiment and a larger supply to another: but certainly there was no object in withholding supplies when we had them.

Q. "We have had from 150 to 200 at sick call each morning. For the most part the trouble has been intestinal. Many have been very ill with 'bloody dysentery.' We have 25 or more cases now, mostly in quarters. We have not had medicines for their relief, and having become tired of going to Lytle and returning with practically nothing for our sick men, yesterday I personally went to Chattanooga and bought about \$40 worth of medicines, cots, etc., which were urgently needed. These we paid for ourselves. We brought with us a hypodermic syringe, which was broken when we first arrived. We tried to have one issued to us, but failed. These so-called 'emergency cases' contained such a syringe, and we made requisition

tion for it. The medical director scratched it out and said 'the regiments can not have them.' I understand some have been recently issued, though they were held in the medical supply depot when most needed. The supplies which have been issued to us I will put upon an attached slip. They are as nearly correct as I can figure at this moment. Our men are suffering. Besides that which we have bought, we have practically no medicine supplies. We have not a single surgical instrument. We are in extremity now. If we were ordered out you can well judge of our condition and ability to do the work required of us. We respectfully ask that something be done at once to equip this regiment with medical and surgical supplies." Now, was there any necessity for any regiment, after having been at Chattanooga for two weeks, making such a report as that in reference to the supply of medicines?

A. I think I have a communication right here on that subject which will answer that same question.

Q. What date was that, please?

A. The 2d of June. This is the letter:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, DEPT. OF THE GULF,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON,

Camp George H. Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga., June 2, 1898.

The SURGEON-GENERAL U. S. ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the number of organizations that have arrived in this park for organization and equipment up to date is as follows:

	Regiments.
Infantry	53
Cavalry	9
Artillery	19

Many of the volunteer organizations came without arms, uniforms, or supplies of any kind. Some of the regiments had a very limited medical supply, having been furnished by their State with a supply for ten days only, which was nearly gone on their arrival here. A few regiments arrived with a little larger supply.

The volunteer regiments are slowly learning the often repeated lessons of economy.

Owing to the pressing need for medical supplies on the part of the many regiments arriving here daily, and of regiments departing, and the limited supplies on hand, a book account with each regiment had to be opened, and the supplies absolutely necessary only were issued. To the regiments leaving here it has been the practice to issue a larger supply—all that could be spared. The demand for certain articles has been great, and, as all were exhausted, purchases have been made and are being made.

Little has been done in the way of organizing, all our energies having been directed to getting organizations into and out of camp and helping them to absolute necessities in all the different departments. Until within a few days we have had almost no privates of the Hospital Corps (have now nearly 100), few ambulances with team, and as yet have no mounts.

The chief quartermaster here has been requested to furnish tentage, means of transportation, and mounts, but the demand has been so great that requisitions could not be filled, and the Medical Department has taken its turn. We are now getting quartermaster's supplies much more freely, and it is said all requests on the Quartermaster's Department will soon be filled.

I have just directed the acting medical purveyor here to report to me at once the amount of medical supplies received by him and the date of their receipt.

As soon as sufficient supplies can be obtained issues will be made regularly, on special requisitions for a three-months' supply. As yet no instruments of any kind

have been received except ten field cases, old pattern, which many surgeons here object to using.

I have kept this letter open for one day hoping I would be able to inform you of the dates and amounts of supplies received here by the acting medical purveyor and of supplies wanting. The purveyor reports to me now that he is preparing his report to me, but it is not yet finished. Will send his report as soon as I receive it.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,

Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon.

A true copy.

DEPUTY SURGEON-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY.

Here is the only complaint that ever came up to me, and it pertains to the Sixth Ohio, and answers the question pretty well. I will read the letter, if you please:

CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON,

Chickamauga Park, Ga., June 13, 1868.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

SIR: Referring to your L. R. 1147, complaint of surgeon Eighth Ohio Infantry, that he is unable to secure certain medical supplies, etc., I have the honor to state as follows:

I have no recollection of this particular case, and do not at all question the correctness of the statement in general. That I may not have approved the request on the acting medical purveyor for medicines is true, but it is also true that in no case have I refused to approve any request for medicines and medical supplies on the supply officer, if the articles were on hand, without explaining fully that at least one division hospital of the corps was in full working order, and the articles for which requisitions were made could be obtained on application to the division hospital. The First Division hospital of the First Corps has been equipped and in running order for several weeks, and the Third Division hospital of the First Corps was equipped with supplies, etc., as early as the 9th instant.

From the date of arrival of the first volunteer regiment at this camp medical supplies have been issued to all regiments without requisition or receipt, and as fully as the limited amount on hand would warrant. A book account was kept with regiments by the medical supply officer, and all requests for medical supplies received immediate attention. An account of stock could not be taken; invoices and receipts could not be made out, and when the Surgeon-General of the Army called on me by telegraph for information as to medical supplies the acting medical purveyor informed me that he had been so busy that he could not let me know what had been received and what was needed. By the 1st of June the great incoming rush of regiments to this camp was reduced, when I sent out a circular as follows:

"In future medicines and supplies should be issued, so far as possible, on regular blank forms and for three months' supply. Requisitions to be consolidated and drawn by the division surgeons on the medical supply depot. Issues to be made by division surgeons to regiments."

Notwithstanding this, little slips of paper continued to come to me from regiments, brought by soldiers, in many cases paper having neither date, heading, nor signature, and with the names of certain drugs written thereon, not the amounts, many of which were not on the supply tables. Issues were still made in the irregular manner named, and in each case was the information repeated that great irregularities must gradually cease, and order, system, and finally organization be established.

As already stated, I have no personal recollection of this case. It is the first complaint of any kind that I have heard, and as we are so far advanced in our work now I am sure it will be the last.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,

Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon.

Now, in no case where requests were ever sent to him—that I can state with absolute certainty—where the supplies were on hand and could be furnished to the regiments, where some other regiment did not need them and could delay more than others, that they were not furnished at once, so far as I know.

Q. Now, is it not a fact that hypodermic syringes were refused by you to Dr. Martin when asked for?

A. It might have been the case; I do not know.

Q. If there were hypodermic syringes in the depot and the regimental surgeon asked for one, would you refuse it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Under what circumstances?

A. Because the division hospitals—

Q. Before the time of the division hospitals?

A. Not unless I was familiar with the facts.

Q. If the facts are as I represented them to you—the statement of the First New Hampshire—would it or would it not have been proper to have supplied one to him at that time?

A. Yes, sir; most essentially.

Q. If there was one in the depot and it was refused, where does the responsibility lie?

A. I can not tell that.

Q. If you refused it, it rests with you, does it not?

A. Certainly.

Q. Now, after the establishment or upon the establishment of the division hospital, how was the personnel of the hospital determined—from what sources did the hospital draw its medical supplies?

A. The personnel of the Hospital Corps—I would say of the hospital—was made up of transfers from the Regular Army.

Q. I was not speaking of corps—I was speaking of the medical officers.

A. By details from regiments.

Q. By details from regiments?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many officers, as a rule, were drawn from each regiment?

A. Two.

Q. Leaving how many behind?

A. One.

Q. What was the duty, as you look at it—what was the duty of the one left behind?

A. To look after the interests of the regiment, to attend to sick call, and to attend all minor cases of sickness.

Q. Anything else?

A. Certainly; all camp hygiene—everything that pertained to the health of the command.

Q. These duties devolved on him?

A. Prior to the establishment of the division hospitals these special duties devolved upon him—upon the chief surgeon, with his assistants.

Q. Now, in your case: was sanitation attended to properly?

A. It was not.

Q. Was the camp foul?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was any representation made to you officially as chief surgeon through the subordinate officers that such a condition of things did exist?

A. Very few.

Q. Did you yourself observe the condition?

A. I did.

Q. What did you do upon observing the condition of affairs?

A. I made a report to General Brooke.

Q. With or without recommendations?

A. With recommendations in many cases.

Q. Your recommendations were to what effect, please?

A. One case that I remember was that a brigade—a First Corps regiment and two division regiments were brigaded together and the camp was outrageously foul—outrageously foul. I had reported it personally to General Brooke on repeated occasions. I was at General Brooke's headquarters—most of my reports were made personally, then it became necessary for me to report it in writing—and I stated that it was an imperative necessity that the camp be broken up at once and a new camp formed.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who was the commander of that brigade?

A. It was in the First Corps, and made up of two Arkansas regiments and one Mississippi regiment—I think it was the Second Division.

Q. Who was the commander of the division?

A. General Wade.

Q. What recommendations did you make in connection with this unsatisfactory condition?

A. If you will permit me, I will refer to my letter, which I have here, on that subject, making recommendations, which is as follows:

CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
Chickamauga Park, Ga., July 11, 1898.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

SIR: I have just made a partial inspection of the Second Division, Third Corps, and find the sanitary conditions in many respects bad. Especially is that the case in the First Mississippi and First and Second Arkansas. The camps of the regiments named are thoroughly unsanitary. There are large numbers of typhoid-fever cases in each regiment. I recommend an immediate change of camp.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,
Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What action was taken upon this report of yours?

A. The First Mississippi was moved. The other two regiments remained in the camp in a foul and bad condition.

Q. Was that foul and bad condition maintained during the rest of the time?

A. Up to the time that I left there.

Q. Do you know of any instance in which your recommendations were disregarded by the commanding general?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you instance some of them, so that we may know what the character of your recommendations were?

A. Here is one that was made pretty late, however, namely, on July 14, which is as follows:

CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS, OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
Chickamauga Park, Ga., July 14, 1898.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Camp George H. Thomas, Ga.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that in the organization and general management of division hospitals there are great and seemingly insurmountable difficulties, resulting sometimes most injuriously to patients, regimental organizations, officers, and the Government at large.

Division hospitals are established and equipped in each division for 200 patients. Officers, stewards, and hospital-corps privates—somewhat over 100—are provided to care for the patients and conduct the hospital. The amount of Government property—quartermaster's, ordnance, and medical—provided for such an establishment is large and the property responsibility great. Few medical officers are by nature or habit qualified to organize and manage such an organization and properly care for the property, etc. During my experience in this camp—for nearly three months—I have seen many sad failures. Doubtless one of the unfortunate conditions has been the frequent changes in the personnel of the hospital. Not only has the surgeon in charge of the hospital been suddenly relieved, but other medical officers and hospital stewards (the latter often in charge of the books and records) have been suddenly relieved—owing, perhaps, to the movement of their regiment—and their places had to be supplied by officers and men in no way familiar with their new duties.

Now that a hospital corps is organized, much of the confusion of the past should be corrected. Acting hospital stewards should be detailed, and clerks, wardmasters, cooks, and all other men necessary to conducting the hospital put in their proper places and never changed. When it is found desirable to temporarily detach hospital-corps men from the division hospital the attendants should be taken, but the office clerks, property clerk, wardmasters, cooks, etc., above mentioned, should never be disturbed, and under no circumstances should any papers, records, or books, which constitute a part of the records of the hospital, be even temporarily removed from the hospital.

Regimental medical officers and regimental-hospital stewards must be with their regiments when they move, so they are generally with the division hospitals for a short time only. That is unfortunate, but unavoidable. There should be some means, however, by which the surgeon in charge would be more permanent, and I know of no way of effecting that except by appointing a brigade surgeon to that position and making him permanently the surgeon in charge of the division hospital. Thus the surgeon in charge, the office clerks, and property clerk, the wardmasters, cooks, etc., would never be changed, even though the force of the hospital corps should be increased or diminished to any extent, and the records, reports, and papers always be made promptly, the patients cared for more efficiently, Government property saved from damage or utter ruin, and waste of all kinds prevented or largely reduced.

Very respectfully,

A. HARTSUFF,

Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon.

True copy:

A. HARTSUFF,

Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon.

And I insisted upon, in one or two communications to the general commanding, that troops had been in camp too long and that they ought to be started out on the road in some direction.

Q. Were these recommendations acted upon?

A. When I frequently rode through the camp and found nuisances—outrageous nuisances—in the way of the sale by hucksters, etc., I personally reported it to General Brooke. General Brooke, in many cases, would call one of his aides and send him out to investigate the matter, and in a number of instances there was a permanent and methodical disposition made of that nuisance.

Q. The nuisances remained, notwithstanding your orders?

A. They remained up to the day I left the park—that is, up to the time I left.

Q. What day did you leave?

A. The 27th of July; I think it was that date.

Q. Were these reports of yours and complaints of yours brought directly to the notice of the Surgeon-General?

A. I had sent copies of these.

Q. Of these?

A. Yes, sir; a great many of them; oral reports, of course, I did not.

Q. Was he duly informed of the fact that your recommendations failed?

A. I communicated with the Surgeon-General in a certain way on several subjects and said that the recommendations were not considered.

Q. Practically, then, all the recommendations that you made were simply paper manifestoes?

A. In most cases; yes, sir.

Q. In fact, your protest was disregarded?

A. In a great many cases that was correct.

Q. Was there any officer, from the colonel of the regiment down, against whom charges were preferred on account of gross violation of sanitary rules?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Was it not proper that such action should have been taken by somebody with somebody?

A. That remained with the commanding general.

Q. The responsibility, then, of the sanitation of that camp, after it had been passed from one hand to another, finally rested with the commanding general?

A. The Medical Department could only go up to a certain point—calling attention to the condition of things as they were, and then it rested with parties higher up and beyond the Medical Department.

Q. On those parties above the Medical Department; on whom?

A. Of the line officers.

Q. But ultimately the responsibility rested where?

A. The responsibility for the whole camp rested with the general commanding.

Q. Therefore the observance of ordinary sanitary rules at the time of the occupancy of the camp was consequent upon the decision of the commanding general?

A. The sanitary condition of the camp rested with the commanding general.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you know whether the commanding general sent orders to the troops?

A. I know he did.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you know whether those orders sent were obeyed or not?

A. I know they were not, because if they had been obeyed the evils would not exist.

By General DODGE:

Q. They were not eradicated?

A. No, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. There seems to be general complaints, then, in regard to the issuance of orders?

A. I know that these orders were issued orally, and in some cases written to the different men on the part of General Brooke; but the conditions remained the same and there was no material change. There are copies of sanitary reports here—there are copies of orders, too, I think, written by me and issued by General Brooke—sanitary orders calling the attention of all the different regiments to the necessity and particularizing throughout the whole camp—the necessity of camp hygiene.

Q. I, after the order was issued and that order is not obeyed, of what value is that order?

A. Of course, nothing; but the Medical Department could not go beyond.

Dr. CONNER. I know that. I am not asking any questions in regard to the powers of the Medical Department.

By General DODGE:

Q. You have acknowledged that this order was issued by General Brooke to the commanding officer of the division. It was not obeyed. Did you then notify General Brooke?

A. Almost daily—every few days, personally—I was living with General Brooke and notified him continually.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you or did you not, from the beginning, protest against the occupancy of Chickamauga Park?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you regard it as a proper camp site?

A. I did and do.

Q. In what way are you going to dispose properly of the excreta?

A. Put it into holes, where we put it. I would not occupy Chickamauga Camp for any length of time.

Q. For how long a time, then, as a maximum, would you favor the occupancy of a camp at Chickamauga?

A. There was space enough in Chickamauga to move camps, as I have recommended over and over again, so it was not necessary to occupy one camp more than two or three weeks and then move the regiments out of the camp, if possible, as I have recommended here, and then have the troops return in a few days to a new camp.

Q. That was another one of the recommendations of yours that was not regarded?

A. I went into the country myself around there, and found out where camps could be located—on Lookout Mountain—and found plenty of places with a plentiful supply of water, etc., and recommended that the camps should be sent there, because I had asked the authorities who owned the property and they gave me permission.

Q. Throughout a large part of Chickamauga, is it possible to dig proper sinks?

A. Throughout a large part of it sinks could not be dug at all.

Q. I speak now of that part of the park which is occupied.

A. A good many of the camps that were located ought not to have been located where they were at all because of the difficulty of digging sinks, etc.

Q. Did you protest against the occupancy of those points which you regarded as improper?

A. In no case was a medical officer, at the time the troops were put into camp—in no case was I or any medical officer consulted as to the special location where troops were located. When troops went into camp in some cases a protest was made as to the location of that regiment.

Q. And it met with the usual results of protests from the medical department there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, as respects the supply depot at Lytle, were any of the reports—systematic reports—made to you of the amount of stores in that depot?

A. No; for the reason—I have the reports right here, a copy of the letter to the Surgeon-General, and, I think, the commanding officer—for the reason that Dr. Comegys, when he arrived there, was totally inexperienced in the kind of business which was required of him. He had no assistants whatever, excepting men from volunteer regiments, perfectly green, as he was himself. The stores came and were put in there, but it took a good while to open boxes of medicines after

they arrived there. Before they were opened, before they were arranged, issues had to be made: so that with these green men there from the beginning it was confusion confounded all the way along. Dr. Comegys was directed to report to me frequently as to the supplies that he did have on hand and what he received, etc.: of course I could not keep in touch with all those things. He was unable to make those reports to me because of the inefficiency of his help in the work of distributing supplies. I think finally, along in July, he made those reports.

Q. So that practically things went on sixes and sevens?

A. Very much indeed.

Q. Both as respects receipts and distributions?

A. Yes, sir. In many cases we opened cars—repeatedly opened cars—and issued medicines, etc., long before he got invoices of the medicines, not knowing what had been invoiced to him at all.

Q. To what do you attribute the fact of a statement made that if a man wanted medical supplies he had better go there early in the morning? Do you know that such was the case?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. We have had testimony that individuals had gotten what they wanted when they went there themselves.

A. You will find here among my reports directions to Dr. Comegys. It was not necessary for me to approve requisitions when the pressure became great, and I directed Dr. Comegys to issue to whomsoever came. The papers did not come to me at all. Then reports came to me of the great necessities for supplies on the part of certain regiments. I became personally familiar with them, and every regiment being pretty well supplied, I directed the medical purveyor not to issue except by my directions, wishing to send the medical supplies where they were most needed.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was it not possible to detail from the medical force in that park competent men to aid him?

A. No, sir; we tried to get men in the division hospitals. Reports were not made. In fact, reports are not now in the Surgeon-General's Office which ought to have been there long ago. From the start to the end the inefficiency of the men was manifested, owing to their lack of experience.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was there any possibility of getting, either from the regular staff or by calling on the country at large, men who were capable of running a large-sized drug store, for that is what it amounted to?

A. No man can run a large drug store without a proper amount of help.

Q. Was there any difficulty of getting a sufficient amount of help?

A. I was not authorized to employ help; I received it as it was sent.

Q. Did you originally demand that?

A. I originally demanded of the Surgeon-General—copies appearing there—asking that regular hospital stewards be sent, or if we had had half a dozen the atmosphere would have been cleared up in quick order.

Q. Where were those hospital stewards?

A. They were not with us.

Q. Did you know where the hospital stewards were, as a rule?

A. Where they were?

Q. Where they were at this time?

A. I did not.

Q. Were there hospital stewards in the hospital?

A. We had one hospital steward in a camp of about 60,000 men.

Q. How many hospital stewards are there?

A. There ought to be one hundred and something—I have forgotten how many

Q. Now, the division hospital was established upon what general principle, as you understood it?

A. If you put the question a little differently——

Q. Well, was it or was it not intended that the division hospital should receive the sick of the division and take care of them up to a certain point, and if they were likely to be permanently filled or for a considerable length of time to pass them on to base hospitals?

A. The division hospital was intended to receive all the sick of the division except those that were temporarily ill, and they were to be provided for by the regiment.

Q. In establishing the division hospitals at Chickamauga you had to call upon the regiments for the medical officers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They were assigned by you?

A. No, sir; by the corps surgeon.

Q. Upon your recommendation?

A. Entirely so after the corps surgeon arrived.

Q. When was that?

A. I do not know. I can not tell that.

Q. Do you know what time, please?

A. I can not tell that. Dr. Hoff at the very beginning was assigned.

Q. Was Dr. Huidekoper there with Dr. Hoff?

A. They came from the North together, but I can not remember the details of these things. As soon as the corps surgeons arrived they were assigned to duty as corps surgeons, and I exercised only general supervision, leaving the details as far as possible to them.

Q. Did you or did you not from the very beginning receive formal reports of the division hospitals from the officers having charge through the proper channels?

A. I inspected almost daily the division hospitals myself.

Q. Did you not receive reports?

A. No, sir.

Q. It was sufficient for you to see what the condition was yourself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How were the division hospitals supplied with medicines; did they draw upon the regiments for their stores, or did they rely entirely on the depot?

A. The division hospitals, under the order, were directed to draw for the medical stores for the whole division.

Q. In the establishment of it in the beginning?

A. They were taken from wherever they could be got from the regiments and from the purveying depots.

Q. Regiments having medical stores were compelled to turn them over to the medical hospitals?

A. Yes, sir; largely, if they had the goods.

Q. Were these division hospitals from the start properly supplied with medicines and medical stores?

A. They were not.

Q. What was the reason?

A. Want of supplies on hand.

Q. Did they have the necessary amount of hospital furniture to properly care for the sick?

A. They did not.

Q. Were they supplied with tentage in amounts sufficient for the sick?

A. They were not.

Q. Were requisitions made for tents at an early period?

A. They were.

Q. In what amounts?

A. In large amounts on the Quartermaster's Department. I have a communication on that subject where I made a requisition on the Quartermaster's Department, and the quartermaster told me he had 10 tents. I made a requisition for 150 hospital tents—I think it was 150—but they could not be supplied, and I was in direct communication with the quartermaster, Colonel Lee, appealing to him continuously for tents.

Q. Were there at any time up to the time you left there a sufficient quantity of hospital tents to answer the requirements of the men?

A. There were.

Q. At what time?

A. About the time I left there.

Q. As division hospitals were furnished were you able to secure for them, or were they able to secure for themselves, tentage in sufficient amounts to answer the demands?

A. Yes; largely to meet the emergencies; not as abundant as we wanted, but we succeeded exceedingly well in meeting the conditions all that time.

Q. Did you yourself at that time observe men lying on the ground without shelter in any division hospital?

A. I did. I saw it personally in numerous cases and did not object to it.

Q. Go on, please, and explain the conditions.

A. They ought not to have been in division hospitals at all; they were men for duty. There were a great many cases of men coming in from regiments into division hospitals, occupying, if they could, beds; well men ought to have been kept in the regiments. I have a communication on that subject here. The First Division Hospital of the First Corps was in an outrageously bad condition. I repeatedly called the chief surgeon's attention to it (Colonel Huidekoper), asking him to make changes and correct evils existing there. I reported it to the general commanding. It became necessary for me to say to the commanding general that the condition had become so outrageous that I would like to take charge of it myself—take charge of that division hospital personally. I did take charge of the division hospital personally, and sent a report to the chief surgeon of the First Corps, narrating the condition of the hospital, and when I took charge of the hospital I found an abundance of medicines and abundance of medical supplies, and an absolutely paralyzed condition of the medical force—nobody knowing what to do or how to do it. The command was almost in a starving condition: no one knew how to get commissary supplies, not knowing anything about the purchase, not knowing anything how to bury men or make a report of any kind, and always sitting around as if the responsibility had overcome them.

I took charge at once; took that same force that was there, organized them, put some of the medical officers in certain places, classified the sick and wounded, putting typhoid cases together, etc., telling them specifically what their duties were, assigning ward men and stewards to certain positions, and issuing an order that no man should work more than eight hours unless it should become absolutely necessary, and we had the force so organized that every man was in his place and knew what his duties were. No reports had previously been made, so I went there and stayed right at that division hospital, took my clerk with me, took the only regiment hospital steward with me I had from headquarters—all the force I could get together—and it took us four or five days to put the division hospital in shape. I then turned it over and asked Colonel Huidekoper personally, saying to him, "Don't disturb the present condition of things until you find it unsatisfactory." I established an office—no reports were made at all—and directed the clerks—I selected pretty quickly a corps of clerks—so that at the time I left there they knew their duties. I said to Dr. Huidekoper, "Let those clerks alone, and they will

work out their own salvation," and they were working all right and everything going very smoothly. Within forty-eight hours, or seventy-eight hours, or something of that kind, an order came for the brigade to move. The surgeons that had been detailed in the division hospitals belonged to the regiments constituting brigades and some of the stewards that were on duty in the division hospitals belonged to those regiments, and the brigade was ordered to move with dispatch. Then everybody had to be relieved, everything was scattered, and in almost no time the division hospital became as bad as it was before.

Q. Who was the officer in charge of that hospital prior to your taking charge of it?

A. There had been within six weeks three or four medical officers in charge of it. That had been one of the great difficulties. Frequent changes had been made, and each change seemed for the worse, but who was in charge of it—I have forgotten the name.

Q. Did Colonel Huidekoper make any representation to you of the confusion that was existing in the command?

A. Never; he did not apparently know that there was any confusion.

Q. Was he an efficient or an inefficient officer?

A. He was thoroughly efficient, but an inexperienced officer. He was a hard-working man—a very hard-working man—but thoroughly inexperienced, and from want of experience, want of knowledge, as was the case throughout the command, in many cases there were a great many efficient and able men who would soon learn their duties, but a great many of them did not, because they were inexperienced and did not know what their duty was.

Q. Did you or did you not, as chief surgeon of the camp, report to your superior officer, the Surgeon-General, that medical officers under you were inefficient?

A. I did not.

Q. If they were inefficient because not experienced it does not make any difference; was it your duty to report them?

A. I think not.

Q. Then, under existing circumstances, things were left to care for themselves as best they could?

A. As I said, the whole command was inefficient from want of experience or training; they were inexperienced, and therefore inefficient, and there would be no way of correcting that evil with new orders that the Surgeon-General could put forth. If I had had, as chief officer in command, the authority to appoint my own chief officers of corps and divisions I could have selected from those men of that command most efficient officers who were there, but in many cases positions were not occupied by the most efficient officers—

Q. Returning to the subject of the division hospitals, are you able to say whether there was at all times a sufficient amount of tentage up and ready for the reception of all sick who were taken from the division hospitals?

A. There was not.

Q. What was the difficulty in securing tentage?

A. The requisitions were made on the quartermaster. It was the quartermaster's office to furnish tentage, but it could not be obtained.

Q. Were requisitions made in sufficient time?

A. I think in the erection of the division hospitals always in advance, and I think there were requisitions made subsequently; that is, afterwards, when it became necessary to extend and enlarge the division hospitals.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. How many requisitions were made and for what quantities, so far as you can tell?

A. I can not tell anything about it.

Q. Several times?

A. A good many times.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. You simply know that the tents were not furnished and it was stated to you that the tents were not there?

A. Yes, sir; that was the general report.

Q. Now, as respects the tents, is it or is it not a fact that when tents were required and could not be furnished by the Quartermaster's Department or the Medical Department there were hospital tents used for purposes other than for hospital purposes at that place?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many did you know of?

A. I can not tell.

Q. Have you any idea.

A. No.

Q. How many hospital tents were at headquarters?

A. What do you mean, occupied by officers?

Q. Yes; for office purposes and for officers.

A. Oh, I should think ten or a dozen might have been used. I do not know. I can not remember.

Q. Do you know whether or not hospital tents were simply used at the various corps headquarters?

A. No; I do not think so. I believe that at General Wade's headquarters there were some hospital tents used. I know there were. How many I can not tell you—and at General Williston's headquarters. I do not remember how many there were.

Q. Do you know how many hospital tents were in use by the so-called reserve corps?

A. Well, that was the ambulance corps.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I do not know; I can not tell.

Q. If there was an existing scarcity of tents for the use of the sick should or should not these tents have been used at the various headquarters, and should or should not the reserve hospital, so called, have had from 5 to 36 tents at a time?

A. Well, if you mean—what do you mean by the reserve?

Q. That is the name that has been given to us.

A. The reserve hospital—Fourth Division of the corps—I do not know.

Q. But the hospital tents were used?

A. I do not know whether the hospital tents were used.

Q. We have testimony from a medical officer who was detailed for duty there that hospital tents at all times ranged from 5 to 36 in number.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did they not reduce the number to 4 or 5?

A. Well, they were not fixed, because I was there at the reserve hospital establishment camp grounds repeatedly.

Q. Were you or were you not frequently called upon by the officers in charge of the division hospitals corps to accommodate the sick that were being brought in?

A. Not by the division hospitals.

Q. You were never called upon by the division hospitals?

A. Not that I remember, because it was not the duty of the division hospitals to do a thing of that character. It was the duty of the division hospitals to call upon the corps surgeons. It was the duty of the division hospitals to make demands on the corps surgeons—it was the duty of the quartermaster to make a request.

Q. At what time was there a quartermaster established at the division hospitals?

A. I do not know. It was a little time after the organization of the division hospitals.

Q. When they had no quartermaster there who would make requisitions?

A. The responsible officer in charge of the hospital.

Q. Would such requisitions have passed through your hands or otherwise for approval?

A. As a rule.

Q. Do you know of any instance where such requisition, after having been duly approved by you, was refused and the tents not issued?

A. I can not recall as to that, but I can say that I would have done so if I had had the opportunity.

Q. Would have done what, sir?

A. Refused my approval.

Q. Why?

A. Because, perhaps, in that case the tents were needed in some other locality.

Q. If a division hospital was overcrowded, were not tents needed at that hospital?

A. No, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to show how?

A. From the fact that a great many of those patients at the hospitals did not need medicines and ought not to have been there.

Q. But so long as they were there, held by the surgeons in charge of that hospital and were kept there, was there a necessity of tentage?

A. No, sir.

Q. Whose business was it to see that those not needing hospital care should not be kept in the hospital?

A. The corps surgeon was to inspect the corps hospitals; the division surgeons were to inspect the division hospitals; and the surgeon in charge to know what patients came into the hospitals.

Q. If you were sufficiently familiar with the conditions of things and you knew that men were not proper subjects for hospital treatment, was it or was it not your duty to see that these men were sent out of the hospitals?

A. No, sir.

Q. But you tell us that those hospitals were overcrowded and that yet you would not furnish tents because there were men there in the hospital who were not fit subjects?

A. Yes, sir. If we had had a sufficient number of tents to supply all the division hospitals with all the tents that might be wanted, then I would not.

Q. Why were you not supplied with a sufficient number of tents?

A. You will have to apply to the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. Did you make any report to any higher authority that there was not sufficient tentage there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you got no answer?

A. All these matters were reported to General Brooke; frequently in conversations with him.

Q. And no action was taken, so that the scarcity of tentage remained?

A. Apparently.

Q. Will you kindly tell us, as near as you can remember, when you asked for tents and when you made complaints to General Brooke that the tents were not there?

A. All these reports that I speak of were made in conversation with General Brooke, and these verbal reports I can not tell anything about.

Q. During what period of time were those verbal reports made? I mean the reports which you made stating that you were short of tents for hospital purposes.

A. Up to July, along in July, pretty early in July. When the division hospital was moved, when the division of the First Corps was moved, the question of tentage came up, and that was, I think, along in July. We made a demand for tentage then. Let me just think a moment—the quartermaster had tents at that time; he agreed to leave those tents of the First Division there and supply the First Division, that was going away to Porto Rico, with tents that he had on hand.

By General DODGE:

Q. About what time was that, Colonel?

A. That was about the 20th of July, I think.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you have a sufficient supply of tents to fit out the expedition to Porto Rico? Why did he not have a sufficient supply to answer your requisition for the division hospitals at that time?

A. Well, you are getting on to the Quartermaster's Department, and as to that I do not know.

Q. Well, did he say he did not honor your requisition because he did not have them?

A. I would not say that. Perhaps at this date, up to a certain time—at the early part of the campaign—he did have them; at least, I think he so reported to me. Later—I can not tell the date; along, perhaps, the 1st of July—the quartermaster's tents were much more abundant, very much more abundant, and my recollection is that at that time there was no great difficulty in getting hospital tents, although there was a disposition on the part of all of the organizations to apply for hospital tents, to make requisitions for hospital supplies of everything they thought they needed; and then these requisitions had to be supervised pretty closely by me to find out the absolute necessity for them.

Q. Please state whether or not you had frequent conversations with Colonel Lee—the Quartermaster's Department—about hospital tents, and that he admitted upon some occasions, and how many, that he was short of hospital tents.

A. These questions came up a half a dozen times a day, many days in succession.

Q. What did he say in regard to the tents?

A. He wanted a supply of tents.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Please tell us whose business it was to see that improper men were not kept in division hospitals.

A. It was a very difficult thing for any man to determine who were improper men or proper men. Naturally it took some considerable time. Everybody was green; no man had passed an examination, and almost all of them were unfamiliar with their duties.

Q. I am talking about whose business it was to see that only the actual sick were in the hospitals.

A. It was the business of the officer in charge and the officer of the day. They were responsible for the examination of every patient that went into the hospital, and then periodically it has been my practice to have a board appointed to periodically examine all questionable cases. That was the action I took when I put myself in charge of the First Division hospital.

Q. Do you know of any instance in which such examination was had—a regular examination of a patient?

A. No.

Q. You know of no instance of the kind in connection with the division hospital, where men were properly and thoroughly examined when they entered, and duly inspected from time to time?

A. No; I can not tell.

Q. Whose business was it to see that such very necessary steps were taken to prevent the hospitals from being overcrowded?

A. The business of the surgeon in charge; it was on him the responsibility rested. He was the surgeon of that hospital.

Q. If he did not discharge his duty, whose business was it to bring him to task?

A. The duty of the division surgeon.

Q. And if he failed, whose business was it to see that he performed his duty?

A. The corps surgeon.

Q. And if he failed, whose business was it to bring him to task?

A. You might say it was mine; but no cases of that kind were ever reported to me.

Q. And yet?

A. And yet in some cases I became aware of this condition of things by personal inspection, and, as I stated, the First Division hospital had become so outrageous that I had to assume charge myself.

Q. Knowing these facts and knowing that the surgeon of the camp had made no official reports to you, did you take action in the matter by calling his attention to same?

A. Not infrequently—very frequently—both of them. I called the attention of both Drs. Hoff and Huidekoper. I reported to them, and they were in receipt of certain orders of reform.

Q. Did you call attention to these reforms and were they carried out?

A. They were carried out in a great many cases and changes were made, but the changes made perhaps resulted in a worse condition than the previous condition.

Q. Notwithstanding that, as far as you yourself observed, were you aware that those conditions existed in the combination hospitals?

A. No.

Q. Was it not their business to report to you?

A. No; I did not require it at all.

Q. You did not require it at all?

A. No.

Q. Then it mattered not what was going on: it was not their business to report to you?

A. No, sir; to the Surgeon-General.

Q. But if they reported to the Surgeon-General, such reports came to you, did they not?

A. No.

Q. Then they were to be made, as I understand it, to the Surgeon-General?

A. What do you mean, sanitary reports?

Q. These hospital reports that I am speaking of, showing the condition of things, such as the hospitals being overcrowded with men. Did they or did they not report to you?

A. Perhaps they did, perhaps not. I observed the condition of things there myself.

Q. You have already said that you saw certain conditions.

A. I could see a great many things that they could not see.

Q. Would it not have been wise, under these circumstances, to have relieved those gentlemen?

A. Not by any means. I had no authority to relieve them at all.

Q. Did you report the fact that they were not observant?

A. Perhaps: they were not in that particular case, but a thing of that sort was not so apparent.

Q. But it might have been apparent to them, don't you think?

A. I do not know. I saw the condition of things in the First Division hospital myself.

Q. Did you see it in any other hospital?

A. I saw the condition of things; it was pretty bad in the Second Division hospital of the First Corps.

Q. And the conditions continued so?

A. Frequently changes were made; there was a great deal of floundering done—a good deal in the selection of men to occupy this responsible position—to find out the right men suitable for the right place. The man that was put in charge of the Second Division hospital of the Third Corps was thought to be a competent man, but he was not a man who understood how to run things—he meant well and did the best he could.

Q. What was his name, please?

A. I can not tell—it is a “Ber-something”—there were so many men there that I knew them all very slightly.

Q. There have been complaints that these hospitals were overcrowded; you have yourself stated to us that there was overcrowding—at least, you have stated to us there were men in the hospital who had no business to be there; and then, so far as I can ascertain, no man was called to account for it?

A. That had to be discovered before a report could be made.

Q. But having been discovered, was any man called to account?

A. The discovery was made, as I said, in the First Division hospital when I made a return of these men to their respective regiments.

Q. The conditions must have been existing all along, were they not?

A. I presume they were.

Q. And you, frequently visiting the hospitals, must have seen the character of the men in the hospitals who had no business to be there?

A. Probably.

Q. You recognized the fact that they were not fit subjects for that hospital?

A. Not until they were thoroughly examined.

Q. Did you order or was it your place to order an investigation?

A. Just as soon as I assumed charge of that division hospital I spoke of some things.

Q. You, as the senior officer of that camp, exercised supervision over those officers who were in charge when you assumed control?

A. The corps surgeons and division surgeons were instructed by me, and then common sense taught them that men ought to be examined before they were permitted to be put into the hospital.

Q. If the corps surgeons permitted this condition of things to go on, not for days, but for weeks, was it not the duty of the chief surgeon of the camp to put a stop to that sort of conduct on the part of the corps surgeons?

A. If that thing had been brought to my attention as chief surgeon of the command and it was perfectly patent, why certainly some action ought to have been taken.

Q. Were at any time charges brought against any medical officer in charge of a corps hospital, division hospital, or any hospital?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Was there not ample occasion for preferring charges?

A. No, sir.

Q. You think the condition of things were in such a state that the men should not have been called to account for it?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You mean by that, Doctor, that you did not prefer charges against men for inexperience?

A. Yes, sir; for inexperience. These men were willing men, competent men, but did not know how to work.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. If you had relieved any of those men, Doctor, would you not have had to take men of less experience to fill their places?

A. Just so. I might have had a man with less experience, and besides that, I could not have relieved anybody—I did not have the authority.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Would your recommendations have been acted upon, think you?

A. I think not.

Q. How long should a man remain in an official position in which he was supposed to be the head when his recommendations were not acted upon?

A. If that applies to me, all my recommendations were not disregarded.

Q. But practically so?

A. There are a great many things that you have not asked me.

Q. There are a great many things which I have asked; and then not securing the changes which you thought desirable, you continued in the service, did you?

A. We are speaking of these volunteer surgeons. As I have stated before, some of them excellent men, some indifferent, and some worthless. It took a good deal of time to discover, and I was not going to put myself in the position—not knowing the facts in the case—to make recommendations in cases of that character.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you think it is possible, where you put 40,000 volunteer troops together and who have not been in camp for forty days, for anybody to state how efficient the officers of that command may be?

A. That is exactly the point that I am getting at. We do not want to do anybody any injustice—they were all new in the business.

Q. Being new in the business, it was impossible for one to tell how efficient they would be after they had learned it?

A. Yes, sir; I think so.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. If your recommendations and your directions to Drs. Hoff and Huidekoper were not carried out, would you consider them excusable because of the want of familiarity with such duty?

A. Dr. Hoff ought to have been and was familiar with the duties required of him.

Q. Did he obey your orders thoroughly?

A. I never gave him any orders.

Q. Did you not call his attention to existing conditions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he correct the conditions?

A. Yes; in a general way.

Q. The conditions remained, however, the same in his corps?

A. To a large extent. In the First Division of his corps no change was made, because the conditions were fairly good. In the Second Division they were poor—his attention was called to it every day. He relieved the surgeon in command of the hospital, and his successor was relieved, and also two or three who followed him, one right after the other.

Q. And yet the difficulty remained?

A. And the difficulties largely remained, and in some cases were worse than they were before.

Q. I want to go back to that subject of the overcrowding of hospitals because of the complaints being made—I understood you to say that you had seen men lying outside in the open—hospital surgeons, so called, not in tents?

A. I did not say "not in tents;" I said lying on the ground.

Q. Were they all under shelter?

A. I never saw a man not under shelter in a hospital—not to my knowledge.

Q. Take the period of the first week in July. About that time how large a proportion of the hospital tents in the various division hospitals were floored?

A. Well, they were pretty much all floored, except what we called the "convalescent tents." There were certain tents outside for men who were not seriously sick at all, but who were in the hospital. Some of those tents were not floored. I think in some of the division hospitals, so far as I can recollect now, the Second and Third Division hospitals of the First Corps, I think those were all floored. The First Division hospital was not all floored, but the greater part of it was floored.

Q. At what period of time are you prepared to say that the Second Division hospital and the Third Division hospital were floored?

A. I do not know; I do not think that they had them all floored.

Q. The majority of the tents of the Second Division were not floored?

A. I do not know; there were a good many floored and a good many not floored.

Q. How large a number of men have you seen in a division hospital tent?

A. Six.

Q. Never more than that?

A. Never, that I remember, and those were moved out at once.

Q. Would you have known it if there had been eight?

A. There might have been plenty of places where there were eight; I can't remember.

Q. Would the general filling up of the hospital, if it had been at the rate of eight to a tent—you would have observed it?

A. I did not observe it.

Q. Do you think you would have observed it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us what you know about the administration of the Second Division, Third Army Corps, hospital up to the time you left?

A. The Second Division, Third Army Corps, changes had been made there in the administration of the hospital at three or four different times, each time with a view of correcting the evils which existed, and yet the difficulties did exist. They had a great many patients there. It seemed that in that corps certain brigades and certain regiments were particularly unfortunate, and there was a great deal of typhoid fever there, and I had frequent conversations with the corps surgeons there, and with Dr. Hoff, and some of the changes that were instituted in that division hospital were made on my recommendation by Dr. Hoff.

Q. As you yourself observed it, what was the condition as respects the excess of patients in proportion to tentage; the care that was exercised on the part of the medical officers and nurses, and the supplies that were furnished to the hospitals?

A. The care exercised by nurses, etc., throughout the whole army division was, as a rule, poor. Men were taken without experience from the various regiments, and in many cases were very inefficient. The hospital stewards, as a rule—we had not hospital stewards excepting those that were appointed acting hospital stewards, and they were thoroughly inefficient, because none of these men knew anything about their duties—their special duties. Many of them were willing, but inexperienced, and with nobody to instruct them; and in the division hospitals and in the regimental hospitals the different surgeons wanted a great many things that were not supplied by the Medical Department at all.

Q. I am speaking about the division hospitals.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But they ought to have medicines to take care of their sick. Was the general character of the requisitions made by them in such shape as the supply table would be able to accommodate the wants of the parties?

A. In a great many cases I saw the medicines were not on hand and could not be supplied. If on hand, they were furnished promptly.

Q. For what length of time was any division hospital left without medicine?

A. Not for any considerable time, because on two or three occasions there was a report made that certain articles were required very much indeed—I have forgotten, however, what the stores were now, but I telegraphed the Surgeon-General at once the conditions and that the supplies were not promptly forwarded. I telegraphed on two or three occasions that supplies were needed at once, and asked for authority to buy them; that is, so far as medical supplies were concerned.

Q. Were the existing deficiencies in the hospitals due to the fact that medicines could not be secured and that formerly; that medicines were not to be had at the depot at Lytle?

A. Certainly.

Q. Was that the only reason?

A. So far as I know.

Q. Let me read some testimony given by Major Jenne before this commission:

"Q. Was your attention called during this period of time, as to failure to get medical supplies or hospital supplies, tentage, etc., on account of want of knowledge as to making requisitions?

"A. Yes, sir; the Second Division hospital during this time made complaint that they had been unable to get medicine, and they were suffering very greatly; and I made inquiry into it, and this fact was disclosed, that, beginning with the 1st of July, six requisitions had been made up to the time I went over to the division—I went over there on the 16th of June, first, and the 22d—six requisitions had been made for supplies, all of which had been turned down by Colonel Hartsuff, who would not allow them; and the statement was that he wouldn't allow them because they were improperly made out."

What have you to say in regard to this?

A. I have this to say, that the probability is, as far as my recollection goes, that no requisition was ever made—I can say was ever made on me for anything—almost in these terms. Requisitions that came to me from that hospital were written on pieces of paper—that did not make a bit of difference in the issuing of supplies if they were on hand. Both these papers came in to me, and if the supplies were on hand they would be issued—that is, if they were not in greater demand in other localities, as I did not wish to give one hospital supplies to the detriment of another which was in greater need.

Q. Did you approve of the requisitions coming from this division hospital for medicines, or did you disapprove them?

A. I can not tell that. It is not likely. In some cases I might have disapproved them.

Q. On what ground was the disapproval?

A. If they were disapproved at all they were disapproved because the medicines were not on hand or because they were needed in some other locality more than they were there.

Q. Now, could there be any greater demand in any locality than in a hospital like the Second Division hospital of the Third Army Corps?

A. I was to be the judge of that. There might have been a hospital.

Q. Was there any necessity for any hospital being left without essential medicines?

A. Any necessity? What do you mean by that? Certainly I could not approve of requisitions unless the medicine was there.

Q. If the Medical Department knew that there was a large number of sick at the hospital at that time, was it not the duty of the Medical Department, from the chief officer down, to see that supplies were at that camp? Was it not their duty?

A. The chief surgeon there sent requisitions asking for greater and greater supplies. The supplies were not there; if the supplies were there they were distributed promptly.

Q. Can there be any reasonable excuse for the absence of medicines in the northern part of Georgia in the months of June and July and August?

A. On two or three occasions it became necessary to communicate with the Surgeon-General of the emergencies that existed and I obtained his authority. I went into Chattanooga, made my wants known to the chief druggist there, and he had to telegraph to Atlanta and Nashville, making up a requisition and bought up what they had.

Q. Could not that amount of telegraphing have been done by the Medical Department to the various cities throughout the United States and the articles have been purchased instead of going to Chattanooga?

A. From Chattanooga, no, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. Because the authority of that nature rested with the Surgeon-General and he did not give me authority—I beg your pardon—he gave me authority to purchase certain articles.

Q. Were you not authorized to purchase anything that was needed for that camp?

A. By no means.

Q. Was there or was there not a sufficient quantity of quinine for the necessities of these hospitals at any and at all times?

A. I think not.

Q. Was there any good reason why there should not have been quinine to supply the wants of an army of 46,000 men?

A. The supply department will have to answer that question. I communicated with the proper authorities in Washington. I tried to get these things.

Q. After the requisition was made upon you, how long did it ordinarily take to supply the articles, speaking generally?

A. If the paper that was brought to me was approved by me—and in many cases the papers were sent directly—the man who brought the paper could have gone to the supply depot and have gotten the stuff in half an hour.

Q. Is it not known to you that a period of twenty-two days have elapsed between the filing of a requisition and the articles being supplied?

A. I do not know anything about their requisitions. I kept no record of requisitions, because I had none; they may have entered their application for supplies upon a piece of paper and envelope.

Q. As I understand you to say, you disapproved these requisitions only when you thought that it was necessary, when you thought the medicine should be distributed in some other way?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If medicine was present?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The requisitions were not turned down for any other reason?

A. By no means. The requisitions were approved and the medicine supplied when it was on hand.

Q. Here is a statement that when a requisition was made on the 2d of July—when a large number of articles were required—that was testified to us by Major Jenne in reply to the following questions:

“Q. Do you think of anything you would like to say in connection with this hospital besides what you have said?

"A. I think I should, in justice to myself and those who were connected with the institution, refer again to the matter of requisitions, and call your attention to requisitions and their disposal. Here is a requisition [producing papers]. These are all special requisitions of July 2. Here is a special requisition of the 2d, in which we ask for some things for the kitchen—iron kettles, large tripod, and some chains, etc., none of which were on hand. It was approved by everybody who should approve. They were not on hand.

"Q. How do you know they were not on hand?

"A. We went to the medical purveyor, who said they were not here. He did not have any.

"Q. What annotations are made on the border?

"A. 'Approved by all; none on hand.' The next requisition—July 4, 20 articles—it is noted on the margin 'Approved by Major Bradbury, Major Schooler, Major Hoff;' and further annotation is made, 'Rejected by Colonel Hartsuff,' because such indorsement should have been made on the back."

Q. Is it true?

A. No.

Q. "A. Well, I wish to say further that Major Hubbard presented this requisition in person to Colonel Hartsuff, who could easily have handed it back to him and asked him to write him the name of the hospital there, or he could have written it himself, because he knew perfectly well what hospital it was, I think—could have been no doubt at all what hospital was meant.

"Q. What did he say to Major Hubbard on that occasion, when he carried the requisition in? Did he hand him back the requisition at that time?

"A. He handed him back the requisition."

What do you know about this case?

A. I remember the case—I remember it. Major Hubbard's requisitions had been frequently brought in—they had been approved. I had rather specially instructed Major Hubbard, because he was an active, bright fellow and I had tried to get him to make requisitions carefully and correctly, and in this particular case it was made out very well indeed, and I had asked him to make an entry of something or other so as to complete the requisition, so as to make that requisition perfect.

Q. Did you send that requisition back?

A. I handed it back to Major Hubbard.

Q. Did he correct it at the time?

A. I don't remember now—I don't think that I ever saw the requisition again.

Q. He had it on hand, etc.?

A. That is entirely incorrect, and I know that they were not drawing as many supplies as I would like to have given them, because the great majority of the supplies were going into the First Corps, which was being put into position for field service, and I often wanted to give supplies to the Third Corps which were received by the First Corps men because they were about to move.

Q. Then you did not require any inventory of articles in the Second Division preparatory to the granting of requisitions?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it possible, think you, for the individuals at that hospital to have prepared such inventory?

A. Well, the chief surgeon of the hospital—no; with respect to the medicine on hand, no. With respect to the furniture and appliances, such as utensils, yes.

Q. It was not possible to make it?

A. For expendable articles, no; in expendable articles, yes.

Q. "A. It would have been impossible for him to furnish an inventory with our hospital as full of patients, as we had not a single competent clerk; we were not

able to get a man into that store—into that supply store—that was capable of running it; we changed three or four times; tried to find some man who was capable of accounting for what was asked for. He was supposed to have a copy of the requisition, so that he would know what would be asked for; he was supposed to know when he checked it up—everything that was actually received, when he issued it to this ward and that ward and this surgeon and the other; he was supposed to give himself credit for those things; but we didn't find a man who had clerical knowledge enough to manage it, and with the large quantity of supplies that we did have of the various things he was not capable of making an inventory.

“Q. What important medicines were requisitioned for that were not received?

“A. Well, carbolic acid, quinine, salol, and other intestinal so-called antiseptics that were in great need on account of the presence of typhoid fever; the quinine on account of malarial diseases; opium and such preparations, on account of the presence of diarrhea and dysentery, colic and indigestion; carbolic acid and other disinfectants, for general purposes of cleanliness about the wards in which there were contagious diseases.”

Q. Did you turn down requisitions for anything of that sort?

A. By no means.

Q. Requisitions for bandages and such articles?

A. As you will find in my communication all along here, an open book account was kept; requisitions were not made; I did not require requisitions. In the course of time it became necessary for the medical purveyor to get a knowledge of this status, and in order to help him I asked that requisitions should be made, so as to systematize, to put things in order, and give the medical purveyor a little breathing room to know where he stood and what he had on hand; but so far as requisitions were concerned, in the early part of it and all the way through requisitions were not made. I do not believe that one dozen were ever made correctly, and I do not know of a requisition that ever went back not approved when the goods were on hand.

Q. Are we to understand you to say definitely, and once for all, that you did not yourself disapprove any requisitions because of the form in which they were made out?

A. Except in that one case—a Dr. Bradbury is the only case that I remember having any question about—if the articles were on hand, they were issued—that is, if there were not greater necessities for them somewhere else—and in that case the requisition was handed back, asking Dr. Hubbard to complete the requisition, simply making a heading to it, because I was not aware of what the conditions were in the purveyor's establishment—the medical purveyor not having had time to make an inventory of his supplies—I could not direct him to fill the requisition because he did not have the things on hand.

Q. Before you left had typhoid fever become very extensive?

A. No, sir; not to any large extent, although there were manifestations of it—the highest rate, the percentage of sick, was about 4.

Q. Did you or did you not at any time urge upon the Surgeon-General that the nursing forces of that hospital should be changed, so that female nurses should be employed instead of male?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would it have been advisable to have done so?

A. No, sir.

Q. You still think that male nurses would have been preferable?

A. In a field hospital—in a general hospital I would not object at all; on the contrary, I would prefer female nurses, but under the circumstances there—the First Corps was moving—the female nurses would have been more in the way than serviceable.

Q. How soon was it apparent to you that the division hospitals at Chickamauga were not division hospitals in the proper definition of the name, but were practically base hospitals?

A. That never appeared at all, because I had no knowledge whatever when those troops were to be moved.

Q. Were complaints made to you officially that the men in the various division hospitals were not properly nursed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What steps were taken by you to correct that evil?

A. I tried to educate the nurses; I tried to improve their status and condition.

Q. Do you think it probable that such change could be effected only to securing proper nurses for the patients?

A. I knew it could; I felt that it could.

Q. How long a time would be required to fit these untrained men for service as nurses?

A. It would have taken, to have fitted them to have nursed certain class of patients, a considerable time. For the character of patients that we had mostly it would have required a very short time; but to have cared for typhoid cases it would have required experts.

Q. You had a considerable number of typhoid patients, did you not?

A. Typhoid cases, as fast as they were appearing on the division hospitals, were being transferred to other localities. I had taken active measures to secure the Leiter Hospital. I had recommended to the Surgeon-General to erect desirable hospitals there; they were not erected, and the typhoid cases and most of the serious cases were being transferred to other localities as rapidly as possible, so that not long before I left—not long before General Brooke left there—I made an official report that the number, the total number of typhoid cases, were about 90—92, I think, was the number—and they were being sent to Leiter Hospital as rapidly as possible.

Q. What was the bed accommodation of Leiter Hospital?

A. We expected at the time, with the tents erected, about four or five hundred. The total accommodation, I think, was in the vicinity of 300.

Q. Was it possible to accommodate in the Leiter Hospital 250 patients?

A. With the tentage.

Q. To what extent?

A. The whole grounds were covered with tents.

Q. Do you remember the maximum number of patients that were reported from the Leiter Hospital when you were there? Can you approximate it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it over 200?

A. It was in that vicinity, I think.

Q. As I understand you to say, Doctor, there were 90 cases of typhoid fever in the whole camp?

A. Yes, sir; I sent out for reports all over the camp.

Q. Was there or was there not any question as to the character of the disease prevailing at the camp continually?

A. There was.

Q. What was your impression of the disease?

A. The experts differed in opinion as to whether it was typhoid fever or malarial fever.

Q. If there was any question of the character of the disease, which was the safest view to take, typhoid or malarial?

A. By all means typhoid.

Q. Was that acted upon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were the larger number of cases that were doubtful treated as typhoid?

A. In some division hospital, according to the disposition of the surgeon in charge of that hospital. In some division hospitals these cases were reported as malarial, some typhoid. Of course I had no direction as to how they should be reported.

Q. Were there reports brought officially to your notice that the sick were being neglected in these various hospitals?

A. By reports—no, sir.

Q. Not by official reports, but was it reported to you as the senior surgeon of the camp?

A. I do not remember. I made my own personal observations by personal inspection. I was in each division hospital very frequently.

Q. Had there already begun to be the great complaints that were afterwards made of the neglect of the sick at Camp Thomas?

A. Yes, sir. In some of the camps—the Second Division of the Third Army Corps—there was a number of complaints made.

Q. Did you endeavor to secure outside nurses to take proper care of these sick men?

A. I did not, sir.

Q. They were left to the nurses that you have already spoken of, trusting in time to educate the nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the meantime the men were suffering actually and positively, were they?

A. The men were sick.

Q. And the men were dying?

A. They were not properly attended.

Q. And dying for want of proper attention?

A. Very likely, sir.

Q. And no effort was made to save them by securing proper nurses from outside?

A. No, sir.

Dr. CONNER. I think that is all I want for the present.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You will remember that the surgeon in charge of the hospital stated that he secured the supplies of medicine by getting up early in the morning and applying to the medical purveyor; do you know who that was?

A. That was Dr. Huidekoper.

Q. Well, how do you account for that?

A. I can account for that easily. Dr. Huidekoper was surgeon in chief of the First Corps. General Brooke was in command of the First Corps. General Brooke was also in command of the camp. The First Corps were virtually under orders to move, and there was a preference manifested all along the line to supply the First Corps first before the Third Corps was supplied, and the First Corps received in some cases an excess of supplies—supplies that had been issued to it up to the maximum, and the maximum at that time was liberal. They had sent to me then for an approval of an excess of that, and I did not approve it, feeling that these supplies ought to go to the Third Corps; they were needed there; but my disapproval was overruled.

Q. Overruled by whom?

A. By the commanding officer, General Brooke, and the purveyor was instructed to furnish the goods.

Q. And in that way you deprived other hospitals of their proportion?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand you to say, you established a school of instruction for the surgeons?

A. I did.

Q. How long did that continue?

A. The school was established at the coming into the camp of the different regiments. As soon as they got into camp and got straightened out at all, all the general surgeons responsible and as many others as could be spared were directed by me to report to me at my tent; and they came in great numbers each day, both the regulars and the volunteers, many of them being young men and not having had any experience, and I occupied an hour and perhaps two hours each day in going over the subject of camp hygiene, of clerical work, of the duties that belonged to a medical officer in the field, explaining all the points to them and asked them if they had any questions to ask, and told them, in closing, when they did not have any questions to ask, "You will find plenty of difficulties when you get to your regiments in making out reports to me, etc., and when you experience these come to me freely and I will help you out." Many of them did so, and many of them did not.

Q. What proportion of your supplies were secured from the Red Cross and other charitable associations while you were there?

A. Not any of my supplies. A good many supplies were supplied by the Red Cross. They came in there, and I received them and helped to get them established. I went to General Brooke to help get them established, getting him to permit them to put their supplies in and working in harmony with the Red Cross all the time, but what they took there I can not tell.

Q. Why was it you could not tell—the Government could not supply?

A. The Government could and did supply in many cases; but, on the other hand, there were a great many things that the Government did not supply.

Q. And the whole thing was brought to a focus at once?

A. The Government was unprepared for such a condition of things. Many of the little things that the Red Cross—luxuries and things of that sort, which were not supplied by the Medical Department. I was very glad to have the Red Cross supply. Many of the things that were reported to have been, and were not, supplied by the Medical Department ought to have been ready and could have been supplied. When I went down there, however, anticipating that the division hospital would be established and that there would be required for the sick such things as ice, milk, and various things of that kind, I telegraphed to the Surgeon-General that we wanted a quantity of money to meet these conditions. He sent over \$100 to me by dispatch at once, and I devoted this money to the purchase of supplies that we needed.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. How ample a supply of milk and ice did you have there?

A. From the Medical Department?

Q. No matter where it came from: how much did the Government furnish?

A. Each division hospital was authorized to buy what they pleased. There were in some division hospitals 10 to 20 gallons of milk and 200 or 300 pounds of ice. That was before a large number became sick—before there were many typhoid-fever cases.

Q. Was there an ample supply of milk and ice at all times?

A. If there was not, there was no reason why there should not have been, so far as I know.

Q. Was there any scarcity at any time while you were there?

A. That depends—I can not tell; I was not familiar with the details of all the division hospitals; I know in some cases they were pretty liberally supplied and I know in some cases they were not.

Q. Was there furnished by the Government a sufficient amount of necessary supplies to the really sick?

A. I do not know.

Q. Have you any idea?

A. If it was not it could have been furnished.

Q. Was it furnished, as far as you know?

A. I said just now that I do not know as to the different division hospitals.

Q. But you have an impression.

A. I know that milk and ice were pretty largely supplied. I know that in the course of time and afterwards—that after the ice and milk commenced to be purchased, then typhoid fever was manifest; also that then it became necessary to have larger and still larger quantities—then the Red Cross came in and supplied largely milk and ice.

Q. In your judgment how much of a percentage of the ill health of that command was due to drinking and vice, favored by the conditions existing at Lytle or Chickamauga?

A. I can not say as to the percentage; there was a good deal of illness when the weather was considered. The drills were had early in the morning; the men received almost nothing in some cases in the way of sustenance; they had no breakfast and went out to drill on an empty stomach. After a long drill they became exhausted, and being exhausted from the long drill rushed over to the canteen and drank largely of beer, which paralyzed the stomachs of most of them, and not only did they go to the canteens to drink the beer, but they ate whatever it was possible to obtain from the many hucksters who visited the camp. The presence of these hucksters I protested against continuously, and I endeavored as far as possible to caution the men frequently to refrain from eating any of the fruits furnished by these hucksters on an empty stomach.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you object to their drilling before breakfast?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was your objection sustained or overruled?

A. In the course of a week, I think, the drills were reduced in length of time and made later.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was any effort made to protect the men against conditions existing in that town of Lytle to preserve their health?

A. No. I have said here that I have reported frequently it was a nuisance and a menace to the camp. Ever since the Chickamauga camp was established the men were to a certain extent making themselves ill through the articles which were taken from the hucksters.

Q. And no efforts made to protect the men against these conditions?

A. Well, I can not tell; I do not know.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did Colonel Denby take up the matter of disinfectants with you when you were examined before him?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. The universal excuse was that they could not get medicines because they were retained for the First Corps. I should judge from the evidence that they were several weeks in getting supplied. Do you know the time when the First Corps were finally supplied?

A. Not until just before General Brooke moved out of there. The First Corps was completed in its organization about the 21st of July.

Q. Why could not supplies have been issued for that corps independently of the

hospitals that were there? They seem to have absorbed all the supplies that came.

A. Well, the hospitals constituted a part of that corps.

Q. Those that were in the hospital could not be moved?

A. No, sir; that was one of the difficulties in the division hospital. When the divisions were moved out suddenly there would have been no provisions made at all. We had to run around and do the best we could to get the supplies for those who removed, and that caused a great deal of work to supply that division. I had an interview with Colonel Hoff almost every day, and it was by earnest consultation with Colonel Hoff and his officers that I succeeded in having the camp remain in statu quo. I made many requisitions on the commanding general to leave at least one clerk who was familiar with the papers and three acting hospital stewards and one or two other men to take control of affairs.

Q. Why was it not just as easy to supply that camp with medical supplies as it was with commissary supplies?

A. I was asking for supplies in large quantities, and I got down to asking for them in smaller quantities. I suppose that the medical authorities in the East, at Washington, were issuing all the supplies that they could get hold of in getting supplies to Tampa and finally to Cuba. I tried to be patient down there, waiting in anticipation of supplies being sent there as soon as possible.

Q. They were taking supplies at Tampa and Camp Thomas to the First Army Corps and the troops were being moved there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, why was it they could not just as well have secured medicine as commissary supplies?

A. If you want to ask me that question, and can give me the authority, I would say there was no reason. It seems to me that there were supplies in Cincinnati and the various cities to put them there, but I do not know; I can not go beyond a certain point.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did you ask to be relieved from service there?

A. I did.

By General DODGE:

Q. You stated in your testimony, I think, that the medical force that came with the volunteers were inexperienced. Now, when you left there, which was about July 20—

A. About July 27.

Q. Were those medical officers fully competent, reasonably experienced, and efficient?

A. Lots of them were doing well on the ground, and were material, who had been very inefficient when in the First Division hospital. Paralyzed as they were when I took charge of the division hospital to oversee the duties there, I found that some of the men did their work well—that is, some of those men who had been inefficient.

Q. I speak not only with reference to a few of the men there, but were the larger percentage of them efficient, and were they working in such a way that they would become efficient with a little more experience?

A. Oh, yes, sir; they were working into it nicely, but there were a great many men that ought to have been weeded out. Of course it took a little time to discover these cases.

Q. But suppose you found them inefficient after they had had plenty of time to have become efficient, you weeded them out?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. You relieved them, then?

A. Certainly; they were relieved from the division hospitals.

Q. Those medical forces coming there with so much inexperience, how did you expect with that condition of affairs, who had charge of the sanitary affairs of that camp, to have a sanitary condition of things existing?

A. These same surgeons were responsible for that. I did not believe that they could have had a perfect sanitary condition by any means, but hoped to have one soon.

Q. Taking their experience into consideration, did they have a reasonable sanitary idea of the necessary sanitation of a camp of that kind?

A. In a good many cases they had. In a good many cases they had not. They were absolutely worthless.

Q. Why is a camp that is commanded in its corps and most of its brigade commanders with officers of the Regular Army and officers of military education—now, then, why was it that with those experienced officers with those divisions and those brigades, why was not the sanitary condition there in fairly such a condition as you recommended and such as you received orders yourself to have? Did they not have that order of the Surgeon-General specifying that the conditions of such a camp should be in good order?

A. Yes, sir; also an order from General Brooke, showing just what ought to be done, and I myself recited those things in many cases to the colonel (Colonel Huidekoper) as to the great importance of camp hygiene, and that when the time would come for the regiments going into camp that they should dig their own sinks and that the condition of the camp generally should be properly hygiened.

Q. Do you think, taking a volunteer force of that character, do you think it is possible under any conditions, and taking into consideration the inefficiency of the officers, to enforce proper sanitary regulations in a camp of that kind—that is, a camp of about 60,000 men?

A. Well, it seems to me—it seemed to me—that it was almost impossible to get these men up to the proper status to appreciate the importance of sanitary hygiene.

Q. Is not a soldier instructed to obey orders?

A. Yes, sir; to a large extent. The volunteer soldiers did not learn the great idea that a soldier should obey orders strictly.

Q. You were in the last civil war?

A. From the beginning to the end.

Q. Did you see many cases of typhoid fever there?

A. I saw many cases of typhoid fever there, and went through that sickness myself.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. When was the order issued by General Brooke placing the division hospitals under his own control—in other words, taking the control away from the division hospitals?

General DODGE. The order was July 20.

Dr. CONNER. So late as that?

Q. And before that time they were under the command of the division officers?

A. Yes, sir.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you remember that order?

A. I do not.

Q. It seems to have been issued after a consultation while you were there. It was issued on the 20th. Do you remember any such order?

A. I do not.

Q. That order taking from the commanding general of divisions authority over the division surgeons of their division hospitals and placing it with the Medical Department?

A. Why, yes; I remember it. It had almost gone out of my mind.

Q. You think that was proper?

A. No, sir; but it seems to me that the commanding general commanded whatever was in his division or corps. I understood always that the division commander commanded the division hospital.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. And that was that the commander in charge of the division hospital reported to the division commander; or would he have to make a report to him?

A. I think he would report to the division commander. I supposed that the division commander would properly have control of the whole division.

By General DODGE:

Q. That is so.

A. Yes. I remember a case occurred there where the question was raised as to whom they should report and who had authority, and so far as I understood the general commanding had the authority over his men; and if the division hospital was in his command he had command of that also.

Q. Of the division hospital?

A. That I understood to be the case.

Q. And it was under the direction of the chief surgeons of the corps?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Among them yourself?

A. There were a good many difficulties about the organization of division hospitals—the question of the ambulances, for instance; the ambulances were together in all conditions. The whole erection of the division hospitals, in my opinion, was radically wrong.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Could you not have corrected it?

A. No, sir; the taking of the forces from the regiments and the depleting of the regiments to build up division hospitals is all wrong; the locating of the ambulances and separating of the ambulances in what is called the ambulance corps; these ambulances in some localities could be reached only by special applications sent there through an orderly. The management of the division hospitals, the detail of the surgeons from the regimental to the division hospitals was all wrong. I reported it all to General Brooke as being all wrong, and that no division hospital could run successfully any regimental hospital under those circumstances.

By General DODGE:

Q. Under whose advice was that order issued?

A. These orders were generally issued from Washington.

Q. Answer the question; from the Surgeon-General?

A. The Adjutant-General.

Q. What order was it that you particularly refer to?

A. The order some time ago establishing division hospitals.

Q. You have that order; that is the one, is it, showing what should be left with the regiments and what with the hospitals?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your opinion, was that a mistake?

A. It was radically wrong, as without that one order I think we would have gotten through in a fair way and in pretty good condition.

Q. Well, did you tell the Surgeon-General that that was a mistake?

A. I notified General Brooke; I made a report to General Brooke.

Q. Do you know whether General Brooke made a representation to the Surgeon-General?

A. I do not.

Q. Don't you think it was your duty to have notified the Surgeon-General?

A. Just at that time, I do not know.

Q. But if he had been advised he could have revoked that order?

A. It was in process of trial, and I did not feel quite confident to ask the question.

Q. That is, you wanted to try it to see if it did not have a good effect?

A. Yes, sir; but the more I saw of it the more I was convinced that it was radically wrong.

Q. Did you at any time communicate with the Surgeon-General in reference to it?

A. I have told the Surgeon-General.

Q. Before you left that camp?

A. I don't remember whether I reported on it or not.

Q. But it has been changed?

A. Yes; I know it has been changed.

Q. If I have got your testimony right, that is, that if you had had the authority you could have selected medical officers in that camp who could have prevented many of the troubles that did exist there?

A. I think so.

Q. Well, did you not have the authority; could you not obtain that authority from General Brooke?

A. All these officers, like myself, were assigned—General Brooke personally applied for me; everyone else that was assigned there was assigned from Washington; all the surgeons outside of the regimental surgeons were assigned from Washington.

Q. Could not General Brooke, as corps commander—could he not have changed this?

A. He might have assumed the authority to do so.

Q. Did he not really have authority to do it—there was no one in that camp he could not command?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were they not assigned to him, so that he could exercise his authority to assign them to places he wanted them?

A. As I understand it, they were assigned to those places direct from Washington.

Q. Did you suggest to General Brooke the making of changes in these matters?

A. I reported to General Brooke the inefficiency of certain individuals and talked with him as to the misfortune of these men being placed there, and continued to do so until the time that he went away, and said that I did not want to measure a man up quickly, as it took a long time to discover this condition of things.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Mr. President, we have testimony showing that these surgeons were ordered to report to the corps headquarters for assignment to duty.

General DODGE. We have evidence to show that it was not so. My understanding was that they were assigned from Washington.

Colonel SEXTON. We also have evidence that a brigade surgeon objected to being assigned to a ward because he was a brigade surgeon.

By General DODGE:

Q. The surgeons all practiced?

A. There were so many corps surgeons appointed—they were assigned, I am sure, by order from Washington to the corps.

Q. And the division surgeons, they were assigned by the chief surgeons to their respective divisions?

A. They were assigned to certain corps.

Q. Were any of these surgeons taken and sent to hospitals on your recommendation?

A. They were taken on my recommendation in certain cases.

Q. So that really the surgeons there were subject to the orders of yourself, through the commanding general.

A. I had the selection of some of the surgeons in charge of the division hospitals, and I made selections, some of which turned out beautifully.

Q. You have testified here to the difficulty of obtaining supplies at times. Were those short supplies, in your opinion, of such a nature that they affected the sickness there in that camp, or the deaths in it?

A. There was a misapprehension, it seems to me, on the part of the surgeons in general there as to their duties, very largely, indeed, and I tried to cure that so far as possible, and explained to them that they were there to prevent sickness, and that if they would take hold of their duties properly they could prevent sickness, and therefore the necessity for a large supply of medicine, as many of the men were not nearly as sick as they wished to make out, and that by taking proper sanitary measures and by giving close and early attention to the sanitary condition of the camp and men—seeing that they were fed and properly exercised—it would prevent a large amount of sickness; and, according to my experience, the longer I remained there the more I found out about these things. I think the last lot of medicine was better and that there was altogether too much used, but that there seemed to be a disposition on the part of the officers there in camp that they were going to cure all the convalescents by greater supplies of medicine.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Now, Doctor, in relation to this Order, No. 116, you are aware that it is the 60-cent ration order. Did you understand that it would apply to any sick in quarters, sick in regimental hospitals, or the sick in the division hospitals; that is, did you consider that a regimental surgeon could draw that 60 cents for any man sick in quarters?

A. They have done so right along.

Q. So that any man sick in quarters did not mean sick in the hospital?

A. If he is sick in quarters, not sick enough to be put in the hospital, no.

Q. I mean that a sick man needs a different diet from the army ration?

A. If he is sick in the hospital, yes; if in quarters, no.

Q. Well, the Commissary-General testified here, and so made in his report, that an order was issued providing that any surgeon, regimental or other, could draw the money and make the returns on that 60-cent ration for any man sick in quarters, and that all it required was that the doctor should state that he was unfit for duty?

A. Those sick in the hospital have drawn it right along, but not in quarters.

Q. Is it not your experience, as a surgeon, that a good deal of this sickness comes from the fact that men sick in quarters need a different diet from the army ration that they could not eat?

A. Yes, sir; in a good many cases a little change of diet would cure some things.

Q. Why has not the Medical Department made a provision of that kind? That is one of the great troubles we have met with—with a man not sick enough to go to the hospital; but there was no process by which he could receive the food he ought to have had.

A. If he is sick enough in quarters to require a different diet, he ought not to be in quarters, because he should be sent to the hospital if he wants to get a different diet.

Q. If you wiped out the regimental hospital and you would not receive him in a division hospital, what was he to do?

A. Some of these cases I speak of, they were to go on duty.

Q. A great many of these men may have had diarrhea and some diseases of that sort, which necessitated a different diet?

A. If they have to have a different diet, the quicker they go into the hospital the better.

Q. Take the army that came from Santiago, every man required a different diet, and you could not put every man in the hospital?

A. They ought to have been in the hospital, and they would have gotten well a good deal quicker, probably, if they had been there.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. What was the reason of the old arrangement that medical storekeepers, who were business men, and that medical inspectors were done away with?

A. That, sir, is something that I don't know; it is a thing that I do not know; it should have been avoided against.

Q. Avoided against?

A. Yes, sir; from being done away with.

Q. Would it or would it not, in your judgment, be wise if businessmen had been connected with the shipping department and received all the supplies, and medical inspectors had been appointed whose sole duty it would have been to look after the conditions that existed there?

A. I think we ought to have had a competent man there, and that we ought to have had all that was needed.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you think it is necessary for the sanitary regulations and for the health of the soldiers that they should have floors to the hospital tents, if they have cots?

A. If they have cots, floors are not absolutely necessary, particularly where we were, and especially during the summer. The ground under the tents was absolutely dry: there had been no rain for weeks and I may say for months, and all the men could lie on the ground, as I did myself. There was no difficulty whatever; no rains there at all, and a man is not going to be in any danger by lying on the ground, even for months, in such a climate, and there was no great danger at all.

By General McCook:

Q. Have you any memory of a Major Martin—he was surgeon of the Second Brigade—have you any knowledge that he had been summoned to your headquarters?

A. I have.

Q. Who summoned him there?

A. I did.

Q. What did you summon him for?

A. Some time in July General Boynton reported to me—that was the time the question was being raised as to whether typhoid fever was becoming prevalent or not, and I was considering the question as carefully as I could, trying to get information in regard to it—that it had been generally reported to him in Chattanooga, being circulated in the hotel and all around it, that typhoid fever was very prevalent in the camp in an alarming manner, and that the people in Chattanooga had asked him if he was aware of it and told him that it was serious, and so forth, and that it was existing here and there very largely. Now, when General Boynton told me about it I wanted to know if it was true. I had just at that time got a report from the doctors of the number of cases in camp—92, as I have just stated—and I wanted to know if it was a fact. Up to that time I had never seen Dr. Martin. I therefore sent for Dr. Martin and asked him what evidence he had that there was (he was in the Second Division, I think, of the First Corps) typhoid fever existing there in an alarming state, as I wanted to get at the facts of the case. I said to him,

"Give me what information you have on the subject," and he gave me a lot of information. "Now," I said to him, "Doctor, I am going to ask these men all about this thing. I have got my reports and statements and I want you to sustain what you have said here, or if you can not sustain the statements that you have made, you have made false reports all over the camp"—and up to that time we had no typhoid fever to speak of. I said, "Doctor, either sustain this thing or else, if you can not sustain it, retract your statement fully; and if you won't do one thing or the other you will take the consequences."

Q. At that time do you know how many cases of typhoid fever were in the Leiter Hospital?

A. I have seen a great many cases, quite a great many cases. I do not remember how many, but still the scientists in this Second Division were not convinced—the scientists were working vigorously over this same question as to whether the disease was a malarial or typhoid fever, and at that time it was not definitely known whether it was malarial or typhoid.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was any microscopic examination made which determined the presence or absence of malarial fever?

A. It was so reported to me in the Second Division that malarial fever was prevalent.

Q. And did they report in the majority of these cases that it was malarial fever?

A. In many cases.

Q. But did not subsequent conditions show that it was typhoid that was prevalent and not malaria?

A. About that time I departed from the camp.

Q. Did you in any way threaten this doctor that if he did not retract what he said you would court-martial him?

A. In substance I did say that if he did not retract what he had said, or if he could not substantiate his statement, I said that I would report him to General Sheridan and he would probably be court-martialed, and I think then that General Brooke took him personally to General Sheridan to make his statement and General Sheridan reiterated what I have said.

Q. Did Dr. Martin give you the cause for his belief that there was too much sickness in his brigade?

A. He said that it had been reported to him that he had not examined the cases, but that it was rumored all over the camp.

Q. He says that he went down and saw the condition of things (referring to his conversation dated the 15th July).

A. I do not think the General threatened him in any way. I took Dr. Martin to General Sheridan, as my idea was to get the whole of the facts of the case, that if typhoid fever did exist there where did he get his information from and why did he not make it known to us instead of spreading the information all through the town of Chattanooga, creating a kind of a furore there.

Q. He says he got it from Dr. Crawford, and the question was, did it really exist there? That is the only point.

A. Yes, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. Do I understand that you were present during this interview with General Sheridan? And you were absolutely sure that he made no such statement, threatening him with court-martial?

A. I think General Sheridan said to him that he should retract his statement or prove that typhoid fever was prevalent there; that he deserved to be court-martialed, that it was wrong to make a statement generally without going into any details;

and that he should either give us a letter of that character, showing where the typhoid cases existed, or else he should retract what he had said; if he did not, he should be court-martialed.

By General McCook:

Q. Did you not know there was typhoid fever in the camp at that time?

A. A good many cases had been taken out to Leiter Hospital and other localities, and, as I said here in my communication to General Brooke, it was for the purpose of correcting the evils existing there.

Q. General Boynton was one of the officers of that camp?

A. No; he did not have charge of the surgeons; nothing except of the water supply; he did not have anything to do except just boring wells.

Q. And he laid the pipe line?

A. No—well, yes; the engineer of the camp laid the pipe lines.

Q. Then he had general charge of the water?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you think it was improper for this doctor to have a conversation with a man and tell him the condition of the water supply?

A. Not at all.

Q. Did you consider this doctor an alarmist?

A. That was the idea exactly. I said to him—I had never seen him before—“What is the evidence: where did you get all this information from? Make your statement of the whole case clearly and verify your statement.”

Q. There were, then, 140 medical cases at the Leiter Hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this number had just left there; he had this information?

A. We all had this information.

Q. Don't you think when he had this conversation with General Boynton it was with the best interests in view?

A. Well, it alarmed everybody.

Q. But it was a good thing that it did alarm someone?

A. Everybody was on the qui vive.

Q. I think if Dr. Martin had discovered this state of things—I do not think he was anyways to blame?

A. That may be.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Did not subsequent events show that Dr. Martin was right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Therefore the wrong was done in his being called to time?

A. There was no wrong done to him and none intended. The report made by General Boynton gave us information that the whole of Chattanooga was alarmed, and we were not aware of the direct cause.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you think it was right to threaten him with being court-martialed?

A. No, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. The plain fact of the matter is, Doctor, that the man was right in his opinion and the others were wrong; that there was typhoid fever there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it was quite as evident to you as it was to him that typhoid fever existed?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was evident that an enormous amount of sickness existed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a fact that he did make this statement throughout Chattanooga?

A. I do not know, except that I received information to that effect from General Boynton, but the proper thing for him to have done was to make a report of it through the proper channels in the regular manner, when the same would have been taken care of.

Q. Suppose that he had made the report in a proper way through the proper channels, what action would have been taken?

A. We would have taken the matter up in due course.

Q. Do you know anything about a report made by Dr. George A. Smith, as to the condition of the Second Division of the Third Army Corps?

A. He sent a report to the chief surgeon of the corps, and was sent for and was asked to retract, and he was given to understand that if he did not retract he would get into trouble. It never was received at the Surgeon-General's Office.

Q. We have a copy of the report—now, that report was smothered somewhere, either at the corps headquarters or camp headquarters or somewhere, because the commission asked for every paper that had been sent?

A. Those were papers not required at General Brooke's headquarters.

Q. Ought not a paper of that sort to go through the authorities to the Surgeon-General's Office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Ought a man to be called up in order to retract it?

A. Not by any means.

Q. And if Dr. Martin had made such a report through the proper channels, would action have been taken upon it?

A. That report ought to have been taken up and the matter investigated at once.

Dr. CONNER. I guess this report was smothered somewhere.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. When you reported to General Brooke the deficiencies in the medicines and medical supplies, what did General Brooke do?

A. Nothing, that I know of.

Q. Do you know whether General Brooke reported that condition of things to the Surgeon-General?

A. I will qualify my statement by saying that General Brooke had frequently taken up my reports and forwarded them to Washington and supplemented my requests to Washington for supplies.

Q. General Brooke, in his letter to us of November 12, says: "The deficiency in the supply of medicines and hospital supplies will be found treated in my daily reports from Camp George H. Thomas to the Adjutant-General, in which reports all supplies were mentioned." Now do you know anything about this report?

A. Perfectly; about early in July an order was issued.

Q. I do not care about going into details—do you know anything about these reports?

A. An order was issued in Washington directing General Brooke to make a report of deficiencies in all the different departments—quartermaster's, commissary, medical, and everything, every evening at 5 o'clock—as regular as clockwork, of all the different departments, and these reports were made to the Adjutant-General, showing the deficiencies of the supplies on hand, and these reports were sent by telegraph.

By General DODGE:

Q. All the supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then General Brooke did what he could to get those supplies there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then, according to his statement and according to your own, he is not responsible if those supplies did not get there?

A. I do not suppose that General Brooke would be responsible.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Do you know anything about General Brooke making daily inspections of the camp?

A. No, sir; I know that General Brooke was out almost every day in camp looking it over. I know that he was very active in getting through the camp.

Q. General Brooke says, in his letter of November 12, that "Lieutenant Colonel Parker, Twelfth New York Volunteers, states that, 'So far as I know, neither General Brooke nor General Wade ever made a sanitary inspection of the camp,' etc. Of course not. Lieutenant-Colonel Parker and too many of the regimental officers did not see my daily inspections of those parts of their camps, the company kitchens and sinks, which did not evidence sufficient care on the part of those whose duty it was to give especial attention. All my comments on the defects were made to the division and other commanders." Do you know anything about this daily inspection by General Brooke?

A. I know that General Brooke rode through the camp often. I was occupied in various other ways.

Q. According to your statements this camp was not in good condition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so you reported to General Brooke?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you advised, even, that the troops be moved away?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, what have you got to say to the statement of General Brooke that he made general inspection of all the camps and he communicated his views to the officers of the division?

A. I can not state anything about that at all. I know that this condition existed.

Q. Now, in that particular case General Brooke can not say that he wired to a superior officer for instructions or anything else. The responsibility would rest with him, would it not, according to military rule?

A. I was annoyed a good deal because of the number of hucksters which continued, and the evils existing with the Lytle and Chattanooga towns. They were responsible, to a great extent, for many of the evils which existed there, and I felt that they ought to be corrected some way or another. I was reporting continually on these questions, both personally and by letter.

Q. Did General Brooke consult you with regard to the location of the troops and the camp?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you make a protest with him?

A. Of some locations; yes, sir.

Q. Did you make a protest to General Brooke with regard to the water?

A. Most thoroughly and continually.

Q. Did he overrule your protests?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he overrule your protests as to the arrangements of the camp?

A. I want to answer the first question. Unless it became manifest that we had to have some water, and when it became manifest that the regiments were coming in so rapidly, and the only good water that I had discovered in that vicinity was Crawfish Spring, and that question of the water supply came up—

Q. I wanted simply to call your attention to the statement made by General Brooke in his letter to us, dated November 12, to know whether or not you can explain it. He says in his letter: "In the clipping from the Tribune of November 4 will be found extracts of the testimony of Colonel Hartsuff, who was sent to me as chief surgeon. In the matter of the location of the troops in camp, Colonel Hartsuff was not consulted, so far as my recollection goes, nor did I deem it necessary to consult him; there was no need of it; 'any protest' he made received such attention as the importance of it required. Colonel Hartsuff's impression of the water was not borne out by the analysis of it." He means by that that the water was sent to Washington on three or four different occasions. What I wanted to ask you was—he admits, however, that you made a protest—now, did he give that protest any consideration at all?

A. That protest was made after a consultation between Generals Lee, Boynton, and myself, and finally we got on to the question of water.

Q. What about the location of the camps?

A. That question—I do not remember the question of camp ever came up.

Q. I will read what he says here again: "Lieutenant-Colonel Parker * * * commanders." Can you tell anything about what passed between you and General Brooke with regard to the location of the camp, or the trouble in the camp sites?

A. In conversation with General Brooke I reported frequently on certain regiments—regiments I think were put in too closely on a rocky mound. I reported against this. One regiment (I think the Ninth New York) was located on bad ground, and I reported in general terms against the First Mississippi and two Arkansas regiments.

Q. And no attention was paid to your request?

A. The Mississippi regiment—one regiment—was moved; that is, as I remember.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 13, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. FRANCIS L. GUENTHER.

Brig. Gen. FRANCIS L. GUENTHER then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By GENERAL BEAVER:

Q. Will you kindly give us your full name and rank, and position which you occupied during the war with Spain?

A. Francis L. Guenther, colonel of the Fourth Artillery, and during the operation of the war with Spain I occupied the position of brigadier-general of volunteers.

Q. Please state whether or not you were at Camp Alger at any time; and, if so, in what position and for what length of time?

A. I was ordered to assume command at Camp Alger of the troops of that camp on the 16th day of May. I received verbal instructions from the Adjutant-General to proceed there at once, but I found that the quartermaster who was to go in charge of the camp could not go that afternoon, so we went there early the following morning, the 17th of May.

Q. Were there troops in camp at that time?

A. At the time I reached there, the First District of Columbia Volunteers were in camp.

Q. When did you assume command of the camp?

A. I assumed command of the camp on the 11th day of May.

Q. How long did you remain in command of the camp?

A. I remained in command of the camp until, I think, it was on the 23d day of May, when I was relieved by the arrival of General Graham.

Q. What is your opinion as to the character of the ground for camping purposes; what was it at the time? Did you regard it as a suitable place?

A. At the time I went over I did not think it at all suitable. It was not a camp that I would select.

Q. What were the reasons, General, that induced that opinion?

A. Well, the main objection that I had, after a careful examination of the ground, was that it did not have a good water supply.

Q. That was apparent at that time?

A. That was apparent to me at that time.

Q. Do you know what steps were taken to remedy that difficulty?

A. The quartermaster, Captain Martin, who was then acting as camp quartermaster, was directed to make preparations, as far as possible, to procure a proper water supply, and he did make some arrangements with the city of Washington, I think, to sink wells. That work was carried on to a certain extent before I left the camp. After the arrival of some of the other regiments those regiments dug wells.

Q. Do you know to what extent the lack of water was supplied by those wells?

A. I can not say about the wells, because I don't know much about it. I will state that the map of the farm showed a number of springs—I think there were sixteen springs marked there—but I was informed by the lessee of the farm that the springs were entirely unreliable, could not be depended upon at all, and at the time I went over there they were filled with brush; apparently had not been cleaned out for years. They were cleaned out, however, but they were entirely unreliable.

Q. They were simply surface springs?

A. Yes, sir: surface springs entirely, and the only water that I could find on the farm was a little stream which supplied the city of Alexandria—so we had to be careful about the pollution of the stream: so orders were given to carry that out—and the two wells there, one of which was reported as being inexhaustible. That well never gave out, but I believe the other well did give out.

Q. Was the camp, in other respects, a suitable one for the number of men there?

A. I think it was entirely too small. There was not ground enough for anything like the number of troops that I was ordered to provide for. I was furnished with a list of regiments—I think the original list furnished to me was nineteen regiments of infantry. After that there were other orders for some other regiments not on the list; but the camp was intended to provide for at least twenty-five or thirty-five thousand men.

Q. Were there any other respects in which you regarded the ground as unsuitable? How was it as to drainage; was it good or otherwise?

A. It was not good for drainage. The drainage of the camp was toward those runways or smaller streams, which it was our endeavor to prevent from being polluted in any way. Some parts of the ground would make very good camping ground for a regiment, but the ground was so limited that it was necessary as a preliminary to give the troops a chance to go into camp on their arrival, and they came very rapidly, with very little time to prepare. The camping ground was too close together; two regiments were placed where it was hardly large enough for one. The camps were crowded.

Q. What was the sanitary condition of the camp in the early days of its existence?

A. The very first day of the existence of Camp Alger my attention was called

to the sickness, particularly typhoid fever. I think my attention was called to that the second day I was in the camp. The typhoid fever, to my recollection, was pretty bad in a Western regiment, I think the Sixth Illinois.

Q. How successful were your efforts at securing a good camp sanitation? Did you have good sanitary conditions existing in the camp while you were there as to policing, etc.?

A. No, sir. As far as the policing was concerned, the camp was kept pretty clean. Every effort was made to keep it so.

Q. Was the ground good for sinks?

A. Yes, sir; the ground was good for sinks.

Q. And the sinks properly constructed and generally used?

A. So far as I know they were properly constructed; the only objection I had was, on account of the limited space we had, that it became necessary to get them too close to the camp itself, and the camp of the regiment; and in some cases I ordered the colonel to move the sinks and get them farther off, and at the same time they did not have room to get them farther away.

Q. Had typhoid fever developed to any considerable extent before you left the camp?

A. I don't remember how many places; it was getting pretty bad. The first case reported to me was by the surgeon and colonel of the regiment; they asked what disposition to make of the case; the man was very ill and we had no accommodations whatever. We understood of course, and had no medical officer, and there was no staff, except that I had the adjutant-general in my regiment. We had no ambulance, no medical officer, no medical supplies whatever. This case of typhoid fever was reported to me, and I immediately reported to the Surgeon-General of the Army, requesting instructions that this patient be sent to Fort Myer, and that an ambulance be sent at once. I got an immediate answer from the Surgeon-General, and he would send an ambulance and the patient would be moved. Between an hour or two hours the driver reported to me that he had driven to the camp of the Sixth Illinois and that he had told the colonel he came for a sick patient, but that the colonel told him that the patient was dead. He afterwards reported to me for instructions, requesting that I would have a letter written which he could show that he had complied with the orders given him. I directed the adjutant-general to prepare the letter, but before the letter was signed the surgeon of the regiment came over and told me he had just discovered two more cases, and asked for the ambulance, and I said certainly he could have it if he could get them both in the same ambulance. Then I directed the driver to report to him, and gave orders to the doctor to send the two sick patients forward.

Q. How long had this regiment been encamped at that time, General?

A. I think it was the second day they were in camp. They had been there a very short time, either the first day or the second. There were so many coming in and there was so much to do that I can not recollect it.

Q. They had evidently brought this man with them sick who had died?

A. There is no doubt about it.

Q. Do you know to what extent this regiment was supplied with medical and hospital supplies?

A. I don't know. They had some medicine. They didn't have an ample supply. None of the regiments had an ample supply of medicine or much of anything else. The regimental surgeons reported to me in regard to their wants of medicines, and when they did so I suggested that they go in and see the Surgeon-General of the Army, as I had no means of providing such.

Q. You had no medical staff?

A. None whatever. I received orders to purchase supplies in this city. I think there was no trouble about the medical supplies after the arrival of the medical director, who came there just about the time that I was leaving.

Q. That was on the assumption of the command by General Graham?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was, I think, on the 23d of May?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that you were there nearly two weeks?

A. A little less than two weeks; that is, I was there in command just about a week, I think.

Q. Did you remain in the camp in command of a division or brigade, General?

A. No, sir. I was assigned to the command of a division by General Graham, and left there, I think, on the 23d of May on sick leave.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. To whom did you report, if to anyone, as to the unsuitableness of the camp?

A. I made no report whatever as to the unsuitableness of the camp itself. The report was made to the Adjutant-General of the Army in regard to the water supply, and the request was made to delay the departure of troops from State camps until proper preparations could be made.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 14, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF REV. EDWARD A. KELLY.

Rev. EDWARD A. KELLY then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Have you given your name to the stenographer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And your rank?

A. I am chaplain of the Seventh Illinois Infantry.

Q. When did you enter the military service, and how long did you remain?

A. The United States military service or the State?

Q. United States.

A. Right at the call, and remained in until mustered out on the 20th of October.

Q. Where did your regiment serve?

A. First month or so at Springfield, State capital of Illinois, then to Camp Alger; remained there until ordered to move; then to Virginia, to Thoroughfare, and then to Camp Meade, and from there we were ordered home.

Q. How were you subsisted in the State of Illinois?

A. By the State.

Q. How was your regiment clothed, by the State of Illinois?

A. It was clothed by the State while in Illinois; but I want to say that the regiment was not full when we left Illinois, and they filled it up to the maximum of 106 to each company at Camp Alger, and there they received clothing from the United States.

Q. To what extent was your regiment supplied with tents, camp and garrison equipage when you left the State?

A. No tentage at all. Our camp equipment was sent to one regiment that left before us. We were encamped on the State fair grounds in several large buildings, and we were the only infantry under tents while there until the other regi-

ments were moved, and when moved they took our supplies, and we moved into the buildings. As far as the medical supplies were concerned, we brought down about \$100 worth that we had from the State.

Q. When did you reach Camp Alger?

A. I don't remember the date.

Q. About what time?

A. Toward the latter part of May.

Q. How many troops did you find in Camp Alger when you went there?

A. I should think at that time there were very nearly 15 or 16 regiments.

Q. What was the character of the camp in which you were placed?

A. As to location?

Q. Yes.

A. I think it was very good; in fact, we were all pleased with it. When we got off at Dunn-Loring, we got orders to march down a road lying south from the depot, and we marched 4 miles through a very pleasant bit of country. There General Graham met our colonel and pointed out a camp site and asked our colonel if he cared to take that. Our colonel said he didn't care to take the camp there as it was low ground; and the General said, "Where would you like to go?" and he said, "I would prefer the woods there;" and the General said, "You can go into the woods there;" and we did.

Q. Did you remain there until you left Camp Alger?

A. No; we did not. We remained there about three weeks. When we got there immediately our men were sent out to locate wells. That was our principal difficulty there, in connection with the wells: we had considerable difficulty in retaining our wells against the others. We got the wells in the neighboring farms at springs located in various places.

Q. Then, it was only a question of retaining for your own use what you secured?

A. Yes, sir. Complaint was made by two regiments. One was the Second Tennessee, I think. When they came around the well, they stationed 4 or 5 men; but our fellows would not acknowledge them, as they had no clothing, and our men chased them away. Word was sent to General Graham about it, and he said as long as the regiment could take care of itself he would not deprive them of what they had got in that way.

Q. What was the health of your regiment at Camp Alger?

A. Very well. We were there seven weeks and did not have a solitary man sick; and finally, when the camp became affected, as it had to from the way most of the regiments abused their camp ground, we were sent to Fort Myer. Major Davis, who had charge over there, said, "Where is that Seventh Illinois stationed?" And we said, "We have been over there seven weeks;" and he said, "We have got notification of every other regiment through its sick men." The fact is, we were there for seven weeks without a sick man, and that was so strange to Major Girard, who had charge of the sick there, that he accused our surgeons of hiding some of the men in the woods there. I want to say in regard to the question of health, that up to date, out of 1,326 men, we have just lost 2.

Q. What provision was made when you went into camp for your sinks?

A. Just as soon as we struck camp the officer of the day was ordered to have men dig sinks as soon as they stacked arms; and then the surgeons of the regiment got a detail once a week to go around and see that the sinks were well taken care of; and also to go through the woods and see if there was any defecation; and anyone caught there, even though not in the act of defecating, was placed under arrest—he was made to understand that he could not go back that way; and in that way we kept the place pretty clean.

Q. To what extent were your sinks made by the men—were they made comfortable?

A. They were very primitive. I was surprised when I got into contact with one the first time.

Q. Was that one of the difficulties in inducing the men to use the sinks, Father Kelly?

A. No, sir; not at all. It was the natural slovenliness for some men to take the first brush they came to.

Q. Where were your sinks as related to your camp?

A. Always at the end of the company streets, below the kitchens.

Q. What distance away?

A. One hundred and fifty or 250 yards.

Q. Did you have any difficulty as to water supply while there?

A. We did in the first camp. We would then be in what was called the southwest part of Camp Alger. We had to haul water in a long way; that was the only hardship there. Men would be carrying it with long sticks with the ends on their shoulders and five or six buckets hanging from it. We started in to bore wells there, and I thought the water was the finest I ever drank, but our surgeons thought differently.

Q. Who was your colonel?

A. Col. Marcus Cavanaugh.

Q. What experience had he had?

A. He was in the State militia in Iowa, and then he was with us four or five years before we were called out.

Q. Had your regiment any experience in the State camps of Illinois?

A. Yes, sir; in the Chicago riots, and in the coal troubles; we were there a week or so.

Q. What was the character and quantity of food issued to your regiment?

A. The quality of the food was the best. I could not see any reason for anybody objecting to the food. The time of getting it was where the mix-up came. The trouble was that when they went to Dunn-Loring, the man there in charge thought he could only open one car and on one side of the car at one time; and it was very hot weather. It seemed to me that both sides of the car should be opened and three cars at a time. They got there at 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning for their provisions, and that was the trouble—they had to wait three or four hours.

Q. That related only to the fresh meat?

A. Yes, sir; when we started on the march from Camp Alger there was some trouble with provision, and I felt this way, that we could not experience the same thing in camp as where you carried your own rations. Some of them got tired of carrying it and threw it away, and when it came time to eat it they did not have it. One young man said, "You could not expect a fellow to go off and work an hour or two in the sun and eat that kind of grub." It happened to be a rainy morning when he came to my tent, and it was the third or fourth time he had made that complaint, and he had his meat with him; so I asked him to come in with his mess-pan and he did and sat down; and I talked with him about home and other interesting subjects while I tasted his meat; after we had been talking for some time and the meat was nearly gone he noticed it and looked at me then with his eyes bulging out and he said, "Where do I come in on this meal?" And I said, "You don't come in on this meal." Then he went off growling that it was no use complaining to me. We had a good many little incidents like that that made it very pleasant.

Q. That was especially pleasant to you?

A. Yes, sir; very.

Q. Do you remember, Father Kelly, when your clothing was issued to you?

A. At Camp Alger?

Q. Yes.

A. I do.

Q. What was the date?

A. I do not place dates very well in my memory; but I think it was toward the middle of the time of our encampment there. By the way, that came in dribs and drabs, too. They said they did not have the sizes. That is what the quartermaster said.

Q. What was the character of your men as to size?

A. They were very much over size. Our surgeons would not take any man who was not physically fit and sound in health. They were all over size, as a general thing.

Q. That made it difficult to get clothing to fit them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the character of the clothing when you did get it?

A. I think it was pretty good. I heard none of the men making complaints about the clothing. The clothing we got down there was, as a general thing, all right. We had a hard time getting anything from the State in regard to clothing, and so Colonel Cavanaugh and I went down and ordered 300 uniforms. They were ordered of a firm in Chicago, and the men told me afterwards that the clothing they got afterwards lasted better.

Q. That the men you recruited who were not in the National Guard go there without uniforms?

A. I suppose they were around the camp five or six days.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Were they not sent down in details?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, that would make it pretty slow?

A. Yes, sir.

By General BEAVER:

Q. You did not maintain a regimental hospital?

A. We tried to. We had quite a little row on that head. Before we started some of our friends presented us with an ambulance. It was better than anything at camp and some of the surgeons there wanted to keep it. We would not let them have it. Major Surgeon Sullivan built a little hospital in the woods. Then we got an order that our sick would have to go to the general hospital, but as we had only some little troubles, where the men could be kept in the tents, we did not send them over. On account of that Major Girard thought we were hiding them in the woods, but that was not so.

Q. Have you any knowledge as to the medical supplies your surgeon was able to get from the Government?

A. I have not any positive knowledge, except what he remarked, namely, that if it were not for the supplies that he brought from Illinois he would be in a bad fix; that he could not get any at all.

Q. That is, could not get medical supplies?

A. Yes, sir; we all wondered why, because it was so near Washington, Philadelphia, and New York, and we thought they should be able to get what was wanted.

Q. Do you know how many men were sent from your camp to Fort Myer, to the division hospital, during your stay at Camp Alger?

A. From my regiment, or all?

Q. From all.

A. I think there were 20 or 30, maybe more. Then, when we started on the march several got sick at the various stations. We had a field hospital at Bristow Station, and one of our men died there, and we had another at Thoroughfare Gap, and we sent some men over there.

Q. What was the length of your march?

A. Let me see—16, 20, 45—I don't think it was over 60 miles.

Q. How long were you making that march?

A. We were about two weeks. They would have marched right up to Middletown if they would have taken it easy, as they did toward the last.

Q. Did you carry your tents with you, or had you only the shelter tents?

A. Carried only the shelter tents, and one of the funny incidents that occurred then was on that account. We had only a mess tent to shelter them. They left them in Camp Alger, so that if it were not for that we would have been without shelter, and it rained like everything one time when we were in Thoroughfare Gap, and a big wind came along and swept that tent into a field. But I do not understand why they did not bring the officers' tents. I think they were allowed—I don't know the number—but I heard them complain about the insufficiency of the number. We had the conical tents with our regiment—that is, five to a company; that would be 60 tents—and if they put on enough to haul those that would have been sufficient.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. Was not the object to instruct the men to handle their shelter tents?

A. But even then it seemed to me that they would not be more than the protection of a little veil. They are buttoned at the top and the rain will get in. The tents are insufficient to protect them.

Q. But it was very warm?

A. Yes, sir; but it rained a great deal. But we got on very well down there, and we had no more sickness, we think, than anyone else.

Q. Your experience in all of the departments—the supply department—was that your regiment was fairly well attended to?

A. Yes, sir. We have no reason to complain. As a general thing, our officers knew what was due them and they got it, or found out why they did not get it.

Q. How long were you in Camp Meade?

A. We were there, I think—it seems to me we were there three or four weeks.

Q. What was its character?

A. Very nice; the location was fine. We were at the extreme north end of the camp. The only danger about Camp Meade was its proximity to the large towns, where the fellows could sneak off and get full. I thought it was an ideal camp. It was beautifully located, and the ground was nice and high, and I rode around a good deal, as I was the only Catholic priest for 30,000 or 40,000 men there.

Q. How was the water supply?

A. They were just beginning to put that there. There was a supply placed in the middle of the road. There were several stands and pipes, and every regiment—at least we did—sent wagons to get all the fresh water they wanted.

Q. The sanitary condition of the camp was like what?

A. The whole camp?

Q. Yes.

A. Ours was very good. I was not there long enough to judge for the whole camp. It seemed to me the sanitary condition of every camp depended upon the care of the officers, as the men are nothing but grown children. You have got to watch and keep after them and scold them and threaten them just as you would children.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I would like to ask how long you remained in the State camp you went to?

A. I think we remained there about three weeks. The way I judge it is by the Sundays.

Q. You said you changed your camp. I want to know whether that change was not considered by you as beneficial?

A. As I told you, we were at the southwest corner of the camp when we first went there. We were then moved a mile and a half east into the center of the camp.

Q. Did you go on new ground?

A. We went into the woods. We went in there and cut our streets.

Q. The change was beneficial?

A. Yes, sir; very.

Q. Your idea is that regiments should change their locations?

A. If I had anything to do with it, I would have them changed every month.

Q. Did you look into the question as to whether a camp would be better in the woods than in the open?

A. I did, and I made up my mind it was the only place for them—in the woods. One of the regiments we were brigaded with—I think it was the Sixth Pennsylvania—the colonel was asked by General Davis where he would go, and he said he would stay out on the hill; and his men were exposed there to the wind and the sun and out in the dust, and we were across the hill and nicely sheltered from the elements in the woods, and it seems to me it is healthy, as the ground and trees absorb the extra moisture and make it healthy.

Q. How was the weather while you were there?

A. Very hot.

Q. Then, of course, you did not feel it necessary to take into account the question of rain. Did it rain?

A. Yes, sir; several times.

Q. Hard?

A. Yes, sir; when it rained there it was hard.

Q. Then you tested and made comparison between camping in the woods and the open?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you still remain of the same conclusion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were the woods open—that is, no underbrush?

A. They were so thick when we started you could not drive an animal in; but the men stacked their guns and cleared it out. It was also a pine woods; that was an extra inducement.

Q. Did the sun shine in?

A. Yes, sir.

By General McCook:

Q. And your beds were raised from the ground?

A. Yes, sir. Whenever we stayed two or three days our surgeon in charge sent the men to get sticks or bricks to keep their bunks off the ground.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. You state the condition of your men, as far as health was concerned, was good?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what do you ascribe that?

A. They were healthy men. From my experience I made up my mind that the man from the city made the best soldier. The man from the country leads a simple and methodical life. He goes to bed at certain hours, and he gets his meals at certain hours, and does everything at certain times. The man from the city is up and down at irregular times.

By General DODGE:

Q. What proportion of your regiment was sick during the campaign?

A. Well, I should judge that there was not any more than—well, 10 per cent would be—I don't think we had 10 per cent of sick.

Q. And only two deaths?

A. Yes, sir; and that is up to date. I mean by sickness serious sickness, where the man would have to go to the hospital.

Q. You occupied five camps and were on the march how long?

A. Oh, I think we were on the march three or four weeks.

Q. Four weeks?

A. Yes, sir. We were on the march all of that, and out of that time these two men were lost, one at Camp Alger and the other at Bristow Station.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Did you have any typhoid?

A. Yes, sir; those that were sick all had typhoid, and our surgeon, instead of sending them to the division hospital, sent them to Fort Myer.

Q. To what did you ascribe the typhoid fever?

A. Because the camp was affected.

Q. Do you mean Camp Meade?

A. No, sir; Camp Alger. Since we have come home a number of them carried the germs with them, and after the excitement the germs took hold of them, and we had about 30 in the hospital; but they are all well now.

Q. You had some typhoid in the camp at Springfield, didn't you?

A. Not to any extent.

Q. I do not mean in your regiment, but in the camp.

A. Yes, sir; they had some there. But in Springfield we were the only regiment out in the weather. We were in tents and the others lived in large halls; but I think we rather had the best of it out in the field, although it was pretty muddy and rainy.

Q. A gentleman testified yesterday that the first typhoid had was in the Sixth Illinois, and he said that was the first they had at Camp Alger.

Captain HOWELL. You examined the hospital at Fort Myer, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From your inspection there and the manner in which they treated your cases is it your opinion that the men could be better treated there than at the average home from which they came?

A. I think they would be better treated there than in any hospital in the United States. I want to say in regard to Major Davis that he is the most capable man I ever saw. The number of men lost there is exceedingly low. When they got sick at Camp Alger the facilities for transportation were very poor, and the men would be likely to be shocked to death going over the rough road. That is what lost our first man. They had to go over this rough road, and then they were put in an electric car; and once they got to Fort Myer there was every facility for them to recover. As a matter of fact, most of them did recover.

Q. I have talked to many convalescents and they told me that they thought the treatment there was better than in the average home.

A. Major Davis, I thought, was one of the brightest men I ever saw. I was agreeably surprised to find him in that position, as he is an excellent man.

Q. What did you think of Camp Alger as a place to encamp a number of soldiers?

A. I liked it. The place was rolling land and it had shade enough, and the water gotten from those wells driven there appeared to me very good. I do not know that anyone made an analysis of it, but it was cool and nice, and there was a running stream there; and if the individual officers had made the men take care of themselves, I think it would have been an ideal place. They should also make

the men bathe themselves more frequently. For \$5,000 they could have bathed every man in that regiment once or twice a week, and they could have done it in this way. When we were at Springfield, our major got a large tent and some stoves, and he had a number of tubs, and he had the men brought in and bathed them, company by company. They simply had to erect four or five posts and tie the tent up, have a hose to fill it, and put a stockade around, and make them bathe. Instead of that, our regiment marched 10 or 12 miles to get down and take a bath.

Q. Don't you think the march was beneficial to you?

A. It was beneficial, but the roads were simply frightful down there; it was simply powdered dust; but the boys enjoyed the march, and they went once a week.

Q. Was your regiment alone?

A. Yes, sir.

By General WILSON:

Q. You have just given, in answer to Captain Howell's question, your opinion as to the quality of the hospitals and the different camps; and now, to sum up, what is your opinion as to the quality of the rations?

A. As good as could possibly be had by the men.

Q. And the quantity?

A. Good.

Q. And the character of the clothing?

A. Good; so far as I know.

Q. Of your own regiment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is all I want you to answer to.

A. It was very good. They were very well taken care of.

General DODGE. Any other question?

[No response.]

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you anything we have not questioned you about that you would care to speak of?

A. I have no suggestion to make to you gentlemen except in regard to my own line; I gave a little spiritual advice once in a while. I did want to say that I do not know whether—for the time or number of men that there was—I do not know whether they have been as well taken care of anywhere as in our Army. I think, excepting the Medical Department, they were as well taken care of as they could possibly be. For instance, down in Camp Alger. I do not see why the men when sick should not be supplied with bunks, and also have a floor in the hospital tents. When a man is sick I think he should be taken care of, but when he is well he should hustle. Some of these men were delirious, and they would stand on the ground in their bare feet, and the ground would absorb all of the heat out of their bodies and chill them. I do not know any way to remedy that unless you had men or women or sisters, experienced as nurses, to take care of them. Our hospital corps was well drilled, but they were divided and split up among the others. That is the only remedy I could suggest.

Q. The medical profession is divided as to the floors for hospitals. Some prefer the ground.

A. I did not know that. I know if a man in Chicago or anywhere else had a son sick with typhoid fever and he put him out into a yard under a cover they would have him arrested by the humane societies.

LETTER FROM NATIONAL RELIEF COMMISSION.

The following communication from the National Relief Commission was read and ordered filed and printed in the record:

PHILADELPHIA, PA., *December 12, 1898.*

RICHARD WEIGHTMAN,

*Secretary to Commission to Investigate Conduct of
War Department in War with Spain, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter of December 6, 1898, stating that the secretary of the National Relief Commission be requested to be present before your commission on Wednesday, the 11th instant, to "give such testimony as will aid the purpose of this investigation," I have the honor to inform you that at a meeting of the subcommittee of this commission, held at this office this day, it was, on motion of Mr. George C. Thomas,

Resolved, That in the judgment of this commission it is deemed undesirable that the general secretary should accept the invitation contained in the letter of Richard Weightman, secretary of the commission appointed by the President of the United States to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain, under date of December 6, and that he be instructed to inform the said commission that the National Relief Commission has not as yet completed its labors, but as soon as the report, which is now being prepared, is issued a copy will be sent to the commission.

And on the motion of Mr. Thomas E. Baird, it was

Resolved, That the commission deems it inexpedient to be represented before the investigation commission by any of its members at the present time.

Respectfully,

M. S. FRENCH, *General Secretary.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 14, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. BENJAMIN F. POPE.

Maj. BENJAMIN F. POPE then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell us what your stations were during the progress of the war with Spain?

A. Up to the 19th of April I was on duty at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, with the Seventeenth United States Infantry. I was then ordered by the Secretary of War to accompany that regiment to duty in the field at Tampa, Fla. We arrived, I think, about the 22d day of April, and I was still surgeon of the regiment for a week or more, but during that time, being the senior medical officer present, I was appointed the chief surgeon of the United States forces at that place. With the gathering of the commands I received another assignment under another title, as chief surgeon of the independent division, which was under command of General Wade. Later, General Shafter took command; again, being the senior officer present, I was made chief surgeon of the forces under General Shafter, and on the formation of the Fifth Army Corps I was made chief surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps, and so continued up to the 23d of July, when I was relieved

from duty on account of illness at my own request, at that time being in Cu' near Santiago.

Q. Major, during the time you were in Tampa, will you tell us whether or not you were consulted in the selection of Tampa as a camping place?

A. I was not, sir.

Q. What is your opinion now of Tampa as a camp site?

A. Taking my experience from the time we went to Tampa up to the 8th day of June, I had every reason to be satisfied with Tampa as a camp site, especially that part which was on Tampa Heights. It was elevated ground, a good, sandy soil, fairly well shaded with pine trees, and good, clean sand. The subsoil water was about 12 feet below the surface—we made some investigation as to the depth of subsoil water. The water supply of the camp at that time was from a large spring supplying the whole city of Tampa. I inspected the spring, found that it had been developed from rock, walled up, and the water was certainly fine, and I could find no possible point where it could be contaminated by surface wash or sewage. This water was delivered into large—if my recollection is right—a large steel tower; and from there piped to the camps and division hospital on Tampa Heights, and delivered through 2-inch mains to the various camps by means of spigots, which were located at convenient distances from the camps of the troops. The camps near the Tampa Bay Hotel were not so fortunately located. The ground was low, the water very near the surface, and the water supply was from a source not connected, I believe, with the city supply, but an independent supply, as I understood, under the control of the owners of the Tampa Bay Hotel. I won't be positive as to that. The troops camped out near what is called Palmetto Beach had a very favorable location at that season, and their water supply came from a large well—I do not know who had control of it, but it was pumped by steam, and I think it was afterwards delivered by pipes to the several commands located there. These troops were nearly all volunteers.

Q. Up to the time you left Tampa, what was the health of the command?

A. The health of the command was—so far as men being excused from duty was concerned, it was excellent. Our average sick rate—in time of peace for the whole Army—was about 4½ per cent; that is, the continuous noneffective rate. The noneffective rate up to the time we left was not over 2½ per cent, sometimes it was lower. In fact, never in my experience have I seen so healthy a command as was at Tampa from the time I came there until the time we embarked, in fact, until the time—say, after the 1st of July, or even later, the health of the command was excellent.

Q. Have you any familiarity with the conditions prevailing in other parts of Florida?

A. None whatever. I would like to state that while this was the rate of men excused from duty, there was a large amount of intestinal disorder among them, which I called an acclimating diarrhea. I had it myself, and nearly every officer and man in the command got it, and the people told us it was common with newcomers. I found that to be the case. In about three or four weeks the men there that length of time gradually recovered from this diarrhea, and nearly all the officers. It disabled no one from duty, but it did make a large draft upon the drugs of the corps.

Q. What influence do you think was made upon this diarrhea by the conditions which prevailed in Santiago afterwards?

A. None whatever, sir. I believe they had wholly recovered from that, and it was possibly due to the change from steam-heated barracks, comfortable beds, and warm blankets that the troops had been accustomed to, and placing them suddenly upon the cold ground and with night chills and the intense heat of the day. I rather accounted for it in that way, as many complained of being chilled

in the abdomen during the night, and I advised them to protect the abdominal viscera with their blankets.

Q. Has it not been the experience of medical officers that this form of diarrhea is exceedingly common in early spring and summer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And isn't it a fact that it is a thing to be provided for and anticipated?

A. Our experience on the frontier in the hot countries of the Rio Grande did not give this diarrhea.

Q. Is there not a difference between the condition prevailing 150 miles from the coast in Texas from that prevailing in the Gulf coast of Florida?

A. There is a difference; one is arid and dry and the other moist, but the difference is not great.

Q. Is not the tendency to diarrhea greater in low, swampy, or moist countries of the Gulf coast than anywhere on the plains?

A. I have not had sufficient experience to tell that. I know we had it in Florida at that time.

Q. Would you regard it as wise to have troops from the North spend the early and middle summer in Florida in the beginning of their military service?

A. Well, so far as the Fifth Army Corps was concerned, I could not see that any harm was done up to the time we left, and I would hardly like to give an opinion on that subject, because I was not present during July and August, when it appears there was a good deal of sickness there.

Q. You spoke of the army requiring a great deal of medicine on account of the intestinal disturbances. Please tell us what amount of medicines were with the command when the several parts of it arrived at Tampa. Also what arrangements were made for securing additional supplies and in what amount those additional supplies were received while you were there.

A. As the regiments arrived from the north they brought with them their complete field and camp equipage of the medical department—

Q. Let me interrupt you one moment. Does that cover all the regiments or only the regulars?

A. The regular regiments. The volunteers arrived with nothing. They also brought with them—but I ought to say before that that in this outfit there came with nearly every regiment a medical chest and a surgical chest and three months' supplies of extra drugs, as laid down in the supply table. I inspected nearly all of these regiments and received lists from the medical officers of everything they had. These lists were all consolidated and kept by me for reference, and, unfortunately that consolidation was left in Tampa, and I have been unable to get hold of it since; but I will say the equipment was very complete, and under usual conditions would have met the requirements of service, I think, for at least two months—hardly three.

Q. For what number of men?

A. For the number of men in each regiment. Each regiment brought its own supplies.

Q. At what time did the volunteer regiments begin to come in?

A. It seems to me they commenced to come in about the latter part of May, to the best of my recollection.

Q. And what time did you leave Tampa?

A. The 8th day of June.

Q. Between the time of your arrival and the date of your departure, how many regiments came in? That is, how many volunteer troops, speaking generally?

A. Well, I will have to make a little figuring on that. There was the Second Massachusetts, the Seventy-first New York, I think the Sixth Massachusetts, a Georgia regiment, the Sixth Ohio Volunteers—

General McCook. Fifth Maryland and Sixty-ninth New York?

The WITNESS. They had not got there. I do not think there were more than five.

Q. Up to the time you left?

A. Yes, sir. The regulars were supplied with medicines, but I do not know that the volunteer regiments had anything.

Q. During the time between the latter part of May and the 8th of June what was the amount of sickness among the volunteer troops as reported to you as chief surgeon?

A. On their first arrival the troops were in fair health, although suffering from the diarrhea the same as others, and up to the time I left they were in pretty good health, although measles appeared among them, and a good many were brought to our hospital suffering with that disease; some few cases of typhoid fever also appeared, but the number was not large. I think, taken as a whole, the health of the volunteers, up to the time I left, was quite as good as the regulars.

Q. Were the medical supplies you spoke of as being brought there by the regulars used by the regular troops and kept in charge by the medical officers of those troops, or were they distributed through the camp to volunteers as well as regulars?

A. The supplies, all by the regular troops; the medicines and the medical chests were retained by the several regiments and were used by the regular regiments in the treatment of their own sick; and I think they were retained by them until they were pretty well exhausted. On the formation of the divisional hospitals the camp equipage that they brought with them was absorbed into the divisional hospitals, but the drugs and the medicine chests and the surgical chests were retained by the several regiments.

Q. Was the supply of medicines, outside those brought by the regulars, sufficient to satisfy all the proper demands of the volunteer troops during the time you were at Tampa?

A. One of my first requests for medicines was for medical and surgical chests to fit out the volunteer troops. I was informed that these chests were in a state of preparation and would be forwarded very shortly, and every day I expected their arrival. In the meanwhile, by the direction of the Surgeon-General, I had started a medical supply depot in Tampa.

Q. About what date, please?

A. I will have to refer to my memorandum. [Witness examines paper.]

Q. Well, about what time, Major?

A. Well, I think it was about the second week in May. I would like to give it to you more explicit than that. I can not find that just now.

Q. That was before the arrival of the volunteer troops, was it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you supplied with any considerable amount of medicines in answer to that request prior to the arrival of the volunteer troops?

A. Yes, sir. Medicines came in—drugs came in in limited quantities—and were discharged from the freight cars and delivered by the Quartermaster's Department to the storehouses which they had given me for that purpose. Something came in almost every day, but the first that we received was surgical materials. The drugs did not come in so rapidly as the surgical materials; and as fast as they came in I directed the issue by the medical supply officer to the volunteer regiments that might be there, approving all requisitions that were brought to me, and directing what we had on hand should be delivered to the volunteer regiments in preference to the regulars, so as to fit them out as quickly as possible.

Q. How soon was the division hospital organized?

A. I will refer to my memorandum for that. [Witness refers to paper.]

Q. Let me save you the trouble. Was it established before or after the arrival of the volunteer troops?

A. Before, to the best of my recollection.

Q. Was it sufficiently provided to accommodate the number of sick from the number of men who arrived?

A. I had no information as to the number of men that might arrive.

Q. Did you not have any information about that?

A. I understood that 15,000 men would be there before we left.

Q. Were requisitions made for the necessary supplies for 15,000 men before the expedition was to leave?

A. That was my understanding. I received word from the Surgeon-General that I was to establish this medical-supply depot, and that ample supplies would be forwarded to me for all the immediate requirements of the command.

Q. In point of fact, when you left did you have all the needed supplies, medical and surgical, for the entire corps?

A. I will have to make a division of that question, and I would like to go into it more particularly.

Q. Answer in your own way, sir. Give us all the facts bearing on the actual amount of supplies you took with you.

A. On the establishment—do you want to know which, with reference to these division hospitals, or the whole expedition medical supplies?

Q. I want to know what medicines you had on hand for the expeditionary corps when you started.

A. That is, when we sailed?

Q. Yes, sir; when you sailed.

A. All surgical material I had received and distributed. I had distributed over 12,000 surgical packets for wounds and dressing.

Q. The first-aid packets?

A. Yes, sir. I received also—I think it was 40 boxes of surgical dressings, each one of which, from my observations in Cuba, would dress from 150 to 200 wounds, probably more. I received surgical operating tables sufficient for the field hospitals. Sterilizers, a large amount of splinting material, adhesive plaster, cotton rolls, batting, absorbent cloths, lint, towels, rubber sheeting, etc.

Q. Let me interrupt for a moment to ask you right there: Did you take with you at the time you left Tampa sufficient surgical dressing to supply the probable necessities of 6,000 wounded men? As I understand you, there were 10 cases, each containing sufficient to dress 150 wounds. Did you carry with you sufficient medical dressing for 6,000 wounded men?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Not the first dressing alone, but in the hospital until they could get their other supplies?

A. I think it might go higher than that, Doctor; I think it would go higher than that.

Q. You had plenty for 4,000?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what extent were you supplied with medicines such as might naturally be needed in a country such as you were going to?

A. There was where we were short. The constant demand for the drugs did not keep up with the supply that came in—the supply that came in did not keep up with the demand, is what I mean—and I was obliged to telegraph the Surgeon-General for permission to purchase in Tampa enough to meet the demands of the command until the supplies arrived.

Q. What would have been the difficulties in your having during those two weeks ample supplies for three months' time for an army of sixteen or seventeen thousand men?

A. So far as I know it is only a question of transportation in getting it into Tampa.

Q. Was an effort made two or three weeks beforehand to get all the medicines needed for an army of sixteen or seventeen thousand men for a period of one month?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The supplies were applied for?

A. Requisitions came in approved by me, and the Surgeon-General informed me that supplies had been ordered and were on the way, and I expected them each day.

Q. And those supplies did not reach Tampa until you were forced to leave?

A. Some of them did.

Q. To what extent?

A. With our purchases we were able to keep up with the current demand. On the 5th of June the first rush of supplies came in. I think, to the best of my recollection, there were some 200 packages received and delivered at our storehouse. The medical-supply officer had them opened, and I directed him to issue at once to the regiments composing the Fifth Army Corps, according to their requisitions, all that we had on hand. I directed him further to issue to the volunteers going with the command all that we could give them out of that stock, according to their requisitions. I further directed him to issue to the field hospitals what they needed on their requisitions, taking, of course, account of what was in the storehouse. We had a good many things that were called for by the requisitions, and some things that were called for by the requisitions that were not there, and we issued what we had. When that was all through I told the acting medical storekeeper to set aside for me one-half of all that was left after that issuing, and that I would take on the transports with me. At first I intended to take everything with me, to clean out the storehouse, but when I understood that troops were to be left behind, and they had needs as well as I, and that I was the medical officer in charge of the Fifth Army Corps, of those that remained as well as those we took, I left one-half for the use of the volunteer troops. I wish to say that one-half was a very small lot, not over 50 or 60 packages of medicine. I left some of the boxes of first dressings, some seven or eight, with directions to deliver them to the volunteer troops. All that was left, or that one-half, I got into the storehouse on the night of the 8th, loaded it into wagons, carried it down to the trains at Port Tampa, and took it from there and put it on the steamer *Seguranga* as my reserve stock. Captain Gandy sent me the next morning two lots more, which I put on the steamer *Comal*, and that was the last of the medical and surgical supplies that we received before sailing.

Q. At the time of sailing to what extent—what proportion of the necessary medical hospital supplies were on the transports for the probable necessities of an army of 17,000 men for thirty days?

A. All surgical supplies—

Q. You have already answered that; just take the medical supplies?

A. The medical supplies, counting what was with the regiments—I believed at the time we had enough to carry us through nicely until the arrival of the hospital ship *Relief*, which I was informed would leave New York immediately and join our expedition at Key West and follow us wherever we might go. I felt pretty secure then for at least thirty days.

Q. With or without the supplies you expected from the *Relief*?

A. No; without them.

Q. Are we to understand, Major, that you are satisfied you had with you all the medical supplies that would be probably needed for an army of 17,000 men going to a country such as you knew southern Cuba to be at that season of the year?

A. At the time we sailed it was my judgment that, with ordinary contingencies, we had enough to meet the demand for at least thirty days.

Q. Were those supplies transported to Cuba?

A. Yes, sir; that is, they were transported to Daiquiri and Siboney, but some of them did not get on shore in Cuba.

Q. When the expeditionary force landed, what proportion of your medical hospital supplies you took with you were landed?

A. All of the supplies that were in the field hospitals, all the supplies that were in the first divisional hospitals, all of the supplies that were in the third divisional hospitals, or reserve-corps hospitals, were put on shore, together with their tentage and everything they had. The supplies of the second divisional hospitals were on the steamer *Oilette*. I directed, and it was carried out after I left the front, that all of the camp equipage and every article of stores that could be spared from the second divisional hospitals be taken off and landed and added to the base hospital under command of Major La Garde, leaving the steamer *Oilette* as a hospital for constant use in receiving the wounded and sick as they came down. These supplies of the cavalry division hospital were only one-half gotten off, and so far as the medical supplies of the field hospitals were concerned, I would say they were wholly under control and could be utilized for the benefit of the sick and wounded. Now, when we come to the regimental supplies, I have a different story to tell. When I formed the field hospitals in Tampa I tried to be as liberal with regimental hospitals as I could. I allotted to each regimental organization a hospital tent, a common tent, a medical chest, a surgical chest, a mess chest, a food chest, a commode chest, a box of surgical dressings, which I have spoken of, and I left with them all the medical supplies they had drawn and which I could issue to them, and the understanding was that this was a regimental outfit; was to be with the regiments in their camp; to be carried with them on their march; to be placed on the transports by the regiments to be disembarked, and to be carried to the front wherever they went. It was even more liberal than the scheme authorized by the War Department. All other material brought by the commands was absorbed into the division hospitals—became a part of them; and looking at it now, I only regret that I did not take more of it into my field hospitals and get it on shore. It was the regimental outfits that were abandoned by the regiments in whose care they were placed, and that was the cause of our woes—the abandonment of the regimental outfits, medical supplies, and stores.

Q. By whose order or authority were they abandoned?

A. I do not know. I never saw the order or learned why they were left on the transports. But I do not think you will have any trouble to ascertain if you inquire of the commanding officers of the several regimental hospitals.

Q. Was this a general or isolated fact?

A. It was a general fact.

Q. Was it in pursuance of a general order?

A. I can not conceive of such a wholesale abandonment otherwise than as the result of a general cause.

Q. Under the command of General Shafter, if it was a condition which was the result of a general cause or order, would or would not the order have come from General Shafter for their abandonment?

A. He was the commanding officer of the corps and I do not think any order less than his would have operated in that way. Had it been a division order only, other divisions would have carried their stores with them.

Q. Were all the regimental supplies left behind and none carried forward?

A. With a very few exceptions. I think the Seventy-first New York took off what supplies they had, and I think that the Second Massachusetts got off some of their supplies. But I know that the First Cavalry and the Tenth Cavalry, having a consolidated hospital on the steamer *Lena*, left it on that steamer and it was never taken off until the transports were taken into Santiago and there unloaded at the docks.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Major Pope, if an order had been issued by General Shafter, you being the chief surgeon of that corps, that the medical outfit of these different regiments should not be landed, would not that have come to your knowledge?

A. I think any specific order of that nature would have come to my knowledge. I do not believe it was a specific order of General Shafter's to abandon those. I think it was the result indirectly of another general order. There was a general order given—I did not see the order, but I heard that the troops were to be landed with three days' rations and ammunition and what they could carry in their hands. I never saw the order and do not know now what it was.

Q. And you do not know now whether it was the expectation or intention of the commanding officer that the medical supplies should be left behind?

A. I do not think such was General Shafter's intention; certainly not.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. But are we to believe that as a result of the general order all such medical supplies were left behind?

A. As a result of the general order I think the medical supplies, along with the camp equipage and cooking outfits of the regiments, their tents, and in fact all they possessed, except their three days' rations and ammunition, were left on the transports to be unloaded later as it could be done.

By General DODGE:

Q. Supposing that order was issued, as General Shafter states, that the fighting force should land with what they could carry, that would not cover the supplies of the medical officers?

A. No, sir. You mean that would not cover the leaving of it. Every Hospital Corps man had a Hospital Corps pouch; the hospital steward had an orderly pouch; the surgeon had with him the hand case of medicines known as the emergency case, and he also carried a case of surgical instruments, ail on his person, and the troops carried the first-aid packets on their persons. My instructions were that these first-aid packets were to be retained by the medical officers until they were to be landed, and then distribute them among the men, giving them to the more responsible men. The reason I did not distribute them generally was the known carelessness of the soldier with anything of that character left with him. These packets were designated to be left in the right pocket of the shirt, so that the medical officer would know where to find it. I think that was carried out from what I saw of the surgeons treating the wounded who came down the hill after the first day's fighting. The admirable manner in which the instructions in regard to the first-aid packets were carried out, and that the men had them with them, I noticed. Now, I do not believe—in fact, I know this—that when I reported to the general commanding that the troops had left their regimental supplies on the transports, he was as much dumfounded as I was. I do not think he had any idea that that would be the result of any order he might issue. I told him, however, that we were in good luck. We had our field hospitals in hand, and I could get them ashore and put everything I had in the way of the field hospitals into use. After succeeding in getting the field hospitals on shore I turned my attention to getting these regimental supplies on shore. The exact date of this I can not remember, but it was after the battle of Las Guasimas, which was on the 24th, and we went to the front on the 28th. I asked the commanding officer to intercede with the Navy Department and get for me a steam launch and four boats. I had an officer and two men whom I could put on this launch and these boats and we would run down to these transports at sea or wherever they were and hunt out these regimental supplies and get off what we could. He said he would do what he could. In a very little while he told me that the Navy would supply no more boats, as we had in

the debarkation broken several of their boats. So I did not get the boats. He then told me I could get a ship's boat from the *Segurança*, and he would give me a boat's crew. I put an officer in a boat, put in what regimental supplies I could in that boat, and landed them on the dock. The officer came back and we started for another vessel, when an urgent demand came for that boat, and the commanding general said I could not have it any more. That ended that boat. Next day he assisted me by placing at my disposal the steamer *Cumberland*. All my medical officers had gone either with the division hospital or the regimental organizations, and my only regimental officer—I had placed him on the steamer *Cherokee* to get off what supplies I could and land them.

Q. What officer was that?

A. That was Captain Munson. Dr. Goodfellow, of California, an aid of General Shafter, was directed by the general to take the *Cumberland*, visit as many transports as he could, take off of them all quartermaster's supplies he might find there, and such medical and surgical supplies belonging to regiments as he could get his hands on. It was my impression that was either the 26th or 27th; I can not remember the exact date. He started out, went to Daiquiri, and worked pretty much all day. He chased down 13 of these transports, and it is my impression that he got the supplies off most of them; but he told me he had great difficulty in finding them. There was nobody on the transports except the captains and officers of the ships and a surly lot of roustabouts for crews. They did not know, did not want to tell, did not know one box from another; but he got some of them, I think, a good many chests, and he landed them at Daiquiri, and they thought that this came up and were placed in the reserve corps hospital at Siboney. I think that Captain Munson succeeded in getting supplies off from 7 or 8 transports. That would leave about 20 that had not been visited—I think there were 29 or 30 transports—and I believe that we got from the transports, before they went into the harbor of Santiago, at least one-third of what they had on them of regimental supplies.

Q. Are we to understand that two-thirds of these supplies were on the transports when they reached Santiago?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is, regimental supplies?

A. Yes, sir; our corps supplies were taken off.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. By "corps supplies" you mean those in the reserve hospitals?

A. Yes, sir; and the stocks I carried with me on board the *Segurança*.

Q. If there had been an officer at any time or during a considerable time at Siboney or Daiquiri whose duty it was to furnish transportation to those whose duty it was to get supplies, and whose pleasure it was to do so at any hour of the day or night, would you have known of the certain officer?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you know of the presence of a Captain McKay or Mackey—

A. I made his acquaintance on the steamer *Segurança*.

Q. Will you tell me whether, so far as your knowledge, personal or official, goes, that man was prepared to do that day or night?

A. It is the very first I ever heard of it. I never heard of it before.

Q. You have stated you would have known of it had it been a fact; is that so?

A. Well, it might have been a fact without my knowing it, but I do not believe it could have been a fact and I not hear of it before this.

Q. Did you, so far as your own knowledge goes, either personal or official, know that he did furnish transportation to those authorized by the Medical Department to get off supplies?

A. Unless he commanded the steamer *Cumberland* I do not know.

Q. He said he was assistant to Colonel Humphrey?

A. I always understood he was a sort of consulting navigator for the entire fleet, but in no other capacity.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you know he had charge of the unloading of vessels?

A. No, sir. There was a Captain Quay, I think, at the Quartermaster's Department. He was an assistant to the quartermaster at Tampa.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. So far as your knowledge, personal or official, goes, no one of that name had to get or furnish transportation to medical officers in order that they might get supplies off the transports?

A. No, sir.

Q. He testified he was ordered to get medical supplies off the transports, and he would have gotten them at any hour of the day or at any hour of the night if called upon to do it.

A. It is the first I ever heard of it, and no medical officer ever told me of it.

Q. The result of all this is that the regimental medical supplies were not landed during the course of the three, five, or seven days; is that it?

A. I think that is correct, sir.

Q. Now, had they been landed, was there any way of transporting these stores to the front?

A. I will tell you that Major Wood—he commanded the first divisional hospital—got his stores to the front.

Q. How did he do it?

A. He packed them on litters and took them to the front, right up to the firing lines; not only his medical chests, but his tents. He packed his own horse, and Lieutenant Godfrey, his assistant, did the same way, and they worked into the night; and that shows what can be done by one energetic man.

Q. Was his the only hospital there?

A. No, sir; that was the most advanced hospital. The other was on shore in charge of Major La Garde, and when I arrived I think it was in good condition to receive the wounded from San Juan. Besides that, I had the steamer *Olivette* anchored in the harbor ready to take off any wounded she might be able to accommodate. She had already 54 wounded on her from the battle of Las Guasimas, and some sick she took off the transports coming down.

Q. How soon did the *Olivette* reach the harbor after the main body of the corps had arrived there on the transports? Was she with the transport fleet?

A. She was, sir.

Q. And therefore was ready at that time?

A. Yes, sir; I took her personally from Las Guasimas to Siboney to get the wounded. I went down to Daiquiri and boarded the *Olivette* in time to take on board the wounded when they were carried in from Las Guasimas; and we got on board the night of the 24th fully 35 wounded.

Q. The same day as the battle?

A. Yes, sir. They were brought out in boats furnished by the Navy. They were willing to risk their boats for that; and it was a grand sight to see how they took those boats into the surf and got the wounded and brought them out and landed them on board.

Q. Was the *Olivette* prepared to furnish any considerable quantity of medical supplies to the regimental officers?

A. She had enough for herself and a little for the corps hospital at Siboney. I directed her to turn in all she could spare at Siboney. At that time I intended to and did supply a medical supply depot for the corps, and from that point distrib-

uted to the regiments in front all the supplies that could be spared from the hospital.

Q. Captain McKay was asked the following questions and gave the answers which I shall read:

“Q. That was moved away from there, but I don’t know how. Did you take off any medical supplies?

“A. Yes; some.

“Q. In what quantity?

“A. I can’t recollect that.

“Q. There were men in charge of the hospital, so that you took off the entire hospital from the ships?

“A. Yes; I wanted to take that off—the surgeon and the equipment he had—the day I discharged the *Louisiana* of her packers, the ambulances, and the pack train, and he said he did not feel justified in leaving there until he got orders to do so.

“Q. Therefore it was the Hospital Department that kept them from being taken off?

“A. Yes, sir; and I didn’t know he was taken ashore until a couple of days after that.

“Q. Did Colonel Pope, the surgeon of that division, make any application to you to take off medical stores or hospital supplies?

“A. I never saw Colonel Pope from the time he arrived there until he took transport to Santiago.

“Q. Do you know anything as to this fact, that the only transportation that was given to us was a small boat which was turned over to Colonel Pope and used by him for the collection of medical supplies to the transports? This was taken away after accomplishing nothing, but was directed to be returned immediately to the ship where it was needed for other purposes.

“A. Never heard of it.”

Q. Was this transaction at Siboney or at Daiquiri?

A. To the best of my recollection it was at Siboney.

Q. Then he goes on:

“Q. Dr. Munson, who was in charge of the transportation and landing of the hospital supplies; did you meet him?

“A. Not to my knowledge.

“Q. He testified that he requested of Colonel Humphrey, or one of the majors, who was quartermaster; transportation, and it was refused him.

“A. I never heard anything of it.”

Q. If he was at Daiquiri, would he be apt to know what was going on at Siboney?

A. Not to my knowledge. I do not see how he could.

Q. Then he goes on:

“A courier came in there at 8 o’clock at night from headquarters to get medical stores from certain ships: we went out and got one of them, and the other we could not find. I also had notice from Colonel Humphrey that just as soon as I could get hold of certain other ships—as soon as I could find them—to get medical supplies of them.

“Q. So you had orders to take the supplies?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. How long before you got hold of them?

“A. Not more than a day.

“Q. If any medical officer or courier or order from any doctor had come to you, being there in charge of the unloading of ships, asking you for medical supplies, was it your orders to refuse or would you let them have the supplies?

“A. Yes, sir; promptly.

“Q. So that if you received an order any day after you landed there, and received

any request from any doctor, there was no trouble about getting them ashore in a day?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did the doctor know that fact?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Was there not an order printed that you had charge of the matter?

"A. I can not tell you.

"Q. Were you in uniform?

"A. No, sir; I was around the ships. Every day I was around the whole fleet, giving the orders to the captains, and telling them when I received orders.

"Q. Yes. You don't know whether an order was issued that you were an assistant?

"A. I don't say.

"Q. Were you recognized as such?

"A. Colonel Pope consulted me about a hospital ship. I took him down and showed him the *Olivette*."

Q. When was that?

A. That was in Tampa.

Q. Then he goes on to say that he was the man you consulted about the hospital ship and other things. Did you have any occasion to know of the presence of a man at Siboney or Daiquiri whom you consulted about the taking of the *Olivette*?

A. I can not recollect.

Colonel SEXTON: He says himself he did not see Major Pope.

The WITNESS: I can not recollect having seen him. My impression is he was at Daiquiri. I was up at Siboney until the move from the headquarters of the corps up to the front line.

Q. Where was the main body of supplies, off Daiquiri or off Siboney?

A. The medical supplies of the field hospital were at Siboney and the regimental supplies were cruising around somewhere there in these transports, and they were the most exasperating ships I ever came across. We would see them one moment near shore and the next moment they would be out at sea. If you attempted to run them down in a boat they seemed to work their paddles as fast as they could, and then off they would go.

Q. Was it at Daiquiri or Siboney that you made an attempt to get these medical supplies, or at both?

A. At Siboney particularly: the *Cumberland* did nearly all this work at Daiquiri.

Q. Was there any proper hospital transportation when you landed or soon after you landed?

A. You mean in Cuba?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Well, I would like to go back in the story a little—to Tampa.

Q. Answer the question first, Major, and I will take you back to Tampa.

A. All right, sir. There were landed from a steamer coming from New Orleans—I have forgotten her name—three hospital ambulances. They were set up and came in use at the battle on the 1st of July. Aside from that, we had no other ambulances until the 2d of July, when Lieutenant Kennedy, assistant surgeon, appeared at the front with a train of ten ambulances.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. When was that?

A. On the 2d day of July. Now you speak of prior to that?

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. You have answered it as I wanted it answered. There were, then, originally or early landed three ambulances?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then soon following them ten more under Lieutenant Kennedy's direction?

A. Yes, sir; I think they came from the steamer *Louisiana*.

Q. Were they landed at Daiquiri or Siboney?

A. I understand at Daiquiri.

Q. Was there any difficulty taking those ambulances, the first three and the second lot of 10, over the roads to the front?

A. Lieutenant Kennedy reported to me that he had no difficulty in doing so when he came on the 2d of July.

Q. At that time, in your judgment, there would be no difficulty in taking in 13 or 113 ambulances over that road?

A. So far as I could see, no.

Q. Why were there not a proper number of ambulances taken to Siboney and Daiquiri and landed at an early date?

A. In forming my field hospitals at Tampa I at the same time formed two ambulance trains. The first train we formed was that in command of Lieutenant Kennedy, and became a part of the third divisional or reserve corps hospital. To the best of my recollection, that train—it certainly had 15 ambulances, and I am inclined to think there were 20. Another train was formed for the Second Division hospital, consisting of about 12 ambulances. The first divisional hospital had a train, I think, of some seven or eight in formation. Now, we had plenty of ambulances at Tampa. There was a train load of them there—certainly 150—and we had plenty of mules, but we did not have plenty of harness, and that is what delayed the formation of the ambulance train—waiting for the orders of the Quartermaster's Department to get in sufficient harness to get the train formed. But we got that formed eventually, and they were the first trains.

Q. How long before the date of your embarkation were your hospital trains in condition to be moved?

A. The train attached to the hospital First Division corps was two weeks before we left.

Q. The Second Division train came when?

A. The Second Division train within ten days and the First Division train within a week.

Q. Therefore we are to understand that a week before you had a proper hospital train ready to go with the expedition?

A. Yes, sir; and not only that, but a baggage division.

Q. Kindly tell us why you did not take this train.

A. A few days before the order of embarkation came I asked the general commanding about taking my ambulance train. He said, "I fear we shall have to leave them; the transports are filled, and we have not a foot of space to put in this ambulance train," and my subsequent inspection of the transports demonstrated to me he was correct. He had either to leave his troops or the ambulances behind, as there were not enough transports to carry both. The transports between decks, and often in the hold, were crowded with standing bunks for the troops, and I could not see where on earth we could get those ambulances in. It would probably have required at least two large vessels with clear space between decks to have taken my ambulance and baggage train. And all the ambulances, from the nature of the ports on the ship, would have to be taken apart, the wheels and axles and covers taken off, and the whole thing packed for shipment in a confined space. Then we had four mules to every ambulance, and our wagons were very largely six-mule. I should have had two vessels.

Q. Do you know, as chief surgeon of the corps, whether space had been made for your ambulance train?

A. I had full confidence that if the transportation was to be had I would have

had it. I can not recollect that until just before the embarkation I made any special request on that point, for I thought if anything went our ambulances would go.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was the country such, off this main road, that your ambulances could move?

A. The troops did a great deal of cutting, and most of the moving we did was on roads cut by troops. The other roads were so overgrown that we could hardly get through.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. There were, as you stated, 13 ambulances on hand on the 2d of July?

A. Yes, sir; and they were all used for the transportation of the wounded from Daiquiri to the first hospital and from the first hospital to the base hospital at Siboney. From the time they first reported they were used day and night over from the advance line to the first divisional hospital and from the first divisional hospital at Siboney.

Q. How large a proportion of the wounded, after the fights of the 1st and 2d of July, were transported in ambulances from the field; first, to the division hospital?

A. Well, as we had over 1,100 wounded, 10 ambulances could probably make 4 trips from the field to the division hospital, and each ambulance would carry, of seriously wounded men, 4—they were double-deckers—of men less seriously wounded they carried 8 and sometimes 12. That could be worked out pretty well.

Q. Then at the very best—were there 10 or 13 ambulances?

A. Thirteen, sir.

Q. At the very best, then, you could transport 208 seriously wounded—that is, you had 4 trips of 13 ambulances, 52 trips carrying 4 each, which is 208? You could have delivered 208 seriously wounded and double that number of fairly seriously wounded and possibly three times as much of slightly wounded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Isn't it a fact in battle that half of the wounded men do not need an ambulance?

A. Yes, sir. After the battle of San Juan hill I saw a number of them walk down or carried down by their comrades.

Q. If that is a fact, is it a fact that your thirteen ambulances should have afforded transportation for all the seriously wounded of the 1st and 2d of July?

A. Not all of them. On the 1st we had only three ambulances. It was only on the 2d that we had thirteen. The carriage of the wounded commenced as early as 10 o'clock.

Q. I asked about when you had the thirteen.

A. At that time the great mass of the wounded had been brought in by hand, by wagon, and the three ambulances we had.

Q. Is it a fact that a large number or considerable number were carried in army wagons and jolted up and down rough roads and the sides of creeks?

A. Yes, sir. There were a number of seriously wounded carried in wagons on the 1st of July, and they had to cross streams and ride over bad roads, very bad roads, and roads with cobblestones; and, with the exception of the wounded at El Caney, they must have carried the bulk of the wounded to us by noon of the 2d.

Q. If you had had all the ambulance train you wanted, would not there have been much the same complaint about transporting wounded over rough grounds?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Isn't it a fact that the loading of these men in the wagons was an unnecessary cruelty?

A. I won't say that. My experience in the civil war taught me that wagons must be utilized for the transportation of wounded where ambulances are not at hand or not enough of them. That has occurred frequently during the civil war,

and during this war we intended to use wagons rather than not have any transportation to bring them off the field.

Q. The question I want to get an answer to is simply this: You have stated that if you had your full ambulance train there, the men would have to be carried over the same roads with the same jolting practically?

A. Yes, sir; that is so.

Q. Then, because of the fact that they were transported in wagons instead of ambulances, were their sufferings materially aggravated because of not having them transported in the ambulances?

A. Certainly. The transportation by ambulance is by a spring wagon, and in the other wagons there were no springs.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you have any deaths occur by reason of that fact, of transportation in wagons instead of ambulances?

A. But one came to my notice. I saw one man at the first divisional hospital taken out dead. I can not say that he died because of the ride in the wagon. I did not see him put in it. Wherever we could get grass or hay we bedded the men down, and in transporting them from Daiquiri to Siboney I had the wagons bedded with hay and endeavored to prevent any crowding. Captain Plummer, who had charge of the wagon trains, gave me hay when he had it; but when he did not have it, he set men to cutting grass, so as to make the transportation of the wounded as merciful as possible.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. In how large a proportion of the cases were the wagons so bedded and the men relieved in this manner from unnecessary discomfort? Half of them?

A. On the 1st day of July we had no hay there, but some of the wagons were bedded with hay, that being done by some officers at the front. I would not attempt to give you any figures on that.

Q. As a result of your experience heretofore and during this war, is it your opinion that it is possible to prevent suffering in transportation?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever know of a dead man being taken out of an ambulance?

A. Certainly I have.

Q. I myself have taken four out of one wagon; that was at a hospital in this town after the second battle of Bull Run.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Major, as between wagons for ordinary purposes and ambulances, if one was to be left behind, was it not better to leave the ambulances, because you could not use the ambulances for carting stores, and you could use the wagons for carrying the wounded?

A. It was our intention to utilize every means of transportation for the wounded. Much of the transportation of the wounded was by hand, and it was done splendidly. One man was carried 7 miles that way.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. I do not think you quite answered the question. The question was, as I understood it: If it were necessary to leave either the wagons or the ambulances behind, which do you think should be left?

A. That is a hard question to determine, because the medical officer has only the care of his wounded in mind in answering, and he would say: Let the wagons go; you can use a pack train, but take along your ambulances. The fighting officer would say: We will take our chances on the ambulances; we will pack the men down by hand carriage if necessary.

Q. Major, be good enough to tell us how many medical officers you had with you in your division leaving Tampa?

A. On leaving Tampa we had 36 regular officers, 15 volunteer officers, and 20 contract surgeons.

Q. The 15 volunteer officers you speak of refers to those that were attached to regiments, or were they all attached to regiments?

A. To those attached to volunteer regiments.

Q. And under the head of 36 regular officers, do you include any of the brigade appointments made since the war broke out?

A. Well, at the time that we left there were a number of regular officers who, I think, after we left, got their brigade appointments.

Q. I mean, does this 36 include any appointed from civil life as brigade surgeons?

A. No, sir; all regular officers receiving volunteer commissions.

Q. What number of volunteer officers reported to you while you were in Cuba?

A. On the steamer *Relief* there were a number of medical officers came out, and of that number, to the best of my recollection, some 15 reported to me for duty. In that number was Major Gorgas, of the Regular Army, who afterwards took charge of the yellow-fever hospital at Siboney; and the rest were contract surgeons, to the best of my recollection. Later, several came after the capture of the city of Santiago and reported to me. There were also some Illinois volunteers. When they arrived they brought three officers with their regiments of volunteers. The First District of Columbia brought three. But the number I give you is the number of regular officers who were with the expedition when we sailed from Tampa.

Q. Thirty-six regular, 15 regimental—and how many contract surgeons?

A. Twenty.

Q. Seventy-one in all?

A. Seventy-one in all.

Q. At what time did Dr. Senn—

A. I never included him in my force. He was there as an expert. Dr. Senn reported from the steamer *Relief*. Dr. Nancrede and Dr. Vaughan came, I think, with the Michigan volunteers; I believe I have included them among the 15 volunteer officers.

Q. They were, however, brigade surgeons of volunteers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To what duties were these 36 regular officers assigned upon arrival in Cuba?

A. Their assignments to duty were made prior to embarkation for Cuba.

Q. I want to find out how many were connected with regiments on regimental service, how many were detailed for hospital service, and how many were with you?

A. Oh, yes. I will have to do some digging out here. [Referring to list.] I had the names of the officers.

Q. Just give it to me in a general way?

A. To commence with, I will give you the names of those who were with the field hospitals: Maj. L. A. La Garde, in charge of divisional hospital No. 3 at Port Tamp, Fla.; Maj. A. H. Appel, in charge of the divisional hospital No. 2.

Q. That is the *Olivette*?

A. Yes, sir; at one time on the *Olivette*. Maj. George McCreery, he was in charge of the field hospital, cavalry division, and executive officer at Siboney during the yellow-fever epidemic; Major Havard was chief surgeon of the cavalry division; Maj. Henry S. Kilbourne, chief surgeon, Second Division; Major Wood, M. W. Wood, chief surgeon of the First Division; Maj. R. G. Ebert was assigned to the Twelfth United States Infantry, and he was chief surgeon, Second Brigade, Second Division, and also in charge of the wounded Spanish prisoners at El Caney; Maj. R. W. Johnson was executive officer and brigade surgeon in division hospi-

tal No. 1; Maj. W. D. McCaw, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, was chief surgeon of the First Brigade, First Division; Maj. F. J. Ives, Twentieth United States Infantry, chief surgeon of Bates' independent division; Maj. H. S. T. Harris, United States Infantry, brigade surgeon of volunteers, later chief surgeon in the cavalry division; Maj. W. B. Banister, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, Second United States Infantry, in charge field hospital near General Bates's division; Maj. Paul Shillock, brigade surgeon, Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, chief surgeon, Second Brigade, Second Division; Maj. Ogden Rafferty, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, on duty at Siboney, Cuba, and acting medical supply officer; he returned to the United States in charge of the sick on the steamer *Cherokee*; Maj. Philip G. Wales, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, was with the Twelfth United States Infantry; Capt. A. B. Heyl, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the First United States Cavalry; Capt. Joseph T. Clarke, assistant surgeon, Twenty-second United States Infantry; Capt. M. W. Ireland, U. S. Army, assistant surgeon, surgeon at division hospital No. 3, at Port Tampa and Siboney; Capt. H. C. Fisher, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, Twenty-first United States Infantry; Capt. F. A. Winter, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, Third United States Cavalry, returned to the United States on the transport *City of Washington*; Capt. M. W. Brewer, assistant surgeon, Tenth United States Cavalry; Capt. H. M. Hallock, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the Seventh United States Infantry; Capt. G. J. Newgarden, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, Third United States Cavalry; Capt. E. L. Munson, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, was executive officer to the chief surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps, and left on the steamer *Olivette* to the 24th to the 26th of June, and was in charge of outfitting transports for the reception of the wounded until July 10, when he left for the United States on the *Breakwater*; First Lieut. J. M. Kennedy, assistant surgeon, in charge of ambulance train of the Fifth Army Corps and in charge of the distribution of supplies and the transportation of wounded and sick, from July 30 to August—I think he was relieved from that August 20, but I will get the date and send it to you; First Lieut. W. W. Quinton, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with Battery A, Second Artillery; First Lieut. D. C. Howard, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, on duty with division hospital No. 2, and on steamer *Olivette*; Lieut. W. H. Wilson, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with Battery K, First Artillery; First Lieut. T. J. Kirkpatrick, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, First Lieut. F. H. Stone, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the Sixteenth United States Infantry; First Lieut. P. C. Fauntleroy, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the Fourth United States Infantry, and division hospital No. 3 at Siboney; First Lieut. L. A. Fuller, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with the Tenth United States Cavalry; First Lieut. L. P. Smith, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, on duty at division hospital No. 2, and hospital on steamer *Olivette*; that is all those.

Q. After the battles of the 1st and 2d of July, how many regular officers were left with the regular regiments—any?

A. Well, they kept their complement of regular officers so far as possible. I think that Lieutenant Stone, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick, and one other officer were detailed to assist at the first divisional hospital until the rush was over, and then they reported back to their regiments.

Q. To what extent were the regular regiments supplied with the medical officers engaged on contracts?

A. I can give you the names of those.

Q. I don't want the names. It has been said that the regular regiments there had been supplied with doctors under contract, contract doctors, and in some cases two regiments were under the sole care of a single contract doctor. Please tell us in regard to those matters.

A. With the Sixth Infantry was Major McCall, and with him was a contract

doctor, Dr. Marshall, a very accomplished man—making two with that regiment. When the rush of wounded came I directed Dr. Marshall to report for duty to the first divisional hospital. Dr. Calhoun was a contract surgeon with the Fourth United States Infantry, which was rendered necessary by Major Stephenson being relieved from duty with the Fourth Infantry just before the expedition sailed for Tampa. Dr. —I think I had better go to my list. [Does so.] Dr. Wilfred Turnbull was on duty as acting surgeon with the battalion of the United States engineers. Dr. F. E. Menocal, assistant surgeon U. S. Army, Second United States Cavalry, then with the Sixth United States Cavalry, and First United States Infantry. He was assigned to the First Cavalry, and later to the headquarters guard with the Fifth Army Corps, and he also worked among the Spanish refugees in taking care of the wounded and starving at that place. Acting Asst. Surg. J. M. Delgado was with the First United States Cavalry. It is my impression he was there as an assistant with Dr. Heyl. Dr. Morino De La Torrie, an acting assistant surgeon, was with the Tenth United States Infantry as an assistant to Maj. Samuel Q. Robinson, the surgeon of the regiment, afterwards brigade surgeon, and later division surgeon: on the *Olivette* for part of the time. Acting Asst. Surg. J. A. Tabor with the Eighth United States Infantry. Dr. T. R. Marshall was assigned to the Sixth United States Infantry, divisional hospital No. 1, and among the refugees and Spanish prisoners at El Caney; Dr. F. J. Comb, he was assigned to divisional hospital No. 1 and the yellow-fever hospital at corps headquarters; Dr. Arthur Jordon, with the Second United States Cavalry; Dr. A. E. Winter; Dr. Thomas Abbey, with the Twentieth United States Infantry; Dr. Bragg, with the Third United States Infantry. But each of these two last regiments, if I remember rightly, had a regular officer. It is my impression that Dr. Ives was the regular officer of the Second Infantry. About the Third Infantry I can not remember. Dr. R. N. Pitts was assigned to the First United States Infantry, first as an assistant to Captain Gandy, and later on he had charge of the regiment. Dr. Hamilton P. Jones was at first assigned, I think, to the Thirteenth Infantry as an assistant to the medical officer of that regiment. Later he went into the divisional hospital No. 1, and still later he was in charge of the yellow-fever hospital at Siboney. Dr. Echeverria was a Cuban assigned to Light Battery D, Fifth Artillery. He offered his services in Tampa, and was a most valuable man in the yellow-fever hospital at Siboney. Dr. H. W. Danforth, assigned to the Ninth United States Cavalry, was assigned as an assistant to Major Harris, and he was mortally wounded at Bloody Bend—died from his wound—while carrying to that station an armful of first-aid packets picked up under the fire of the enemy. Dr. W. E. Parker, at divisional hospitals Nos. 2 and 3, and on yellow-fever service at Siboney and on steamer *Olivette*. Dr. B. C. Leonardi was with the Ninth United States Cavalry as an assistant; Dr. William P. Lawrence, with Battery G of the Fourth Artillery and with the yellow-fever hospital at Siboney. I think that covers it.

Q. At the time of the battles of the 1st and 2d of July, had you a sufficient number of officers to answer the requirements?

A. I think, sir, that we had. Of course, I would have liked to have had 3 to a regiment; but I did not have them, and we got along very well. In fact, the mass of the wounded were taken care of and their wounds dressed, and they were made as comfortable as circumstances would permit within the forty-eight hours following the battle.

Q. In your judgment, was the expedition sufficiently supplied with medical officers, having in prospect the battle or battles and such sickness as you would naturally look for in the southern part of Cuba in midsummer?

A. We had 71.

By General BEAVER:

Q. That was over 4 to a thousand men?

A. Yes, sir; I would like to have had at least 96 at that time.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Do you think there was any difficulty in getting medical officers at that time?

A. That I do not know, because it was away from my observation. I asked the Surgeon-General for 17 additional officers, and he said he would send them to me, and I was instructed to make contracts with valuable men, such as Cubans, whom I could get in Tampa. I got 6 or 7 of the utmost value to the expedition. Others were sent to me from various points of the South, and I think I can say that nearly all of them were serviceable and valuable men to the corps. I would like to have had about 20 more of the same stripe when we sailed, but I think I had about the number of officers brigaded by the War Department at that time. I did want at least 2 medical officers to each regiment, but I understood it was the policy of the War Department to have only 1.

Q. Was that because it had been for a long time customary in the department to have one surgeon to a regiment, or because they thought they were not able to get sufficient additional men?

A. I think it was a combination of those reasons.

Q. If it is a fact that medical men could have been obtained in sufficient numbers, would it have been wise to secure the services of such men before starting on an expedition of that sort?

A. I think it would, sir. I was authorized, as chief medical officer of the Fifth Army Corps, to make a contract with medical gentlemen; but in each case I was required to submit the name to the Surgeon-General at Washington for his action and approval. Under that authority I was able to secure the appointment of six valuable men, who proved very valuable indeed.

Q. Your field was limited?

A. Limited to Tampa.

Q. Would it not have been possible to have made the selection from the country at large, here at Washington, rather than leave it to you?

A. I do not think the matter was left to me; I was working only that part of the territory.

Q. Do you know how many medical officers were drawn from the Gulf States?

A. I do not know.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you think you should have had more than these medical officers, or did you have trouble in getting them?

A. I was satisfied I had the complement required by the War Department order, and I think I was very nearly up to the complement. I would liked to have had more, and when I got into Cuba I asked General Shafter to ask for 40 more medical officers.

Q. What I wanted to ascertain, Major, was this: Whether at the time you desired more, or whether that is what you think now?

A. That is what I think now. At the time I thought I had enough and that the experience of the War Department was better than my single experience, and at the time I had a complement, and I thought I had enough to meet the conditions that might arise.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Is it customary, Major, to consider the regulations existing in time of peace sufficient to govern in time of war?

A. No, sir.

Q. It is one medical officer when the parts of the regiment are together?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is one regimental officer sufficient to take care of one-half a regiment of full strength in time of war?

A. No, sir; during peace our regiments are comparatively small; we only had 350 sometimes in a regiment. That would be a battalion under the new organization.

Q. Now, when it became necessary to supply medical officers to the regiments, why was it that the old rule of one man to a regiment was still adhered to?

A. I can not tell, sir, unless it was that there was not enough to go around.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Or was it because some of the regiments were smaller?

A. Some of them were of 100 men only.

Q. No medical officer can properly take care of 300 men in time of war?

A. No, sir; that is my experience.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Why did not the Medical Department put enough in the field to supply all the wants?

A. Are you speaking now of the Fifth Army Corps?

Q. No, sir; but generally.

A. Well, really, sir, I do not know. We had enough regular officers to have supplied the Fifth Army Corps with twice the number of regular medical officers very easily. I suppose they were retained for the purpose of forming a nucleus of the medical department of the large army which must be raised. They were the only experienced men the United States could get hold of.

Q. Up to the time of your leaving Santiago was there a sufficient number of medical officers to answer all requirements?

A. In Santiago?

Q. In Cuba, under your command.

A. There was not, sir, after the fever broke out; but they commenced to come in first with the steamer *Relief*, and after we captured the city there were quite a number came in on transports and reported to me for duty. I can not recollect now the exact number. The roster which I kept up to the 23d day of July was turned over to the officer who succeeded me, and he, I think, is now in Santiago; but it seems to me that they were pouring them in as fast as they could get them, and they appeared to be a valuable lot of medical officers.

Q. Was the number of incoming men in excess of the number of those who were breaking down?

A. Well, I do not think it did any more than keep up with those who became unable to perform duty on account of sickness.

Q. Then, practically, you were in no better shape at the end than at the beginning as respects number?

A. I think we were, sir, because our medical officers held up wonderfully well, and those unable to do any duty were very small. They were sick, but they kept at it as well as they could; but they say a sick physician's judgment is not wholly reliable.

Q. Now, was it understood before the expedition started that it was probable there would be both fighting and sickness from the climatic conditions existing?

A. I am inclined to think we did not look for a very large number of wounded. We had gotten a report from the Navy that 10,000 men in forty-eight hours could take the forts around Santiago and in less than a week we would be back on our transports and going home.

Q. Did that prove to be the fact?

A. No, sir; we got our belly full of fight on the very first day we struck it.

Q. You expected that in the case of the troops not getting away in a week there would be considerable sickness there?

A. I expected we would be able to stand it about a month with good luck, and nearly all military men count on luck largely in their expeditions. The facts proved that the time was a little too long; we caught the fevers before the month was up. I had great hopes that we would get away without yellow fever from the fact that experienced Cuban physicians informed me that yellow fever was extremely rare in the country and that it was only to be apprehended in the cities, and I was informed we would not enter Santiago and that we might reasonably expect to escape yellow fevers. He said, "You might catch malarial fevers," but not unless we had to do very heavy intrenching. But the fight of the 1st of July was followed by a most laborious amount of trench digging. The whole army corps was digging that pestiferous soil and then lying in or near their trenches until the capitulation, and there is where the most of the sickness came from, trench fever. It was the same as occurred in Chickahominy and at the siege of Richmond and around there. The Spanish suffered from trench fever also. In the city of Santiago I saw, lying in their beds, 2,000 Spaniards with the same sort of fever we had. Yellow fever had not got many of them; there they are practically immune.

Q. Are we to suppose that the military authorities based their calculations on a slight and trifling service being necessary to do their work and that they would get right out promptly?

A. I think not, sir. The number of medical officers was based on the view of the War Department at that time.

Q. In point of fact, did you have a sufficient number of medical officers when you left to do the work thoroughly and efficiently, as it should have been done?

A. At the time the expedition left Tampa I felt we could get along with what we had. I would have felt better if I could have had a few more officers there. I would have liked to have had 20 with every military organization. Then if an officer felt sick or I desired to bring more, I would not deprive any military organization of its medical officer.

Q. Did you have sufficient to thoroughly and properly care for the wounded and sick that were there?

A. No, sir; not for the sick. We had too great sickness.

Q. What arrangements were made for the removal of the sick from Cuba?

A. By the War Department—I don't know. An idea I had in view, if no other arrangements were made by the War Department, was to utilize the transports on their return to the United States for the purpose of carrying convalescents and those able to stand the trip. The seriously ill I hoped to be able to keep in Cuba until they recovered so as to be able to travel without danger to health or life.

Q. How soon did you begin to transport the sick to the North—not the wounded, but the sick.

A. I think the first sick were those taken off the *Olivette* and placed on the steamer *Troquois* or *Breakwater*, and they were transported to the North, I think, about July 9, to the best of my knowledge. Later, transports were sent out for the sick, but I have lost track of them. I know there were seven or eight transports loaded with sick that went to the North during the month of July.

Q. What orders were issued by your office respecting the preparation of these transports and the reception of sick on them?

A. At the time I was at the headquarters of the army corps I gave general instructions to Major Le Garde, who was at Siboney and had general charge of affairs at that point, to see that the transports used for the sick were suitable for the purpose and that they were provided with such medical stores and medical officers as he could spare from his hospital. That was a general order, and I think it was transmitted to me by telephone from corps headquarters. Nearly all our communications there were by telephone. As we had no mail facilities, nor any means for sending written orders back and forward from Siboney to corps head-

quarters, I trusted nearly everything to verbal directions given over the telephone line.

Q. At the time you were in charge of the matter, was any medical officer appointed to inspect these transports to see that they were properly equipped?

A. While I was in Santiago I endeavored to inspect—this was about the 20th of July—the transports myself. I think that Assistant Surgeon Ireland made the inspections at Siboney; but I left that matter with Major La Garde. I do not recollect that up to the time I was relieved I designated any special officer for that purpose, as I tried to do the work myself as well as possible.

Q. Speaking generally, were the transports properly prepared for the reception of sick and wounded, principally the sick, and sufficiently provided with medicines and medical stores, to meet the ordinary requirements of a four or five days' trip north?

A. That work was being done at Siboney, and the reports I received from there from Major La Garde in regard to the equipment of these transports were satisfactory to me. By using cabin space only, and sending but a few sick on the transports, I believed that they could be made comfortable for the sick, especially for those who were convalescent, and I tried to impress—as late as the 20th of July—that convalescents only and not the seriously ill were to be sent.

Q. At this time were the convalescents sufficiently recovered to expect that they could go on the travel rations?

A. Well, I did not see the convalescents at Siboney, but I think that even for a well man that travel ration is hard fare, and I doubt very much that unless the travel ration is prepared by a skillful cook it could be made a proper diet for a sick man for any length of time.

Q. Was there such an amount of hospital supplies, or could such an amount of proper food be obtained from the Commissary Department at that time as would enable the officers sending these men north to be assured the material for a proper diet was on board the transport?

A. I understood that the *Iroquois*—that was before I left to go to the front—was loaded with a large amount of commissary supplies which would answer every purpose of delicacies for the sick. These supplies, I understood, had been taken off and stored at Siboney and were open to purchase by the Medical Department for the benefit of the sick. That was the rule during peace, that our delicacies should be purchased by the hospitals for the use of the sick.

Q. Had these hospitals at this time any money for this purpose?

A. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection Major La Garde had nearly \$700 with him. Three hundred dollars was sent to me, which I distributed to the party in charge of the First Division hospital; and I gave some to the volunteer regiments and also to the regular regiments for the purpose of purchasing delicacies from the Commissary Department for the use of the sick.

Q. As a matter of fact, were these commissary delicacies available at Siboney?

A. I think they must have been, because we got some of them.

Q. Was any report officially made to you as to the preparation of these transports for furnishing the necessary food and material?

A. No, sir; except such verbal communication as I had with Major La Garde by telephone.

Q. And did such communication lead you to believe that those transports were being properly fitted out for use by the sick, or convalescents at least?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you remember anything about the leaving of the transports *Concho* and *Seneca*?

A. That was pretty near the end of my administration. I have often tried to recall the names of the vessels I inspected at the docks in Santiago with a view of

using them for transportation of the convalescents. At that time there were five vessels lying at the docks. I inspected them one afternoon and one morning; went over them carefully. They were discharging their cargoes onto the docks, and I was looking at them with a view of getting some transports to carry convalescents north. I now think the *Concho* was among that number. I was inspecting for the yellow fever among the crews. I found none there. I found the *Concho* in a dirty condition from the freight. She was discharging freight. I spoke to the captain and he said that in a very few hours with his powerful pumps he would be able to clean his ship from one end to the other. I tasted of the water they had while I was on board and it tasted and smelled like the water I tasted on a dozen other transports, the *Seguranga* among them. It had that peculiar odor due to a vegetable organism growing in the tanks. I had sent a telephone message to Major La Garde asking him if he could give me any room for the sick who were with the regiments, whom I desired to transfer at once to the hospitals. At that time the hospitals were crowded. We had no shelter for any more sick in the hospitals. He told me that if he could send north 175 convalescents he had, men able to take care of themselves, that he would have that number of beds vacant. I requested the general commanding for a steamer to carry these men north. He referred me to Colonel Humphrey, and I saw the colonel and asked what steamers I could have; and he said, "There are the *Seneca* and *Concho*; as soon as they are cleaned out and fitted up they go down to Siboney, and will do very well." By telephone I informed Major La Garde that the *Seneca* and *Concho* would come down, and to prepare the ships, put his convalescents on there and send them north, and give me the beds and shelter I needed for the sick in the trenches. At that time—I think that was about my last official act—I was pretty sick at the time and it is difficult for me to remember all that occurred—I think that was the 22d or 23d of July.

Q. Were any medical officers detailed to go on these transports?

A. That was left in the hands of Major La Garde, and he furnished them from a large number of officers he had at Siboney.

Q. Did he have enough active and well men to spare two or three officers to go north on these transports?

A. At the time I believed or I understood that he had one or two medical officers that could be spared to go on there; but I am not certain about that. He may have been shorthanded in the matter of officers at that time.

Q. If it was the case that he had medical officers he could send north, were they well officers or convalescents?

A. Most of them were convalescent.

Q. Was it reported to you that these transports had been properly equipped; that is, supplied with a sufficient supply of medicines and the proper food materials for the trip?

A. I can not recollect all that occurred now. That may have been reported to Major Havard, who succeeded me.

Q. I think we understood from him that the *Concho* and *Seneca* were out before he took charge.

A. That may have been so. I can not recollect that now. All that week is pretty much a blank to me.

Q. If it was a fact that these transports went north unprovided with medicines, principally supplied with travel rations, and scarcely anything else—in fact, with nothing else but some meal gotten from a charitable organization there—if it is a fact that they went without any medical officers but two or three convalescents, one of whom broke down after starting, and who did nothing, and another an inexperienced man, the third a representative of a charitable organization—that they went without any nurses or any means of caring for these sick, except as

they cared for themselves—if these be facts, was the condition of the department at the time that transports started such that it was the best thing that could be done?

A. I think more than likely that that was the best they could do at that time. My recollection is nearly everyone was sick; that by sending transports north we had lost a good many of our medical officers; that our Hospital Corps men could not be spared, as there were over 3,000 patients being nursed on the line and in the hospitals at that time, and from what I knew at the time and can recollect I do not believe we could have done much better. My only directions were that only convalescents should go, and by "convalescents" it was understood that they were men who could take care of themselves and did not require nurses or physicians.

Q. Was it or not said or thought that convalescents starting north were likely to have a return of their diseases as soon as the atmospheric conditions changed?

A. I think that is the experience we have gained later. At that time I knew nothing of it.

Q. As a matter of fact, when a man is thoroughly saturated with malarial germs, even though he is perfectly well, is it not a fact that if he goes north the fever will break out in a few days?

A. Our experience is that.

Q. Has it not been known to be the case for years?

A. Many writers say so. In our peace establishment we have very little experience with malaria fever. Malaria gave a very small return at most of our posts; it had been practically eliminated, and I think I may say we had considered it a rather trifling disease which could be easily met with large doses of quinine continued. I, for my own part, had no idea that the typical malaria, until I saw it, was such a persistent and such a deadly poison as it has proven itself to be.

Q. Was there not in the service a sufficient number of officers familiar with the malaria of the Gulf Coast to know that it was a serious disease, and that if a man recovered it was an apparent, instead of real recovery, and that a transfer from a warm to a cold climate made it return, and that within a few days? Were there not officers in the service familiar with these facts?

A. I do not know of any. I think perhaps the Surgeon-General himself was the only one who had knowledge of that fact by personal experience. Nearly all the older men who had had experience with these Southern fevers during the civil war had left the service.

Q. If there were twenty officers in the corps who entered the service before I did, most of whom had served in the South during the war, was it not probable that they would have recollections of the conditions which followed when malaria patients, recovered from their ailment, directly were transferred to a northern climate?

A. I think so.

Q. Was it wise, if possible to prevent it, to let convalescents come north without proper medicines or hospital supplies or proper diet?

A. No, sir; I do not think it was wise, looking at it from my present stand point and from my experience with these fevers. At the time the great anxiety of all of the sick and the general consensus of the opinion of the medical officers of the Fifth Army Corps was that if you could only get north into cold weather these fevers would stop at once. I do not think any of us anticipated the explosion of malarial manifestations on their arrival north.

Q. Did any such explosion take place within twelve hours, even, after leaving Santiago?

A. I do not know.

Q. Especially on the *Concho*, as the reports show?

A. I have not seen these reports.

By General DODGE:

Q. When the *Concho* and *Seneca* sailed, was not there a relief ship there with plenty of supplies?

A. It is my impression that the *Relief* was there when those ships sailed, but I have not a very clear recollection. I think she was.

Q. It has been stated that on a certain occasion, soon after the arrival of the *Relief*, application was made for medical supplies, and she was loaded to the guards with medical supplies, and it was stated that a small quantity of these was doled out, and that the officer in charge, upon being asked for others, made the remark that to get any more it would necessitate breaking into these stores, and that he, the officer in charge, did not want to do that. Was any such statement made to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. The statement is that Dr. Torney made that remark when applied to for supplies. I asked you the question whether what was done was the best that could be done under the circumstances.

A. When I made that answer I had forgotten the fact that the *Relief* was there. She being in the harbor there with the ships, I can not say it was the best that could be done.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Were the yellow-fever hospitals properly organized and administered at Siboney?

A. The yellow-fever hospital was organized as soon as the yellow-fever cases were reported by Dr. Guiteras, who was there on the watch for it. The second hospital was organized by myself near corps headquarters and was placed under the charge of Dr. Hamilton P. Jones. At that time there was great doubt among the medical officers with the regiments as to what sort of fever we were dealing with. Some seemed to think that it was simply a thermic fever of short duration, lasting four or five days, with very high temperature; others, Dr. Jones among them, believed that many of these cases were a mild form of yellow fever. As soon as he clearly recognized yellow-fever cases I had some tents placed up three-quarters of a mile below the headquarters camp, across the creek, and to that point I transferred all the yellow-fever cases which he and Dr. Cohen had diagnosed as such. The sick were brought in from the front and placed in a detached camp and there inspected. Those having yellow fever I detained at the hospital in charge of Dr. Jones. Those having other fevers I placed in ambulances and shipped to Siboney, very often in wagons. When we did not have wagons enough—but at that time the rush was not so great but that the ambulances could carry them. Dr. Jones's hospital had, up to the time I was taken ill, received about 125 yellow-fever cases, and out of that number, to the best of my recollection, there were 35 deaths. The hospital at Siboney, the yellow-fever hospital, was constantly increasing in size; and patients I sent down, whom I believed to be not yellow-fever cases, were on their arrival very often declared to be cases of yellow fever. And the number grew until finally the whole of the hospital at Siboney was declared to be a yellow-fever hospital, and the precautions to be taken in regard to the treatment of the cases were carried out with all the fever cases there occurring. That was after the 23d of July, to the best of my recollection.

Q. During the time you were familiar with these hospitals, were they properly administered, and were the medical officers sufficient, and were they competent to take care of the sick, and did they?

A. At the Siboney hospital, I should say, from all the information I gained—I should say, "Yes." At the smaller hospitals, near the old Fifth Army Corps headquarters, I had two medical-corps officers who were fully capable to take charge

of the yellow-fever cases. I later sent them an assistant, whose name I can not now recollect. At the first of these hospitals I sent some Cuban soldiers, who had been recommended to me by a Cuban officer as being experienced nurses in yellow fever. I think I sent fifteen. They only stayed a few days, however. They tired of the work, and shortly they left. Then it became necessary for me to send them Hospital Corps men. I gathered what Hospital Corps men I could find from among the volunteer regiments, and they went there and labored among the sick—well, for a number of weeks—many of them taking the disease themselves. After the corps headquarters moved into the city of Santiago, I designated Surgeon Ives to take supervision of the detention camp hospital, which, prior to that, had been under the charge of Major Crampton, and also to have supervision of the yellow-fever hospital of Dr. Jones. That was one of my last official acts. I have every reason to believe they took satisfactory charge of these hospitals, but I have never heard since.

Q. Were any yellow-fever nurses sent to you from the north?

A. That was after I was taken ill. I think they came on the 25th.

Q. Did they prove satisfactory?

A. I think the colored women did. I would like to say something about the *Relief*. On the 8th day of July, or the night of the 8th day of July, I was in my tent, or under my shelter, in a state of great despondency. Lieutenant Kennedy came and told me that Major La Garde had sent all the supplies we had; that we were out of medicines, and had scraped the bottom of the barrel. I had expected the *Relief* day after day for a week, praying she might come in. An orderly came to me in the dark and stated I was wanted at the telephone. I stumbled through the long grass and got down there, and by the dim light of a candle I put the receiver to my ear and said, "Hello, who is that?" The answer came from Dr. Torney, and he said, "It is Torney." Then he said, "The *Relief* is in with 700 tons of supplies on board;" and, gentlemen, I felt as though 700 tons had been taken off my head and brain at that minute. I told him to get them out as quickly as possible, and he said, "The weather is rough;" and I said, "I will send down Lieutenant Kennedy and an ambulance as soon as you can land them, and we will bring them to the front as fast as we can." I think it was two or three days before I was told the supplies were on shore and that I could send Kennedy with the ambulances for them. He went down and they commenced to come in—mattresses, blankets, malted milk, and beef extract, condensed milk—they all commenced rolling up. Medicines came. I sent word to the division surgeons to let me know what they wanted, and I sent an ambulance out every morning with what we had, and we would push them to the front. Lieutenant Kennedy every morning had an ambulance with medicines and food come up, and it was sent out to the division surgeons at the points designated, with the understanding that they were to be distributed to the brigades and regiments, and division surgeons. "Well," I said to the commanding general, "We are all right now; we have got them now. They are in." What we needed was drugs. I know she was loaded to the guards with surgical materials and beds and blankets and everything of that kind, but the question struck me, Did she have drugs—sufficient drugs? About the 20th day of July Lieutenant Kennedy said to me, "The drugs are getting short," and I said, "For God's sake, you don't mean that 700 tons are gone between the 7th day of July and the 20th of July!" He said, "That is it. The drugs are going, and they are nearly gone." Well, I collapsed. As soon as I could get word to Major Havard I told him the situation, and I told him to telegraph at once the condition, and he cabled to the Surgeon-General for supplies. Now, I never have known to this day whether these drugs were on the *Relief* or not, but I know we pushed them to the front as fast as they came to us; and how it was we managed to get rid of all that stock between the 8th of July and the 20th, or I will say the 23d of July, I can not say.

By General DODGE:

Q. Did you haul up everything in an ambulance?

A. I asked for six wagons to go down, and I got three; and I do not think the three came up filled.

By General McCook:

Q. Why did not Captain Plummer give you the six wagons?

A. I do not know.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. As a matter of fact, you did not have any such amount of drugs?

A. I do not know.

Q. But you could not have hauled those?

A. In regard to Captain Plummer, he furnished all the wagons I wanted. The three may have gone down, that being all he had. Plummer was mighty good; he furnished the wagons I asked for, General.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was it ever reported to you, officially or otherwise, that these drugs on the *Relief* were not landed, but carried back?

A. No, sir; I never heard of that. I understood there was a pile of supplies there as big as a house that came up. That I was informed by Lieutenant Kennedy; and I thought there was any quantity of drugs, as the Surgeon-General informed me the *Relief* would bring supplies ample for three months.

Q. Was there any receiving officer there who would have known what was landed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was there, sir?

A. It is my impression that Dr. William H. Parker can give you the information on that point.

Q. Of New Orleans?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he ever state to you that these drugs were landed?

A. No, sir; he made no official report on that matter.

Q. Now, as respects the condition after you went into Santiago, I want to ask you as to the Medical Department and the so-called Red Cross Association after Santiago was captured and the *State of Texas* came into the stream.

A. Well, the relations appeared to me to be of the most cordial nature. They landed their supplies. One of the last things I saw there was a large amount of supplies apparently for the reconcentrados. They were issuing them to medical officers who applied for them and to anyone. They gave us most valuable assistance from my first entry into Cuba until I was relieved from duty.

Q. Did their stores materially supplement those provided by the Medical Department?

A. I can not tell you to what extent; but it is my belief that for food supplies in the way of malted milk, farina, and things of that kind they did supplement our supplies until ours came in after the capture of Santiago, and then I remember a large storehouse in Santiago belonging to the Medical Department, which appeared to be loaded with everything anybody could use. That was probably in the middle of August.

Q. Looking back at the expedition to Cuba as you observed the medical conditions, do you or do you not think it wise that female nurses should accompany a moving army?

A. Not a moving army.

Q. Would it or not have been advantageous to have nurses to put in the yellow-

fever hospital—Dr. Wood's hospital and the yellow-fever hospital near your headquarters?

A. At Siboney I think it would. At the yellow-fever hospital near corps headquarters, with a hardy lot of female nurses—I do not mean lady nurses, but such as I saw in the First Division hospital—I think their services were invaluable.

Q. By the First Division hospital, what hospital do you mean? Dr. Wood's hospital?

A. Yes, sir. He did not have the First Division hospital at that time, but his hospital was reorganized and was placed back on a hill, and was placed under the command of Maj. Samuel Q. Robinson, and we got our tents and put them up and got our female nurses.

Q. From the North or Santiago?

A. All from the United States. We had an excellent corps of medical men, most immune surgeons and physicians in that hospital; and I have talked with Dr. Robinson about them, and he said they did good work. Most of them were colored women.

Q. Was it right to care for these female nurses where they were, and would it have been possible?

A. No, sir; they had to rough it.

Q. But I mean such care as would protect them properly and secure to them the privileges which belong to women?

A. With an ample supply of tents I do not see why there should not be facilities for privacy, but at that time the yellow-fever hospital under Dr. Jones had been broken up and absorbed with the hospital at Siboney.

Q. The question is, would it be advisable to have female nurses moved with the army, and have them at the base hospital? Of course they can not move with the army at the front. What is the opinion you have on that subject?

A. I think at the base hospital they would be very valuable wherever the army might be; but at the same time I think that a well-organized Hospital Corps, well-instructed men, can be better disciplined and more easily handled than the female nurses. There are many things you can say and do to a man that you can not do to a woman.

Q. Is it at all likely, do you think, in the Army of the United States, to so train male nurses that they will be good nurses?

A. If they stay in the service long enough, it can be done. My experience in the Regular Army with men who have been in the service one or two years is that they are the most admirable lot of men and able to perform all the functions of a trained nurse, and I would like to say a course of training was given to all our Hospital Corps men which fully qualified them to perform the duties of the trained nurse. That was in addition to the so-called Hospital Corps drill; and I have been able to furnish several institutions with men coming from the Hospital Corps in the Army.

Q. Is it possible at any army post to train a male nurse so that he will be able to take proper care of a case of typhoid fever or any other serious illness?

A. Yes, sir; in the same way you could to the women.

Q. The opportunities, however, in the army hospitals in time of peace are very limited?

A. In time of peace we do not have many cases of those fevers you refer to.

Q. Therefore you can not instruct?

A. Only by verbal instructions and lectures and giving them analogous cases.

By General WILSON:

Q. From the time you arrived at Santiago up to the time the hospital-relief steamer brought the stores you received I understand more or less assistance was received from the Red Cross. Had it not been for the Red Cross would you have been able to go along without any trouble and save disasters and sickness, etc., or was their assistance absolutely necessary?

A. What I personally saw of the Red Cross was at Major Wood's hospital, which was the most advanced hospital there. Miss Barton appeared after the battle, put up her tent, started her little cooking ovens. I think she had two or three meat broths that she was preparing, and they furnished the wounded who were there with nourishing drinks; and the same work was being done at the hospitals with such stores as Major Wood had on hand. I also superintended a cook kettle, had two men at it, furnishing as good a soup as we could make from that. We would have been very unwilling to have missed the services of the Red Cross, and we welcomed their supplies and relief. It was timely, and kindly given. We would have welcomed relief from anyone—Red Cross or others. I think, although we had a large amount of beef extract, which is noted on the supply table, and a good deal of condensed milk, that we did not have the time to gather in from the commissary all that we needed in the way of those special delicacies. I suppose we could have gotten along without them, but we certainly were most delighted to have their assistance. The soldiers, especially those of the Regular Army, do not expect a great deal beyond what is allowed by regulations, and all that they got from the Red Cross was received with great gratitude.

Q. Then your answer to my direct question is that you could have gotten along without them?

A. Yes; I think we could, for a while at least.

Q. Well, you have added a proviso. The question to which I want an answer is whether from the time you arrived at Santiago until the time of the arrival of the relief hospital steamer, whether the supplies in your charge were sufficient to take care of that army without the assistance of the Red Cross?

A. I think it was, sir.

By Colonel SEXTON:

Q. You testified that you were taking along supplies for an army of 17,000 men for thirty days under ordinary emergencies?

A. Surgical supplies—that was with the regiments. I believed I had enough for the medical supplies also.

Q. As a matter of fact, how long did the medical supplies last you?

A. Well, we were about the bottom of them on the 8th of July, as far as I know. General DODGE: Had you landed then all you took with you?

The WITNESS. No, sir; the regimental supplies, which were in the transports—

Q. I understood your explanation this morning. After the failure to get the regimental supplies aboard, I understood you said you had sufficient to last that army thirty days?

A. I believed that. We had enough drugs I thought with the regiments, but we did not get hold of the regiments' drugs. We got only one-third of them.

Q. Now, wasn't it well understood when our army went to Cuba that there was to be a great amount of sickness there and an unusual amount of yellow fever and other fevers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you evidently did not take enough supplies to last an army of 17,000 men for thirty days?

A. I intended to state for ordinary conditions.

Q. It think you said for ordinary emergencies, and you should have said extraordinary conditions. Did you ever have a full supply of drugs while there to answer all your purposes?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why could not medical supplies be delivered there, when you only needed a small quantity of drugs, as well as the commissary supplies?

A. I see no reason, for they were on the vessels.

Q. Were they not as obtainable as commissary supplies? They were in the United States?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was to blame if they were not to be had?

A. All of our supplies are furnished by the medical supply officers in New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco. There is where most of the purchasing is done.

Q. Why could they not have anticipated wants as well as the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments?

A. I think they could. I think that after the city was open and the ships got into the city—I know that large amounts of medical supplies were poured into Santiago.

Q. And you purchased some in Santiago?

A. There were purchases in Santiago.

Q. Which practically admitted that you did not take proper supplies with you?

A. We were out, and Major Havard at the time I informed him that the supply of drugs on the *Relief* had been exhausted he at once began purchasing at Santiago to tide him over until they could arrive from the United States.

Q. That was not a good market to purchase in. You certainly should have been able to sell them instead of buying from them if there had been proper foresight on the part of our Medical Department. As a matter of fact, if the relief societies had not been there you would have been swamped?

A. I did not know they furnished medicines.

Q. Well, sick food?

A. The hospital stores, according to the supply table, consist of beef extract, tea, condensed milk, and beef and meal, together with whisky and brandy; and that, to the best of my recollection, is the list of hospital stores, so called. Anything outside of that we are supposed to purchase in the markets where we are. That was the system under which we worked before the war was declared.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Please state to what extent you and your department received the support of the commanding general of that expedition.

A. I think the commanding general always listened to my views and gave me every support which military conditions would permit. In the formation of my division hospitals he promulgated an order forming them; also my ambulance trains and Hospital Corps companies. In the institution of sanitary regulations he also promulgated the order; and I do not know of any instance where he failed to support me.

By General DODGE:

Q. There has been a good deal of testimony here in relation to the Quartermaster's Department—its failure to support the Medical Department at Siboney and Daiquiri. Were you in communication with Colonel Humphrey all the time?

A. No, sir; I rarely saw Colonel Humphrey. Occasionally he came to the corps headquarters to consult with the commanding general, but I had very little communication with him.

Q. Did you have occasion to make requests of him for the landing of your supplies or for any other duty—for the transportation of supplies or any other duty of the Quartermaster's Department; and if so, what was the result of those applications?

A. Usually my applications were made to the depot quartermaster.

Q. Who was that?

A. At Siboney?

Q. Yes.

A. I think that they changed. For a time it was Lieutenant Rondiez, and for a time it was Major Jacobs, and usually those requests were made by my officers at

my direction. My personal requests—I can not recall now; I do not think they were very many—often were in writing, addressed to the quartermaster. I do not know even who was in charge.

Q. Did they send transportation which you requested from Captain Plummer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did your officer at Siboney make complaint that the quartermaster's department would not comply with your requests?

A. These complaints came in to me rather late and usually came to me through my supply officer, Lieutenant Kennedy. He informed me that we were getting off very few of the medical and surgical chests and that there was great difficulty in getting the cooperation of the quartermaster's department in removing them. I had a personal experience with them which satisfied me that we had to help ourselves. In removing Major La Garde's hospital from the steamer *Saratoga* I got some boats from the ship, and Major La Garde had loaded them with his hospital supplies, when alongside of her came the *Laura*, which belonged to the quartermaster's department. An officer, whom I understood represented the quartermaster's department, was on board. I asked him to assist me in getting that hospital ashore by means of his lighter. He said, "I can not do it." I said, "The hospital will take very little room on your lighter," and I begged him to let the hospital go on that; and he said, "No, sir; it can't be done." I said, "Will you obey an order from the commanding general?" He said, "Yes; if I get it in writing." After a while I was able to get a boat and catch the *Segurança*. I went to the assistant adjutant-general; got a written order to permit the landing of that hospital by means of the steam lighter *Laura*. As soon as I handed it to the officer, which was some hours later, he said, "All right, sir; you have got the use of the *Laura*," and the hospital was put on her and taken ashore.

By General McCook:

Q. Who was this officer?

A. I think it was Colonel Weston, and I think he had the use of the *Laura* for removing supplies from the ships.

By General Dodge:

Q. So that was not in the quartermaster's hands?

A. I understood it was in the quartermaster's department, and I think he was acting under orders of the quartermaster in refusing me transportation.

Q. That experience would not indicate to you, would it, that you could not obtain the use of the boat or the quartermaster would not comply with your request?

A. I think at the time that was wholly under the charge of the quartermaster's department, although temporarily in the charge of the subsistence department.

Q. Did you ever make complaints to the chief quartermaster there, Colonel Humphrey, in relation to the difficulty of obtaining supplies from the ships or make any requests from him to bring them ashore?

A. That I can not recollect.

Q. Now, Major, have you any suggestion of your own to make or any information that you would care to state to us that would be of interest to the Department or the service? If so, we would be pleased to hear it.

A. Well, I thought I had some suggestions to make, but just at present they have slipped my mind. Probably I will remember them later.

General BEAVER. Major, there is one thing puzzles me. If you were to put 71 doctors in a community of 71,000 people, with all the female sicknesses and children's ailments to help out, they would starve; and yet Dr. Conner wants us to think you had not enough when you had four or five to a regiment.

By General McCook:

Q. Suppose the tents of those men had been landed and the army put under tents and protection, what effect would that have had on its health?

A. If not exposed to the disease-producing influences of those trenches, I think the tents would have had a protective influence on the health, for the reason we have a headquarter guard with the headquarters of the Fifth Army Corps who were not exposed to the trenches, a company of the First Infantry, and we got on very well up to the time we left. Most of those men were under dog tents until quite late. I think we would have had possibly less sickness if we had tents up and protection against the sun and rain that we did have later on, after the damage was done.

Q. What is the difference between Santiago and Guantanamo?

A. No material difference.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do they usually put up regular tents or dog tents on the firing line?

A. Dog tents they use until the conditions are such as to put up the regular tents.

By General DODGE:

Q. What about your immune regiment that went into tents with floors?

A. I understand they got sick much the same as our own men in three or four weeks. The Spaniards, with all their shelter, suffered largely from those fevers. They were sheltered in what we would call very fine barracks. They were protected from the rain and the sun, and still they suffered from fever as much as our men. They were not as well supplied as our men with food. I think they had rice meal and olive oil, which they cooked after mixing, and which I tasted. It was tough, but nourishing, and the Spanish troops that paraded there when we went in looked very well. I do not think anyone else had anything to eat; but the soldiers did. The civilians and poor people showed evidences of starvation, but the troops did not. I used to look at them, and when our men would say, "See what these Spanish soldiers are eating," I said, "That is not much worse than our bad hard-tack."

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Do you know the comparative sick and death rates of the two armies?

A. Their death rate was enormous. I think they were losing from 35 to 50 men a day after we got there.

Q. Very much in excess of ours.

A. Very much in excess of ours. I understood they had enough medical supplies and stores there to last a year at Santiago. I went through their dispensary, and they had nearly 2,000 men in bed with malarial fevers and illnesses of that kind; but they had been extremely liberal in supplies—storing supplies.

By General DODGE:

Q. Was a prompt response made to your request for doctors from the Surgeon-General?

A. I think as prompt as circumstances would permit. As soon as the city was opened and ships could get in, the doctors commenced to come. No trouble was had at all.

By General McCook:

Q. How was it at Tampa before you left? Was the same zeal displayed there before you sailed in securing you doctors?

A. I think we had what was required by the schedule of the War Department in the Fifth Army Corps. The volunteer regiments had their full complement of three doctors to a regiment, and they had a good outfit of Hospital Corps men in every regiment.

[The following letter gives the data referred to in the foregoing testimony:]

UNITED STATES BARRACKS,
Columbus, Ohio, December 16, 1898.

To the President of the War Investigation Commission, Washington, D. C.

SIR: With your kind permission I would like to add the following to my testimony given before you on the 14th instant:

Just as I left Siboney to go to the front with the headquarters staff I directed Maj. Ogden Rafferty, surgeon, United States Volunteers, to act as my representative in the distribution of the supplies I had landed from the *Seguranga*, and also in trying to get the regimental chests, etc., from the transports and to use my authority and do everything in his power to accomplish that result.

I told him to apply to Major Jacobs and Lieutenant Rondiez, as I understood they were the officers directly engaged in unloading the transports, and it was either through him or Captain Munson or, later, Lieutenant Kennedy that my applications for assistance in getting supplies off the boats were made.

I did not see the quartermaster's officers personally, as my answer to one of the last questions given me might imply. I had no opportunity to go either to Siboney or Daiquiri and was obliged to leave the matter in the hands of my officers.

Very respectfully,

B. F. POPE,
Major and Surgeon, United States Army.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 14, 1898.

TESTIMONY OF DR. URBEN SINCLAIR BIRD.

DR. URBEN SINCLAIR BIRD then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Where is your place of residence?

A. Tampa, Fla.

Q. Where were you on duty during the war with Spain?

A. I was on duty at Tampa, on board the transport *Hudson* and on board the transport *Seneca*.

Q. Doctor, will you be kind enough to tell us at what time you were ordered to go on board the *Seneca* and where?

A. The day after the *Hudson* arrived at Siboney, Cuba.

Q. You went down on the *Hudson* and returned at once on the *Seneca*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you notified at the time of the receipt of your orders what the nature of your duties would be on the *Seneca*?

A. I was.

Q. And what were the orders you received?

A. That I was to be in charge of the convalescent sick and wounded returning from Cuba.

Q. The date of this was about what?

A. You will have to give me a little time, as I have no notes.

Q. Well, we will pass that just now. You were told you would take charge of how many convalescents?

A. At first 150.

Q. Were these orders changed so that you would have to take charge of a larger number?

A. Changed so that I would take charge of a less number.

Q. You did take charge of how many?

A. Seventy-five.

Q. Was that all the passengers on the *Seneca*?

A. That is all under our control. There were others under the commissary's charge.

Q. Were you directed to take medical charge of that ship?

A. I was.

Q. What orders were given you as respects the fitting of her up for the reception of convalescents?

A. I was told supplies would be provided for, and we would only have to take charge.

Q. By whom was the supply to be provided?

A. The ordinary travel ration on the return made out by Dr. Parker, and the other from the *Relief* on requisition.

Q. Were all the supplies on board the vessel when you got on board?

A. They were not. I got them from the *Relief* on requisition.

Q. Did you make application definitely for supplies, or did you simply say you had come for the supplies that had been prepared for her?

A. I was told to go there, and Major Torney asked what I wanted, and I told him, and he said he wished he was in position to give us all we wanted, but he said that under the conditions, as supplies in his cargo were not broken, he did not know what he could do.

Q. What did you have there?

A. We were short of delicacies of all kinds.

Q. Did you have a sufficient quantity of medicines to answer all necessary medical purposes?

A. We did.

Q. Then it was simply with reference to the diet that the shortage existed?

A. We had plenty of food materials for the men.

Q. For sick men?

A. We had a reasonable quantity. The shortage was made up by the Red Cross ship. They sent sufficient for use.

Q. Did you make application to the Red Cross?

A. I did not. One of the Red Cross nurses got it for us.

Q. Do you remember her name?

A. Miss Jennings.

Q. Did she get these before or after you got the supplies from the *Relief*?

A. After.

Q. Supplementing what had been sent by the *Relief*?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, after you started you found you had how many sick men?

A. We had about seventy-five, which were under our care, and then after the ship had started a good deal of sickness broke out among those not sick and with whom we had nothing to do unless they got sick—that is, people under the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. Had any measures been taken by you or anyone else for any people that might get sick?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Were you sufficiently and properly supplied with food for the seventy-five men you had?

A. We were.

Q. What was the cause of the complaint?

A. There was cause for complaint, and the cause was in the condition of the ship itself.

Q. What was the condition of the ship?

A. It was simply a transport, and there was no room to get seventy-five sick men in the cabin, and the only space was in the ordinary bunks which the troops used going down.

Q. Were there any officers or civilians on board?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. State how many.

A. One hundred and thirty-five people aboard altogether.

Q. That would leave about sixty people included among those going under the charge of the Quartermaster's Department. How many officers were there, or how many passengers, how many newspaper reporters, how many men, in other words, who were not sick who did not belong to the Army as soldiers or quartermaster's employees?

A. I am unable to state that.

Q. Was there a considerable number of these?

A. People who came on the authority of the Quartermaster's Department I had nothing to do with, and I do not know the exact number.

Q. You state there were not stateroom accommodations enough for the sick. Now, I want to find out whether or not there were staterooms occupied by newspaper men, etc., who were not entitled to them.

A. There were such.

Q. When you found your sick were not being accommodated, did you ask any of these men to vacate these places?

A. Yes, sir; and in the great majority of cases they did.

Q. Were there any exceptions?

A. Yes, sir; in the case of some foreign attachés.

Q. Who were they? Count them without naming them.

A. As I remember, there were about seven altogether: there might have been one more.

Q. Did each one of them occupy staterooms?

A. I think most of them did, singly or together.

Q. Did any of these foreign attachés refuse to give up his stateroom?

A. Yes, sir; I remember one.

Q. Who was that one?

A. The Turkish general.

Q. How many staterooms more than you had would have been required to accommodate your sick?

A. At least twice as many as we had.

Q. Did the sick materially suffer because they were not in staterooms?

A. Not to any material extent.

Q. Were they in bunks or on floors?

A. In bunks.

Q. Was the air in between decks, where these bunks were, in fair condition?

A. Yes, sir; everything was open. There was a breeze through there all the time.

Q. Were these bunks prepared for the accommodation of sick men?

A. No, sir; the bunks were simply beds with slats and nothing else, and the first men were sent with only the clothing they had on on board—with, say, underdrawers or nightshirt—and we had nothing to give them.

Q. Where did they come from?

A. From the hospitals.

Q. Was any explanation made?

A. The explanation was that the *Seneca* contained a large number of supplies

which belonged to a regiment which went down on the first expedition, and it was the understanding that our men would use them; but when we got on board, there was an officer in charge of those, and he would not give them out.

Q. Who was this officer?

A. I declare I don't know his name.

Q. Do you know what command he belonged to?

A. He belonged to Colonel Van Horn's, and this gentleman was a major in the Quartermaster's Department.

Q. Did you get blankets for the sick?

A. Not in the sense of having the free use of them. We got consent for our men to use them by piling them together without undoing the rolls, but the next day we got some on the *Relief*.

Q. The night they did not have the blankets the ship was not in motion?

A. No, sir; not for several days. Then we got everything from the *Relief*. Major Torney sent all he could give us, which was simply blankets.

Q. Was each man properly protected with blankets, or were some simply lying on the slats?

A. I think not all.

Q. Why were not more secured?

A. Major Torney, as I understood, sent all he had, and the *Relief* was lying a long distance from us, and I had no opportunity to get to her other than this time.

Q. Did you apply for transportation to take you to the *Relief*?

A. There was only one boat for the use of ourselves and the officers in command of that boat, and I had commands for her to take me but once.

Q. Were there a sufficient number of men on your ship to make more than one boat's crew?

A. I could not say.

Q. Was this major you spoke of the ranking officer?

A. Colonel Van Horn was the senior officer.

Q. Did he take any action?

A. He sided with the major.

Q. Did you ask the colonel for them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he still refused?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it possible for you to get anything for these men?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you make application to anyone in authority for clothing for these men?

A. We stated the case to the hospital officer in charge of the reserve hospital at Siboney.

Q. Who was in charge there?

A. Major La Garde.

Q. What did he do?

A. He sent everything he could get.

Q. Did he or anyone else make application for clothing for these men?

A. Not so far as I know.

Q. Was it understood by you that men having practically no clothing but the clothing they were in would probably have trouble coming north in the change of climate?

A. We did not anticipate that, as it was summer.

Q. Isn't that to be anticipated?

A. Not sufficiently to injure health.

Q. Did these men suffer for want of clothing on the way up?

A. No, sir. Those who could not be accommodated—in the cases where there was special sickness to amount to anything we put them in the staterooms and

on cushions we had found there and around the ship. Men who were able to be up and about had to lie in the bunks.

Q. Did the men without staterooms who had to lie in bunks suffer because of having to lie on boards?

A. No, sir; because many of them would lie on the decks otherwise.

By General DODGE:

Q. Didn't you have sick men put off the *Relief* delivered to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was clothing delivered to you?

A. Blankets and their hospital clothing—the nightshirts and pajamas.

Q. They had no clothing whatever?

A. Only their night clothing and their pajamas.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Now, was it best for the convalescents who became worse in convalescence to be restricted to the travel ration?

A. They were not restricted to the travel ration, as we had beef tea, rice, and malted milk.

Q. Did you have a sufficient amount of food for the convalescents on board to supply the wants of those not able to take the proper travel ration?

A. I think we did.

Q. Were any of these men on board seriously ill?

A. There was but one among the surgical patients. There was but one sick man among the medical. They almost all got sick on the way, an increase on the way, and before we arrived at New York. Among them we had at least three cases which might be called seriously ill men.

Q. Did you have a sufficient amount of food supplies and medicines to take care of the seriously ill?

A. I think so.

Q. Were there any nurses on board other than those Red Cross nurses to take care of them?

A. Except the men assigned to us as assistants.

Q. Were they of any value as nurses?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you alone in charge of this vessel?

A. Dr. Hicks was with me.

Q. Was Dr. Hicks able to do duty on the way up?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you?

A. I was part of the time; I got seasick, and I arranged to take charge of the surgical cases and Dr. Hicks took charge of the medical cases. I was seasick, and I would go up and attend to my cases and then go back to bed again.

Q. Did you go straight to New York or did you stop at Fortress Monroe first?

A. Fortress Monroe first.

Q. How long did you lie in the Roads?

A. From 12 o'clock Monday until 8 o'clock Tuesday morning.

Q. What was the occasion of your detention at Fortress Monroe?

A. Some misunderstanding between the ship's captain and the Quartermaster's Department. When I arrived at Fortress Monroe, I telegraphed to the Surgeon-General. We were boarded by the marine-hospital people and the character of the sickness was sufficient for them to deem it suspicious and refuse us permission to land, and I telegraphed to the Surgeon-General about it, and he answered to go on to New York. In the meantime the captain said he was under orders from the Quartermaster's Department and could not move until ordered by them, and an order did not come until next morning.

Q. When you left Siboney were you supplied properly with milk and ice?

A. We had no milk except malted milk, and the ice gave out the first day.

Q. Did you resupply the vessel at Fortress Monroe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, as respects the water of the ship, in what condition was that water; was it proper for use, or not?

A. I do not think it was, in my opinion.

Q. What was the matter with it?

A. It was forbidding in appearance. It was the color of natural river water.

Q. Do you think ordinary river water is not proper to drink?

A. I would prefer drinking some other kind.

Q. What other objections were there to the water?

A. That was the principal objection.

Q. Did the water stink?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did it have any peculiar odors?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did it have any taste?

A. Not sufficiently noticeable to be disagreeable.

Q. So it was the color rather than anything else that was disagreeable?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was the water obtained?

A. I think he said it was obtained in Savannah.

Q. Do you know how long it had been in the tanks of the vessel?

A. As I remember, the ship had not been fitted out in two months.

Q. Was there a sufficient quantity of water on board for all purposes?

A. I do not think we ever gave out of water.

Q. Were the tanks refilled at Fortress Monroe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did they get that water?

A. From a ship or boat which was sent out by the Commissary Department.

Q. Was that water clear or colored?

A. It was clear, but being put in the same tanks there was a little color given to it; but on the whole it was an improvement.

Q. How many men did you lose on the trip, Doctor?

A. None.

Q. What was done with the sick when you reached New York?

A. Dr. Doty was on the ship examining the cases, and he deemed it sufficient to place the ship in quarantine?

Q. What did Dr. Doty say to you?

A. He said that under the conditions he would place us in quarantine as if we had yellow fever on board. He took all the wounded to Bellevue Hospital; the fever patients he sent to Swinburne Island and the others went to Hoffman Island.

Q. You had charge of the wounded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it or not a fact that any of the wounded were taken from the battlefield to the hospitals and then taken to your ship in a night-shirt?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is it a fact that the night-shirt was filthy dirty when your ship arrived in New York?

A. I know of no such thing.

Q. Would you have known it had such been the case?

A. I think so.

Q. Is it a fact that men had wounds which were not dressed but once on the way up to New York?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is it wise to disturb a nonsuppurative wound, the subject not being a sufferer from fever?

A. It is better not to disturb it.

Q. Is it, or not, a fact, as stated by Dr. Doty, that the wounded arrived in that condition? He stated some of the wounds were suppurating, and I asked the doctor what was the matter, and he said you said you had no instruments or medicines. What instruments did you need in dressing sores?

A. Our fingers.

Q. Is it, or not, a fact that you stated to Dr. Doty as an explanation of the wounds not being dressed that you had no instruments or medicines?

A. I do not remember any such statement.

By General DODGE:

Q. Have you seen the statement Miss Jennings made in relation to this ship?

A. I think I have. I think I saw it as soon as it was published.

Q. What have you to say in relation to the charges she made?

A. I do not remember, even generally, what they were now. Can you recall any details you would like to ask me about?

Q. No. Did you make any answer to her statement?

A. I made no formal answer, but I made a report to General Sternberg.

Q. Did you make any reference to that in your report?

A. Not intentionally.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Out of the 135 patients you had on board how many of them, practically, at the time you left Cuba, had you reason to expect would be sick?

A. Not more than fifty, to need any great attention.

Q. What was the condition of the sick during the voyage as to cleanliness?

A. The ship was not cleanly.

Q. Why?

A. Because the people who had charge of cleaning the ship, that is, the sailors, did not do it, and we had no way of making them do it. They had charge of the water and hose and things that did that, and they would not do it.

Q. How uncleanly was it?

A. Just simply the floors were dirty from the voyage the ship had made before in carrying troops down.

Q. Did you complain to anyone about the refusal of Colonel Van Horn—about his refusal to let your men use the blankets?

A. I did not mention Colonel Van Horn; but I mentioned this major, who was left in personal charge, and who was on the ship for two months, as I understood it. I have made reference to that in my report by stating the facts.

By General McCook:

Q. I want to see who that major was.

A. He was a volunteer officer.

By General DODGE:

Q. The statement as to the cleanliness of the ship refers only to the dirt on board that the men would naturally make?

A. Yes, sir. The ship had taken a regiment down on the first expedition, and then she was immediately sent to Jamaica, and then she was sent immediately north, and there was no chance to clean the ship, and she was simply a dirty ship.

Q. Is it your opinion that the men on board that ship suffered?

A. No, sir; not more than I have said. We had no ice; that was beyond our control; and the color and character of the water was beyond our control. Some

newspaper ship let us have 100 pounds of ice, but it fell overboard getting it alongside, and we got on board probably 5 or 10 pounds.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. I believe you stated nobody died on that ship?

A. Nobody.

Q. Then these inconveniences the men suffered produced no serious results?

A. I am not aware that they did.

Q. Why could you not have taken those blankets?

A. Because Colonel Van Horn and this major had charge of them.

Q. Could you not have taken them?

A. Yes, sir; but Colonel Van Horn was an officer in the Regular Army, and I thought he knew.

Q. Did you get blankets from the *Relief*?

A. Yes, sir; but not other bedding.

By General DODGE:

Q. Do you remember Lieutenant Byron?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Lieutenant Goss?

A. I think I can remember Lieutenant Goss. They came with authority of the Quartermaster's Department, but we had nothing to do with them unless they got sick, and I think they did, of some little ailment or other. Lieutenant Byron had been wounded in the foot, but was convalescent then.

Q. Did you have any morphia aboard?

A. A very small quantity; not very much.

Q. Do you remember Dr. Doty saying in this case that the people were sick and crawling over each other in agony, and that he asked the doctor why he did not give some of them who were suffering some morphia, and that the doctor on board said he had none on board; and that these men were suffering from diarrhea and suffering excruciating pain. Was anybody on board suffering excruciating pain?

A. We had only one surgical case, and that not very severe.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 15, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. BROOKE.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General WILSON:

Q. Will you please give us your name and rank, your full name?

A. John R. Brooke; major-general, United States Army.

Q. How long have you been in the military service of the United States, both in the regular establishment and in the Volunteer Army?

A. Since the 20th of April, 1861, with an exception of a few months at the close of the war.

Q. Where have you served during the war with Spain?

A. What do you mean?

Q. Your several commands during the war with Spain?

A. At Chickamauga Park and in Porto Rico.

Q. How long were you at Chickamauga Park?

A. From the 20th of April to, I think, the 23d day of July.

Q. How many men were there in camp—the maximum number at one time—what was the largest number of troops congregated there at one time?

A. To the best of my recollection, the largest number was 56,000 men, in round numbers.

Q. Now, General, in your own way, will you give us the story of Chickamauga Park, beginning with the selection of the camp and by whom selected, if you know: the condition when you took command, the problems that confronted you in the management of it, and its condition when you left there?

A. When I reached there, on the 20th of April, there was one regiment of infantry (the Twenty-fifth) encamped there. There were en route to that place ten batteries—light batteries of artillery—and six regiments of cavalry; within a few days these arrived, and then there were eight regiments of infantry diverted from other points to Chickamauga, seven of which only arrived, as nearly as I can recollect now without notes. These were all regular troops. They came there with what transportation, animals, wagons, etc., there were at their separate posts. Much of this transportation was in need of extensive repairs. The order was to equip them for the field in a certain manner. There was nothing to do with these troops but to equip them for transportation, which was done as rapidly as could be done. They all went away, however, without a thorough equipment for want of time, their final departure being hastened very much. I think the last of the regular troops left the park for Camp Thomas about the 13th or 14th of May. They were all destined for Tampa—not all; no; some went to Mobile. These little details, gentlemen, I can not possibly carry in my head, because there has been so much occurring since. With the regular troops there was no hitch or hurry in any way: they were all organized thoroughly, and all there was to do was to give them their equipment. The volunteers commenced to arrive on Sunday afternoon, I think, the 15th of May. They came rapidly in great numbers. I was directed to organize the First Army Corps, the Third Army Corps, and as much as possible of the Sixth Army Corps. Those troops which came to the First Army Corps were practically troops of the National Guard of the various States. They came there supposedly equipped—actually not equipped as we understand the term. I speak now of the equipment of the soldier and not the transportation. They came there supposedly with ten days' rations from the time that they left their camps in the various States, but on their arrival there were numerous complaints of being without food. An investigation showed that a ration, as they understood it, was only part of a ration. They had what is erroneously called a field ration—hard bread, salt meat, and coffee, or the money to buy coffee; that was practically all they had. Of course they grew very hungry; and as I was advised that they had plenty of rations it relieved me very much, until I found the conditions which actually existed, which as soon as known their wants were supplied at once and there was no difficulty; so far as supplies were concerned, the subsistence department was always ready to issue, and had the supplies and got them. The tentage was of all patterns—old, most of it. They were uniformed principally in the National Guard uniform, which had been worn considerably, and with the extra wear and tear they were not really serviceably uniformed. There was considerable difficulty in obtaining uniforms sufficiently fast to equip them, our supply department being organized on a very parsimonious basis for 25,000 men; the channels of supply were very contracted and the sudden extension of the number which were called into service caused delay, necessarily. When the National Guard regiments came in, there were other troops—I scarcely understand how to term them, for they came there without any equipment whatever, in citizens' clothes and generally with one blanket; no underclothing; no shelter.

Q. And no arms?

A. And no arms. There came our difficulty. We overcame it in time. The weather was good. There was no suffering. We had plenty for them to eat. We managed to get good cooking utensils to satisfy the urgent needs. This continued with the best of regiments of the National Guard now and then, who came in equipped as those that I speak of, from the first until the end. The exact number of regiments coming in thoroughly equipped I can not recall. It is a matter of record, however, in the various departments; therefore I did not charge my mind with the details. All these men who came in May and June came in very rapidly. The First Corps, which was my corps, was filled with its 27 regiments, I think, in less than ten days. We received at one time, I think, six regiments in one day. Several were coming from their camps in cold parts of the country, some of them leaving snowdrifts; they arrived there where everything was thoroughly dry and very warm; some of those regiments, from the New England States particularly, marching from the station or stations—for we used two to avoid congestion—necessarily encountered at the little station of Battlefield, which was right near the camp—back of my headquarters, in fact—when they marched to their camps, men dropped out very greatly from the heat and in consequence of too much heavy clothing, and of course their systems were probably considerably deranged by the excitement of getting off, which you gentlemen, who remember our experience years ago, will understand. The reaction came and left them in a collapsed condition. Great efforts were made by all the departments to equip these men. My duty was to organize and equip as rapidly as I could. The difficulties of doing so can better be imagined than described. I was fortunate in having an extraordinarily efficient staff in the supply department. Nothing that I can remember was omitted to hasten the thorough equipment of the troops. There were times when the supply was not equal to the demand. Oftentimes this deficiency occurred by reason of the system which prevailed in furnishing clothing in a certain proportion of sizes to the hundred. I will say a man could not be reasonably fitted with clothing in that way. Sufficient clothing came, as I remember, but it was too large, as a rule. Very large sizes were not used, and of course that created delay in the clothing. The equipment in the ordnance department was deficient, in so far as the belts, haversacks, canteens, cups, knives, forks, spoons, and knapsacks was concerned; that part of the equipment was very slow in going forward. The difficulties were doubtless very great, which I understood, appreciated, and did the best I could to overcome. Very early in June, or the latter part of May, I was ordered to send eight of the best equipped regiments in the camp to Tampa immediately. In order to complete their equipment it was necessary to take from the other regiments that part of the equipment which those regiments who were selected to go—and those who were selected to go were more nearly equipped than any others—in order to equip them; and as it was, they went away with a deficient equipment. I remember one regiment particularly—the One hundred and fifty-seventh Indiana. I saw it on the march out—met it, on my return from one of my inspection trips, marching out. They had no belt straps. The belts were tied around the waist in some way—I did not observe particularly how—by strings and by twine. We did not have time then to reduce the amount of impedimenta of the regiment—individual men—that was absolutely necessary for the comfort and convenience to the supply of transportation, so that these men carried their knapsacks not fully loaded, probably, so far as I observed, but they carried their knapsacks with a good deal more in them than we were accustomed to using in our experience as young men. The effort to equip them in that way went on, so far as the ordnance department was concerned, during the whole time of my stay at Camp Thomas. When I left there, there were a great many articles still deficient in the way of canteens, haversacks, and the equipment for the haversack belts. It seemed to be exceedingly difficult to obtain the cartridge belt, so that some of the regiments

were still supplied with the cartridge boxes—how many I do not now recall. The equipment was, so far as transportation was concerned, hurried forward as rapidly as we could get the mules, wagons, harness, etc. Tents were deficient in number because, as I was informed by the Quartermaster-General, they had exhausted the supply of canvas in the country; that the demands had been so great that there was nothing left. They bought all the tents that were manufactured, of whatever size and whatever quantity they could find, and shipped them to us. The standard tents came along in time, but not in such quantities as to meet the demands which were made on us in order to equip the troops which were to be held in readiness for movement at very short notice. The consequence of that was that in the month of June the men were too much crowded in their larger tents, and the pitching of the “shelter tent” was generally resorted to to relieve the congestion in the larger tents, which of course was permitted. In the latter part of June—I am not sure whether it was the 29th or 30th, but it was about then—I received directions from the Headquarters of the Army to equip three divisions or to prepare three divisions of those best equipped in the camp for service in the West Indies, under my command, to report at the earliest possible date when they would be ready to move. The First Army Corps divisions, having arrived first, were in my opinion more thoroughly ready in the efficiency of their equipment than were those of the Third Army Corps, which had part of two divisions then on the ground. I immediately turned my attention to the completion of the equipment of the divisions of the First Corps with those things of which they were still deficient. That continued up to the very moment of my departure. When I left the park, on the 23d of July, I considered the divisions of the First Army Corps equipped in all their parts, even to the equipment of their hospitals and of the reserve hospitals and ambulance companies: that is to say, the material was there in the hospital corps. The men were all new to their work, uninstructed in their duties, and as a matter of fact large numbers of them were ever without reason inefficient, as you may well understand. Large numbers of them came into the service without any previous service, and large numbers came there without uniforms at all, and they had to be supplied and equipped with all that was necessary for that corps. Transportation had been accumulated very rapidly and had been furnished throughout. At first as many wagons were sent to the regiments as were necessary to use in the camp. When they were all supplied to that extent, more were issued, beginning at the head of the column and going down in regular gradation to the last arrival. When the troops were being started away—eight regiments started away about the beginning of June and left their camps, and it was necessary to transfer wagons from other regiments in order to give them their equipment. In the beginning, in so far as the selection of the camp was concerned—I am not informed more than by general report how this spot was selected; it was sufficient for me to know that it had been selected and I was sent there—I accepted the conditions and did the best possible. My attention was at first directed to the efforts of the park commission to meet the water supply, that sufficed for the regular troops, it being practically a very early spring; that portion of the park, that which was covered by timber, was wet, and the troops were camped in the open, where it was dry. The water supply was obtained largely from large springs, one called the Cave Spring, near which a brigade of infantry was camped and not far away a brigade of cavalry. Another was the Mullis Spring, said to be living springs, inexhaustible. Around it were grouped ten batteries of artillery and one regiment of cavalry, who drew their supply of water from it, and one brigade of infantry. Part of the other brigade of cavalry drew its water supply from a spring which was under a very large water oak tree, which was near the park headquarters. I forget the name of the field it was in—I think the Dyer field. The wells were put down there—through limestone rock—at various depths until they penetrated and reached

the water supply below; and when I left the park these machines were still at work, although I had instituted a pipe line, water from which was taken from the Chickamauga Creek, upon the mouth or outlet of the Cave Spring Branch which furnished it, and which proved to be, by very frequent analyses made here in Washington, to be good water. It was at first condemned. When the pipes were first laid the work was rapidly done, and they were exposed to the sun to such an extent as to heat the water in them, so as to make it necessary to cool the water before it was used for drinking. That was obviated very shortly by covering the pipes in the shallow branch and protecting them from the rays of the sun. The water supplied there was in considerable volume; the supply was pumped into a reservoir; from that it was distributed in two directions, one to the east, and one to the west. The western one had several branches of it. I think it was a 6-inch main. I think the one going directly from the tank to the eastward was less in size—I think probably 3-inch size or thereabouts; I don't recollect the size. There was, of course, a great deal of complaint about that water. Many contended that it was contaminated by the drainage from this Cave Spring camp. It was probably without foundation. I know that from personal observations made very frequently indeed. The camp, as I say, was put in the woods. Those of you gentlemen who have been in Chickamauga have seen the woods: you know what they were. I was unable to discover during my daily inspection of the camp that there was any point in the timber that the sun did not reach some time during the day. An effort was made to observe all sanitary rules. My orders were quite clear as to that, but I supplemented those orders by a very rigid personal inspection. Very rarely a day passed that I did not inspect that whole camp, or so much of it as I could get over. When not able to reach certain portions of it, some of my staff were sent there to see that the regulations were carried out. I was particularly anxious and insisted that that portion of the camp which was occupied by my own corps, by the cavalry, and by the artillery should observe all sanitary rules. The commander of the Third Corps was there, an officer of equal rank with myself, and I did not inspect his camp as frequently as I did that of the First Corps.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Who was the commander of that corps, please?

A. General Wade. The location you have before you in that map. [Pointing to chart of Chickamauga in the commission's room.] I made it myself in a general way, indicating the lines generally where the camps should be, and then leaving it to the officers in command to fill in details. If, on inspection, I had any criticism to make, I made it; and if there were any corrections required, the corrections were made. All the appurtenances of camps of infantry, artillery, and cavalry were insisted upon. There was, when we first went there, a very great influx of what you might call hucksters, with all sorts of trash. As old soldiers, gentlemen, you will understand what effect that will have upon the health of the men. I regulated that and forbade any of these people from coming into the camp except they had a permit signed by a distinguished staff officer of mine. The provost guard inspected the permits and the contents of the wagons, and wherever the slightest infringement was made the permit was revoked and the parties were taken beyond the confines of the park. After that got into operation my medical staff informed me that the sick report had fallen off about 30 per cent. I do not think that that came to me in writing, but that is my recollection—it was about 30 per cent decrease in the sick report. I have seen it stated, gentlemen, in the newspapers that certain officers have stated before you in reports which were printed that I did not inspect these camps. I deem it proper to say to you, gentlemen, now that it is altogether possible that officers did not see me in these inspections—the officers rarely saw me—the officers rarely saw me unless they

were sent for. My usual track was between the company's kitchens and the sinks, oscillating from kitchen to sink and sink to kitchen.

General DODGE. General, there is plenty of testimony before us that you were often through the camps.

The WITNESS. It was not only often, General Dodge, it was daily.

General DODGE. We have that, too.

The WITNESS. There has been, of course, a great voluminous pile of alleged testimony which I don't know anything about, as I was out of the country and far away, giving no attention to it until my attention was directed to the newspaper report made by the chief surgeon of the camp while I was there. Whether it was true or correctly printed or not I can not say. I made that clipping a subject of a letter to you, gentlemen of the commission, as I deemed it might be wise before you adjourned for you gentlemen to examine the records which are obtainable. In everything connected with the camp at Chickamauga Park I can only say this: That the camp was well selected; that it was a good camp. There were difficulties there which were overcome, I think, when I left it. I was informed the evening before I left the camp—for I had a daily sick report in memorandum form—and my memory is, my recollection is, that it was under 4 per cent for the whole of the camp. There has been a great deal stated to you about typhoid fever. When I was summoned to Washington, about the middle of July last, I had a report brought to me of the number of typhoid-fever cases then in the camp. There were 92. I remember that, I think, distinctly. There was some complaint about the hospital service. I was impressed very strongly by the effort of the Medical Department to inaugurate a medical service at the beginning of this war which was similar to and probably an improvement on that in which most of you gentlemen were engaged, the war of the rebellion. We all know that our provost and best soldiers—men distinguished for bravery and coolness—were selected at that time as stretcher bearers and drivers of the ambulances. The fact that a man was seen with a stretcher on his shoulder was one indication that he was one of the best men in the Army. I am satisfied that the efforts of the Medical Department were to start out with an organization having as many of the benefits or improvements of the former organization of 1861 and 1865 as it was possible to obtain in the beginning of the war. When the orders of the Medical Department reached me in regard to that I found a great deal of opposition in regard to regimental matters and the proper men to fill these places. This, gentlemen, was to such an extent that I directed my chief surgeon, Colonel Huidekoper, to select the men and furnish me the names, and that those men must be the best he could select with the knowledge he would have. I then had those men detailed for that service; I refer particularly to those who were detailed from regiments. The design evidently had received the attention of those who were presumably well versed in the necessities of the case. Satisfied of that and coming to me with the proper authority, it was not mine to question: I should have considered myself culpable had I in any way obstructed any effort to improve or establish an improved condition of things in so important a branch as the Medical Department. There was great want of medicines in the beginning, but so far as that is concerned it was my purpose and practice to rely largely upon the medical officer sent to me as chief surgeon. The complaints came to me of deficiencies directly, and I would say here that whenever an officer, no matter what his rank, had a complaint to make I was ready to hear him. Of course large numbers of them would hesitate to come to me, but there were those that did come. In every instance where a complaint reached me of a deficiency of medicines and medical supplies, hospital supplies, hospital property—for I believe it was divided in various ways—I sent for my chief surgeon and inquired into it. It was either reported to me, of course verbally stated to a staff officer, or from a staff officer to his general, the reason for nonfulfillment of the demands. A great

many other reports reached me which are not current reports, although they may all be true, but I don't know it, as to the matter of supplies from the depots established there. The depots were established in a place selected by myself; some of you gentlemen have been there, I think, and have seen them—

General DODGE. We have all been there.

A. [Continuing.] You have seen the supply depots of that camp. I have seen an army in the field of 150,000 men with not nearly so good a base as that was. The Army of the Potomac had its supply base at Brandy Station in the winter of '63 and '64—did not have anything equal to it. The subsistence department there had ample floor space and roof protection for the storing of ten days' supplies for 60,000 men. There was a bakery adjoining in which could be baked every day 55,000 rations of bread—good bread—it was all good bread that was issued. There was a cold-storage plant there which would hold two carloads of refrigerated beef. There was a medical purveyor's storehouse there large enough to hold all the medicines that was necessary for the number of men we had there. It was not necessary to hold them there very long. We had a clothing storehouse there which held all the clothing we could get—had a quartermaster's storehouse which held all that was necessary to put into it. We had large corrals, where mules and wagons could be assembled and harness put on the mules and hitched up and driven to the various places where required. We had a hospital corral which held several hundred animals and appurtenances for the treatment of sick animals; in fact, gentlemen, I don't recall anything that was deficient in that camp except now and then, for reasons which will appeal to you all, supplies were deficient temporarily. One thing, the sky-blue kersey ran out. There was trouble. They attempted to furnish dark blue, did furnish it, but it was not of such a character as it should be. Shoes were deficient in number, but they bought all the shoes they could find in the market; so I was informed by the Department. Of course we were satisfied. I saw that everything was being done that could be done. There was an army at Tampa being assembled, an army at San Francisco being assembled for immediate service, to which were sent all supplies that could be collected in a certain time in order to equip it. We felt that at Chickamauga, of course, because the supplies were diverted. At first I thought of establishing an ordnance depot at the camp. I had placed at my disposal and under my disposition the Columbia Arsenal, which was within twelve hours' run, and which had its equipment of ordnance officers, laborers, and clerks necessary and all appurtenances to quickly handle supplies and fill requisitions, and under those circumstances I decided not to establish an ordnance depot at the camp. I had scarcely attempted to draw on the Columbia Arsenal for that portion of the equipment which was not furnished before it was taken away from us. Then I regretted that I had not established a depot.

Q. Who was it taken away from you by?

A. By my superior.

Q. For military purposes?

A. I don't know; I presume so.

Q. I mean did they continue to use it or not?

A. Certainly; they diverted the supplies from me to Tampa and for the Manila expedition. There was one thing that struck me then and has impressed itself upon me ever since, and that is the effect which the centralization which has continued for thirty years has had upon the individual officers of the supply departments. It has destroyed their individuality and their enterprise in a great measure. I have fortunately been able to keep myself clear of the contaminating effect produced by the system of centralization. I have never hesitated during this war, or on any other occasion where it appeared to me to be necessary, to compel my staff officers to obey my orders in matters of that kind, assuming all the responsibility which would be placed upon my shoulders, becoming personally responsible

for my acts. The Treasury, however, as a rule, thought the disbursement officer was responsible alone for the disbursements he might make, and for that reason I have often been compelled to submit, in deference to the decision which neither he nor I was responsible for or could combat, and did not insist in time of peace on the plain prerogative of a commander. At Chickamauga I do not recall an instance where there was any hesitation on the part of any of my supply department staff officers to go right ahead. The whole matter of the buildings erected for the protection of stores was conceived and carried out right at headquarters, details of which were in the hands of the proper departments, and during the erection of the buildings I frequently inspected the property. In fact, gentlemen, in that way I never hesitated to exercise the full power of a commander to meet such emergencies as were within my reach. I saw myself—I have had my attention called to the remark made before your commission of a staff officer of mine. I do not know that I can correctly quote his language, but the remark was to the effect that my headquarters camp was unutterably filthy. There must be some great mistake on the part of that gentleman, for my solicitude, as far as my headquarters camp was concerned, was as to cleanliness, and had it been in that condition I certainly would have seen it, and so would others. It was not so; it was exceedingly clean.

Q. He said that the headquarters were in a filthy condition. It was a Colonel Goethals; he spoke of the policing. I asked him the question myself.

A. No, General; the camp throughout—the camp grounds were absolutely clean. The surroundings at times I found littered; but whenever I did find such, an aid or a staff officer went directly to the officer responsible, be it a regimental, brigade, division, or corps commander, and that received his attention until the matter was corrected. I have frequently gone back to my headquarters from one of my tours of inspection without even an orderly, as they had all gone on various messages in regard to matters which I found it necessary to correct. I think I have given as tersely and about as clear a history of that camp as I can. The reason for putting the troops in the timber, which seems to have received some criticism at the hands of some gentlemen who probably had views of their own about such things, I will give as from my experience, from the nature of the timber, for it was a very beautiful park no underbrush; it was cleaned up; it was the only place possible to put troops during the heat which prevailed. My tent was in the open ground; the sun beat down on it until late in the afternoon. The thermometers frequently stood in my tent at 105°. I occupied a conical wall tent of my own design, until one day, busy writing with the canvas hanging over my head, I felt everything turn black before my eyes. I looked up at a little thermometer which I had carried for years with me and it stood at 104°. I got out into the timber, made up my mind that I should have to have a different kind of tent or else would not be able to attend to business, for my tent was my office. I was threatened also—I would say here that an alleged copy of a newspaper report, at least of an inquiry instituted by the commanding general of that camp to inquire into its unhealthy condition and the cause thereof—the finding of the board, consisting of the general officers, as published, describes the cause due to conditions existing under previous administration. If that is the true report, I would only invite the attention of this commission to the actual conditions as regards the health of that camp up to the 23d day of July; after that I can not go personally. Of course, gentlemen, you will understand that after I had received the order to equip three divisions I was intensely occupied in that. I established a depot then, and insisted that the ordnance supplies, which was the main trouble at that time, should be sent to me by express and be sent in bulk. That ordnance depot was in the open ground in front of the tents of my chief ordnance officers and within very easy reach of my own. It is unnecessary for me to say anything further to General Beaver on this subject, for he will understand that I spent a

great deal of time in that little pile of boxes, and saw that the ordnance supplies were distributed, in so far as they went, with the regiments of the First Army Corps, which was being prepared for foreign service, and that in many cases supplies sent to the other regiments which needed them I ruthlessly took from regiments which were not designated to leave that camp, in order to fill the necessities existing with those which were to leave that camp. I adopted such methods as seemed to be best in regard to these things. Another little matter which may not have attracted your attention is a daily report to the Adjutant-General of the Army by telegraph of the amount of supplies issued during that day and the amount of deficiencies, of the urgency in various instances of meeting the deficiencies which existed in the supply department at the time. If you will look over those reports you will find one remark continuously; it is this, as near as I can recollect: "Subsistence department is well supplied." It became rather a matter of amusement to me on account of its being reported every day in that identical language, as I can remember.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. It was, General, an exception so far as the Subsistence Department was concerned?

A. The difficulty we had with the Subsistence Department was to keep them from sending too much. We could not handle it. We had no place for it until I directed the renting of a large warehouse in Chattanooga that was available. We were in a box, so to speak; we could not handle the stores. I think there was three months' supply for a very large number of men—I think it was 100,000 in Chattanooga.

Q. Did a like difficulty exist with reference to the medical supplies?

A. What do you mean?

Q. Did the medical report show the amount of medical stores on hand?

A. The telegraphic daily reports showed the amount of supplies issued and the deficiencies in each of the departments; it was sent at 6 p. m. and was called the "6 p. m. report."

By General DODGE:

Q. Before you left—the location of the camp—when you located these troops there in the open, was it in very dry soil—hot?

A. Yes, sir; very, very dry; besides the roads were choked with dust, which crossed the open ground.

Q. Was it your intention to move these camps out of the woods when the rainy season came?

A. Why, of course: I would move them anywhere, at any time, when the necessity arose. By that I mean that whenever an occasion arose; but I never crossed a stream until I came to it. The conditions existing where those camps were under my command—I daily went over them, and I would call your attention, General Dodge, that in 1862 to 1863, or in the beginning of 1863, the Army of the Cumberland camped at Murfreesboro, on that little stream, in almost the same character of soil—open grounds principally—from December to June.

Q. Yes.

A. And I do not know whether they changed the camps often or not. General McCook will know; he was there.

General McCook. Yes; they changed the camps, but kept them in the same vicinity.

The WITNESS. That is what would have been done in this case. I had explored all the country in the vicinity of Chickamauga, and I was prepared at any time to do anything that circumstances demanded; but up to the time I left there was no occasion for it; there was no possible reasons for any change—that is, no purpose for the change apparent to me.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Were there no changes made in the camps of any of the regiments prior to your leaving?

A. Well, the First Division had moved out largely before I left the First Corps; that was parallel to there [pointing to chart in commission's room]; you see, right along the Lafayette road, southeast of it; but one brigade of that division had only moved out. That is that on the left there, General [pointing to map]; that is it [pointing to map]. It was a surprising feature, and I watched it very closely. The most condensed camp that we had was the Second, over by Jay's Mills; that was the most condensed camp, and it was up to the time I left the healthiest in the park. Its sick list was less than in others, as far as I remember, in the park.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who commanded that division?

A. General Poland; but he died of malarial fever shortly after I left there.

Q. This division moved out in June, did it not?

A. No, sir; one brigade of it moved out in July and the second brigade moved on the 21st and 22d.

Q. The 25th of July?

A. The 21st and 22d. The third brigade followed immediately after.

By General BEAVER:

Q. When you so moved out, they did not change their camps in the immediate vicinity but to the point of embarkation?

A. Yes. [Reference is here made to chart in commission's room, whereon General Brooke explains to the commission the certain localities of the camp, the lines of pipe, the laying of the pipe lines, the various roads, and so forth, and explained in a general way his ideas upon the different locations, and so forth, there.] Here [indicating on map] is a pipe line: here is a branch going over the different divisions. The cry for water was an amazing one for me. Here was probably the healthiest part of the camp—that is, the First Division of the Third Army Corps—upon which the ground, the surface of it, was slated rock. Now, in justice to myself, I think I ought to speak of this First Division hospital. It was established at a time when I did not have an opportunity to go over it. I directed my chief surgeon, Colonel Hartsuff, to select a place for that hospital, and so far as I know he selected that place. There have been various reports made by the officers who had charge of it as to its location, but it was the one place in the whole camp which I condemned as to location. It was a bad one, I think.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. I would like, Mr. President, to ask General Brooke a few questions. I want to state to you, General, that there has been a good deal of testimony before this commission in regard to certain facts that corroborate some statements which you have made, but some, I think, I am frank enough to say, will require explanation from you, and I am going to be frank enough to state it to you here, as it has made an impression upon me—I do not know whether it has with any of the other men here. In the first place, there have been complaints made in regard to the location of certain regiments in that reservation upon grounds that were so rocky that they could not make sinks, nor could they drive their tent pins in the ground. That was on that section of ground between where your headquarters were and Chickamauga Creek; you know where it is. I want you to explain why these troops were put in that locality, and then I want to ask you whether plans were made, and what your reasons were if they were not made?

A. One thing at a time, please.

General DODGE. Take your time, General.

A. First, the troops were put in on that locality in a general way by the division

commander, an officer of long experience in the regular service, a brigadier of volunteers at the time, and I indicated in a general way where I wanted that division to rest. The immediate location of any particular camp along that line—you are alluding now to the Third Brigade of the First Division of the First Corps?

Q. One of the New Hampshire regiments was there, or the Twelfth New York Regiment.

A. The Twelfth New York was on another ground, on the road to the left; it was the second brigade there [pointing to the map], right in front of you, General—the Twelfth New York is the center regiment?

By General DODGE:

Q. Well, they were on the rocky ground also?

A. Yes, they were; also the Eighth Massachusetts, the Twelfth New York, and the Twenty-first Kansas, I think.

Q. What was the condition of the ground there?

A. There was some rocky substance—limestone, I think—floating on the surface. They would occasionally probably strike a piece of rock embedded in the ground. I looked into it. I could see no reasonable cause of complaint. I examined the places where their sinks were dug in that brigade, where the Twelfth New York was, and where their sinks were dug they could have dug them, so far as I could judge, 20 feet deep if they so desired; there was nothing to obstruct the digging of sinks there.

Q. As far as the other brigade was concerned, was there any quantity of ground within a proper distance of the camp in which they could have easily dug sinks?

A. I give this as my opinion: Having examined the ground, after the camps were established, and feeling satisfied that there was no reasonable ground for complaint, I did not move the troops. Had there been any just grounds they might have been moved.

Q. I simply state that that was the complaint which was made. General Williston even testified.

A. By the way, what had he to do with it?

Q. Well, he was camped there.

A. General Williston was not there.

Q. General Williston occupied part of the ground that I allude to.

A. Then you are mistaken on the ground. Williston's camp was where the artillery were.

Q. General Williston complained of the camp of the artillery.

A. Well, as to that, they did dig sinks, and deep ones, too; I saw that myself.

Q. Well, as I understand you, did the complaint reach you that they could not dig sinks or drive tent pegs in the ground?

A. Not officially; but in going over the ground where the Second Missouri, Ninth Texas, and First New Hampshire were encamped I saw that they had been placed in ground which, if I had located those regiments, would not have selected.

By General BEAVER:

Q. These were the worst camps I saw when I was down there. Did you find the same thing in the Third Tennessee, General?

A. There was any quantity of this limestone rock such as I have described, but it was not necessary to place them just exactly on that particular ground. I could see no evidence of their not being able to drive their tent pins there. Their tents were up in good shape, all of them.

Q. Gen. Edward B. Williston, in his testimony to this commission, in answer to a question by General Beaver, reading as follows: "What were the conditions at Camp Thomas generally as to the camp facilities, the water supply, and the gen-

eral environments so far as healthfulness was concerned?" said, "My camp was about one-half mile long and from one-third to half a mile wide, in a grove, which served for shade and still at the same time didn't prevent the sun from drying up the ground after a rain. The ground sloped gradually both ways, right and left, and it drained evenly. The position I was camped on was unfortunate for troops, because there was little soil above the rocks. I could not dig a hole without striking a rock. I would dig through 3 or 4 inches of loose soil and strike the hardest kind of clay, and it was only by the most constant and unremitting attention that I was able to have any sanitary condition kept in regard to the sinks, and the medical board said that the condition of my camps was entirely satisfactory, but it was by constantly changing them and using every disinfectant I could get hold of and by inspecting it myself every day. The water supply was very unsatisfactory when I first went there. I had a large number of horses and mules, and the water all came from wells. I do not think there was any surface contamination. There were artesian wells there from 30 to 50 feet deep, and I think, from the effect it had on everybody, there was more or less magnesia. I considered it good, but the supply was small. At one time before they commenced ordering the troops away it was almost impossible to get water. I have sent my horses down there at 12 o'clock and they would not get their water until night. After this we commenced the construction of two artesian wells, but they were not finished. The water from the springs was piped over quite close to my camp, but it never reached it, but it reached the point where I could water the horses. The supply for the men we got from the same place. I tried to boil the water for the men, but it was ridiculous; I could not do it. The men would not touch it; and the men were bound to drink from a spring near to them instead of walking a distance to drink my boiled water. The orders were positive, and I had all the battalion commanders trying to carry out the orders, but it was a failure." General, what have you to say in regard to General Williston's statement?

A. I can only say that it was his duty to inspect the camp every day, and it was necessary for him to do that. He had an artillery brigade there.

Q. What is your opinion, General, as to the condition of things in General Williston's camp?

A. My recollection of Williston's camp is that he had sinks on the ground, but I saw evidence that not only the stuff from the kitchen but other excreta were thrown into those sinks.

Q. General, a great many have testified to this fact—that they could not dig sinks there on account of the rock.

A. As I stated before, there was plenty of places where sinks could be dug—

(A general conversation then ensued between the commission and General Brooke, whereupon the General explained on the chart in the commission's room the different situations of the different camps and the several conditions which existed during the time he was in command there.)

Captain HOWELL. General, when you read this testimony you will find a great deal of the testimony that has been taken in regard to the camps and a great many complaints. Of course, there have been a great many complaints made that have no foundation; there never was a camp in the world organized wherein complaints were not made; but I want an explanation of them, because I do not think you would permit that state of affairs to exist unless you had good reason for it.

The WITNESS. Of course.

General DODGE. One of the complaints in regard to the sinks, I think, which is the strongest, is that the ground was not absorbent—that it was clay, and that when they endeavored to sink their excreta it forced itself to the top and overflowed and was floating around; do you know anything about that, General?

The WITNESS. I would only say that they did not cover the excreta two or three

times a day daily, as they should have done, and which was enjoined upon them, and which was the principal charge of the officers of the day in each individual camp, of the officer commanding a regiment, brigade, and division. The division commander was the one whom I called to account twice for an omission of that kind. On the First Division line of sinks, which was toward the Lafayette road, there was that difficulty. The first good heavy rain that came filled them up and they overflowed; but General Williston was commanding that division. He observed what was necessary to do and did it. There was no further trouble that ever I heard of or observed, and I was frequently, very frequently, in that neighborhood.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Now, another point is, and that is in regard to the water supply. Gen. George W. Davis testified before this commission that when he selected that place he reported on it—he investigated certain localities, and he said that the question with him was that the supply of water for that camp was to come from Crawfish Springs. There has been a great deal of testimony before us with regard to the trouble the men had to get drinking water, and a great many witnesses have testified that they had to haul in wagons drinking water, during that hot spell of weather that you have testified about, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Now, why was not that water pipe from Crawfish Springs sufficient to supply the necessary wants, and why was it that men were required to haul water for their needs?

A. They hauled it in wagons from that spring because it was the best way to get water down, of course. There was no objection to the hauling of water by wagons until the owner of Crawfish Springs objected to it. I had Colonel Goethals make an expert examination and estimate for putting in the necessary pipe supply for pumping of water from Crawfish Springs, and when those plans and estimates had been completed no less a man than Dr. Senn, of Chicago, raised the question about the condition of that water. When the question of a sufficient water supply was raised, and an effort made to arrange for an additional supply from Crawfish Springs also, the estimate of expenses which would be entailed and the feasibility of it was thoroughly considered by Colonel Goethals and his report was made; before it could be put into operation about 30,000 men were going away from there, and before it could possibly have been finished—had they gone according to programme there would have been left possibly 25,000 men and the supply of water for them—part of the troops left the camp. The Blue Spring water was hauled a mile and over from Alexander Bridge; there was no difficulty in hauling all the water needed in that way—they got what they wanted; they had plenty of mules, wagons, etc., at their disposal, and there was no reason why the Government should be put to the expense of \$25,000 for a temporary plant for what might only be a very temporary use, when the animals were not more than reasonably exercised and the men not overburdened with work in bringing that water there in wagons. These are my reasons, and the fact that Mr. Gordon Lee—I think that was his name—

General DODGE. Yes.

A. [Continuing.] And his brother, one of the Lees, came to me and said that he objected to the further use and trespass on his property at Crawfish Springs, and complained in such a way that I forbade the further use of that spring, being satisfied from the analyses made here in Washington by the Medical Department as to the absolute purity of the water so far as used, and that it was fit for domestic purposes and for drinking purposes.

Q. From Chickamauga Creek?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were the men ever prostrated there who used that water for drinking purposes?

A. Not to my knowledge.

By General DODGE:

Q. If they had used the water through the pipe line, which was established, was there not sufficient water there in that camp to supply the troops without hauling?

A. Certainly.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Was that the Chickamauga Creek water?

A. Certainly.

By General DODGE:

Q. But there were plenty of wells there?

A. Certainly. The wells were actually there, but it must be remembered that limestone water does not quench the thirst as well as sandstone water or a gravel water; and this is true about that whole section of Georgia, as I remember it—it was largely tinctured with lime.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General Brooke, the important point about this camp is the question of sanitation, based upon two distinct grounds—first, as to sinks, their use and lack of use, and next, as to the water supply. The complaint has been made that the men were unaccustomed to the use of sinks and that they defecated promiscuously over the whole camp, and that it became such a nuisance that the camp became uninhabitable. Is that a fact; and what was done to remedy the fact, if it existed?

A. In what part of the camp was this?

Q. That complaint has been very general as to all parts of the camp.

By General DODGE:

Q. More especially when regiments first arrived there?

A. There was a great deal of that, but it had gotten under control largely, with the exception of a few regiments. Of course, you will all understand that it is impossible on a dark night to catch every fellow who hugs to a tree for that purpose, but that received my particular and closest attention in the First Corps as its commander; directly and wherever it was observed it had occurred action was taken, until finally it had practically ceased. There was one regiment which caused a great deal of annoyance in that respect.

Q. Do you recall the name of the regiment?

A. My recollection is that it was a Mississippi regiment. In riding past the camp it was my endeavor to visit the pump house, which I did very frequently, two or three times a week, and there were some places there which were a sort of channel of communication, that is, large numbers of men passed through certain strips of timber during the day, and passing to and from the stations they were compelled to obey the calls of nature, and they did not have time to look around very much probably—that is a possible explanation; but as far as that other point was concerned, it seemed to me to be deliberately done, so far as I could see. The ground, of course, was policed, and as often as these things occurred action was taken in the matter.

By General BEAVER:

Q. I have seen the time when you would probably make a fellow believe if his nose had been rubbed into such things—

A. I have had dirty men in my own regiments right across the river here whom I sent down to the bank of the creek and used considerable sand in policing them. I did not have to have the operation on the same man again; but in these days if you took such an action it would, perhaps, bring you into considerable unpleasant notoriety.

Q. Do you recall the case of the Ninth New York? I think it was there in your

command; it was in the Third Corps. The major of that regiment testified that that regiment was in camp for ten days without a sink of any kind. Have you any recollection or knowledge or was that reported to you in any way?

A. I have no recollection of it. Who was the major?

Q. Major Lorrigan.

A. The major of that regiment reasoned under somewhat peculiar circumstances.

Q. That, of course, might have been. If it had existed, it would have reflected upon Colonel Huidekoper; but I do not know but that it might have been reported in some way to you.

A. It would naturally have gone to the corps commander. I want to say here, gentlemen, it was quite a delicate matter with the corps commander present for the commander of what you might call an army to give a very great deal of personal supervision in that corps. What supervision I did give to that corps was through him.

Q. You occupied, as I understand it, a dual position: first you were in direct command of the First Corps, and were responsible for the details through your division commanders, and then you were in command of the other corps?

A. I was in command of the whole.

Q. You were departmental commander there?

A. Yes, sir. At one time we had three commands. All matters connected with the Third Army Corps were transmitted through the commander of that corps; all matters connected with the First Army Corps were transacted from the general headquarters, through the commander of that corps; all matters connected with the Department of the Gulf were transacted by the Adjutant-General in my name while I commanded it; so that was another distinct, separate command; but the records of the First Army Corps were in the office of the Adjutant-General, I suppose; the records of the Third Army Corps were at their headquarters; the records of the camp generally—Camp George H. Thomas—were in the office of headquarters.

Q. Did you avail yourself of the medical arm of the service in endeavoring to secure good sanitary conditions in the camp?

A. Of course; certainly.

Q. To what extent were the recommendations of the medical staff in regard to camp sanitation, in regard to the removal of camps that were considered unhealthy, in regard to the striking of the tents and the airing of the ground, and all that kind of thing, complied with?

A. I have no recollection of any recommendations being made in regard to those points by any medical officer of my staff.

Q. Have you any recollection of Colonel Hartsuff calling attention to a brigade which he recommended should be removed to a point on Lookout Mountain?

A. Not the slightest.

Q. Did he not advise that the whole camp be moved?

A. Well, he instanced a special brigade.

Q. Did he at any time recommend the removal of the entire camp?

A. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Q. Have you any recollection of his requesting, either in an official communication or in your daily talks on the subject, the removal of the camps out of the limits of the park, from one location to another?

A. No.

Q. Have you any recollection of his recommending, officially or otherwise, the striking of the tents?

A. No.

Q. How long whilst you were there did the troops remain in one camp without any removal at all?

A. All the time.

Q. All the time, except one regiment which you mentioned?

A. That is the only regiment which changed its camp, except those regiments which went off from the ground.

Q. What, General, in your judgment, is the limit of time that troops should occupy camp ground with tents under ordinary circumstances, without either an airing of the ground or a removal of it, so as to give them fresh ground to camp on?

A. I will divide that into two. The airing of the ground, that is, the raising of the tents or the striking of them temporarily, giving an opportunity to reach the ground of the tents, should be done at least once a week, weather permitting. The fact is that every tent that I observed throughout the camp when it had a wall had that wall raised daily, and I was particularly careful to observe those things. I observed them without trouble; my hand is trained to those things, those little matters of sanitation never escaped my eye. If a thing is not done I see it very quickly. As a rule, every day those tents were aired in that way; every day the blankets of the men were aired over the tops of the tents and were hung there as a rule. I have seen them so much that while I could not say that every blanket was treated in that way I think they were.

Q. The removal of the camp from one locality to the other, what, General, in your judgment, is the limit of time which troops should occupy a given camp?

A. That depends upon circumstances; it would be hard to say. If the ground is well dried, kept in good policing condition, there is difficulty in determining the time limit when the camp should be changed; circumstances would determine that.

Q. Did the rainy season commence at Chickamauga before you left there?

A. It did; we had some very heavy showers and some heavy rains.

Q. Was the general location of the camps in Chickamauga Park suitable, in your judgment, for any weather?

A. No; not all of them. Those which have been located on stony ground were more adapted, as a rule, to rainy weather than some of the others; tent pins could be driven without trouble; but in a rainy season many of those camps in Chickamauga Park would not have been good sites.

Q. That is, because tents would not have dried out during the day?

A. No; but because the ground would not dry out. When I first went there, on the 25th of April, that received my attention in selecting camps for the regular troops. In riding through the camps at that time the horses went in over their fetlocks. Before the regular troops left the cavalry used the timber grounds for drill purposes, and they exercised their horses in it as much as possible; and the infantry did the same, for the reason that they were going probably into a country which was covered with a growth of various kinds of timber.

Q. Some persons have given as a reason why the open ground was not occupied that it was reserved for drill grounds, and it occurred to some of us that possibly the woods were the best drill grounds they could have had in view of what was expected of them. Was that the reason, in your judgment, or was it better fitted for green troops?

A. I think the drill ground did not enter into the matter at all--there was plenty of ground. You recollect there were about 6,000 acres; and if you have been there you would see that there was no congestion in the camps.

Q. What was the size, General, of the water pipe there which this camp was supplied with?

A. Do you mean the main pipe?

Q. Yes.

A. Eight inches, from the pump to the tank.

Q. What was the size of the tank?

A. That I don't remember; my recollection is, 35 feet in height.

By General DODGE:

Q. Then you had direct pressure on the pipe?

A. We could put it on, of course; and until the camp was completed we used the direct pressure entirely.

By General BEAVER:

Q. An 8-inch pipe. Is that of sufficient capacity for supplying a city of 60,000 people?

A. It depends upon the pressure you apply.

Q. With the pressure that you had there could you force water through an 8-inch pipe sufficient to supply a city of 60,000 men?

A. With the aid of the wells we did it, and also supplied sufficient for the animals.

Q. Of course a city includes animals, and your camp would include animals; that is, you did it by hauling water from outside for drinking purposes?

A. Yes, sir; with the wells.

Q. Had any of the wells, General, been condemned by the medical department prior to your leaving the department?

A. By alleged medical departments? Two of them were erroneous, I believe, after examination into it myself. The one in front of the South Carolina regiment, which, I believe, really to have been perfectly pure water. There was afterwards discovered a surface well which had been walled up, and water slipped in from which this regiment—this is reported to me—used the water. That well was not far from a large sink, and possibly on lower ground. I never could understand from my knowledge of rocky strata how that well could have been contaminated. Another well lying on the road between the Alexander House and Jay's Mill was also condemned. I drank of that well water every time I passed it until somebody broke the pump to pieces. I suppose it was some of our energetic medical fraternity, who had spent their time in finding that there was a suspicion of these two wells—and then I did not bother further about it.

Q. Were these wells condemned and ordered discontinued from your headquarters, or was it done in some irregular way of which you had no knowledge?

A. In an irregular way: a report never came to me except by rumor, and in my inspection I, of course, observed that the pump handle was broken and the well was disabled, and I naturally inquired at once into the reason of this, and then through Mr. Betts, engineer, I think, I learned this suspicion as to the purity of the water: the handle was first repaired before I knew about this suspicion of the water. I examined the break and was satisfied that there was a defect in the metal. While on the road across to Jay's Mill from the Alexander House, the well situated there was also reported to me as being condemned by some surgeon. I let that go; I did not bother about it further.

Q. At the time at which you left had the increase or the spread of typhoid fever created any great alarm?

A. No; not to my knowledge. At the time I left, as I said, I think the number of typhoid cases in the entire camp were 92.

Q. Had they been separated from the division hospitals—had there been a creation of any general hospitals at that time?

A. Except the Leiter; no. There had been one railroad train there to carry sick men to Fort Thomas, near Cincinnati, which was used as a general hospital. Now, the number that went on that train I do not recall; I did know it—I don't remember, and the kind of cases I don't recollect, but there were sick men, a number of men, sent to the Leiter Hospital.

Q. That hospital; had it been completed before you left?

A. Yes.

Q. Ready for occupancy?

A. Yes; it was being used. Dr. Carter, I think, was in charge of it.

Q. I have before me, General, a report of James Parker, major of the Twelfth New York Volunteers, inspector of sanitation, dated at Camp Thomas, August 19, 1898—that was after you left, but the report deals with the previous condition of affairs there. I will read that to you so that you can say what you please in regard to it:

“When the volunteer troops arrived here in May they were inexperienced in the details of camping. Moreover, they were poorly supplied with tools and materials of all kinds. It is absolutely necessary in this climate that latrines be dug deep and boxed and roofed in. Many regiments had no picks or even shovels. They had no lumber, and in consequence of these obstacles insufficient latrines were dug. The men relieved nature all through the woods, and the ground around the camp became contaminated. The rains quickly filled the shallow latrines, and their contents ran over the surface of the ground. This made it necessary to dig new latrines, which, in turn, had to be abandoned. I know of one camp which has over 200 old latrines on its outskirts. The holes for garbage near kitchens became filled with water in the same manner. All these places—shallow trenches, with the same covering of soil—are now emitting poisonous gases from the decomposing material beneath. The camps have been changed to new sites, only to extend foulness and infection. The whole park reeks with it. It is estimated that 8,000 tons of excrement, garbage, manure, and sweepings now infect it. The troops now have better methods of treating their offal and garbage. The latrines are properly closed, the garbage in some instances is burned, the manure and refuse burned if possible. The troops are now camping in the open drill fields, where they get plenty of sun and air. Every precaution is being taken, but it is too late. The mischief has been done. The park as a camping place is incurably infected. Every breeze carries a stench. The sick report mounts day by day. A general lassitude is apparent in men and officers. The months in which typhoid fever and malaria are most common are at hand. The cases of typhoid fever have reached 500, and the whole situation presages a general epidemic. Under the circumstances detailed above no remedy exists except a general departure of the troops from this place.”

Was any such condition as that apparent or imminent or foreseeable at the time you left the camp?

A. If you will give me a copy of that report, I will see that that young man goes before a court-martial for the sort of statements he has made there, if he is not protected by this commission.

By General DODGE:

Q. This communication is not made to us; it is a report made to the Adjutant-General.

A. Of what?

Q. As inspector of sanitation.

A. Of what?

Q. This is addressed to the adjutant-general at Camp Thomas. It is dated August 19, and then it is indorsed August 31, 1898: “Headquarters Camp George H. Thomas, Ga. August 31, 1898. Respectfully referred to the Inspector-General of the Army. Many details have received attention as the inspection proceeded, but as all this command is now ordered to new stations, it may be too late, for the usual remedial action upon, etc., probably contain information directly related to and supplementing the data secured during a similar inspection of the command last May, and this may be aided by Major Parker. Perhaps the most notable features are how much the military instruction and efficiency have improved and how greatly the sickness has increased, though with comparatively small percentage of deaths.” Signed “J. C. Breckinridge, Major-General.” This was not testi-

mony before this commission; and if it had been, we are of course bound to protect our witnesses. The President has directed that all such witnesses before this commission shall be protected.

A. Well, Mr. President, I shall call the attention of the Secretary of War to that report, with the request that he be made to substantiate that statement.

General DODGE. This is, of course, on record at the War Office, and comes direct to us from the War Office.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Do you state, General, that that condition of affairs did not exist?

A. It did not exist when I was there. There was nothing existing at that time to show that such a condition of things did exist, to my recollection.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Well, I understand you to say also that up to the time you left there there were no conditions that could have produced such a situation as that which he outlines in this report?

A. None whatever.

Q. General, do you recall the case of a brigade surgeon named Maj. J. C. Martin?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did Colonel Hartsuff leave camp before you did?

A. A few days after.

Q. Did General Sheridan go with you?

A. He went with me.

Q. Did you hear of a conversation between Major Martin and General Boynton in regard to the prevalence of typhoid fever, which was reported to Colonel Hartsuff, who in turn summoned Surgeon-Major Martin before him and directed that he either retract the statement that he had made, make good the allegation which was contained in it, or undergo a court-martial; was that called to your attention?

A. I heard nothing of that until long afterwards, and then merely in a conversational way. At least I have no recollection of the matter at all. I think I would have, had the matter occurred.

Q. Dr. Conner wishes me to ask you this—it is not a fact; it is simply to get your opinion—that is, that if Dr. Martin had made that statement and subsequent events justified it, was that sufficient in your judgment to have threatened him with a court-martial?

A. That would depend upon the whole conditions, of which I could not give an opinion until I was familiar with the whole subject.

Q. It is fair to say that, as far as Colonel Hartsuff is concerned, it was stated to him that Dr. Martin was circulating this generally about the unsanitary condition of things there, and I have no doubt that that may have materially influenced him in what he said in regard to it. Have you any recollection of the communication addressed by A. Hartsuff, deputy surgeon-general of the United States Army and chief surgeon of Camp George H. Thomas, to the adjutant-general, in which he says: "I have just made a partial inspection of the Second Division, Third Corps, and find the sanitary conditions in many respects bad, especially is that the case in the First Mississippi and First and Second Arkansas. The camps of the regiments named are thoroughly unsanitary. There are large numbers of typhoid fever cases in each regiment. I recommend an immediate change of camp."

A. Is there any indorsement on it?

Q. No, sir; not in the copy that we have.

A. If that is an authentic paper, it would undoubtedly refer to General Wade.

By General DODGE:

Q. That is the paper that Colonel Hartsuff refers to in his testimony.

A. You will find disposition made of that in the records at headquarters. A

matter of that kind would have been referred to General Wade, if the conditions were such.

Q. Upon examination, as is indicated in this letter, very summary action would have been taken. I think.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Now, General, for information, I want to ask, supposing that the doctor referred that to General Wade, it went to your headquarters and your adjutant-general referred it to General Wade, and then he would have looked into the matter, and if necessary for anything to have been done he would have done what was necessary?

A. Of course.

Q. On the 17th of July Colonel Hartsuff addressed a letter to the adjutant-general, as follows:

"CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS,

"OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,

"Chickamauga Park, Ga., July 17, 1898.

"THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Camp George H. Thomas.*

"SIR: I have the honor to make sanitary recommendations as follows:

"First. That the Signal Corps be moved to another camp ground. They have occupied the present camp ground several months, and, owing to the recent large increases of the company, they are now too much crowded. Their large corral is too close to their camp and to headquarters. It is difficult to keep their camp grounds and corral clean, and they are not kept clean.

"Second. That a number of sites—as few as possible—be selected and conveniently located for dumping grounds for this whole park; that all the dumping grounds be remote from wells, springs, and creeks, and on high, open ground, from which there can be no contamination to water supply, and where the materials can be destroyed by fire as much as possible. It would be well to have the limits of the dumping grounds well defined and the area reduced as much as possible, not only because it would be less of a nuisance in a small area, but if this park is to be occupied as a camp ground a long time, as much clean, unpolluted territory as possible should be preserved. At present the grounds are rapidly being covered by garbage, each regiment having its own dumping grounds.

"Third. That, so far as possible, all the regiments of this command change camp. Many of the regiments have been in camp two months or more without a change, and the camp has become more or less saturated. I think a change will be largely beneficial to health of each regiment; and especially would that be the case if in connection with the change each regiment or brigade should leave the camp and make easy marches for a few days and return into a new, clean camp.

"Fourth. That if the First Division, First Corps, is to remain in camp here for more than a few days, then the division hospital of that division should be moved on to better ground. The hospital named has been on the ground where it is two months or more. The ground is low and flat, with little, if any, natural drainage, and is now especially objectionable because of its long occupancy. There are beautiful locations for a hospital on Snodgrass Hill, which I have personally inspected, and General Boynton says he will be glad to bore wells there for the hospital as soon as it is determined to locate one there.

"Fifth. The sanitary condition of Lytle is a menace to the health of the troops of this park, and a nuisance in every particular. It should be thoroughly cleaned and kept properly policed; or, so far as possible, none of the forces of this command other than those authorized should be permitted to go into the town for any purpose whatever.

"Sixth. That all wells, springs, water holes, etc., that have been condemned, or that are at all suspicious, should be filled up or destroyed, as far as possible, so that drinking water can not be obtained from them.

"Seventh. That the attention of division, brigade, and regimental commanders be especially directed to the great importance of using the filters recently issued by the Quartermaster's Department, and that no water not filtered through those filters, or boiled, should be used for drinking purposes. A strict observance of the directions recommended here as to the use of drinking water would surely drive typhoid fever and some other diseases from this camp and command.

"Eighth. That all hucksters, peddlers of food and drink, other than those authorized to sell eggs and pure milk, be entirely kept out of this command and away from this park. A great many hucksters are on these park grounds daily, and each day they sell all kinds of foods and drinks. Melons and poor fruit in large quantities are daily sold here.

"Ninth. That there should be a very careful general supervision of all the cantons in this park; that all food dangerous under any circumstances to the health of the command be excluded, and that drinks in quality and quantity be regulated.

"An observance of the above recommendations will, I am sure, materially reduce the sick and death list of this command and keep the men in ranks, and thus very substantially promote the efficiency of the command.

"Very respectfully,

"A. HARTSUFF,

"Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon.

"A true copy."

Q. Was that communication called to your attention?

A. No, sir; that communication was, from the date of it, written on July 17, while I was here in Washington and General Wade was in command; but I have no doubt it received the attention it merited.

Q. At the time this communication was written you were not in the camp: and how long did you remain here in Washington?

A. Until, I think, about the 20th or 21st.

Q. And you left Camp Thomas on what date?

A. On the morning of the 23d.

Q. So that after the date of that communication you were in Camp Thomas about two days?

A. The fact is there are a good many things like that that are open to controversy; people make statements there about the allowances, etc., and all sort of stuff in a camp, that is not true, absolutely untrue; the camp was under a very strict supervision, with a very excellent provost guard of regular troops led by regular officers, who were responsible to me.

Q. And that supervision had been instituted at what time?

A. Oh, early; about the beginning of June. The huckster business was taken in hand just as soon as I was satisfied that the men began to know how to take care of themselves. I did not care to cut off the supplies of pies, cakes, and things of that kind until they began to know how to handle their ovens and knew how to cook. I instituted a very rigid course in regard to the upsetting of this sort of thing, and followed it out as I have stated in my general remarks. I kept there two regular organizations, one troop of cavalry and one of infantry, which were given particularly in charge of those sort of matters—provost guard—and there was no departure in any instance. Every week, and I may say daily, every huckster's wagon was scrutinized, and every infraction of their permit was met with the revocation of it. That thing continued all the time that I was in command of that camp, to my knowledge. The reports came to me; and if I was absent from headquarters, they came to General Sheridan every evening. The matter of Lytle had received my attention. It was not on the reservation at all, nor under its control. Whenever it got to be annoying—it was annoying all the time—I put my guards there and would not let the men go in. That was pretty generally

understood. In the town of Chattanooga there was a great deal of loose work being done in the way of inducing men to drink heavily, and I found it necessary at one time to send provost guard to that city and bring up a very large number of soldiers, who came out in a very dilapidated condition from resistance to the guard and from the effect of their potations. After that there was but two men in a company permitted to go on pass on any day. I received a very great deal of petitioning from the people of the town to revoke that order; I did not; the effect was very good on general discipline. I had formerly permitted absences of the troops to be regulated by division, brigade commanders, and, of course, commanders of corps, where it was in a separate command, but I found it was being abused and I remedied it in that way, and it continued some time later; after I left there those orders were in operation. I think the commission could ascertain more from those who personally are cognizant of the facts.

Q. Your order limiting the passes to two was revoked and increased to six?

A. I think so; and as to the sale of injurious edibles, which I considered injurious, Colonel Hartsuff's remark there is *ex post facto*. I did not regard his letter in a very serious sense [referring to letter]. I do not know how he came to write it. There was much complaint in that camp from men of his own profession as to his action. He caused me more trouble and annoyance than anyone ever did. When I left that camp, with the advance of my corps, with the expectation at the time that the corps would follow me under the orders under which I was operating, my chief surgeon, Huidekoper, came to me with a list and said, "General, I can not get these things. We are going out of the country. We have drawn up to the full extent of the supply table, which was Colonel Hartsuff's apparent limit of issue, and I do not know what to do—Colonel Hartsuff won't approve of this." I said to him, "Have you got on this all that you want?" He said, "Yes; I think so." I said, "Look it over and be sure of it; and if it is not there, put it on. Are the supplies here?" He replied, "Yes; they are here." He went away and brought back a revised list. I did not examine the items. I said, "Is this what you want?" and he answered, "Yes; this is what I want." I said, "Do you know this?" He answered, "Yes." Then I said, "You shall have it, sir; take that to Colonel Hartsuff and make the statement which you have made to me; and if you don't get it, bring this back to me." He went to Colonel Hartsuff, came back, and made the remark that it was in excess of the allowance (I think the term "of the supply table" was used), and I then took the paper and wrote in my own hand, "Approved; issue;" signed my own name and rank. In all cases where there was a difference between Colonel Hartsuff and the officers of that department, which was brought to my attention, I compelled the issue of what was proper.

Q. That is all that is proper from your standpoint?

A. From the standpoint of the officer who satisfied me that he was not unreasonable in his demands. I have heard since that I had been criticised upon taking hold of that sort of thing before. In every instance, gentlemen, when the thing was brought to my attention I have not failed to exercise my prerogative, when it was necessary to do so.

Q. That is, that the commander in the field commands—that the several departments are responsible to him and he had control over them?

A. Yes, sir; and further than that, when we got to Porto Rico, and where we found conditions there were appalling as regards health, when our men were going down by hundreds under climatic effects—I had taken my corps ambulance train and hospital department along there with me, so that the five thousand some hundred men that were directly with me could be taken care of, and they were taken care of—and yet, to think when opening original packages of hospital tent supplies the canvas was found to be rotten—original packages that had never been opened since purchase: you could take the canvas and tear it as you would a

piece of paper. All that was done, and I was taking with me 10,000 hospital tents and a good many tents as a sort of reserve supply to have them on hand if necessity should arise. I never was under canvas there myself at all. It was not necessary, and it was used by the troops in the hospitals there. Had it not been for those extra supplies of tents there would have been much suffering.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was that what was called the reserve hospital at Camp Thomas?

A. It was the reserve hospital of the First Army Corps. If it had not been for these supplies of mine and for other things which were taken down they would have been in very desperate straits.

Q. In how many instances, General, as you recall, were you called upon by the medical officers inferior in grade to Colonel Hartsuff to interfere?

A. Only in one or two, if I recollect.

Q. That is, one or two in addition to the one you mentioned?

A. In each instance where it was not apparent to me that there was no particular necessity for action I would send for Colonel Hartsuff, and in every case he assured me that they did not need the supplies of medicines, and I would give him directions on the general principle that it was better to issue these supplies to these people than to make a mistake the other way.

Q. Yes.

A. And I have reason to think that that was done in regard to this location, which he speaks of there in the First Division hospital. He located it himself, and I criticised it when I first saw it very sharply, and suggested that there was room right behind us; there were ample facilities there and it was not too far away. I do not know how much of these things he said, but the location was either his or the officer he put in charge of it, or both. I finally directed him personally to go there and take charge of that hospital and untangle the difficulties he seemed to have gotten in.

Q. Colonel Hartsuff has told us that he did take charge of that hospital; was that by your direction?

A. By my personal orders.

Q. General Brooke, did you have a sufficient and efficient staff at Chickamauga?

A. I don't think so.

Q. You spoke some time ago of the staff officers of the supply department being trammelled to some extent by the centralization which had been occurring up in the staff departments for a long time. What special departments did you include in the supply departments?

A. It was the Quartermaster's, the Commissary, the Ordnance particularly.

Q. And the Medical?

A. The Medical to a certain extent. There has always been a great deal of latitude permitted by the Medical Department, by the chief of it. The Engineer Department has had great latitude, so far as my knowledge of it goes—it has been very slight—my personal knowledge—of late years. They have had two or three officers to devote much attention to strictly military matters.

Q. So that your remark applied particularly to Subsistence, Quartermaster's—

A. To the supply department.

Q. In the Medical Department, you had on your staff Lieutenant-Colonel Huidekoper, of Pennsylvania, whose administration of it has been the subject of a very large amount of adverse criticism, both as to his professional knowledge and as to his administrative capacity and as to the manner in which he actually administered the affairs of his department. Will you give us what your estimate of him as a staff officer is, professionally and otherwise?

A. When he left me I regarded him as one of the best examples of our volunteer service. When he first came to me he was ignorant of the methods in vogue, and

he was like all men suddenly confronted with the occult condition to them. He was very much hampered by it. It is well known that the system of army accounts is peculiar to itself. There is nothing like it in the business world that I know of, in the manner of keeping its records and accounts. All that was new, particularly to the medical officers of the volunteer service, and it was a great struggle to them all; but he finally accomplished it and became a very efficient, able administrator of his department.

Q. Had you opportunities of forming an opinion of his professional qualifications?

A. Not much; not more than his application of his professional knowledge to his duty. In that I could form an opinion, so far as it was worth anything.

Q. Well, what was that opinion?

A. A very high opinion; a man of very broad education. That is the opinion I arrived at after knowing him more thoroughly and seeing him at work in his department.

Q. To what do you attribute, then, the widespread feeling against him?

A. There are several causes, I should think; I can only give my opinion of them. They may all be wrong. First, he was energetic in carrying out what was to the volunteer service a very unpopular effort on the part of the Medical Department of the Army to organize in a certain way which was, I believe, correct and necessary and proper, but defective in that it took from the regiments—and these regiments were over 1,300 strong—the medical officers which should have been with them, and their assistants. It is well known to everyone who has served in the Army in campaigns that there are, possibly, amongst 1,300 men possibly 200 of them who would be ailing in some minor way daily, who need assistance; it would require a very careful rapid service of the three surgeons allowed to a regiment to attend to the sick call of that regiment. It is doubtful whether they would be sufficient to carry it through.

Q. That is, within the time allowed for it?

A. Within the time, or in the whole day, in fact, to do it justice. That was the defect. It was apparent to me at the outset, but there was nothing to do but to carry it out. Huidekoper carried it out successfully so far as he could. The Surgeon-General himself told me that he had asked Congress for officers to complete the hospital arrangement without disturbing, as I understood him, those pertaining to regiments, and it had not been granted. He had not been able at that time, as I further understood him, to employ physicians, contract surgeons, as we call them, who came into the service finally in great numbers. That is the system the carrying out of which caused a great deal of unpleasant feeling on the part of men who did not seem to have broad views, and Huidekoper had no time to sit down and convince people that they were wrong and he was right. It is a most difficult thing anyhow.

Q. That he was not responsible for the orders, but simply carried out what was imposed upon him. Well, that is one reason?

A. That is the only one I know.

Q. He is rather a brusque man?

A. Decidedly. He is a big man, strong man physically. Naturally you would look for him—he would call a spade a spade.

Q. Do you think his manners had anything to do with the feeling against him?

A. That I do not know. I have seen other men more brusque, more brutal (not to say that he was brutal) in their manners than he, but they did not have his physique and probably did not carry so much weight with it.

Q. There is a specific allegation, General, contained in a communication addressed to us by a citizen of Illinois, who says in his communication that he had a son in the Third Illinois Regiment (I think it is the name of M. T. Maloney), who speaks not of personal knowledge, but of what some man in the hospital told him, and

that was that Colonel Huidekoper was of intemperate habits. Do you know of his having been under the influence of liquor when on duty or when he ought to have been on duty?

A. No. I don't believe that story. Huidekoper is a gentleman. He is a man of the highest sense of duty. I never saw him—and I have seen him at all hours, day and night—when he showed any evidence of influence of liquor.

Q. Do you know Mr. Maloney?

A. I have seen him.

Q. Did he bring to your personal attention anything relating to the affairs of the hospital or as to the manner in which the men were buried at Porto Rico?

A. Yes; in one instance.

Q. What was that?

A. The burial of a man of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment after the regiment left. The man died, as I understood, of typhoid fever. He was very much excited about it. He and the chaplain of the Third Illinois attempted to manage the funeral. There was some hitch. The proper orders were given from my headquarters by my adjutant-general, the man being in the general hospital. A detail as an escort and all the other arrangements were made for the funeral at a certain hour. An investigation of that was had afterwards on this complaint, and it was shown, as I remember, that the chaplain was more to blame; that he had promised the chaplain of the Fourth Pennsylvania to bury the dead of that regiment, and he supposed he was responsible; but between them, in some way, they took the body off in the ambulance to the cemetery and buried it. How it ever happened has not been entirely clear to me. Mr. Maloney made it an opportunity to make a great fuss, for which I consider that he and the chaplain were to blame; the exact proportion of blame resting on either was a difficult matter to decide upon. It was one of those cases which you often find—you have met chaplains who have peculiar ideas as to their authoritative functions, etc., as well as the politician who was down there trying to get votes of the Third Illinois. His son was in that regiment, and he came to me and wanted a furlough for him. I supposed he wanted him to go home. I gave him a furlough of sixty days. I don't know that he ever took advantage of it; probably not. I think it would have been well if I had invited Mr. Maloney to go home, or at least leave the limits of my command. He was not a pleasant factor in discipline at all, for such reasons as I have been stating.

Q. He sends a very long communication here, covering 14 pages, the most of it relating to "Dr. Huidekoper," as he calls him. I will not trouble you with that, because the most of it I know you would not know anything about. I simply refer to the few things in which he brings you into relation with the man; but here is a statement of his which is perhaps worthy of some attention. Speaking of the supply of food, he says: "The provisions furnished the soldier, if good, was fairly plentiful, but they were all bad, or mostly bad. Out of ten days' rations of potatoes, not sufficient for two days could be found, and then canned tomatoes were furnished to make up the deficiency. The tomatoes were bad, swelled. I have driven a bayonet into many of these cans, and when withdrawn the inside would squirt ten feet into the air. They were made eatable by the mixture of large doses of soda. Two hundred thousand pounds of fresh beef purchased of Swift & Co., of Chicago, was on the *Massachusetts*, above referred to. Three hundred thousand pounds from the same company was conveyed to Porto Rico on the *Manitoba*, all of which, or nearly all, was tainted, unfit for use, and destroyed after it arrived at Porto Rico. There are more cattle in Porto Rico to the square mile than in any State in this Union. To carry fresh meat from Chicago to Porto Rico was much worse than carrying coals to Newcastle. I have traveled to the west of the island, and the center of it, and all along the point of which I am now speaking, and I know whereof

I speak. The most easily procurable thing on the island, and at the least possible cost, was fresh meat. A few ice machines could be readily transported to that island, and would only occupy a little space in the doing. There was plenty of fuel to operate such machines, to procure ice therefrom, to cool meat when killed on the island. Our Government knew these facts or it didn't. If it did know, it was terrible; if it did not, it was equally so. Thirty-eight per cent of the Ohio regiment were sick, over 30 per cent of the Third Illinois were sick, and all, or mostly all, can be charged to the improper treatment of those soldiers, both in transportation and the food which was received after landing upon the island." We have had an explanation as to the meat business from the Commissary-General, who said it was, in his judgment, improper to kill and use that meat on the island, because it could not be furnished to the men without the animal heat without artificial cooling, and he was putting up an ice plant now with reference to that, but the supply for a time was best made, as he believed, from great establishments here in refrigerator compartments on the vessel; but as to the general food, had you knowledge of the food supplied to the men at Porto Rico?

A. Intimate knowledge.

Q. What is your knowledge in regard to that? Was the food good or bad?

A. Excellent. He is wrong about the amount. There were 150,000 pounds on the *Massachusetts* only. All that we used in that command that was immediately with me, a little over 5,000 men. I think about 100,000 pounds before the ship got out of our reach. Wherever there was a deficiency of fresh vegetables, potatoes, and onions we bought them right there. As to the matter of beef supply, there are plenty of cattle—fine ones—on that island; but you, as a general, or you, General Dodge [turning to General Dodge], would not leave this food item in the hands of an invading army. You would drive it away, and you would destroy all their food supplies. No; the Commissary Department was right.

Q. The Commissary-General stated also that under his contract with Swift & Co. they were not only compelled to land the food there in good condition, but they guaranteed its being sweet and pure for seventy-two hours after being landed, if properly handled—that is, covered with canvas and kept in the shade. Is that a fact or not?

A. I never tried that.

Q. Do you know as to whether or not that is the contract?

A. I do not know positively.

Q. What I was going to say, if there was any destroyed, it was, of course, at the expense of the meat company and did not cost the Government anything?

A. It was elegant meat. There is no question about it. It was landed in splendid condition, and we hauled it 5 miles.

Q. Did you use it in your command?

A. Oh, yes. I used the other, too.

Q. Which?

A. The tomatoes.

Q. Do you know what efforts are being made there now to take advantage of the cattle on the island?

A. No, not particularly. We are using the native beef, much the same as the natives do—the people of the island. There is or was landed from the steamer *Berlin* on her last trip a refrigerator plant of Swift & Co., at San Juan, being erected near the Government storehouse. It was not finished when I came away. Whether it was designed to bring American beef there or not I do not know, but I do know that the cattle on the island there are very fine ones; in fact, it is the supplying point for all the adjacent islands, way down on the Windward Island. They are fine cattle and well bred. Those killed about in the towns are generally, so far as I could observe, worked cattle. All the bulls are worked as bulls in the

yoke, in the Spanish yoke, lashed to the horns and the yoke lashed to the pole of the cart. So far as I know, I don't think any but that class of cattle were killed in the abattoir, but I have seen them on these big plantations where they were very fine cattle, very fine.

Q. What was the bread supply of the army in Porto Rico; was it confined to hard bread or were bakeries erected?

A. At this place, Guayama, we had a portable oven—quite a number of them—and we had bakers hired from the Subsistence Department, and they made bread, and it was good bread; but the natives made better bread than that, so arrangements were made to turn the flour over to the native baker and receive its equivalent in bread, which was as good as any of the bread you eat here.

Q. As to the vegetables, you say they were purchased in the neighborhood?

A. The Commissary Department sends down to the islands, both of them—Cuba and Porto Rico—in shipments every week ten days' supply, expecting to last at least three days, possibly, over, and they often do, and onions and potatoes.

Q. From your personal knowledge, then, was the food furnished to your command sufficient in quantity and good in quality?

A. Excellent.

Q. Were you personally familiar with the conduct of the hospital, both at Chickamauga Park and in Porto Rico; and if so, to what extent?

A. To the extent that a commander would naturally be visiting them, not going in amongst them to disturb them very much. Now and then I would walk through the wards. This was particularly the case in the hospitals in that part of Chickamauga camp which was under my immediate command. You will understand, I felt a delicacy in interfering with the Third Corps, for its commander was there—an able man, conversant with his duties in all ways, and, as a general, saw things right there; and when I saw things to criticise, I didn't care to criticise them, but in my own corps I saw the hospitals. The hospital of the Third Division was established on a point where you see there the South Carolina Regiment and the Ninth Pennsylvania Regiment, off through the course of that knoll there; it was a good locality [pointing to chart in room]. It was an ideal hospital in its construction, and the one in the Second Division was in the vicinity of right west from the headquarters of the division where the division headquarters are. It was a very fine one. The only one I ever criticised was the First Division hospital, which was, as I understood it, placed by Colonel Hartsuff or through his instrumentality.

Q. What did you observe as to the administration of these several hospitals, particularly those in your corps, and what, if anything, was done to remedy any defects that you may have observed in their administration?

A. Up to the time I left there there was no defect in the Second and Third Divisions that I ever heard of. There was some trouble in the First Division, a matter of administration, and I sent Colonel Hartsuff there. I directed him to go over and straighten it out and stay there until it was straightened out, and sent Major Mason, corps medical inspector, with him. I asked him frequently afterwards how he was getting on, and he said he was progressing. What progress he was really making I do not know. It is a matter which requires technical administrative knowledge of the department.

Q. And believing you had a capable staff officer, you left it to him?

A. He was a lieutenant-colonel in the Regular Army and had great experience in the hospital during the war. Naturally I expected him to devote time and attention to correcting evils wherever they might occur.

Q. In this instance was the evil remedied as reported to you?

A. He reported it remedied.

Q. Now, as to Porto Rico, General, what was the character and extent of the

there, and to what extent were you able to give proper attention to the

A. Me, individually?

C. No; in your command.

A. At one time, with 12,000 men, the sick list amounted to 2,500 men. That included, of course, a certain number of sick men left over from those regiments that had been withdrawn. Altogether there were between 17,000 and 18,000 men on the island, as near as I can remember. This sick list was diminished by transferring to the United States in the hospital ships and convalescent ships all those men. When I left there, on the 5th of December, the sick list throughout the island was down quite low. The exact number I could not state, but I should think it was about 200 or 250.

Q. What provision had you on that island for the care of the sick?

A. The field hospital.

Q. With what capacity, do you know?

A. At Guayama the capacity of that hospital was about 250, I think. That at Ponce was a very large one. I think they must have had 600 or 700 there. That at Coamo, where Ernst's brigade was, must have had in hospital and in tents about 700 men. That is in the mountains. All this was largely climatic disease engendered during the operations there—exposure to the elements, the rains, and the heat of the sun afterwards brought on this malarial fever. In the hospital at Mayaguez, in the western part of the island, there was a large number—I don't recall the number—but it was climatic, that sickness. Men perfectly well to-day would succumb during the night and would be sick in the morning—sort of collapse. It troubled me a great deal, naturally. It was at a time, too, when we did not want any people about. They seemed to lose their heads as our friend, your correspondent there, did.

Q. General, at Chickamauga it has been alleged very frequently that the sickness was caused to a large extent by the overwork of the men; that reveille was at 4.30 in the morning; that they were compelled to drill on empty stomachs; that they drilled in the heat of the day, and altogether the men were overworked, and that that was in a great measure the cause of much sickness. What is your observation and knowledge and your conclusion as to that?

A. I heard every reveille when present in the camp. I was up at reveille always as far as my knowledge goes. I don't recall a single reveille at half past 4 in the morning. If it was, it was contrary to orders. The hours for those calls was fixed by my order, and you can get that in the War Department and you can see how it was. If I heard a call too early somebody would have to account for that. There were three general calls: one at reveille, one at retreat, and the tattoo.

Q. That is, from your headquarters?

A. No; that is fixed by orders. It is in each division, brigade, and regiment. That was instructed. The drill was from 7.30 in the morning to 9 or 9.30—I forgot exactly, but I think it started at 7.30. In the evenings it commenced at 3. Oftentimes they got very much interested in the drills and they would prolong those hours; but this thing of going to drill on empty stomachs is a new thing to me. I never heard of that at that time.

Q. Had you any knowledge of camp regulations that compelled the men to rise as early as 4.30 o'clock?

A. No.

Q. An order was displayed—I don't remember whether it was a regimental, brigade, or division—in which they did begin at half past 4.

Colonel DENBY. And it was changed to 5.30.

General BEAVER. I don't remember what the order was. I don't think it was from your headquarters. It went too much into details.

Governor WOODBURY. I think Colonel Hartsuff said, in answer to a question some one asked him as to the cause of sickness, that the drilling before breakfast was one of the causes.

The WITNESS. If there was anything of that kind done it was unauthorized, and it did not reach me. I doubt very much whether there was anything of the kind.

Q. I asked you in general as to Dr. Huidekoper's habits. Governor Woodbury thinks I ought to read you a portion of Mr. Maloney's communication. He speaks of the hospital: "At this time the ordinary food for those sick boys was boiled onions and fat pork. There was no milk, no eggs, no bread to be had from the Government. Captain Odell and myself had to furnish for that hospital from that time forth, and out of our own pocket, the milk and the eggs, up until about the 5th of September; and bread during the greater part of the time and up until the governmental bakery was opened at Guayama. The doctors told the chaplain that the boiled onions and fat pork that was being furnished to those boys in that reserve hospital, who were sick with typhoid fever and other diseases, was simply poison. During all this time Colonel Huidekoper, General Brooke, or General Hayes never gave the faintest suspicion that we were doing this, and they all knew it. They never attempted to direct that these things be furnished by the United States Government. It was so common that even a deaf man might have heard that Colonel Huidekoper, during his time in Porto Rico, was nothing but a common drunkard. Two boys at the hospital told me that at Arroyo the night after they landed they stole from Colonel Huidekoper two quarts of whisky; that Huidekoper, about 11 o'clock at night, instead of going to his headquarters, laid down under his wagon, and four times before he went to sleep drank out of a quart bottle of whisky; that he placed the others under his head, and when he got up in the morning and went away he forgot the other bottles of whisky, which the boys appropriated. This latter, of course, is hearsay, but the boys can be produced." What there is in that that relates to yourself is that you knew that these gentlemen were furnishing supplies to the hospital, and notwithstanding that knowledge took no steps to furnish the proper food from the Government.

A. That part is false. The part relating to Huidekoper's drunkenness is false absolutely. There is no question about it. Ergo, the whole thing is tainted with suspicion. There is no question in the world as to the animus of that man in my mind, nor any other one who knew him. The fact that the chaplain furnished milk, eggs, and things of that kind was never known to me, and I was about that hospital a good deal, and in so far as matters were concerned about that hospital, it was there that I did give personal attention to certain sanitary measures which even Huidekoper, for some reason or other, overlooked. He was very much interested in the sick, very much, and I don't believe—I don't know it—but I don't believe that Huidekoper was drunk at any time during his service on my staff.

By General DODGE:

Q. General, did the Government have the supplies on hand at that time suitable for the sick as much as they required?

A. Not in delicacies, no; but there was every effort made to get them, and the thing of fat pork is absurd.

Q. They had the funds to purchase them where they could in that country?

A. No; I don't know that they had that.

Q. Wasn't order No. 116 in force there?

A. He is mistaken in the dates. On the 5th of September the headquarters were not there; they were at Rio Pedras, 15 miles from San Juan. Huidekoper was not there. On the 2d of September about 125 of the convalescents from that hos-

pital and the regiments at Guayama went home on the steamer *Panama*, under the charge of Dr. Daly, of General Miles's staff. I think it was the 2d of September they went aboard and sailed at night. On the morning of the 3d I left Guayama with my whole staff and went over to Rio Pedras.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Did you have any personal knowledge as to the vessel upon which the Third Illinois went down—the *Massachusetts*?

A. It went down with me on the *St. Louis*, one of the finest ships afloat.

Q. This gentleman says on the *Massachusetts*, with 1,050 mules, including some few horses. There were also on the transport 1,005 men, consisting of some troops of cavalry from Philadelphia, New York, and Brooklyn, together with the signal service corps from Illinois, commanded by Captain Inman. He speaks of the *Massachusetts* and the *Manitoba*. Have you any personal knowledge as to these vessels?

A. Oh, yes; the *Massachusetts* was one of the large ships that had nearly 1,000 animals aboard and 700 or 800 men—a very large ship. It was the one that had that big refrigerator with 150,000 pounds of beef in it.

Q. He went down on the *Massachusetts*, I guess. He does not say the Third Illinois was aboard that vessel. He said they went on the *St. Louis*. In general, General Brooke, what was the condition of the *St. Louis*, upon which you went south?

A. Fine.

Q. What was the character of the accommodations for the men?

A. Good; very good.

Q. What were the mess accommodations on the *St. Louis*? Were you comfortably fed?

A. You mean for whom?

Q. For the officers.

A. Well, you know that requires a little explanation. This was one of the great liners. It was an auxiliary cruiser. The only naval crew she had on board was Captain Goodrich and half a dozen cadets and midshipmen, ensigns, and about 25 or 30 marines. The rest was the mercantile crew, officers and men. The officers' mess was run by the purser of the ship—the original purser. The whole ship's crew was taken over in the service of the Government, in other words; and the mess could have been a great deal better without much trouble. I did not find any fault. It was not unpalatable, but a good many did think it was very bad food. The men had their travel rations, and Captain Goodrich interested himself quite frequently—how often I do not recall—in cooking up some of the rations for the men. I think he was boiling rice for them, or potatoes, or something of that kind; I don't recall it at this moment. At all events, they had ample space. They were all over the fore-castle and all about, and there was no discomfort at all. We had a good deal of trouble with the surgeon of the regiment. Colonel Huidekoper stated the surgeon did not make proper reports of his sick. He concealed the fact that his men were sick, and when his reports of sick came in we saw men who were really quite sick with this climatic fever who were not in his report. It resulted in a court-martial finally, in which, I think, the surgeon was acquitted.

Q. Dr. Shaw was the one, was he?

A. Dr. Shaw. As to carelessness of the vessel, I will say further, I inspected every ship in person, inspected the *St. Paul*, that the men went down on from Newport News, before they went aboard, and there were a good many things I criticised and some I had changed then and there. With the others there was no time to change, but on the *St. Paul* I inspected that ship on the way down and I required the colonel of the regiment and the officers to inspect it frequently dur-

ing the day and keep it clean—keep the litter, broken pieces of hard bread and food scattered around, as they scattered under these circumstances—keep it cleaned up so it was always pure and nice.

By General McCook:

Q. How was the ventilation on the *St. Paul* when you were aboard her?

A. I don't recollect that. We were going into a hot climate and the air down below decks is very close to me and probably was to the men.

Q. What was the condition of the staterooms?

A. They were down where the first-cabin passengers would be on the ship in crossing the ocean, but the sea was pretty high at times and the ports could not be opened. A good many of the officers slept on deck, all my staff particularly.

General DODGE, Lieutenant-Colonel Goethals was the one who made the report against the *St. Louis*. He said that her condition was bad; that the bedding was dirty; that the meals were abominable; and that called out a letter from the Navy Department, who sent us a copy of your letter to Captain Goodrich.

The WITNESS. Will you read that letter to me?

General Dodge reads following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

"Arroyo, Porto Rico, August 3, 1898.

"Capt. C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. N.,

"U. S. S. *St. Louis*.

"CAPTAIN: I can not refrain from expressing to you my gratification at the complete and comfortable arrangements which were made on board your ship for the transportation of my headquarters and the Third Illinois Infantry from Fortress Monroe to this point. The uniform courtesy and consideration shown by yourself and officers will always be a pleasant remembrance of this time of war.

"Trusting that all your future may be as bright and as pleasant as your eminent qualities deserve, I am,

"Very truly, yours,

J. R. BROOKE, *Major-General*."

The WITNESS. That was written at the time with a knowledge of the facts. Of course there are some discomforts in people's minds. Some seem exceedingly felicitous in studying the inhabitants of the deep sometimes.

General BEAVER. This is the testimony to which I referred, General. The officer testifying was Capt. Frank Moore, Ninth Pennsylvania:

"A. I want to volunteer a little testimony. We were required to get up at 4.30 in the morning. Taps were at 9. I do not think the men received anywhere rest enough, and they were worked out; did not receive the amount of rest that nature requires, and the men became in a worn-out condition from steady jading from 4.30 in the morning till 9 at night. I might compare it to the hack horse that is hacked all the time.

"Q. What was the object of having reveille at 4.30?

"A. That was an order from the corps commander. I can furnish you the roster.

"Q. Then you had your breakfast after reveille and roll call?

"A. Roll call and mess. Roll call about a quarter of 5; mess at 5. The cooks had to get up usually at 2 o'clock to prepare the breakfast and also detail the men to split the wood. The wood furnished was that green yellow pine wood, and a good many men were required to split it. It kept three or four men together all the time to split the wood.

"Q. What time was drill in the morning after breakfast?

"A. Mess at 5, and I think the drills would commence at 6 or 6.30. The roster varied. We would get a new one every few days.

"Q. He never changed the order about reveille? Did he have reveille at 4.30 right straight along?

"A. No, sir; that was changed. The second one, I think, was 4.45, and then another came at 5, and I believe the last change was the most easy time that we got. It was 5.30; that was in September. Taps were always at 9, but we did no drilling—comparatively no drilling—after we moved over in the Smith-White field. Then we were not in condition to drill."

By General BEAVER:

Q. Is it your opinion, General, that the men had more work in that camp than was good for the health of green men coming into camp?

A. No. I have always thought there was too much time allowed for running the guard and getting off and having a "time," as they call it. It was necessary for me to place a picket guard along the north end of the park to stop this tramping all the way to Rossville.

Q. What was the effect upon the condition of the troops caused by the tendency to go to Chattanooga?

A. What do you mean?

Q. Did that demoralize the health of the troops as well as their discipline?

A. Yes; it demoralized their health very seriously in some cases, I understand, from venereal trouble and in drinking of the vile whisky in those dens in Chattanooga that they furnished them, which was demoralizing to their manhood in both cases.

Q. Looking at your administration at Camp Thomas, General Brooke, with your knowledge and experience both with volunteer troops and with regulars, do you see now any way in which you could have improved the conditions which existed there during the time you were in command?

A. No, sir; I do not see anything which could have been improved on there.

Q. Is there anything which you would like to say in regard to that or in regard to Porto Rico, General, about which we have not interrogated you?

A. No, there is nothing. I think I have said everything I can think of in connection with the subject.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. General, were any sanitary orders issued by you at Chickamauga?

A. Very positive ones.

Q. At how early a time.

A. At the beginning of the volunteer encampment.

Q. Was there more than a single order issued or a second order repeating the first?

A. The second order carried through.

Q. Was that order obeyed?

A. It was.

Q. It is very largely stated to us that the camp was foul; that the stench was noticeable to those who were riding on the roads; that regiments for days had no sinks in the world; that every sanitary precaution was being neglected. As I understood you this morning, you said that was not a fact?

A. In the beginning of their encampment a regiment, until they could get the shovels, picks, and things of that kind, they would probably use the surface ground as a sink, but that was covered, and the sinks were dug, and the regiments were furnished with lumber, and their sinks were screened. In one instance—I don't recall the regiment—I passed the sinks of the regiment, which were not screened; the pole was up, and it was in the open, and I sent a staff officer directly to the colonel of that regiment, who was commanding a brigade at the time, and the sinks were screened the next day.

Q. As you yourself observed the conditions, were those conditions that I have mentioned in existence up to the time you left?

A. No, sir.

Q. They were not?

A. Not to my knowledge and observation.

Q. Do you know whether any officer or colonel, brigade commander, division commander, or anyone else was called to account for the violation of any one of these sanitary rules that you issued?

A. Frequently.

Q. Was any man so called to account that his position was imperiled as an officer of the army?

A. Not necessarily under the school of instruction.

Q. Now, as respects the hospitals, were you officially or otherwise informed that your hospitals were being badly administered, other than the one you have spoken of?

A. No, sir.

Q. If they had been badly administered you would have known it?

A. Unquestionably.

Q. In what respect did you consider they were well administered?

A. In all respects visible to me.

Q. How would you regard the condition that prevailed in the Third Army Corps as under your view and care?

A. In so far as I have observed, I could see no fault to find except in the location of the tents of the Second Division of the Third Corps.

Q. Then up to the time you left, which was about the 23d of July, the hospitals of Camp Thomas were properly administered and properly managed and carried out in every respect?

A. So far as I could see, with the exceptions I have noted.

Q. Were not frequent reports made to you that the conditions were not good?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did your medical officers report on the conditions of these hospitals?

A. Always.

Q. Were any recommendations made to you by your chief surgeon or any other medical officer, which recommendation was not regarded by you?

A. No. There were recommendations made which, as you have seen in this documentary evidence here—a letter which was thrashing over old straw, things that had been accomplished long before and were not then live issues.

Q. Was your chief medical officer making recommendations to you that were not regarded by you?

A. I don't understand that question.

Q. Was your chief medical officer, who was Dr. Hartsuff, making frequent recommendations to you which were not by you regarded?

A. No.

Q. Were they in all cases regarded, weighed, and determined by your best judgment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You stated to us this morning that there were numerous complaints against Dr. Hartsuff. Of what nature were they?

A. In his want of appreciation of the situation—conditions as regards the want of medicines and hospital supplies.

Q. Was there an actual want of medicines and hospital supplies at that camp during the time you were in command?

A. In the beginning.

Q. Did that continue up to the time you left?

A. No, sir; not entirely.

Q. How long was it that these complaints against Dr. Hartsuff were coming to you?

A. They were coming to me now and then during the whole time of my stay there.

Q. Were they of such a nature as to make it advisable to call the attention of higher authorities to what he was doing and the way he was doing it?

A. Not at all, sir. I considered myself thoroughly competent to meet the case.

Q. Did you correct these evils and see to it that the complaints, if well founded, were not made afterwards respecting him?

A. I corrected it for the time being and corrected it whenever it came up. There were some very sharp words passed from me to him on frequent occasions.

Q. Did you find him in all respects an efficient officer on your staff?

A. Not entirely.

Q. In what respects?

A. His want of appreciation of the situation was the principal.

Q. Was he, in his actions, governed by the rules and regulations of the Army?

A. Not as I considered it.

Q. Was there an order issued placing all division hospitals under your care?

A. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Q. Was there an order issued which relieved the division commanders of having anything to do with their division hospitals?

A. Certainly not.

Q. We have been informed that division commanders were relieved of their authority by you?

A. I would like to see the paper.

Q. I think General Sanger testified to that effect. Did you, as commanding officer, regard the division commanders as having command over their hospitals?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did you regard them responsible for the conditions existing there?

A. Entirely.

Q. If, under these circumstances, the hospitals were badly administered, where did the responsibility for such maladministration rest?

A. The administering of the hospitals is peculiarly in the province of the surgeon. He is answerable to his commander. There is nothing in the regulations or the customs of the service which would excuse him from the responsibility of his commanding officer that I am aware of, and this letter [holding letter in his hand], taken as a whole, conveys that idea. I do claim the right in all instances to send my inspectors, and General Sanger, being an inspector, knows it fully well that he can go, and particularly these officers in their administrative capacity can go to their subordinates without going through him. It is the regulations of the War Department—of the Army.

Q. With the exception of the Leiter Hospital, was there any general hospital in Camp Thomas?

A. No; not to my knowledge.

Q. General hospitals were under the control of the Surgeon-General, were they not?

A. They were.

Q. The division hospitals, as I understand, were under the control of the division commanders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And ultimately the responsibility for everything rested upon the commanding general of the camp?

A. Practically, of that division. Understand me, the responsibility for anything in that division hospital rested upon the general commanding that division.

Q. Do you know any division commander, or any corps commander, or any man, yourself included, who proceeded judicially against any medical officer for maladministration?

A. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Q. Was the maladministration of such a character that such proceedings should have been had?

A. What do you mean?

Q. The maladministration of the hospitals, if there was such—we will assume for the present there was. If there was maladministration there, was any man judicially proceeded against for such maladministration?

A. There was no alleged maladministration.

Q. General, the hospitals at Camp Thomas were abominable.

A. You make that as a personal observation or from evidence?

Q. I understood it as the result of a multitude of evidence before us, and that testimony coming from all classes.

General DODGE. That was after the 17th of July.

Dr. CONNER. Not altogether.

The WITNESS. Will you be good enough to explain a little what you mean by maladministration of the Third Division hospital?

Dr. CONNER. A hospital which was overcrowded; a hospital which did not receive medicines; a hospital in which there was not proper nursing; a hospital, in a word, which was in a turmoil almost from beginning to end; its chief officers relieved, at least four of them having been in charge within comparatively a short time.

The WITNESS. Who was in charge of them?

Dr. CONNER. Dr. Bradbury, Dr. Jenne, Dr. Schooler, and Dr. Briscoe, Second Division, Third Army Corps. We understand that came directly under your control and observation.

The WITNESS. That's the case, sir.

Q. Now, as you had the power to regulate the medical supplies that were sent to the First Corps when it left there, did you or not have the power to regulate the distribution of the medical supplies to all the organizations in that camp before that time?

A. Certainly.

Q. Was there any official action taken by yourself to relieve the conditions existing there for the want of medical supplies?

A. In the Second Division of the Third Corps?

Q. Practically in every one.

A. Every effort was made in every case that was brought to my attention to relieve the conditions so far as our supplies went.

Q. Was there not a constantly recurring condition of scarcity of medical supplies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what special efforts were made to correct this condition?

A. Application to the Secretary of War from the Surgeon-General of the Army for more.

Q. Were those applications granted?

A. In a way; yes, sir. The supplies were coming in all the time.

Q. How did it happen that the medical supplies at Camp Thomas were so defective, were supplied so slowly, and were distributed so imperfectly?

A. The supply is a matter which is not in my province. The distribution was made by the medical officers to the best of their ability, under the requirements of the service, in all cases that came up, to my knowledge.

Q. So far as you know, then, General, the administration of the Medical Department was as satisfactory as it could have been under the existing conditions?

A. Under the conditions of supply, yes, sir; so far as I know.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Was there any occasion to prefer charges against anybody for willful malfeasance in the performance of their duty—medical administration or otherwise—that came to your knowledge?

A. No; not to my knowledge. From the course of the questions of Dr. Conner it is manifest that there has been complaint on that score. It is news to me. There was a deficiency of medicines there from the beginning to the end, but as to the condition of the internal affairs of the Third Corps hospital, which was mentioned, that rested entirely with the chief surgeon of that corps and its commander. It would not necessarily come to me until they had exhausted every measure in their power to correct things. I know the commander and know the chief surgeon. A better officer does not, as far as my knowledge of him goes, exist in the Army—that is, Colonel Hoff. He is thorough and complete so far as his authority extends, and in a general way had every capacity to handle anything of that kind that came before him, and he had the complete control of the division hospital and had complete control to correct and try any officer who was guilty of anything that came within the Articles of War or the customs of the service. Further than that, it has always been exceedingly difficult, as these gentlemen who have served in the Regular Army can tell you, to convict a doctor of any trouble.

Q. I was five years in the Army myself as a doctor during the war and know—

A. [Interrupting.] It would be very difficult to convict them before a court-martial of anything in a professional way.

Q. That was administrative.

A. Of course, in administration you can convict them of anything that is brought to trial.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Why is that?

A. I do not know why it is. I know it is a fact. I have never been on a court-martial where a medical officer has been charged with anything of a professional nature but I have had cases—the same Dr. Shaw, of the Third Illinois, is a man who was tried before a court which I organized. The officers did not belong to his regiment, and that court acquitted him of every charge, as I recall it now, and that was professional—not mistake in administration—but it would come to that condition where the chief surgeon at that point preferred charges against him and the brigade commander recommended a trial; and I say it is exceedingly difficult to convict a medical officer of anything pertaining to his profession, particularly before the laity.

By General BEAVER:

Q. A court composed of the laity?

A. Yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Was any medical officer, so far as you know, placed under arrest for neglect of duty?

A. In this one instance.

Q. I mean at Chickamauga.

A. Not to my recollection. There might have been in the divisions one, but I don't recall it.

By General DODGE:

Q. General, in your administration of Camp Thomas, when you made application or request to your superior officers, were your requests and applications always responded to?

A. No.

Q. In what respect?

A. I would like to qualify that by saying that I have no reason to know that my requests, always going to the Adjutant-General, were sent to the bureaus to which they pertained, and the action was not always prompt or satisfactory; but the conditions were such that I at times wrote direct to the chiefs of bureaus and urged the necessity for promptness in shipment, pointing out where certain obstacles seemed to arise between points of shipment and destination, etc. I have always got replies to these letters promptly, and it seemed from them that they had done all in their power to meet, so far as they were able, the requirements.

Q. Were their answers satisfactory to you that they were making proper efforts?

A. I so understood that they were making proper efforts.

Q. You have had in your command a great many officers of the staff departments who were civil appointments. What, in your opinion, was the efficiency of these officers? Were they officers who took interest in their duties and endeavored to become efficient, and did they in the proper time become efficient officers?

A. They all took interest in their duties. Some of them became proficient; others less so. I don't recall anyone now who was an utter failure, but some men are so constituted that they can grasp the situation better than other men. They are quicker. Their brains work quicker. Others are slower to appreciate the conditions they are to meet.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Did you find any such persons in the Regular Army?

A. Very seldom, because they have had a good deal of experience in the initial work, not because they are more brainy men.

By General DODGE:

Q. If these men had the same experience—

A. [Interrupting.] Experience is all they wanted. The enthusiasm was there, and the desire was there. It was the knowledge as to how to do it.

Q. I want to call your attention to the testimony of Colonel Hartsuff referring to the location of the camps. He said:

"A. It is the custom on the part of the commanding officer to consult the medical officer. The medical officer could not do anything or say anything without having an opportunity presented to him. As regiments were located, I did not know, as chief medical officer, where they were to be located. After they were located, as chief medical officer I protested as to the location.

"Q. On what grounds did you protest?

"A. In some cases the regiments were located on rocky ground, and in some cases on low ground, where the surface drainage was not as it should have been, and in some cases the regiments were put in too close together.

"Q. When you protested against these defects, were they remedied?

"A. No, sir."

A. I have no recollection of protests on that ground. We may have had some, but I don't recall it.

By General BEAVER:

Q. As I understand it, you designated the general ground upon which they were to be encamped?

A. It was left to the division and brigade commanders.

By General DODGE:

Q. He also testifies as to his protesting against the dumping ground. I think he refers to that letter written on the 17th of July.

A. The dumping grounds were designated. The refuse of the camp was burned, as a rule, right in the camp or near it in a convenient spot. The manure from

horses and mules was hauled to the general place, where it also was burned, and as long as I was there I don't recall any place where any considerable accumulation of manure, which was the only accumulation that seemed necessary to dry before being burned, existed.

Q. You received the order to organize the Third Corps of that camp? Did you understand that to be a permanent camp or temporary camp?

A. That I could not say. Of course I took it to mean that as fast as organized they would be moved out into the service.

Q. After the beginning of July, before you left there, did you have under consideration and have plans for moving all these troops?

A. Moving the Third Division of the Third Army Corps to the point parallel to and to some distance in the rear of the First Division, between it and the Second Division.

Q. Had you in your mind the changing of the camps of any of the rest of the troops?

A. Not at that time.

Q. Had you at any time before you left there?

A. No; not subsequently. The purpose I had in mind in moving that division was to get it more conveniently located to the water supply.

Q. Don't you think, General, that troops who are camped on the same ground more than a month ought to be moved?

A. Yes, sir; I do.

Q. Did you take up the consideration of sending these troops on marches or anything of that sort?

A. We had some little marching, and the experience was such that it was abandoned. The complaints of depredations and other little matters connected with these movements—small bodies—were such that I did not intend to incur any more criticism of that kind than could be avoided, and at the time we were ready to do that sort of work the expectation was that they would be moved very soon. In fact, after the 1st of July I would not have been surprised to get orders to move out. They did come about the 11th or 12th, when I got here to Washington.

Q. General, do you consider, with your experience in the civil war, and in this war, and in the organization of large bodies of troops—as you had green troops at Chattanooga—do you consider that the sickness and the difficulties that were encountered there were greater than would be encountered under similar circumstances at any time or any other place?

A. No. I think there was less sickness there, probably, than there was during the war of the rebellion. I can give you an instance of that. In '61, in November, I brought a regiment to this city and camped at Kendall Green, and in ten days or two weeks I had 450 men down with the measles. We got through with that and went across the river and camped near Alexandria, between it and Cloud's Mill, not far from Alexandria Seminary; went through that winter, and on the 10th of March we went on a campaign, in 1862, up to the battle of Fredericksburg. I suppose we lost 200 men in battle—killed and wounded—at the battle of Fredericksburg. We went in there with 16 officers and about 300 men altogether, out of 38 officers and 1,000 men. There had disappeared 500 men and 22 officers during the campaign. We thought nothing of it. It was a matter of course to us then. There were 500 officers and men went out of that regiment by sickness.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. You mean all those men died, General?

A. Oh, no.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Disappeared temporarily?

A. Temporarily.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. What is your opinion of that camping ground at Camp Thomas?

A. I think it was a very good camping ground. The principal objection I saw was the limestone water, which caused diarrhea. I know it did to me. I suffered with it as much as anybody else. I had made my report as to the number of men I thought could be camped there. It was 50,000, but we had more.

By General DODGE:

Q. In relation to the sickness in Porto Rico, you say at one time you had 17,000 men. What proportion of your troops were sick there? Taking all the sickness, what proportion were sick from the climatic or any other source in Porto Rico?

A. There were 2,500 at one time.

Q. I mean take the total sickness while you were there?

A. I don't think I ever ascertained the percentage all through; these 2,500 represented the full sickness of about 17,000 men at one date.

By Governor WOODBURY:

Q. Wouldn't there be one-half or three-quarters sick during the whole time you have been there?

A. I think probably there might. I would not know. I think it is likely that fully one-half were sick at one time or another; possibly more.

By General DODGE:

Q. Is it your opinion that with all our troops going to Porto Rico and Cuba during the summer season a greater portion would be sick?

A. Large numbers, particularly clothed as our men are, in clothing suitable for a Northern climate. The clothing is entirely too heavy.

Q. Are they changing that?

A. They are considering it.

Q. Is it too heavy for this season of the year?

A. Too heavy for any season there. The thermometer when I left San Juan lingered around 75 to 82 and 83. I left there with linen clothing, and wore it for two days.

Q. How were your troops clothed there?

A. The same as here, except with these light canvas trousers and the blue shirt.

Q. You spoke here of pursuing the methods in Porto Rico which the British do in India. What were those methods?

A. Not quite that in the West Indies. What I alluded to was particularly the housing of the men: avoiding the canvas, avoiding any outdoor work during certain hours of the day; in fact, until the men become acclimated they should do no work whatever. It is the system I pursued in Porto Rico. I forbade any work being done by the men other than military duties during certain hours of the day to expose them to the effects of the sun, which, in my opinion, is a sure way of causing sickness.

Q. You also spoke about receiving tents in their original packages. Were they rotten? Was that on account of the climate?

A. No; on account of the canvas made up. They were old tents made up fresh. I think it was the latter. It was supplied in Baltimore. The matter was all brought out on investigation, and the thing was reported to the War Department.

Q. It was a matter that was properly investigated?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Have you any statement to make or suggestion or any information to give us that will be of interest to the commission or of benefit to the service?

A. In what line?

Q. Suggestions as to the future service, or as to what your experience has shown would be of benefit to it.

A. I have very decided ideas as to mobilization of troops, gleaned from the experience that I have had during this past summer. I think that at any future time, should it be necessary to mobilize troops previous to being assembled in large bodies, they should be thoroughly equipped in their native sections. It was the experience of 1861, and it was not a mistake. It is just as easy to assemble all the material for equipment at Harrisburg, Columbus, Indianapolis, Springfield, or any other point that may be selected for the assembling of the volunteer troops, to equip them there, and when equipped they will be found to be drilled to a certain degree. Then they are available in a way for service. As it is, assembling them in large bodies, it is a tremendous draft on the resources of the Government at one spot, which is difficult indeed to meet, on account of the numbers assembled. I never worked so hard in my life—my staff never worked so hard in their lives—during all the months they were there.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Men would come to your camp without anything?

A. Without anything but such as you would find men putting on merely to reach a place where they were sure to get a uniform. They had poor clothes. All these conditions were disheartening to the men themselves. Necessarily there was a great deal of time lost in seeing to them, in equipping them, and clothing them and furnishing them necessities for equipping troops at other points in large bodies. I am decidedly of the opinion that they had better be equipped, each State's quota, in one or two places, as may be most convenient to assemble them. You can do that more satisfactorily at your leisure. You are wasting no time at all. The drills can go on. It does not matter about the arms so much.

By General BEAVER:

Q. There would be less pressure upon transportation, too?

A. Very much. With a little one-horse railroad, which ran from Chattanooga to Battlefield Station, it was a terrible thing to get troops there. We unloaded troops in the city and marched them out. We unloaded them at Rossville and marched them out. When they got to bringing supplies out it was an utter impossibility to bring out regiments without causing some congestion. The whole thing stopped until we got trackage in there, and we were in a terrible condition. In shipping troops out we shipped by Ringgold and Rossville, and Battlefield also, when we had small batteries in there. Every advantage was taken of every opportunity which presented itself to work the thing properly.

By General DODGE:

Q. Don't you think it is more difficult to discipline troops in their own States than after you move them out?

A. It is not the discipline so much. That comes afterwards. You don't find that the improvement is very large when you assemble 50,000 men in one camp and you have 5,000 or 6,000 in the State camps under proper control. The discipline of the volunteer organization is not different at all in any way from the regular command. It takes time. The mind must be disciplined. When you get the men's minds disciplined that is discipline all over. There is no trouble about it then. That requires care and tact and patience.

By General WILSON:

Q. With your own experience in Porto Rico, does that give you any idea for making any suggestions as to the ration in that portion of the country?

A. I have already made suggestions to the War Department on that subject.

Q. Might we ask what that was, so we might have it on record here?

A. I suggested that the ration of rice and hominy and sugar be increased and the meat ration might be decreased. The vegetable ration is all right so far as it goes. I have rather come to the conclusion that the tomato part of the ration is

not good. Unless you can cook it properly it causes some trouble in the intestines, liable to produce diarrhea and dysentery when used raw. Many men can not eat it without producing difficulties of that kind. I suppose, Dr. Conner, you have watched that somewhat?

Dr. CONNER. Yes, sir; you are right.

The WITNESS. All these things have received my attention to the end that I might be able to do some good in that way should occasion ever arise.

Q. Have you made any suggestion as to the addition of dried fruit?

A. We ought to have dried apples; we ought to have these evaporated apples, peaches, and apricots, and things of that kind. They are of great advantage, I think. That, of course, the Medical Department ought to have more knowledge of than I.

By General DODGE:

Q. Would you add that to the ration or in lieu of so much meat?

A. In lieu of meat. We have too much ration now. The trouble is that our people eat too much meat anyhow. It is all very well, but as a soldier and as having an end to reach, I think you will reach it better with less food. There is no danger of starvation, but even with this ration furnished in full I have had the most extraordinary complaints sent to me from the mothers, and sisters, and sweethearts, and wives, and uncles, and aunts, and everything of that kind, and members of Congress, from whom the most ridiculous things in the world have come. A board of officers was composed by General Henry at Ponce, Porto Rico, to investigate these things. They had one man before them—one instance I recall—in which he complained of being starved—we have his own letter for it—that he had not had anything to eat since he had been on the island. We asked how much he weighed when he came into the service, and he told us, and we put him on the scales and he had gained 5 pounds.

Q. You found these complaints that came to you, upon examination—what did you find generally as a result of the examination?

A. That the man was lying—somebody was lying.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, there is widespread feeling in certain parts of the country that is being disseminated all through the country that the presence of our troops in southern latitudes will tend to greatly increase the dissoluteness of habits; did you find that in Porto Rico?

A. It is bad for the men. It does not affect the inhabitants.

Q. The Commissary-General is of the opinion that it would be desirable to place in the hands of the Commissary-General not only the duty of providing the food itself, but the facilities with which it is to be cooked and the personal implements with which the man eats his food; that it would be desirable to have all that aggregated in one department, the Commissary Department, so that the food and its transportation and the cooking utensils and the eating utensils for the men should be all furnished by one department, thus simplifying the service to that extent, instead of being in the hands of green troops. What is your opinion?

A. In so far as the cooking utensils are concerned, it is all right; but the transportation is another thing. Railroad life has demonstrated you can not run two trains on the same track in opposite directions without some trouble. There is the problem. That has been up. The Quartermaster's Department has had charge of the transportation from time immemorial: it is a fixture there. There is no reason in the world why it should not furnish transportation, which is the principal part of its duty, in war time particularly; such transportation as is required; but still I am ready for any experiment they might want to try in peace times. I don't want any experiments in war times.

Q. Who should command the troop transports? Should the troops be under the command of a naval officer?

A. No, sir; the Army should be a distinctive branch by itself.

Q. Don't you think when you put troops aboard a ship to be transported that it would be better for that transport to be under the command of a naval officer?

A. No, sir.

Q. Should be under the Army?

A. Under the Army.

Q. Suppose the commander of that ship—you have a quartermaster aboard; he knows nothing about navigation?

A. The captain of the ship is responsible for the navigation entirely.

Q. Suppose he does not navigate it properly, where is the responsibility?

A. That is the very thing coming up now. We are reducing the pay of our shipmasters to a certain extent. The good men are not going to stay, and the cheap men we can not afford to hire.

Q. Under the British service, the troops are always carried by transport ships that are under the command of the crews. The personal equipment of the ship is from the British navy.

A. If you put the whole command of the ship in the Navy, of course the commander should be a naval officer.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Suppose you have a convoy and danger comes on? You have a general in command of the Army and Navy?

A. The Navy has us on the hip. We are utterly helpless, and the convoy must take care of us.

Q. Then that would be under the naval officer?

A. Yes, sir.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. Wouldn't that question depend on the conditions; that is to say, if you are going to Cuba, you can get along without having a consultation between the quartermaster and commissary?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If we have a war, and we have to send 100,000 men to a given point, then the question comes up; in time of peace it does not come up?

A. No, sir; not necessarily.

By General DODGE:

Q. I am speaking of troops, not supplies.

A. You can not very well spare them.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. The management of the ship would be in the hands of the captain of the ship?

A. Entirely.

Q. Under certain regulations?

A. Certainly.

Q. In time of peace there is no question about the matter?

A. No, sir.

Q. In war there would be?

A. In war there might be a possible conflict between the Army and Navy. That is a matter to which I have not given sufficient thought to be positive. I was on the Navy ship with the Third Illinois Regiment on the way to Porto Rico. We went very fast and averaged over 19 knots an hour all the way down. I know they were short-handed down there and did not know what they might meet, so I was in a hurry. When I got aboard this ship I found that the captain of the ship

had designated a place where all the arms should be piled. That was his regulation. He took general charge of the men on the ship in a way, but not in an offensive way. It was a suggestive way, and it was a very good way, but in the event of any emergency arising he would be necessarily in command of the ship, and the men on board that ship, myself included, would be under his orders to a certain extent; so far as the management is concerned he could put us down below. A soldier does not like to be separated from his command. I don't like to see it, but it was done when I got aboard, and I didn't like to say anything about it. He was a very able man.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 16, 1898.*

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN F. WESTON.

Brig. Gen. JOHN F. WESTON then appeared before the commission, and the president thereof read to him the instructions received by the commission from the President of the United States, indicating the scope of the investigation. He was then asked if he had any objections to being sworn, and replied that he had not. He was thereupon duly sworn by General Wilson.

By General BEAVER:

Q. General, please give us your name, station, and rank.

A. John F. Weston: colonel, Commissary Department, and brigadier-general of volunteers.

Q. Did you serve in connection with the Commissary Department throughout the war with Spain?

A. I was its chief commissary, sir.

Q. Where were you in active service?

A. During that campaign?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Throughout the whole I was acting, as far as relates to my duties as commissary, at Tampa, Siboney, at Daiquiri, 23 miles west of Santiago, where the *Tizcuaya* was subsequently sunk, and then in Santiago, and finally I came back to Montauk.

Q. Were you present when the expedition was fitted out for Santiago at Tampa?

A. Yes, sir; and before.

Q. Had you any difficulty in feeding your troops at Tampa?

A. The troops were not properly fed, and it happened in this way; because in 1894 the ovens were taken from the Subsistence Department and given to the Quartermaster's Department. We assembled at Tampa and the men could only get soft bread if they could bake it themselves, or if they had an oven, or the local bakers would get it for them. They were there from April until the 12th of June with those conditions. In my opinion, 15 or 20 per cent of the vitality was thrown away on account of that failure to get bread.

Q. You depended on hard bread?

A. The regular troops do not want hard bread. If they are in camp three days they will ask for flour and yeast powder and try to make bread. They know how bad the hard bread is, and they don't want it.

Q. So the trouble arose on account of their trying to use the flour ration?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you think that condition would have been remedied if the Commissary Department had the duty of furnishing the ovens?

A. Had it been their duty they could have been held responsible for it. As it is now, you don't know who is to blame; it is mixed up.

Q. Would the difficulty have been lessened to any extent if the responsibility for it had been under one hat?

A. Yes, sir; that is the trouble with the staff—divided responsibility right along.

By Colonel DENBY:

Q. How was that divided? Was not it the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish them?

A. It was changed in 1894. The Commissary Department had it until then, and after that the quartermaster.

By General BEAVER:

Q. To what extent has the bake oven been used in the Army since 1894?

A. Well, they have them right along now. The Quartermaster's Department furnished them subsequently.

Q. But prior to the war with Spain, did they have them manufactured and on hand?

A. No, sir; they did not.

Q. They did not use them at posts?

A. They erected a brick oven there—a permanent affair.

Q. Did you superintend the collection of supplies for the expedition to Santiago—the commissary supplies?

A. I was in the office here on duty in the War Department when the order came from General Corbin for the concentration of 70,000 men for ninety days at Tampa, and General Nash was Commissary-General at the time, but I was really doing the work, and General Eagan came in and under him—I don't claim I did it, but I did it to his satisfaction, and I ordered the stuff that went in there, and it was there.

Q. What number of rations or for what time was the Army which left Tampa for Santiago provisioned?

A. Twenty thousand men for ninety days; we had 1,800,000 rations, taking the minimum as the standard; we had a less number of some; we had 1,800,000 full rations.

Q. To what extent was that provision for the food carried with the troops to Santiago?

A. We took all of that with us on board the ships.

Q. Nearly 2,000,000 rations?

A. Yes, sir; and I was careful to have half hard bread and half flour and all the coffee, except what was loaded before I went there. Half the coffee was ground. The troops loaded at Mobile had all green coffee and only one-fifth hard bread.

Q. In your loading, you made half the coffee roasted and ground?

A. Yes, sir; that is what the schedule showed in the command.

Q. Were you present when the troops landed at Daiquiri?

A. The night before I was sent to where the *Vizcaya* was sunk, 25 or 26 miles west, to shove through 15,000 rations for Generals Garcia and Rabi, but the order I got to do that told me to hurry back, as troops were going to land the next day; but the general, when he gave me that order, did not know how big a task it was to land that in the open. It was in the open, and there was a surf on, and when we put two lighters alongside one another, and the two captains began damming each other, and when the two ports—the two opposite ports—of the two lighters come together is the only time you have, then you have to throw your package from one to the other, and the Cubans I had after a little while helped us to get them ashore, but I did not get to Daiquiri until perhaps 1 o'clock; then a great many were ashore.

Q. How soon were you able to land—what provisions had the troops on their persons when they landed?

A. Three days.

Q. How soon were you able to land commissary stores after the troops got ashore?

A. In four hours I landed 40,000 rations.

Q. So you had two days', in addition to the three on their persons, within three hours after their landing?

A. Yes, sir; the general sent for me after I commenced the unloading, and he impressed me with the necessity of getting enough ashore of sugar, coffee, bread, and meat, and I had that ashore at 6 o'clock, and a great many soldiers who did not land with the regiments, as they generally do, came up then and there was no ration given to them, but I gave them what they could carry and let them go.

Q. To what extent were you able to keep ahead of the demand in the stores you had ashore?

A. When I got those rations ashore, the general sent for me again and said he wanted 200,000 rations landed at Siboney, which was 8 miles closer than where we were. That pulled me away from Daiquiri, and I thought they would not need the 40,000 rations, so I took Gallagher, who was made a major in the commissary, and told him to go to Siboney to get what he could from the ships. That night I pulled in with 30,000 rations and landed the next morning in Siboney, so that on the 23d—no, on the 24th—no, I had the rations there on the 23d, the next night.

Q. So you were prepared at Siboney before the troops came up?

A. Well, General Kent had passed; Lawton had passed, and General Hawkins was there with the Twenty-second.

Q. Were you able to get your 200,000 rations ashore?

A. Not at a wink; but I landed altogether there over 300,000 rations before I got through with it.

Q. Were you ahead of the demand?

A. Yes, sir, at that time; and continued so until the surf came on the 3d of July; I was ahead of the command and pretty easy. I would take a lighter out and run over to a ship wherever I could catch the captain. I had small boats, and unloaded 40,000 rations of the bread, meat, sugar, and coffee, and we always had tomatoes and things of that kind. I would run the boat to where her nose would touch bottom, about 80 yards from the shore; then I got two 10-ton boats from the Navy, and I would load from the lighters to the 10-ton boats, getting the boxes of biscuits and throwing the pieces of bacon in her, and then put a line on the 10-ton boat and pull her ashore as far as I could, and I had a checking line on her stern to keep the surf from driving her up; then I had about 60 stevedores—they were not really stevedores, but crap players—then the stevedores would strip and get over the side of the boat, and take a piece of bacon or a bag of salt or coffee or a box of provisions, and carry them on their heads to the shore or on the arms of a soldier; and that was the way we fed Garcia and his soldiers. At first we had only a small pier there a foot or so wide, and later a body of the engineers started to set a nice pier there, but they were soon pulled away, and then a company of the Thirty-fourth Regiment of Michigan, a pretty enterprising crowd, came. They worked along, but it was only 14 feet wide, the affair we then had, and they fixed it up nice and built a railroad track along with it, so that after that was continued and finished my work would be easy, as I could run the nose of a lighter to the pier. Well, the engineers were taken away, and on the 6th—the surf barred my landing on the 3d, but still I had 80,000 rations ashore now—on the 4th also a surf interfered; on the 5th I ran some rations ashore at Daiquiri. On the 5th I wired to the adjutant-general and he sent me the engineers under Burr, and on the 6th they came with Lieutenant Fitch and another officer, and I told them I wanted them to spread out what the Michigan men were doing, so I could run in and unload on the wharf. Lieutenant Fitch was only too glad to do it, and it was very intelligent work that those fellows

did, and in six days I could run my cars there and run the lighters in and unload in fine shape, and that continued until the 12th; after that my work became very easy.

Q. You—to use a slang phrase—“You got there just the same!”

A. Yes, sir; right you are.

Q. The difficulty then, so far as to feeding the troops on the fighting line, was not at your end of it?

A. It was not, sir. I would say, in reference to the transportation, we could hardly have used it, owing to the quality of the roads. On the 3d—here is where the shortage was—all the transportation was wagon transportation; there were not ambulances enough for the wounded and sick; the men were put in these wagons and the transportation was delayed by taking the men along the roads slowly, and the transportation then was very limited.

Q. Were you up at the firing line at any time?

A. Yes, sir; and I had good reason to remember it. On the 3d, when I saw I could not work, I thought I would get up and get into the scrap, as I belonged to the Seventh Cavalry at one time, and I thought fighting was no man's particular trade and I thought I could do some. The general broke out at me and he drove me back in a good-natured way, and that is all I know about the fighting.

Q. I suppose he thought it was more important to have you down below?

A. Yes, sir; but he was very nice about it.

Q. From the reports that came to you, General, what was the condition, so far as the commissary supplies were concerned, at the front?

A. I never heard a single solitary complaint. I went out of my way for the volunteers. The Eighth Ohio and the Sixth Massachusetts and the Eighth Illinois were the equals of the regulars in all that makes a man up by measurements, and I know that they were only deficient by having officers not knowing the little kinks. I didn't ask the men whether they were rationed up to date or what, but I asked them “What do you want?” and I gave it to them.

Q. It was not a time to consider the matter of requisitions; it was simply to feed the men?

A. Yes, sir; that is what I aimed to do.

Q. Well, were you able to supply the demand, General, from that time until the troops entered Santiago without difficulty.

A. Yes, sir; under the general orders with reference to the rations. After the fight at Las Guasimas, on the 24th, I ran out to the ship—I forget her name—where they had a lot of officers' stores, and I loaded down with them and gave them to Drs. Appel, La Garde, and Ireland. I saw a man wounded—of the Rough Riders—and I saw the man was suffering terribly, and I went and bought a few cans of peaches and apricots and brought them down personally.

Q. How were you supplied, General, with the articles that can be purchased from the Commissary Department?

A. We had a great deal of them, and at Siboney, after we left there, I pulled in on the 19th at Santiago. I pulled away four carloads at Siboney and ran them to a little town three miles from Santiago and took them from there by wagon train.

Q. The supply of these things had been thought of and cured for before you reached there?

A. The commissary officers and purchasing officers may be mainly eliminated from the matter; they had provided everything.

Q. Were the stores you had for sale such as were suitable for the wounded?

A. Such as you would get at Park & Tilford's. Oh, yes; the best in the world—the very best, sir.

Q. In furnishing these stores to the surgeons of whom you have spoken were they compelled to purchase them?

A. No, sir.

Q. How were they issued?

A. Given on memorandum receipt and were to be paid for out of a fund here in Washington.

Q. So you eliminated not only the regulations of the commissary, but also red tape?

A. Yes, sir; there was not a ration memorandum asked from the volunteers, and not a man of them had to make out a paper except the officer with me.

Q. General, you mentioned several surgeons, Dr. Appel and others, who applied to you for these stores; did any surgeon ever apply to you for stores for the sick and wounded who was not supplied with them?

A. Not where we had them. Those stores we got off at Siboney went like wildfire, and in five days we did not have any for them there; but the wounded and men in the hospital and men going north—there was plenty provided for them.

Q. To what extent did the surgeons coming north apply for these stores?

A. They did not come near me for anything; they made their own arrangements aboard the ships; they may have applied to the subsistence department. I was landing the stores. Shafter put me in charge of getting the stores ashore; that kept me out nineteen hours out of every twenty-four, maybe. I saw where Colonel Roosevelt one time came to Siboney with a little pack train for some beans; he wanted to buy some beans. He testified that somebody told him that the beans were for sale, and that he would have to give a certificate that they were for himself. I had two volunteer captains with me, and there is such a thing as knowing a great deal about what is not so, but no surgeon would ever say that to you.

Q. Well, no officer would be likely to think that was so, Doctor?

A. Not if he was at all familiar with his work. When I met Colonel Roosevelt at Santiago afterwards and he told me that he had money, and I said "That makes no difference." I said, "What do you want?" He said, "Tomatoes" and other things. I said, "You don't need any money for them; these things are back rations that you have not drawn; they were the soldiers' rations; part of the soldiers' rations which had not been drawn in full.

Q. When did you remove your commissary headquarters to Santiago?

A. On the 19th. On the 17th I went in at the surrender and looked at the warehouses, and I was disappointed in the harbor. I thought I could run a ship alongside the wharves, but she could not if she drew over 14 feet, and we could not get to the wharves; but still we brought in lighters again, and as the tide was only 2 inches that was no serious drawback; but on the 20th, I wish to say, I had the bakeries going and furnished soft bread; that is right.

Q. After that there was no trouble, I suppose?

A. The *Iroquois* came in with 500 tons of potatoes and onions and fresh beef, and there were fresh potatoes, vegetables, and fresh bread for them.

Q. What was the condition of those vegetables that came in not canned?

A. They were spoiled, and we threw them overboard; but this particular ship just came in and many of the potatoes were bad, and I am in doubt now, looking back, whether it was a good trick. I anticipated great results from fresh provisions, for in the Geronimo campaign I saw the men pick up afterward on fresh beef after living on bacon for a long time; but we did not get those results.

Q. What did you get, General?

A. A good deal of sickness.

Q. You spoke of stores that should be for sale, being accounted for in Washington—

A. To the hospitals?

Q. Yes; had you heard of the 60-cent arrangement at that time?

A. That took place on the 16th of August.

Q. So that the thought in your mind was that that would be paid for out of the hospital fund?

A. Yes, sir; and I knew they had no money, and it was only talk, and I had no place to keep money anyhow.

Q. That is one place the "filthy lucre" did not count?

A. Yes, sir; I took \$5,000 away from Florida, and have the whole lot of it yet.

Q. Well, you did not require, then, any money from anybody?

A. No, sir.

Q. If the officers did not have money they could get stores; if the surgeons did not have it they could account for it later?

A. Yes, sir. We didn't sell to enlisted men on credit, as the accounts would have been mixed up, but to any officers that would ask for it.

Q. Were there applications on the part of enlisted men?

A. At Siboney a plug of tobacco was bought for 42 cents, and they would turn around and sell it across the road for \$4, and cutting it in halves and selling it in that way, so that I had the sale of that stuff stopped at Siboney. Gallagher was taken from me on the 21st and taken to the front. He was the farthest commissary to the front, and I wanted the stuff to give to him, so that the men in front could get it; but not at all times were the stores for sale. The first lot did not last very long, nor did the second lot, but about the 12th I had so many that I later had to haul four carloads away from Santiago.

Q. General, looking back at your experience, state whether, under all the circumstances, you succeeded very well in the administration of the commissary department at Santiago?

A. Yes, sir; with reference to the hardships of the men I had considerable experience with the Seventh Cavalry with Custer, and I would say that in the late war there were no hardships there. In the spring of 1869 and 1870 a couple of white women were stolen from one of the camps, and Governor Crawford raised a considerable discussion, and troops were sent after the Indians. We followed them. We had been out about twelve months; the men were wearing nose bags on their feet; they had few overcoats, and I found once a whole mattress of Custer's, and I, wishing no one would sleep on it, left it on the prairie. Of the 66 mule teams that we took from Leavenworth I don't think we brought in any one of them. I didn't eat any of them, but I saw the men eating them, but I ate dried grass. The men were so desperate I have seen them in their eagerness not wait for the animals to be killed. I saw them run out and cut chunks of meat out of them. To me the campaign was a mere bagatelle as far as hardships were concerned.

Q. So far as the food was concerned?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. General, with your experience, what suggestion would you have to make in regard to the improvement of the service in the Commissary Department? Would the restoration of the order to furnish the ovens by the Commissary Department be an improvement?

A. Oh, yes, sir. Also, I found out it was the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish sheds, houses, and tarpaulins. The commissary was there at Tampa, and I found that we had no tarpaulins, and I wired to Jacobs at New York, but they did not come. Then I wrote a letter showing the consequences—that in a tropical country one night's rain would destroy 200,000 rations of bread. I saw a rain there, gentlemen, and I simply threw my gum coat off; it would not stop the rain from coming through. I wired again. We should have our own covering in those cases.

Q. That is, you should have authority to provide it?

A. Yes, sir. Again, at Montauk Point the Seventy-first Regiment of New York had lots to eat, but they had no mess equipment, no knives, forks, pans, and spoons. It was not my duty or business, but I was also doing other people's business, and I wired Woodruff, in New York, to wire to the closest place to get them. It seems that they had to come from the Ordnance Department. He wired to Eagan and he saw Flagler and he wired to a point in Illinois, and they sent the mess gear down—tin knives, forks, etc. They were sent from there to New York. Had it been otherwise I could have wired to a hardware store and got them on the next train.

Q. Then, your opinion would coincide with the Commissary General's to the extent that the Commissary Department should have the authority of purchasing food, means for cooking it, and handing it to the soldier?

A. Yes, sir. It could not be more ridiculous if one fellow provided drawers and the other fellow breeches.

Q. What do you say as to controlling the transportation, General?

A. It is rather a deep subject, and the commissaries that want to run into it might carom on something very hard. It is no easy job. I have had a good deal of experience with army transportation. If they go that far we had better bunch them all together.

Q. And make a supply department of it?

A. Yes, sir. The transportation is a matter that I would not like to talk about without thinking of it, and I have done lots of thinking about it.

By General WILSON:

Q. General, can you tell us, in view of your experience, what suggestions you have to make, if any, in regard to the character and style of ration, and the quantity to be issued to the troops serving in Cuba and Porto Rico?

A. I notice this, that the natives, no matter where you go, whether with the Indians or New Mexicans, that it behooves you to pay a little attention to what they do; that you have lots to learn from them. Applying that to Cuba, you might say it is poverty, or what you will, but they were not consuming meat all the time. The natives were not eating it, and particularly were they not eating beef. Some men might come after me and say they can not afford it. I don't know but that is the case, but they eat less meat and more fish, and they eat a good deal of corn meal and things generally of that kind. I think our ration is a splendid ration for hardy men in a rigorous climate, but whether it is suitable for that hot climate there I have my doubts; that should be looked into very carefully. When the troops returned I asked that oatmeal and milk be made a part of the ration, and for the time being bacon be thrown out and the men be given ham. It was not granted. They put up evaporated cream, which goes a long way. I think beans are not fit for that country at all; they are too heating.

Q. Did it ever occur to you that the difference in the diet might account for the difference in the men?

A. I think it is racial. I think we are a more vigorous, stronger race of men and need more food; but still I think we gorge on it.

By General DODGE:

Q. Who were the officers at Siboney on shore in charge of your work?

A. Up to the 1st of July there was no regular set of officers at Siboney, but Gallagher was with me on shore up to that time.

Q. Who took his place?

A. Major Wilson. I left him at Daiquiri when we first landed and then pulled him away, seeing the reduced importance of Daiquiri to Siboney, and Gallagher was taken by Shafter to the front. Two volunteer officers were dropped in and Kent dropped them onto me, and another man was dropped onto me.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Do you mean "dropped" to be understood in the sense of unloading them on you?

A. Yes; that is right. Kent would dodge me for a long time afterwards when we met.

By General DODGE:

Q. These men were industrious, but they were not efficient on account of inexperience; or was it that they did not try to do their duties?

A. One had been through the last war, and aimed to do all he could. It was simply he did not know how to do it as we wanted it done. I want no officers around me but sergeants—some fellow like Gallagher, who understood how to do the work, and different sergeants who would not question my orders, but do the work. We have the best noncommissioned officers, and I wish they could be promoted in time of war. It is twice as easy to make a first lieutenant and captain of infantry as to make a captain of commissary out of a great many of them. These men know how to take care of the supplying of troops. It is a rather difficult job in time of war, but the sergeants are the men.

By General BEAVER:

Q. Do you believe it is possible to provide a reserve corps of commissary officers, sergeant-majors, etc., who could be assigned in time of war so as to bring them into contact with the company cooks?

A. Yes, sir. When Wood was raising his regiment—I knew him before that; we served together at Whipple Barracks—and he came to me when he was authorized to raise a regiment, and I told him, "The first thing you need is a commissary-sergeant." I whipped one in from Laredo and ordered him to report to Colonel Roosevelt, and that is what brought that regiment into Florida in such shape, and they came in there almost the equal of any body, and it was entirely due to their having a fellow who knew how to get what they were entitled to. I had to pull the sergeant away from there. And, furthermore, that regiment, when it left Daiquiri, had three days' rations, and Colonel Wood and Colonel Roosevelt came for five days' more rations, and I told them it was against orders, and they said, "We will be short of rations and away from you, and you had better give us three days' more;" so I did.

Q. In providing for the Army in time of peace I notice they provide for certain skeleton companies; would it not be possible to include in those companies commissary-sergeants to be trained, and they could be made the commissary-sergeants in time of war? In this new bill spoken of they talk about having skeleton companies in time of peace; would it not be possible to have with these noncommissioned officers trained in the duties I have spoken of to be assigned to them in time of war? Would it be possible to train them in skeleton companies? Suppose you had a school for your hospital stewards, sergeant-majors, and commissary-sergeants, and give them such duties as they could perform and instruct them in the duties of those three positions and then in war assign them to the volunteer troops?

A. The only training for a commissary-sergeant is the storing and issuing of rations; that training in addition to what is necessary for the Regular Army; in time of peace I would make the sergeants and assign them to duty at posts.

By General DODGE:

Q. This bill provides for 160 commissary-sergeants, who shall be hereafter known as post commissary-sergeants?

A. We have not 160 posts, and that will be the hitch hereafter.

By Captain HOWELL:

Q. Would it be better if the United States, in framing new legislation, reserved the right to appoint quartermasters from the Regular Army—that is, to appoint the quartermasters for the volunteer troops from the Regular Army from those commissary-sergeants and quartermaster-sergeants: I mean those from the Regular Army?

A. That might mean you could take a second lieutenant for that. These commissary-sergeants would be better. Commission them as quartermasters.

General BEAVER. Governors of States would not want their prerogatives taken from them in the matter of appointments to the office of quartermasters.

Captain HOWELL. When the United States calls these men into service it should have the right, as it is their property to be handled, and we know from this investigation that a vast deal of trouble has occurred because of those things. Now, I say if the United States Government would reserve the right to appoint quartermasters when they need the volunteers in the national service, the quartermasters and commissaries of regiments, we would obviate a great deal of trouble.

General DODGE. They might assign, but they could not appoint.

The WITNESS. There was some testimony given before this board that I can throw a little light on. Captain McKay was before you and testified he was there all the time, and that the doctors did not apply to him for transportation or how to get things ashore. Captain McKay was all right as far as he went. Dr. Pope comes before the commission and says he would never see Captain McKay. Here is the way that came about. McKay was the quartermaster's man; he was the captain of the ship and understood his business. He loaded his ship and came over to Daiquiri, and there he stayed. The hospital was at Siboney and the doctors were there or at the front, and from there they came to Siboney, and therefore they did not see McKay; they did not see each other, and McKay did not land at Siboney or anywhere until this pier was put in. He neither helped to make the pier nor any work there; but when it was finished he did the work, and as his packages were too big, his stores had to be landed by taking them on the heads of the men, as there was no other way below Siboney; so he could do very little until the pier was made. The doctors—there has been an awful lot said about them, and I never saw men work better than Major Torney, Major Appel, Captain Winter, and others. Appel got hold of a little steam launch—I could not get one—and he would attach boats to it and run out to the ship, and he worked day and night. I never saw a man working harder than that. There was only one lighter and I had that. Those men did everything they could.

By General DODGE:

Q. McKay testified that he was at Daiquiri most of the time, and only went to Siboney later?

A. After the pier was put in; yes, sir.

By Dr. CONNER:

Q. Were these supplies in great mass at Daiquiri or at Siboney—these supplies on the transports?

A. Many of the transports, the bulk of them, were at Siboney, and no pack trains went back to Daiquiri; wagons went once in a while, but no pack trains.

By General McCook:

Q. Did you make any contracts during the war for supplies?

A. No, sir; that is what I did not. I started out; they wanted to keep me here, but that is not my temperament. I had to go off, and that freed me from all the contract business and all that kind of work. I left before the army did—I left on the 29th of July to come back. I was going to Porto Rico, and I was not sick there, but after I got back I was sick five days and I was to go into the hospital, but I did not go.

By General DODGE:

Q. Were you at Porto Rico?

A. No, sir; they signed the treaty about that time and I did not go.

General DODGE: Any other questions?

(No response being made, the testimony of the witness was concluded.)





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